INTRO TO LAW Philippine Islands is a territory of the United States within

the meaning of the word as used in that rule, comity

1. In re Application of MAX SHOOP for would seem to exist.
admission to practice law
The word "territory" has a general and a technical
November 29, 1920 meaning. It is clear that the Philippine Islands is not an
MALCOLM, J.: "organized territory" incorporated into the United States
under the constitution. (Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 138.) It
Application has been made to this court by Max Shoop is likewise clear that the Philippine Islands is not a
for admission to practice law in the Philippines Islands "foreign country." (The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S., 176.)
under paragraph four of the Rules for the Examination of In the language of that case it is a "territory of the United
Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law, States over which civil government could be
effective July 1, 1920. The supporting papers show that established." So also is Porto Rico (De Lima vs. Bidwell,
the applicant has been admitted to practice, and has 182 U.S., 1.) It has been held that Porto Rico is not a
practiced for more than five years in the highest court of foreign territory and that the United States laws covering
the State of New York. "territories." such as the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
includes Porto Rico. (American Railroad Co. of Porto
THE RULES
Rico vs. Didricksen, 227 U.S., 145.) Porto Rico, Hawaii,
That portion of the rules of this court, in point, is as and Alaska are now incorporated, organized territories of
follows: the United States. (Muratti vs. Foote, 25 Porto Rico, 527;
Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197;
Applicants for admission who have been admitted to Rasmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 516.)
practice in the Supreme Court of the United States or in
any circuit court of appeal or district court, therein, or in An opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States
the highest court of any State or territory of the United holds that —
States, which State or territory by comity confers the
While, like Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands are not
same privilege on attorneys admitted to practice in the
incorporated in the United States, they clearly are
Philippine Islands, and who can show by satisfactory
territory of the United States and to the extent that
affidavits that they have practiced at least five years in
Congress has assumed to legislate for them, they have
any of said courts, may, in the discretion of the court, be
been granted a form of territorial government, and to this
admitted without examination.
extent are a territory. (30 Op. Atty.-Gen., U.S., 462,
The above rule requires that New York State by comity reversing 24 Op. Atty.-Gen. U.S., 549.)
confer the privilege of admission without examination
Further, the Philippine Islands have been held not to be
under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to
"another country" within the meaning of the Cuban
practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of the New
Commercial Treaty. (Faber vs. U.S., 221 U.S., 649.)
York court permits admission without examination, in the
Chief Justice Marshall, in construing the phrase "United
discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases,
States" once observed:
among which are the following:
Does this term designate the whole or any particular
1. Any person admitted to practice and who has
portion of the American Empire? Certainly this question
practiced five years as a member of the bar in the
can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our
highest law court in any other state or territory of the
great Republic, which is composed of states and
American Union or in the District of Columbia.
territories. The District of Columbia or the territory west
2. Any person admitted to practice and who has of Missouri is not less within the United States than
practiced five years in another country whose Maryland or Pennsylvania. (Loughborough vs. Blake, 5
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Wheat [U.S.], 317, at p. 319.)
Common Law.
This is the broad general view which would seem to
This court is advised informally that under this rule one have been the point of view of the New York courts in
member of the bar of the Philippine Islands has been using the phrase "Any state or territory of the American
admitted to practice, without examination, in the State of Union." The New York rule contemplates "state,"
New York, and one member of the same bar has been "territory," and "another country." It seems clear that the
refused such admission, the latter being the more recent Philippine Islands is not "another country." It is not
case. The rulings of the New York court have not been believed that the New York court intended the word
bought to the attention of this court authoritatively, but territory to be limited to the technical meaning of
assuming that reports of such rulings by the New York organized territory, or it would have used the more
court are true, in view of the apparent conflict, it seems accurate expression. the full phraseology, "any state or
proper to enter upon the consideration of whether or not territory of the American Union," indicates a sweeping
under the New York rule as it exits the principle of comity intention to include all of the territory of the United
is established. It must be observed that under the rules States, whatever the political subdivision might be, as
of both jurisdictions, admission in any particular case is distinguished from foreign country. Otherwise, the
in the discretion of the court. Refusal to admit in any Philippine Islands would be in an anomalous position like
particular case is not necessarily conclusive as to the unto Edward Everett Hale's "A Man Without a Country"
general principles established by the rules. — a land neither "another country," nor a "state," nor a
"territory" — a land without status.
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — A TERRITORY.
Of course the construction of what is intended by the use
Under paragraph 1 of the New York rule, practice for five of that phrase is for the New York courts finally to
years in the highest court in any "State or territory of the determine, but in the absence of any authoritative
American Union" is the basic qualification. If the decision from the New York courts on the point, we feel
justified in concluding that under paragraph 1 of the New Once more, in 1903, the New York court said in
York rule there exists between that jurisdiction and this, connection with a question of the right of the public to
with reference to admission of attorneys without use the foreshore:lawph!l.net
examination, a basis of comity sufficient to satisfy the
requirement in the rule of this court in that regard. In adopting the Common Law of the Mother country we
did not incorporate into our system of jurisprudence any
A COMMON LAW JURISDICTION. principles which are essentially inconsonant with our
circumstances or repugnant to the spirit of our
But assuming that comity is not permitted under institutions. (Barnes vs. Midland Railroad Terminal Co.,
paragraph 1 of the New York rule, we turn to a 193 N.Y., 378, at p. 384.)
consideration of whether or not it exits by virtue of
paragraph 2. This rule applies to "another country whose The above statements of the New York court clearly
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English indicate the scope of the English Common Law in that
Common Law." We have then further to assume that if state. In most of the States, including New York,
the Philippine Islands is not a "state or territory," that it codification and statute law have come to be a very large
must be "another country." The question then presented proportion of the law of the jurisdiction, the remaining
is upon what principles is the present jurisprudence of proportion being a system of case law which has its
these Islands based? this is a question which can roots, to a large but not an exclusive degree, in the old
property be answered by this court. It is a problem, English cases. In fact, present day commentators refer
however, upon which books could be and have been to American jurisprudence or Anglo-American
written. We will endeavor to make a brief analysis of the jurisprudence as distinguished from the English
situation. Common Law.

What is "jurisprudence based on the principles of the Accordingly, in speaking of a jurisprudence which is
English Common Law?" Jurisprudence is the "based on the English Common Law," for present
groundwork of the written law, or, as Bouvier defines it, purpose at least, it would seem property to say that the
"The science of law. The particular science of giving a jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction is based upon
wise interpretation to the laws and making a just the principles of that Common Law, if, as a matter of
application of them to call cases as they arise." In an fact, its statute law and its case law to a very large
untechnical sense, it sometimes means Case Law. extent includes the science and application of law as laid
Down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and
COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. modified by the American cases.
We must assume that the New York court, in using this COMMON LAW ADOPTED BY DECISION.
phrase, considered that the jurisprudence of New York
State was based upon the principles of the English The concept of a common law is the concept of a
common Law. We should, therefore, consider to what growing and ever-changing system of legal principles
extent the English Common Law principles apply to New and theories. and it must be recognized that due to the
York. In a case in 1881 we find the following: modern tendency toward codification (which was the
principle of the Roman and Civil Law), there are no
And the Common Law of England was the law of the jurisdictions to-day with a pure English Common Law,
colony at that date (April 19, 1775), so far as it was with the exception of England itself. In the United States
applicable to the circumstances of the Colonists. And it the English Common Law is blended with American
has since continued so to be, when conformable to our codification and remnants of the Spanish and French
institutions, unless it was established by an English Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred
statute which has since been abrogated or was rejected similar to that which is transpiring in this jurisdiction to-
in colonial jurisprudence, or has been abolished by our day. Some of the western states, which were carved out
legislation. (cutting vs. Cutting, 86 N.Y., 522, p. 529.) of the original Louisiana territory, have adopted the
And again: Common Law by decision. (State vs. Twogood, 7 Iowa,
252; Barlow vs. Lambert, 28 Alabama, 704;
This court has interpreted this provision of the Parsons vs. Lindsay, 41 Kansas, 336;
constitution to man not that all of the Common Law of McKennen vs. Winn, 1 Okla., 327.)
England was the law of the Colonists at the time of the
making of the Constitution, but only so much of it as was Louisiana has long been recognized as the one State of
applicable to the circumstances of the Colonists and the Union which retained a portion of the Civil Law. In a
conformable to our institutions. Cutting vs. Cutting, 86 case in 1842 in Louisiana, the court considered the
N.Y., 522, p. 529; Williams vs. Williams, 8 N.Y., 525, p. question of whether a protest on a promissory note had
541. (Shayne vs. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168 N.Y., been made within the required time. The court rejected
70, at p. 76.) the straight Civil code rule, and adopted the custom of
New Orleans, which was the law of the sister States,
In Morgan vs. King (30 Barber [N.Y.], 9), the New York saying:
court said that in adopting the English Common Law,
New York adopted: The superior court of the late territory of Orleans very
early held that although the laws of Spain were not
The written law of England as a constantly improving abrogated by the taking possession of the country by the
science rather than as an art; as a system of legal logic, United States, yet from that event the commercial law of
rather than as a code of rules, — that is, that the the Union became the commercial law of New Orleans;
fundamental principles and modes of reasoning and the and this court has frequently recognized the correctness
substance of the rules of the Common Law are adopted of these early decisions, principally in bills of exchange,
as illustrated by the reasons on which they are based, promissory notes and insurance. (Wagner vs. Kenner, 2
rather than the mere words in which they are expressed. Rob. [La.], 120.)
In Xiques vs. Bujac (7 La. Ann., 498, p. 504), the court are derived, and that to breathe the breath of life into
after deciding a question involving the dedication of real many of the institutions introduced in these Islands
property according to the Civil code rules, said: under American sovereignty recourse must be had to the
rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law
I must add that the general doctrine laid down in under whose protecting aegis and prototypes of these
Common Law courts has been admitted by our courts institutions had their birth.
with some modification resulting from our different
systems of law.lawph!l.net xxx xxx xxx

Louisiana, by statute, adopted certain common law And it is safe to say that in every volume of the
rules, and with reference to these the court said, in Philippine Reports numbers of cases might be cited
State vs.McCoy (8 Rob. [La.], 545): wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles
and doctrines of the Common Law in ascertaining the
We concur with the counsel in believing that the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and
legislature in adopting the Common Law rules of for the Philippine Islands since they passed under
proceeding, method of trial, etc., adopted the system as American sovereignty. (Pp. 331, 333.)
it existed in 1805, modified, explained and perfected by
statutory enactment, so far as those enactments are not And later in speaking of the judicial system of the
found to be inconsistent with the peculiar character and Philippines Islands (page 333):
genius of our government and institution.
The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very
From this brief survey of the extent of the English language and terminology would be unintelligible without
Common Law basis in the States, we may conclude — some knowledge of the judicial system of England and
(1) that the New York court in referring to a jurisdiction the United States. Its manifest purpose and object was
whose jurisprudence is based on the English Common to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and
Law, uses the phrase in a general sense; and (2) that traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new
such Common Law may become the basis of the system modelled in all its essential characteristics upon
jurisprudence by decision of the courts where practical the judicial system of the United States. It cannot be
considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former
ground for such a decision. If, in the Philippines Islands, system which conflicts with the essential principles and
a comparatively young jurisdiction, English Common settled doctrines on which the new system rests must be
Law principles as embodied in Anglo-American held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new
Jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the system.
extent that such Common Law principles are not in
conflict with the local written laws, customs, and In U.S. vs. De Guzman (30 Phil., 416), the court spoke
institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and as follows:
subsequent legislation, and there is no other foreign We have frequently held that, for the proper construction
case law system used to any substantial extent, then it is and application of the terms and provisions of legislative
proper to say in the sense of the New York rule that the enactments which have been borrowed from or modelled
"jurisprudence" of the Philippine Islands is based on the upon Anglo-American precedents, it is proper and of
English Common Law. times essential to review the legislative history of such
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. enactments and to find an authoritative guide for their
interpretation and application in the decisions of
The extent of the English or the Anglo-American American and English courts of last resort construing
Common Law here has not been definitely decided by and applying similar legislation in those countries.
this court. But when the subject has been referred to by (Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 100; 11 Phil., 669;
this court there has been a striking similarity to the Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.S., 470; 11 Phil., 762; Alzua
quotations from the American decisions above cited with and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308.) Indeed it is a
reference to the English Common Law. general rule of statutory construction that courts may
take judicial notice of the origin and history of the
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson (21 Phil., 308), this statutes which they are called upon to construe and
court, in passing upon an objection of counsel, that while administer, and of the facts which affect their derivation,
a certain rule was universally recognized and applied in validity and operation. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory
the courts of England and the United States, it was not Construction, sec. 309.)
the law in the Philippine Islands, said:
In U.S. vs. Abiog and Abiog (37 Phil., 137), this court
To this we answer that while it is true that the body of the made this further statement on the subjects:
Common Law as known to Anglo-American
jurisprudence is not in force in these Islands, "nor are the To elucidate — the principles of the Anglo-American
doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, Common Law are for the Philippines, just as they were
save only in so far as they are founded on sound for the State of Louisiana and just as the English
principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in Common Law was for the United States, of far-reaching
conflict with existing law" (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241); influence. The Common Law is entitled to our deepest
nevertheless many of the rules, principles, and doctrines respect and reverence. The courts are constantly guided
of the Common Law have, to all intents and purposes, by its doctrines. Yet it is true as heretofore expressly
been imported into this jurisdiction, as a result of the decided by this Court that — "neither English nor
enactment of new laws and the organization and American Common Law is in force in these Islands, nor
establishment of new institutions by the Congress of the are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our
United States or under its authority; for it will be found courts, save only in so far as they are founded on sound
that many of these laws can only be construed and principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in
applied with the aid of the Common Law from which they
 conflict with existing law." (U.S. vs. Cuna [1908], 12 The foregoing were written laws which, by change of
Phil., 241.) sovereignty, acquired the force of statute law in the
Philippine Islands. There was no properly called
What we really have, if we were not too modes to claim Common Law or Case Law of Spain to accompany and
it, is a Philippine Common Law influenced by the English amplify these statues, although there were, of course,
and American Common Law, the derecho comun of the customs of the people of the Islands, which
Spain, and the customary law of the Islands and builded continued, in a sense, unwritten law. Spanish
on a case law of precedents. Into this Philippine jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of stare
Common Law, we can properly refuse to take a rule decisis; consequently, there could be no Common Law
which would estop other courses of reasoning and in any sense analogous to the English or American
which, because of a lack of legal ingenuity would permit Common Law. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:
men guilty of homicide to escape on a technicality.
When there is no law exactly applicable to the point in
At this juncture, three years after the last quoted controversy, the customs of the place shall be observed
comment, the influence of English and American and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
jurisprudence can be emphasized even more strongly. A
survey of recent cases in the Philippine Reports, and In order to determined the general principles of law
particularly those of the last few years, shows an "judicial decision cannot be resorted to" . . . . (2 Derecho
increasing reliance upon English and American Civil of Sanchez roman, pp. 79-81; 1 Manresa, p. 80.) A
authorities in the formation of what may be termed a lower court of Spain is at liberty to disregard the
Philippine Common Law, as supplemental to the statute decisions of a higher court. This is the general
law of this jurisdiction. An analysis will show that a great continental rule. (Holland's Jurisprudence, 11th Ed., pp.
preponderance of the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is 68-70.) "The Partidas is still the basis of Spanish
based upon Anglo-American case law precedents, — Common Law, for the more recent compilations are
exclusively in applying those statutory laws which have chiefly founded on it and cases which cannot be decided
been enacted since the change of sovereignty and which either by these compilations or by the local fueros must
conform more or less to American statutes, and — to a be decided by the provisions of the Partidas." (IV
large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of Dunham, History of Spain, p. 109.)
the Spanish codes and written laws.
The Partidas is a code law and cannot in any proper
PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW. sense be considered as Common Law. It specifically
provided, however, for recourse to customs when the
Introductory to analyzing what Spanish written laws written law was silent. The customs to which resort is to
remain in force to-day, we will consider in a general way be had are the customs of the particular place where the
those Spanish laws which were in force at the time of the case arise; the customs of one locality in Spain having
change of severeignty. no effect on the application of law in another place. (1
Spanish law became highly codified during the Manresa, pp. 77-79; Civil Code, art. 6; Code of
nineteenth century. All of the laws of Spain were, Commerce, art. 2.) Accordingly, the Spanish customary
however, not made applicable to the Philippine Islands; law could not have any force here. The law or custom
only those were effective here which were extended by cannot be migratory. Manresa does not defined what is
royal decree. The chief codes of Spain made effective in meant by "general principles of law." but from his
the Philippine were as follows: discussion under article 6 of the Civil Code it appears
how far from a case law system is Spanish
jurisprudence.
1887 He formulates the rule that courts are
governed: first, by written law; second, by the customs of
the place; third, by judicial decision; and fourth, by
ce 1888principles of law. In fact, un urging that resort to
general
judicial decisions should come before resort to general
Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure principles
1888 of law, Manresa rather implies that the
practice of the courts is the contrary.
1889Common Law is quite a different conception.
English
While it grew out of the early Anglo-Saxon customs, it
elating to marriage, thus reviving a portion of Marriage Law of 1870.) came in time to be a case law of binding force which
1870 custom. In fact, it became so binding that it
controlled
was found necessary, in order to effect justice in
particular cases, to establish the Court of Chancery,
1889
which became the court of equity. The English Common
Law recognizes custom only in so far as it does not
1875with
conflict andthe well settled principles of that law. Under
1877
the Spanish system, on the other hand, when the written
law is silent, before considering precedents in the cases
the 1866
court is governed by the customs of the locality at
the time.
In addition to these there were certain special laws Consequently, by the change of sovereignty there was
having limited application: Las Siete Partidas; Las Leyes no body of case law or common law of Spain which
de Toro; Leyes de las Indias; La Novisima Recopilacion; could be considered as existing in connection with the
Mining Law; Notarial Law; Spanish Military Code, and written law retained in force in these Islands. The only
the Corpyright Law. amplification of that written law was the local customs of
the people of the Islands. This is particularly true of
Spanish decision rendered since the change of Such is of even greater importance in showing the real
sovereignty, which do not preclude the local courts from permanency of the hold which Anglo-American Common
exercising an independent judgment. (Cordova vs. Rijos, Law has fastened upon the jurisprudence of this
227 U.S., 375.) jurisdiction. An analysis of the cases, particularly those
of the later years, justifies completely the well-expressed
SPANISH STATUTE LAW. opinion of former Attorney-General Araneta quoted
The Spanish statute law, as amplified by Spanish below:
commentaries but without a background of Spanish We cannot say with certainty that the courts of the
precedent or case law, was by the change of Philippine Islands will, in the absence of a statute, be
sovereignty, severed from Spanish jurisprudence and guided by the common law. It has been said that the
made effective in this jurisdiction to the same extent as if common law is expanded slowly and carefully by judicial
Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines decisions based on a standard of justice derived from
modelled upon those same Spanish statutes. This the habits, customs, and thoughts of a people, and by
retention of the local private law was merely in this standard doubtful cases are determined; that the
accordance with the principles of International Law in office of the judge is not to make the common law but to
that regard. However, by the mere fact of the change of find it, and when it is found to affix to it his official mark
sovereignty, all portions of that statute law which might by which it becomes more certainly known and
be termed political law were abrogated immediately by authenticated. The announcement of the law comes
the change of sovereignty. Also, all Spanish laws, from the courts after they have had the benefit of the
customs, and rights of property inconsistent with the learning of counsel, which to be comprehensive and
Constitution and American principles and institutions useful must embrace a knowledge of the people and
were thereupon superseded. (Sanchez vs. U.S., 216 their customs, as well as a knowledge of the principles
U.S., 167.) established by prior decisions. It is, therefore,
We will give a brief analysis of the further extent to which reasonable to assume that the courts of the Philippine
the Spanish statute law has been repealed and cut down Islands in cases not controlled by statute will lay down
since the change of sovereignty. The table is the principles in keeping with the common law, unless the
note 1 below illustrates the situation in a general way. habits, customs, and thoughts of the people of these
Islands are deemed to be so different from the habits,
Even the Spanish Civil Code has been largely modified customs, and thoughts of the people of England and the
as will appear from the table in the note 2 below. United States that said principles may not be applied
here. (4 Op. Atty.-Gen. P.I., 510, 511.)
CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES.
To illustrate the scope of the use of Anglo-American
It thus appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law
cases in connection with the remaining Spanish statutes,
is derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative
a brief analysis 4 of the more recent cases under a few of
within the sense of having been copied, and in the sense
the principal subjects, will be appropriate. Frequently in
of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its
these cases reference to Anglo-American precedents is
authority. This court has repeatedly held that in dealing
for the purpose of showing that Spanish law and the
with the cases which arise under such statute law the
Anglo-American law s the same, and frequently it is for
court will be governed by the Anglo-American cases in
the purpose of amplifying or extending the Spanish
construction and application. (U.S. vs. De Guzman, 30
statutes. In most cases it is for the purpose of applying
Phil., 416, at p. 419; U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241;
those statutes to the particular case before the court; but
Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 33 Phil., 245,
whatever the use, the fact remains that through the
428, 429.)
influence of these cases a broad exposition of American
To illustrate more clearly the scope of the use of Anglo- case law is made.
American cases in this connection, a bried analysis of
The last group of recent cases, which are but typical of
some of the more recent decisions of this court is
many others in the Reports, illustrates clearly the fact
advisable. For convenience the cases will be taken up in
that Anglo-American case law plays a very great part in
the note 3 by subjects. In all of them, Anglo-American
amplifying and applying the law on those subjects which
decisions and authorities are used and relied upon to a
are still governed by the remaining portions of the
greater or less degree. Although in many cases the use
Spanish statutes.
is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the
building up of a very substantial elaboration of Anglo- The foregoing two groups of cases in combination, those
American case law. under the subjects covered by Spanish statutes and
those under the subjects covered by American-
From the foregoing selection of the more recent and
Philippine legislation and effected by the change of
typical cases, it appears how broad is the scope of the
sovereignty, show conclusively that Anglo-American
use of Anglo-American authorities and precedents in the
case law has entered practically every one of the leading
field of law subjects affected by American derived
subjects in the field of law, and in the large majority of
legislation. In the application of those statutes in the
such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance
many cases which come before the court, there is bound
of this court in developing the local jurisprudence. The
to be developed a substantial common law. There is no
practical result is that the part twenty, years have
question that this exists. We are merely concerned with
developed a Philippine Common Law or case law based
its extent and source.
almost exclusively, except where conflicting with local
CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES. customs and institutions, upon Anglo-American Common
Law. The Philippine Common Law supplements and
In addition to the subjects covered above, there is a wide amplifies our statute law.
field of use of Anglo-American cases in the interpretation
and application of the remnants of the Spanish statutes. COLLATERAL INFLUENCES.
This conclusion is further justified by the practical 37
situation which has surrounded the Bench and Bar of the 340 242 23
........................................
Philippine Islands for many years and which there is very
reason to believe will continue unabated in the future.
38
161 175 19
This court his, in any increasing degree during the past ........................................
twenty years, cited and quoted from Anglo-American
cases and authorities in its decisions. The following 39
analysis of the citations of the last twenty volumes of the 228 143 13
........................................
Philippine Reports show this graphically.

Cases cited.
3,810 2,752 361
Volume. U.S. Philippines Spain England
The American citations are over ten times as numerous
20 as1 the Spanish citations. (In Vol. 1 there were 63
207 63 21
........................................ Spanish to 53 United States.) Add to this the cumulative
effect of perpetuating this ratio through the citations of
21 Philippine cases in which American cases have been
217 127 10 3
........................................ cited, and it is obvious that Spanish decisions have had
comparatively slight effect in the development of our
22 case law.
273 73 21 5
........................................ It is a fact of considerable practical importance that there
are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of
23 Bench and Bar. On the other hand, the local libraries
211 181 18 4
........................................ contain both digests and reports of the Federal Courts
and Supreme Court of the United States, and of most of
24 the State courts, and also many reports of the English
194 108 19 1
courts. Added to his is a liberal supply of English and
........................................
American text books. The foregoing not only has a
natural influence on the results of the work of the Bench,
25
143 98 24 2 it has a very decided influence on the development
but
........................................
of the present Bar of the Philippine Islands; each year
adds to the preponderance of lawyers trained chiefly
26 from a study of Anglo-American case law.
257 104 23
........................................
The fact that prolific use of Anglo-American authorities is
27 made in the decisions of this court, combined with the
145 132 25 1 that the available sources for study and reference on
fact
........................................
legal theories are mostly Anglo-American, present a
practical situation at this moment from which this court
28
145 130 24 can
3 draw but one conclusion, namely, that there has
........................................
been developed, and will continue, a common law in the
jurisprudence of this jurisdiction (which for purposes of
29 distinction may properly be termed a Philippine Common
152 136 9 1
........................................ Law), based upon the English Common Law in its
present day form of an Anglo-American Common Law,
30 which common law is effective in all of the subjects of
98 85 11
........................................ law in this jurisdiction in so far as it does not conflict with
the express language of the written law or with the local
31 customs and institutions.
159 103 8 1
........................................ CONCLUSIONS.

32 We may summarize our conclusions as follows:

103 8 1
........................................ (1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of
the United States, under a civil government established
33 by5 the Congress.
121 137 6
........................................
(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written
laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in
34
214 163 34 cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this
........................................
court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-
American cases, subject to the limited exception of those
35 instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law
109 159 17 4
........................................ present well-defined civil law theories and of the few
cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local
36 customs and institutions.
125 217 21 2
........................................
(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon thousand outstanding shares of stocks of the National
the English Common Law in its present day form of Coal Company. Only nineteen shares stand in the
Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive names of private individuals.
extent.
On November 9, 1926, the Government-General
(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was
reasonable interpretation, permits conferring privileges made therein to opinions of the Judge Advocate General
on attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine of the United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-
Islands similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of General of the United States wherein it was held that the
this court. provisions of the statutes passed by the Philippine
Legislature creating a voting committee or board of
Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the applicant control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof
in this case showing to the satisfaction of the court his with respect to certain corporations in which the
qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby Philippine Government is the owner of stock, are
granted and he is admitted to the practice of law in the nullities. Announcement was made that on account of
Philippine Islands. Our decision is based upon our the invalidity of the portions of the Acts creating the
interpretation of the New York rule, and it does not voting committee or board of control, the Governor-
establish a precedent which may be controlling on this General would, thereafter, exercise exclusivelythe duties
and powers theretofore assumed by the voting
court with respect to future applications if our
committee or board of control. Notice of the contents of
interpretation is not borned out by the future
this executive order was given to the President of the
enforcement of that rule by the New York court. So Senate and the Speaker of the House of
ordered. Representatives. (24 Off. Gaz., 2419.)
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Streets, Avanceña and
Villamor, JJ., concur. A special meeting of the stockholders of the National
Coal Company was called for December 6, 1926, at 3
o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of electing
2. Government vs. Springer directors and the transaction of such other business as
G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927 migh properly come before the meeting. Prior thereto, on
November 29, 1926, the President of the Senate and the
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE Speaker of the House of Representatives as members of
ISLANDS, plaintiffs, the voting committee, requested the Governor-General
vs. to convene the committee at 2:30 p. m., on December 6,
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and 1926, to decide upon the manner in which the stock held
ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants. by the Government in the National Coal Company
should be voted. TheGovernor-General acknowledged
Attorney-General Jaranilla, F. C. Fisher, and Hugh C. receipt of this communication but declined to participate
Smith for plaintiff. in the proposed meeting. The president of the Senate
Jose Abad Santos; Ross, Lawrence and Selph; Paredes, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives did in
Buencamino and Yulo; fact meet at the time and place specified in their letter to
Araneta and Zaragoza; Charles E. Tenney; Camus, the Governor-General. It was then and there resolved by
Delgado and Recto and Mariano H. de Joya for them that at the special meeting of the stockholders, the
defendants. votes represented by the stock of the Government in the
National Coal Company, should be cast in favor of five
MALCOLM, J.: specified persons for directors of the company.

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the
name of the Government of the Philippine Islands special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal
against three directors of the National Coal Company Company was held in accordance with the call. The
who were elected to their positions by the legislative Governor-General, through his representative, asserted
members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 the sole power to vote the stock of the Government. The
and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the
amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides secretary of the company a certified copy of the minutes
that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the
Coal Company) owned by the Government of the company a half hour before. The Governor-General,
Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a through his representative, thereupon objected to the
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the latter
of Representatives." likewise objected to the assertion of the Governor-
General.
The material facts are averred in the complaint of the
plaintiff and admitted in the demurrer of the defendants. The chair recognized the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives in their
capacity as majority members of the voting committee as
The National Coal Company is a corporation organized
the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the
and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine
Government stock. To this the representative of the
Legislature as amended by Act No. 2822, and of the
Governor- General made protest and demanded that it
Corporation law. By the terms of the charter of the
be entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the
corporation, the Governor-General was directed to
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
subscribe on behalf of the Government of the Philippine
Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto,Milton
Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the
E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and
corporation. The government eventually became the
Frank B. Ingersoll. The Governor-General through his
owner of more than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty
represetative, alleging representation of the Government
stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto Barreto, Romarico demarcation between the legislative and the executive
Agcaoili, Frank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and Salvador departments are difficult to fix, and that attempted
Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the encroachments of one on the other may occur, should
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House not dissuade the Supreme Court, as the guardian of the
as electing the names therein indicated, directors of the constitution, from enforcing fundamental principles.
National Coal Company.
The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in
Immediately after the stockholder's meeting, the persons the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In
declared by the chairman to have been elected, met and addition to specified functions,he is given "general
undertook to organized the board of directors of the supervision and control of all the departments and
National Coal Company by the election of officers. All bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as
the directors for whom the President of the Senate and far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
the Speaker of the House of Representatives voted and "He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution
who were declared elected at the meeting of the of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United
stockholders participated in this meeting. Included States operative within Philippine Islands."The authority
among them, were the three defendants, Milton E. of the Governor-General is made secure by the
Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario. important proviso "that all executive functionsof
Government must be directly under the Governor-
The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic General or within one of the executive departments
Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress under thesupervision and control of the Governor-
of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under General. "(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the
authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it. Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief
Executive of the Islands, is charged with the executive
control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in
The Government of the Philippine Islands is an agency
of the Congress, the principal, has seen fit to entrust to person or through the Secretaries of Departments, or
other proper agency, according to law." (Se.58)
the Philippine Government, the agent, are distributed
among three coordinate departments, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial. It is true that the Organic Act The Organic Act grants general legislative power except
contains no general distributing clause. But the principle as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine
is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is Legislature. (Organic Act, secs. 8, 12.) Even before the
expressly incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has approval of the existing Organic Act, it was held that the
time and again been approvingly enforced by this court. Philippine Legislature has practically the same powersin
the Philippine Islands within the sphere in which it may
operate as the Congress of the United States.
No department of the Government of the Philippine
(Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) The rule
Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred
by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is judicially stated is now that an Act of the Philippine
Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved
true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit
by Congress is valid, unless the subject-matter has been
prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the
covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment
Government into three departments. The effect is the
forbidden by some provision of the Organic Law. The
same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has
repeatedly been announced by this court that each of legislative power of the Philippine Government is
the branches of the Government is in the main granted in general terms subject to specific limitations.
(Gaspar vs. Molina [1905], 5 Phil., 197; U.
independent of the others. The doctrine is too firmly
S. vs. Bull, supra; In re Guarina [1913], 24 Phil., 37; U.
imbedded in Philippine institutions to be debatable.
S. vs. Limsiongco [1920],41 Phil., 94;
(Administrative Code sec. 17; Barcelon vs. Baker and
Thompson [1905], 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra.)
Phil., 7; Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial
Board of Occidental Negros [1910], 16 Phil., 366; An independent judiciary completes the governmental
Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco vs. Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., system. Thejudicial power is conferred on the Supreme
534; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338; Couts, Courts of FirstInstance, and inferior courts.
Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. (Organic Act, se. 26)
S. vs. Ang Tang Ho [1922], 43 Phil., 1; Abueva vs. Wood
[1924], 45 Phil., 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1924], 46 It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was
Phil., 83.) provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-
General to execute the law, and the judiciary to construe
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government the law. What is legislative, an executive, or a judicial
of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any act, as distinguished one from the other, is not
other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by alwayseasy to ascertain. A precise classification is
local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The difficult. Negatively speaking, it has been well said that
Governor-General must find his powers and duties in the "The legislature has no authority to execute or construe
fundamental law. An act of the Philippine Legislature the law, the executive has no authority to make or
must comply with the grant from Congress. The construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
jurisdiction of this court and other courts is derived from make or execute the law." (U. S. vs.And Tang
the constitutional provisions. Ho, supra.)

