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1. Pimentel, Jr v. Joint Committee of Congress to Cavass the Votes…

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2. MACALINTAL v. PET

TOPIC: Presidential Election Contests ISSUE: WON the creation of the PET is constitutional
DOCTRINE: PET is the excercise of judicial funtion which is as well founded in
the last paragraph of section 4, Article 7. HELD: YES! Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
LAW: Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections
FACTS: contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

● Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
● The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties
purpose. or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned
● While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
effect the constitutional mandate. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
● Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remained
2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), absolute.
specifically:
○ (1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein (found in the book also)... The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the
the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by
as "Chairman and Members," respectively; the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which
○ (2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to drafted the present Constitution.
appoint employees and confidential employees of every
member thereof;
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing
○ (3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff
what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase,
of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a
line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral
Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the
Tribunal.
PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the
Clerk of the Tribunal; and
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain
○ (4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct
the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the
from the Supreme Court seal.
constitutionality of the PET.
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It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice- presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially
a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,
Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that
"[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial
power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent
in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is
a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly
provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional
proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among
the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17,
Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the
Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the
Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
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unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district

courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the
President’s ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.

3. CLINTON v. JONES
A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil
lawsuits based on the President’s private actions unrelated to his public actions
Doctrine: The United States Constitution does not automatically grant the
as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal
President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his
courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The
private conduct unrelated to his official duties as President.
doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official
power among the three co-equal branches of government.
Facts. The Respondent Paula Corbin Jones filed a complaint against the
Petitioner President Bill Clinton alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. She
states that during her time as an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several
“abhorrent” sexual advances from Petitioner. The Petitioner filed motions
asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity
and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but
held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president.
Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court),
which granted certiorari.

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency
for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were
not related to official duties of the presidency?

Held. Affirmed.

The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure
for actions not related to his official duties as President. It was an abuse of
discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after the
President’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to order a stay was premature
and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the
Respondent’s interest in bringing the suit to trial. Concurrence. It is important to
recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public duties of
an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-management
principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits,
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(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They

insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
4. NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military
Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL.
members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes
REMIGIO M. DE VERA, AN OFFICER NAMED MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG,
despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
GEORGE PALACPAC UNDER THE NAME HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG
PASICOLAN AND VINCENT CALLAGAN
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-
G.R. NO. 191805 | NOVEMBER 15, 2011 looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.

FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon

On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Pilipinas (KMP).
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2
December 2009.
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy
of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie
Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and
forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were
waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol). Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been
working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess
that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted
silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry
on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).
Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine
Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA
Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since
Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez
was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa,
surenderree. Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.
As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On
President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
suits.
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ISSUE: measures to protect his rights.

1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
of her presidential immunity from suit civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of doctrine of command responsibility.
amparo and habeas data cases.

“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the

HELD:
participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
from suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.” investigation of the enforced disappearance.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts “Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R.
committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that No. 191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility
courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or
right.” accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to
hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is
dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog,
office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for
the power of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution lack of merit.
is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity
from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within
the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for
the abduction of Rodriguez.”

5. FUNA v. ERMITA
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
G.R. 184740 Feb 11, 2010
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
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Facts: illegal expenditure of public fund, his personal and substantial interest
– non were alleged, also no claim that public funds were disbursed
- In 2006, PGMA appointed respondent Elena Bautista as Undersecretary
of the Dept of Transpo and Comms (DOTC), she was designated as usec for o No violation of Sec 13 because Bautista was merely designated
maritime transport of the department under special order 2006- 171 acting head

- On Sept 1, 2008 the MARINA Adminstrator Suazo, resigned, respondent Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent as OIC of MARINA
was then designated as OIC Office of the Administrator in concurrent capacity concurrent with the position of DOTC USec violated the constitutional
as DOTC usec. proscription against dual or multiple offices for cabinet members and their
deputies and assistants – YES
- Petitioner, Dennis Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, concerened
citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Held:
respondent’s appointment/designationa which is proscribed by the prohibition
on the President, VP, the members of the cabinet and their deputies and Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter
assistants to hold any other office or employment. prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

