CHAPTER FIVE

ABORTION: FROM MORAL PERSPECTIVE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

‘Abortion’ as already noted is the premature termination of pregnancy

prior to birth. It is a technique of removing a developing embryo or fetus from the

maternal uterus for the purpose of preventing its birth.

The practice of abortion raises the question of morality of terminating a

prenatal human life in response to the desire of others, who may be adversely

affected by the birth. The subject has become one of the most emotionally and

hotly debated social issues in the present time. Abortion, as already discussed, is

sought for many reasons: psychological trauma, pregnancy caused by rape,

inadvertent use of fetus-deforming drugs, genetic pre-disposition to disease,

prenatally diagnosed birth defects as well as many personal and family reasons,

such as the financial burden of rearing a child. These circumstances explain only

why abortions are obtained; but an explanation of this kind does not address the

problem of justification. The question, therefore, arises, are there sufficient

reasons to justify the act of aborting a human fetus? This issue centres around two

major principles: (1) the value of life principle, involving the unborn “conceptus”,

and the quality of life of the woman whose pregnancy is terminated and (2) the

principle of individual freedom, applying to the woman’s rights over her own

body and procreativity. There are two extreme views on this issue: (1) the strong

pro-life position, which holds that from conception onward the conceptus is a

human being, a child, or a person with all rights accorded to any already born

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human being and whose life has equal value as any already born person. This

view is also called the conservative theory of abortion because it emphasizes facts

concerning life; (2) the opposed view is the strong pro-choice position, which

states that an actual human being does not exist with full value and rights until

birth, and that until that time the pregnant woman has rights that supersede the

conceptus’s right to be born. This outlook is often termed as the liberal theory of

abortion because it emphasizes freedom of choice and the right of the woman to

make decisions that affect her body and these rights supersede the rights of fetus

till it is born.

However, many writers defend theories that are intermediate between

conservative and liberal approaches. They contend that abortion is ethically

permissible (a) up to a specified state of fetal development or (b) for moral

reasons that warrant abortions under limited circumstances. We shall consider

these views in due course.

Before proceeding further, let us consider two other questions concerning

abortion: First, whether abortion is a moral decision of a woman, given her

specific situation. This might include consideration of her religious beliefs, age,

marital status, health, economic status, available support systems, genetic make up

etc. Secondly, if even after consulting her physician and perhaps her spiritual

advisor, the woman decides to seek an abortion the question still remains: whether

the government should veto her decision.

The first question is a very personal decision. The second question

generates intense level of debate and occasional violence too. Protesters may

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create an atmosphere of hospitality and violence for women seeking abortion as

well as for clinic employees who assist these women.

Those promoting a pro-life position or the conservatives argue that, the

government should over ride a woman’s decision to have an abortion in some,

many, or in all cases, and require her to continue her pregnancy to child birth.

Most pro-lifers base their stance on the belief that human life in the form

of an ovum and spermatozoon, becomes a human person at the time of

conception. Thus a human pre-embryo, embryo and fetus are all persons entitled

to fundamental human rights, including the most basic right: the right to life. The

lives of two humans are being considered here: that of the woman and her embryo

or fetus.

Those promoting a pro-choice position or the liberals, on the other hand

argue that the government should not interfere with the woman’s decision, or

should do so only under special circumstances. She should be able to have an

abortion in most or in all cases.

Most pro-choicers base their stance on the belief that individual life begins

at conception. But they are not willing to concede that the psychological human

being or person exists at conception. Rather, the fetus achieves the status of a

human or a person somewhere between the extremes of conception and birth —

perhaps at quickening, at viability or when brain waves are first present, or when

it is separated from its mother’s body and functions independently. Thus the

liberals contend that a woman should not be forced to go through a pregnancy and

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child birth if she does not choose to do so; she should be allowed to have an

abortion if it is done before her embryo or fetus attains personhood.

One of the greatest difficulties faced in trying to discuss and resolve moral

issues surrounding abortion is that, both extremes consider the rights of their

position to be absolute. When certain rights are considered absolute, there is no

other right whatsoever that can take precedence. The strong pro-life position states

that, the conceptus [in their view the “child” or the “person”] has an absolute right

to life, and this means that the woman has no right at all that can be considered

absolute or that can have precedence over this. At the other extreme, the strong

pro-choice position states that women have absolute rights over their bodies and

lives and that the conceptus, until it is born, has no right at all that can be allowed

to interfere with women’s rights.

As long as these rights are treated as absolute, there seems to be no

compromise possible or no possibility of the two extremes meeting somewhere;

and this means that there are only two choices: either abortion is completely

wrong and should never be done or it is totally right and can be done anytime.

There are, of course, more moderate positions such as allowing abortions under

certain circumstances, but not under others, and limiting the period of pregnancy

during which abortion may be performed. These will be discussed later. But the

main point is that, when absolutes are held and enforced, there seem to be no

compromises possible.

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5.2 ABSOLUTE VIEW ON ABORTION

Those who defend woman’s right to abortion often refer to themselves as

‘pro-active’ rather than as ‘pro-abortion’. In this way they seek to bypass the issue

of the moral status of the fetus, and instead make the right to abortion a question

of individual liberty. But it cannot simply be assumed that a woman’s right to

have an abortion is a question of individual liberty for it must first be established

that the aborted fetus is a being not worthy of protection. If the fetus is not worthy

of protection, then the laws against abortion would create ‘victimless crimes’. So

the question of moral status of the fetus cannot be avoided. The absolute liberal

position holds that abortion is morally permissible. This position states that

abortion is acceptable in all instances [regardless of the circumstances] these

thinkers contend that, fetus is not a person. Mary Anne Warren (1973) in her

article “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” holds that the fetus’s human

life begins after the first trimester.

But the conservatives as well as some medical text books show that

experts on human development agree that human life begins at conception and

continues in the mother’s womb.

Langman (1977), a doctor of Philadelphia, states the following as regards

the development of the fetus: “The development of a human being begins with

fertilization, a process by which two highly specialized cells, the spermatozoon

from the male and the oocyte from the female, unite to give rise to a new

organism, a zygote, which is the beginning of a fetus”. Thus none of these medical

texts states that human life begins at birth or after first trimester. They all agree

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that life begins at fertilization with the production of a zygote. On this view then

abortion of the fetus is ethically wrong.

Some of the arguments that the conservative offer to defend the moral

status of the fetus are as follows —

5.2(i)(1) THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT

The central argument against abortion would run as follows —

First Premise : It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.

Second Premise : A human fetus is an innocent human being.

Conclusion : Therefore, it is wrong to kill a human fetus.

The liberals would deny the second premise of this argument, because to

them a fetus is not an innocent ‘human being’. So the disputes centre around

whether the fetus is a human being and further, whether human life begins at

fertilization.

On this issue the conservatives’ position is difficult to rule out. Most

opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is human being, a

person, from the moment of conception. The conservatives challenge the liberals

to point out any stage in the continuum, between the zygote and the full grown

child, which marks a morally significant dividing line between the two. — They

further claim that, unless there is such a line, we cannot either upgrade the status

of the earliest embryo to that of the child, or down grade the status of the child to

that of the fetus. It may be noted, however, that no one morally wants to allow

children to be dispatched on request of their parents and hence, the only tenable

position would be to grant the fetus the protection we normally grant to the child.

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5.2(i)(2) FETUSES ARE NOT BEINGS WITH ANY MORAL RIGHTS

The liberals do not think that fetuses should have moral rights at

conception, because they do not possess certain traits that are necessary and

sufficient for one to be called a person. The liberals attack the key premise of the

conservative’s argument, namely, “A human fetus is an innocent human being”

The term “human being” the liberals argue is an ambiguous term. It has

two different meanings and they both point to two different directions. The first

meaning is what we usually think about when we hear the term ‘human’ and that

is the genetic sense of the word. This means that humans are humans beings only

if they possess human genetic code namely that, a human being, in the biological

sense, is an organism belonging to the species Homo Sapiens. Species

membership is not a characteristic acquired during development; a human fetus,

on this view, has been human as long as it has existed. Thus if conception is the

beginning of fetal existence, then, according to this view, human fetuses have

moral standing from conception. Thus the question “when does a fetus become

human?” does not pose a problem for the conservatives. The second meaning is

that, a being is human if it has moral worth. Regarding this second meaning

Noonan points out that, the second feature of being human is that it has the

potential capacity for rational thought. That is, fetuses are humans if they have

moral worth and, moral worth is acquired only after certain characteristics are

fulfilled. In other words in one sense, a human is biologically living cell or

collection of living cells that contains DNA from the species Homo Sapiens. This

includes an ovum, a spermatozoon, zygote, embryo, fetus, new born. This covers

both infant as well as the adult being. In the other sense, ‘human life’ can be used

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to mean life that is distinctively human — that is, life characterised by

psychological rather than biological properties — the ability to use symbols, to

imagine, to love, to perform higher intellectual skills and so on. The ‘human

being’ in this second psychological sense, having those characteristics, is granted

civil rights, including the right to life. People may have different opinions about

the point at which human life becomes a human person. There is a societal

consensus about when a newborn is a human person. But people tend to disagree

on whether a zygote, embryo, or fetus is also a human person. This is the main

point of contention that causes conflict over access to abortion.

In fact, the liberals point out, in order to figure out the moral worth of the

fetus, we must first know — what is personhood. Mary Anne Warren in her article

“On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” has pointed to the already noted,

five characteristics that would make a being — a person. The five characteristics

of personhood in relation to moral worth are as follows: consciousness (ability to

feel pain or pleasure), reasoning (the ability to act on reasons and solve-problems),

self-motivated activity that is capacity to act freely, the capacity to communicate

and, lastly, the presence of self-awareness (that is consciousness of oneself as

existing overtime). Even though these are the five traits, only the first two are

really important in determining personhood. Thus the liberals point out that as the

fetus fails to satisfy any of the five criterions stated, it though genetically human,

is certainly not a person. They further argue that, if these five criteria are indeed

the primary criteria of personhood, then it is clear that genetic humanity is neither

necessary nor sufficient for establishing that an entity is a person. A fetus, no

doubt, is a human being but is not yet a person with full moral rights.

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 Against these views of the liberals, the conservatives may contend that,

there are, no doubt, in many beings, who would not be considered to be worth

anything morally, such as the severely disabled people and non-human animals

who do not show much, if any, signs of being able to reason. Nevertheless we

believe that it is wrong to kill these beings because we still attach moral rights to

their lives.

Thus, the liberals, the conservatives hold, fail to prove their view of

personhood. People who do not have any ability to reason or are not conscious of

themselves such as infants or mentally retarded people-should we not consider

them to be persons? Should we not take care of them? Should we, in any way,

take advantage of them only because of the lack of their power of reasoning? Thus

it is ethically wrong to abuse or harm the person (including fetus) who is unable to

exercise the power of reasoning.

5.2(i)(3) WHEN DOES HUMAN PERSONHOOD BEGIN?

Science tells us with increasing detail that the process starts with a sperm

and ovum and ends up with a new born baby. But it cannot tell us anything about:

● whether the fetus has a soul;

● whether the products of conception make a person;

● whether a zygote should be given the status of human rights; and finally

● whether abortion is an act of murder.

These are questions which have philosophical, religious and even political

bearings. Science cannot contribute much toward resolving them. Let us try to

bring out the debate between the two positions in the following manner —

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 The Pro-life belief.

It happened at conception.

The pro-lifers believe that human personhood begins at conception. That is, a

newly formed zygote (popularly called a ‘just fertilized ovum’) is a full human

being and must be protected as such. It has rights including the right not to be

deprived of its own life.

