Mereology of material objects[edit]

Ontological disputes do not revolve around what particular matter is present; rather, the
center of disputation is what objects can be said to be instantiated by a given collection of
matter. The token objects posited by a given ontology may be classified as instances of one
or more distinct object types. As the types of objects accepted proliferate, so do the
possible tokens that a given collection of matter can be said to instantiate. This creates
variations in size between ontologies, which serve as an arena for disputes among
philosophers. The ontologies of present concern are those that include compositional
objects among posited types. Compositional objects are objects made of a collection of one
or more parts . These objects seem to be included in any intuitively constructed ontology as
objects ordinarily encountered are doubtless composed of parts. For example, any ontology
that affirms the existence of tables, rabbits, or rocks necessarily commits to the inclusion of
some compositional objects. The specification of ‘some’ compositional objects foretells the
point of attack suffered by these theories. Clarification demands that these theories provide
a means to account for which compositional objects are included and which are excluded.
One may include tables and, presumably, chairs, but what about the composition of the
table and surrounding chairs? What characteristics of a collection of parts determine that
they form a whole?
Mereological Nihilism[edit]
Mereological nihilism is an extreme eliminative position. Mereological nihilism denies that
any objects actually instantiate the parthood relation appealed to in theoretical descriptions
of mereology. If there are no relationships that count as parthood relationships, then there
are no composite objects. One may initially seek to reject such a position by pointing to its
counterintuitive conclusions. However, there are other mereological positions that prove
equally counterintuitive and so a more substantial rebuttal is required. A principled rejection
of mereological nihilism is put forward those committed to atomless gunk. A mereology is
gunky if every part is itself a whole composed of further parts. There is no end to the
decomposition of objects, no fundamental part or mereological atom. There is no place for
the atoms posited by mereological nihilism in gunky ontologies. This causes a problem
because if all that exists are atoms, but there is nothing like an atom that exists within an
ontology, then nothing can be said to exist (Van Cleve, 2008). Noting the appeal of
accepting that things do exist, one must reject mereological nihilism in order to maintain a
gunky ontology. Not everyone will strive to maintain a gunky ontology and so mereological
nihilism is still potentially a viable position.
Conservative Theories[edit]
There are various attempts to conserve the existence of parthood relationships. These
theories all attempt to specify characteristics that a collection of objects must possess in
order to compose a whole. Characteristics may derive from some principle or be proposed
as brute fact.
Principled Accounts[edit]
A principled account of the composition relationship will appeal to a general characteristic
which is sufficient to instantiate the relationship. Many of these accounts appeal to
characteristics derived from intuitive notions about what does or does not allow objects to
function as parts in a whole. Two such proposed restricting characteristics are connection
and cohesion (Van Cleve, 2008). First, connection is the stipulation that objects must be
spatially continuous to some degree in order to be considered parts composing a whole.
Objects like tables are made of legs connected to tops. Tables and legs are in direct contact
with one another, the parts are spatially contiguous. Yet, the chairs are only in proximity to
the table and so do not compose a table set. In order to maintain the standard of absolute
contiguity one would have to recruit the air molecules bridging span between the table and
chairs. This is unsatisfactory though because it fails to exclude extraordinary objects such
as the table, the air molecules, and the dog’s nose as he begs for food. It seems that it is
necessary to redefine connection as some degree of proximity between parts within a whole
. By abandoning the extreme of direct contact, any account of connection acquires the
burden of defining what degree of proximity instantiates composition. It will not do to leave
specification of degree for future theorists if one cannot even show it is possible to provide
such a determination in a principled manner. The continuum of the spatial dimension is a
three dimensional axes composed of distinct ordered points. Suppose absolute succession
of points along a dimension corresponds to direct contact of parts. According to a moderate
formulation of connection, composition is instantiated by two objects separated by a
countable number of discrete points (x), where (x) need not be one, but cannot be
unbounded. Unfortunately, even the more moderate formulation is untenable. Criticizing the
possibility of bounding degree, Sider (2001) takes as given these premises: (1) On a
continuum of discrete points, if there are both instances of both composition and not, then
the series of points instantiating composition (e.g. (1, 2, 3, 4)) is continuous with any series
not (e.g. (5, 6, 7)). (2) There is no principled way determine a cutoff for composition along
such continuums (no non-arbitrary way to determine between (1, 2, 3) and (1, 2, 3, 4)). (3)
Since the nature of existence does not allow for indeterminacy a cutoff must be specified (a
failure to determine between (1, 2, 3) and (1, 2, 3, 4) leaves (4) in a position between
existence and non-existence that does not exist). Conclusion: If composition is to be non-
arbitrary then it must either always occur or never. Sider’s rejection of any bounding of
degree is not particular to spatial proximity. Degree of cohesion can also be represented as
a continuum. Much like absolute spatial contiguity was determined too strict, absolute
cohesion is also rejected. To illustrate Van Cleve (2008) describes how a rod and line
compose a fishing rod. The line must move with the rod to some degree. In order to
accomplish this knots of line are tied around the rod. As the knots are tightened the line
becomes more and more fixed to the rod. There is a cutoff where the line could be tighter,
yet is tight enough to compose the fishing rod. Any variable represented on a continuum will
fail to provide a principled determination of this cutoff.
Brute Accounts[edit]
Van Inwagen's 'Life'[edit]
According to Van Inwagen a collection of objects are considered parts composing a whole
when that whole demonstrates life (Van Cleeve, 2008). This approach guarantees the
existence of you and me, while ruling out extraordinary objects consistent with other
conservative theories. Detractors of the 'life' criterion point out the difficulty of defining when
life is present. It is not clear if a virion, a virus particle composed of nucleic acid and
surrounding capsid, is a compositional object or not. Additionally, in some formerly
paradigmatic cases of life it can be difficult to identify when it is no longer present, and thus
the compositional object is no longer extant (e.g. brain death).