July 4, 2017

G.R. No. 231658

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,

AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231771

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL
ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H.
ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
REPRESENTATIVE i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE
PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER MARI
CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231774

NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-
MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY
(OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN.
EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;

WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law x x x';

WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that 'the crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval
or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives';

WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts committed by the
Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding
several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur,
established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several
areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and

WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause
death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding
sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.

SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of
the state of martial law.

DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Seventeen.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017,
a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only
escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more recent years, we have
witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the
Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)
and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.1

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in
Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only
against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the
President's Report:

On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG, and Maute Group
operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open
hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and
government authorities, institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and
political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the
groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.

Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three
(263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the
province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced
by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-
based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial
and logistical support to the Maute Group.

The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and
their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives.2

In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which
impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:

• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced their attack on various
facilities - government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi.

• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP).

• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP
personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells.
• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisoner vans and private vehicles).

• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights were heard and felt
everywhere. By evening, the power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still
cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.)

• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station. A patrol
car of the Police Station was also taken.

• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group
facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.

• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.

• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell under
the control of these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement.

• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi City, including Naga Street,
Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod
Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.

• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.

• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's
quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church.

• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed by the lawless groups.

• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School.

• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among other several locations.
As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital.
They held hostage the employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.

• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, which they later set ablaze.

• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered one of its armored vehicles.

• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been infiltrated by lawless armed
groups composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the
Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously
wounded.

• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities in Marawi City to execute
Christians. They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male Muslims to join their groups.

• Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a strategic mass action of lawless
armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel, and
committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the government. 3

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to conclude that -

These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi
City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of
the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable
intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.

There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all
laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.4
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, brought about undue
constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and
functions, and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.:

Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive
due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. Through
the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge
and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its
citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area.
Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.

The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and
illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the
deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
Mindanao.5

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the
Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under
the control of the lawless groups.

The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to
other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes,
supply lines, and backdoor passages.

Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the
siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These
circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our
national integrity.6

The President ended his Report in this wise:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of
invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 7

In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted
briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 8 expressing full support to
the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the
law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus
resolved as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the Senate, that the Senate finds
the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. The Senate hereby
supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds no compelling reason to revoke the sarne. 9

The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of Representatives likewise issued
House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.

The Petitions

A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and
Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no
rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute
rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the
Philippines, its laws, or its territory.13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying
areas as mere propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It
contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco
wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand
theatrically to inflate perceived capability". 15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of the
military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that
they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen.
Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the
government in its bid to capture Hapilon. 18 Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Group's
armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on
Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic. 19 It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion
in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial
law.20

Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because the
President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts". 21

It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing
online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute
Group merely brought an injured member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital
personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of the
Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank employees themselves clarified
that the bank was not ransacked while the armored vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was
commandeered.23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the
Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24,
2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was not burned
by the terrorists.24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
and the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State University. 25

Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis since the President's
Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break
in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other
bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law.
It contends that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with
the culprits having already been arrested.26

Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis considering that the
President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.

Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient factual basis owing to
the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that
the military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other
parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign
fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters who
can lend support to the Maute Group.29

Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its specific and special
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and
nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis.30

In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman Petition and set the case
for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.

On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were filed and eventually
consolidated with G.R. No. 231658.32

B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)

The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" 33 of the Constitution, likewise seeks the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao
and that public safety warrants its declaration. 34

In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi
City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for
the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less
x x x allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause
death and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of
Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39

Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last Whereas Clause of
Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they
were supposedly waging.40

In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the Report of the President to
Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the
killing of five teachers of Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities. 41

In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional or in the alternative,
should the Court find justification for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao. 42

C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)

The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration
of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special
proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen" 45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.

The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort46 and should be invoked by the President only after
exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose
which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of
the situation.49

According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the imposition of martial
law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual
rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its]
imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety" 52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.

Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group
intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers
and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of
Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of substantiation. 53

The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without waiting for a congressional
action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the
wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness". 54 Further, it asserts that since it is making
a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents.55 It
thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant information" 56 in order for it to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis.

In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel respondents to present proof
on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.

The Consolidated Comment

The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by the Court. Noting that the same
coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every
Filipino to unite behind one true flag and defend it against all threats from within and outside our shores".59

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the authority or power to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. 60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18,
Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG
suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode
or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review
power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the discretion not to give due
course to the petition.63

Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 should
be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of discretion" 64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the
facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.