There are many reasons for the belief that personhood starts at conception:

● Some base their belief on their religious faith, that is, on their belief that

religion teaches that God injects a soul into the zygote at the instant of

conception. Even though it is composed of only one cell it becomes a human

person at that time due to the presence of the soul. The concept of a soul is

unique to certain religions.

● others point out that shortly after conception, a unique DNA code is formed

which remains unchanged throughout the life of the fetus, and even after birth.

Scientists define this event as the start of a human organism or human life.

Many pro-lifers assert that the presence of a unique human DNA code also

signals the start of a human person.

● Almost everyone agrees that a newborn child is a human person. One can

work backwards in time through the birth process, fetal development, embryo

growth, pre-embryo stage, and finally end up at the zygote, the start of a

human organism. Prior to that point, there was no human life. There was just

an ovum and sperm, neither of which is considered a form of life by most

scientists. Conception is the first point where a single, living human organism

exists and that has a good chance to grow and become a new born.

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● The zygote is simply the earliest stage of human development; it is what

human persons look like about nine months before they are born.

THE PRO-CHOICE BELIEF

IT DOES NOT HAPPEN AT CONCEPTION

Many pro-choice advocates believe that personhood does not occur at

conception. It develops later during pregnancy or at childbirth. At conception a

spermatozoon and ovum join to produce what is commonly called a “just fertilized

ovum”, the proper medical term of which is ‘zygote’. Debates about abortion will

never be resolved until the precise status of a human zygote is agreed upon:

namely,

● is it, or is it not, a human person.

● if it is not a human person, there needs to be some agreement on at what state

of pregnancy the embryo or fetus attains personhood.

5.2(i)(4) THE PERSONHOOD ARGUMENT

Before discussing this we must first note that those who wish to deny the

fetus’ right to life may be on stronger grounds, if they challenge the first, rather

than the second premise of the argument set out earlier. To describe a being as

‘human’ is to use the term that straddles on two distinct notions: as discussed

earlier first, membership to the species ‘Homo Sapiens’, and second, being a

person in the sense of a rational or self-conscious being. If ‘human’ is taken as

equivalent to ‘person’, the second premise of the said argument, which asserts that

the fetus is a human being is clearly false, for one cannot plausibly argue that a

fetus is either rational or self-conscious. If, on the other hand, ‘human’ is taken to

mean no more than ‘member of the species ‘Homo Sapiens’, then it needs to be

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shown why membership of a given biological species should be a sufficient basis

for a right to life.

Thus the question about fetal personhood, more specifically, the question

of when a developing human being becomes a person, and hence a full member of

the moral community becomes the central issue. As the liberals reject the minor

premise of the said formal argument that ‘A human fetus is an innocent human

being’, —the conservatives attack the liberals (permissives) by saying that a fetus

must be considered as a human being, that is a person from the beginning, a being

who goes through growth and development, both inside and outside the womb of

the mother. The development of the human being from conception through birth

into childhood is continuous; hence it can be said that to draw a line, to choose a

point in this development and say that ‘before this point the thing is not a person,

and further that, after this point it is a person’—would be to make an arbitrary

choice,—a choice for which no good reasons can be given. So the conservatives

are of the opinion that, through the continuous development of the birth into

childhood we cannot draw a line by saying that, ‘before this point the fetus can be

killed and after this point it could not.” Thus according to the Pro-life view there

is no moral difference between a fetus and a born child (although, on the liberal

view the latter may be considered to be a ‘person’).

5.2 (i) (5) ABORTING A FETUS DOES NOT MEAN ABORTING A PERSON

Some contemporary philosophers, like Jonathan Glover, James Rachels

and Peter Singer have challenged the orthodoxy of the conservative view, arguing

that membership of a given species —for example, Homo Sapiens —cannot in

itself determine either the value of a being’s life, or the wrongness of killing that

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being. Rather, this wrongness must depend on some morally relevant

characteristics that the being has. Singer, in his book, Practical Ethics argues that,

while a fetus is a member of the human species it is not a person, because

sentience or the capacity to feel pain or pleasure, seems to be a minimal

characteristic. Hence killing a fetus, who lacks the feature, is not wrong in itself.

But Singer defines ‘person’ (accepting the central characteristics of the concept of

personhood namely sentience, emotion, reason, capacity to communicate, that is

Warren’s view which we have discussed in the previous section) as a being who

has, in addition to sentience, self consciousness, capacity to act freely, making his

or her own decisions (including a decision about whether or not to continue

living). Thus the permissives (the liberals) hold that, as the fetuses do not have the

capacity to feel pain or pleasure—that is they lack sentience, they do not have

self-consciousness and also the capacity to act autonomously or freely. Hence a

fetus cannot be considered as a ‘person’. That is to say, as the fetus lacks the

essential characteristics of personhood—“rationality, autonomy, and self-

consciousness”, killing a fetus is never equivalent to killing a person.

“A fetus is not a member of the moral community” because “it is not yet a person,

nor is it enough like a person in morally relevant respects to be regarded the equal

of those human beings who are persons. Thus, for the pro-choicers, it is

“personhood” and not “genetic humanity” which is the fundamental base for

membership in the moral community.

It may be argued by the conservatives, what about the case of those human

beings who currently lack some of these mental capacities that make a “person”?

The pro-choicers would argue that these human beings despite their current

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disabilities are persons and members of the moral community. Yet, they would

add, that in extending moral rights to these beings, “We need to be careful not to

burden human moral agents with obligations that they cannot possibly fulfil.”1

Again the conservatives’ argue — a fetus is a potential person (i.e. if

nurtured and allowed to develop it may eventually become a person). Does not

that potential give it atleast some right to life? Warren (pro-choicer) argues “Even

if a potential person does have some right to life, that right could not outweigh the

right of a woman to obtain an abortion. For the basic moral rights of an actual

person outweigh the rights of a merely potential person, whenever the two

conflict.” (Sec-II)Thus for the pro-choicers, neither a fetus’ resemblance to a

person, nor its potential for becoming a person provides an adequate basis for the

claim that it has a full and equal right to life.

5.2 (i)(6) ‘BIRTH’ AS A BORDERLINE BETWEEN BORN AND UNBORN

The Permissives may argue that ‘birth’ is the borderline between a fetus

inside the womb and a born child outside the womb of its mother. Fetus is an

unborn child (unborn in the sense of not residing outside the mother’s womb), and

also no one can deny the difference between an unborn child (fetus) and a born

child. Thus to the permissives ‘birth’ is the most visibly possible dividing line

and the one that would suit liberals best. It coincides, to some extent, with

common sentiments, —we are less disturbed at the destruction of a fetus we have

never seen, than at the death of a being whom we can all see hear and cuddle. But

this is enough to make birth the line which decides whether a being may or may

not be killed.

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 But the restrictive conservatives who locate the onset of personhood very

early in fetal development, tend to see personhood as an all-or-nothing matter, and

understand personhood largely in the biological or in structural terms. As it has

been discussed earlier, they tend to stress the fact that human biological

development is a continuous process. Since there is no point in fetal development

that is significantly continuous with any other, the restrictives further point out

that, there are no ‘magic moments’ at which a fetus, who was not already a

person, can be said to turn into one.

As ‘birth’ has been considered by the permissives as the borderline

between the fetus and the child, the restrictives reject this view point. To them,

birth is an implausible dividing line between persons and those not yet persons or

potential persons; for it is thought to allow us to attribute personhood to the

premature, neonate who is born after seven or eight months gestations, and to

deny that status to the fetus who is still in utero for nine months. Since there may

be no relevant developmental or structural differences between a seven or eight

month old fetus who is still in utero, and one who has just been born, those who

understand personhood largely in biological or structural terms, regard birth as too

late or too arbitrary a dividing line between persons and not-yet or potential

persons. In other words, the conservatives can plausibly reply that the fetus and

the child is the same entity, whether inside or outside the womb, for a prematurely

born infant may be less developed in these respects than a fetus nearing the end of

its moral term. It seems rather odd to hold that we may not kill the premature

infant, but may kill the more developed fetus.

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5.2(i)(7) THE LOCATION OF A BEING CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF ITS DEATH

The status of this argument is more or less the same as the previous one

‘Birth is the borderline between born and unborn’.

The liberals consider ‘birth’ as the dividing line between the unborn and

the born and though this is made arbitrarily; the conservatives may argue by

saying that, depending on this borderline how can we say that one, who is on

“that” side (that is within the utero), can be killed and one who is on “this” side

(that is outside the utero) cannot be killed? Infact, it is illogical to say that a

person, whom we can perceive cannot be killed, and the potential person whom

we cannot perceive may be killed. We cannot judge whether one can be killed or

not only on the basis of one’s location. The location of a being—inside or outside

the womb—should not make much difference to the wrongness of killing it. As

stated in the previous argument—a prematurely born infant may well be less

developed in these respects than a fetus nearing the end of its normal form; and it

seems peculiar to hold that we may not kill the premature infant (that is located

outside the womb), but may kill the more developed fetus. Thus the conservatives

hold that, it is odd to argue that a fetus has a right to life if the pregnant woman

lives in London, but not so if she lives in say, New Guinea. For this reason the

conservatives hold that every ‘unborn’ child must be regarded as a human person

with all the rights, including the right ‘not to be killed’, from the moment of

conception.

5.2(i) (8) NO PERSON HAS THE RIGHT TO KILL A NON-PERSON

The conservatives or the pro-lifers argue that, even if the fetus is deemed a

non-person, it does not follow that it is usually permissible to kill it. Many of

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those who have discussed the moral claims of non-human animals have

persuasively argued that, creatures who are not (and may never be) persons, may

nevertheless have interests, and are thus entitled to some moral protection.2

Depending on what kinds of interests a fetus is taken to possess, and what weight

those interests are thought to carry, one might maintain that the fetus is not a

person and yet think that abortion is often wrong. For one might believe that,

although the pregnant woman has reproductive rights and is, therefore, entitled to

respect as an autonomous individual, the fetus has interests—in the avoidance of

pain or harm, to itself or the continuation of its life, and this may be thought to

counter balance the pregnant woman’s interest in personal or reproductive

autonomy except, perhaps, in extreme circumstances.

5.2(i) (9) THE SANCTITY OR VALUE LIFE OF ARGUMENT

The defenders of abortion have failed to recognise the sanctity or value of

life. We find that, the conservatives or pro-lifers insist that human life begins at

conception, that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception and that

abortion is murder or homicide or an assault on the sanctity of human life. But

each of these phrases can be used to describe two very different ideas—

First, the claim that fetuses are creatures with interests or their own, from the start

includes pre-eminently, an interest in remaining alive. Therefore the fetuses have

the right that all human beings have and we need to respect and protect these

basic interests, including a right not to be killed. Thus, according to this claim,

abortion is wrong in principle, because abortion violates someone’s right not to be

killed, just as killing an adult is normally wrong because it violates the adult’s

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right not to be killed. This is why the restrictives are of the opinion that we ought

to have the responsibility to protect a fetus.

Second, according to this claim the conservatives argue that abortion is wrong in

principle because it disregards the intrinsic value, the sacred character of any stage

or form of human life. The argument runs as follows— that human life has an

intrinsic, innate value; that human life is sacred just in itself and that the sacred

nature of a human life begins when its biological life begins, and all this leads to

the conclusion that abortion is wrong in principle.