These canons of political science have more than It is legislative power which has been vested in the
ordinary significance in the Philippines. To the Philippine Legislature. What is legislative power? Judge
Government of the Philippine Islands has been Cooley says he understands it "to be the authority, under
delegated a large degree of autonomy, and the chief the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
exponent of that autonomy in domestic affairs is the them." Those matters which the constitution specifically
Philippine Legislature. TheGovernor-General on the confides to the executive "the legislature cannot directly
other hand of the Government and symbolizes American or indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's
sovereignty. That under such a political system, lines of Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-131, 157-
162.) President Wilson in his authoritative work, "The
State", page 487, emphasizes by italics that legislatures usually possess wide latitude in the premises. But this
"are law making bodies acting within the gifts of charters, situation does not obtain in the Philippines where the
and are by these charters in most cases very strictly people are not sovereign, and where constitutional rights
circumscribed in their action." If this is true, the converse do not flow from them but are granted by delegation from
that legislative power is not executive or judicial or Congress.
governmental power needs no demonstration. The
Legislature essentially executive or judicial. The It may finally be inferred from the books that the
Legislature cannot make a law and them take part in its appointment of public officials is generally looked upon
execution or construction. So the Philippine Legislature as properly an executive function. The power of
is not a partaker in either executive or judicial power, appointment can hardly be considered a legislative
except as thePhilippine Senate participates in the power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature of
executive power through the Governor-General, and the courts, but when so made be taken as an incident to
except as the Philippine Senate participates in the the discharge of functions properly within their respective
executive power through having the right to confirm or spheres. (State vs. Brill [1907], 100 Minn., 499;
reject nominations made by the Governor-General, and Stockman vs. Leddy [1912], 55 Colo., 24; Spartanburg
except as the Legislature participates in the judicial County vs. Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673; Mechem on
power through being made the sole judge of the Public Officers, secs. 103-108; Mechem, The power of
elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective Appoint to Office; Its Location and Limits, 1 Mich. Law
members and through having the right to try its own Rev. [1903], 531.)
members for disorderly behavior. The Philippine,
Legislature may nevertheless exercise such auxiliary From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would
powers as are necessary and appropriate to its
seem that the State legislatures have all too often been
indenpdence and to make its express powers effective.
permitted to emasculate the powers properly belonging
(McGrain vs. Daugherty [1927], 273 U. S., 135; 71 Law.
to the executive deparment, and that the governor of the
ed., 580.) State has been placed with the responsibility of
administering the government without the means of
When one enters on a study of the abstract question, doing so. The operations of the executive department
Where does the power to appoint to public office have been fundamentally variedby the legislative
reside?, one is nearly buried in a mass of conflicting department. The legislature has absorbed strength, the
authority. Yet we have been at pains to review all of the executive has lost it. This tendency has rather been
cases cited by counsel and others which have not been tolerated than acquiesced in. The executive should be
cited. Shaking ourselves loose from the encumbering clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the
details of the decisions, we discern through them a few affairs of state. He should have complete control of the
elemental truths which distiguish certain cases from instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is
others and which point the way for us in the Philippines. discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A
feeble executive implies a geeble execution of the
The first principle which is noticed is that the particular government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for
wording of the constitution involved, and its correct a bad execution; and a government ill executed,
interpretation predetermines the result. Does the whatever it may be intheory, must be in practice a bad
constitutions deny the legislative body the right of government." The mistakes of State governments need
exercising the appointing power. The legislature may not not be repeated here..
do so. (State vs. Kennon [1857], 7 O. St., 547;
Clark vs. Stanley[1872], 66 N. C., 28.) Does the The history of the power of appointment and the stand
constitution confer upon the government the power to taken by the judiciary on the question in the State of
prescribe the manner of appointment. The authorities Kentucky is of more than ordinary interest. Kentucky was
are in conflict as to whether the legislature the power to permitted to become an independent State by Virginia.
prescribe the manner of appointment. The authourities The clause in the Kentucky constitution separating and
are in conflict as to whether the legislature may itself guarding the powers of government came from the pen
make the appointment. Does the constitution merely of the author of the Declaration of Independence,
contain the usual clause distributing the powers of Thomas Jefferson. He it was who, in a letter to Samuel
government and no clause regulating appointments. The Kercheval, dated July 16, 1816, said: "Nomination to
weight of judicial opinion seems to be that the power of office iss an executive function. To give it to
appointing to office is not exclusively an executive thelegislature, as we do is Virginia, is a violation of the
function and that the legislature may not only create principle of the separation of powers. It swerves the
offices but may also fill them itself, but with a vigorous members from correctness by the temptation to intrigue
opposition in most respectable quarters. (Contrast for office for themselves, and to a corrupt barter for
Pratt vs. Breckinridge [1901], 112 Ky., 1, and votes, and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a
State vs.Washburn [1901], 167 Mo., 680, with multitude." Possibly inspired to such action by the
People vs. Freeman [1889], 80 Cal., 233, and authorship of the portion of the State constitution which
Richardson vs. Young [1909], 122 Tenn., 471.) was under consideration, in the early days of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky, Mr. Chief Justice Robertson
The second thought running through the decisions is that in the case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth ([1830], 3 J.
in the state governments, the selection of persons to J.Marshall, 4010) announced that "Appointmets to office
perform the functions of government is primarily a are intrinsically executive," but that it might be performed
prerogative of the people. The general powerto appoint by a judicial officer when the duties of the office pertains
officers is not inherent in any branch of the government. strictly to the court. This opinion was shaken in the case
The people may exercise their political rights directly or of Sinking Fund Commissioners vs. George ([1898], 104
by delegation. Should the people grant the exclusive Ky., 260) only to be afterwards reaffirmed in Pratt vs.
right of appointment to the governor, he possesses that Breckinridge ([1901], 112 Ky., 1), and in Sibert vs.
right; but if they should otherwise dispose of it, it must be Garrett ([1922], 246 S. W., 455). in the decision in the
performed as the sovereign has indicated. Inasmuch, latter case, one of the most recent on the subject, the
however, as the legislative body is the repository of Supreme Court of Kentucky after reviewing the
plenary power, except as otherwise restricted, and the authorities refused to be frightened by the bugaboo that
chief executive of the State is not, legislative bodies numerically a greater number of courts take a contrary
view. It said: "We are convinced that they by doing so sergeant at arms, and such other officers and assistants
are inviting destruction of the constitutional barriers as may be required. (Organic Act, sec. 18.) The
separating the departments of government, and that our Philippine Legislature is authorized to choose two
interpretation is much the sounder one and is essential Residentcommissioners to the United States. (Organic
to the future preservation of our constitutional form of Act, sec. 20.) The prohibition on the local Legislature,
government as originally intended by the forefathers who which has been thought of as referring to the Resident
conceived it. . . . Such power (of appointment) on the Commissioners, is that "No Senator or Representative
part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be shall, during the time for which he may have been
persisted in, would, enable it to gradually absorb to itself elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is
the patronage and control of the greater part of the vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any
functioning agencies of the state and county office of trust or profit which shall have been created or
governments, and, thus endowed, it would be little short the emoluments of which shall have been increased
of a legislative oligarhy." during such term." (Organic Act, sec. 18.)

It is of importance, therefore, not to be confused by The Administrative Code provides the following: "In
Statedecisions, and invariably to return to the exact addition to his general supervisory authority, the
provisions of the Philippine Organic Law which should Governor-General shall have such specific powers and
be searched out and effectuated. duties as are expressly conferred or imposed onhim by
law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set
The right to appoint to office has been confided, with forth," including th special powers and duties "(a) To
certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of nominate and appointofficials, conformably to law, to
the United States to the executive branch of the positions in the service of the Government of the
government which it has set up in the Philippines. Let Philippine Islands. (b) To remove officials from office
the Organic Law speak upon this proposition. conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held
by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
Government of theUnited States, the Governor-General
The original government inaugurated in the Philippines
may at any time remove a personfrom any position of
after American occupation was military in nature, and
trust or authority under the Government of the Philippine
exercised all the powers of government, including, of
Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists
course, the right to select officers. The original civil
authority with administrative functions establishedhere the officers appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec.
was the second Philippine Commission. President 66.)
Mckinley, in his Instructions to the Commisions of April
7, 1900, ever since considered as the initial step taken to It will be noticed that the Governor-General, in addition
introduce a constitutional government, provided that until to being empowered to appoint the officers authorized by
further action should be taken by congress or otherwise, the Organic Act and officers who thereafter he might be
"The Commission will also have power . . . . to appoint to authorized to appoint, was to continue to possess the
office such officers under the judicial, educational, and power to appoint such officers as could be appointed
civil- service systems, and in the municipal and him when the Organic Act wa approved. The careful
departmental goernments, as shall be provided for." phraseology of the law and the connection provided by
When the first Civil Governor was appointed on June 21, the word "now" with prior Organic laws is noteworthy. It
1901, the President again took account of the power of would not be at all illogical to apply the same rule to the
appointment in the following language: The power to Governor-General in his relations with the Legislature
appoint civil officers, hererofore Governor, will be which the judiciary uniformly applies to the courts in their
exercised by the Civil Governor with the advice and relations with the Legislature, which is, that the
consent of the commission." The Congress when it came Legislature may add to, byt may not diminish, the
to make legislative provision for the administration of the jurisdiction of the courts — The Legislature may add to,
affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, in the but may not diminish, thepower of the Governor-
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Bill, General. (Organic Act, sec. 26; Barrameda vs. Moir
"approved, ratified and confirmed," the action of the [1913], 25 Phil., 44; In re Guarina, supra; U.
President, and in creating the office of Civil Governor S. vs.Limsiongco, supra.)
and authorizing said Civil Governor to exercise powers
of government to the extent and in the manner set forth It will also not escape attention that the only reference
in the exectutive order date June 21, 1901. (Philippine made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the
Bill, sec. 1.) Congress in the same law provided that the selection of Secretaries of Departments, of officers and
Islands "shall continue to be governed as thereby and employees for the Legislature, and of Resident
herein provided." (See opinion of Attorney-General Commissioners, from which it would naturally be inferred
Araneta on the power of the Governor-General to that no other officers and employees may be chosen by
appoint and remove civil officers, 3 Op. Atty.-Gen., 563.) it. The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature
strengthen rather than weaken the grant to the
Thus stood the right to appoint to office for fourteen executive. The specific mention of the authority of the
years. Legislature to name certainofficers is indicative of a
purpose to limit the legislative authority in the matter of
The Organic Act of August 29, 1916, included what selecting officers. The expression of one things not
follows on the subject of appointments. The governor- expressed. Had it been intended to give to the Philippine
Legislature the power to name individuals to fill the
General "shall, unless otherwise herein provided,
offices which it has created, the grant would have been
appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine
included among the legislative powers and not among
Senate, such officers as may now be appointed by the
Governor-General,or such as he is authorized by law to the executive powers. The administrative controlof the
appoint." (Organic Act, sec. 21.) The exception to the Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-
Generalto whom is confided the responsibility of
general grant is that the Philippine Legislature "shall
executing the laws excludes the idea of legislative
provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of
control of administration.
the executive departments by the Governor-General."
(Organic Act, sec. 22.) Each House of the Philippine
Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, a
Possibly, the situation may better be visualized by "* * * The Constitution was so framed as to vest
approching the question by a process of elimination. Is in the Congress all legislative powers therein
the power of appointment judicial? No one so contends. granted, to vest in the President the executive
Is the power of appointment legislative? Not so if the power, and to vest in one Supreme Court and
intention of the Organic Law be carried out and if the such inferior courts as Congress might establish,
Legislature be confined to its law-making function. Is the the judicial power. From this division on
power of appointment executive? It is. principle, the reasonable construction of the
Constitutionmust be that the branches should be
The exact question of where the power of appointment kept separate in all cases in which they were not
to office is lodged has never heretofore arisen in this expressly blended, and the Constitution should
jurisdiction. But a decision of this court and a controlling be expounded to blend them no more than it
decision of the United States Supreme Court are in affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of
point. Congress, 497.

In Concepcion vs. Parades, supra, this court had before xxx xxx xxx
it a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for
judicial positionss in derogation of executive power. The The vesting of the executive power in the
case was exhaustively argued andafter prolonged President was essentially a grant of the power to
consideration, the questioned portion of the law was held execute the laws. But the President alone and
invalid as in violation of the provisions of the Organic unaided could not execute the laws. He must
Act. Following the lead of Kentucky, it was announced execute them by the assistance of subordinates.
that "Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive This view has since been repeatedlyaffirmed by
act involving the exercise of discretion." this court. . . . As he is charged specifically to
take care that they be faithfully executed, the
In the case of Myers vs. United States ([1926], 272 U. reasonable implication, even in the absence of
S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160), the United States Supreme express words, was that as part of his execute
Court had presented the question whether, under the power he should select those who werre to act
Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of for him under his direction in the execution of the
removing executive officers of the United States whom laws. The further implication must be, in the
he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of absence of any express limitation respecting
the Senate. The answer was that he has. The decision is removals, that as his selection of administrative
ephocal. The Chief Justice quoted from Madison the officers is essential to the execution of the laws
following: by him, so must be his power of removing those
for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.
(Fisher Ames, 1 Annals of Congress, 474.) It
If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed
was urged that the natural meaning of the term
in any free Constitution more sacred than
"executive power" granted the President
another, it is that which separates the legislative,
included the appointment and removal of
executive and judicial powers. If there is any
executive subordinates. If such appointments
point inwhich the separation of the legislative
and removals were not an exercise of the
and executive powers ought to be maintained
executive power, what were they? They cetainly
with great caution, it is that which relates to
were not the exercise of legislative or judicial
officers and offices.
power in government as usually understood.
'The powers relative to offices are partly
It is quite true that in state and colonial
legislative and partly executive. The
governments at the time of the Constitutional
legislature creates the office, defines the
Convention, power to make appointments and
powers, limits its duration and annexes
removals had sometimes been lodged in the
a compensation. This done, the
legislatures or in the courts, but such a
legislative power ceases. They ought to
disposition of it was really vesting part of the
have nothing to do with designating the
executive power in another branch of the
man to fill the office. That I conceive to
Government.
be of an executive nature. Although it be
qualified in the Constitution, I would not
extend or stain that qualification beyond xxx xxx xxx
the limits precisely fixed for it. We ought
always to consider the Constitution with We come now to a period in the history of the
an eye to the principles upon which it Government when both Houses of Congress
was founded. In this point of view, we attempted to removes this
shall readily conclude that if the constitutionalconstruction and to subject the
legislaturedetermines the powers, the power of removing executive officers appointed
honors, and emoluments of an office, we by the President and confirmed by the Senate to
should be insecure if they were to the control of the Senate, indeed finally to the
designate the officer also. The nature of assumed power in Congress to place the
things restrains and confines the removal of such officers anywhere in the
legislative and executive authorities in Government.
this respect; and hence it is that the
Constitution stipulates for the xxx xxx xxx
independence of each branch of the
Government.' (1 Annals of Congress,
The extreme provisions of all this legislation
581, 582. Also see Madison in The
were a full justification for the considerations so
Federalist, Nos. 47, 46.).
strongly advanced by Mr. Madison and his
associates in the First Congress, for insisting
The distinguished Chief Justice said: thatthe power of removal of executive officers by
 the President alone wasessential in the division The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not
of powers between the executive and the served to disconnect the Company or the stock which
legislative bodies. It exhibited in a clear degree the Government owns in it from the Government and
the paralysis to which a partisan Senate and executive control. The Philippine Legislatureis
Congress could subject the executive arm and empowered to create and control private corporations.
destroy the principle of executive responsibility, (Martinez vs. La Asociacion de Señoras Damas del
and separation of the powers sought for by the Santo Asilo de Ponce [1909], 213 U. S., 20.) The
framers of our Government, if the President fhad National Coal Company is a private
no power of removal save by consent of the corporation.(National Coal Company is a private
Senate. It was an attempt to redistribute the corporation. (National Coal Company vs. Collector of
powers and minimized those of the President. Internal Revenue [1924], 46 Phil., 583.) By becoming a
stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
xxx xxx xxx Goverment divested itself of its sovereign character so
far as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Bank
of the U. S. vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia [1824], 9
For the reasons given, we must therefore hold
Wheat., 904.) Unlike the Government, the corporation
that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the
may be sued without its consent, and is subject to
unrestricted power of removal of first class
taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an
postmasters is denied to the President is in
agency or instrumentality of government. Mr. Chief
violation of the Constitution and invalid.
Justice Marshall in speaking of the Bank of the United
States said, "It was not created for its own sake, or for
Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos. private purposes. It has never been supposed that
2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to Congress could create such a corporation."
accomplish the impossible, which is to formulate an (Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S. [1824], 9 Wheat., 738;
exact judicial definitions of term "office." The point is that National Bank vs. Commonwealth [1869], 9 Wall., 353;
the positions in question constitute an "office," whether Railroad Co. vs. Peniston [1873], 18 Wall., 5;
within the meaning of that word as used in the Code of Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. vs. U. S. [1918], 250
Civil Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," U. S., 123.) Of the National Coal Company, it has been
and in the jurisprudence of Ohio from which these said by Mr. Justice Johnson as the organ of the court in
portions of the Code were taken; whether within the local National Coal Company vs. Collector of Interanl
definitions of "office" found in the Administrative Code Revenue, supra, that "The Government of the Philippine
and the Penal Code; or whether within the constitutional Islands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in
definitions approved by the United States Supreme order to insure proper governmental supervision and
Court. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq., 519; control, and thus to place the Government in a position
Act No. 136, sec. 17; State vs. Kennon, supra, cited to render all possible encouragement, assistance and
approvingly in Sheboygran co. vs. Parker [1865], 3 Wall., help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company's
93; Administrative Code, sec. 2; Penal Code, arts. 264, business.' The analogy is closer in the
401.) Paraphrasing the United States Supreme Court in companionNational Bank case, No. 27225.
alate decision, there is not lacking the essential
elements of a public station, permanent in character,
It further is inconvertible that the Government, like any
created by law, whose incidents and duties were
prescribed by law. (Metcalf & Eddy vs. Mitchell [1926], other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the
269 U. S., 514; U. S. vs. Maurice [1823], 2 Brock., 96; U. transactions in the corporation, and in protecting its
S. vs.Hartwel [1867], 6 Wall., 385.) The Legislature did property rights in the corporation. Public funds were
appropriated to create the National Coal Company.
more than add incidentalor occasional duties to existing
Those funds were used to purchase stock. The voting of
executive offices for two of the members of the voting
the government stock is the prerogative of the
committee are representatives of thelegislative branch.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that the stockholder, not the prerogative of the corporation. It is
Act of the General Assembly giving to the President of transaction in, but not of, the corporation. The stock is
property. The Government, the owner of the majority
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
stock in the company, naturally dominates the
Representatives the power to appoint proxies and
management of its property. The Government may
directors in all corporations in which the State has an
enforce its policies and secure relief in and through the
interest, creates a public office and fills the same by
appointment of the Legislature. (Clark vs. Stanley [1872], corporation and as stockholder.
66 N. C., 28;Howerton vs. Tate [1873], 68 N. C., 498;
Shoemaker vs. U. S. [1892], 147 U. S., 282; Advisory The situation will be better understood if it be recalled
Opinion to Governor [1905], 49 Fla., 269; Mechem on that, in addition to the National Coal company (Acts Nos.
Public Officers, Ch. I.) 2705 and 2822), the Philippine Legislature has created
the Philippine National Bank (Acts Nos. 2612, 2747,
To tell the truth, it is possible that the earnestness of 2938, and 3174), the National Petroleum Company (Act
No. 2814), the National Development Company (Act No.
counsel has just led us to decide too much. Not for a
2849), the National Cement Company (Act No. 2855),
moment should there be dismissed from our minds the
and the NationalIron Company (Act No. 2862). The
unusual and potently effective proviso of section 22 of
the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the aggregate authorized capital stock of these companies is
government must be directly under the Governor- P54,500,000. The Legislature has in each of these
General or within one of the executive departments instances directed that a majority of the shares of stock
under the supervision and control of the Governor- shall be purchased for the Government, and has
General." At the very least,the performance of duties appropriated money for this purpose. There have
likewise been authorized corporations for the promotion
appurtenant to membership in the voting committee is an
executive function on the Government, which the of the merchant marine (Act No. 2754). The stock of the
Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered Manila Railroad Company has been purchased for the
Government. (Acts Nos. 2574, 2752, and 2923.) All
control of the Government-General. The administrative
these are conspicuous instances of a paternally inclined
domination of a governmentally organized and controlled
government investing large sums in business enterprises
corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-
which after acquisition or organization have vitally
makingpower.
concerned the Government. In all of the companies what they are. Like the Legislature and the judiciary,like
mentioned, the stock is to be voted by a committee or the most inconspicuous employee, the Governor-
board of control, consisting of the Governor-General, the General must find warrant for his every act in the law. At
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House this stage of political development in the Philippines, no
of Representatives. The power of the majority vague residuum of power should be left to lurk in any of
stckholders to vote the government stock in the the provsions of the Organic Law.
corporation carries with it the right, under our
Corporation Law, to elect all the directors, to remove any Counsel for the plaintiff rely on a decision of this court
or all of them, and to dissolve the corporation by (U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759) as best
voluntary proceedings. (Corporation Law, secs. 31, 34, expressing the local rule regarding statutes void in part.
62.) In the case of the Philippine National Bank, the law Counsel for the defendants cite an earlier case
explicitly enumerates variousfunctions of the bank which (Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44). As the
may not be performed without the express approval of principle announced in the last cited case is the more
the Board of Control. (Act No. 2938.) comprehensive and is much fairer to the defendants, we
give it preference. It was there announce:
Very important property rights are involved in the
transactions in the governmental directed corporations. Where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to
Just as surely as the duty of caring for government the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the
property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may
as surely executive. Yet a majority of the voting stand and be enfored. But in order to do this, the
committee or board of control is made up of the valid portion must be so far independent of the
presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
and they are in a position to dictate action to the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they
directors and subordinate personel of these had supposed that they could not constitutionally
corporations. enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which
Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce carries out the legislative intent. The void
that the power of appointment in the Philippines provisions must be eliminated without causing
appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive results affecting the main purpose of the Act in a
department; that membership in the voting committee in manner contrary to the intention of the
question is an office or executive function; that the Legislature. The language used in the invalid
National Coal Company and similar corporations are part of a statute can have no legal force or
instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what
after government agencies and government property remains must express the legislative will
belongs to the executive department; that the placing of independently of the void part since the court
members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting has no power to legislate.
committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative
Department of the provileges of the Executive Omitting reference to the President of the Senate and
Department. Under a system of government of the Speaker of the House of Representative in section 4
delegated powers, under which delagation legislative of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No.
power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive 2822, it would then read: "The voting powerof all such
power vests in the Governor-General, and under which stock owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands
Governor-General and a specified power of appointment shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of
resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot the Governor- General." Would the court be justified in
directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive so enforcing the law without itself intruding on the
nature through the designation of its presiding officers as legislative field?
majority membersof a body which has executive
functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-
The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is
partite theory of the division of powers. That is the
authourized to create corporations and offices. The
purport of the provisions of the Organic Law. That has
Legislature has lawfully provided for a National Coal
been the decided trend of persuasive judicial opinion.
Company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its
members to sit in the committee. Would this court be
The intimation contained in the conclusions just reached doing violence to the legislative will if the votig power be
does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will be continued solely in the hands of the Governor-General
privileged to substitute the directors designated by the until different action is taken by the Legislature? We
Governor-General for those designated by the two conclude that we would not, for the reason that the
presiding officers in the Legislature. The burden has primordial purpose of the Legislature was "to promote
heretofore been on the defenfants. From this point, it will the business of developing coal deposits . . . and of
be on the plaintiff. It is well established in quo mining . . . and selling the coal contained in said
warranto proceedingsthat the failure of the defendant to deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec 2; Act No.2822, sec.1.)
prove his title does not established that of plaintiff. The incidental purpose of the Legislature was to provide
(People vs. Thacher [1874], 10 N. Y., 525.) a method to vote the stock owned by the Government in
the National Coal comapny. In the words of the United
The answer to the problem comes from two directions. States Supreme Court, "The striking out is not
The acting Attorney-General of the United States finds necessarily by erasing words, but it may be by
the solutions in the supreme executive power entrusted disregarding the unconstitutional provision and reading
to the Governor-General, while cousel for the plaintiff the statute as if that provision was not there." (Railroad
advance the rule of statutory construction pertaining to companies vs. Schutte [1880], 103 U. S. 118;
partial invalidity. We are frank to say that we experience State vs. Westerfield [1897], 23 Nev., 468;
difficulty in following the lead of the law officer of the State vs. Washburn, supra; State vs. Wright [1913], 251
Government of the United States. The Governor-General Mo., 325; State vs. Clausen [1919], 107 Wash.,667; 1
since the approval of the last Organic Act has had no Lewis Sutherland, Statutory construction, Second ed.
prerogative powers. His powers are so clearly and Ch. IX.)
distincly stated that there ought to be no doubt as to
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in jure office, there cannot be a de facto officer in a de fact
Clayton vs. People ([1890], 132 U. S., 632) is particularly office. There is no such thing as de facto office under an
applicable on account of relating to the validity of an Act unconstitutional law. (Norton vs. Shelby County [1886],
passed by a territorial legislature, the question of partial 188 U. S., 425.)
invalidity, and the contention likewise here made, that
since the law in question had been on the statute books Before terminating, a few general observations may be
for a number of years, it must be considered as having appropriate.The case has been carefully prepared and
been impliedly ratified by the Congress. An Act of the elaborately argued. All parties appear to desire to have
Legislature of Utah of 1878 had declared that the auditor the matter at issue definitely determined. We have
and the treasurer shall be elected by the voters of the endeavored to accomodate them. But in such a bitterly
territory. In a decision handed down in 1886, the fought contest, the ingenuity of counsel presses
Supreme Court of the territory of Utah held the act void collateralpoints upon us which the court need not
because in conflict with the organic act creating the resolve. We thus find it unnecessary to express any
territory, which provided that the governor, with the opinion on the propriety or legality of Executive Order
consent of the legislative council, shall appoint such No. 37, on that portion of section 18 of the Organic Act
officers. It further held that a territorial statute invalid which disqualifies Senators or Representatives for
when enacted is not validated by the failureof the election or appointment to office and no other subsidiary
congress expressly to disapprove it. (People vs. Clayton matters. Need it be added that the court is solely
[1886], 4 Utah, 421.) The United States Supreme Court concerned with arriving at a correct decision on a purely
on appeal affirmed the judgment. It said: legal question.