The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216
is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they asked
the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on the factual basis" 66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he
who alleges must prove"67 and that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional. 68

Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the trajectory or point of view of
the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the decision was made.69 It argues that the sufficiency of
the factual basis should be examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare
martial law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard. 70 It reiterates
that the President's decision should be guided only by the information and data available to him at the time he made the
determination.71 The OSG thus asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law should not be
considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. The OSG suggests that
the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety
of revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine
whether martial law should be revoked or extended.72

It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports coming from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be expected to personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the
reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of
recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its
validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.

Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by the President in
Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts
asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay
evidence, twice removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal
presumption bestowed on governmental acts". 76

Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It
maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied
upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216". 77

The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the Court's Ruling.

ISSUES

The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:

1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate proceeding"
covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this
Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;

2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;

c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the
situation to have not been accurately reported;

3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by
Congress jointly or separately;

4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted
the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and declaration of martial law;

6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void:

a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;

7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress
are sufficient [bases]:

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1
region;

8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public
safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and

9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of
the Mindanao region.

After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda.

OUR RULING

I. Locus standi of petitioners.

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought before [the Court] by a
party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it." 79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years,
there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of
Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing
to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer." 81

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;" 82 similarly, petitioners
in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".83 In the
Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred
to themselves as duly elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress
couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House Resolution
No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such
resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the
Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well
as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not
venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could
compel assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the
Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as
representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides,
respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing.

II. Whether or not the petitions are the

"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.

All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88

The Court agrees.

a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law. 89 Unless jurisdiction
has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or
pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent,
jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. 90 It must appear clearly from the law or it
will not be held to exist.91

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would
refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition
for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court
applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII.

c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.

The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the
pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.

"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of which it
grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the
good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry." 93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:

The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to impose
authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding the actions
taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the
Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with
a view to dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds
for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential
action.94 (Emphasis supplied)

To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide whether there is a state
of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision
thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that
the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and
reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98

Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to
the Lansang doctrine.

d) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers.

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of
his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the
Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article
VII.99 This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the
President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the
President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase,
even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or
rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for
a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.

MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to
determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining whether
the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines
by virtue of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein he made
this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:

Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the Communists and other armed
aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the
magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.

And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:

Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and properties, widespread lawlessness
and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been brought about by
groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order
to take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war
against our people and the legitimate government ...

And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law in our country
without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least
a majority of all the members of the Congress'?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history
and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient
safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the
factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days
from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here
we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying
that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned. 100

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it
also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of
such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any
citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further
designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis
and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.

e) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to curtail the extent of
the powers of the President.

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department
but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.

During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her
sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:

The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term with no reelection
for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for
the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief
Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.

The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of martial law for more
than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new
Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety
demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or
proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action
of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive
action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.

For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor
abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege
of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have
written during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases. 101

f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
of Article VIII would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.

To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this
Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against
possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1
of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

g) Jurisdiction of the Court is

not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections I and 5 of Article VIII
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For instance, its
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. 102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article
IX(A).103

h) Unique features of the third

paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
make it sui generis.

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a
petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the
Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of
intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing." 104 In fine,
the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the
Court.

III. The power of the Court to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.

During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two co-equal branches of the
Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to
Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

a) The judicial power to review

versus the congressional power to
revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of
lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information
and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings." 106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness
of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of
the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by
a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power
of revocation of Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the judicial
power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional
power to revoke.

If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto powers
independently from each other, we quote the following exchange:

MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards that Congress will be able to
revoke such proclamation.

MR. RAMA. Yes.

MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the Congress has been padlocked,
then who is going to declare that such a proclamation was not warranted?

xxxx

MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just standing by. A petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also
review the factual basis. x x x107

c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo

Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement
in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that:

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. 109

xxxx

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short
time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a
factual basis. x x x110

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to
Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting
and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified
and set aside in this proceeding.111

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power
to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the
Court of its power to review.

IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency

of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.

The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under
specified conditions.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by revising the "grounds for the
activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential
action."113
a) Extraordinary powers of the
President distinguished.

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. 114 The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" 115 the only limitations being that he acts
within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. 116 In fact, "the actual
use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review." 117

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the
following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress;
[and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court." 118

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase "imminent
danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;" 120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling
imminent danger."121

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and
suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that
the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the
emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress,
and review by the Court.123

b) What really happens during martial law?