5.2(i) (10) ABORTING A FETUS MEANS VIOLATING GOD’S DECISION

Aborting implies killing. Presumably no society could survive unless it

had some restrictions on its members. But the prohibitions that societies have on

killing vary greatly. In Greek and Roman times to be a human, that is, a member

of the species Homo Sapiens was not sufficient to guarantee that one’s life would

be protected. Slaves and barbarians could be killed, under conditions that varied

from time to time; and deformed infants were exposed to the natural elements

when discarded on a hill top. Aristotle in Politics wrote, “when couples have

children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun.” The

coming of Christianity brought a new insistence on the wrongness of killing those

born of human parents, partly because all humans were seen as having an

immortal soul, and partly because to kill a human being (of any form) would be to

violate God’s right to decide when we shall live and when we shall die. Thus

aborting a fetus means violating God’s rule of life and death. Now, in this context

a question may arise about the non-human animals. Non-human animals, on this

view, would remain unprotected, because they are believed to have been placed by

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God under man’s dominion. This doctrine of sanctity of all (and only) human life

remains the orthodox view on the morality of abortion.

5.2(i) (11) IF A FETUS IS CONCEIVED BY A HUMAN PARENT THEN IT IS A HUMAN

BEING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS.

The fundamental question that most philosophers agree on when

discussing abortion is, “How to determine the humanity of a being or in other

words, when does a being acquire a right to life. The conservative believe that

infants acquire their right to life at the moment of conception. They feel strongly

that, if a being were conceived by human parents then the being is a human being

with human rights. Therefore, it would always be immoral to abort a fetus unless,

under extreme circumstances, when the mother’s life is in danger. To support this

belief the conservatives may put forward the following two arguments —

(1) At conception there is a sharp increase in the probability of development,

therefore

(2) it is reasonable to think that a fetus is a human from conception onwards.

The pro-lifers, then, generally believe that human life should be valued

either from fertilization3 or implantation4 until natural death. The contemporary

pro-life movement is typically, but not exclusively associated with Christian

morality (specially in the United States) and has influenced certain strains of bio-

ethical utilitarians. From that view point, any action which destroys an embryo or

fetus kills a human being. Any deliberate destruction of human life is considered

ethically or morally wrong and is not considered to be mitigated by any alleged

benefits to others. As such, benefits come at the expense of life they consider as a

person.

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 Moreover, the conservatives point out that, in a normal ejaculation,

approximately 200 million sperms are released. Thus the chance of any one sperm

of becoming human is approximately 1 in 200 million. When sperms meet eggs

the probability of development increases dramatically. It goes from 1 in 200

million to 4 out of 5. Thus the pro-lifers feel that since the probability of

development increases so much at the time of conception, the fetus should be

considered a human with full moral rights.

The liberals, on the other hand, point out that, the above argument is weal.

According to the pro-choicers (permissives) the premise does not support the

conclusion in any way, for just because the probability of a fetus becoming a

human being increases so drastically, this does not prove that a fetus is a human.

Although the argument seems to be apparently a plausible solution to the problem

of abortion, it, in fact, cannot prove such a thing.

The conservative may put forward another argument that —

(1) At conception the fetus receives human genetic code.

(2) A being with human genetic code is human.

(3) Therefore, a fetus is human from conception onwards, or to put it more

simply “a being with human genetic code is a man”.

This is an alternative approach to base personhood or the right to life on a

being’s natural or inherent capacities. On this approach, a being essentially has a

right to life if it has a genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop the

relevant psychological features: and since human beings do have this natural

capacity, right to life begins at conception or whenever they come into existence.

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 Considering this argument of the restrictives, the liberals may point out

that, even though this argument seems compelling, it is unsound. Mere genetic

potentiality is not a plausible basis of respect for right to life. The problem

however is in the second premise that “a being with human genetic code is

human”. Let us take a blueprint of a building as an example. A blue print is

nothing more than a plan of a building. It is either drawn out on paper or on

computer. The blue print does not have any of the building’s characteristics. It

would, therefore, be ridiculous to call a blueprint a building; it is only a potential

building. Just as a blue print is not a building so also genetic human code, does not

seem to be enough to entitle a fetus being human. Thus, basing a right to life on

natural capacities would lead to the counter initiative position that encephalic

infant, irreversibly comatose patients, and brain-dead patients kept alive on

medical ventilators, are all persons with a right to life.

5.2(i) (12) PRE-VIABILITY ARGUMENT

The pre-viability argument states that it is not wrong to commit abortion

because the fetus is not yet “viable”. The argument of viability states that,

‘Because a fetus is not capable of surviving on its own outside the mother’s

womb, it does not matter if someone keeps that fetus from reaching the point of

viability’.

There are three problems with this argument. First, if one defines viability

in term being able to survive on one’s own, then it should be permissible to kill an

infant, toddler, or pre-schooler none of whom can survive on his/her own. Infact

no human children, at these stages of development are capable of surviving

without copious amount of love and care from their parents. Hence to kill a small,

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non-viable child would amount to committing a murder. The viability argument

therefore does not hold water.

Second, the pre-viability argument assumes that survival outside the womb

is the standard case. Abortionists argue that, if a pre-born infant were

hypothetically to be removed from the womb, it would not survive if it is not

“viable” therefore; it does not deserve or have the right to live.

The pro-lifers would argue in the following way. Never in the natural

course of the fetus’ development it is outside the womb, why should that be the

criterion for it to have a right to life? Every organism on Earth has a certain set of

environmental conditions to which it is suited; this is called an organism’s

environmental condition change. The organism will attempt to cope with that

change, but will only be able to do so up to a point; beyond that point, the

organism cannot survive.

In the same way to remove a baby from its mother’s womb before it has

developed to the point that it can cope with the outside world is actually removing

that child from its natural environment. A pre-born baby is perfectly viable in the

environment of the womb but, naturally, is not viable outside of it. To abort a pre-

born baby would be to interfere with the natural course of events.

This brings us to the third problem concerning viability argument, which is

the non-interference problem. The viability argument should read something like

this:

Because a fetus is not capable of surviving on its own outside the womb

and assuming that one decides to interrupt the natural course of the events in her

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pregnancy, it does not matter if she keeps that fetus from reaching the point of

viability, by aborting it.

Pro-choice advocates make the tacit statement to the effect that left alone,

the pregnancy will, barring few medical problems, produce a viable person at

some time in the future. The very name “abortion” means to stop something in

progress before it comes to fruition. If the pro-choicers did not believe this, there

would be no reason to have an abortion in the first place. Therefore by the very act

of aborting a fetus, the pro-choicers themselves admit that they take a person’s life

before one even has a chance of living it.

5.2(i) (13) FUTURE LIKE OURS

The argument from the value of future life of fetus is the key point in this

debate. The pro-lifers argue that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives the

fetus of a valuable future. That is to say, abortion is wrong because it deprives the

fetus of a “future like ours”. This is to show that both the fetus as well as the adult

person fall into the same moral category. Now, killing an adult human being is

wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours — a future containing

highly valuable or desirable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments. This

argument seems convincing because it eliminates all the problems relating to

whether the fetus is a person with rights. The argument goes like this: The claim

that the primary wrong-making feature of killing is the loss on the part of the

victim of the value of its future life — “a future like ours”. This has obvious

consequences for the ethics of abortion. If a being has such a future, then

(according to this argument) killing that being would prevent it from experiencing

that future life and therefore, would be morally wrong. Now, since a fetus could

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have such a future life, the “overwhelming majority” would place deliberate

abortion in the ‘same moral category’ as killing an innocent adult human being.

According to this argument then, abortion would be justified if one could justify

the killing of an adult human.

Criticism of this line of reasoning follows several strains. The pro-choicers

reject the argument on the grounds relating to personal identity, holding that the

fetus is not the same identical being as the adult into which it will develop, and

thus the fetus does not have a “future like ours” in the required sense. Others grant

that the fetus has a future like ours, but argue that being deprived of this future is

not a significant harm nor a significant wrong to the fetus, because there are

relatively few psychological connections (continuations of memory, belief, desire

and the like) between the fetus as it is now and the adult into which it will

develop. Another criticism is that the argument creates inequalities in the

wrongness of killing, as the futures of some people (for example the young, bright

and healthy) appear to be far more valuable or desirable from that of the futures of

other people (for example the old, depressed and sick). The argument appears to

imply that some killing are far more wrong than others, or that some people have a

far stronger right to life than others — a conclusion that is taken to be counter

intuitive or unacceptable. Finally, some argue that since a gamete has a similar

potential as the fetus the argument would entail that contraception is as wrong as

the killing of an adult human being — a conclusion that could be similarly taken

to be counter intuitive or unacceptable.

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 Since, the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human

beings after the time of birth also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is

prima facie morally wrong.

Abortion, depriving the fetus of its future life argument may be put as

follows—

● death is a bad thing because it deprives people of all the experiences, activities,

enjoyments, projects that would make up their future personal life.

● A premature death is a bad thing because it causes the loss of future experiences

etc.

● Although abortion is not the same thing as premature death nevertheless, it

deprives the fetus of future experience, in the same way as a premature death

deprives a human being of future experiences.

● Therefore abortion is a bad thing for the fetus in the same way as premature

death is for human beings.

● Therefore abortion is as wrong as killing people (causing their premature

death).

5.2 (i)(14) ABORTION AND DISABILITY

The liberals would point out that, if the fetus has physical or mental

abnormalities then, without considering any other sentiment, the fetus must be

aborted. One such argument runs like this—

That which cannot lead a productive life may be killed.

Some fetuses cannot lead productive lives (such as those who are physically or

mentally handicapped).

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Therefore, some fetuses may be killed.

This argument seems to allow two cases where abortion would not be

wrong.

● Abortion is not wrong where the fetus, if born, would be so handicapped that it

would not be capable of having any future experiences (or at least none that it

was aware of).

●● Abortion is not wrong where the fetus, if born, would be so defective that all

its experiences would be unpleasant or painful and that it would not benefit

from being deprived of these experiences.

The conservatives surely would not like the argument that, abortion should be

allowed where the baby, if born, would suffer from physical or mental handicaps.

They would say that this actually would leave us on a slippery slope. In fact, they

could argue in a similar vein that abortion is not wrong where the fetus, if born,

would be born into a society or a situation so dreadful that, all its experiences

would be unpleasant or extremely painful. Consider the (admittedly, painful) case

of a child born as a slave in a culture where slave children are slowly burned alive

shortly after birth as a sacrifice —would we consider it acceptable in such a case?

The conservatives’ argument about disability would run as follows—

1) Allowing disability as a reason for abortion implies that disabled people, are

less worthy than ‘normal’ people. This argument is offensive and would surely

make the disabled people feel worthless, having no real value.

Another argument would run like this —

1) Most people with disabilities say that they would rather be alive than be killed

in the womb (as stated above).

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2) Allowing abortion on the grounds of disability therefore pre-empts the choice

of the individual concerned.

A third argument is that allowing abortion of a fetus with a disability

permits ‘eugenic’ abortion — abortion to eliminate disabling genes from the

human race.

The pro-life supporters may stand against this view by arguing that, people

with disabilities should not be discriminated against in any way. The prejudice

against disabled people is not acceptable. In fact, the society should do everything

to remove anything that gets in the way of disabled people playing a part in

ordinary life. Thus it would be immoral to abort (kill) the fetus with physical or

even mental abnormalities.

5.2 (i)(15) SENTIENCE OR CAPACITY TO FEEL PAIN OR PLEASURE BEING THE

MINIMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A PERSON.

Some argue that abortion is morally wrong on the basis that a fetus is an

innocent human being. Others reject this position by drawing a distinction

between human being and human person arguing that, while the fetus is innocent

and biologically human, it is not a person with a right to life. No doubt

membership of a given species for example, Homo Sapiens — cannot in itself

determine the value of a being’s life. So wrongness of killing must depend on

some morally relevant characteristics that the being has. In support of the

distinction between human being and human person, some propose a list of

criteria as a marker of personhood5. Peter Singer argues that, while a fetus is a

member of the human species, it is not a person, because sentience or capacity to

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feel pain or pleasure, seems to be a minimal characteristic for being a person.