It can hardly be admitted as a general Every other consideration to one side, this remains
proposition that under the power of Congress certain—The congress of the United States clearly
reserved in the Organic Acts of the territories to intended that the Governor- General's power should be
annul the Acts of their legislature the absence of commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress
any action by Congress is to be construed to be never intended that the Governor-General should be
a recognition of the power of the Legislature to saddled with the responsibility of administering the
pass laws in conflict with the Act of Congress government and of executing the laws but shorn of the
underwhich they were created. . . . We do not power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will be
think that the acquiescenceof the people, or of best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of
the Legislature of Utah, or of any of its officers, constitutional government.
in the mode for appointing the auditor of public
accounts, is sufficient to do away with the clear
We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of
requirements of the organic Act on that subject.
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of
It is also, we think, very clear that only that part
Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the
of the Statute of Utah which is contrary to the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company
Organic act, namely, that relating to the mode of in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
appointment of the officer, is invalid; that so
House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It
much of it as creates the office of auditor of
results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and
public accounts and treasurer of the Territory is
as it would be impractible for the defendants to answer,
valid; and that it can successfully and
judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them
appropriately be carried into effect by an from the offices of directors of the National
appointment made by the governor and the
Coalcompany. So ordered, without costs.
Council of the Territory, as required in the Act of
Congress.
Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
On the assumption, however, that the entire provision
authorizing the voting committee be considered as wiped
out, yet we think it would still devolve on the Governor-
General to protect the public interests and public
property. He is made responsible for the execution of the Separate Opinions
laws, and he would be unfaithful to that trust if, through
inaction, instrumentalities of government should fail to JOHNSON, J., concurring:
function and government property should be permitted to
be dissipated. Under the admitted facts the writ of quo warranto prayed
for should be granted. Milton E. Epringer, Dalmacio
Counsel for the dependants have injected the argument Costas, and Anselmo Hilario are unlawfully and illegally
into the discussion that, as the President of the Senate holding and exercising the position of members of the
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are at Board of Directors of the National Coal Company
least de facto officers, their right to act as members of andshould be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom;
the voting committee cannot be collaterally attacked, and that Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador
that the defendants in this suit are the de jure members Lagdameo have been duly and legally elected as
of the board of directors of National Coal Company. members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal
Contentions such as there are out of harmony with the Company, and judgment is rendered that they be
avowed purpose to avoid technical obstruction, and to inducted into said position to take charge thereof and to
secure a definite expression of opinion on the main perform the duties incumbent upon them as members of
issue. However, it remains to be said that this is a direct said board of directors.
proceeding to test the right of the defendants to the
offices to which they consider themselves entitled. The The principal questions involved in this action are:
inquiry then may go, as is proper in quo
warranto proceedings, to the extent of determining the
(a) May the Legislative Deparment of the
validity of the act authorizing the offices. The fallacy of
Government of the Philippine Islands adopt a
the argument relating to the de facto doctrine is that,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de
 law and provide that some of its members shall The National Coal Company was organized in
take part in its execution? accordance with the provisions of its charter. A Board of
Directors was elected from time to time. Its business was
(b) Was the Governor-General of the Philippine carried on by said Board of Directors. Finally a legal
Islands authorized, under the law, to promulgate question arose concerning the right of the President of
Executive Order No. 37? and, the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to act with the Governor-General in
(c) Were the respondents legally elected as voting the stock of said company. That question was
members of the Board of Directors of the referred to the Judge Advocate General of the United
States Army as well as to the Attorney-General of the
National Coal Company?
United States. Upon full consideration of the question,
the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney-General
Inasmuch as these questions involve respective powers reached the conclusion that the President of the Senate
of two great departments of the Government, they and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were
should be seriously considered by this court and not to without authority in law to take part in the voting of the
be lightly resolved on. stock owned by the Government, for the reason that the
particular provision of the charter granting or creating
These questions were presented to the Supreme Court said power as illegal and void, and that the participation
of the Philippine Islands for solution in an original action, of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
praying for the issuance of the extraordinary legal writ House of Representatives in voting said stock was an
of quo warranto. In relation with the questions involved, illegal encroachment upon the powers of the Executive
the specific and definite purpose of the action is (a) to Department of the Government. Upon receiving said
inquire into the right of the respondents, Milton E. opinions, the Government-General evidently for the
Spinger, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario to act as purpose of avoiding criticism that he was permitting an
members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal illegal and void law to be enforced and, if possible,
Company, a private corporationcreated by special impeachment proceedings for a failure or refusal on his
charter by an Act of the Philippine Legislature; and (b) to part to comply with the law of the land, issued an
have inducted into office, in their place and stead, said executive order, known as Executive Order No. 37.
Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Executive Order No. 37 provides:
Lagdameo.
Whereas it is held in an opinion of the Judge
To the petition presented by the Government of the Advocate General of the United States Army,
Philippine Islands (ex rel. Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath confirmed by an opinion of the Attorney-General
and Salvador Lagdameo) the respondents demurred. of the United States, received at the Office of the
The facts are therefore admitted. A question of law only Executive, November seventh, nineteen hundred
is presented for solution. and twenty-six, that the provisions of the statutes
passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a
THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE ACTION IS BASED 'Board of Control' or 'Committee' and
enumerating the duties and powers thereof, with
The facts upon which the petition is based are few, clear, respect to certain corporations in which the
and well defined. There is no dispute upon the facts. Insular Government is the owner of stock, are
They are briefly: That the National Coal Company is a nullities; that the remaining portions of said
private corporation created by Act No. 2705 (vol. 2, statutes are valid; that the duties imposed by
Public Laws, p. 216, March 10, 1917) as amended by said statutes upon said Board or Committee are
Act No. 2822 (vol. 14, Public Laws, p. 202, March 5, executive in their nature, and subject to the
1919). Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, provisions of the Organic Act relating to the
constitutes the charter of said company. Said Acts are executive functions; that said executive duties
not public laws. They are private Acts of the Philippine and powers may be performed as in other cases
Legislature. They provide that said company shall be not specifically provided for by law.
subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law (Act No.
1459) in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Now, therefore, acting under authority of said
provisions of said charter, and shall have the general opinions, the duties and powers heretofore
powers mentioned in said Act (Act No. 1459) and such exercised by said 'Board of Control' or
other powers as may be necessary to enable it to Committee' shall, from and after this date, be
prosecute the business of developing coal deposits in exercised solely by the Governor-General
the Philippines Islands, and mining, extracting, pursuant to the executive power vested in him
transporting, and selling the coal contained in said by the Organic Act."
deposits. Said charter provided that the capital of said
company shall be P3,000,000, divided into 30,000 Notice of said Executive Order was duly and timely given
shares of stock with a par value of P100 per share. by the Governor-General to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
Said charter further provided that the Governor-General Governor-General further notified the President and
on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands, Speaker that "he would thereafter exercise exclusively
shall subscribe for 51 per centum of said capital stock, the duties and powers" with respect to the voting of the
and that the "voting power of all such stock owned by the stock held by the Government of the Philippine Islands in
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested the National Coal Company.
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker At the time of the issuance of said Executive Order No.
of the House of Representatives." At the time of the 37 or thereabouts the Government of the Philippine
adoption of said charter the Philippine Legislature Islands was the registered owner of about 29,975 shares
appropriated the sum of P1,530,000 for investment in of the total of 30,000 shares of said company. The
the stock of said company to be acquired by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Government of the Philippine Islands. Representatives protested against the alleged assumed
authority on the part of the Governor-General to vote
said government stock and insisted upon their right to It can scarcely be contended that the President of the
participate in the voting of the same. Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, when the Governor-General is present
Later, and without going into great detail, a meeting of at a meeting of the stockholders of said company, have
the stockholders was called for the purpose of electing a right to vote all of the stock of said company, to the
members of the Board of Directors of said company. In entire exclusion of the Governor-General. There is
accordance with the preannounced intention, the nothing in the law which indicates the manner in which
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of the stock owned by the Government of the Philippine
Representatives attended the meeting of the Islands may be voted when a difference of opinion exists
stockholders of the company and then and there among the members of the "Voting Committee" as to
asserted their right, as a majority of the "Voting how the same shall be voted.
Committee," to vote the stock of the Government.
Against the objections and protest of the Governor- Without discussing the method of voting the stock when
General they were permitted by the Chairman of the there is a difference of opinion in the "Voting Committee"
meeting to vote all of the stock held by the Government as to how it shall be voted, we pass to the question,
of the Philippine Islands. They deposited a ballot whether or not the President of the Senate and the
purporting to be signed by them on behalf of the said Speaker of the House of Representatives, as members
"Voting Committee" for the election as Directors of of the Legislative Department of the Government, have
Alberto Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer, any right whatever to participate in the voting of the
Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario. Notwithstanding stock belonging to the Government of the Philippine
the objection and protest of the Governor-General to the Islands.
acceptance of said ballot, the Chairman permitted it to
be deposited in favor of the persons for whom it was THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF
cast. At the same meeting of the stockholders and at the THE GOVERNMENT TO EXECUTE OR TO ASSIST IN
same time the Governor-General, insisting upon his sole THE EXECUTION OF ITS LAWS.
right to vote the stock owned by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, cast his ballot representing all of the
The Legislative Department of the Government adopted
stock of the Government, in favor of Alberto Barretto,
the law creating the charter of the National Coal
Frank B. Ingersoll, Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and
Company. The Legislative Department of the
Salvador Lagdameo, which ballot was rejected by the Government provided a method, in said charter, by
Chairman and the same was not allowed to be which it, through the President of the Senate and the
deposited.
Speaker of the House of Representatives, should assist
in the execution of said law.
Against the ruling of the Chairman, permitting the ballot
of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the It has been stated so frequently by eminent statesmen
House of Representatives to be deposited on behalf of and jurists, that it scarcely needs the citation of
the said "Voting Committee" a protest of the Governor-
authorities to support the doctrine, that wherever the
General was duly and timely presented. Notwithstanding
American flag flies as an emblem of Government, the
said protest on the part of the Governor-General, that
powers of that Government are divided into three distinct
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
and separate departments — Executive, Legislative and
House of Representatives had no authority to vote the Judicial — each acting in its own field, under its own
stock of the Government nor to participate in the voting authority and general powers of the government. While
of the same, the Chairman declared that Alberto
the line of demarcation, by division, is easily discerned, it
Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio
is at times difficult to follow in actual cases. There is a
Costas, and Anselmo Hilario had each received a
constant overlapping of the different departments of the
majority of the votes cast and that said persons had government which cannot be avoided, and yet such
been duly elected as members of the Board of Directors overlapping generally results in the greater stability and
of the National Coal Company.
permanency of the government. It is also a statement,
based upon political science, that scarcely needs
It will be noted that both the Governor-General, and the repetition, that one department overreaches its powers
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of whenever it steps across the line of demarcation and
Representatives voted for the election of Alberto attempts to function within the field of another
Barretto, and Frank B. Ingersoll. There is no objection in department of government under the American flag.
this record to the right of said persons to act as Under the form of government established in the
members of the Board of Directors. The contention of Philippine Islands, one department of the government
the Government is, that Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath has no power or authority to inquire into the acts of
and Salvador Lagdameo had been duly and legally another, which acts are performed within the discretion
elected as members of the Board of Directors by the of the other department. It is the general duty of the
vote of the Governor-General, and that Milton E. legislative branch of the government to make such laws
Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario had not and regulations as will effectually conserve the peace
been duly and legally elected as members of the Board and good order and protect the lives and the property of
of Directors by the vote of the President of the Senate the citizens of the state. It is the duty of the governor-
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and General to take such steps as he deems wise and
that they should be ousted and altogether excluded from necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. Every
their office. delay and hindrance and obstacle which prevents a strict
enforcement of laws necessarily tends to jeopardize
Considering the foregoing facts we have the question public interest and the safety of the whole people.
squarely presented, whether the persons elected by the (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87.)
Governor-General in voting the stock owned by the
Government had been duly and legally elected directors The different departments of the government are
of said company, or whether the persons elected by the coordinate, coequal and each functions independently,
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of uncontrolled and uncontrollable by the other. To that
Representatives were legally elected as such Directors. statement, however, there exist exceptions. For
example, the executive department of the government
may annul and set aside acts of the legislative necessary for wise legislation. The judicial department of
department of the government under its power of veto. the government is limited to the administration of justice
So may the legislative department of the government and the interpretation of laws. In case of differences
annul and set aside actions of the executive department between the executive and legislative departments as to
of the government by repealing or amending laws. So their respective powers, it has long since been conceded
likewise the judicial department of the government may that the Supreme Court shall act as an umpire.
annul and set aside acts of the legislative department of (Marbury vs.Madison [1803], 1 Cranch [U.S.] 137;
the government when such acts are contrary to the Rice vs. Austin, 19 Minn., 74; Luther vs. Borden, 7
fundamental laws of the state or beyond the powers of Howard [U.S.], 44; Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. [U. S.],
the legislative department. But in every case, where one 19.)
department, as above indicated, to any extent attempts
to control the effects of acts of the other department or No government, past or present, has more carefully and
departments, it is acting under its own power and within watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual
its own department. rights of life and property of its citizens than the
governments under the American flag. Each of the three
The Constitution of the United States as well as the departments of the government has had separate and
Constitution of each of the states of the United provide distinct functions to perform in this great labor. The
that the government shall be divided into three history of the United States, covering nearly a century
departments: executive, legislative, and judicial. George and a half, discloses the fact that each department has
Washington, who was the President of the Constitutional performed its part well. No one department of the
Convention which adopted the United States government can or ever has claimed, within its
Constitution, in a letter written to his friend Lafayette in discretionary power, a greater zeal than the others in its
1788, referring to the complete separation of the powers desire to promote the welfare of the individual citizens,
of the government, said: "These powers are so entities or corporations. They are all joined together in
distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial their respective spheres, harmoniously working to
branches, in which the powers of the government are maintain good government, peace and order, to the end
arranged that it can never be in danger of denigrating that the rights of each citizen be equally protected. No
into a monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or any one department can claim that it has a monopoly of
other despotic form of government as long as there shall these benign purposes of the government. Each
remain any virtue in the body of the people." department has an exclusive field within which it can
perform its part within certain legal and discretionary
Mr. Thomas Jefferson, who has been quoted on limits. No other department can claim a right to enter
questions relating to the meaning, force and application these legal and discretionary limits and assume to act
of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States there. No presumption of an abuse of these legal and
perhaps more than any other one person, said: "The discretionary powers by one department will be
great principle established by the Constitution of the considered or entertained by another. Generally such
United States which was never before fully established, conduct on the part of one department, instead of
was the separation of the delegated power into the tending to conserve the highest interest of the
hands of the executive, the legislative department, and government and its citizens and the rights of the people,
the judiciary. This is our system of check and balances would directly tend to destroy the confidence of the
which makes ours a 'government of laws and not of people in the government and to undermine the very
men.'" On another occasion Mr. Thomas Jefferson said, foundations of the government itself. (Barcelon vs. Baker
in discussing the necessity of limiting the power of and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87, 115; Forbes vs. Chuoco
government: "When it comes to a question of power — Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534.)
trust no man, bind him down from mischief, by the strong
chains of the Constitution." The Government of the Philippine Islands, like the
Government of the United States, is based upon the
By the well known distribution of the powers of fundamental principle of the separation of the executive,
government among the executive, legislative, and legislative, and judicial powers. Subject only to the
judicial departments by the constitution, there was exceptions especially established by the organic act,
provided that marvelous scheme of check and balances neither of the great department of the government may
which has been the wonder and admiration of the validly exercise any of the powers conferred upon either
statesmen, diplomats, and jurists in every part of the of the others. In the case of Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil.,
civilized world. 612) it was said: "The duties of each department are well
defined and limited to certain filed of governmental
operation." Each department exercises functions as
The balance of the powers of government provided for in
independent of each other as the Federal or state
the constitution as well as in the charter of the Philippine
Government was not the result of chance. The various governments of the Union. It was not intended by the
parts did not fall into place merely through the framers of the theory of our government that the duties
which had been assigned to the executive should be
vicissitudes of circumstance. They were devised by
performed by the legislative, nor that the duties which
careful foresight; each in a measure dependent upon the
had been assigned to each of them should be performed
others and not possessed of so much independence as
and directed by the judicial department. (Sinking Fund
to give freedom and courage in the exercise of their
Cases, 99 U. S., 700, 718; Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U. S.,
functions. Each was to move within its respective
361; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
spheres as the bodies of the celestial system march
along the pathways of the heaven. It is a fundamental
rule of constitutional law that no department of No well organized government or business even can be
government has power to perform nor to assist in well managed if one department can enter upon the field
performing the functions of another. of another and attempt to administer or interfere in the
administration of the other. (Abueva vs. Wood, supra;
Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; U.
The executive department is limited to the execution
S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7, 27.)
of valid laws adopted by the legislative department of the
government. The legislative department is limited to the
enactment of laws and to the investigation of facts
In the case of Kilbourne vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168) it Mr. Justice Cooley, one of the greatest expounders of
was said: "It is also essential to the successful working constitutional law, said: "The legislative power, we
of the system, that the persons entrusted with power in understand, to be the authority, under the constitution, to
any one of these branches shall not be permitted to make laws and to alter and repeal them."
encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but
that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the Mr. Biddel, an eminent lawyer, said: "The legislature has
exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department no other duty nor power than to make laws. After a law
and no other." has been enacted, that department has no further power
over the subject except to amend or repeal it. It can
Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1917 (Act No. neither adjudge the law nor execute it. All power of that
2711) provides: "The executive, legislative, and judicial department is ended."
powers of the Philippine Government are distributed,
respectively, among the executive, legislative, and Mr. James Wilson, who was a member of the convention
judicial branches, severally exercising the functions and which adopted the Constitution of the United States, and
powers conferred on them by law. later one of the first members of the Supreme Court of
the United States, and one of the very ablest of the
Each department of the government has an exclusive members of that great body, in discussing the question
field within which it can perform its part within certain of the powers of the legislative department of the
discretionary limits. No other department can claim a government, said, quoting from an able English
right to enter these discretionary limits and assume to statesman: "England can never be ruined but by a
act there. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, supra; U. Parliament (legislative department), which demonstrates
S. vs. Bull, supra; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and the danger of allowing to the legislative department any
Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., other (power) than strictly legislative powers."
322; Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial
Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366; Province of Even the Justice of the Supreme Court joined in a letter
Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 338.) addressed to President Washington upon the general
subject of the separation of the departments of
In the case of United States vs. Ang Tang Ho (43 Phil., government, and insisted upon a scrupulous and
1) this court said that the legislature has no authority to undeviated maintenance of the separation of the
execute or construe the law, the executive has no departments.
authority to make or construe the law. Subject to the
constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme Mr. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander
within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the judiciary only Hamilton, who were among the great expounders of the
to say when an act of the legislature is or is not Constitution, wrote earnestly upon the question of the
constitutional. It is beyond the power of any branch of separation of the departments of government, and, with
the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its many others, united in protesting against tolerating the
functions in any other way than that prescribed by the claim of the legislative department to exercise any other
Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the than purely legislative power.
Organic Law. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 96.)
It has been said in many of the leading cases decided by
It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to the highest courts of record that "the power of the
enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish legislature is the power to legislate only and to make
the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the such investigations as are necessary for that purpose."
Chief Executive. (Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil.,
599.) Under a constitutional form of government it is believed
that all will agree that the concentration of power in the
From all of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable, legislative department of government or in any one of
that if any given act of the Philippine Legislature does the other departments will inevitably result in despotism.
not, by its nature, pertain to the law-making function, but
is either executive or judicial in character, and does not Mr. Bryce, who for many years was a close student of
fall within any of the express exceptions established by
the system of government under the American flag, said:
the Organic Act, such an act is ultra vires and therefore
"A legislature is a legislature and nothing more." Mr.
null and void. (See, for a discussion of the powers of the
Woodrow Wilson, in discussing the powers of the
executive department of the Government, the opinion by
executive and legislative departments of government,
the late Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano in the case said: "The power of the legislative department is to enact
of In re Patterson, 1 Phil., 93.)
laws, while it is the duty of the President to see that the
laws of Congress are failthfully executed."
POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF
GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG
A careful reading of the debates, in the Constitutional
Convention, by the greatest statesmen and diplomats at
Some one has said that the powers of the legislative that time shows clearly that one of their greatest
department of the Government, like the boundaries of concerns was the limitation upon the powers of the
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, executive and legislative departments. A reading of the
however, as well as governments acting under Constitution itself adopted after a long discussion shows
delegated authority, the powers of each of the clearly that its members intended to expressly limit the
departments of the same are limited and confined within powers of said departments. In the enumeration of the
the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each powers of the three departments the phrase that each
department can only exercise such powers as are "shall" or "shall not" do a particular thing is frequently
expressly given and such other powers as are found. No general unlimited power is found. Experience
necessarily implied from the given powers. The had shown that there was need of curbing the legislative
constitution is the shore of legislative authority against body in order to prevent a violation of the citizens' right
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but of liberty and property. The members of the Constitution
over which they cannot leap. Convention made an effort to strike at the very root of
the evils which the people of the state had suffered by The only legislative authority possessed by the
the madness of a sovereign legislative body. Philippine Legislature is a delegated authority. The only
power or authority to legislate is granted by the
James Madison, a member of the Convention, and later Congress of the United States by the charter (Jones
President of the United States, said: "Experience had Law; Act of July 2, 1902). To ascertain the power of the
proved a tendency in our governments (state Philippine Legislature, therefore, an examination of its
governments) to throw all power into the legislative charter must be made.
vortex. The executives of the states are, in general, little
more than ciphers; the legislature, omnipotent. If no It is argued that when either the President or the
effectual check be devised in restraining the instability Congress of the United States gives express or tacit
and encroachment of the latter, a revolution of some approval to an Act of the Philippine Legislature, that
kind or other would be inevitable." such an act thereby becomes a valid subsisting law.
That argument is tenable, except when such act is
Gouverneur Morris, one of the great statesmen of his beyond the powers granted to the Legislature. The
time, said that "he concurred in thinking the public liberty approval by the President or Congress of an act of the
in greater danger from legislative usurpation than from Philippine Legislature does not render such an act legal
any other source." (July 21, 1787.) if, in fact, the same is beyond the powers of the
Legislature or contrary to the fundamental law of the
James Madison, in September, 1787, in speaking of the land. If the provisions of the act extend beyond the
encroachments of the legislative department, said: "The powers of the Legislature, then certainly it cannot be
contended that the same is a valid and legal act even
experience of the states had demonstrated that their
checks are insufficient. The legislative department is though the same has been expressly or tacitly approved
everywhere extending the spheres of its activity and by the President or Congress, unless the same can be
draining all power into its impetuous vortex. I have considered an act of the congress of the United States
appealed to experience for the truth of what I advance and then only, when the same is within the power and
authority of Congress. Such act of the Philippine
on this subject."
Legislature, even with such approval, can be no more
valid and legal than if the Congress of the United States
Mr. James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional itself had adopted a law which was beyond its power.
Convention and one of the first members of the Supreme The legality of such act, notwithstanding the approval,
Court of the United States, said on the 16th day of June, may be decided in a proper proceeding for the purpose
1787: "If the legislative authority be not restrained there of determining whether its provisions are beyond the
can be neither liberty nor stability." powers of the legislative department of the government.

The great statesmen who were among the members of The general legislative powers granted to the Philippine
the Constitutional Convention were as solicitous about Legislature and found in sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 of the
the limitations of the executive department of the Act of August 29, 1916, and those provisions of the Act
government, as they were concerning the limitations of of July 2, 1902, which have not been repealed. Section 6
the legislative department. They were exceedingly provides that the laws now in force in the Philippines
cautious in defining the powers of each of said shall continue in force, except as altered, amended or
departments, and so far as their knowledge and modified herein, until altered, amended or repealed by
experience aided them their work was complete. the legislative authority herein provided by the Act of
Congress.
POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINES LEGISLATURE,
GRANTED BY THE PHILIPPINE CHARTER Section 7 provides that the legislative authority herein
provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with
Turning to the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, this Act, by due enactment, to amend, alter, modify or
commonly known as the "Jones Law," for the purpose of repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this
ascertaining what power or authority to legislate was Act, as it may from time to time see fit.
granted to the Philippine Legislature, we find that, while
the legislature was given "general legislative power" Section 8 provides that general legislative power, except
(secs. 7, 8, 12), "all laws enacted by the Philippine as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the
Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act. Section 12,
United States, which reserved the power and authority to among other things, provides that general legislative
annul the same." Not only must all laws enacted by the power in the Philippines, except as herein otherwise
Philippine Legislature be reported to Congress for provided, shall be vested in the Legislature, which shall
approval but certain laws, in addition to the requirement consist of two houses, one the Senate and the other, the
that they must be submitted to Congress, must be House of Representatives, and the two houses shall be
submitted to the President of the United States for designated "the Philippine Legislature."
approval (secs. 9, 10, and 19). In other words, no act of
the Philippine Legislature can have the force and effect
of a law until it has been either expressly or tacitly From a reading of said sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 we have
approved either by the Congress of the United Statesor some difficulty in determining why it was necessary to
repeat practically the same idea concerning the
by the President. Neither will it be contended that the
legislative authority in said sections. The provisions of
express or tacit approval by the Congress of the United
sections 6, 7, and 12 add nothing to the provisions of
States or by the President, of a law otherwise illegal and
section 8 which granted general legislative power to the
void, will render such law valid if, in fact, it was adopted
without power or authority. Philippine Legislature.

We have read said Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE
in vain, to find the slightest reference to the power of the
TO ENACT LAWS IS WHOLLY A DELEGATED
AUTHORITY Philippine Legislature to participate in the slightest
degree, by legislation or otherwise, in the execution of its
laws even after they have been approved expressly or
tacitly by the President or Congress, unless such power other department, legislative or judicial, or with any of
is found in that provision of the law, and then only in the the bureaus of the Government. All executive functions
Philippine Senate, which gives that branch of the of the Philippine Government are expressly under the
Legislature the right to participate, with its advice and direction and control of the Governor-General.
consent, in the appointment of certain officers the
Government. But even that provision can scarcely be Outside of the provisions for the internal regulation and
construed to mean that the Senate can participate in the control of the affairs of the legislature, its rules and
execution of the laws. regulations in its relation with the confirmation of certain
appointees by the Governor-General, there is not a
THE ONLY SOVEREIGN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS syllable, a word, a phrase, a line, nor a paragraph in the
IS THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES Jones Law which permits the legislature to participate in
the execution of its general or special laws.
The people of the Philippine Islands exercise in all
matter of government a delegated authority. The It is a fundamental maxim of political science,
executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments of recognized and carried into effect in the Federal
the government are merely exercising a delegated Constitution and the constitutions of all the states of the
authority. These departments, unlike the departments of Union, that good government and the protection of rights
Government in the United States under the Constitution, require that the legislative, executive, and the judicial
have received no authority from the people of the powers should not be confided to the same person or
Philippine Islands. In the absence of Congressional body, but should be apportioned to separate and
authority, these departments have no authority or power. mutually independent departments of the government.
They are each creatures of the Congress of the United (Black's Constitutional Law, p. 83.)
States. Like all agents, they must act within the authority
given. The title of acts of the Philippine Legislature, by The idea of an apportionment of the powers of
which it assumes to enact laws "by its own authority" is government, and of their separation into three coordinate
an assumption of authority not possessed in fact nor in departments is not a modern invention of political
law. It acts by authority of the Congress of the United science. It was suggested by Aristotle in his treatise on
States and in the enactment of laws that authority should "Politics." and was not unfamiliar to the more advanced
be recognized. of the medieval jurists. But the importance of this division
of powers, with the principle of classification, were never
RIGHT OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO APPOINT fully apprehended, in theory, until Montesquieu gave to
COMMITTEES TO MAKE INVESTIGATIONS IN the world his great work "Spirit of the Laws." Since then
ORDER TO ENACT WISE LEGISLATION. his analysis of the various powers of the state has
formed part of the accepted political doctrine of the
In addition to the power to enact, the Philippine civilized world.
Legislature has the inherent power on its own account,
or through committees appointed by it, to inquire into the All American constitutions, state and Federal, provide for
general condition of the government, the administration the separation of the three great powers of government,
of governmental affairs and the general welfare of the and their apportionment to distinct and independent
people, to obtain information to aid it in adopting wise departments of government.
legislation. When such investigation is terminated and
laws are adopted, then the authority of the legislature is The principle of the separation of the three departments
ended and the execution of such laws is turned over to of the government imposes upon each the limitation that
the Executive Department of the Government. it must not usurp the powers nor encroach upon the
jurisdiction of either of the others.
THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE
UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE The people of the United States ordained in their
GOVERNMENT constitution that "all legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." The
From a further examination of the Act of Congress of people also declared that "the executive power shall be
August 29, 1916, in relation with the Act of Congress of vested in a President" and that "the judicial power of the
July 2, 1902, we find a depository of power and authority United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
created for the express purpose of executing the laws of in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
the Philippines. (Section 21 of said Act (August 29, time ordain and establish." It is made clear therefore that
1916) provides "that the supreme executive power shall the power to legislate is given to the Congress and that
be vested in an executive officer whose official title shall the President and the courts are prohibited from making
be the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands." It laws. The legislature cannot lawfully usurp any of the
occurs to us that when the Congress of the United functions granted by the Constitution to the executive
States used the words "supreme executive power" that department. The true meaning of the constitutional
the phrase was used after a careful consideration of its division of governmental powers is simply that the whole
meaning. It was not a haphazard use of the term. The power of one of the three departments of government
use of that phrase was carefully considered by the shall not be exercised by the same hand which
Congress of the United States when the Jones Bill was possesses the whole power of either of the other
under consideration. In addition to the enumerated departments.
powers conferred upon the "supreme executive power,"
we find that he is held responsible for the faithful Mr. Baker, who was Secretary of War of the United
execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands." The States at the time the Jones Law was adopted, and who
language of section 22 is "he shall be responsible for the perhaps was more familiar with its meaning and purpose
faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands." than any other one person, wrote a letter to Governor-
There is nothing in any of the provisions of the Jones General Harrison, in which he said in general terms that
Law which authorizes or permits the "supreme executive "it would seem to be the part of wisdom for the President
power" to divide its responsibility for the faithful and the Governor-General to admit of no encroachment
execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands with any on those powers and placed in their hands."
Energy and constancy in the executive department of Assembly — which form continued up to the 16th day of
the government is a leading element in the definition of October, 1916. The Governor-General during that period
good government. They are essential to the protection of not only possessed the executive powers of the
the people of the state against foreign attack; they are Government, but acted as a member of the branch of the
not les essential to the steady administration of the law; legislative department, known as the United States
to the protection of property against those irregular and Philippine Commission.
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt
the ordinary course of justice and administration of the Fifth. Legislative Department of the Government
law; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and Separated from the Executive Department. — From the
assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. A feeble 16th day of October, 1916, until the present time, by
executive in the administration of his department implies virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law, the executive
a feeble execution of the government. A feeble and legislative departments of the Government have
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and been separated, each constituting a separate and
a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, distinct department of government; the first, represented
must be, in practice, a bad government. Delay in the by the Governor-General and the second, by the
administration of the laws will lead to injustice, Philippine Legislature.
dissensions, turmoils, and disorder.
In each of the separate forms of government above
While the legislature has authority to adopt laws and the mentioned there existed the executive, legislative and
courts are possessed with power to construe them, yet judicial powers fully established and recognized by the
finally in its largest sense, the administration of a only authority for the existence of said Government, —
government and the execution of the laws so adopted the Government of the United States.
and construed is finally left in the hands of the executive
department of the government.
DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHEN ADVISED OF ILLEGALITY OF A
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE EXISTED IN LAW — HE MAY DISREGARD IT OR FORMULATE A
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SINCE AMERICAN PROPER ISSUE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE COURT
OCCUPATION CONCERNING ITS LEGALITY.

Since the 13th day of August, 1898, there have existed It is the sworn duty of the Governor-General of the
in the Philippines several district forms of Government. Philippines to execute the laws. That duty, however,
does not require him to execute an illegal act of the
First. A Military Government. — From the 13th day of Legislature. When he is advised by his legal department
August, 1898, until the 1st day of September, 1900, that a certain act, or any part thereof, of the Legislature
there existed a Military Government in the Philippine is illegal and void, he may do one of two things: (a) He
Islands under the authority of the President of the United may disregard it and refuse to executive it, or (b) he may
States. That Government exercised all of the powers of formulate an issue upon the alleged illegality and have
government, including executive, legislative, and judicial. that question presented to the courts for solution. He is
acting within his powers whichever to these courses he
Second. Divided Military and Civil Government. — From elects to take. To disregard an illegal and void act of the
the 1st day of September, 1900, to July 4, 1901, the Legislature is neither tyranny nor a violation of his sworn
legislative department of the Government was duty. It would be a violation of his sworn duty to enforce
transferred from the Military Governor to the United or permit the enforcement of an illegal act.
States Philippine Commission, to be thereafter exercised
by said Commission in the place and stead of the RIGHT OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS TO
Military Government, under such rules and regulations CONSTRUE POWERS GRANTED UNDER THE
as the Secretary of War might prescribe, until the CONSTITUTION OR CHARTER
establishment of the Civil Central Government for the
Islands, or until Congress should otherwise provide. While in many jurisdictions a provisions exists by virtue
During that period the executive authority was vested in of which the executive and legislative departments may,
the Military Governor while the legislative authority was in case of doubt as to their powers, refer the question to
vested in the Philippine Commission. (See Instructions the courts for decision, no such provision exists in the
of the President of the United States to the United States Philippines. In the absence of such provision it becomes
Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900.) On the 4th day of necessary therefore in the first instance, when a duty is
July, 1901, the executive power theretofore possessed to be performed, for said departments to pass upon the
by the Military Governor was transferred to the President question of their power to act. Every department of
of the United States Philippine Commission. government invested with constitutional or charter
powers must, in many instances, be the judge of their
Third. Civil Government. — From the 4th day of July, powers, or they could not act. Such interpretation of their
1901, to the 16th day of October, 1907, the executive powers is not exclusive. The parties aggrieved may
and legislative powers of the Philippine Government resort to the courts for a judicial interpretation. (Cooley's
were possessed by the United States Philippine Constitutional Limitations, 73.)
Commission. The President of the Commission not only
possessed and exercised the executive power of the EXCLUSIVE DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
Government but sat as a member of the United States TO PROTECT THE PROPERTY OF THE
Philippine Commission as a member of the legislative GOVERNMENT
department of the Government.
It is the duty of the Governor-General, as the supreme
Fourth. Legislative Department of the Government executive power, to protect the property of the
Divided into Two Branches. — On the 16th day of Government. If he, by negligence or inattention to that
October, 1907, the Legislative Department of the responsibility, permits the property of the Government to
Government was divided into two branches — the be wasted, destroyed or lost, he subjects himself to the
United States Philippine Commission, and the Philippine danger of impeachment. His responsibility is then one of
great seriousness. He should not supinely disregard it. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his
While the legislative department of the Government may valuable work on Statutory Construction. In section 111
adopt laws for safeguarding and protecting the property, he says that:
public and private, it cannot intervene in the enforcement
of such law. The legislative department would thereby be In the construction and application of this
taking part, not only in the enactment of laws but in the constitutional restriction the courts have kept
execution of the same, which is not permitted under the steadily in view the correction of the mischief
American Constitution and system of laws. against which it was aimed. The object is to
prevent the practice, which was common in all
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY LEGISLATIVE legislative bodies where no such restriction
DEPARTMENT FURNISHES NO CRITERION AS TO existed, of embracing in the same bill
REAL POWERS incongruous matters having no relation to each
other, or to the subject specified in the title, by
In support of the contention that the President of the which measures were often adopted without
Senate and the Speaker of the house of attracting attention. Such distinct subjects
Representatives, under Act No. 2705 as amended by represented diverse interests, and were
Act No. 2822, have a right to intervene in the execution combined in order to unite the members of the
of said laws, our attention is called to many acts of legislature who favor either in support of all.
legislative bodies, where such bodies have not only These combinations were corruptive of the
enacted laws but have made provisions in the same, by legislature and dangerous to the State.
which they have intervened in their execution. The cited Such omnibus bills sometimes included more
cases support the allegations of the respondents. Our than a hundred sections on as many different
attention is called especially to Acts Nos. 69, 1415, subjects, with a title appropriate to the first
1841, 1849, 1870, 1981, 2023, 2479, 2510, 2598, 2957 section, 'and for other purposes.
and 3208 as well as to many acts of the legislatures of
different states of the Union. It is true that in each of the The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the
various acts cited, of the Philippine Legislature, a object intended to be accomplished by the
provision is made for the appointment of certain persons legislation often resulted in members voting
to assist in their execution. ignorantly for measures which they would not
knowingly have approved. And not only were
No question has ever been raised concerning the legislators thus misled, but the public also; so
powers of the Legislature in respect of said acts. The that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed
mere fact, however, that the legality of said acts has through in the closing hours of a session, which,
never been questioned and their legality has been having no merit to commend them, would have
passed sub silentio, does not create a conclusive been made odious by popular discussion and
presumption that they were in fact adopted within the remonstrance if their pendency had been
powers of the legislative department of the Government. reasonably announced. The constitutional
The fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and clause under discussion is intended to correct
invoked and applied for many years in cases where its these evils; to prevent such corrupting
validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a aggregations of incongruous measures by
court from later passing on its validity where the question confining each act to one subject or object; to
is properly raised and presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring
and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, and cases cited.) that subject or object to be expressed in the title.