- During the pendency Bautista was appointed Administrator of MARINA Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
- Petitioner argues that concurrent positions as DOTC usec and MARINA
OIC is in violation of Sec 13, Art 7 of the consti as interpreted and explained in Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
Civil Liberties v. Exec Sec deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
o Further, that Bautista’s appointment as OIC of MARINA was said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
intended to be temporary, still, such designation must not violate a any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
standing constitutional prohibition franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
o Also asserted the incompatibility between the posts of DOCT usec corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
and MARINA administrator. – the recommendations of MARINA may the conduct of their office.
be the subject of counter or opposing recommendations from the
Usec of Maritime transport On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:

o Finally, that there is a strong possibility the challenge in this case Sec. 7. x x x
be rendered moot through the expediency of simply revoking the
temporary appointment, but a similar violation can be commited in Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
the future, thus exist a possibility of evading review. appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
- Respondents: government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

o Raise lack of legal standing: a requirement that a party suing as a In Civil Liberties Union, EO 284 was challenged as it allowed members of the
taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing cabinet and undersecretaries and asst secs to hold another office in
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government and government corporations. This was struck down as it was

violative of Sec 13, Art 7 of the Consti. – incase its asked.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the assistants.
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to nature.
be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.
and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of person named.
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she

was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in
an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
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6. FUNA v. AGRA designation of a Member of the Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity,

on the one hand, and one in a permanent capacity, on the other hand; and
Doctrine: Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the that Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or exempt from the constitutional ban. He emphasizes that the position of the
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure Solgen is not an ex officio position in relation to the position of the Sec. of
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Justice, considering that the OSG is an independent and autonomous office
attached to the DOJ. He insists that the fact that Agra was extended an
FACTS: appointment as the Acting Solgen shows that he did not occupy that office in
Funa alleges the following: an ex officio capacity because an ex officio position does not require any
1. On March 1, 2010, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) appointed further warrant or appointment.
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Devanadera; Contentions of Agra, et. al
2. On March 5, 2010, PGMA designated Agra as the Acting Solgen in a His concurrent designations as the Acting SOJ and Acting Solgen were only in
concurrent capacity; temporary capacity, which means, to confer additional duties to him. Thus, he
3. On April 7, 2010, Funa commenced this suit to challenge the was not “holding” both offices in the strict constitutional sense. They argue that
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments claiming it to be an appointment, to be covered by constitutional prohibition, must be regular
prohibited under Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution; and permanent, instead of a mere designation.
4. During pendency of the suit, Pres. Noynoy appointed Atty. Cadiz as
the Solgen and the latter assumed on August 5, 2010. They also contend that even on the assumption that Agra’s concurrent
designation constituted “holding of multiple offices,” his continued service as
According to Agra: the Acting Solgen was akin to a hold-over; that upon his designation as Acting
1. On January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate SOJ, his term as Acting Solgen expired; that during his continued service as
Counsel when PGMA designated him as the Acting Solgen; Acting Solgen, he did not receive any salaries and emoluments from the OSG
2. On March 5, 2010, PGMA designated him also as the Acting Secretary after becoming Acting SOJ.
of Justice;
3. That he relinquished his position as the Government Corporate ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Counsel; and Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solgen violated the
4. That pending the appointment of his successor, he continued to constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of
perform his duties as the Acting Solgen. the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

Arguments of Funa HELD YES. The designation was unconstitutional and void.
In this case, Funa has adopted the arguments he advanced in Funa v. Ermita
where he also assailed the constitutionality of the designation of then Being designated as the Acting SOJ concurrently with his position of Acting
Undersecretary of DOTC Maria Elena Bautista as concurrently the OIC of the Solgen was undoubtedly covered by Sec. 13, Art. VII. Hence, Agra could not
Maritime Industry Authority. validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
The appointment being challenged here were in acting or temporary
capacities. Still, the petitioner submits that the prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
of the 1987 Constitution does not distinguish between an appointment or capacity. The text of Sec. 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of
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the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor
Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached
Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, in fact the Admin Code of
was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to 1987 decrees that OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment
occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, of RA 9417, the Solgen is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives salaries, allowances, benefits
duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or
designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointment;
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, the “de facto officer”
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed In view of the application of stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, Agra did not
objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the validly hold the position of Acting SOJ concurrently with his holding of the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, position of Acting Solgen. He was not to be considered a de jure officer for the
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe entire period of his tenure as Acting SOJ. He was a de facto officer.
differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an
important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
instrumentalities, or government- owned or controlled corporations.” authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as the Acting SOJ officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as
was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one
office being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the The Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary
stricter prohibition embodied in Sec. 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid,
the broad exceptions provided in Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B of the Constitution binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified
(Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position) to for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of
justify his designation as Acting SOJ concurrently with his designation as Acting the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates
Solgen, or vice versa. from the State.