Killing of plant therefore, is wrong on this argument.

Similarly, as we have discussed earlier, Mary Ann Warren suggests that,

consciousness that is the capacity to feel pain or pleasure, reasoning, self-

motivation, the ability to communicate, and self awareness are the characteristics

that a person must possess. According to Warren, a being need not exhibit all of

these criteria to qualify as a person with a right to life; but if a being exhibits none

of them (or perhaps only one) then it is certainly not a person. Warren concludes

that as the fetus satisfies only one criterion namely consciousness (and this only

after it becomes susceptible to pain) the fetus is not a person and abortion is

therefore, morally permissible. Other philosophers apply similar criteria,

concluding that, a fetus lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness

rationality and autonomy. The list may diverge over precisely which are the

features that confer a right to life, but they all agree that none of those features can

be found in the fetus.

The pro-lifers typically argue that, the proposed criteria for personhood

would disqualify two classes of born human beings — reversibly comatose

patients and human infants, — from having a right to life; since they, like fetuses,

are not self-conscious, do not communicate, do not have the capacity to autonomy

and so on. Defenders of the proposed criteria may respond that the reversibly

comatose do satisfy the relevant criteria because they “retain all their unconscious

mental states”. Warren concedes that, infants are not “persons” by her proposed

criteria and further that, infanticide (abortion) could be morally acceptable under

some circumstances ( for example if the infant is severely disabled or in order to

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save the lives of several other infants). Moreover, the pro-lifers may see such

concessions as an indication that the right to life cannot be adequately defined by

reference to developed psychological features.

5.2(i)(16)THE FETUS AS POTENTIAL LIFE

If following Warren, we distinguish between “human being” and “person”

and argue that only persons can be members of the moral community, then it

seems clear that the fetus is not a bearer of moral rights in the same sense that a

person is and so does not have the same “right to life” as a person.6 But what

about its potentiality, the fact that if nurtured and allowed to develop naturally it

will very probably become a person? Beside the actual characteristics of the fetus,

we must also take into account the potential characteristics. On the basis of its

actual characteristics, some opponents (pro-lifers) of abortion will admit, the fetus

compares unfavourably with many non-human animals; it is when we consider its

potential to become a mature human being that membership of the species Homo

Sapiens becomes important, and the fetus far surpasses any chicken, pig or calf.

` Upto this point we cannot raise the question of the potential of the fetus

because the potential of the fetus can be mounted by the following argument—

First premise : It is wrong to kill a potential human being.

Second premise : A human fetus is a potential human being.

Conclusion : Therefore, it is wrong to kill a human fetus.

The second premise of the argument is problematic because whether a

fetus actually is a human being depends on what we mean by the term —it cannot

be denied that the fetus is a potential human being. This is true whether by

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 ‘human being’ we mean ‘member of the species Homo Sapiens’ not a rational

and self-conscious being, a person. The strong second premise is however,

purchased at the cost of a weaker first premise, for the wrongness of killing a

potential human being—even a potential person—is more open to challenge than

the wrongness of killing an actual human being.

It is of course true that the potential rationality, self-consciousness and so

on of the fetal Homo Sapiens surpasses that of a cow or pig; but it does not follow

that the fetus has a strong claim to life. There is no rule that says that a potential X

has the same value as an X, or has all the rights of an X. Analogously, seeds can

become mature plants—but that hardly makes a pile of acorns equal to a forest. If

we are to accept the equation of the potential with the actual and call the embryo/

fetus an “unborn child”, we could, with equal logic call any adult an “undead

corpse” and bury him alive and dissect him for the instruction of medical students

(which I have discussed in detail in later section—The Feminist View). And if this

is so, then mere potential for becoming a person does not count against killing.

It might be said that this reply misunderstands the relevance of the

potential of the human fetus, and that this potential is important, not because it

creates in the fetus a right or claim to life, but because anyone who kills a human

fetus deprives the world of a future rational and self-conscious being. If rational

and self-conscious beings are intrinsically valuable, to kill a human fetus is to

deprive the world of something intrinsically valuable, and so wrong. The chief

problem with this as an argument against abortion—apart from the difficulty of

establishing that rational and self-conscious beings are of intrinsic value— is that

it does not stand up as a reason for objecting to all abortions, or even to abortions

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carried out merely because the pregnancy is inconveniently timed. Moreover, the

argument leads us to condemn practices other than abortion that most

antiabortionists accept. Furthermore Paul Ramsey, a former Professor of Religion

at Princeton University holds that modern genetics, teaches us that the first fusion

of sperm and ovum creates a ‘never-be-repeated’ informational speck. This seems

to lead us to the conclusion that ‘all destruction of fetal life should be classified as

murder.’ A canine fetus is also, no doubt, genetically unique. So we cannot

support the pro-choice view ‘that it is permissible to abort a human fetus’—a

potential human being.

5.3(i) THE ARGUMENT FOR FETAL REASON

The argument for fetal reasons states that, given the difficulty of the world

we live in, it is difficult enough for a normal person to survive, much more is it for

one who is born deformed and will remain so for a life time. Further, it is claimed

that, it is unfair to expect a family that has the option of aborting such a conceptus

to go through with the pregnancy only to give birth to a seriously deformed child,

requiring all kinds of medical support and may remain so for most of its life. The

birth of such a child may affect a family adversely from emotional, sociological,

and economic points of view. The financial and emotional cost of raising such a

child is hard to calculate, and the effect on other siblings in the family and the

parents can be quite disastrous. Some families can and willingly do adapt to such

a situation. In fact, many have to do so in the past, prior to amniocentesis.

However, now that such a procedure is available, it is argued that families should

be able to exercise their free choice and prevent such a child from being born. It is

also argued that abortion for these reasons would also be done in the interest of

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such a child as well as its family and society. After all, the argument states, would

it not be better to prevent such a child from being born than to make the child live

a life of hardship with a low quality of life?

5.3(ii) THE ARGUMENT AGAINST FETAL REASON

The argument against abortion for fetal reasons is that it constitutes a

serious discrimination against the potentially handicapped and even unborn

people. Proponents of this argument often states that, dealing with a handicapped

child is a very special task and should be undertaken with compassion and

willingness. Some who are religious even cite that, God has chosen a particular

family for this very special task. They go on to say that even if families feel that

they cannot raise such a child, they can give it up for adoption or place it in some

sort of institution for its care. Atleast, any of these alternatives is better than

murdering the child.

The rebuttal of these arguments would be that the view regarding the

specialness of such a child and the compassion of the family in caring for it is

applicable only after such a child is born, but not if its birth can be prevented.

Opponents could argue that, since a conceptus is not a human being in the fullest

sense of the term, discrimination is really not an issue until after it is born.

In conclusion, then fetal reasons are definitely important while considering

the continuance of pregnancy or having an abortion and these cannot be

overlooked in trying to arrive at some clear moral policy about abortion.

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5.4 THE FEMINIST VIEW ON ABORTION

5.4(i) INTRODUCTION

From a feminist perspective, the central moral feature of pregnancy is that

it takes place in women’s bodies and has profound effects on women’s lives.

Since only women experience a need for abortion, policies about abortion affect

women uniquely. Therefore it is important to consider how proposed policies on

abortion fit into general patterns of oppression for women.

Feminist ethics promotes the value of reproductive freedom which is

defined as the condition under which women are able to make truly voluntary

choices about their reproductive lives. In addition to reliable and caring abortion

services, women also need access to safe and effective birth control, which would

provide them with other means of avoiding pregnancy. Again, it is important to

stress that feminist accounts do not deny that fetuses have value. Feminists

positively value fetuses that are wanted by the women who carry them and oppose

practices that force women to have unwanted abortion. Although feminists are

often found as being supporters of the right to abortion, it will be seen that the

feminist case can be argued very well on both sides of the issue.

In the context of women’s rights, the issue is often presented not as a

moral issue but as a political issue — not so much as to whether abortion is

ethically wrong, but whether women should be prevented from having abortions if

they want them.

There is also a second political ground, namely, that women cannot choose

freely whether or not to abort a pregnancy unless they also have the right to the

necessary support if they are to continue pregnancy.

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 To put it in another way, women should have the right not to be pushed

towards abortion because of poverty or lack of family support.

The women’s rights argument for abortion involves not only placing an

appropriate value on the lives and freedom of women, but also accepting that it

may sometimes be permissible to sacrifice the life of a fetus. Infact, in its crudest

form, the alleged conflict is between a) the “right to life” of the fetus, a right based

on the presumption that it is a being deserving of some moral consideration, and

b) the right of the women to bodily autonomy, that is, her right to decide what

happens in and to her body.

5.4 (ii) WOMEN’S RIGHTS ARGUMENTS FOR ABORTION

Here are some of the women’s rights arguments in favour of abortion:

● A woman has a moral right to decide what to do with her body.

● The right to abortion is vital for gender equality.

● Abortion is not murder: the so called “Pro-life” Movement is Anti-woman.

● Abortion is Self-Defence.

● Abortion affects woman disproportionately.

● Banning abortion puts women at risk by forcing them to use illegal

abortionists.

● The right to abortion should be a portfolio of pregnancy rights that enables

women to make a truly free choice whether to end a pregnancy.

● The responsibility of determining the value and the moral standing of the fetus

must rest with the woman.

These arguments remind us that even in the abortion debate we should

regard the women as a ‘person’ and not just a “container” for the fetus. We

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should, therefore, give great consideration to her rights and needs as well as to

those of the unborn.

Before discussing the arguments in favour of abortion it must be noted

that, the pro-choice women’s rights activists take a casual or callous attitude to the

fetus; the opposite is usually true, and most of them acknowledge that choosing an

abortion is usually a case of choosing the least bad of the other bad actions.

The arguments are as follows—

(1) A woman has a moral right to decide what to do with her body

Many people regard the right to control one’s own body as the key to

moral right. If women are not allowed to abort unwanted fetus they are deprived

of this right.

The simplest form of woman’s rights argument in favour of abortion goes

like this:

a) a woman has the right to decide what she can and cannot do with her body.

b) a fetus exists inside a woman’s body.

c) a woman has the right to decide whether the fetus should remain in her body.

d) therefore a pregnant woman has the right to abort the fetus.

The issue brings many ideas about human rights into sharp focus.

1) Every human being has the right to own his or her own body.

2) A fetus is a part of a woman’s body.

3) Therefore, the woman has the right to abort a fetus she is carrying.

That is to say, a woman has a right to her own body, and if she chooses to

abort, then all efforts should be made to protect the woman from injury. To rule

otherwise would be to deprive her of this right. This claim involves that, even if a

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fetus does have a right to life, the woman’s right to bodily autonomy overrides

that right. On this view then, the ‘right to life’ of the fetus, to the extent that it has

such a right, cannot possibly outweigh the right to bodily autonomy. Banning any

type of abortion to “protect the fetus” necessarily grants rights to the fetus. If a

woman has no right to her own body, then by what logic does a fetus (which, by

definition, is a biological parasite) have a right to the woman’s body? It is only at

birth that the infant becomes a member of the human moral community in its own

right because its relationship with its mother and other human beings changes

significantly. It is a woman’s individual right—to her life, to her liberty, and to the

pursuit of her happiness—that sanctions her right to have an abortion.

Thus, if it is a common claim that a woman ought to be in control of what

happens to her body to the maximum extent possible, that she ought to be able to

use her body in ways that she wants to, and refrain from using it in ways that she

does not want to. This right is particularly pressed where certain uses of her body

have deep and lasting effects upon the nature of her life— personal, social as well

as economic. Therefore, it may be argued that a woman should be free either to

carry her fetus to term, thereby using her body to support it, or to abort the fetus,

thereby not using her body for that purpose.