LEGALITY OF THAT PROVISION OF ACT NO. 2705, In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the
AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 2822, CREATING THE Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as
"VOTING COMMITTEE" follows — citing and quoting from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 143:
In addition to the contention that the Legislature, by
virtue of the provisions of Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822, not The object sought to be accomplished and the
only attempted to legislate but to participate in the mischief proposed to be remedied by this
execution of its laws, there is still another objection of provision are will known. Legislative assemblies
the legality of that provision of said acts which creates for the dispatch of business often pass bills by
the "Voting Committee." One of the inhibitions against their titles only, without requiring them to be
the powers of the Philippine Legislature is found in one read. A specious title sometimes covered
of the subparagraphs of section 3 of the Jones Law. legislation which, if its real character had been
Said subparagraph provides: "That no bill (public or disclosed, would not have commanded assent.
private) which may be enacted into law shall embrace To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature
more than one subject, and that subject shall be is one of the purposes this provision was
expressed in the title of the bill." The title of Act No. 2705 intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of
reads: "An Act to create the National Coal Company." this provision, the title of a statute was often no
The title of Act No. 2822 is: "An Act to amend Certain indication of its subject or contents.
Sections of Act No. 2705, Entitled 'An Act to create the
National Coal Company.'" Act No. 2822 does not amend An evil this constitutional requirement was
that provision of Act No. 2705 relating to the "Voting intended to correct was the blending in one and
Committee." The inhibition, therefore, of the Jones Law the same statute of such things as were diverse
need not be discussed with reference to the provisions in their nature, and were connected only to
of Act No. 2822. combine in favor of all the advocates of each,
thus often securing the passage of several
Many of the states of the Union have adopted similar measures, no one of which could have
constitutional provisions. The purpose of this legislative succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus
restriction and the evils sought to be remedied thereby sums up his review of the authorities defining the
are clearly stated by Mr. Sutherland, now an Associate objects of this provision: "It may, therefore, be
assumed as settled, that the purpose of this
 provision was: First, to prevent hodge-podge, or Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations
log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent (pp. 179, 180) states that our courts have held, without
surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means exception, that such constitutional provision
of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no is mandatory. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883.)
information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally Inasmuch as the body of said Act contains a provision to
adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, which no reference is made in the title, in view of the well
through such publication of legislative established authorities, we are forced to the conclusion
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects that, that provision creating the "Voting Committee" is
of legislation that are being considered, in order illegal. That illegality, however, is one which may be
that they may have opportunity of being heard separated from the rest of the act without affecting the
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so legality of the other provisions.
desire.'
THE "VOTING COMMITTEE" AS PUBLIC OFFICERS
"The practice," says the Supreme Court of Missouri, "of OF THE GOVERNMENT
comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and
antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support
It is argued most earnestly by the petitioner, and denied
members who were in favor of particular measures, but
with equal earnestness by the respondents, that the
neither of which measures could command the requisite President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
majority on its own merits, was found to be not only a Representatives, acting as members of the "Voting
corrupting influence in the Legislature itself, but
Committee" in participating in voting the stock of the
destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was National Coal Company, were acting as public officials of
not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice
the government and that the legislature is without
by which, though dexterous and unscrupulous
authority to appoint public officials for that purpose or to
management, designing men inserted clauses in the appoint public officials at all for any purpose. It is
bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles
admitted by both parties that the National Coal Company
gave no indications, and by skillful maneuvering urged
is a private corporation. It is admitted that the
them on to their passage. These things led to fraud,
Government of the Philippine Islands is a stockholder.
surprise, and injury, and it was found necessary to apply
The law provides that the Governor-General, the
a corrective in the share of a constitutional provision." President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House
(City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 578, 590.)
of Representatives at a stockholders' meeting shall act
as a committee for the purpose of voting said stock.
The authorities are to all intents uniform that this Does that fact make the President of the Senate and the
constitutional requirement is mandatory and not Speaker of the House of Representatives public
directory. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section officials? In the voting of the stock do they stand in any
112, states the rule correctly as follows: different relation to the Government and the National
Coal Company than any other holders of stock? Are they
The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to not governed by the same laws, and by-laws of the
cure the evil and mischief which has been corporation like other stockholders?
pointed out, depends on judicial enforcement; on
this constitutional injunction being regarded Mr. Justice Marshall, in the case of the Bank of the
as mandatory, and compliance with it essential United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia (22 U. S.,
to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed 904 [Feb. 18, 1824]), in discussing the question of the
notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of relation of the Government to private corporation when it
legislators; it might be expected to continue becomes a stockholder in a private corporation, said,
notwithstanding that obligation is formulated and among other things: "It is, we think, a sound principle,
emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it that when a government becomes a partner in any
be construed as addressed exclusively to them, trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
and only directory. It would, in a general sense, transactions of that company, of its sovereign character,
be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed communicating to the company (or corporation) its
or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the privileges and its (sovereign) prerogatives, it descends
legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question to a level with those with whom its associates itself, and
that such was the intention of the framers of that takes the character which belongs to its associates, and
instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the to the business which is to be transacted . . . . . As a
proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that member of a corporation, a Government never exercises
it descends to prescribing rules of order in its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and
unessential matters which may be followed or exercises no other powers in the management of the
disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the
whatever constitutional provision can be looked incorporating act. The Government of the Union held
upon as directory merely is very likely to be shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the
treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of privileges of the Government were not imparted by that
moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually circumstance to the bank. The State of Georgia, by
disregarded. giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued,
voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far
In the case of Walker vs. State, supra, the court said: as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all
the privileges of that character."
It is the settled law of this court, founded on
reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that The doctrine announced by Chief Justice Marshall in that
this provision of the constitution is not a mere case has been followed without modification not only by
rule of legislative procedure, directory to the the courts but by all of the eminent authors who have
general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it written upon that particular question. (Thompson on
is the duty of courts to declare void any statute Corporations, vol. 1, sec. 167; Bank of
not conforming to it. Kentucky vs. Wister, 27 U. S., 318, 322;
Briscoe vs. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U. S., 256, 324; The question of the validity of every statute is
Liuisville Railway Co. vs. Letson, 43 U. S., 497, 550; first determined by the legislative department of
Curran vs. State of Arkansas, 56 U. S., 302; Veazie the Government, and the courts will resolve
Bank vs. Fenno, 75 U. S., 533; Railroad every presumption in favor of its validity. Courts
Co. vs. Commissioner, 103 U. S., 1, 5; are not justified in adjudging a statute invalid in
Hopkins vs. Clemson College, 221 U. S., 636, 644; the face of the conclusions of the legislature,
Putnan vs. Ruch, 56 Fed., 416; Wester Union Tel. when the question of its validity is at all doubtful.
Co. vs. Herderson, 68 Fed., 591; U. S. vs. Chesapeake The courts will assume that the validity of a
& D. Canal Co., 206 Fed., 964; Encyclopedia of the U. S. statute was fully considered by the legislature
Supreme Court Rep., vol. 11, p. 225; Encyclopedia of when adopted. Courts will not presume a statute
the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 3, p. 124; invalid unless it clearly appears that it falls within
Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 4, p. some of the inhibitions of the fundamental laws
643.) of the state. The wisdom or advisability of a
particular statute is not a question for the courts
The petitioner as well as the respondents cite many to determine. If a particular statute is within the
cases in support of their respective contentions. The constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it
petitioner cites the following cases: should be sustained whether the courts agree or
not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute
Pratt vs. Breckinridge (112 Ky., 1); State vs. Brill (100 covers subject not authorized by the
Minn., 499); State vs. Denny (118 Ind., 382; 4 L. R. A., fundamental laws of the land, or by the
79); State vs. Washburn (167 Mo., 680); constitution, them the courts are not only
State vs. Stanley (66 N. C., 60); Welker vs. Bledsoe (68 authorized but are justified in pronouncing the
N. C., 457); Howerton vs. Tate (68 N. C., 546); same illegal and void, no matter how wise or
Myers vs. United States (272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., beneficent such legislation may seem to be.
160); Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599). Courts are not justified in measuring their
opinions with the opinion of the legislative
department of the Government, as expressed in
Cases cited by respondents: statutes, upon questions of the wisdom, justice
and advisability of a particular law. In exercising
The Smithsonian Institution; Mechem's Public Officers, the high authority conferred upon the courts to
sec. 1; Olmstead vs. Mayor (42 N. Y. Sup. Ct., pronounce valid or invalid a particular statute,
481); United States vs. Germaine (99 U. S., they are only the administrators of the public will,
508); McArthur vs. Nelson (81 Ky., 67); Congressional as expressed in the fundamental law of the land.
Reports, vol. II; State vs. Kennon (7 Ohio State, 562). If an act of the legislature is to be held illegal, it
is not because the judges have any control over
See also: the legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and
Walker vs. City of Cincinnati (21 Ohio State, 14; 8 Am. because the will of the people, as declared in
Rep., 24); State vs. Hocker (39 Fla., 477; 63 Am. St. such fundamental law, is paramount and must
rep., 174); Butler vs. Walker (98 Ala., 358). be obeyed, even by the legislature. In
pronouncing a statute illegal, the courts are
simply interpreting the meaning, force, and
After a careful analysis of all of the authorities cited, it is
application of the fundamental law of the state.
difficult to conclude just what is the weight of authority, in
(Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil.,
view of the decision of chief Justice Marshall quoted
250, 251.)
above. If the Government acts merely as one of the
corporators of the National Coal Company and exercises
no other power in the management of the affairs of the The judicial department of the Government may examine
corporation than the one expressly given by the every law enacted by the legislative branch of the
Incorporatory Act, it is difficult to understand how the Government when the question is properly presented for
"Voting Committee" is acting as a public officer. It was the purpose of ascertaining:
not the intention of the Legislature to make the President
and Speaker officers of the Government. The Legislature (a) Whether or not such law came within the subject-
simply intended to add additional duties to said officers. matter upon which the legislative branch of the
But after all, in our opinion, the fact that the Legislature Government might legislate; and
enacted the law and at the same time provided that,
through the President and Speaker, it (the Legislature) (b) Whether the provisions of such law were in harmony
should assist in the execution of the same, is sufficient to with the authority given the legislature.
nullify that provision. It is a matter of no importance in
what capacity they acted. The Legislature had no If the judicial branch of the Government finds (a) that the
authority to take part in the execution of the particular legislative or executive branches of the Government had
law. authority to act upon the particular subject, and (b) that
the particular law contained no provisions in excess of
THE RIGHT OF THE COURT OF DECIDE THE the powers of such department and the acts of the
QUESTION, WHAT ARE THE RESPECTIVE POWERS executive were within his powers, then that investigation,
OF THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF or that conclusion, conclusively terminates the
GOVERNMENT. investigation by the judicial department of the
Government.
It is conceded by all of the eminent authorities upon
constitutional law that the courts have authority to finally SOLICITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
determine what are the respective powers of the UNITED STATES AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN
different departments of government. THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR THE WELFARE AND
WELL BEING OF THE INHABITANTS.
No Government, past or present, has more carefully and greater powers, rights, or privileges than any
watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual other corporation which might be organized for
rights of life and property of the citizens of the Philippine the same purpose under the Corporation Law. It
Islands than the Government of the United States and its was not the intention of the Legislature to give it
representatives. Each of the three departments of the a preference, or right, or privilege over other
Government has had separate and distinct functions to legitimate private corporations in the mining of
perform in this great labor. The history of the Philippine coal. The law made no provision for its
Islands, covering a period of more than a quarter of a occupation and operation of coal-bearing lands,
century, discloses the fact that each department has to the exclusion of other persons or corporation,
performed its part well. No one department of the under proper permission. The National Coal
Government can or ever has claimed, within its Company being a private corporation, neither
discretionary and legal powers, a greater zeal than the the lessee nor the owner of the lands upon
others in its desire to promote the welfare of the which it mined coal for the year in question, is
individual citizen. They are all joined together in their subject to the payment of the internal revenue
respective spheres and departments, harmoniously duty provided for in section 1496 of the
working to maintain good government, peace, and order Administrative Code.
to the end that the rights of each citizen in his life and
property be equally protected. No one department can The National Coal Company, having been created and
claim that it has a monopoly of these benign purposes of established by the Philippine Legislature for the purpose
the Government. Each department has an exclusive of developing the coal industry in the Philippine Islands,
field, under the law, within which it can perform its part, in harmony with the general plan of the Government to
within certain discretionary limits. No other department encourage the development of the natural resources of
can claim a right to enter these discretionary and legal the country, what relation does it bear with said
limits and assume to act there. No presumption of an Government? Is it an agency or instrumentality thereof
abuse of these discretionary powers by one department empowered to perform some government act or function
will be considered, permitted or entertained by another. for governmental purposes?
Such conduct on the part of one department, instead of
tending to conserve good government and the rights of
Agency or instrumentality is defined to be a means by
the people, would directly tend to destroy the confidence
which a certain act is done (2 C.J., 420; 32 C.J., 947).
of the people in the Government and to undermine the
So governmental agency or instrumentality may be
very foundation of the Government itself. defined as a means by which a government acts, or by
which a certain governmental act or function is
CONCLUSIONS performed. A governmental act is a term sometimes
used to describe an act done in pursuance of some duty
For all of the foregoing reasons the petition for the imposed by the state on a person, individual or
extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto should be corporate, which duty is one pertaining to the
granted, and that Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, administration of government and as an absolute
and Anselmo Hilario are each illegally and unlawfully obligation on a person who receives no profit or
occupying the position of members of the Board of advantage peculiar to himself for its execution (28 C.J.,
Directors of the National Coal Company and should be 753, n. 1). Naturally, when a government acts it does so
ousted and altogether excluded therefrom; that for purposes of its own. Now, what is the purpose of
Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Health, and Salvador government? "A government does not exist in a personal
Lagdameo have been duly and legally elected as sense, or as an entity in any primary sense, for the
members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal purpose of acquiring, protecting, and enjoying property.
Company, and judgment is rendered that they be It exists primarily for the protection of the people in their
immediately inducted into said position, to take charge individual rights, and it holds property not primarily for
thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon them the enjoyment of property accumulations, but as an
as members of the Board of Directors. The demurrer is incident to the purpose for which it exists — that of
overruled. Considering the petition and demurrer in serving the people and protecting them in their rights."
relation with the stipulated facts, there seems to be no (Curley vs. U. S., 130 Fed., 1, 8; 28 C.J., 750.) "The term
reason for permitting an answer to be filed. And without governmental purposes, as used in the constitution
any finding as to costs, it is so ordered. which provides that public property taken for public
purposes is exempt from taxation, means, in its most
AVANCEÑA, C.J., VILLAMOR and VILLA- extensive sense, the punishment for crime, for
REAL, JJ., dissenting: prevention of a wrong, the enforcement of a private right,
or in some manner preventing wrong from being inflicted
upon the public or an individual, or redressing some
Much to our regret we have to dissent from the majority
whose opinion has always commanded our respect. grievance, or in some way enforcing a legal right, or
redressing or preventing a public individual injury. (City
of Owensboro vs. Com., 105 Ky., 344; 28 C.J., 753, n.
In the case of National Coal Company vs. Collector of 8).
Internal Revenue (46 Phil., 583), this court said:
In the light of the above definitions, let us inquire what
THE NATIONAL COAL COMPANY, A PRIVATE governmental act or function does the National Coal
CORPORATION; SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT Company perform and for what governmental purposes.
OF INTERNAL REVENUE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1496 OF THE
As was stated by this court in the above cited case, "As
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — The National Coal
Company is a private corporation. The fact that a private corporation, it has no greater rights, powers, or
privileges than any other corporation which might be
the Government happens to be a stockholder
organized for the same purpose under the Corporation
therein does not make it a public corporation. It
Law. It was not the intention of the legislature to give it a
is subject to all the provisions of the Corporation
preference, or right, or privilege over other legitimate
Law in so far as they are not inconsistent with
Act No. 2705. As a private corporation, it has no private corporations in the mining of coal. The law made
no provision for its occupation and operation of coal-
bearing lands to the exclusion of other persons or The Government of the Philippine Islands, as a
corporations, under proper permission." It is subject to stockholder, has a right to participate in the election of
the payment of internal revenue tax on its coal output. the Directors of the National Coal Company by the
The Philippine Government owns nothing in said exercise of its voting power. In so doing it acts merely as
corporation except the stock which it has purchased a corporator with no other power than are expressly
therein. The National Coal Company cannot perform any granted by the Corporation Law, and does not exercise
governmental act, for it has not been authorized to do its sovereignty. It cannot impose its sovereign will, but it
so. The fact that it has been created and established for must act according to the by-laws of the corporation. The
the purpose of developing the coal industry in the only control it has is what is given to it by the amount of
Philippine Islands, in harmony with the general plan of its stock.
the Government to encourage the development of the
natural resources of the country, and the fact that the The Government, as stockholder, has a right to appoint
Government owns a majority of the stock thereof, are not or designate a proxy to vote its stock in the National
alone sufficient to give the National Coal Company the Coal Company, and the Philippine Legislature has done
distinction of being an agency or instrumentality of said this for it by creating in the same Act a voting committee
Government, just as the investment of government to be composed exclusively of the Governor-General,
money in any other corporation of the same nature or in the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
a radio corporation to which it has given a charter for the House of Representatives. Now the question arises
purpose of encouraging the development of radio whether or not the position of a proxy of the Government
communication in the Islands is not by itself sufficient to in said corporation is a public office.
make of such a corporation an agency or instrumentality
of the Government in the political and administrative
An office is defined by good authority as
sense of the term.
involving a delegation to the individual of some
of the sovereign functions of government, to be
If the National Coal Company is a private corporation, exercised by him for the benefit of the public, by
and is not a government agency or instrumentality, what which it is distinguished from employment or
standing has the Government in said corporation by contract. (Mechem Pub. Off. quoted in
virtue of its ownership of a majority of its stock. Barnhill vs. Thompson, 122 N. C., 403, 405; 29
S. E., 720.)
In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Planters'
Bank of Georgia (6 Law. ed., 244), Chief Justice The word "office" mentioned in the constitution means a
Marshall said: position having to do with the general government of the
State (Walker vs. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 145), and that
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a same meaning must be given to the word "office"
government becomes a partner in any trading mentioned in the Jones Law, which has the character of
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the a constitution.
transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Does the committee in voting the stock of the
Instead of communicating to the company its Government perform any sovereign function of
privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a government?
level with those with whom it associates itself,
and takes the character which belongs to its
The Government participates in the management of the
associates, and to the business which is to be
affairs of the National Coal Company every time it
transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who
exercises by proxy the right of voting in the election of its
have an interest in banks, are not usable even in
directors, and, according to Chief Justice Marshall, in so
their own courts; yet they never exempt the doing it acts as a corporator merely and does not
corporation from being sued. The State of
exercise any sovereign power. Its proxy, in performing
Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to
his duty exercises no greater power. And it cannot be
sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its
otherwise, for we would have the absurd result of an
sovereign character, so far as respects the
agent exercising a higher power than that of the principal
transactions of the bank, and waives all the in the fulfillment of the latter's mandate. If the voting of
privileges of that character. As a member of a the stock of the Government in the election of the
corporation, a government never exercise its
directors of the National Coal Company is the act, not of
sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and
the Government in its sovereign capacity, but of a
exercises no other power in the management of
corporator merely, the designation of the members of the
the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly
voting committee by the Government to vote its stock
given by the incorporating act. (Bank of the does not involved a delegation of a sovereign function of
United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia [22-
government, for the function delegated is of a private
25 U.S.], 6 Law. ed., 244.)
and not of a public nature.

In the case of the Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister (7 Law.

The case of State vs. Stanley (66 N. C., 59; 8 Am. Rep.,
ed., 323), the court, after citing the above paragraph, 488), cited in the brief for the plaintiff, wherein it was
added: held that membership in a committee, composed of the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
To which it may be added, that if a State did Representatives of the State of North Carolina, is an
exercise any other power in or over a bank, or office, is not in point, for said committee was entrusted
impart to it its sovereign attributes, it would be with the appointment of directors and proxies in all the
hardly possible to distinguish the issue of the corporations in which the State was a stockholder; while
paper of such banks from a direct issue of bills the committee under consideration has no other power
of credit; which violation of the Constitution, no except to vote the stock of the Government in the
doubt the State here intended to avoid. National Coal Company. In that case the committee was
an appointer of directors and proxies; in this case the
committee is a mere proxy.
Is the public directly benefited by the exercise of the No challenge seems to have been made to the power of
delegated power of voting the stock of the Government the Philippine Legislature to designate the Governor-
by the committee? When the committee votes the stock General or any other executive officer to serve on said
of the Government, as a stockholder, the corporation voting committee or any public office, and a challenge of
and its stockholder alone are directly benefited by the that nature, if made at all, will find no support in the
act, and the public only indirectly by way of an increased authorities (12 C.J., 837).
material prosperity. But this is not the kind of benefit that
is sought to be obtained by the creation of a public What is vigorously attacked is the power of the
office. It is the benefit that is deserved from the Legislature to designate any of its members to serve on
protection of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of said voting committee, the contention being that the
happiness. exercise of such power is a violation of the principle of
separation of powers and an encroachment upon the
The voting of the stock of the Government which is power of appointment to office vested in the Governor-
delegated to the committee, not being a part of the General by the Jones Law.
sovereign functions of the said Government, and not
being exercised for the direct benefit of the public, By some authorities the power of appointment to
membership therein is not a public office. office is regarded as per se an executive
function, which, therefore, may not be exercised,
Let us now examine into the question whether or not the vested, or controlled by the legislature except in
designation of the President of the Senate and the so far as it is a necessary incident to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as ex- exercise of the legislative power or is vested by
officio members of said committee, by section 4 of Act the constitution in the legislature. By the great
No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, is constitutional, weight of authority, however, the power of
and therefore valid. appointment is held not to be per se an
executive function, and unless the appointment
If the membership in the voting committee is not a public of particular officers is, by the constitution,
office, the designation by the Philippine Legislature of its expressly conferred on the executive department
own members as members ex-oficio thereof is not in or forbidden to the legislature the latter may, by
violation of the principle of separation of powers. It will statute, vest the power of appointment in its
not be denied that the power of appointment to certain discretion. The ordinary constitutional distributive
offices vested in the Governor-General by the Jones clause providing for the complete separation of
Law refers only to public executive office; that his power governmental power has generally been held
of supervision and control is limited to public executive insufficient to vest the appointing power solely in
functions, and that the responsibility imposed upon him the executive. Thus a statute conferring on a
for the faithful execution of the laws refers only to laws of circuit judge the power to fill vacancies in a
public nature. Membership in the voting committee, not board of park commissioners is valid. So a board
being a public office, the Governor-General has no of civil service commissioners may be appointed
power to appoint its members; the voting of the stock of by the legislature for the purpose of prescribing
the Government not being a public executive function, qualifications for offices except such as are
he has no supervision and control over it; and the law otherwise provided for in the constitution. (12
creating the National Coal Company and designating a C.J., 836, par. 319, n. 1.)
voting committee not being a public law, he is not
charged with the responsibility of executing it. Therefore, A provision of the constitution precluding the
in creating the voting committee and designating the legislature from electing or appointing officers
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of does not invalidate an act creating a board or
Representatives as ex-officio members thereof the commission of which certain state officers shall
Philippine Legislature did not encroach upon any of the be ex-officio members, nor prevent the
powers of the Governor-General. legislature from imposing new functions on
existing officers. (12 C.J., 837, par. 319, n. 5.)
The contention that the Legislature cannot execute its
own laws, is contrary to the congressional interpretation Under the American system of government the
expressed on various occasions, specially in the case of chief executive has no prerogative powers, but is
"The Smithsonian Institution." In incorporating it, the confined to the exercise of those powers
Congress has provided for its management "by a Board conferred upon him by the constitution and
of Regents" named the Regent of the Smithsonian statutes. (12 C. J., 898, par. 402;
Institution, to be composed of the Vice-President, the State vs. Bowden, 92 S. C., 393;
Chief Justice of the United States, and three members of Richardson vs. Young, 122 Tenn., 471.)
the Senate and three members of the House of
Representatives; together with six other persons, other This must be true of the Governor-General of the
than members of the Congress, two of whom shall be Philippine Islands, when section 21 of the Jones Law
resident of the City of Washington; and the other four says in part:
shall be inhabitants of same State, but no two of them in
the same State" (9 Fed. St. An., sec. 588 [a]). The
He shall, unless otherwise herein provided,
members of the Senate were to be appointed by the
appoint, by and with the consent of the
President thereof; and the member of the House, by the
Philippine Senate, such officers as may now be
Speaker thereof. Granting, for the sake of argument, that
appointed by the Governor-General, or such as
membership in the voting committee is a public office,
he is authorized by this Act to appoint, or whom
does the designation of the President of the Senate and he may hereafter be authorized by law to
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-
appoint.
officio members of the said committee an encroachment
upon the power of appointment to office vested in the
Governor-General. The enumeration of the instances in which the Governor-
General may make appointments, implies that he has
not been empowered to make all appointments. The
expression "whom he may hereafter be authorized by transactions of the government of Porto Rico to
the law to appoint," implies clearly that there may be the executive department of the United States,
certain cases in which he may not be authorized to make to be designated by the President, and the said
appointments. annual report shall be transmitted to the
Congress. Moreover, in section 34 (Camp. St.,
It is contended that the legislature may make such par. 3803 n), it is provided that if, after veto of
appointments where the source of power is the people or the Governor, the Legislature shall by a two-
the constitution made by the people, as the residuum of thirds vote pass an Act over the veto, the
power is entrusted in the legislature; but that this may Governor, if he shall not then approve, shall
not be done in the Philippine Islands where the source of transmit the proposed Act to the President of the
power is the Congress of the United States, and the United States; that "if the President of the United
Philippine Legislature only acts by delegation of said States approve the same he shall sign it and it
body. The Congress of the United States, after shall become a law. If he shall not approve
enumerating the powers pertaining to each of the three same, he shall return it to the Governor so
departments of the Government and declaring which are stating, and it shall not become a law." It follows
the functions of each, has reserved to itself the power that no Act can become a law without the
and authority annul the laws enacted by the Philippine approval of the Porto Rican Governor, a
Legislature, which must be reported to it (Jones Law, presidential appointee, or the President of the
sec. 19). If the Congress of the United States had United States. There is also a provision in
intended to limit the powers of the Philippine Legislature section 34 that:
to those enumerated by it in the Organic Act and to
those of purely legislative character, it would seem that 'All laws enacted by the legislature of
there would have been no necessity for making such Porto Rico shall be reported to the
reservation; because all laws passed by the Philippine Congress of the United States . . . which
Legislature which are within its powers will of necessity hereby reserves the power and authority
be valid, and all laws in excess of its powers will be null to annul same.'
and void, and the courts will so declare them. It is only
when a residuum of power is left with a legislature which If not thus annulled, within reasonable time,
does not owe its powers to the people or to a there is a presumption that they are approved.
constitution made by the people, as the Philippine (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U. S., 549, 558; 33 S. Ct.
Legislature, that such reservation becomes necessary; 585; 57 Law. ed., 960; Porto Rico vs. American,
for it may exercise a power which the Congress had not etc., R. R., 254 F., 369; 165 C. C. A., 589;
intended it should exercise, and which the latter may be Camunas vs. P. R. Ry., etc., Co. [C. C. A.], 272
powerless to correct, giving room to doubts with no other F., 924, 931, and cases cited.)
means of solving them except by judicial decision, which
may be precisely the contrary of what the Congress may The result is that all Porto Rican legislation now
have intended. If such reservation of power and authority on the statute books is — in a very real sense,
has any meaning at all, as it must have, it cannot be
though indirectly — the output of our Federal
other than to avoid doubts and undertainties as to the
Government. Under such conditions, the court
authority of the legislature to enact certain laws, by
should not lightly assume that the tax acts of
permitting those affected by them to determine by the
Porto Rico, now contended to be in conflict with
action or inaction of Congress whether or not such section 20 of the Organic Act, are inconsistent
power was one of those constituting the residuum.
and therefore invalid. Doubtless the relation of
the Organic Act to the Porto Rican Government
Furthermore, nothing could have prevented the is in certain respects, like the relation of a state
Congress of the United States from giving to the Constitution to a state Legislature.
Philippine Legislature the power of appointment to an (Camunas vs. P. R. Ry., etc., Co. [C. C. A.], 272
office which have not previously been vested expressly F., 924, 928.)
in the Governor-General, as nothing had prevented if
from placing in the hands of the Philippine Commission But the analogy is not complete; for, after all, the
not only executive but legislative powers as well. If so, Organic Act is nothing but federal legislation,
there is nothing that can prevent it from ratifying any law and Porto Rican legislation, approved expressly
by which executive officers are created and filled by the or impliedly by Congress, has exactly the same
legislature with its own members. Ratification may be import.
made either expressly or impliedly. Act No. 2705, as
amended by Act No. 2822, having been reported to
Congress, the failure of the latter to annul it was The only prohibition to the appointment of members of
equivalent to an implied ratification. the Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is
that contained in section 18 of the Jones Law, which
says that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the
In the case of Fajardo Sugar Co. of Porto rico vs.
time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to
Holcomb, decided on Noveberm 23, 1926, the Federal
any office the election to which is vested in the
Court of the First Circuit said:
Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust
or profit which shall have been created or the
If, turning from the section specifically dealing emoluments of which shall have been increased during
with the powers of the auditor, we look more such term." The present Speaker of the House of
broadly at the structure of the Government of Representatives is clearly not within said prohibition, as
Porto Rico provided under the Organic Act, — Act No. 2705 creating said committee was enacted in
we are driven to the same conclusion. Under 1917, before his term of office began in 1922; so the
that Act, the Governor-General, Attorney- now President of the Senate, for which the said Act was
General, Commissioner of Education, and passed during his term of office, that term had already
Auditor are presidential appointees. The expired in 1922, and he is not serving another term
Governor has, in general, the powers of the (1922-1928).
Governor of one of our states, and, besides, he
is required annually to make official report of the
Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may not only create 4. That the voting of the stock of the
the voting committee but designate the President of the Government is a private act, and the committee
Senate and the Speaker of the House of in doing so performs a private function, and
Representatives as ex-officio members of said therefore membership therein is a private and
committee, always granting, for the sake of argument, not a public office.
that membership therein is a public office.
5. That membership in the voting committee
It only remains now for us to dispose of another being a private position and not a public office,
question, that of the power of the Governor-General to the designation by the Philippine Legislature of
vote the stock of the Government alone, granting again, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
for the sake of argument, that section 4 of Act No. 2705, the House of Representatives as ex-officio
as amended by Act No. 2822, is unconstitutional in so members thereof was not an encroachment
far as it refers to the designation of the President if the upon the power of supervision and control over
Senate and the Speaker of the House of all executive functions of the Government vested
Representatives as ex-officio members of the voting in the Governor-General.
committee.
6. That even granting that membership in said
The provision in constitutions as to distribution of committee is a public office, still the Philippine
powers, and as to the executive power of the Legislature has the power to designate the
state being vested in the Governor, is President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
declaratory and does not confer any specific House of Representatives as ex-officio members
powers" (12 C. J., 898; Field vs. Peo, 3 Ill., 79). of said committee, by virtue of the residuum of
The power to vote the stock of the Government power placed in its hands by the Congress of the
is delegated to a committee to be composed United States.
exclusively of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the 7. That whether we consider the delegation of
House of Representatives, and the rule is the voting power as for public or private
"Where the power is delegated for a mere purposes, the Governor-General alone cannot
private purpose, all the persons (if more than exercise that power as it requires discretion and
one), upon whom the authority is conferred must judgment, and at least a majority must concur.
unite and concur in the exercise. In case of the
delegation of a public authority to three or more
8. That, finally, the Congress of the United
persons, the authority conferred may be
States by its reserved power and authority to
exercised and performed by a majority of the
annul any law of the Philippine Legislature, has
whole member. If the act to be done by virtue of by its silence impliedly ratified Act No. 2705, as
such public authority requires the exercise of amended by Act No. 2822.
discretions and judgment, — in order words, if it
is a judicial act, — the persons to whom the
authority is delegated must meet and confer For the foregoing considerations we are of the opinion
together, and be present when the act is that the demurrer should be sustained and the complaint
performed; or at least a majority must meet, be dismissed.
confer, and be present after all have been
notified to attend. Where the act is to be done is
merely ministerial, a majority must concur and
unite in the performance of the act, but they may
act separately. (18 C. J., 472, note 3-a;
Perry vs. Tynen, 22 Barb [N. Y., 137, 140].)