To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and prohibition;
of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting
To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting
the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, he needed to establish herein that his Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he VII of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was a de
did not do so. facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.

OSG and DOJ NOTE:

It would show that one position was not derived from the other. The powers Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
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their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their office.
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7. PIMENTEL, JR. v. ERMITA

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8. AGUINALDO v. AQUINO III (2016) 1. Musngi, nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Associate Justice, was
appointed as the 16th Associate Justice;
FACTS: 2. R. Cruz, nominated for the vacancy of the 19th Assoc. Justice, was
The Judicial Bar Council published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the appointed as the 17th Associate Justice;
JBC website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for the six 3. Econg, also nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Assoc. Justice, but was
newly created positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After screening appointed as the 18th Assoc. Justice;
and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists 4. Mendoza-Arcega, nominated for the vacancy of the 17th Assoc. Justice, but
contained in six separate letters for the 16th to 21st vacancies. was appointed as the 19th Assoc. Justice;
5. Trespeses, nominated for the vacancy of the 18th Assoc. Justice, but was
President Aquino then appointed the respondents, namely: (1) Respondent Musngi; appointed as the 21st Assoc. Justice.
(2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) Respondent Econg; (4) Justice Mendoza-
Arcega; (5) Justice Miranda; (6) Justice Trespesses who later on took their oaths of Only the appointment of Miranda as the 20th Assoc. Justice is in accordance with his
office on the same day all at the Supreme Court. The Petitioners in this case were nomination.
all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Petitioners insist that the President could only choose one nominee from each of the
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy , and no other;
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the politicization of the and any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the
appointments to the Judiciary, i.e. “to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary Constitution. In other words, President Aquino should have appointed the 16th SB
from the political pressure and partisan activities.” Assoc. Justice from the nominees in the shortlist for the 16th SB Assoc. Justice, the
17th SB Assoc. Justice from the nominees in the shortlist for the 17th SB Assoc.
Article VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate of the JBC, as well Justice, and so on and so forth. By totally overlooking the nomineed in the shortlist for
as the limitation on the President’s appointing power to the Judiciary: 16th SB Assoc. Justice and appointing Musngi and Econg, who were both nominees
for the 21st SB Assoc. Justice, as the 16th and 18th SB Assoc. Justices, respectively,
“Sec. 9 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be Pres. Aquino violate the 1987 Constitution and committed grave abuse of discretion
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.”
OSG’S ARGUMENTS
It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, select nomineed recommended for The power to determine the order of precedence of the Assoc. Justice of the SB is
appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified reposed in the President, as part of his power to appoint. The order of precedence of
nomineed for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, the Assoc. Justices of the SB shall be according to the order of their appointment, that
who, in trn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioner is, according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when two or more
emphasize that Article VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous commissions bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions
as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for had been issued by the President. The Constitutional power of the JBC to recommend
“every vacancy” to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President’s authority nominees for appointment to the Judiciary does not include the power to determine
to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the nominees named in the shortlist their seniority. President Aquino correctly disregarded the order of precedence in the
submitted by the JBC. shortlists submitted by the JBC and exercised his statutory power to determine the
seniority of the appointed SB Assoc. Justice.
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each,
for the six vacancies in the SB, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and ISSUE: W/N President Aquino was limited to appoint only from the nominees in the
21st Assoc. Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy. [NO]
16th SB Assoc. Justice may be appointed as the 16th SB Assoc. Justice, and the
same goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, etc. HELD:
Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino’s appointments: The nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary,
 PRESIDENCY