Some argue that, even if the fetus has a right to life, abortion is morally

permissible because a woman has a right to control her own body. The best known

variant of this argument draws an analogy between facing a woman to continue an

unwanted pregnancy and forcing a person’s body to be used for another person

suffering from kidney failure.7 In this paper Thomson argues that, even if the

embryo /fetus is said to have a right to life, yet abortion is permissible in some

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circumstances. Her central argument revolved around a thought experiment.

Imagine, Thomson says, that you wake up in bed and find yourself next to a

famous violinist. He is unconscious with a fatal kidney ailment; and only because

you happen to have the compatible blood type to help, the society of Music

Lovers has kidnapped you and plugged your circulatory system onto his, so that

your kidneys can function as a dialysis machine for him. If he is disconnected

from you now, the violinist will die; but in nine months he will recover and can

then be safely unplugged from you. Thomson argues that you may permissibly

unplug yourself from the violinist even though this act would kill him. No doubt

the violinist has a right to life, Thomson contends, but this right does not entail the

right to use another person’s body. In short the violinist has no right that would

entail an obligation on your part to extend to him the continued use of your body.

He could benefit from your being a ‘good Samaritan’ but he does not have a right

against you on that matter. Thus, in Thomson’s view, disconnecting the violinist

from you do not violate his right to life, but merely deprives him of something —

the use of your body—to which he virtually has no right. Similarly, even if the

embryo/fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant

woman’s body. In other words the pregnant woman is not obligated to keep the

fetus attached to her body, especially, if the fetus threatens her life. Thus abortion,

in atleast some circumstances is permissible. However, Thomson notes that, the

woman’s right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the

death of the child, should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of

surviving outside the womb. In other words on Thomson’s view, the right to an

abortion does not entail a right to commit infanticide.

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 However, a number of different aspects of responsibility are often

conflated in the abortion debate. First, we should distinguish causal responsibility

from moral responsibility. By causal responsibility we mean simply responsibility

for the direct causal consequences of one’s actions. In this sense, a woman can be

said to be responsible for the existence of the fetus (for she voluntarily engaged in

sexual intercourse, knowing that it can result in pregnancy. If she then becomes

pregnant, she is causally responsible for the fetus inside her body.).

However, causal responsibility for the existence of the fetus, the feminist

would argue, does not necessarily imply moral responsibility for maintaining the

fetus’ existence inside the body. Infact in pregnancy the assumption of parental

responsibility necessarily involved certain commitment towards, the fetus. In

other words the decision to continue a pregnancy is a decision to assume

responsibility for the well being of the fetus. Pregnancy is not simply a biological

event with respect to which women are passive. Rather it is an active process and

a social process, which places women in a situation of moral responsibility—

namely, decision responsibility —this is because fetuses are morally significant

beings since they are potential persons and, further, the decision to commit or not

to commit oneself to the existence of such a future person has far-reaching

implications for the woman’s own life, as well as for the lives of others. Let us

consider this position a little.

In Thomson’s argument pregnancy emerges as a kind of contract between

the woman and the fetus, such that she contracts with it to allow it to use her body

for the required period until it is able to survive without her. In Thomson’s

violinist example the problem seems to be that the unwanted fetus attempts to use

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a woman’s body without her having contracted with it to do so (as in case of

pregnancy due to rape). It is this factor which makes abortion permissible in this

case. Thus, on this view, the fetus represents a potential threat to the woman’s

bodily autonomy up to the moment of birth. It seems that underlying this

‘property-contract model’ of bodily autonomy is a very inert view of pregnancy in

which pregnancy is represented as a purely biological process with respect to

which women are passive. It is, as though, having agreed to the terms of the

contract, the woman simply allows her body to be used by the fetus. But the

relationship between the woman and the fetus is a very special and intimate one.

The fetus is not simply a stranger who contracts with the woman for the use of her

body, neither is it an absolutely separate being growing within her body—thus its

very existence places her in a situation of moral responsibility.

Hence, to think that the question of autonomy in abortion is just a question

about preserving the integrity of one’s body boundaries and to see the fetus

merely as an occupant of the woman’s uterus, is to divorce woman’s bodies from

their subjectivities. The body is one’s mode of being in the world, hence changes

to one’s body do affect one’s relation with the world. In pregnancy, the gradual

differentiation and development from within her own body of another being,

which is now a part of herself, affects a woman’s mode of being in the world both

physically and morally, and re-shapes her sense of self. Thus in pregnancy,

questions about the fate of the fetus cannot be separated from the issue of a

woman’s right to self determination. The question about the morality of abortion,

then is not simply a question concerning personhood and fetal status, but more

fundamentally about women’s self-determination.

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 Thus, in some contexts in which this argument is advanced, it is clear that

it is not addressed to the issue of the morality of abortion at all. Rather, it is made

in opposition to laws against abortion on the ground that, the choice to abort is a

moral decision that should belong only to the mother. In other words, here we use

this principle as a putative ground tending to show the permissibility of abortion,

with the claim that, because it is the woman’s body that carries the fetus and upon

which the fetus depends, she has certain rights to abort the fetus that no one else

can have.

● Let us now consider the other arguments against the feminist position.

The Pro-life feminist view on bodily rights

The pro-life feminist view usually attacks the argument that—

1) Every human being has the right to own his/her own body.

2) A fetus is a part of a woman’s body.

3) Therefore, that woman has the right to abort a fetus she is carrying.

The pro-life feminists attack the idea that, a fetus is ‘part’ of a woman’s

body. They argue that, a fetus is not the same sort of thing as a leg or a liver; it is

not just a part of a woman’s body, but is, to some extent, a separate ‘person’ with

its own right to life.

A second objection which the pro-life feminists raise is that, people do not

have the complete right to control their bodies. All people are subject to various

restrictions on what they do with their bodies— and some of these restrictions

(laws against suicide or euthanasia) are just as invasive.

Moreover they argue that, the pro-choice feminists argument, based on the

violinist analogy, is open to certain criticisms. These thinkers, the pro-life

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feminists argue, tend to identify abortion with unplugging from the violinist body.

The analogy, however, does not hold. For first, they argue that the fetus is

woman’s future child, as opposed to being a mere stranger, as supposed in the

analogy. Secondly, these critics hold, abortion kills the fetus rather than merely

letting it die which happens in the alleged case, and finally, in the case of

pregnancy arising from voluntary intercourse, the woman has either tacitly

consented to the fetus using her body, or has a duty/obligation to allow it to use

her body, since she herself is responsible for its need to use her body. However,

some thinkers try to defend the violinist analogy against these alleged objections

by arguing that, the supposed disanalogies seem to be morally irrelevant or that

8
they do not apply to abortion in the way that the critics have claimed. Thus

Thomson’s analogy, the pro-life feminists argue, fails to show that abortion is

sometimes permissible. Let us now consider some of the feminist arguments in

favour of abortion.

The right to abortion is vital for gender equality.

The women’s liberation movement sees abortion rights as vital for gender

equality. The woman is supposed to have the role of authority to decide the

outcome of the pregnancy. But what is the position regarding her

interconnectedness with the child and with relevant others? Both she and the

unborn child already exist within a network of relationships ranging from the

closest ones namely father, grandparents, siblings and so on —to the broader

society—who also would be affected by her choice. To dismiss this existing

network of relationships as irrelevant to the mother’s decision would be to express

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the sort of social atomism, which the feminist thinkers condemn as

characteristically masculine.

These thinkers further argue that, if a woman is not allowed to have an

abortion she is not only forced to continue the pregnancy to birth, but is also

expected, by the society, to support and look after the resulting child for many

years to come.

These thinkers, therefore, contend that, only if women had the right to

choose whether or not to have children, could they achieve equality with men.

Infact, with respect to all other aspects of responsibility the situation of men and

women is asymmetrical; in pregnancy however, men and women are equally

responsible in the causal sense; yet decision responsibility in abortion lies entirely

with women. This is because of a woman’s bodily connection with the fetus which

makes the causal responsibility and, hence, decision responsibility inescapable for

her.

The feminist thinkers further add that women’s freedom and life choices

are limited by her ability to bear children, as well as by the stereotypes, social

customs, and oppressive duties that go with it. Thus the right to control one’s own

body is the key to moral rights that women could achieve only if they were

allowed to abort unwanted fetus.

According to Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood9— no

woman can call herself free until she can choose consciously whether she will or

will not be a mother.

To sum up:

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● Women need free access to abortion in order to achieve full political, social

and economic equality with men.

● Women need the right to abortion in order to have the same freedom as men.

● Women need the right to abortion to have full rights over their own bodies

(including the right to decide whether or not to carry the fetus to birth) —

Without these rights women cannot have the same moral status as men.

These rights not only protect rights of bodily integrity and autonomy, but

they also enable millions of women to participate fully and equally in society.

(2) Abortion is not murder: the so called “Pro-life” movement is anti-human

Abortion rights advocates should not concede the term “pro-life” and

“right to life” to the anti-abortionists. It is a women’s right to her life that gives

her the right to terminate her pregnancy. Again the abortion rights advocates keep

harping on the phrase “a women’s right to choose” — Does a woman have the

right to choose murder? That is what abortion would be, if the fetus were a

person?

Now, the status of the fetus in the first trimester is the basic issue that

cannot be side stepped. The fetus is clearly pre-human; only the mystical notions

of religious dogma treat this lump of cells as constituting a person.

We must not confuse potentiality with actuality. A is a potential human

being. It can, provided the woman chooses, develop into an infant. But during the

first trimester it is actually a mass of relatively undifferentiated cells that exists as

a part of a women’s body. If we consider what it is rather than what it might

become, we must acknowledge that the embryo/fetus under three months is

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something far more primitive than a frog or a fish. To compare it to an infant is

ludicrous.

If we are to accept the equation of the potential with the actual and call the

embryo/fetus an “unborn child”, we could, with equal logic, call any adult “not-

dead corpse” and could bury him alive or dissect him for the instruction of

medical students.

An embryo is that tiny growth, that mass of protoplasm, which exists as a

part of a women’s body during the first eight weeks of conception. It is not an

independently existing, biologically formed organism, let alone be a person. That

which lives within the body of another can claim no right against its host. Rights

belong only to the individual and not to the parts of an individual or to collectives.

“Rights” in Ayn Rand’s (a novelist philosopher) words, “donot pertain to a

potential, only to an actual being. A child cannot acquire any rights until it is

born10.

It is on this basis that we can support the woman’s political right to do

what she chooses in this matter. No other person, not even her husband, has the

right to dictate what she may do with her own body. This is a fundamental

principle of freedom.

There are many legitimate reasons why a rational woman might undergo

an abortion like accidental pregnancy, rape, birth defects, danger to her health, and

so on. The issue here is the proper role of the government. If a pregnant woman

acts wantonly or capriciously, then she should be condemned morally but not

treated as a murderer.

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 To take an example, if someone capriciously puts to death his cat or dog,

that can well be reprehensible, even considered immoral, but it is not within the

province of the state to interfere. The same is true of an abortion which puts to

death a far less developed growth in a woman’s body.

If anti-abortionists argue that, an embryo has the genetic equipment of a

human being, then one could respond that every cell in the human body possesses

that too.

Abortions are private affairs and often involve painful difficult decisions

with lifelong consequences. But, tragically, the lives of the parents are completely

ignored by the anti-abortionists. Yet that is the important point at issue. In any

conflict it is the actual, living persons who count, not the mere potential of the

embryo.

Being a parent is a profound responsibility – financial, psychological and

moral across decades. Raising a child demands time, effort, thought, and money.

It is a full-time job for the first three years, consuming thousands of hours after

that — as caretaker, supervisor, educator and mentor. To a woman who does not

want it, this would amount to a death sentence.