Whether we consider the delegation of the power to vote

the stock of the Government as for public or private
purpose, the Governor-General alone cannot exercise it
as the voting requires the exercise of discretion and
judgment, and at least a majority must concur after all 3.Municipality of San Juan, MM vs CA (invalid
have been notified. exerciser of LP)

To recapitulate, we believe that we have demonstrated

G.R. No. 125183 September 29, 1997
the following propositions:
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO
1. That the National Coal Company is not an
MANILA, petitioner,
agency or instrumentality of the Government of
vs.
the Philippine Islands.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
2. That the Government of the Philippine CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS
Islands, as mere corporator, if it had to vote its ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR.
own stock would have to do so in the capacity of CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T.
a private citizen, and not in its sovereign TORRES, CATALINA BONGAT, MILAGROS A.
capacity. HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTEL,
PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO RENION,
3. That the voting committee in exercising the SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ, BENEDICTO FALCON,
power delegated to it does so in the same MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO BOLANOS, VICENTE T.
capacity as its principal. SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO,
JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX RODRIGUEZ, MARIA
LUISA ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ,
VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L. AGUILAR, THE MUNICIPALITY
FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO PURISIMA, JR., OF SAN JUAN,
PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, METROPOLITAN
HELENITA GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO MANILA, ISLAND OF
GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION, DAISY A. LUZON, BY
MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, EXCLUDING FROM
MANOLITO HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA, ITS OPERATION THE
TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA SAMPAGA, PARCELS OF LAND
MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA, NOT BEING UTILIZED
MAGDALENA CABREZA, MARIA BIANDILLA, NILDA FOR GOVERNMENT
ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and NAPOLEON CENTER SITES
D. VILORIA, SR., respondents. PURPOSES BUT
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED
FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND
MELO, J.: DECLARING THE
LAND OPEN TO
DISPOSITION UNDER
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule THE PROVISIONS OF
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to THE PUBLIC LAND
reverse and set aside: a) the decision dated November ACT, AS AMENDED.
23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Upon recommendation of the Secretary
Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28, 1996
of Environment and Natural Resources
denying reconsideration of said decision.
and by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
The generative facts of the case are as follows: President of the Philippines, do hereby
amend Proclamation No. 1716, dated
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos February 17, 1978, which established
issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal for municipal government center site
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of purposes certain parcels of land
land of the public domain located in the Municipality of mentioned therein situated in the
San Juan, Metro Manila. Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by excluding from its operation the
Considering that the land covered by the above- parcels of land not being utilized for
mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the government center site purposes but
Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land actually occupied for residential
in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said purposes and declaring the land so
squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the excluded, together with other parcels of
municipality be able to develop and construct its land not covered by Proclamation No.
municipal government center on the subject land. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for
residential purposes, open to disposition
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the under the provisions of the Public Land
Municipality of San Juan started to develop its Act, as amended, subject to future
government center by constructing the INP Building, survey, which are hereunder particularly
which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire described as follows:
Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two
salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270
Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the
Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High xxx xxx xxx
School Annex Building.
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already and Psd-810
convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending xxx xxx xxx
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation
pertinently reads as follows:
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
PROCLAMATION NO.
164 xxx xxx xxx

IN WITNESS
AMENDING
WHEREOF, I have
PROCLAMATION NO.
hereunto set my hand
1716, DATED
FEBRUARY 17, 1978, and caused the seal of
WHICH RESERVED the Republic of the
Philippines to be
FOR MUNICIPAL
affixed.
GOVERNMENT
CENTER SITE
PURPOSES CERTAIN Done in the City of
PARCELS OF LAND Manila, this 6th day of
OF THE PUBLIC October in the year of
DOMAIN SITUATED IN Our Lord, nineteen
 hundred and eighty- petitioner's rights over the subject property against the
seven. claims of private respondents.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO We find good legal basis to sustain petitioner's position
on the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area
By the President: covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject
matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
(Sgd.) CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR. The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former
Acting Executive judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it
Secretary had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.) must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma
vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21 [1995]).
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital The existence of the first three elements can not be
Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that
only substantial identity is required and not absolute
prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order
identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18
against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan
SCRA 682 [1966]). The addition of public respondent
and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them
DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment.
from either removing or demolishing the houses of the
association members who were claiming that the lots Likewise, there is identity of cause of action since the
they occupied have been awarded to them by right of the municipality over the subject property, the
corresponding obligation of private respondents to
Proclamation No. 164.
respect such right and the resulting violation of said right
all remain to be the same in both the first and the second
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court actions despite the fact that in the first action, private
dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action,
question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan they were the respondents.
for government purposes and thus, the condition set
forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res
judicata only extends to such portion of land covered by
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be
in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became automatically segregated from the land covered by
final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, Proclamation No. 1716. It does not include those
1992. portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation
No. 1716.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment,
private respondents hired a private surveyor to make Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, would be justified upon the above premise and our
submitting the same to respondent Department of discussion may properly end here. However, there exists
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed
connection with their application for a grant under decision and this has reference to a fundamental and
Proclamation No. 164. gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on
October 16, 1987 by then President Aquino.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due
restraining order and preliminary injunction against exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act
Jesus Homeowners Association. of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended
by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986,
parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164. President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power
under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986,
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating
recourse. the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred
to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall
ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature
the petition before us boils down to the correct is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then
interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be
Proclamation No. 1716. known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress
was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost
this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716
of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in
was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power
view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had
was already solely on Congress.
become final and executory, had already settled the
respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No.
164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the
reasons why the court had previously ruled in favor of attention of petitioner as well as the courts before which
this case has already passed through, this Court cannot present time and under present circumstances pose a
help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
Proclamation No. 164. Because this unauthorized act by their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989,
the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a
most basic principle in the separation of powers between statement, President Aquino said:
the three branches of government enshrined in our
Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely In the interest of the safety of those who
upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a law. will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting
There is a long standing principle that every statute is ways, and for the tranquility of the state
presumed to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734 and order of society, the remains of
[1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]). Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute to be brought to our country until such
was duly enacted by legislature. This presumption time as the government, be it under this
cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative administration or the succeeding one,
power by the executive branch. For this Court to allow shall otherwise decide. [Motion for
such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of
validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was
duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it filed by petitioners, raising the following major
is in the discharge of this task that we take this exception arguments:
from the Court's usual practice of not entertaining
constitutional questions unless they are specifically
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from
raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the
inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the
No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared
NULL and VOID. 2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily;
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of and
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent
Department of Environment and Natural Resources is
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of
hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that
Proclamation No. 164. the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to
issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs.
SO ORDERED. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M.
Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin
concur. respondents from implementing President Aquino's
decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos,
4. Marcos vs. Manglapuz and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989 Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the
Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the
FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA,
'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the
IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos'
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR
remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize
YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its
shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for
vs.
Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO
MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE We deny the motion for reconsideration.
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, 1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants,
Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents. petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling
reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
RESOLUTION
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in
the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view
that no compelling reasons have been established by
petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's
EN BANC:
decision.
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a
vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition,
supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario
after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or
under which the Court's decision was rendered. The
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
threats to the government, to which the return of the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, the concept suggests only that not all
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, powers granted in the Constitution are
instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will themselves exhausted by internal
be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos enumeration, so that, within a sphere
reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return properly regarded as one of "executive'
when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that power, authority is implied unless there
it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE,
President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
"should be brought to all the courts of the world." 158-159 (1978).]
[Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that recognition of the President's implied or residual powers
the President, upon whom executive power is vested, is tantamount to setting the stage for another
has unstated residual powers which are implied from the dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for residual powers of the President under the Constitution
her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The should not be confused with the power of the President
powers of the President are not limited to what are under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Amendment No. 6 which provides:
Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed Whenever in the judgment of the
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission President (Prime Minister), there exists
of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction a grave emergency or a threat or
to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the imminence thereof, or whenever
result was a limitation of specific power of the President, the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief regular National Assembly fails or is
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of unable to act adequately on any matter
executive power. for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in
That the President has powers other than those order to meet the exigency, issue the
expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we instruction, which shall form part of the
have patterned the distribution of governmental powers law of the land,
among three (3) separate branches.
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of
Executive Power shall be vested in a the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to
President of the United States of Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers
America." In Alexander Hamilton's to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then,
widely accepted view, this statement Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of
cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific power of legislation.
the specific executive authorizations that
follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton 4. Among the duties of the President under the
stressed the difference between the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
sweeping language of article II, section office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare
1, and the conditional language of article of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
I, [section] 1: "All legislative Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos
Powers herein granted shall be vested at the present time and under present circumstances is
in a Congress of the United States . . ." in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of
Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or
enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision,
therefore to be considered, as intended the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this
merely to specify the principal articles decision.
implied in the definition of execution
power; leaving the rest to flow from the
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion
general grant of that power, interpreted
for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
in confomity with other parts of the
Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme

Court — accepted Hamilton's Separate Opinions
proposition, concluding that the federal
executive, unlike the Congress, could
exercise power from sources not
enumerated, so long as not forbidden by CRUZ, J., dissenting:
the constitutional text: the executive
power was given in general terms, Nothing important has happened to change my vote for
strengthened by specific terms where granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not
emphasis was regarded as appropriate, plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-
and was limited by direct expressions called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been
where limitation was needed. . ." The met with only passing interest if not outright indifference
language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in
makes clear that the constitutional death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant
concept of inherent power is not a memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.
synonym for power without limit; rather,
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the this country. Will the respondents be allowed to
national security when he was already moribund that complete the circle of denying the constitutional and
feeble threat has died with him. As the government human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in
stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die
makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His and be buried in this country? The answer should be in
cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the
or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the
dead body waiting to be interred in this country. completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last
right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important of earth in the treasured land of his birth.
things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves
no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be Those who would deny this Filipino the only
brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it constitutional and human right that can be accorded him
forever. now say that the constitutional and human right to be
buried in this country would apply to any Filipino, except
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he
Reconsideration: plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant
argument that can be raised at this time. For, our
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I democracy is built on the fundamental assumption (so
have already expressed. we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees
apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned
or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is Filipino.
still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a
dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried
ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal
in this country would pose a serious threat to national
Code prohibits the commission of libel against a
security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out
deceased individual. And even if we were to assume the
in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and
non- existence anymore of his human rights what about
the human rights of his widow and the other members of decisive proposition in this case is that respondents
his family? have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases)
or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are
general conclusions of national security and public
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and
security have remained unproved and consequently, enforceable constitutional and basic human right to
unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to
possible uprising or political and military destabilization. confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that
is, if we do not allow the remains to come, more trouble
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a
may be expected.
serious threat to national security, the situation cannot
be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where
if the petition for the return is granted. To refuse the there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where
request can mean a hardening of resistance against the the rule that reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice
well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the
hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a united
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered
citizenry.
impotent to threaten national security, his supporters
would pose that threat to national security. This
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it,
government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and
"the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in this
is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos
you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if are brought to the country and allowed the burial to
not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled,
fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise
the question will no longer be what is right, but what is potent argument—so conducive to mass protests and
left. even violence—that their Idol has been cruelly denied
the right to be buried in his homeland.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, constitutional or human rights, to speak of. This
which supervened after decision in this case had been contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one
rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a
dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for
decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted
a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be long before his death. But, more importantly, the right
buriedin this country." I have only to add a few of every Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of
statements to that dissenting opinion. a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on
the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos
the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the
country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out Philippine government the right to lay down conditions
for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit
that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed
recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried residual executive power can amend the Charter.
in this country NOW.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial limitation not only against legislative encroachments on
in this country now. Without in any way affecting my individual liberties, but more so, against presidential
respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the intrusions. And especially so, because the President is
majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed the caretaker of the military establishment that has,
that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from several times over, been unkind to part of the population
burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity to it has also sworn to protect.
defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble
assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return
nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is
finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination.
the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return
strife, among our people, of unending hatred, of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to
recriminations and retaliations. God save this country! national security. And apparently, the majority itself is
not convinced ("has been viewed...").
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to
allow the immediate return and burial in the Republic of That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon
the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not, so I
subject to such conditions as the Philippine government submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive
may impose in the interest of peace and order. destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has said
over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting: successful destabilization effort. And only this morning
(October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe given to foreign investors by no less than the President,
being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before, I can not of the political and economic stability of the nation, as
allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened well as the Government's capability to quell forces that
impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of menace the gains of EDSA.
the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his
homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had, I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos.
then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant My personal impressions, however, are beside the point.
reconsideration. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny
requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the homeland. As for the former, let them get their just
Constitution, by direct grant or by implication, the deserts here too. And let the matter rest.
President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens
from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution Separate Opinions
of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot
be denied that the President, upon Nothing important has happened to change my vote for
whom executive power is vested, has granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not
unstated residual powers which are plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-
implied from the grant of executive called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been
power and which are necessary for her met with only passing interest if not outright indifference
to comply with her duties under the from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in
Constitution. The powers of the death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant
President are not limited to what are memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.
expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the
scattered provisions of the Constitution. national security when he was already moribund that
This, notwithstanding the avowed intent feeble threat has died with him. As the government
of the members of the Constitutional
stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His
of the President as a reaction to the
cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos,
or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a
for the result was a limitation of specific dead body waiting to be interred in this country.
powers of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important
general grant of executive power. things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves
no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be
brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the forever.
Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers
of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution
of executive power. The Charter says that the right may PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for
only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of Reconsideration:
law. Had the fundamental law intended a presidential
imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and have already expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a
still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a Filipino.
dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has
ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried
Code prohibits the commission of libel against a in this country would pose a serious threat to national
deceased individual. And even if we were to assume the security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out
non- existence anymore of his human rights what about in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and
the human rights of his widow and the other members of decisive proposition in this case is that respondents
his family? have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases)
or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national general conclusions of national security and public
security have remained unproved and consequently, safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and
unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any enforceable constitutional and basic human right to
possible uprising or political and military destabilization. return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to
In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
is, if we do not allow the remains to come, more trouble
may be expected. If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a
serious threat to national security, the situation cannot
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead
if the petition for the return is granted. To refuse the Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where
request can mean a hardening of resistance against the there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where
well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the the rule that reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice
other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."
hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a united
citizenry. It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered
impotent to threaten national security, his supporters
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our would pose that threat to national security. This
government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it,
"the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and
is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in this
you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos
not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of are brought to the country and allowed the burial to
fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled,
the question will no longer be what is right, but what is Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise
left. potent argument—so conducive to mass protests and
even violence—that their Idol has been cruelly denied
PADILLA, J., dissenting: the right to be buried in his homeland.

The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no
which supervened after decision in this case had been constitutional or human rights, to speak of. This
rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one
dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a
decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for
a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted
buriedin this country." I have only to add a few long before his death. But, more importantly, the right
statements to that dissenting opinion. of every Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of
a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on
the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos
the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this
country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the
for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in Philippine government the right to lay down conditions
this country. Will the respondents be allowed to for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit
complete the circle of denying the constitutional and that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate,
human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried
my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die in this country NOW.
and be buried in this country? The answer should be in
the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial
answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the in this country now. Without in any way affecting my
completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the
right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed
of earth in the treasured land of his birth. that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from
burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity to
Those who would deny this Filipino the only defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble
constitutional and human right that can be accorded him assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided
now say that the constitutional and human right to be nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional
buried in this country would apply to any Filipino, except dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and
Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to
plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing
argument that can be raised at this time. For, our strife, among our people, of unending hatred,
democracy is built on the fundamental assumption (so recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!
we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees
apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to
allow the immediate return and burial in the Republic of
the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon
subject to such conditions as the Philippine government Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not, so I
may impose in the interest of peace and order. submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive
destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has said
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting: over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of
successful destabilization effort. And only this morning
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances
being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before, I can not given to foreign investors by no less than the President,
allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened of the political and economic stability of the nation, as
well as the Government's capability to quell forces that
impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of
menace the gains of EDSA.
the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his
homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had,
then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos.
reconsideration. My personal impressions, however, are beside the point.
I reiterate that the President has no power to deny
requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the
homeland. As for the former, let them get their just
Constitution, by direct grant or by implication, the
deserts here too. And let the matter rest
President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens
from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution
of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that: 5. In Re Cunanan (Traditional concept of LP/ New
Definition of JP)
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot
be denied that the President, upon Resolution March 18, 1954
whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the
implied from the grant of executive Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
power and which are necessary for her ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo,
expressly enumerated in the article on and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
the Executive Department and in Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
scattered provisions of the Constitution. respondent.
This, notwithstanding the avowed intent
of the members of the Constitutional DIOKNO, J.:
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, so much public interest and concern as Republic Act
for the result was a limitation of specific No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
powers of the President, particularly
1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission
those relating to the commander-in-chief
to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to
clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the
falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering
of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution
of executive power. The Charter says that the right may the varying difficulties of the different bar
only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree
law. Had the fundamental law intended a presidential of strictness with which the examination papers were
imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar
completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and those candidates who had obtained an average of
executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per
residual executive power can amend the Charter. cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to
1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a
limitation not only against legislative encroachments on Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law
individual liberties, but more so, against presidential as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
intrusions. And especially so, because the President is feeling conscious of having been discriminated
the caretaker of the military establishment that has, against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
several times over, been unkind to part of the population unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
it has also sworn to protect. few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic reduced the passing general average in bar
effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. President requested the views of this court on the bill.
The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return Complying with that request, seven members of the
of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to court subscribed to and submitted written comments
national security. And apparently, the majority itself is adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
not convinced ("has been viewed...").
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although
the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to
year, reads in full as follows: Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING as a more detailed account of the history of Republic
MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY- forth:
FIVE.
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be
Be it enacted by the Senate and benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
House of Representatives of the 1,168, classified as follows:
Philippines in Congress assembled:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of 1946 (November) 477 228 43
section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar 1947 749 340 0
candidate who obtained a general average of 1948 899 409 11
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after 1949 1,218 532 164
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one 1950 1,316 893 26
bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the 1951 2,068 879 196
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
1952 2,738 1,033 426
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar 1953 2,555 968 284
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
examinations without a candidate obtaining a subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for
the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or (2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
and included as part of the next whole Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
number. two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain
a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they
grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth, would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be (3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by
included in computing the passing general this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
average that said candidate may obtain in any 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
subsequent examinations that he may take. who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
approval. had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic
Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated,
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider
Executive approval. their grades

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar 972
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for
the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
additional ground for admission. There are also others reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their and the administration of justice, and because some
grades without, however, invoking the law in question. doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions
first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
for admission on the sole question of whether or not mimeographed copies were made available to the
Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional. public during those years and private enterprises had
also published them in monthly magazines and
We have been enlightened in the study of this annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
question by the brilliant assistance of the members of published continuously. Books and magazines
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, published abroad have entered without restriction
on the various aspects in which the question may be since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire and enlarged editions have been printed locally during
Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of to be published since 1946, which continued to be
the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique are facts of public knowledge.
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from valid, it has to be enforced.
the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly resolution of the question would have been easier had
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the an identical case of similar background been picked
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long from which has been directly derived the judicial
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the system established here with its lofty ideals by the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a Congress of the United States, and which we have
new member in order to place it as humanly as preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality. contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who similar law had been sustained, while those against its
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon,
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated: Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
cent passing grade is the tremendous which the postponement of the contested law
handicap which students during the years respects.
immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
reading materials and the inadequacy of the laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
preparation of students who took up law soon judiciary immediately declared them without force or
after the liberation. effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
uphold the disputed law.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
"inadequacy of preparation." revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that
State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who concerning the school of law of Columbia College
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public Constitution of the state of New York.
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. time provided:
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the office of public trust. All votes for either of
legal profession is entrusted the protection of them for any elective office except that of the
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to the people, shall be void. They shall not
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to exercise any power of appointment to public
create a serious social danger. Moreover, the office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal one years, of good moral character, and who
reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were possesses the requisite qualifications of
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in learning and ability, shall be entitled to
 admission to practice in all the courts of this The act was obviously passed with reference
State. (p. 93). to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the examination by the law committee of the
constitutional precept is as follows: college for that of the court. It could have had
no other object, and hence no greater scope
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; should be given to its provisions. We cannot
the power of appointing them had previously suppose that the Legislature designed entirely
rested with the judges, and this was the to dispense with the plain and explicit
principal appointing power which they requirements of the Constitution; and the act
possessed. The convention was evidently contains nothing whatever to indicate an
dissatisfied with the manner in which this intention that the authorities of the college
power had been exercised, and with the should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc.,
restrictions which the judges had imposed of the students before granting a diploma. The
upon admission to practice before them. The only rational interpretation of which the act
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was admits is, that it was intended to make the
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion college diploma competent evidence as to the
of the provision" expecting the admission of legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
attorneys, in this particular section of the else. To this extent alone it operates as a
Constitution, evidently arose from its modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is
connection with the object of this prohibitory to be read in connection with these statutes
clause. There is nothing indicative of and with the Constitution itself in order to
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to determine the present condition of the law on
preserve any portion of their power over this the subject. (p.89)
subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word xxx xxx xxx
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged
that the admission spoken of must be by the The Legislature has not taken from the court
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that the power of granting necessarily implies that has simply prescribed what shall be
the power of refusing, and of course the right competent evidence in certain cases upon
of determining whether the applicant that question. (p.93)
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission. From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the
case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen.
These positions may all be conceded, without Please note only the following distinctions:
affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
possession of a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor (2) The law of New York according to the very
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
the constitution required of applicants for admission to jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney
the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of
of the law, which we cannot find in any public or any lawyer.
accessible private library in the country.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the admission of the practice of law.
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
In the judicial system from which ours has been
The motive for passing the act in question is evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
apparent. Columbia College being an reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
institution of established reputation, and profession and their supervision have been disputably
having a law department under the charge of a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
able professors, the students in which attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and
department were not only subjected to a exercise by the judicial power have been
formal examination by the law committee of demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
the institution, but to a certain definite period certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
of study before being entitled to a diploma of considering the power granted to Congress by our
being graduates, the Legislature evidently, Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
and no doubt justly, considered this promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
examination, together with the preliminary the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition
study required by the act, as fully equivalent that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
examination by the court; and as rendering function, properly belonging to Congress, is
the latter examination, to which no definite unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
period of preliminary study was essential, established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
unnecessary and burdensome. whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts state government, under 42a scheme which it
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a was supposed rendered it immune from
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes embarrassment or interference by any other
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if department of government, the courts cannot
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these escape responsibility fir the manner in which
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
modified. the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