but this only means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not vital part of the President’s power of appointment.
nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed that respondents Musngi and Econg
were indeed nominated by the JBC and hence, qualified to be appointed as SB Assoc. There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions of SBAJ
Justice. should not each be assigned a specific number by the JBC. The SBAJ positions were
created without any distinction as to rank in seniority or order of preference in the
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to collegiate court. The President appoints his choice nominee to the post of SBAJ, but
restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose not to a SBAJ position with an identified rank, which is automatically determined by
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is the order of issuance of appointment by the President. The appointment does not
still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by specifically pertain to the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st SBAJ, because the
the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President SBAJ’s ranking is temporary and changes every time a vacancy occurs in said
Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new SB Assoc. Justice from each of the sex collegiate court. These vacancies will surely cause movement in the ranking within the
shortlishts submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the SB. At the time of his/her appointment, a SBAJ might be ranked 16th, but because of
six shortlists encroached on President Aquino’s power to appoint members of the the two vacancies occurring in the court, the same SBAJ may eventually be higher
Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same ranked.
positions of the SBAJ.
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting hte qualified nominees into six clusters,
Moreover, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of SBAC, and the one for every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond every
JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
the prospective appointees. The SB, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the
Justice and 20 AJ divided into seven divisions, with three members each. The President’s power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of
numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the 20 AJ is determined the qualified nominees, becuase:
pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or appointment by the (1) The President’s option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven
President. nominees in the cluster; and
(2) Once the presindet has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among the Four (4) from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the CA, which vacancies.
involved the CA: “For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date of
the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of
face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the the President’s appointment power.
seniority of the members of the CA. In other words, the earlier the date of the
commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other To recall, the JBC invited applications and recommendations and conducted
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more interviews for the “six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments Sandiganbayan.” Applicants, including respondents Musngi and Econg, applied for the
by the President becomes material.” vacancy for “Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan.” Throughout the application process before the JBC, the six
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the SBAC newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were not specificaly
cannot be determined until their acutal appointment by the President. identified and differentiated from one another for the simple reason that there was
really no legal justification to do so.
It bears to point out that part of the President’s power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the SB, is the power to determine the seniority or order of The requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and
preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of responsibilities are the same for all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. If an
issuance of said members’ appointment or commission papers. By already individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all
designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the the other vacancies. It was only at the end of the process that the JBC precipitously
seniority or order of preference of the new SBAJ, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a clustered the 37 qualified nominees into six separate shortlists for each of the six
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vacant positions. the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.

There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired FACTS:
the power of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory
● JBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition of Justice
authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court. The clustering by the JBC of the
De-Castro (ponente) and Motion for Reconsideration-Intervention.
qualified nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears
to have been done arbitrarily, there being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for ● The motions immediate concern is the SC’s 2016 pronouncement that
the same. The number of nominees was not even equally distributed among the JBC’s act of submitting 6 separate shortlists (clustering) for 6 vacancies for
clusters. Sanidanbayan Associate Justices, is unconstitutional.
● The following are JBC’s arguments and the corresponding ruling of the
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary Court for each
power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
ARGUMENT #1: In submitting the shortlists for 6 vacancies, it was only acting in
20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely
accordance with the mandate of Art 8, Sect. 9 of the 1987 PH Constitution.
maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in SC RULING: The JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the
one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which nominees into six separate short lists, and President Aquino did not commit grave
requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said
constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous
nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC
but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted influenced the appointment process and encroached on the
for the President’s consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the
appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution.
the

JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of ARGUMENT #2: JBC exercises independence, discretion and wisdom in performing
respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan its mandate under the Constitution, as a constitutional body.
Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
SC RULING: The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without
limits. It cannot impair the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and
his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan
(FEBRUARY 2017 SC-RESOLUTION) Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the
President’s appointing power.
DOCTRINE: The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well
as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be
qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other ARGUMENT #3: JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies to distinguish one list
vacancies — there are no distinctions among the vacant posts. from the others and to avoid confusion

SC RULING: By designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC

In relation to President’s power to appoint: therefore he is not bound to respect the established the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate
clustering of the JBC, as long as in the end, the President appoints someone Justices, a power which the law (Constitution, PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan) and jurisprudence vest exclusively to the president.
nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the appointment is valid, and he, not
 PRESIDENCY