The anti-abortionists are reluctant to take these issues into consideration.

Some of the other objections against the anti abortionists would run as follows:

Sentencing a woman to sacrifice her life to an embryo (by forcing her to

continue her pregnancy) is surely not upholding the “right-to-life”.

Again, the anti-abortionists argument, it seems, goes against its own claim.

Their claim on being “pro-life” seems to be a classic case of a “lie”. For someone

cannot be in favour of life and yet demand the sacrifice of an actual, living

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individual as against a lump of tissues (i.e. embryo). Anti-abortionists appear to be

not lovers of “life” — but perhaps lovers of “tissues”.

Infact the pro-lifers argue that abortion should be rejected on the ground of

“the sanctity of human life”. But let us consider what banning ‘abortion’ would

ultimately imply for human life. It would mean by banning the killing of the

“embryos” or “primitive fetuses” the lives of the real, living rational women are

thereby put in danger.

This would mean that women, who wanted to terminate a pregnancy,

because it resulted from rape or contraceptive failures, — or because the father of

the would-be child has abandoned her, or because the embryo/fetus is malformed,

would be forbidden from doing so. Thus they would be forced to endure the

misery of unwanted pregnancy and bear the incredible burden of child rearing

thereby suffocating their hopes, their dreams, their personal ambitions, their

chance of happiness. And this would ultimately imply that women, who refused to

submit to such a fate, would be forced to turn to the “back alley” at a staggering

risk to their health. According to World Health Organization estimate, 110,000

women worldwide die each year from such illegal abortions and up to six times as

many suffer injury from them.

Clearly, anti-abortionists believe that women’s lives are unimportant while

considering the issue of abortion. This is because they claim that, the embryo or

the fetus is a human being — and to abort it would tantamount to murder. Now

there is no scientific reason to characterize a lump of cells (embryo) as a human

being; biologically speaking, an embryo as noted earlier is far more primitive than

a fish or a bird. Anatomically, its brain is yet to develop. In terms of its capacity

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for consciousness, it does not bear the remotest similarity to a human being. This

growth of cells has the “potential” to become a human being if presented, fed,

nurtured, and brought to terms by the woman it depends on; — yet it is not

actually, a human being.

What can justify the sacrifice of an actual woman’s life to human potential

of the most primitive kind? There can be no rational justification for such a

position. The ultimate “justification” of the “pro-life” position is therefore,

religious dogma, propounded by the Roman Catholic and Protestant

fundamentalists. They, as noted earlier (Chapter IV), consider that an embryo

must be treated as a person from conception, created by the “action of God”. What

about the argument that an embryo is manifestly not a person, and treating it as

such would inflict mass suffering on real people?

This tenet is not subject to rational scrutiny—it is a dogma that must be

accepted on faith.

The “pro-life” movement, therefore, tries to obscure the religious, inhuman

nature of its position by endlessly focusing on the medical details of late-term

abortion (although it seldom mentions that “partial birth” abortions are extremely

rare, and often involve a malformed fetus or a threat to the life of the mother). But

one must not allow this hazy screen to distract one from the real issue: the “pro-

life” movement is a faith-based crusade to ban abortion, no matter what the

consequences in actual human life would be. Infact part of what the pro-life

alliance regards is that the “absolute moral duty would be to do everything

possible to stop abortion.

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 Thus, it appears that, the pro-life movement is not a defender of human

life—it is, infact, a profound enemy of actual human life and of happiness. Its goal

is to turn woman into breeding mares, whose bodies are owned by the state and

whose rights, health and pursuit of happiness are sacrificed.

3) Abortion in Self-defence

Even if we accept that the fetus is a person with a right to life, this does not

mean that all abortions are wrong.

In some circumstances it may be ethical for a mother to have an abortion

to defend herself from the danger to her mental or physical health that continuing

with the pregnancy would cause.

3(i) Where continuing the pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or health

If continuing with the pregnancy causes the mother’s death, even those

most strong anti-abortionists would accept that this is a case where abortion is

ethically acceptable.11

It is generally accepted that a person has the right to defend himself/herself

when he/she is in danger, and that he/she may use violence, or even kill in

extreme circumstances, in order to protect himself/herself from physical attack.

This can apply even when the person causing the danger is entirely

innocent of any bad intent, or is completely unaware that he /she is causing a

danger, or is in some other way not responsible for being a danger to others.

Thus, on this view, if a fetus (who is entirely innocent) endangers the life

of a mother, it may be argued that, the mother has the right to abort it.

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 A person, may also have the right to kill when threatened with severe harm

but not actual death. For example, in a pregnancy that would permanently damage

the mother (by causing some permanent injury to her internal organs). The mother

may take the help of someone else to perform the necessary action to protect

herself, for example, the doctor who performs the abortion.

The pro-life supporters may put an objection to this view that—in most

cases the mother brings the danger on herself by becoming pregnant (i.e. engaging

in voluntary sexual act)—would not this argument change our attitude towards

justifying abortion?

However, in practical terms, one may argue that, if pregnancy kills the

mother it will probably kill the fetus too. Moreover, the mother could also argue

that, she only consented to becoming pregnant, but did not willingly consent to

having perhaps a ‘defective and life-threatening pregnancy’. Judging her

circumstances, will abortion be justified? Let us now, turn to another case, where

pregnancy may result in non-physical threat to the mother.

3 (ii) The case of non-physical threat

Some people argue that a woman should have the right to an abortion, in

certain cases,—especially, when there is a threat of damage to her mental health,

to family, to career and financial prospects, and, finally, to the plans for her life.

The self-defence argument for abortion seems to fail here, because

although a threat to life can be a defence to a charge of killing someone, none of

the above would be considered as adequate defence in a case of homicide, nor

would these circumstances be regarded as reasons that justified abortion.

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 Thus abortion is wrong where the woman willingly had sex and, therefore,

could be held responsible for the consequences. In other words, if one voluntarily

acts in a way that brings about the existence of a “person” or a fetus, then one has

the responsibility of maintaining the life of that person or fetus.

So, abortion is wrong where the mother had sex on her own free will, but

is unwilling to take the responsibility of the child as a consequence. Hence a

woman must have the right to choose whether or not to become pregnant, and she

must make that choice before engaging in sex. To make the ‘choice’ after a

pregnancy occurred by aborting the fetus would be an immoral act.

To put the argument formally—

1) A person should accept the consequences of risks that she knowingly and

willingly takes.

2) A woman who willingly has sexual intercourse knows that she takes the risk of

bringing a fetus or future moral person into existence.

3) Therefore a woman who becomes pregnant should accept the pregnancy as the

consequence of taking the risk involved in sexual intercourse.

4) It follows that the woman has a duty of care to the fetus or the moral person.

5) She should allow the resulting fetus or future moral person to be born.

6) Hence she should not abort the fetus or moral person.

3(iii) Unwilling Sex invalidates this argument

But, let us suppose that a woman has not willingly taken the risk of getting

pregnant and so did not have any choice in the contraception (perhaps she has

been raped, for example).

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 In this case the woman does not have any responsibility for the fetus and so it

seems that abortion is not wrong.

This makes it clear that the vital point of the argument is not the rights of the

fetus, but the duties of the mother.

3(iv) Contraception and responsibility

It might get trickier where the woman has been using a reliable

contraceptive method. The feminists contend that, in such cases the woman could

argue that it would not be wrong to abort the fetus because she did not willingly

take the risk of getting pregnant. On the contrary, she took every possible

precaution to avoid pregnancy.

3(v) Diminished responsibility

The water becomes even more muddier when the woman does not

understand, or is incapable of understanding, that sexual intercourse leads to

pregnancy. She may live in an area where sex education is inadequate. In such

cases, the woman does, not knowingly risk pregnancy, and hence, could be

considered less responsible for the consequences of her actions.

3(vi) Application to men

The power of the responsibility argument can be seen by changing

genders. Most people would apply the argument that sex has consequences for

men without any worries at all. Once a man has parted with his sperm he is

considered totally responsible for any pregnancy that results, and for any

pregnancy that results, and for the child thereafter. Therefore few people would

think it morally right for the man to demand an abortion in order to escape his

responsibilities.

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(4) Abortion affects women disproportionately

Abortion is an important element of women’s rights because women are

more affected by the abortion debate than men, both individually (if they are

considering an abortion) and as a feminine.

Pregnancy has an enormous effect on the woman involved. As Sarah

Weddington12 puts to the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe V. Wade Case: “A

pregnancy to a woman is perhaps one of the most determined aspects of her life. It

disrupts her body. It disrupts her education. It disrupts her entire family.”

Weddington continues. “. . . and we feel that, because of the impact on the

woman, this . . . is a matter which is of such fundamental and basic concerns to

the woman involved that she should be allowed to make the choice as to whether

to continue or to terminate her pregnancy.”13

Again Judith Jarvis Thomson argues —“If abortion rights are denied, then

a constraint is imposed on women’s freedom to act in a way that is of great

importance to them, both for its own sake and for the sake of their achievement of

equality; and if the constraint is imposed on the ground that the fetus has a right to

life from the moment of conception, then it is imposed on a ground that neither

reason nor the rest of morality requires women to accept, or even to give any

weight at all.”14

(5) Banning abortion puts women at risk

Banning abortion would go against reproductive choice-which is a

fundamental right for women. Moreover it would force the women to take the help

of illegal means—like back alley or self induced abortions— this would be to

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return to the day where women sacrificed their health and lives because they felt

they were left with no other option. Infact, re-criminalising abortion or severely

restricting it so as to make it practically unavailable, will not end the practice of

abortion; it will simply end the practice of safe abortion.

(6) The right to abortion should be a part folio of pregnancy rights that
enables women to make a truly free choice whether to end a pregnancy

The feminist ethics framework views the situation of the pregnant woman

considering abortion as part of a social system. A central moral feature of the

argument is that pregnancies take place within woman’s bodies and have profound

effects on their lives.15 The other central argument is grounded in women’s

status—their social and family roles and responsibilities, their secondary status in

most spheres of activity and male-centred work cultures and employment policies.

Within this framework, it may be argued, women should be the judge of

whether abortion is an appropriate response to a pregnancy. It is inappropriate to

lay down abstract rules for when a decision to abort or not is “right”. Women’s

deliberations will involve considerations of their commitments to the needs and

interests of everyone concerned, including the fetus.16 Women should be

considered as full moral agents, responsible for making moral decisions. Women

must have the freedom and the authority to control their reproduction, free of male

dominance and oppressive conditions of poverty and subordination.

This argument might seem to fall within the libertarian framework which

holds individual rights sacred and absolute. However, it is based on an analysis of

empirical realities recognising the ‘individual in isolation’. Its appeal is not so

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much to the woman’s right to bodily integrity, but to privacy and pursuit of

happiness. It is based on two fundamental principles: human beings have “the

right to a full human life and whatever is necessary to achieve this”, and

“decisions should be made by those, and only by those who are importantly

affected by them.”17 Since it is the woman who will probably be responsible for

rearing the infant to adulthood if it is born, the decision to have or not have the

child must be hers.

Further, the approach to abortion must address women’s reproductive

needs to balance the systematic oppression they face because of gender, race, class

and ethnicity. For example, women from poorer families are much more affected

by the lack of access to abortion. Thus, the two reinterpreted principles— the

notion of a ‘relational’ autonomy and a redistributive justice— and the feminist

perspective of ‘personhood’ together justify women’s rights to abortion from the

ethical point of view.