We have said that in the judicial system from which The relation at the bar to the courts is a
ours has been derived, the act of admitting, peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at an attache of the courts. The quality of justice
law in the practice of the profession is concededly dispense by the courts depends in no small
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
this matter had been undertaken in the case of unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the reproach to the administration of justice and
validity of a legislative enactment providing that bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts (p.445)
was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs: Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their bars,
This statute presents an assertion of at least in the English speaking countries. (p.
legislative power without parallel in the history 445)
of the English speaking people so far as we
have been able to ascertain. There has been After explaining the history of the case, the Court
much uncertainty as to the extent of the power ends thus:
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows:
expressly committed to the courts, and the act For more than six centuries prior to the
of admission has always been regarded as a adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
judicial function. This act purports to constitute England, concededly subordinate to
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
respect it stands alone as an assertion of exercise the right of determining who should
legislative power. (p. 444) be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Under the Constitution all legislative power is Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, most solid of all titles." If the courts and
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of judicial power be regarded as an entity, the
qualifications for admission to the bar are power to determine who should be admitted to
legislative in character, the Legislature is practice law is a constituent element of that
acting within its constitutional authority when it entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. and say with assurance that it is either a part
444) of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power
But when the Legislature has prescribed those exercised by the court, but that it is a power
qualifications which in its judgment will serve belonging to the judicial entity and made of
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, not only a sovereign institution, but made of it
is the power of the court to impose other and a separate independent, and coordinate
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed branch of the government. They took this
or exhausted? (p. 444) institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute
Under our Constitution the judicial and its attorney at law. There is no express
legislative departments are distinct, provision in the Constitution which indicates
independent, and coordinate branches of the an intent that this traditional power of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the judicial department should in any manner be
powers of sovereignty which properly belongs subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
to its department. Neither department should dominant thought of the framers of our
so act as to embarrass the other in the constitution was to make the three great
discharge of its respective functions. That was departments of government separate and
the scheme and thought of the people setting independent of one another. The idea that the
upon the form of government under which we Legislature might embarrass the judicial
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; department by prescribing inadequate
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, qualifications for attorneys at law is
4 Wis., 567. (p. 445) inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the
The judicial department of government is legislative department, and such a purpose
responsible for the plane upon which the should not be inferred in the absence of
administration of justice is maintained. Its express constitutional provisions. While the
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By legislature may legislate with respect to the
committing a portion of the powers of qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
sovereignty to the judicial department of our merely to its general and unquestioned power
 to protect the public interest. When it does the bar "for something more than private
legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications gain." He becomes an "officer of the court",
required of attorneys at law in order that public and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
interests may be protected, such qualifications agency to advance the end of justice. His
do not constitute only a minimum standard cooperation with the court is due "whenever
and limit the class from which the court must justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
make its selection. Such legislative withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate judicial department of government would be
qualifications beyond which the court cannot hampered in the performance of its duties.
go in fixing additional qualifications deemed That has been the history of attorneys under
necessary by the course of the proper the common law, both in this country and
administration of judicial functions. There is no England. Admission to practice as an attorney
legislative power to compel courts to admit to at law is almost without exception conceded to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at filed in courts, as are other proceedings
law. (p. 450) invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar
is accomplish and made open and notorious
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to by a decision of the court entered upon its
exercise the power of appointment. It is quite records. The establishment by the
likely true that the legislature may exercise the Constitution of the judicial department
power of appointment when it is in pursuance conferred authority necessary to the exercise
of a legislative functions. However, the of its powers as a coordinate department of
authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the government. It is an inherent power of such a
power to admit attorneys to the practice of law department of government ultimately to
is a judicial function. In all of the states, except determine the qualifications of those to be
New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
attorneys receive their formal license to from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
practice law by their admission as members of learning, and those not possessing good
the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated
572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. succinctly and with finality in Ex
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565,
366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. "It has been well settled, by the rules and
Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, practice of common-law courts, that it rests
115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, exclusively with the court to determine who is
23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. qualified to become one of its officers, as an
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413. attorney and counselor, and for what cause he
ought to be removed." (p.727)
The power of admitting an attorney to practice
having been perpetually exercised by the In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
courts, it having been so generally held that petition to secure license to practice the legal
the act of the court in admitting an attorney to profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE
practice is the judgment of the court, and an 646), the court said in part:
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature
to confer such right upon any one being most In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333,
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
the licensing of an attorney is and always has for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained
been a purely judicial function, no matter the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
where the power to determine the "They are officers of the court, admitted as
qualifications may reside. (p. 451) such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of private character. It has always been the
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the general practice in this country to obtain this
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said: evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such
It is indispensible to the administration of officers in the highest court of the states to
justice and to interpretation of the laws that which they, respectively, belong for, three
there be members of the bar of sufficient years preceding their application, is regarded
ability, adequate learning and sound moral as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
character. This arises from the need of requisite legal learning, and the statement of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and counsel moving their admission sufficient
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. evidence that their private and professional
It is highly important, also that the public be character is fair. The order of admission is the
protected from incompetent and vicious judgment of the court that the parties possess
practitioners, whose opportunity for doing the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., counselors, and are entitled to appear as such
in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. parties become officers of the court, and are
851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege responsible to it for professional misconduct.
burden with conditions." One is admitted to They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
 ascertained and declared by the judgment of of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional
the court after opportunity to be heard has Limitations, 192.
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or
their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
power, and has been so held in numerous of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
cases. It was so held by the court of appeals subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
of New York in the matter of the application of the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment —
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
"are not only officers of the court, but officers concerned; and although this Court certainly can
whose duties relate almost exclusively to revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
their appointment may, with propriety, be not the legislative nor executive department, that may
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
performing his duty, may very justly departments would be a clear usurpation of its
considered as engaged in the exercise of their functions, as is the case with the law in question.
appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
portions: promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Admission to practice of law is almost without Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the
need not be burdened with citations in this power to promulgate rules concerning
point. Admission to practice have also been pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
held to be the exercise of one of the inherent and the admission to the practice of law. Said
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
472, 172 Pac. 906. same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
Admission to the practice of law is the on pleading, practice and procedure are
exercise of a judicial function, and is an hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
inherent power of the court. — A.C. Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
A.L. R. 1512. pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines,
between the functions of the judicial and legislative Art. VIII, sec. 13.
departments of the government.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred
The distinction between the functions of the on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
legislative and the judicial departments is that concerning the admission to the practice of law. the
it is the province of the legislature to establish primary power and responsibility which the
rules that shall regulate and govern in matters Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this
of transactions occurring subsequent to the Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
legislative action, while the judiciary promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
determines rights and obligations with nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
reference to transactions that are past or Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital responsibility over the admission, suspension,
one and not subject to alteration or change disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and
either by legislative action or by judicial their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
decree. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or
The judiciary cannot consent that its province take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
shall be invaded by either of the other primary power on the matter. The Constitution does
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
Constitutional Law, p. 229. disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control
the existing rules on the matter, if according to its
the action of the courts by requiring of them
judgment the need for a better service of the legal
construction of the law according to its own
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly,
this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
by settling aside their judgments, compelling
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise
them to grant new trials, ordering the
the practice of the legal profession.
discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress
Being coordinate and independent branches, the the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
should be exercised with the respect that each owes Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
to the other, giving careful consideration to the assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
responsibility which the nature of each department General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
requires. These powers have existed together for Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
centuries without diminution on each part; the attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
harmonious delimitation being found in that the for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
legislature may and should examine if the existing the Moro Province, may be licensed to
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the practice law in the courts of the Philippine
demands which public interest requires of a Bar Islands without an examination, upon motion
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and before the Supreme Court and establishing
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, The records of this court disclose that on a
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and former occasion this appellant took, and failed
efficient administration of justice and the supervision to pass the prescribed examination. The
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider report of the examining board, dated March
these reforms as the minimum standards for the 23, 1907, shows that he received an average
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the legal learning upon which he was examined,
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, thus falling four points short of the required
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
law is realized. They are powers which, exercise the performance of our duty to the public and
within their proper constitutional limits, are not to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would the required qualifications of learning in the
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of law at the time when he presented his former
the administration of justice. application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our of these Islands, without first satisfying
criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
few points to obtain the general average. A recently examination on that occasion, he now
enacted law provided that one who had been "possesses the necessary qualifications of
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to learning and ability."
the practice of law without a previous examination.
The Government appointed Guariña and he But it is contented that under the provisions of
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
This tribunal refused to give his license without as of right to be admitted to the bar without
previous examinations. The court said: taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court"
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks held and now holds the office of provincial
admission to the bar, without taking the fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
prescribed examination, on the ground that he that having in mind the object which the
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the legislator apparently sought to attain in
Province of Batanes. enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February generally and especially of the fact that the
28, 1907, is as follows: amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of provides for the admission of certain
Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, candidates without examination. It is
entitled "An Act providing a Code of contented that this mandatory construction is
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special imperatively required in order to give effect to
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
hereby amended to read as follows: the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
1. Those who have been duly licensed under
the laws and orders of the Islands under the And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of
and are in good and regular standing as Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands Court continued:
at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred
the passage of this act, or at any time upon this court by the commission and
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would
of the United States, the position of justice of be limited and restricted, and in a case such
 as that under consideration wholly destroyed, It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
by giving the word "may," as used in the grant license for the practice of law belongs
above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
defining or limiting the power conferred upon as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
the commission is to that extent invalid and conditions for the license.
void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority. The law in question, like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
Speaking on the application of the law to those who defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court unreasonable.
held:
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
In the various cases wherein applications for 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
the admission to the bar under the provisions 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law
of this statute have been considered to those students who began studying before
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
such appointments had been made as presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of those who had studied in a law office and would pass
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had an examination, or to those who had studied for three
reason to believe that the applicants had been years if they commenced their studies after the
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
appointment. that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was This is an application to this court for
not and never had been practicing attorney in admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of diplomas from law schools issued to the
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it applicants. The act of the general assembly
further affirmatively appears that he was passed in 1899, under which the application is
deficient in the required qualifications at the made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of
time when he last applied for admission to the an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
bar. relation to attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
In the light of this affirmative proof of his 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in
defieciency on that occasion, we do not think the enacting clause, consists in the addition to
that his appointment to the office of provincial the section of the following: "And every
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his application for a license who shall comply with
possession of the necessary qualifications of the rules of the supreme court in regard to
learning and ability. We conclude therefore admission to the bar in force at the time such
that this application for license to practice in applicant commend the study of law, either in
the courts of the Philippines, should be a law or office or a law school or college, shall
denied. be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
In view, however, of the fact that when he took said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a . . . After said provision there is a double
license to practice; and in view also of the fact proviso, one branch of which is that up to
that since that time he has held the December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
responsible office of the governor of the license of admittance to the bar to the holder
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave of every diploma regularly issued by any law
evidence of such marked ability in the school regularly organized under the laws of
performance of the duties of that office that this state, whose regular course of law studies
the Chief Executive, with the consent and is two years, and requiring an attendance by
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought the student of at least 36 weeks in each of
to retain him in the Government service by such years, and showing that the student
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, began the study of law prior to November 4,
we think we would be justified under the 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in of good moral character. The other branch of
waiving in his case the ordinary examination the proviso is that any student who has
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers studied law for two years in a law office, or
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a part of such time in a law office, "and part in
special examination which will be given him by the aforesaid law school," and whose course
a committee of the court upon his application of study began prior to November 4, 1897,
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
desires so to do, to present himself at any of examination by the examining board in the
the ordinary examinations prescribed by branches now required by the rules of this
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.) court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is
by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon course its managers may prescribe is made
the persons named therein, and establishes all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
rules of legislative creation for their admission relation to the qualifications or fitness of
to the bar. (p. 647.) persons to practice law resting upon the mere
date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a
Considering the proviso, however, as an basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, began the study of law November 4th could
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as qualify themselves to practice in two years as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit well as those who began on the 3rd. The
attorneys to practice in the courts and take classes named in the proviso need spend only
part in the administration of justice, and could two years in study, while those who
prescribe the character of evidence which commenced the next day must spend three
should be received by the court as conclusive years, although they would complete two
of the requisite learning and ability of persons years before the time limit. The one who
to practice law, it could only be done by a commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a
general law, persons or classes of persons. diploma, is to be admitted without examination
Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice before December 31, 1899, and without any
law is a privilege, and a license for that prescribed course of study, while as to the
purpose makes the holder an officer of the other the prescribed course must be pursued,
court, and confers upon him the right to and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to classification cannot rest upon any natural
collect fees therefor, and creates certain reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
exemptions, such as from jury services and sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is
arrest on civil process while attending court. for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges
The law conferring such privileges must be upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
purpose, may classify persons so long as the 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law
law establishing classes in general, and has to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court
some reasonable relation to the end sought. also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
There must be some difference which legislation:
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one,
having no just relation to the subject of the But the statute is invalid for another reason. If
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, it be granted that the legislature has power to
147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 prescribe ultimately and definitely the
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 qualifications upon which courts must admit
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255. and license those applying as attorneys at
law, that power can not be exercised in the
The length of time a physician has practiced, manner here attempted. That power must be
and the skill acquired by experience, may exercised through general laws which will
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity
People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature
where such physician has resided and to exact qualifications of those desiring to
practiced his profession cannot furnish such pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
making an enactment based upon it void 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every
Here the legislature undertakes to say what citizen of the United States to follow any lawful
shall serve as a test of fitness for the calling, business or profession he may
profession of the law, and plainly, any choose, subject only to such restrictions as
classification must have some reference to are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex,
learning, character, or ability to engage in and condition." This right may in many
such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a respects be considered as a distinguishing
class of persons who began the study of law feature of our republican institutions. Here all
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is vocations are all open to every one on like
subdivided into two classes — First, those conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
presenting diplomas issued by any law school livelihood, some requiring years of study and
of this state before December 31, 1899; and, great learning for their successful prosecution.
second, those who studied law for the period The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the
of two years in a law office, or part of the time "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right
in a law school and part in a law office, who to continue their prosecution — is often of
are to be admitted upon examination in the great value to the possessors and cannot be
subjects specified in the present rules of this arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
court, and as to this latter subdivision there their real or personal property can be thus
seems to be no limit of time for making taken. It is fundamental under our system of
application for admission. As to both classes, government that all similarly situated and
the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
and as between the two different conditions equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating
and limits of time are fixed. No course of study the practice of medicine, requiring
is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma medications to establish the possession on
granted upon the completion of any sort of the part of the application of his proper
 qualifications before he may be licensed to and natural cause for the difference made in
practice, have been challenged, and courts their liabilities and burdens and in their rights
have seriously considered whether the and privileges. A law is not general because it
exemption from such examinations of those operates on all within a clause unless there is
practicing in the state at the time of the a substantial reason why it is made to operate
enactment of the law rendered such law on that class only, and not generally on all.
unconstitutional because of infringement upon (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468. examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
to confer upon him the right to practice law permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
and to constitute him an officer of this Court oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. that the rules require a minimum general average of
It is not material that he had once established 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
his right to practice law and that one time he 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
possessed the requisite learning and other the abovementioned authorities, for this classification
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
fact in no matter affect the power of the classification is fatally defective.
Legislature to select from the great body of
the public an individual upon whom it would It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or
confer its favors. the years before, with the general average indicated,
were not included because the Tribunal has no record
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This
1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
to admit to the practice of law without unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951,
examination, all who had served in the military 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of
or naval forces of the United States during the those who failed before said years under the same
World War and received a honorable conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act that no one concerned may prove by some other
of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known means his right to an equal consideration.
as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent To defend the disputed law from being declared
thereunder at the time of the passage of this unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
the ground that it clearly violated the quality constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure
clauses of the constitution of that state. In ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179. candidates who did not obtain the general average of
75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
A good summary of a classification constitutionally cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent;
follows: and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
the authorities that a classification to be valid circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
must rest upon material differences between These changes in the passing averages during those
the person included in it and those excluded years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
and, furthermore, must be based upon Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
substantial distinctions. As the rule has cancel the license that was issued to those who did
sometimes avoided the constitutional not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not.
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
and real differences, as distinguished from Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
law that is made applicable to one class of did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
citizens only must be based on some candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
substantial difference between the situation of qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
that class and other individuals to which it will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
does not apply and must rest on some reason cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
on which it can be defended. In other words, effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
there must be such a difference between the the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
situation and circumstances of all the the general average by one per cent, with the order
members of the class and the situation and that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
circumstances of all other members of the purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
state in relation to the subjects of the that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
discriminatory legislation as presents a just not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of
the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal should have done 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
during those years according to the judgment of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
continue in force. What was done was to stop or regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
suspend them. And this power is not included in what should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
confided. to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
defect of this system is that it does not take into Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his law according to existing rules.
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting 4. The reason advanced for the pretended
in this manner his usefulness. The system that the classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
said law prescribes was used in the first bar contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, students inadequately prepared. The pretended
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to legislation.
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its article 1, the entire law is void.
nullity affect the entire law.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
first, because they are not within the legislative to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has the examinations in those years, shall continue in
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or force.
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested
law suffers from these fatal defects.
RESOLUTION
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
for the following reasons, to wit: discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at
the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
since the beginning have announced their decision
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
under the authority of the same:
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine
if they are at present already prepared to become
members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform 1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No.
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the 2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
candidates, without having examined their respective subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
examination papers, and although it is admitted that 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no the Constitution.
other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of
Constitution. the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946
to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates
who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general
average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a 69 per cent
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed 68 per cent
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has Number of candidates who passed
become final, they shall be permitted to take and Number of candidates who failed
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
Justice may set. So ordered. Percentage of success (
Percentage of failure (
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Passing grade (
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68

ANNEX I per cent respectively, the Court found out that
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. Civil Law.
972 August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor,
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro,
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barr
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
August, 19461 Number of candidates
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez 71's
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. 70's
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates who passed
Number of candidates whose grades were raised Number12
of candidates who failed
73'S 6
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
72'S 6
Percentage of success (
Number of candidates who passed 85 of failure
Percentage (
Number of candidates who failed 121
Passing grade (
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18resolution of the Court).
(by
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62 August, 1949
Percentage of failure (per cent)
Board of58.74
Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, H
Passing grade Hon.
(per cent) Enrique
72 Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pa
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon.
November, 1946 Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, exceptNumber
Hon. Jose
of candidates
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
Number of candidates (74's) 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised Number19 of candidates who passed
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --- Number of candidates who failed
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates who passed 249
Percentage of success (
Number of candidates who failed 228
Percentage of failure (
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Passing grade (
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
(by resolution of the Court).
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
August, 1950
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court). Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman,
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichau
October, 1947 Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filam
A. Delgado,
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Number of candidates
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members. Number of candidates whose grades were raised
Number of candidates (The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by
749
authority
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francis
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1
Number of candidates who passed
cent
 Number of candidates who failed 894 Civ. Land Merc.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent)MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L.
32.14 66 71 61

Percentage of failure (per cent)MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

67.86 76 72 74
Passing grade (per cent)MRD- 75
3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65
August, 1951 1948
MRD- 4.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe MRD-
Natividad,
5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71
Alfonso Felix, Members.
1949
Number of candidates 2,068
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 112
(74's) MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62
Number of candidates who passed 9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.
1,189 63 85 70
Number of candidates who failed 10. Alacar, Pascual C.
879 61 63 83
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11. Amog, Pedro M.
196 75 66 76
Percentage of success (per cent) 12. Apolinario, Miguel S.
57.49 75 84 78
Percentage of failure (per cent) 13. Aquino, Maximo G.
42.51 82 77 71
Passing grade (per cent) 14.
75 Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69
August, 1952 15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. 16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69
Number of candidates 2,738
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 163
(74's) 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70
Number of candidates who passed 22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.
1,705 75 71 72
Number of candidates who failed 23. Canda, Benjamin S.
1,033 75 72 75
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 24. Canon, Guillermo
426 77 86 67
Percentage of success (per cent) 25. Carlos, Estela S.
62.27 75 81 81
Percentage of failure (per cent) 26. Cerezo, Gregorio O.
37.73 69 76 76
Passing grade (per cent) 27.
75 Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76
August, 1953 28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio V.
Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. FelipeMRD-
Natividad,
30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73
Number of candidates 2,555
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 100
(74's) 33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70

Number of candidates who passed 34. Espiritu, Irineo E.

1,570 80 88 69

Number of candidates who failed 35. Fernandez, Macario J.

986 63 82 76

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 36. Gallardo, Amando C.
284 78 79 67

Percentage of success (per cent) 37. Garcia, Freidrich M.

61.04 76 80 66

Percentage of failure (per cent) 38. Garcia, Julian L.

38.96 64 77 68

Passing grade (per cent) 39.

75 Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under 41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79
Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which 42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to
who had presented motions for reconsideration which 43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71
were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for 44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66
reconsideration without invoking said law, which are
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71
still pending, follows:
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67
 48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 MRD-98.
64 55Cruz,
85Filomeno
70.65 de la 70 71 78
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 99.
60Española,
85 70 Pablo S. 71 78 55
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 100.
65Foronda,
85 70.3
Clarencio J. 60 78 68
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 101.
60Hechanova,
80 70.3 Vicente 59 76 75
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75MRD-
65Peñalosa,
75 73.15
Osias R. 80 78 61
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 102.
65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 103.
65Sarmiento,
70 71.15 Floro A. 65 86 63

55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71MRD-65Torre,

80Catalino
70.4 P. 75 85 68
104.
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
1951
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 110.
65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 111.
65Antiola,
80 Anastacio
72.55 R. 68 76 75
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 112.
65Aquino,
75 S.71.15
Rey A. 70 71 71
1948 113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 114.
65Avanceña,
75 71.9Alfonso 71 71 65
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79MRD-
50Balacuit,
75 Camilo
70.1 N. 75 73 75
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 115.
55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 116.
55Barinaga, Jeremias L.
80 69.5 68 69 73
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74MRD-
60Barrientos,
75 70.6Ambrosio D. 76 60 67
117.
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
118.
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 120.
55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 121.
65Buela,
85 Arcadio
73.55 P. 72 77 61
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 122.
55Cabilao,
80 Leonardo
69.55 S. 73 50 75
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 123.
70Cabrera,
80 Ireneo
70.9 M. 75 66 70
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 124.
65Cacacho,
75 70.75
Emilio V.
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 125.
65Calilung,
80 Soledad
73.35 C. 64 73 73
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83MRD-
65Calimlim,
75 72.85
Jose B. 64 73 73
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 126.
60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 127.
65Calimlim, Pedro B.
70 71.8 66 82 69
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 128.
60Camello, Sotero H.
75 71.9 70 77 63
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 129.
55Campos,
75 69.5Juan A. 71 88 70
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 130.
65Castillo,
75 Antonio
72.3 del 78 78 70
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82MRD-
65Castillo,
75 Dominador
73.25 Ad. 75 61 72
131.
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 132.
60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 133.
65Casuga,
63 Bienvenido
69.65 B. 75 72 72
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 134.
55Cabangbang,
70 70.4 Santiago 77 67 61
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55B. 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 135.
65Cruz,
80Federico
70.65 S. 69 74 75
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 136.
55Dacanay,
80 70.7
Eufemio P. 70 73 62
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 137.
75Deysolong,
85 73.85Felisberto 66 62 72
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73MRD-
55Dimaano,
85 73.6
Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 138.
60 75 70.6
1950 139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72MRD-
62Rimorin-Gordo,
73 72.25 Estela 70 72 62
140. 182.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 183.
75Rosario,
69 Prisco
70.75 del 70 64 70
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 184.
78Rosario,
75 Vicente
72.35 D. del 75 91 65
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 185.
89Saavedra,
75 72.1Felipe 73 80 63
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 186.
86Salazar,
72 Alfredo
73.9 N. 66 72 73
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 187.
78Salem,
56 Romulo
69.55 R. 77 81 72
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 188.
75Foz,77
Julita71.5
A. 75 72 75
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 189.
83Santa
61Ana,
69.6
Candido T. 77 69 65
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 190.
75Santos,
71 Aquilino
73.35 72 66 69
148. 191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 192.
80Suico,
75 Samuel
71.9 73 79 72
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 193.
82Suson,
77 Teodorico
73.7 74 68 66
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 194.
85Tado,
53Florentino
70.85 P. 64 76 67
151.
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
MRD- 67 60 71
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 75Tiausas,
61 196. 78 Miguel
72.05 V.
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 197.
75Torres,
69 Carlos
72.95P. 68 71 71
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 198.
85Tria,79 70.55
Hipolito 69 72 75
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 199.
75Velasco,
78 Avelino
70.55 A. 65 72 75
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 200.
92Villa,75Francisco
71.75 C. 65 80 73
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 201.
90Villagonzalo,
70 72.75 Job R. 78 67 74
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 202.
84Villarama,
68 71.35
Jr., Pedro 75 74 75
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 1952
57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 203.
75Abacon,
61 Pablo
72.75 75 72 78
161.
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 204.
91 51 72.3
162.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 205.
75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70MRP-
68Abellera,
72 62.05
Geronimo F. 75 79 79
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 206.
81 75 73.15
165. MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 207.
84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 208.
82Alandy,
51 Doroteo
73.95 R. 64 83 93
167. 209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61
MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65MRP-
81Alcantara,
75 73.75
Pablo V. 71 79 80
168. 210.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 211.
77Arcangel,
69 72.05
Agustin Ag. 75 85 71
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 212.
75Acosta,
79 Dionisio
72.2 N. 75 81 78
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66MRP-
71Abinguna,
74 72.1
Agapito C. 66 85 80
171. 213.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 214.
85Adove,
62 Nehemias
73.5 C. 76 86 78
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 215.
75Adrias,
69 Inocencio
73.75 C. 75 83 61
173.
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
175. MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75
218.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75Felicidad
66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68MRP-
80Amodia,
53 Juan
72.3 T. 75 79 68
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 220.
76 69 70
179. MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81
MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 221.
88 75 73.35
180. MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 222.
79 65 70.9
 223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 262.
74Capitulo,
76 72.7Alejandro P. 75 70 53
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70MRP-
69Calupitan,
80 67.7Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 263.
70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70MRP-
67Caluya,
78 Arsenio
72.2 V. 75 86 70
226. 264.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67MRP-
77Campanilla,
65 73.95 Mariano B. 80 75 78
227. 265.

228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55MRP-

75Campos, Juan A.
75 70.85 66 85 83
266.
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
230. 268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65

231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60MRP-

67Castro,
50 Daniel
70.65T. 65 75 77
269.
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
233. 271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 272.
70Cerio,
81Juan A.
70.7 75 82 75
234. 273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 274.
67Chavez,
78 Doroteo
71.2 M. 73 65 79
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 275.
71Chavez,
62 Honorato
71.25 A. 77 76 79
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67MRP-
80Cobangbang,
70 72.75Orlando B. 69 81 74
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 276.
67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 277.
76Cortez,
76 Armando
72.85 R. 78 60 88
239. 278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77MRP-
75Cornejo,
50 Crisanto
73.15 R. 68 87 78
240. 279.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57MRP-
75Cruz,
80Raymundo
73.95 75 81 79
241. 280.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63MRP-
68Cunanan,
62 72.85
Jose C. 78 92 63
242. 281.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 282.
64Cunanan,
78 71.85
Salvador F. 70 82 64
243. 283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 284.
84Crisol,
75 Getulio
73.45R. 70 91 78
244.
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 285.
70 82 72.75
245.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 286.
71 78 73.05
246.
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 288.
71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 289.
76Delgado,
80 70.9
Vicente N. 70 84 82
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70MRP-
71Diolazo,
60 Ernesto
72.2 A. 75 83 86
250. 290.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 291.
67Dionisio,
71 Jr.,
70.5Guillermo 73 84 64
251.
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 292.
75 76 73.3
252.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 293.
71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75MRP-
68Delgado,
76 70.6
Abner 75 84 63
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 294.
66 62 70.85
255. MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 295.
75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 296.
78Ducusin,
75 Agapito
71.8 B. 70 78 53
257. MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 297.
69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 298.
66Duque,
82 Castulo
71.95 75 80 73
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 299.
72Ebbah,
75 Percival
71 B. 70 80 85
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 300.
72Edisa,
60 Sulpicio
70.65 65 77 75
 301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59MRP-
69Guzman,
86 73.4
Mateo de 76 79 79
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 341.
65 75 73.2
302. 342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 343.
69Guzman,
75 72.65
Salvador T. de 75 84 64
303. 344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 345.
75Hedriana,
78 67.1Naterno G. 75 68 84
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 346.
70Hernandez,
76 71.7 Quintin B. 67 75 72
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 1952
71 67 70 73.05
306.
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
307. 348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 349.
73Jamer,
75 Alipio
72.5S. 68 75 83
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63MRP-
77Ibasco,
70 Jr., Emiliano M.
72.15 75 65 68
350.
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 351.
70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67MRP-
73Jaen,
59Justiniano
72.2 F. 76 75 78
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 352.
72 70 72.25
313. 353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76MRP-
64Javier,
50 Aquilino
73 M. 75 84 79
314. 354.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 355.
68Jomuad,
73 Francisco
72.05 75 75 72
315.
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 356.
64 75 70.35
316.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
317. 358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 359.
76Leones,
60 Constante
70.9 B. 68 81 79
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 360.
73Liboro,
60 Horacio
72.85 T. 72 69 80
319. 361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 362.
75Lomontod,
65 73.75
Jose P. 75 76 69
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 363.
71Luna,60Lucito
71.95 70 75 69
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61MRP-
72Luz,75 73.15
Lauro L. 76 90 78
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 364.
75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70MRP-
70Macasaet, Tomas S.
65 71.85 73 81 72
365.
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325. 366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 367.
62Majarais,
62 73.4Rodolfo P. 70 62 64
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56MRP-
70Makabenta,
53 71.15 Eduardo 75 90 77
368.
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 369.
75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 370.
73Maloles,
68 Iluminado
71.25 M. 70 87 73
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 371.
76Maniquis,
65 72.8Daniel R. 75 80 73
331.
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332. 373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57MRP-
64Marco,
70 Jaime
70.5 P. 75 67 74
374.
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 375.
69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69MRP-
70Masancay,
54 72.35 Amando E. 73 87 75
336. 376.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70MRP-
70Mati-ong,
60 70.05
Ignacio T. 62 87 72
337. 377.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 378.
69Mara,
65Guillermo
73.3 L. 70 78 78
338.
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 379.
73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 418.
79Perez,
65 Toribio
72.8 R. 71 64 81
380. 419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68MRP-
69Pido,53Serafin
71.95C. 77 81 72
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 420.
69 83 73.1
382. D. 421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74
MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 422.
70Poblete,
75 Celso
72.15 B. 72 79 82
383.
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 423.
75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 424.
68Puzon,
70 Eduardo
73 S. 72 80 81
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 425.
77Quetulio,
66 73.15
Josefina D. 75 90 60
386.
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 426.
70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63MRP-
72Quietson,
66 72.15
Bayani R. 73 75 76
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 427.
75 75 69.15
389. 428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 429.
75Ramirez,
57 72.05
Sabas P. 71 80 73
390.
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 430.
76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56MRP-
72Ramos,
70 Patricio
73.15 S. 75 87 76
392. 431.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37MRP-
64Ramos-Balmori,
72 63.6 Manuela 78 84 76
393. 432.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59MRP-
71Raro,
76Celso
71.35 75 81 76
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 433.
78 67 73.65
395. MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 434.
65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 435.
75Revilla,
79 Mariano
71.9 S. 75 78 81
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 436.
68Reyes,
70 Abdon
71.85L. 72 64 81
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 437.
68Reyes,
79 Domingo
71.8 B. 72 87 78
399. 438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 439.
70Reyes,
79 Lozano
73.45 M. 80 57 78
400.
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 440.
72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 441.
70Rigonan,
78 72.1
Cesar V. 71 85 65
MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 442.
76Rivera,
75 Honorio
72.95 71 56 70
403.
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 443.
72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58MRP-
75Robles,
70 Enrique
72.6 75 77 75
405. 444.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 445.
74Rodriguez,
66 71.65
Orestes 76 75 76
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78Arellano
75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 446.
78Roldan,
50 Jose
72.95
V. 67 80 79
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 447.
69Rosario,
75 Adelaida
73.25 R. del 80 75 65
409. 448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59MRP-
63Sabelino,
71 73.45
Conrado S. 71 81 69
410. 449.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 450.
76San73Juan,73.65
Damaso 77 86 72
411.
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
413. MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70
453.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 454.
65 80 70.9
415.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
416. 456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76MRP-
66Villaseñor,
70 73.7Leonidas F. 80 85 67
457. 494.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 495.
71Viterbo,
60 Jose
66.75
H. 80 77 65
458. 496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79MRP-
71Yasay,
85 Mariano
73.8 R. 75 75 72
459. 497.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72MRP-
66Ygay,
54Venancio
73.3 M. 73 80 83
460. 498.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 499.
76Yulo,76Jr., 73.1
Teodoro 73 82 78
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 500.
68Zamora,
67 Alberto
73.5 70 65 76
462.
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80A list
53 of those
70 who 65 petitioned
70.7 for the
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76consolidation
70 64 of70 their71.9
grades in subjects
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75passed
75 in72 previous
60 examinations,
73.05 showing the
466. years in which they took the examinations
together with their grades and averages, and
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74those
68 who 72had filed
60 motions
71.85 for
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62reconsideration
75 73 which73.95
80 were denied, indicated
468. by the initials MRD, follows:
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469. PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
72
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15 Civ. Land Merc. I
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
473. 1946 68 67 76 7

474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 1950

75 71 63 71.3 59 80 67 7
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 552. Baldo,
65 Olegario Ga.
57 67.55
475. 1951 65 76 58 5
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
1952 65 68 75 8
476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 1953
66 67 65 70.8 57 74 68 6
477. 3. Blanco, Jose B.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 MRD-1949
51 64 75 70.8 75 75 70 7
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 1951
56 68 75 72.6 64 71 58 6
479.
4. Condeno, Mateo
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 1950
85 56 56 66 60 71 71 80 62 7