Each of the six short lists submitted by the JBC to President Aquino explicitly stated more of a ground for her inhibition if she had received the allowance and decided the
that the nomi nees were for the Sixteenth (16th - 21st) Sandiganbayan Associate instant case in favor of the JBC. But here, the ponente’s decision did not arise from
Justice, respectively; and on the faces of said short lists, it could only mean that personal hostility — or any other personal consideration — but solely from her
President Aquino was to make the appointments in the order of seniority objective evaluation of the adverse constitutional implications of the clustering of the
predetermined by the JBC, and that nominees who applied for any of the vacant nominees for Sandiganbayan AJs.
positions, requiring the same qualifications, were deemed to be qualified to be
considered for appointment only to the one vacant position to which his/her cluster Wherefore, Motions for Reconsideration and Inhibition are hereby denied.
was specifically assigned.
Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the separate short
ARGUMENT #5: Submitting separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the lists of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa
only way for the JBC to observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list for every Duterte for the present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the compulsory
vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of competence, independence, probity, and retirements of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these
integrity for every such vacancy. were not in issue nor deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the
decision the President may take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of his
“Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall power to appoint members of the Judiciary under the Constitution.
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
(AUGUST 2017 SC-RESOLUTION)
from the submission of the list.”

SC RULING: Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified FACTS: This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 2017 (MR-
nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong
Resolution, which was eventually denied by the SC and reiterated its previous rulings
contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a
cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment. in 2016 and 2017.

[ Illustration: if all the 6 nominees (who were actually appointed by then Pres. Aquino)
were placed in the same cluster, only one of them would have been actually Ratio: Since all the basic issues raised in the case at bar had been thoroughly passed
chosen/appointed, and the other 5 could no longer be considered even of all are upon by the Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and Resolution dated
qualified. In short, appointment of one excluded the other. ] February 21, 2017, the Court need not belabor them any further.

The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal, objective, and rational Moreover, given the admission of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) itself in its
basis for determining which nominee shall be included in a cluster. Simply saying that previous pleadings of lack of consensus among its own members on the validity of the
it is the result of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is clustering of nominees for the six (6) simultaneous vacancies in the Sandiganbayan,
unsatisfactory. further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court (SC) against the
validity of such clustering of nominees.
What is difficult to comprehend is how they determined the distribution of the
nominees to the different clusters in the absence of any criteria or standard to be
observed in the clustering of nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any of
its Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case.

ARGUMENT #6: With regard to the need for the Ponente to inhibit herself as she
appears to harbor hostility and conflict of interest arising from her termination as JBC’s
consultant.

SC RULING: No legal or factual basis for the ponente to inhibit herself.

The JBC argued that since JBC consultants receive monthly allowance from the JBC,
then “[o]bviously, JBC consultants should always favor or take [the] side [of] the JBC.
Otherwise, there will be conflict of interest on their part.”

While the ponente indeed received monthly allowance from the JBC for the period
she served as consultant, her objectivity would have been more questionable and
 PRESIDENCY

9. RUFINO v. ENDRIGA reconsideration.

● CA denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of judgment
Doctrine: Where the Law is silent as to who is the appointing authority, it is understood for the reasons submitted to justify execution pending appeal were not
to be the President of the Philippines. persuasive.
● Angara filed for Petition-in-intervention.
Facts:
● President Marcos issued EO 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Issue:WON PD 15 Sec 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow
Philippines (CCP) as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members is constitutional- NO
members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
● After the declaration of Martial Law, Pres Marcos issued PD 15 the CCP's
charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non- municipal public
corporation free from the "pressure or infuence of politics”. PD 15 increased Held:
members of CCP Board from 7 to 9. EO 1065 was issued and further
increased the Board to 11. The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in
● Pres Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the incumbent CCP the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees . Should only
one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board.
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely
● During the term of Pres Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in
Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez (Endriga Group), Cabili and consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees,
Mañosa. whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
● Pres Estrada appointed 7 as new trusteed to CCP Board to replace the hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more
Endriga group as well as other 2 incumbent trustees Rufino, Tantoco, than two consecutive terms.
Calma, Simpao, Jr. and Garcia (Rufino Group), Pascual, and Buenaventura.
● Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority
performance of their duties in early January 1999, except for Tantoco. to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those
● Endriga group filed for a petition for quo warranto before SC questioning
instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.
President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board.
They alleged that under Sec 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
"shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
next regular meeting " In case "only 1 trustee survives, the vacancies shall ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
be fllled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
officers of the CCP. And they claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. They further officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
alleged that CCP is not under the supervision and control of President citing appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
Sec 3 of PD 15 which states that CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and commissions, or boards. The President appoints the first group with the consent of the
operation" Commission on Appointment, while for the second and third groups without the
● SC referred to CA. CA granted the petition for quo warranto and held that consent of CoA. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on
Sec 6(b) of PD 15 mandates the remaining trustees to fill by election who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department,
vacancies in the CCP Board. Only when the Board is entirely vacant, which agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
is not the situation in the present case, may the President exercise his
power to appoint. Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The
CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section
● MR denied and declined to rule on the constitutionality of Sec 6(b) of PD
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
15 since the Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for
 PRESIDENCY

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article and the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not resolved.
VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect
their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only
"officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer
equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. Further, it
makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees.
The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
President's power to appoint.