(7) The responsibility of determining the value and the moral standing of the
fetus must rest with the woman

The concept of ‘personhood’ is pivotal to determining the moral standing of

the fetus. The manner in which this concept is defined influences the way in

which the conflict between the rights of the woman and of the fetus are seen in the

context of abortion. The key questions to define the ‘personhood’ status of the

fetus are: ‘what is a person?’ and ‘when does personhood begin?’ The literature

indicates that there is no consensus on the criteria of defining personhood, they are

as difficult and controversial as the concept of abortion itself is. Definitions of

personhood vary between the most stringent and the most lenient. For example,

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the criteria proposed by the philosopher Anne Warren [as noted earlier] include

consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate,

and the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness.18 These will not be fulfilled

by a newborn. The most lenient, defined by theologians, refers to the “decisive

moment of humanisation”, when the new being receives the genetic code.19

Between these two extremes lies a range of other criteria. Some are based on

traditional beliefs, such as the point of ‘quickening’ and ‘ensoulment’. Others are

the result of scientific development, such as ‘viability’ and the presence of

‘electroencephalographic’ (brainwave) activity.20 Other approaches emerged from

the developmental view of prenatal life21 and from the ‘potential for developing

into adult human being’—both views mark the point of conception as the

beginning of personhood. However, there has never been any consensus on these

criteria; this is primarily because those involved in the debate arrive at the

definition of personhood based on their values about abortion—their moral

judgement on the woman who undergoes an abortion, or its association with a

particular religion and so on. Thus, though the definition of personhood is pivotal

to the discourse of abortion ethics, it remains unresolved. Feminists consider

personhood a social category, not an isolated state. To be a morally significant

category, personhood must involve personality as well as biological integrity. It

relies much on the concept of the ‘second person’ defined by Annette Baier.22

This emphasises the social dimension, fundamental to any moral notion of

personhood. Persons are thus members of a social community which shapes them,

personhood is a relational concept defined in terms of interactions and

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relationships in which they can participate and can make only the most restricted

contributions. They cannot form relationships freely with others and vice versa.

The fetus’s primary relationship is with the woman who carries it in her womb.

All relationships are mediated through her. The relationship between the fetus and

the woman carrying it is asymmetrical, it is completely dependent on the woman,

whereas she can live without it. For this reason, feminist bio-ethicist argues that,

the responsibility of determining the value of the fetus must rest on the woman.

5.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ABORTION

Pro-life advocates, that is the anti-abortionists, in discussing abortion, cite

the adverse psychological effects that happen to the woman going through an

abortion. They state that there are and can be much worse psychological effects of

going through a pregnancy. They describe the guilt feelings that women, who

choose abortion, must feel knowing that they have in essence murdered an

innocent child or more clearly killed her baby.” The regrets and remorse, they

feel, the argument goes on, would far outweigh going through a pregnancy or

giving their child up for adoption to a good, loving family or keeping and raising

the child themselves. Atleast women will be able to say, no matter how difficult it

is to do either of these, that they have done nothing to take the life of an innocent

human being, nor would they have to live with the guilt of such an act for the rest

of their lives. Living with such guilt-feeling is bound to have psychological ill-

effects on any woman, and it is important that she should be counselled on this

possibility before she goes through the abortion about which she may regret for

the rest of her life.

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 Pro-choice advocates argue that, it is not true that most women have a guilt

feeling that is long-lasting and powerful enough to cause psychological damage of

any consequence. Infact, they hold that, many women do not even feel any guilt

whatsoever, and would have felt more guilt if they had brought a child into the

world in less than optimum circumstances. Further, any guilt feeling that may or

perhaps do arise can be alleviated by emotional support from family, friends, or,

where needed, through professional counselling.

In conclusion it may be noted that, psychological reasons concerning

pregnancy and abortion are no doubt important and should not be ignored. More

and more, health and well-being issues are considered to include psychological as

well as physical aspects, and there is no doubt that anything in a woman’s life as

significant as pregnancy or abortion is bound to have an important effect on her

body, mind, and life. But, here again, such reasons should not, without careful

examination, be considered as automatically ruling out either continuing with

pregnancy or having an abortion.

However, there are several areas involving both pregnancy and abortion

that are worth investigating.

5.5(i) THREATS OF SUICIDE

Needless to mention here that women, who claim to be so overwrought by

pregnancy that they threaten or attempt to commit suicide, should be taken

seriously, and ought to be helped in every possible way—including even the

consideration of abortion, if their threats and attempts seem to be unresolvable in

any other way. However, from all the researches done on this problem, Callahan

reports that, “while a number of psychiatrists stress the possibility of suicide, on

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the basis of some threats and some genuine attempts, the evidence of the actual

incidence of suicide suggests that it is in fact very rare.”23

5.5 (ii) RAPE OR INCEST

One of the strongest arguments put forth in favour of abortion is that it

should be allowed especially in cases of rape or incest. Apart from the very

staunch pro-life advocates, most people would allow abortion when pregnancy

occurs as a result of either of the referred incidents. The argument runs, there has

been such psychological damage to the woman as result of either of these two

incidents, that she should not be forced to go through a pregnancy at all or bear a

child conceived under such circumstances. The counter argument by the strong

pro-life advocates is that, these actions account for a very few pregnancies, and if

the woman reports the occurrence soon enough, pregnancy can be prevented.

However, it may still be argued that, even if the woman be unfair on her

part to penalize the “fetus-child” for an act for which he or she is not responsible,

yet the pro-choice advocates argue, the woman should be able to make her own

choice and decision here. This is because the woman has been through a traumatic

experience and only she knows how it affects and probably will affect her if she

continues with her pregnancy. There is one more psychological issue, which will

be discussed later namely, the psychological effect of continuing a pregnancy

when the fetal defects are diagnosed beforehand.

5.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS

Pregnancy and the raising of any child affects society at all levels—

financially, politically, and socially. If a child is unwanted, uncared for or

defective or deformed, the burden on the mother is greater. Supporters of abortion

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want to prevent unwanted and defective births but they do not advocate the

mistreatment of those already born handicapped or are unwanted. Again they feel

that, the prevention of such births, whenever possible, is moral.

The financial cost of giving birth to and raising a child these days is very

high, and in most cases we talk about an eighteen to twenty-one year period, not

just childhood rearing. Socially, the cost can also be quite high. For example, if an

unmarried teenager, still in high school, becomes pregnant, her whole life can be

adversely affected by going through with the pregnancy. Also, not just a teenager

but even a married woman, with a family living on a limited budget, can be

adversely affected by the birth of an unwanted child. Furthermore, there is the

financial burden on society as a whole because of the need for state and

government care for welfare and support of handicapped children and adults.

The answer to all these arguments given by pro-life supporters is that,

where human life is concerned, economics must take a back seat, and even though

there is certainly distress for both the teenager and the married woman already

over burdened, the death of an innocent conceptus cannot be justified even under

these circumstances. Many critics of this pro-life position argue that, they do not

want to be over burdened by unwanted or handicapped children; and if abortion is

allowed, then they can concentrate on helping those who are already born.

In addition, it would seem that, those who are adamantly opposed to

abortion ought to, “put their money where their mouths are” or atleast provide

viable alternatives to abortion. In other words, if they want to prevent abortion,

would they be willing to take effective action to spend a great deal of their money

to provide alternatives to it? For example, if a destitute woman does not choose

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abortion, will the society support her and her child atleast financially through the

pregnancy and other wards for eighteen to twenty-one years? A commitment

along these lines would do a great deal towards making abortion less attractive.

However, most pro-choice people are skeptical that society, as a whole, is willing

to make such a commitment, even on a partial basis.

5.7 THE POLITICS OF ABORTION

Feminist’s accounts explore the connections between particular social

policies and the general patterns of power relationships in our society. Anti-

abortion activists appeal to arguments about the unconditional value of human

life. When we examine their rhetoric mire closely, however, we find other ways of

interpreting their agenda. In addition to their campaign to criminalize abortion,

most abortion opponents condemn all forms of sexual relations outside of

heterosexual marriage, and they support patriarchal patterns of dominance within

such marriages. Many are distressed that liberal abortion policies support

permissive sexuality by allowing women to “get away with” sex outside of

marriage. They perceive that ready access to abortion supports women’s

independence from men.

Although non-feminist participants in the abortion debates often discount

the significance of its broader political dimensions, both feminists and anti-

feminists consider them crucial. The intensity of the antiabortion movement

correlates closely with the increasing strength of feminism in achieving greater

equality for women. The original American campaign against abortion can be

traced to the middle of the nineteenth century, that is, to the time of the first

significant feminist movement in the United States. Today abortion is widely

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perceived as supportive of increased freedom and power for women . . . . Clearly,

much more than the lives of fetuses is at stake in the power struggle over abortion.

When we place abortion in the larger political context, we see that most of

the groups which are active in the struggle to prohibit abortion also support other

conservative measures to maintain the forms of dominance that characterize

patriarchy. The movement against abortion is led by Catholic Church and other

conservative religious institutions, which explicitly endorse not only fetal rights

but also male dominance in the home and the Church. Most opponents of abortion

also oppose virtually all forms of birth control and all forms of sexuality other

than monogamous, reproductive sex; usually, they also resist having women

assume positions of authority in the dominant public institutions. Typically,

antiabortion activists support conservative economic measures that protect the

interests of the privileged classes of society and ignore the needs of the oppressed

and disadvantaged. Although they stress their commitment to preserving life,

many systematically work to dismantle key social programs that provide life

necessities to the underclass. Moreover, some current campaigns against abortion

retain elements of the racism that dominated the North American abortion

literature in the early years of the twentieth century, whereas abortion was

opposed on the grounds that it amounted to racial suicide on the part of whites. In

the eyes of its principal opponents, then, abortion is not an isolated practice; their

opposition to abortion is central to a set of social values that runs counter to

feminism’s objectives. Hence antiabortion activists generally do not offer

alternatives to abortion that support feminist interests in overturning the patterns

of oppression that confront women. Most deny that there are any legitimate

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grounds for abortion, short of the need to save a woman’s life— and some are not

even persuaded by this criterion. They believe that any pregnancy can and should

be endured. If the mother is unable or unwilling to care for the child after birth,

then they assume that adoption can be easily arranged.

Furthermore, even if an infant were born healthy and could be readily

adopted, we must recognize that surrendering one’s child for adoption is an

extremely difficult act for most women. The bond that commonly forms between

women and their fetuses over the full term of pregnancy is intimate and often

intense; many women find that it is not easily broken after birth. Psychologically,

for many women adoption is a far more difficult response to unwanted

pregnancies than abortion. Therefore, it is misleading to describe pregnancy as

merely a nine-month commitment; for most women, seeing a pregnancy through

to term involves a life-time of responsibility and involvement with the resulting

child and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, disproportionate burden on the

woman through the child-rearing years. An ethics that cares about women would

recognize that abortion is often the only acceptable recourse for them.

5.7. CONCLUSION ON THE MORALITY OF ABORTION

It is obvious that, abortion is still a very important moral issue inspite of its

legality. There are good reasons on both sides of the issue, and they should all be

taken seriously because abortion definitely involves the aspects of medical or

physical, psychological, fetal, social, economic, and women’s rights. However,

these should not be presumed to be automatic in deciding for or against such a

serious act; nor should these be accepted or rejected superficially. In every

abortion decision, two lives, if not more are, to some degree, always involved, and

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they all deserve careful consideration. A survey of the literature on abortion

reveals an implicit assumption by most writers that, the issue is to be viewed as a

two-party conflict—the rights of the fetus versus the rights of the mother. Further,

an adequate analysis of the balance of these rights is sufficient to determine the

conditions under which abortion is morally permissible. However, in some cases,

it would be morally impermissible for a woman to have an abortion because it

would be a wrongful harm to the father, and a violation of his autonomy. Infact,

the interests and desires of the father should also be taken into consideration.