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 1951

76 71 70 73.55 70 60 61 6
482. 5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 MRD-1949
78 71 75 73.7 69 70 76 7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
1950 60 71 55 6
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
486. MRD-1949 60 70 82 7
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 1950
50 72 67 71.05 57 65 51 6
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 7. Luna,
55 75 Lucito
73 A.73.65
488.
1946 63 53 69 7
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
1952 70 75 69 8
MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490. 8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 1949
64 75 65 71.2 72 68 68 7
491. 1952 65 79 60 7
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
9. Montano, Manuel M.
492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 1951
66 69 50 70.75 61 60 58 6
 1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 2. 70
Alcantara,
50 Pedro
66.4 N. 67 70 75
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 3. 71
Alejandro,
78 Exequiel
70.65 67 72 71
10. Peña, Jesus S. 4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 10. 58 69Benjamin
Barrios, 67.75 O. 65 71 76
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 11. 75
Buhay,71 66.8 L.
Eduardo 73 76 71
12. Rementizo, Filemon S. 12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 13. 55
Cariño,85Eldo66.65
J. 79 81 60
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 14. 55
Casar,75
Dimapuro
64.05 67 73 84
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 15. Castañeda,
75 Gregorio
64 65.7 70 73 80
13. Amao, Sulpicio M. 16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 22. 71
Gracia,70Miguel
70.1L. de 73 68 75
15. Sanchez, Juan J. 23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 24. 55 50 Antonio
Gutierrez, 63.5 S. 68 77 66
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 25. 60
Ilejay, 75 68 I.
Abraham 77 70 76
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 26. 78
Leon, 67
Benjamin
65.8La. De 66 66 75
16. Santos, Constantino 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 28. 66
Lukman,
65 Abdul-Hamid
66.65 76 64 67
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60
17. Santos, Salvador H.
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 34. 66
Molina,80Manuel
70 C. 75 78 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C. 35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 36. 60 52 Buenaventura
Navarro, 63.1 M. 80 75 65
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 37. 65 85 Domiciano
Nodado, 68 R. 60 67 67
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 38. 27
Papas,49Sisenando
45 B. 65 62 71
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 39. 75
Pagulayan-Sy,
75 69.3Fernando 63 75 71
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 40. 69
Padula,
71Benjamin
71.05 C. 70 77 54
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, 42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81
while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions 43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the
provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those 44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78
candidates separating those who filed mere motions 45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76
for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the 46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76
aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75
1953 PETITIONERS FOR 48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75
RECONSIDERATION 49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
51. Sabaot, Solomon
Av. B. 69 73 80
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 5152. Sumaway,
67 77 Ricardo
73.45 S. 66 76 69
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74
 54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 admission
77 69 50 of attorneys-at-law
67 to the practice of the
77 60.9
profession. The amendments embrace many
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64
interesting 71 but 65
matters, those67.15
referring to sections 14
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 16
and 68immediately
54 70 concern
77 64.5
us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
972 SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
obtained a general average of 70 per cent
Av.
without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73foregoing
74 81 77 shall
subjects 73.5be given the following
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87relative
54 weights:
71 80Civil72.8
Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78Mercantile
63 78Law,72 72.9
15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76per61
cent; 74
Political
78Law, 73.35
10 per cent;
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75International
61 68 Law,72 5 per
73.2cent; Remedial Law,
20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81Exercises,
68 715 per84cent;73.05
Social Legislation, 5 per
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82cent;
50 Taxation,
58 5 per 72.05
79 cent. Unsuccessful
Concepcion candidates shall not be required to take
another examination in any subject in which
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81higher
63 and 61such80 72.8
rating shall be taken into
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 account
78 67 in
72 determining
73 73.35 their general average
in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75however,
50 68
That if68 72.3
the candidate fails to get a
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83general
51 average
70 75of 7073.25
per cent in his third
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73examination,
62 62 he70 shall71
lose the benefit of
having already passed some subjects and
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79shall
61 be required
69 82to the
71.6examination in all the
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60subjects.
61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74applicants.
72 68— Any
77 applicant
72.75 who has obtained
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80a general
74 average
62 70 of71.45
70 per cent in all
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 subjects
68 81 50 without
71 falling
78 70.65 below 50 per cent in
any examination held after the 4th day of July,
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 681946,70 or who
76 has71 been 71.6
otherwise found to be
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72entitled
69 to72admission
79 72.6 to the bar, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe before the
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76office.
75 (Arts.
70 4 and
70 5,72.98, No. 12).
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
pertinent to the matter before us being:
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81It seems
56 to be unfair
69 71 71.05that unsuccessful
candidates at bar examinations should be
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
compelled to repeat even those subjects
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80which58 they68have83previously
73.25 passed. This is not
the case in any other government
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 examination. The Rules of Court have
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 therefore been amended in this measure to
candidates who have not presented any petition, they give a candidate due credit for any subject
reach a total of 1,094. which he has previously passed with a rating
of 75 per cent or higher."
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; while three chose to refrain from making any and one
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, took no part. With regards to the matter that interests
but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per us, the Court said:
cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 127. One part of this amendment provides
of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or
higher in any subject, although failing to pass We have already stated in our comment on
the examination, he need not be examined in the next preceding amendment that we are
said subject in his next examination. This is a not exactly in favor of reducing the passing
sort of passing the Bar Examination on the general average from 75 per cent to 70 per
installment plan, one or two or three subjects cent to govern even in the future. As to the
at a time. The trouble with this proposed validity of making such reduction retroactive,
system is that although it makes it easier and we have serious legal doubts. We should not
more convenient for the candidate because he lose sight of the fact that after every bar
may in an examination prepare himself on examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
only one or two subjects so as to insure corresponding resolution not only admitting to
passing them, by the time that he has passed the Bar those who have obtained a passing
the last required subjects, which may be general average grade, but also rejecting and
several years away from the time that he denying the petitions for reconsideration of
reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he those who have failed. The present
shall have forgotten the principles and amendment would have the effect of
theories contained in those subjects and repudiating, reversing and revoking the
remembers only those of the one or two Supreme Court's resolution denying and
subjects that he had last reviewed and rejecting the petitions of those who may have
passed. This is highly possible because there obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
is nothing in the law which requires a but less than the general passing average
candidate to continue taking the Bar fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
examinations every year in succession. The involves legal implications, and this phase of
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on the amendment if finally enacted into law
this plan, must pass the examination in no might have to go thru a legal test. As one
more that three installments; but there is no member of the Court remarked during the
limitation as to the time or number of years discussion, when a court renders a decision or
intervening between each examination taken. promulgate a resolution or order on the basis
This would defeat the object and the of and in accordance with a certain law or rule
requirements of the law and the Court in then in force, the subsequent amendment or
admitting persons to the practice of law. When even repeal of said law or rule may not affect
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed the final decision, order, or resolution already
and presupposed that he possesses the promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the rendering it void and of no effect.
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to Another aspect of this question to be
practice the legal profession and adequately considered is the fact that members of the bar
render the legal service required by are officers of the courts, including the
prospective clients. But this would not hold Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
true of the candidates who may have obtained admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
a passing grade on any five subjects eight impliedly regards him as a person fit,
years ago, another three subjects one year competent and qualified to be its officer.
later, and the last two subjects the present Conversely, when it refused and denied
year. We believe that the present system of admission to the Bar to a candidate who in
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing any year since 1946 may have obtained a
general average with no grade in any subject general average of 70 per cent but less than
below 50 per cent is more desirable and that required for that year in order to pass, the
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, Supreme Court equally and impliedly
and prepared in all required legal subjects at considered and declared that he was not
the time of admission to the practice of law. prepared, ready, competent and qualified to
be its officer. The present amendment giving
xxx xxx xxx retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts
We now come to the last amendment, that of and resolutions of the Supreme Court and
section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment practically and in effect says that a candidate
provides that any application who has not accepted, and even rejected by the Court
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in to be its officer because he was unprepared,
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless
any subject in any examination held after the and in spite of all, must be admitted and
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take allowed by this Court to serve as its officer.
and subscribe the corresponding oath of We repeat, that this is another important
office. In other words, Bar candidates who aspect of the question to be carefully and
obtained not less than 70 per cent in any seriously considered.
examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject, The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951,
despite their non-admission to the Bar by the stating the following:
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain
a passing general average in any of those I am fully in accord with the avowed objection
years, will be admitted to the Bar. This of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
provision is not only prospective but the legal profession and maintain it on a high
retroactive in its effects. level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class
 who have failed in the bar examination, more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which and included as part of the next whole
I find serious fundamental objections. number.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in examination after July 4, 1945 shall be
any subject in any examination held after the deemed to have passed in such subject or
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take subjects and such grade or grades shall be
and subscribed the corresponding oath of included in computing the passing general
office. This provision constitutes class average that said candidate may obtain in any
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically subsequent examinations that he may take.
one group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its
1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations. approval.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or With the following explanatory note:
set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in This is a revised Bar bill to meet the
force. It should be noted that after every bar objections of the President and to afford
examination the Supreme Court passes the another opportunity to those who feel
corresponding resolution not only admitting to themselves discriminated by the Supreme
the Bar those who have obtained a passing Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who
general average but also rejecting and would otherwise have passed the bar
denying the petitions for reconsideration of examination but were arbitrarily not so
those who have failed. The provision under considered by altering its previous decisions
consideration would have the effect of of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution been altering the passing mark from 69 in
denying and rejecting the petitions of those 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
who may have failed to obtain the passing apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
average fixed for that year. Said provision also and to give satisfaction to all parties
sets a bad precedent in that the Government concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual
would be morally obliged to grant a similar increase in the general averages for passing
privilege to those who have failed in the the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to
examinations for admission to other 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952
professions such as medicine, engineering, bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
architecture and certified public accountancy. examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote passing mark will be restored with the
of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI condition that the candidate shall not obtain in
of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows: reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade, is the tremendous handicap
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS which students during the years immediately
FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP after the Japanese occupation has to
TO AND INCLUDING 1953 overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of preparation of students who took up law soon
Representatives of the Philippines in after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956
Congress assembled: the preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of normal conditions, if not improved from those
section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, years preceding the last world war.
any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any bar In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the having our Supreme Court assumed the
August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in supervision as well as the administration of
the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the the study of law which was objected to by the
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955
bar examinations without a candidate The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any stated among his objections that the bill would
subject, shall be allowed to take and admit to the practice of law "a special class
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as who failed in the bar examination". He
member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, considered the bill a class legislation. This
however, That 75 per cent passing general contention, however, is not, in good
average shall be restored in all succeeding conscience, correct because Congress is
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for merely supplementing what the Supreme
the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or Court have already established as precedent
by making as low as 69 per cent the passing (Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
mark of those who took the Bar examination in Senator
1947. These bar candidates for who this bill
should be enacted, considered themselves as
having passed the bar examination on the Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
strength of the established precedent of our Congress as above transcribed. The President again
Supreme Court and were fully aware of the asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps the following:
which they were unavoidably placed. We
believe that such precedent cannot or could Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
Supreme Court, without giving due information that, with respect to Senate Bill
consideration to the rights already accrued or No. 371, the members of the Court are taking
vested in the bar candidates who took the the same views they expressed on Senate Bill
examination when the precedent was not yet No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
altered, or in effect, was still enforced and contained in the first indorsement of the
without being inconsistent with the principles undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the
of their previous resolutions. Assistant Executive Secretary.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be

considered as a simple curative act or (Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a "valid
The President allowed the period within which the bill
classification" as against class legislation, is
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue
very expressed in the following American
of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20,
Jurisprudence:
Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
A valid classification must include all who
naturally belong to the class, all who possess
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
a common disability, attribute, or
election year, and that both the President and the
classification, and there must be a "natural"
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
and substantial differentiation between those
together, however, they lost in the polls.
included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and
then have the dissevered factions of the
original unit designated with different rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Separate Opinions
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo:
"Time with its tides brings new conditions The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has
which must be cared for by new laws. always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
Sometimes the new conditions affect the because lawyers are members of the Court and only
members of a class. If so, the correcting this Court should be allowed to determine admission
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense
statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The that discretion is used in is exercise. This power
constitution does not prohibit special laws should be distinguished from the power to promulgate
inflexibly and always. It permits them when rules which regulate admission. It is only this power
there are special evils with which the general (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given
laws are incompetent to cope. The special in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise
public purpose will sustain the special form. . . of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the
. The problem in the last analysis is one of rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
legislative policy, with a wide margin of of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in scope of the legislative power. But the power to
the case of plain abuse will there be revision determine when a candidate has made or has not
by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City made the required grade is judicial, and lies
Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. completely with this Court.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of
statute which always retroacts to the extent of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules.
the care of correction only as in this case from To say that candidates who obtain a general average
1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of per cent in 1955 should be considered as having
Court. passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the
privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
For the foregoing purposes the approval of mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for
this bill is earnestly recommended. different years with grades lower than the passing
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per
discriminatory. Why should those taking the cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly
have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
those taking earlier or later are not? Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In
1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, previous bill vetoed by the President, with the
because it is not embraced within the rule-making important difference that in the later bill the provisions
power of Congress, because it is an undue in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
interference with the power of this Court to admit regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law,
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory. (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as
new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examination, and
(4) the equal division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a
PARAS, C.J., dissenting: law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely
not signing it within the required period; and in doing
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order so the President gave due respect to the will of the
that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained repass the bill first vetoed by him.
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who
passing mark has always been adhered to, with obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
certain exception presently to be specified. examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71
per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in
With reference to the bar examinations given in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar
included only those who obtained a general average examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per
of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a
averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in
the examinations of November, 1946 the list first such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
released containing the names of successful shall be included in computing the passing in any
candidates covered only those who obtained a subsequent examinations.
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a Numerous candidates who had taken the bar
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing
indicate that in the original list of successful average, filed with this Court mass or separate
candidates those having a general average of 73 per petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice
cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the
After the original list of 1947 successful bar allegation that they have obtained the general
candidates had been released, and on motion for averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution
reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar,
July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations especially authorized representatives of bar
held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of associations, were invited to argue or submit
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective said hearing being that some doubt had "been
of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, the matter" involved "a new question of public
for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent interest."
as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
All discussions in support of the proposition that the
perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
power to regulate the admission to the practice of law
is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subject is now governed by the Constitution which in
subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this
The Supreme Court shall have the power to
Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were
promulgate rules concerning pleading,
uniformly denied.
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings shall be uniform for all courts of the same
where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, grade and shall not diminish, increase or
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates
 modify substantive right. The existing laws on the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby the facts and circumstances then brought out.
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules
of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme As regards the alleged interference in or
Court to alter and modify the same. The encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Congress shall have the power to repeal, Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if
alter, or supplement the rules concerning there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference
admission to the practice of law in the in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is
Philippines. essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that
have already been vested or acquired in virtue of
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose
Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning of creating appearances of separation and equality
the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has among the three branches of the Government.
the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case
Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor
the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the of one and against the other. Needless to say, the
admission to the practice of law is concurrent. statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing
bar candidates who had obtained the general average
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it would provide that those who have been admitted to
sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law,
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative because said statute would then destroy a right
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion already acquired under previous resolutions of this
this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose
the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of
Court expressly fix certain periods after which they Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution
filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several
period within which the motion were filed, and this has years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
that bar examinations and admission to the practice of candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per
law may be deemed as a judicial function only cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of
in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
because bar examinations and the admission to the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect said section (fixing the general average at 75 per
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
other examining boards. In the second place, reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
except only when they would be ex post facto, would admission to the practice of law, that the latter may
impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing
would deny due process and equal protection of the general average.
law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the
contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
right to due process and equal protection of the law. since this Court had already adopted as passing
On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations
intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway,
from the adoption by this Court of different passing we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
general averages in certain years. since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from
no longer have any record of those who might have nullifying them solely on that ground.
failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that
75 per cent had always been the passing mark during To say that the admission of the bar candidates
said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said
Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
classification, the reasonableness must be not considered by the Congress. As already stated,
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had interference with the power of this Court to admit
taken all the circumstances into account before members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I
may observe that the Congress, representing the
people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic
Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
through their duly elected representatives.
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that
that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed
the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained
to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court
a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
regarding the admission to the practice of law, may
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This
act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same
passing mark has always been adhered to, with
way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in
certain exception presently to be specified.
the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can
and should only hope that the right men are put in the
right places in our Government. With reference to the bar examinations given in
August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general
its entirety.
averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In
the examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a
Separate Opinions general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting: general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per
cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has indicate that in the original list of successful
always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, candidates those having a general average of 73 per
because lawyers are members of the Court and only cent or more but below 75 per cent were included.
this Court should be allowed to determine admission After the original list of 1947 successful bar
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation candidates had been released, and on motion for
of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense reconsideration, all candidates with a general average
that discretion is used in is exercise. This power of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of
should be distinguished from the power to promulgate July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations
rules which regulate admission. It is only this power held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
(to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a
in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective
of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus,
scope of the legislative power. But the power to for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent
determine when a candidate has made or has not as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
made the required grade is judicial, and lies cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
completely with this Court. perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held
of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for
To say that candidates who obtain a general average reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this
of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were
per cent in 1955 should be considered as having uniformly denied.
passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the
privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
different years with grades lower than the passing presidents of bar associations, and law graduates
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per
discriminatory. Why should those taking the cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July
examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly
have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
those taking earlier or later are not? Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In
1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, previous bill vetoed by the President, with the
because it is not embraced within the rule-making important difference that in the later bill the provisions
power of Congress, because it is an undue in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme
(2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has
examiners before the holding of the examination, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules.
(4) the equal division among the examiners of all the Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely
not signing it within the required period; and in doing The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that
so the President gave due respect to the will of the this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held
Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it
repass the bill first vetoed by him. sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on
per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of
examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations
also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the
after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in period within which the motion were filed, and this has
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is
shall be included in computing the passing in any that bar examinations and admission to the practice of
subsequent examinations. law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the
examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved,
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing in the subject and constitutional sense of the word,
average, filed with this Court mass or separate because bar examinations and the admission to the
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of
allegation that they have obtained the general other examining boards. In the second place,
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution,
of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a except only when they would be ex post facto, would
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or
especially authorized representatives of bar would deny due process and equal protection of the
associations, were invited to argue or submit law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and
said hearing being that some doubt had "been contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. right to due process and equal protection of the law.
972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute
the matter" involved "a new question of public intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising
interest." from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.
All discussions in support of the proposition that the
power to regulate the admission to the practice of law Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July
is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we
subject is now governed by the Constitution which in no longer have any record of those who might have
Article VII, section 13, provides as follows: failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that
75 per cent had always been the passing mark during
The Supreme Court shall have the power to said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war
promulgate rules concerning pleading, bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of
admission to the practice of law. Said rules classification, the reasonableness must be
shall be uniform for all courts of the same determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
grade and shall not diminish, increase or recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we
modify substantive right. The existing laws on can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules the facts and circumstances then brought out.
of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The As regards the alleged interference in or
Congress shall have the power to repeal, encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
alter, or supplement the rules concerning Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
admission to the practice of law in the sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference
Philippines. in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is
essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that
have already been vested or acquired in virtue of
decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court
of creating appearances of separation and equality regarding the admission to the practice of law, may
among the three branches of the Government. act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same
Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in
involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can
of one and against the other. Needless to say, the and should only hope that the right men are put in the
statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing right places in our Government.
bar candidates who had obtained the general average
prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
would provide that those who have been admitted to its entirety.
the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is
below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law,
because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this
Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose
general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme

Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution
amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several
years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per
cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of
Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
said section (fixing the general average at 75 per
cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and
the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may
validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing
general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the

ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing
averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations
and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway,
we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
since this is a matter that is addressed to the
judgment of the legislators. This Court in many
instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from
nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates

benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said
Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
not considered by the Congress. As already stated,
the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound
to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had
taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I
may observe that the Congress, representing the
people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic
Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people
through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that

the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power
6 Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.7
Phil Truth Commission of 2010 (SC
Declared EO Unconstitutional) The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
Representatives.
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010, Respondent. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to
the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
G.R. No. 193036 walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. objective, catapulted the good senator to the
ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. presidency.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR., Petitioners, To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
vs. President Aquino found a need for a special body to
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND allegedly committed during the previous
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. administration.
ABAD, Respondents.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President
DECISION on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
MENDOZA, J.: (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts OF 2010
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987
authority under the Constitution and to establish for Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which principle that a public office is a public trust and
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. mandates that public officers and employees, who are
servants of the people, must at all times be
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1 accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
through the Constitution that the fundamental powers
of government are established, limited and defined, WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable
and by which these powers are distributed among the acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
several departments.2 The Constitution is the basic violation of this mandate;
and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
highest officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional seriously affects the political, economic, and social life
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and accommodate the call of situations and much and underprivileged sector of society;
more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
government and the people who run it.4
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached
very alarming levels, and undermined the people’s
For consideration before the Court are two trust and confidence in the Government and its
consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail institutions;
the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the government and
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis cases against those involved, if warranted, and to
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and deter others from committing the evil, restore the
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for people’s faith and confidence in the Government and
being violative of the legislative power of Congress in their public servants;
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his controlled corporations, to produce
campaign for the Presidency in the last elections documents, books, records and other papers;
"kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a
solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption c) Upon proper request or representation,
and the evil it breeds; obtain information and documents from the
Senate and the House of Representatives
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body records of investigations conducted by
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the committees thereof relating to matters or
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and subjects being investigated by the
corruption during the previous administration, and Commission;
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all; d) Upon proper request and representation,
obtain information from the courts, including
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Court Administrator, information or documents
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives in respect to corruption cases filed with the
the President the continuing authority to reorganize Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the
the Office of the President. case may be;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their
III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by testimonies and for that purpose, administer
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
order:
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is need to utilize any person as a state witness
hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH to ensure that the ends of justice be fully
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as served, that such person who qualifies as a
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and state witness under the Revised Rules of
find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate Court of the Philippines be admitted for that
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and purpose;
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious
officers and employees, their co-principals, prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, authorities, by means of a special
if any, during the previous administration; and or interim report and recommendation, all
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or evidence on corruption of public officers and
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full employees and their private sector co-
measure of justice shall be served without fear or principals, accomplices or accessories, if any,
favor. when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman ground to believe that they are liable for graft
and four (4) members who will act as an independent and corruption under pertinent applicable
collegial body. laws;

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The h) Call upon any government investigative or
Commission, which shall have all the powers of an prosecutorial agency such as the Department
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and
I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation such assistance and cooperation as it may
of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in require in the discharge of its functions and
Section 1, involving third level public officers and duties;
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the i) Engage or contract the services of resource
previous administration and thereafter submit its persons, professionals and other personnel
finding and recommendations to the President, determined by it as necessary to carry out its
Congress and the Ombudsman. mandate;

In particular, it shall: j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules

of procedure it deems necessary to effectively
a) Identify and determine the reported cases and efficiently carry out the objectives of this
of such graft and corruption which it will Executive Order and to ensure the orderly
investigate; conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence;
evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are
investigate, and to this end require any appropriate and necessary in connection with
agency, official or employee of the Executive the objectives and purposes of this Order.
Branch, including government-owned or
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x. (SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x Executive Secretary

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x. Nature of the Truth Commission

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions,

Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x. the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
Persons. – x x x. and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations
or Give Testimony. – Any government official or
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear
Though it has been described as an "independent
upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the
appearing before the Commission refuses to take
Office of the President Proper and subject to his
oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an
documents for inspection, when required, shall be
ad hoc body is one.8
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may be dealt with
in accordance with law. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
Commission. – x x x.
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
Office of the President shall provide the necessary corruption and make recommendations. It may have
funds for the Commission to ensure that it can subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
exercise its powers, execute its functions, and contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a
perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible. if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it
SECTION 12. Office. – x x x. cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The other countries which have been created as official,
Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to
December 31, 2012. establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x. country’s past."9 They are usually established by
states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
the Commission. – x x x. transitional justice.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Truth commissions have been described as bodies
Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the that share the following characteristics: (1) they
President there is a need to expand the mandate of examine only past events; (2) they investigate
the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as
include the investigation of cases and instances of opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary
graft and corruption during the prior administrations, bodies that finish their work with the submission of a
such mandate may be so extended accordingly by report containing conclusions and recommendations;
way of a supplemental Executive Order. and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State.10 "Commission’s members
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy recommendations to
this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof. investigations, the commissions may aim to discover
and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way
SECTION 19. Effectivity. – This Executive Order for prosecutions and recommend institutional
shall take effect immediately. reforms."11

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
of July 2010. reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory
body set up to try and punish those responsible for commissions to exclusively investigate human
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory rights violations, which customary practice
tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of forms part of the generally accepted principles
South Africa, the principal function of which was to of international law which the Philippines is
heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims. Declaration of Principles enshrined in the
Constitution.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa’s model. The
latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on (f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is
judicial retribution, while the marching order of the an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan
PTC is the identification and punishment of hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by
perpetrators. As one writer12puts it: publicity and a mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people that
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the widespread poverty will altogether vanish if
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural corruption is eliminated without even
speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if addressing the other major causes of poverty.
they mean that they would like us to simply forget
about the wrongs that they have committed in the (g) The mere fact that previous commissions
past, we have this to say: There can be no were not constitutionally challenged is of no
reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to moment because neither laches nor estoppel
go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring can bar an eventual question on the
over and over again." constitutionality and validity of an executive
issuance or even a statute."13
The Thrusts of the Petitions
In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents,
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order through the Office of the Solicitor
No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from standing of petitioners and defended the assailed
performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of executive order with the following arguments:
the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
summarized them in the following manner: Congress to create a public office because the
President’s executive power and power of
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of control necessarily include the inherent power
powers as it arrogates the power of the to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
Congress to create a public office and are faithfully executed and that, in any event,
appropriate funds for its operation. the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No.
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the jurisprudence that authorize the President to
delegated authority of the President to create or form such bodies.
structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
efficiency does not include the power to create Congress to appropriate funds because there
an entirely new public office which was is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
hitherto inexistent like the "Truth funds already appropriated by Congress.
Commission."
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Constitution and pertinent statutes when it Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi- Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
under the 1987 Constitution and the erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection created for laudable purposes.
clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the The OSG then points to the continued existence and
previous administration as if corruption is their validity of other executive orders and presidential
peculiar species even as it excludes those of issuances creating similar bodies to justify the
the other administrations, past and present, creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint
who may be indictable. and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon
B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by
Commission of 2010" violates the consistent President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency
and general international practice of four on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO)by
decades wherein States constitute truth President Ferdinand E. Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.
memoranda, the following are the principal issues to As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
be resolved: Enriquez,21

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
legal standing to file their respective petitions so is the power of each member thereof, since his
and question Executive Order No. 1; office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
violates the principle of separation of powers An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
by usurping the powers of Congress to create Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
and to appropriate funds for public offices, substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
agencies and commissions; member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it
the DOJ; that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 they are allowed to question the validity of any official
violates the equal protection clause; and action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.22
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to
injunctive relief. With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a
taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation
Essential requisites for judicial review of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation
and operation of the commission are to be taken from
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the
those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus,
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court
the allocation and disbursement of funds for the
needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid
commission will not entail congressional action but will
exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
simply be an exercise of the President’s power over
contingent funds.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution,
the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not
wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
any personal and direct injury attributable to the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial
substantial interest in the case such that he has
power and to wield the axe over presidential
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
David v. Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
locus standi. Thus:
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.19
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question." In private suits,
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of
standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
the petitioners has been put at issue.
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that
Legal Standing of the Petitioners "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly,
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to
petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly
the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to
that they have sustained or are in danger of the relief sought.
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
the commission’s investigations, petitioners will not public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
proceedings.20 does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger,"
legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
Congress as a body to which they belong as make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present "taxpayer.
the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both that the petition covers matters of transcendental
"citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by Where the issues are of transcendental and
the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he paramount importance not only to the public but also
is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people
Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, are more than interested to know the status of the
however…the people are the real parties…It is at President’s first effort to bring about a promised
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of
interfere and see that a public offence be properly the petition not due to overwhelming political
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the
remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful controversies with overreaching significance to
use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." society.

However, to prevent just about any person from Power of the President to Create the Truth
seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act Commission
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office
the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same President.31 Thus, in order that the President may
Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the create a public office he must be empowered by the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in
or legislative action, he must show that he has him by law. According to petitioner, such power
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in
and it is not sufficient that he has a general the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the
interest common to all members of the public. President to create a truth commission.33 He adds that
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our granting the President the continuing authority to
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the
who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a creation of a truth commission considering the
personal and substantial interest in the case such aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and
as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany "abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the
of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. President to the extent of creating a public office,
De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution
Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity
thereof.35
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators
can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary argue that the creation of a public office lies within the
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public province of Congress and not with the executive
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of branch of government. They maintain that the
transcendental importance, of overreaching delegated authority of the President to reorganize
significance to society, or of paramount public under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code:
interest."25 1) does not permit the President to create a public
office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. the reorganization of the administrative structure of
Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the
importance where serious constitutional questions are restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right and efficiency.36Such continuing authority of the
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers President to reorganize his office is limited, and by
Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President
to question the constitutionality of several executive overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public. The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively
legislative about the creation by the President of a
The OSG claims that the determinants of fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing
transcendental importance28 laid down in CREBA v. to numerous offices created by past presidents, it
ERC and Meralco29are non-existent in this case. The argues that the authority of the President to create
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion public offices within the Office of the President Proper
has long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part
the Executive, just like the other two branches of of the structure of the Office of the President prior to
government, possesses the inherent authority to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in
create fact-finding committees to assist it in the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
performance of its constitutionally mandated functions Secretary,46
and in the exercise of its administrative
functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the
an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President to reorganize any department or agency in
President under Section 1 and his power of control the executive branch does not have to end here. We
under Section 17, both of Article VII of the must not lose sight of the very source of the power –
Constitution.39 that which constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
It contends that the President is necessarily vested (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
enforced by public officials and employees of his economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
department and in the exercise of his authority to authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
assume directly the functions of the executive the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the transfer the functions of other Departments or
discretion of his officials.40 The power of the President Agencies to the Office of the President. In
to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we
power of control over his subordinates in the ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
executive branch, but extends further in the exercise personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
of his other powers, such as his power to discipline by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It
subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
and licensing purposes42 and in order to be informed structure of government offices or units therein,
on matters which he is entitled to know.43 including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under
Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has the the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the President’s continuing authority to reorganize.
executive department in line with his constitutionally [Emphasis Supplied]
granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not
executive offices under existing statutes. justified by the President’s power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
necessarily includes the power to create offices. For performance of his duties and to substitute the
the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly,
to, among others, put a closure to the reported large the power of control is entirely different from the
scale graft and corruption in the government.45 power to create public offices. The former is inherent
in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 The question is this, is there a valid delegation of
contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the power from Congress, empowering the President to
following functional and structural lines: (1) create a public office?
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
merging units thereof or transferring functions from commission pursuant to the above provision finds
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D.
the Office of the President to any other No. 1772.48 The said law granted the President the
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring continuing authority to reorganize the national
any agency under the Office of the President to any government, including the power to group, consolidate
other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
provision refers to reduction of personnel, functions, to create and classify functions, services
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason and activities, transfer appropriations, and to
of economy or redundancy of functions. These point standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in
to situations where a body or an office is already relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to been invoked in several cases such as Larin v.
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere Executive Secretary.49
mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No.
negative. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a
public office. Said decree is already stale,
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
the Office of the President under Section 31 is a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to
misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning reorganize the administrative structure of the national
attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back
purposes of the decree, embodied in its last the presidential system of government and restored
"Whereas" clause: the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary distinct branches of government with provision for
form of government will necessitate flexibility in the checks and balances.
organization of the national government.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. the President is head of state as well as head of
No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became government and whatever powers inhere in such
functus oficio upon the convening of the First positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus: the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. the country's foreign relations.
1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition
from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a On these premises, we hold the view that although
parliamentary form of government, the legislative and the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
executive powers are fused, correct? exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor. within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective
anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive. x x x.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D.
[No.] 1416, Your Honor.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the
stated above, the powers of the President are not
President to reorganize the entire National
limited to those specific powers under the
Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the
Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50 committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
While the power to create a truth commission cannot faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC Administrative Order No. 298, creating an
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the investigative committee to look into the administrative
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to charges filed against the employees of the
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
17 reads: medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
supplied). Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the executive officials and employees faithfully comply
allocation of power in the three principal branches of with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and used the offices and facilities of the latter in
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not into matters which the President is entitled to know so
mean that he is bereft of such authority.51 As that he can be properly advised and guided in the
explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. performance of his duties relative to the execution and
Manglapus:52 enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to
be revisited, this was also the objective of the
investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo established by the inquiry.
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There
being no changes in the government structure, the The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the
Court is not inclined to declare such executive power same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
as non-existent just because the direction of the observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
political winds have changed. examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate investigation," "investigation" being in turn described
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
say that there will be no appropriation but only an ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
allotment or allocations of existing funds already Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to matter or matters."
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood,
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
for the Office of the President will be the very source term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:
the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
there is no impropriety in the funding. as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x
to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate x."