In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees,
while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same
positions. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in
the Executive branch.

Further, it violates Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with provides that all
Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of
the Philippines, which is self- executing provision. Since the President exercises
control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President
necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch.
In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices ,"
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
— one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies
— from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs
executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the
Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 139554. We declare

UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as
amended, insofar as it authorizes the remaining trustees to ll by election vacancies in
the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in
G.R. No. 139554, we find it unnecessary to rule on G.R. No. 139565.

NOTE:

Mootness

While the issues may be set aside in the meantime, they are certain to recur every
four years, especially when a new President assumes office, generating the same
controversy all over again. Thus, the issues raised here are capable of repetition, yet
evading review if compromises are resorted every time the same controversy erupts
 PRESIDENCY

10. DE CASTRO v. JBC

(with separate opinion of J. Brion)
 PRESIDENCY

11. VELICARIA-GARAFIL v. OP
 PRESIDENCY

(RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes issued her

12. MANALANG-DEMIGIOLLO v. TIDCORP appointment as head of RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a
reappointment under the reorganization plan.
Doctrine: A reorganization undertaken pursuant to a specific statutory ● In her letter dated December 23, 2002 that she sent to TIDCORP
authority by the Board of Directors of a government-owned and government- Chairman Jose Isidro Camacho, however, Demigillo challenged
controlled corporation is valid. before the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No. 136, which
approved the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan, and of
Facts: her assignment to the RCMSS. She averred that she had been
● On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan thereby illegally removed from her position of Senior Vice President in
Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development the LCSD to which she had been previously assigned during the
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act reorganization of July 1998. She insisted that contrary to OGCC
No. 8494 entitled An Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. Opinion No. 221 dated September 13, 2002 the Board of Directors
1080, As Amended, by Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine had not been authorized to undertake the reorganization and
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its corporate restructuring.
Primary Purpose, and for Other Purposes. Republic Act No. 8494 ● The Board decided as it hereby decides to DISMISS the appeal of
reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. Atty. Ma Rosario Demigillo for lack of merit. She failed to show to the
● The issuance of appointments in accordance with the reorganization Board that she was prejudiced in the implementation of the TIDCORP
ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was organizational refinements/restructuring. She was reappointed to the
appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, same position she was holding before the reorganization. She was not
and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department demoted in terms of salary, rank and status
(LCSD) of TIDCORP. ● Meanwhile, Petitioner was evaluated and given a ‘poor’ rating for
● In 2002, TIDCORP President Joel C. Valdes sought an opinion from the two consecutive evaluations, January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) relative to and January 1, 2003 to June 2003, due to her unimproved
TIDCORP’s authority to undertake a reorganization under the law. performance resulting to her name being dropped from the rolls of
● There is no question on the power of the PhilEXIM (also known as TIDCORP.
TIDCORP) Board of Directors to undertake a reorganization of the
corporation’s present organizational set-up. In fact, the authority to Issue: Whether or not the reorganization is valid resulting to Demigillo’s
provide for the corporation’s organizational structure is among the reassignment valid
express powers granted to PhilEXIM through its Board.
● During the implementation of the Organizational Ruling: YES
Refinement/Restructuring Plan, the LCSD was abolished. According
to the List of Appointed Employees under the New Organizational The doctrine of qualified political agency (which the Board argued that it is
Structure of TIDCORP as of November 1, 2002, Demigillo, albeit applicable to them) could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was assigned to Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the
head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential
 PRESIDENCY

Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice
the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of President of TIDCORP. With that abolition, reinstating her as Senior Vice
Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the President in the LCSD became legally and physically impossible.
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and
the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four Demigillo’s contention that she was specifically appointed to the position of
other members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least Senior Vice President in the LCSD was bereft of factual basis. The records
one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by indicate that her permanent appointment pertained only to the position of
the ex officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two Senior Vice President. Her appointment did not indicate at all that she was to
consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the hold that specific post in the LCSD. Hence, her re-assignment to the RCMSS
Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of was by no means a diminution in rank and status considering that she
Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not maintained the same rank of Senior Vice President with an accompanying
because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it increase in pay grade.
was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.
The assignment to the RCMSS did not also violate Demigillo’s security of tenure
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors as protected by Republic Act No. 6656. We have already upheld
effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible reassignments In the Civil Service resulting from valid reorganizations. Nor could
members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to she claim that her reassignment was invalid because it caused the reduction in
Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as her rank, status or salary. On the contrary, she was reappointed as Senior Vice
the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the application of a President, a position that was even upgraded like all the other similar positions
doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of power. Also, it is to Pay Grade 16, Step 4, Level II. In every sense, the position to which she was
settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred. reappointed under the 2002 reorganization was comparable with, if not similar
to her previous position.
The result of the lengthy consultations and close coordination was the
comprehensive reorganization plan that included a new organizational Note: Doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego
structure, position classification and staffing pattern, qualification standards, doctrine, essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive
rules and regulations to implement the reorganization, separation incentive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken
packages and timetable of implementation. Undoubtedly, TIDCORP effected by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts
the reorganization within legal bounds and in response to the perceived need of the President unless the President himself should disapprove of such acts.
to make the agency more attuned to the changing times. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of
government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief
Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and
Republic Act No. 8494, we declare that there are no legal and practical bases agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the
for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive
LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity,
a setup completely different from the previous one, including a new staffing considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform the
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multifarious functions of the executive office.

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13. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs ERMITA

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14. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORP v. CIR

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15. Biraogo vs Truth Commission of 2010

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16. Almario vs Executive Secretary

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17. Risos-Vidal vs COMELEC

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18. David vs Macapagal Arroyo

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19. Gudani vs Senga

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20. Kulayan vs Tan

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21. Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo(2012) 1959affecting Maguindanao.

Doctrine: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Issue: WON Proclamation 1959 is constitutional- SC held that present cases do not
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review for being moot.
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the Held:
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. 2 reasons why issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is avoidable

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to 1) Pres Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Although the
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its President has the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress under Section 18, Article VII
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's of the 1987 Constitution.
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the
hands of the Court. SEE DOCTRINE

Facts: Here, Pres Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress,
which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in
these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
● Nov 23, 2009- heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao.
● Nov 24- President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1946 (PP 1946), declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, 2) Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of
● Pres Arroyo issued Pres Proc 1959declaring martial law and local government units in Maguindanao. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation charged in court. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an
Front. uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the
● 2 days later- Pres Arroyo submitted her report to Congress rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply
within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the armed government presence. However, the Court has not bothered to examine the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit evidence upon which President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely
to that body a report in person or in writing of her action, in because it felt no need to, the proclamation having been withdrawn within a few days
accordance Sec 18, Art VII of Constitution. In her report, she of its issuance.
acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms
in Maguindanao and risen against the government. Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30
● Dec 9, 2009- Congress, in joint session, convened to review the days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the
validity of the President's action pursuant to Sec 18, Article VII of factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the 1987 Constitution. the writ of habeas corpus. More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the
present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it
● 2 days later, before Congress could act, the President issued
actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question having become moot and
Pres Proc 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of academic.
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
● Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, Justice Carpioin the dissent said that it would be impossible for the Court to exercise
190294, 190301, 190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 its power of review within the 30 days given it. But those 30 days, fixed by the
challenged the constitutionality of President Arroyo's Proclamation
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Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting
congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his
actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or
suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without need of a call within
24 hours following the President's proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the
Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that
action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate
to review the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its
issuance.

But what if 30- day period given by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice
Carpio said in his dissent that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of
its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not
lost until the case has been terminated. However, President aborted the proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension
never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having
become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that
the same have become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.
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22. Lagman v Madialdea

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23. Padilla v Congress

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24. Lagman v Pimentel III

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25. Lagman v Medialdea

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26. Akbayan v Aquino

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27. Vinuya v. Romulo

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28. Saguisag v Ochoa

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29. Ocampo v Enriquez