In order for a man to lay claim on the fetus being his in a sense that the

mother is obligated to respect, the fetus must be the result of his pursuing the

legitimate interest in procreation in a morally legitimate way. Thus when a man

has satisfied the requirements of autonomy in this regard, then the woman, his

sexual partner, has a prima facie obligation to him not to harm the fetus. And

unless there is some countervening moral consideration to override this prima

facie obligation, the abortion of the fetus is morally impermissible.

Now, let us cite one or two cases which are arranged to elucidate the moral

consideration involved in the analysis.

CASE 1: Twenty-five year old woman Gauri, becomes pregnant as a result of

being raped by a man with severe psychological problems. After therapy the man

has significant improvement in his mental health, he realises his guilt and is

willing to accept the liability for the harm he has caused, and even punishment

should the victim deem it necessary. His only plea is that Gauri carries the fetus to

term and then give the child to him if she does not care to raise it herself. Unable,

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however, to dissociate the fetus from the trauma of the rape, Gauri decides to

abort.

CASE 2: Anju is a man hater. This resentment was brought on partly by

traditional male chauvinistic attitudes toward women. This led her to stereotype

all men as little more than barbarians. Raghu is a reasonably decent man, who

desires very much to be a parent. After meeting Raghu, Anju devises a plan to

vicariously vent her rage through Raghu on the entire male sex. Carefully playing

the role of a conventionally attractive woman with traditional life plans, she sets

out to seduce Raghu. Soon he falls in love with her and, thinking that he has met

the ideal mate, proposes marriage. She accepts and after the wedding, convinces

Raghu that if they are to have a happy married life and a healthy environment in

which to raise children he must give up his lucrative realty business and the house

he inherited from his parents. Valuing his life with Anju and the prospects of a

family more than his career, he sells the business at a considerable loss and takes a

less lucrative job. He also sells his home and buys another, again at considerable

financial loss. Finally, Anju becomes pregnant. Initially, she plays the adorable

expectant mother, intentionally-heightening Raghu’s expectations. But later she

has an abortion. Relishing Raghu’s horror, she further reveals her scheme and

explains that his pain and loss are merely the just deserts of any man for the things

that men have done to women.

In these two cases, the issue is this: if we assume that all men could be

acceptable parents and that the pregnancies are physically normal, would any of

the abortions by the woman in these cases constitute a moral wrong done to any of

the men? I believe that the second case is a wrongful harm24 done to the father

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and that it would be morally impermissible for the woman to proceed with the

abortion. In the cases where abortion is claimed to be morally impermissible it is

so on the grounds that it violates the father’s autonomy; that is, it invades the

man’s morally legitimate interest in self-determination. This is the Kantian notion

of treating persons as ends—as autonomous agents in pursuit of morally

legitimate interests.

Finally, before drawing a conclusion on this debatable issue, I would like

to consider how the two major ethical theories —utilitarianism and deontological

ethics, would attempt to solve the problem associated with abortion.

● Utilitarianism An important consequentialist theory is utilitarianism—indeed,

these two forms are often used interchangeably. The principal architects of this

ethical theory were Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. It derives its name

from “utility”, which means “usefulness’. The utilitarian says that, an act is right

(moral) if it is useful in “bringing about a desirable or good end.” Classical

utilitarianism specifies that the only thing ultimately valuable is pleasure or

happiness, and all actions are to be judged in terms of their conduciveness to this.

It has been more characteristically stated, however, as ‘Everyone should perform

that act or follow that moral rule that will bring about the greatest good (or

happiness) for everyone concerned.” Utilitarianism generally is found on two

main forms: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism of the hedonistic variety is concerned only with pleasure and

with pain. Here we are concerned with the amounts of pleasure and pain in

situations where abortion is permitted as contrasted with the amounts of pleasure

and pain where abortion is forbidden. It might be suggested that the main

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consideration would be the interests of the fetus: not only can its future life be

expectedly happy (or atleast having a balance of happiness over suffering), it

might also be the case that the abortion itself is painful, particularly if it occurs

later in pregnancy. However this focus on the fetus is unwarranted: any suffering

involved in the abortion itself can be avoided by simply aborting the pregnancy

sooner (before the fetus has even developed the capability of suffering), with

painless techniques. Thus utilitarianism is teleological, concerned with ends or

outcomes. A utilitarian would ask whether having an abortion brings about the

greatest good. Having an abortion because of several reasons such as financial

pressures, other family members’ needs, education, work—any of these reasons

may be justified by hedonic calculus, if the practice brings about the greatest

happiness. Utilitarianism challenges traditional views that abortion is an “evil”

act, arguing instead that the end justifies the means. Utilitarianism generally

supports a pro-choice position and Mill strongly believed that individual

sovereignty: “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is

sovereign.”— with the rider — so long it does not cause harm to others.

However, the pro-choice argument that a woman has the right to choose is

not supported by classical utilitarianism. The concept of absolute rights is

compatible with deontological ethics, but not with utilitarianism. Mill can be seen

as arguing for rule utilitarianism, saying that we should give freedom of choice to

all people. Rule utilitarianism says that we should make rules that bring about the

greatest good. Either way, the utilitarian response should accept that it may, in

some circumstances, be right to deny a woman the right to choose to have an

abortion for doing so would bring about the greatest good.

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● Deontological ethics

Just as utilitarianism falls into two categories (act and rule), so too does

non-consequentialist or Deontological theory. The main difference between act

and rule utilitarianism and act and rule non-consequentialism is that, the former

are based on consequences, whereas the latter are not.

Act non-consequentialists make the major assumption that there are no

general moral rules or theories at all but only particular actions, situations, and

people about which we cannot generalize. We must approach each situation

individually as one of a kind and somehow decide what is the right action to take

in that situation. It is the “how we decide” in this theory that is most interesting.

Decisions for the act non-consequentialist are “intuitionistic”. This type of theory,

then is highly individualistic— individuals must decide what they feel is the right

thing to do, and then do it. But rule non-consequentialists believe that there are or

can be rules that are the only basis for morality and that consequences do not

matter. It is the following of the rules (which are right moral commands) that is

moral, and the concept of morality cannot be applied to the consequences that

ensure when one follows the rules.

Thus it is characteristic of deontological ethical theories that they regard

certain types of action as required or forbidden in themselves, simply because of

the kinds of deed they are, and not because of their consequences.

Kant is the best known exponent of deontological ethics, and he employs a

complex and sophisticated theory in its defence. The best place to start with Kant

is to take a maxim and universalise it. If it is a self contradiction or a contradiction

of the will, have a duty (perfect or imperfect) not to act according to that maxim.25

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 Let, us consider an example which concerns the killing of another human

being. Kant argues that one cannot kill another human being without violating a

moral absolute, because in order to do so one would have to establish a rule that

would be self-contradictory: “Everyone must kill everyone else.” Because the

meaning of life is to live, then everyone killing everyone else would contradict

that meaning and would, therefore, violate the Categorical Imperative26 and fail to

universalize. Killing, then is immoral, and one should not kill. Thus the maxim

“You should have an abortion” becomes a self-contradictory universal maxim

“Everyone should have abortions”. It could not possibly work, as there would be

no people to have abortions. So, let us choose a different maxim, such as “people

who have been raped should have abortions” and we would no longer have a self-

contradiction. However, this must be a contradiction of the will (one would want

to make a law) to make a law of nature that ended pregnancy naturally, if it arose

out of rape? At first we might think this would be a perfectly desirable state of

affairs—people who have been raped would almost certainly prefer not to be

pregnant. However, if one willed such a law of nature, one might be willing

herself/himself out of existence, as there are undoubtedly rational agents who have

been born as a result of rape. One could not will a universal law of nature that

would have prevented one’s own existence.

Thus the question naturally arises that — Can Kant’s theory ever support

abortion? It seems that even in the case of a threat to the mother’s life, it would be

‘using humanity merely as a means to an end’ and not also as an end-in-itself to

have an abortion. A lot hinges on the status of the fetus. Does the fetus count as

‘humanity’? For Kantians, it should. Thus, Kant’s concept of moral duty seems to

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come in favour of the anti-abortionists who maintain the lawful rights of an

unborn child.27 This does not depend on whether the fetus/unborn child has brain

activity—clearly even an infant is not capable of the sort of rationality that

following the categorical imperative requires. However, at some stage, if allowed

to live, the fetus and infant will be able to imagine different universal laws, and

ask whether they could will them to be laws of nature. It would be contrary to the

will to universalise a law that would have prevented one from being born.

Could a Kantian will that abortions happened naturally in ectopic

pregnancies? Yes, because such a law could not have prevented that agent from

being born. There are no rational agents alive after ectopic pregnancies, so it

would not be contrary to their will to have a law of nature that prematurely ended

ectopic pregnancies.

A further potential exception would be fetuses with severe learning

disabilities. If there were mental illnesses that prevented a person from imagining

maxims as universal laws, it could never be contrary to the will to will that these

pregnancies naturally terminated before birth. One would not be willing a law that

would have prevented him/her from being born, as the mere willing of it means

that the law would not have applied to him/her.

Thus we have considered both the sides of the controversial issue

revolving around abortion. We discussed the philosophical viewpoints of both

Kant and J.S. Mill. Furthermore, I have tried to argue why abortion should be

taken into account more as a moral dilemma and not simply as a controversial

matter.

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 REFERENCES

1. Mary Anne Warren: On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.

2. Some philosophers have argued that non-human animals deserve equal

consideration of interest because, they too, like human beings, have the
capacity to suffer pain or feel pleasure. Singer, Practical Ethics, Second
edition, Cambridge University Press.

3. Fertilization is fusion of gametes to produce a new organism of the same

species.

4. Implantation is an event that occurs early in pregnancy in which the embryo

adheres to the wall of uterus.

5. The term ‘person’ is used informally to mean human. But in the field of law,
philosophy, medicine and others, it means the presence of certain
characteristics that grant a certain legal or moral standing.

6. Warren, “On the Moral and Legal status of Abortion”. op.cit, supports this
distinction by outlining five criteria for personhood, specifying that a person
need not satisfy all these criteria but that a being which satisfied none of t
hem could not be considered a person. The five criteria are: consciousness,
reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, the presence
of self-concepts and self-awareness.

7. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defence of Abortion.

8. ‘A Defense of Abortion’, David Boonin. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2003.

9. http:www.wikipedia.com.

10. http:www.wikipedia.com.

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11. Some people argue that this is a case of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ rather
than a self-defence argument, for in this case, the death of the fetus occurs
merely as the side-effect of medical treatment to save the mother’s life.

12. www.wikipedia.com., ‘Woman and Abortion’, reproduced by permission.

13. http://www. study world.com/moral-issues/abortion/ethics of-abortion. htm.

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15. Sherwin S. No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care.

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19. Brody B. “On the Humanity of the Fetus”. In Beauchamp L. Walters LE

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20. Cahil L. Defining Personhood: A Dialogue, Conscience 13 (spring), 1992,
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21. Petchesky R. Abortion and Womans’ Choice: The State, Sexuality, and
Reproductive Freedom. Boston: North Eastern University Press, 1985.

22. Baier A. Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals, Minneapolis,
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23. Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, New York, Macmillan; London,
Collier—Macmillan, 1970.

24. By a “wrongful harm”, I shall mean a harm that could reasonably have been
avoided.

25. A ‘maxim’ is a subjective principle on which I act. Kant’s thought is that an

act is morally wrong if I cannot prescribe (‘will’) that not only I, but anyone
else too, should act similarly in similar circumstances.

26. The Categorical Imperative may be stated in several ways, but basically it
asserts that an act is immoral if the rule that would authorize it cannot be
made into a rule for all human beings to follow.

27. http:www.spiritarticles.com.

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