The President’s power to conduct investigations to In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in
ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the president settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x.
represents the government as a whole and sees to it Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
that all laws are enforced by the officials and of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
department.57 likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and
As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
rights of persons who come before it. It has been said to the factual conclusions to the end that the
that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear controversy may be decided or resolved
and determine questions of fact to which the authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
accordance with the standards laid down by law itself law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the
in enforcing and administering the same law."58 In commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.61
simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not
exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
authorized by the legislature in the case of respective powers. If at all, the investigative function
administrative agencies. of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
The distinction between the power to investigate and recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence
the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court of the overall task of the commission to conduct a
in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, function given to the commission. The phrase, "when
research on, study. The dictionary definition of in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g),
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function
subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official of determining probable cause for the filing of the
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate
under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls
Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,65 it was within the investigative power of the President, the
written: Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
This power of investigation granted to the transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with Constitution. Section 1 reads:
other similarly authorized government agencies such
as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct or property without due process of law, nor shall any
preliminary investigation on charges against public person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
employees and officials is likewise concurrently
shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because
passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the contend that it does not apply equally to all members
Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to of the same class such that the intent of singling out
investigate complaints against local elective officials. the "previous administration" as its sole object makes
[Emphasis supplied]. the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."66 Thus, in
order to be accorded with validity, the commission
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the must also cover reports of graft and corruption in
power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal virtually all administrations previous to that of former
cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which President Arroyo.67
states:
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on the reported cases of graft and corruption must
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any encompass acts committed not only during the
public officer or employee, office or agency, when administration of former President Arroyo but also
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, during prior administrations where the "same
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the reported to have been committed against the Filipino
exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at people. They assail the classification formulated by
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the respondents as it does not fall under the
government, the investigation of such cases. recognized exceptions because first, "there is no
[Emphases supplied] substantial distinction between the group of officials
targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as and other groups or persons who abused their public
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a office for personal gain; and second, the selective
preliminary investigation or the determination of the classification is not germane to the purpose of
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to
of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advocate that the commission should deal with "graft
advise and guide the President in the performance of and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of administration with the strong arm of the law with
the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits equal force."70
no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial
duties. Position of respondents

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its According to respondents, while Executive Order No.
authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial
IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means subject of the investigation, following Section 17
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
crimes. administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be of the previous administration, the petitioners argue
inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be that no offense is committed against the equal
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, protection clause for "the segregation of the
the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission transactions of public officers during the previous
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at administration as possible subjects of investigation is
best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the a valid classification based on substantial distinctions
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order
latitude to decide whether or not to reject the seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not administration from past administrations, it recited the
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be following:
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws. First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread
reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause previous administration which have eroded public
confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore,
an urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft and through the state’s duly constituted authorities."77 "In
corruption in the government and to put a closure to other words, the concept of equal justice under the
them by the filing of the appropriate cases against law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
confidence in the Government and in their public governmental objective."78
servants.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
Second. The segregation of the preceding state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its
administration as the object of fact-finding is inhibitions cover all the departments of the
warranted by the reality that unlike with government including the political and executive
administrations long gone, the current administration departments, and extend to all actions of a state
will most likely bear the immediate consequence of denying equal protection of the laws, through
the policies of the previous administration. whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80

Third. The classification of the previous administration It, however, does not require the universal application
as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.
that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the What it simply requires is equality among equals as
evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to the equal protection clause permits classification.
ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
executed, are more easily established in the regime the test of reasonableness. The test has four
that immediately precede the current administration. requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
even as a routine measure of due diligence and good class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a
housekeeping by a nascent administration like the valid classification."82
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. For a classification to meet the requirements of
Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
Saguisag Commission created by former President members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
form an ad-hoc and independent citizens’ committee necessary that the classification be made with
to investigate all the facts and circumstances absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his the class should possess the same characteristics in
predecessor, former President Fidel V. equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as
Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied] long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially
One of the basic principles on which this government distinguishable from all others, does not justify the
was founded is that of the equality of right which is non-application of the law to him."84
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is The classification must not be based on existing
embraced in the concept of due process, as every circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of addition to the number included in the class. It must
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
separate clause, however, to provide for a more thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As
general may be challenged on the basis of the due elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
process clause. But if the particular act assailed Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
clause.74 guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
simply requires that all persons or things similarly prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights and child should be affected alike by a statute.
conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the but on persons according to the circumstances
equal protection clause is to secure every person surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the which are different in fact be treated in law as though
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. previous administration and thereafter submit its
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in finding and recommendations to the President,
the object to which it is directed or by the territory Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
within which it is to operate.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
The equal protection of the laws clause of the administration is but just a member of a class, that is,
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, own. Not to include past administrations similarly
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
because they agree with one another in certain protection clause cannot sanction. Such
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere and selective retribution.
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid Though the OSG enumerates several differences
classification is that it be reasonable, which means between the Arroyo administration and other past
that the classification should be based on substantial administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it the "previous administration" only. The reports of
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration
that it must apply equally to each member of the cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
class. This Court has held that the standard is administration from earlier administrations which were
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on also blemished by similar widespread reports of
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure
palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted] solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani
Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order valid classification."88
No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the The public needs to be enlightened why Executive
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft investigation to the previous administration only. The
and corruption during the previous OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past
administration"87 only. The intent to single out the administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions effectiveness."89The reason given is specious. It is
of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
are: objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption
and the evil it breeds."90
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the The probability that there would be difficulty in
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports
corruption during the previous administration, and involving the earlier administrations were already
which will recommend the prosecution of the inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased
offenders and secure justice for all; presidents and cases which have already prescribed
can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC.
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous
hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH investigations of previous administrations, given the
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as body’s limited time and resources. "The law does not
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad
find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate impossibilia).91
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility,
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
officers and employees, their co-principals, investigating almost a century’s worth of graft cases.
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1
if any, during the previous administration; and suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
measure of justice shall be served without fear or must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
favor. past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the
Commission, which shall have all the powers of an often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by
of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
Section 1, involving third level public officers and so as practically to make unjust and illegal
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and discriminations between persons in similar
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
constitution. [Emphasis supplied] mention any particular act, event or report to be
focused on unlike the investigative commissions
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an created in the past. "The equal protection clause is
ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, violated by purposeful and intentional
is of the considered view that although its focus is discrimination."103
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws should not in any way be To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is
circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
and paramount law of the nation to which all other commission does not only confine itself to cases of
laws must conform and in accordance with which all large scale graft and corruption committed during the
private rights determined and all public authority previous administration.104The OSG points to Section
administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.94While the thrust of the PTC is SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate.
specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
read together with the provisions of the Constitution. defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of of cases and instances of graft and corruption during
"substantial distinctions" would only confirm the the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is extended accordingly by way of a supplemental
only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case Executive Order.
of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited
number of such classifications have routinely been The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17
held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, allows the President the discretion to expand the
national origin, gender, political activity or scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include
membership in a political party, union activity or the acts of graft and corruption committed in other
membership in a labor union, or more generally the past administrations, it does not guarantee that they
exercise of first amendment rights." would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or not to include them, the section would then be
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was
existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
preclude additions to the number included within a personalities of the Arroyo administration."105
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all
those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances The Court tried to seek guidance from the
and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
and circumstances which are relative to the Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG Charter
discriminatory legislation and which are (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14)
indistinguishable from those of the members of the does not violate the equal protection clause." The
class must be brought under the influence of the law decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on
and treated by it in the same way as are the members how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
of the class."97 principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency
of a cause of action.
The Court is not unaware that "mere
underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law A final word
under the equal protection clause."98 "Legislation is
not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-
The issue that seems to take center stage at present
embracing and does not include all the evils within its
is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise
reach."99 It has been written that a regulation
of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
challenged under the equal protection clause is not
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
legislature and the executive department, is
happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the
exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal,
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason
which is expected to be the protector of the
to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
can be attained in future legislations or regulations.
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time
These cases refer to the "step by step"
and again, this issue has been addressed by the
process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a
Court, but it seems that the present political situation
legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
action lest it continually be accused of being a
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that
hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.
might conceivably have been attacked."102
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with
inadvertence. That the previous administration was
Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
three times in the assailed executive order. It must be
determine whether or not there has been a grave of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of emphasized that the search for the truth must be
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a
of the government." government of laws and not of men."110

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
the power of judicial review which is the power to Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, equal protection clause of the Constitution.
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional.
This power also includes the duty to rule on the As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby
constitutionality of the application, or operation of ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These
provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of SO ORDERED.
conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand,
and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of 7. Angara vs. Electoral Commission
asserting superiority over the other departments.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel
would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional vs.
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts MAYOR,respondents.
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
authority under the Constitution and to establish for Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which Electoral Commission.
that instrument secures and guarantees to them."107 Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial
review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal LAUREL, J.:
body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the This is an original action instituted in this court by the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
more authority of proscribing the actions under further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of
pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional. said petitioner as member of the National Assembly
for the first assembly district of the Province of
It cannot be denied that most government actions are Tayabas.
inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then The facts of this case as they appear in the petition
again, it is important to remember this ethical and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
principle: "The end does not justify the means." No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
(1) That in the elections of September 17,
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be
and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Constitution and its enshrined principles.
Tayabas;
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial
bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not
be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for
debase its rectitude."109
the said district, for having received the most
number of votes;
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for
a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
took his oath of office;
executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it Assembly in session assembled, passed the
is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing following resolution:
the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance
or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be [No. 8]
 RESOLUCION (10) That the case being submitted for
CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS decision, the Electoral Commission
DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS promulgated a resolution on January 23,
CONTRA QUIENES NO SE 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to
HA PRESENTADO Dismiss the Protest."
PROTESTA.
The application of the petitioner sets forth the
Se resuelve: Que las actas de following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed
eleccion de los Diputados for:
contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive
protesta antes de la adopcion jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission
de la presente resolucion solely as regards the merits of contested
sean, como por la presente, elections to the National Assembly;
son aprobadas y confirmadas.
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, jurisdiction the power to regulate the
1935. proceedings of said election contests, which
power has been reserved to the Legislative
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein Department of the Government or the National
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Assembly;
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against the election of the herein petitioner, (c) That like the Supreme Court and other
Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed courts created in pursuance of the
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, relates solely to deciding the merits of
that said respondent be declared elected controversies submitted to them for decision
member of the National Assembly for the first and to matters involving their internal
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said organization, the Electoral Commission can
position be nullified; regulate its proceedings only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral to so regulate such proceedings;
Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph
6 of which provides: (d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
6. La Comision no considerara respected and obeyed;
ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia. (e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of
the ordinance appended to the Constitution
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed of the United States) as well as under section
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court
Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the question herein raised because it involves an
National Assembly was adopted in the interpretation of the Constitution of the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional Philippines.
prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared
members should be presented; (b) that the and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is Electoral Commission interposing the following
the accepted formula for, the limitation of said special defenses:
period; and (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period; (a) That the Electoral Commission has been
created by the Constitution as an
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein instrumentality of the Legislative Department
respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is contests relating to the election, returns, and
no legal or constitutional provision barring the qualifications of the members of the National
presentation of a protest against the election Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
of a member of the National Assembly after December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last
confirmation; day for the presentation of protests against
the election of any member of the National
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of granted it by the Constitution to adopt the
Dismissal"; rules and regulations essential to carry out the
power and functions conferred upon the same
by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
 resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election subsequent thereto;
protest in question, and declaring itself with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, (e) That the Electoral Commission is an
it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi- independent entity created by the
judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth functions, whose decision are final and
Government, and hence said act is beyond unappealable;
the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court; ( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a
constitutional creation, is not an inferior
(b) That the resolution of the National tribunal, corporation, board or person, within
Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code
the election of the members of the National of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
Assembly against whom no protest had thus provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
far been filed, could not and did not deprive (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and
the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance
take cognizance of election protests filed appended thereto could it be subject in the
within the time that might be set by its own exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ
rules: of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body (g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the
invested with quasi-judicial functions, created Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Congress of the united States) has no
Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior application to the case at bar.
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936.
the Code of Civil Procedure, against which Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prohibition would lie. prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the respondent Electoral
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared Commission which petition was denied "without
and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
1936, setting forth the following as his special this court of March 21, 1936.
defense:
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules
of the Electoral Commission on December 9, The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
1935, there was no existing law fixing the reduced to the following two principal propositions:
period within which protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
should be filed; that in fixing December 9,
Electoral Commission and the subject matter
1935, as the last day for the filing of protests
of the controversy upon the foregoing related
against the election of members of the
facts, and in the affirmative,
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission
was exercising a power impliedly conferred
upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted
quasi-judicial attributes; without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest
filed the election of the herein petitioner
(b) That said respondent presented his motion
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
of protest before the Electoral Commission on
such election by resolution of the National
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
Assembly?
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing
directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we
acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by
do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
said respondent and over the parties thereto,
case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be
and the resolution of the Electoral
consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
broader aspect of the question and leave it
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the
an act within the jurisdiction of the said
industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
commission, and is not reviewable by means
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely
of a writ of prohibition;
presented to our consideration.
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
requires confirmation by the National
our system of government. It obtains not through
Assembly of the election of its members, and
express provision but by actual division in our
that such confirmation does not operate to
Constitution. Each department of the government has
limit the period within which protests should
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
be filed as to deprive the Electoral
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not embodied in our Constitution are real as they should
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be be in any living constitution. In the United States
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution where no express constitutional grant is found in their
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and constitution, the possession of this moderating power
independent of each other. The Constitution has of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
provided for an elaborate system of checks and development there, has been set at rest by popular
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
various departments of the government. For example, centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
made a check on the legislative power that this assent section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
the case may be, of the National Assembly. The provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
President has also the right to convene the Assembly rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on any superiority over the other departments; it does not
the Executive in the sense that its consent through its in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
of a majority of all its members is essential to the conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to and to establish for the parties in an actual
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court controversy the rights which that instrument secures
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
appropriate funds for their support, the National involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain properly is the power of judicial review under the
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
effectively checks the other departments in the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
to declare executive and legislative acts void if attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
violative of the Constitution. barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
the executive, the legislative and the judicial legislation. More than that, courts accord the
departments of the government. The overlapping and presumption of constitutionality to legislative
interlacing of functions and duties between the enactments, not only because the legislature is
several departments, however, sometimes makes it presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the because the judiciary in the determination of actual
other begins. In times of social disquietude or political cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution justice of the people as expressed through their
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely representatives in the executive and legislative
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial departments of the governments of the government.
department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of But much as we might postulate on the internal
powers between the several departments and among checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
the integral or constituent units thereof. not the less to be remembered that, in the language of
James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
As any human production, our Constitution is of palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians
much as it was within the power of our people, acting . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice
through their delegates to so provide, that instrument to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
which is the expression of their sovereignty however constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then,
limited, has established a republican government must the success of our government in the unfolding
intended to operate and function as a harmonious years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided court chambers.
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in
no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said
government along constitutional channels, for then the date as the last day for the filing of protests against
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill the election, returns and qualifications of members of
of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
principles of good government mere political confirmation made by the National Assembly as
apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
entertain protests against the election, returns and undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, thus created in our constitutional system which may
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is framework? To ask these questions is to answer
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
contended by the respondents, the Electoral exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
Commission has the sole power of regulating its principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
proceedings to the exclusion of the National opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as Commission and the subject mater of the present
the last day for filing protests against the election, controversy for the purpose of determining the
returns and qualifications of members of the National character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant
Assembly, should be upheld. to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
Here is then presented an actual controversy qualifications of the members of the National
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional Assembly."
nature between the National Assembly on the one
hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we
From the very nature of the republican government shall now proceed to pass upon the second
established in our country in the light of American proposition and determine whether the Electoral
experience and of our own, upon the judicial Commission has acted without or in excess of its
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9,
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, protest filed against the election of the herein
as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
namely to determine all contests relating to the 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
election, returns and qualifications of the members of out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4
the National Assembly. Although the Electoral of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
Commission may not be interfered with, when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
Commission is not a separate department of the be nominated by the party having the largest number
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of of votes, and three by the party having the second
authority under the fundamental law between largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
department powers and agencies of the government the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
English type and other European types of the members of the National Assembly." It is
constitutional government, the framers of our imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
constitution adopted the American type where the history of this constitutional provision and inquire into
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the intention of its framers and the people who
the judicial department. In some countries which have adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full
declined to follow the American example, provisions meaning, import and significance.
have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting
the courts from exercising the power to interpret the The original provision regarding this subject in the Act
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of
of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
is logically their function. For instance, the members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5,
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides Article I of the Constitution of the United States
that courts shall have no power to examine the validity providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the
of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29,
countries whose constitutions are silent in this 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the
in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the qualifications of their elective members . . ."
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the
Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified.
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are This court has had occasion to characterize this grant
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
In our case, the nature of the present controversy Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte
determine the conflict of authority between two and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
The first step towards the creation of an independent (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of
tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested the Members of the National Assembly and all
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub- cases contesting the election of any of its
committee of five appointed by the Committee on Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Commission, composed of three members
Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report elected by the party having the largest number
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a of votes in the National Assembly, three
Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear elected by the members of the party having
legislature but also against the election of executive the second largest number of votes, and three
officers for whose election the vote of the whole justices of the Supreme Court designated by
nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
proceedings against specified executive and judicial presided over by one of said justices.
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests,
the tribunal was to be composed of three justices During the discussion of the amendment introduced
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
the house of the legislature to which the contest proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the
corresponds, three members to be designed by the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
majority party and three by the minority, to be following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall qualifications of the Members", the following
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight the scope of the said draft:
modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two xxx xxx xxx
senators to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the Senate and two representatives to
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a
be designated one each from the two major parties in
doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of
the House of Representatives, and in awarding
the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
representation to the executive department in the
draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
persons of two representatives to be designated by
qualifications of the Members of the National
the President.
Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like
also preparing its report. As submitted to the to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, the election and qualification of the member
section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative whose elections is not contested shall also be
Department, reads as follows: judged by the Electoral Commission.

The elections, returns and qualifications of the Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the
members of either house and all cases election of the members, there is nothing to be
contesting the election of any of their judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to
members shall be judged by an Electoral indicate a controversy. If there is no question
Commission, constituted, as to each House, about the election of a member, there is
by three members elected by the members of nothing to be submitted to the Electoral
the party having the largest number of votes Commission and there is nothing to be
therein, three elected by the members of the determined.
party having the second largest number of
votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
also that the Electoral Commission shall
Justice.
confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional
Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation.
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which
As the gentleman knows, the action of the
was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
House of Representatives confirming the
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was
election of its members is just a matter of the
soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar
is not necessary. After a man files his
body with reduced powers and with specific and
credentials that he has been elected, that is
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power
with respect to the composition of the Electoral Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
Commission and made further changes in sufficient, as we have observed that for
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a purposes of the auditor, in the matter of
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The election of a member to a legislative body,
draft as finally submitted to the Convention on because he will not authorize his pay.
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with
regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody own motion does not have the right to contest
confirm their election? The municipal council the election and qualification of its members?
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
— in this case the municipal council proclaims Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the
who has been elected, and it ends there, gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
there is no need on the part of the Electoral that a member has not the qualifications
Commission unless there is a contest. The provided by law, they cannot remove him for
first clause refers to the case referred to by that reason.
the gentleman from Cavite where one person
tries to be elected in place of another who was Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove
declared elected. From example, in a case shall only be retained by the Electoral
when the residence of the man who has been Commission.
elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
is in question.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
However, if the assembly desires to annul the
qualifications of the members.
power of the commission, it may do so by
certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when
the returns are submitted to the Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Commission.
Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no
elections, returns and qualifications of the member of the assembly has the right to
members. When there is no contest, there is question the eligibility of its members?
nothing to be judged.
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated. the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I the Electoral Commission.
think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar Commission shall decide whether the election
question as that propounded by the is contested or not contested.
gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be
cases contesting the election as separate informed if the Electoral Commission has
from the first part of the sections which refers power and authority to pass upon the
to elections, returns and qualifications. qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly even though that question has not
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of been raised.
clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections
are already included in the phrase "the Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no
elections, returns and qualifications." This power, because they can only judge.
phrase "and contested elections" was inserted
merely for the sake of clarity. In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid
draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not of the members of the National Assembly and" was
the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response
refuse to confirm the elections of the to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco,
members." Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking
a protest. for the Sponsorship Committee said:

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the xxx xxx xxx

gentleman yield?
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente,
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion
if he so desires. apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de
que la primera clausula del draft que dice:
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly. "The elections, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly"
parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de
from Capiz believe that unless this power is
los miembros que no ha sido protestados y
 para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la Assembly, three elected by the members of
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si the party having the second largest number of
enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea votes, and three justices of the Supreme
como sigue: "All cases contesting the Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
election", de modo que los jueces de la Commission to be presided over by one of
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a said justices.
los casos en que haya habido protesta contra
las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted
Labrador was voted upon the following revised it as follows:
interpellation also took place:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la Commission composed of three Justices of
enmienda, quisiera the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite? National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros shall be its chairman. The Electoral
tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, Commission shall be the sole judge of the
¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale election, returns, and qualifications of the
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los Members of the National Assembly.
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of
esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of"
de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion and the words "the elections", which was accordingly
sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el accepted by the Convention.
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
The transfer of the power of determining the election,
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en returns and qualifications of the members of the
un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
los de la mayoria como los de la minoria independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by
prescindieran del partidismo? no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el
partidismo no les daria el triunfo. Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious"
xxx xxx xxx
canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, the following passages which are partly quoted by the
Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
decide contests relating to the election, returns and 1936:
qualifications of members of the National Assembly to
the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote
153. From the time when the commons
of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
established their right to be the exclusive
judges of the elections, returns, and
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate qualifications of their members, until the year
Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in
representation of the minority party and the Supreme the determination of controverted elections,
Court in the Electoral Commission to two members and rights of membership. One of the standing
each, so as to accord more representation to the committees appointed at the commencement
majority party. The Convention rejected this of each session, was denominated the
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against committee of privileges and elections, whose
forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan functions was to hear and investigate all
character of the commission. questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to
made to read as follows: the house, from time to time. When an
election petition was referred to this
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns committee they heard the parties and their
and qualifications of the Members of the witnesses and other evidence, and made a
National Assembly shall be judged by an report of all the evidence, together with their
Electoral Commission, composed of three opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions,
members elected by the party having the which were considered and agreed or
largest number of votes in the National disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the one of the nobles works, for the honor of the
house itself. When this court was adopted, the house of commons, and the security of the
case was heard and decided by the house, in constitution, that was ever devised by any
substantially the same manner as by a minister or statesman." It is probable, that the
committee. The committee of privileges and magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success
elections although a select committee. The of the remedy, may have led many of the
committee of privileges and elections although contemporaries of the measure to the
a select committee was usually what is called information of a judgement, which was not
an open one; that is to say, in order to acquiesced in by some of the leading
constitute the committee, a quorum of the statesmen of the day, and has not been
members named was required to be present, entirely confirmed by subsequent experience.
but all the members of the house were at The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De
liberty to attend the committee and vote if they Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common
pleased. pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been
clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James
154. With the growth of political parties in Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
parliament questions relating to the right of introduction of the new system was an
membership gradually assumed a political essential alteration of the constitution of
character; so that for many years previous to parliament, and a total abrogation of one of
the year 1770, controverted elections had the most important rights and jurisdictions of
been tried and determined by the house of the house of commons.
commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks settlement of the controverted elections of its
upon his government, resigned his office in members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges
consequence of an adverse vote upon the of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court
the trial of election cases, as conducted under made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
this system, that "Every principle of decency practice has become imbedded in English
and justice were notoriously and openly jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31
prostituted, from whence the younger part of & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary
the house were insensibly, but too Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43
successfully, induced to adopt the same Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices
licentious conduct in more serious matters, Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70;
and in questions of higher importance to the Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5,
public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p.
distinguished member of the house of 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests
commons, undertook to propose a remedy for which were originally heard by the Committee of the
the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the
obtained the unanimous leave of the house to courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia,
bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of election contests which were originally determined by
controverted elections, or returns of members each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In
to serve in parliament." In his speech to Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. against the election of members of the Upper House
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme
following terms: "Instead of trusting to the Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
merits of their respective causes, the principal par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921
dependence of both parties is their private (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
interest among us; and it is scandalously Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed decide contested elections to the Diet or National
to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of
we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
act by the principles of justice, but by the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
nay, it is well known, that in every contested February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
election, many members of this house, who Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial for an Electoral Commission.
capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and The creation of an Electoral Commission whose
take upon themselves the partial management membership is recruited both from the legislature and
of the very business, upon which they should the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
determine with the strictest impartiality." States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was
a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus by each of the two opposing candidates. As the
described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
which met with the approbation of both contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,
houses, and received the royal assent on the 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap.
12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
law since known by the name of the Grenville Commission composed of five members elected by
Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four legislature. But it is a body separate from and
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission independent of the legislature.
was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses
voting separately. Although there is not much of a The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
moral lesson to be derived from the experience of judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
America in this regard, judging from the observations qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the remained originally in the legislature. The express
Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. National Assembly. And this is as effective a
25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding restriction upon the legislative power as an express
historical interest. prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260;
The members of the Constitutional Convention who L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in
framed our fundamental law were in their majority behalf of the National Assembly that said body may
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
many of them were familiar with the history and and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
political development of other countries of the world. the period within which protests should be filed, the
When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an grant of power to the commission would be
Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon would be invested with the power to determine
and determining the election, returns and contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative
light of their own experience but also having in view power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
the experience of other enlightened peoples of the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was transferring this authority from the legislative body be
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with
of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
the vigorous opposition of some members of the time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the
Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the without the necessary means to render that authority
approval of the constitutional the creation of the effective whenever and whenever the National
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than
and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.) Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will
From the deliberations of our Constitutional inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly
Convention it is evident that the purpose was to of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission,
transfer in its totality all the powers previously and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should
contested elections of its members, to an independent not be permitted.
and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the
knowledge and appreciation of contemporary We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
need of determining legislative contests devoid of importance and necessity of respecting the dignity
partisan considerations which prompted the people, and independence of the national Assembly as a
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to coordinate department of the government and of
provide for this body known as the Electoral according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body characterized would be practically an unlimited power
in which both the majority and minority parties are of the commission in the admission of protests against
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its members of the National Assembly. But as we have
deliberations was created, and further endowed with pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral
judicial temper by including in its membership three Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
justices of the Supreme Court. regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, is a settled rule of construction that where a general
invested with the necessary authority in the power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
performance and execution of the limited and specific power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
any other. The location of the provision (section 4) therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral the Supreme Court the six members of the National
Commission. Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6,
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may confirming non-protested elections of members of the
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the the time for the presentation of protests, the result
tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the would be that the National Assembly — on the
National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
argument against the concession of the power as regulation in such cases — had already barred the
there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In presentation of protests before the Electoral
the second place, if any mistake has been committed Commission had had time to organize itself and
in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Constitution. This result was not and could not have
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is been contemplated, and should be avoided.
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National
abuses of the government are not intended to be Assembly confirming the election of members against
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
the people in creating the Electoral Commission passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed
reposed as much confidence in this body in the as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
exclusive determination of the specified cases election contests. While there might have been good
assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. the election of members of the legislature at the time
All the agencies of the government were designed by when the power to decide election contests was still
the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
each constitutional organ working within its own legislature cannot be construed as depriving the
particular sphere of discretionary action must be Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
deemed to be animated with the same zeal and constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which contest relating to the election, returns, and
they were created by the sovereign will. That the qualifications of the members of the National
actuations of these constitutional agencies might Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
leave much to be desired in given instances, is protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of
inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the the returns of its members against whose election no
third place, from the fact that the Electoral protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
may exercise jurisdiction. Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is
not required by the Constitution before he can
But independently of the legal and constitutional discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
aspects of the present case, there are considerations fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
of equitable character that should not be overlooked canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the seat in the national Assembly and to render him
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date of the National Assembly, adopted December 6,
the Constitution, except as to the provisions 1935).
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on Under the practice prevailing both in the English
November 25th of that year, and the resolution House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to
Angara was approved by that body on December 3, entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro the proper election officers is sufficient, and the
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do the privileges of a member from the time that he takes
not show when the Electoral Commission was his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331.
formally organized but it does appear that on 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs.
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said contested elections where the decision is adverse to
date as the last day for the filing of election protest. the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its decision or report in controverted elections is certified
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the House, upon being informed of such certificate or
Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same
appear that said body had actually been organized. upon the Journals, and to give such directions for
As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
official records on file in the archives division of the writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution
National Assembly attached to the record of this case the determination as circumstances may require (31 &
32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of
believed, the order or decision of the particular house judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any and controversies, and is the power and duty
actual alternation or amendment of the return to see that no one branch or agency of the
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, government transcends the Constitution,
9th ed., sec. 166). which is the source of all authority.

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law (e) That the Electoral Commission is an
was still in force, each house of the Philippine independent constitutional creation with
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the specific powers and functions to execute and
election of any of its members should be filed. This perform, closer for purposes of classification
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones to the legislative than to any of the other two
Law making each house the sole judge of the departments of the governments.
election, return and qualifications of its members, as
well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering (f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole
each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the judge of all contests relating to the election,
time and manner of filing contest in the election of returns and qualifications of members of the
member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after National Assembly.
the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had
already expired, each house passed a resolution (g) That under the organic law prevailing
confirming or approving the returns of such members before the present Constitution went into
against whose election no protests had been filed effect, each house of the legislature was
within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as respectively the sole judge of the elections,
cutting off the filing of further protests against the returns, and qualifications of their elective
election of those members not theretofore contested members.
(Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89;
(h) That the present Constitution has
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth
transferred all the powers previously
Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
exercised by the legislature with respect to
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
contests relating to the elections, returns and
pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District,
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Commission.
Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate],
Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has (i) That such transfer of power from the
repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, legislature to the Electoral Commission was
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
determine all contest relating to the election, returns prescribe the rules and regulations as to the
and qualifications of members of the National time and manner of filing protests.
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to
prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the
There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions Electoral Commission was to have an
which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is independent constitutional organ pass upon
alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time all contests relating to the election, returns
for the filing of contests against the election of its and qualifications of members of the National
members. And what the National Assembly could not Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
do directly, it could not do by indirection through the consideration, which object would be
medium of confirmation. frustrated if the National Assembly were to
retain the power to prescribe rules and
Summarizing, we conclude: regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory (k) That section 4 of article VI of the
of separation of power into the legislative, the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
executive and the judicial. the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns and
(b) That the system of checks and balances
qualifications of its elective members, but also
and the overlapping of functions and duties
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each
often makes difficult the delimitation of the
house to prescribe by resolution the time and
powers granted.
manner of filing contests against the election
of its members, the time and manner of
(c) That in cases of conflict between the notifying the adverse party, and bond or
several departments and among the agencies bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court costs and expenses of contest.
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may
 discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in
of a member of the National Assembly. the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the
absence of any clear constitutional provision to the
(m) That confirmation by the National contrary, the power to regulate the time in which
Assembly of the election of any member notice of a contested election may be given, must be
against whom no protest had been filed prior deemed to be included in the grant of legislative
to said confirmation, does not and cannot power to the National Assembly.
deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within The Constitution of the United States contains a
which protests against the election of any provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section
member of the National Assembly should be 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I,
filed. section 5, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that each house of the Congress shall be the
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
was acting within the legitimate exercise of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent in which notice of a contested election may be given.
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of Annotated prescribes:
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
in any manner toll the time for filing protests against Whenever any person intends to contest an
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of election of any Member of the House of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a Representatives of the United States, he shall,
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral within thirty days after the result of such
Commission might prescribe. election shall have been determined by the
officer or board of canvassers authorized by
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the law to determine the same, give notice, in
character of the Electoral Commission as a writing, to the Member whose seat he designs
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent to contest, of his intention to contest the
of its authority under the facts of the present same, and, in such notice, shall specify
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine particularly the grounds upon which he relies
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the
purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the
Procedure. Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect
that the Senate and House of Representatives,
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,
Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
against the petitioner. So ordered. Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine
Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, which reads as follows:
JJ., concur.
The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall by resolution respectively prescribe the
time and manner of filing contest in the
election of members of said bodies, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party,
Separate Opinions and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
shall fix the costs and expenses of contest
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: which may be paid from their respective
funds.
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably
expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however, The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of
constrained to withhold my assent to certain the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that
conclusions therein advanced. would be above the law, but to raise legislative
elections contests from the category of political to that
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place
Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of insure the determination of such contests with the due
the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. process of law.
(Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949,
951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the
time in which notice of a contested election may be time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV,
given, is legislative in character. section 2, of which provides that —
(M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177;
Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.) All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the
It has been correctly stated that the government Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
established by the Constitution follows fundamentally such laws shall remain operative, unless
the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, inconsistent with this Constitution, until
 amended, altered, modified, or repealed by
the National Assembly, and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far
as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision

was to insure the orderly processes of government,
and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine
Islands shall remain operative even after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all
references in such laws to the government or officials
of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far
as applicable, to refer to the government and
corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would
seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the
letter of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the
Election Law remains operative and should now be
construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which,
in so far as the power to judge election contests is
concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the
House of Representative under the former regime. It
is important to observe in this connection that said
section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to
regulate the time and manner in which notice of a
contested election may be given, not in the Philippine
Legislature but in the Senate and House of
Representatives singly. In other words, the authority
to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in
the elections of members of the Philippine Legislature
was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed
with power to decide such contests. Construing
section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National
Assembly, as required by Article XV, section 2, of the
Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing
contests in the election of members of the National
Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission,
which is now the body clothed with power to decide
such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the

National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not
have the effect of barring the right of the respondent
Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner.
By the same token, the Electoral Commission was
authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December
9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written
contests must be filed with the commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its

resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction
to hear and determine the contest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose
A. Angara.