During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the imposition of martial law?
What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law?
Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely does martial law add
to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v.
COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So
these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does
not suspend the principle of separation of powers.

The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the
Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In
actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders
which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In
other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed especially in
American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of war.124

xxxx

FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting
it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater
of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the
military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts
are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can the military courts be
given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.

MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area.

FR. BERNAS. That is correct.

MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief.

FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The understanding here is that the phrase
'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to the practice
under the Marcos regime where military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow
that except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for some kind of court to
function.125

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a function
of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety
and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which
remains under the control of the State.126

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement
before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x
x".128

Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to
infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under
the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with
invasion.129

Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties, 130 the Constitution has
safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.

c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by
which the Commander-in-Chief must
adhere to.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy
based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-
Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President
decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore
necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling
out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for
the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-
Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the
government, and the very integrity of the State.132

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to
which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

d) The framers of the 1987

Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the
President.

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that
judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed
of in a given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional
concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege. 133

MR. PADILLA.x x x
We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should not require beforehand the concurrence
of the majority of the Members of the Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend,
or shorten or even increase the period of such suspension. 134

xxxx

MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there
is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.'
If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response
because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be
blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members of the Congress in
case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.

Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.

And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political one in that it is subject
to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to
declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x135

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at
least a majority of all the Members of the Congress...'

MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or also the
declaration of martial law.

MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an exclusive prerogative of the
President?

MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be shortened by the Congress
or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the proclamation. 136

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. x x x

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the
President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase,
even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or
rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for
a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and
national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient
safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the
factual basis because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here
we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. x x x

MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?

MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What we are looking for are
safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion,
even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to
ask that there should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end
of such 60 days.

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative check on this awesome power
of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?

MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those conditions.

MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?

MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of Congress would be available;
and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.

MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?

MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the event of an invasion or a
rebellion.137

The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to interfere a priori in the
President's choice of extraordinary powers.

e) The Court must similarly

and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of
which among his extraordinary
powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.

It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission
to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored
on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof,
there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the country.138 The Court, as Congress does,
must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution
to the Executive Department.

j) The recommendation of the

Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials,
is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows
that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President
is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that
the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

g) In any event, the President

initially employed the most benign
action - the calling out power -
before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7,
the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based
on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use
his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious anddeliberate effort to
first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing
and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the
situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the
President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed
hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it.

V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may

be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region.

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel
groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the
entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.

This argument lacks legal basis.

a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application." 140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such
instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." 141

b) Vagueness doctrine applies

only in free speech cases.

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. 142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also
to one which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence."143

It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling
effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

xxxx

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing 'on their faces'
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed
out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'
x x x145
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking down statutes entirely on the
ground that they might beapplied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 146 "Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions
to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness." 147

c) Proclamation No. 216

cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not
regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.

As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a
plain reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct.
It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like
Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject
to state regulation.

d) Inclusion of "other rebel

groups " does not make Proclamation
No.216 vague.

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation,
misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.

In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for 'three or
more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.'
Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance what annoys some people but
does not annoy others.'

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language - but which nonetheless specifies a standard though
defectively phrased - in which case, it may be 'saved' by proper construction. 151

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that
accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it
cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying
its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere
tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of
information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as
will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to
Congress.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review.
Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas,
it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to
revoke.
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.

a) The calling out power is in a

different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the
Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of
lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in
the Philippines.

In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law:

x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. 153

In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a
possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily
entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise of his power to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. 155

In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to sufficiently comply with the
requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of
President Joseph Estrada's order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the
metropolis.156

This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas
corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the
Court,157 without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned Presidential act/s.

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law in this case, such
ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.

b) The operative fact doctrine.

Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant
thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is
declared unconstitutional.158

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void.
As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no
protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of
a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official.

The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for
the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter
much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in
violation of its provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.

The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration of
nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute,
treaty, executive order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and
logical then than to consider it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159

However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that would repulse any challenge
to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly
in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.

VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.

a) The scope of the power of

review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.

To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, 160 which was decided under
the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or
compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:

What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court first gave the general answer that its power
was 'merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the
Court said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal...in
which cases the appellate court has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial administrative
decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead,
the Court accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the President's
decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that
in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.'164

Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review
based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as
provided in Lansang.

b) The "sufficiency of factual

basis test".

Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know
the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power
to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether
the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.

We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency
of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers
is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the
exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the
declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted
by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As
to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.

Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or
related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.

As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President. 165 As Commander-in-
Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report
taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence
reports and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at
all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but
not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the
full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify
the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such
a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports
submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course,
would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon
him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the
emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would
be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to
curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that
the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment, 167 as appears to be the case here.

At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:

President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was within their realm of
competence, and that a state of emergency has also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar
to the 'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety warranting a declaration
of martial law or suspension of the writ.

Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring martial law or suspending the writ
of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The
President is called to act as public safety requires.168

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only on
the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the
situation had not been accurately reported to him.

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or
suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good
only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may
investigate the factual background of the declaration. 169

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some
of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration
and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion
that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an
examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his
possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

VIII. The parameters for determining the

sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a) Actual invasion or rebellion,

and public safety requirement.

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such power." 170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same technical
or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same
meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 172

During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado
alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article 134 of the RPC:

MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the
Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let
us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the
Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that
presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by
the means employed under Article 135. x x x173

Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To
give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion,
which may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see k s to prevent.174

Article 134 of the RPC states:

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking
arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance
to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives."175

b) Probable cause is the

allowable standard of proof for the
President.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or
evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a
higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent
in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard
of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable
cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the
existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because
unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly
restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an
"average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused." 177

To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion;
2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the controversy - whether
Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.

IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the

declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of
the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion
exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded
the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:

1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws
the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.178

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. 179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities
do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance
to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval,
or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.

The contention lacks merit.

a) Facts, events and

information upon which the President
anchored his decision to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM, 180 the Court will consider only
those facts and/or events which were known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial
review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:

1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence
in Mindanao;181

2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:

a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers;

b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the Maute Group and other detainees;

3. On May 23, 2017:183

a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;

b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;

c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;

d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;

e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and

f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in
Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao; and the Report 184 submitted to Congress:

1. Zamboanga siege;185

2. Davao bombing;186

3. Mamasapano carnage;187

4. Cotabato bombings;188

5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189

6. Sulu bombings;190

7. Basilan bombings;191

8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by combined forces of ASG and the Maute Group; 192

9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops; 193

10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and establishments but civilians as well; 194

11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which paralyzed Marawi City;195

12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or
province;196

13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready;197

14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed groups; 198

15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS; 199

16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to ISIS; 200

17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group; 201

18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:

a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked various government and privately-owned
facilities;202

b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape of inmates; killed
a member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones,
personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles;203

c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide power outage by evening;204

d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station; commandeered a police car; 205

e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas; 206

f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by the rebels; 207

g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi junction;208

h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and the Shia
Masjid Moncado Colony;209

i) taking of hostages from the church;210

j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation;211

k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School; 212

1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213

m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214

n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital;215

o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armored vehicle; 216

p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; 217

q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218

r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and

s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing
public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel1 , and committing armed uprising against and
open defiance of the Government.220

b) The President's Conclusion

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in
Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:

1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao
and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order
and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion." 221

2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly constituted government and
against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur -
from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and
detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole." 222

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability
to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. "223

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in
Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao."224

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of
the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable
intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government." 225

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all
laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments." 226

7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief
Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their
functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely
affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic
services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and
order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered."227

8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and
illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the
deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
Mindanao."228

9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men,
the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve
our national integrity."229

Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose
of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the
crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:

x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of proof as to unduly burden and effectively
incapacitate her from exercising such powers.

Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof required for
convicting an accused charged with a criminal offense.x x x

xxxx

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to require the President to establish the existence
of rebellion or invasion with such amount of proof before declaring martial law or suspending the writ amounts to an
excessive restriction on 'the President's power to act as to practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting
the nation against threats to public safety.'

Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil cases, is indispensable for a lawful
declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising
her emergency powers, as it requires proof greater than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.

Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is demanded for a lawful
declaration of martial law.

xxxx

Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides, before she can act and impose martial
law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails the President's emergency powers.

Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of her emergency powers.
Substantial evidence is the amount of proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of
proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.

Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the prosecutor and for the
issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been defined as a 'set of facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included
therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.'

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed
by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.

Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and most expedient standard
by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial
law x x x230

c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.

The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false, inaccurate,
simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness,
accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent
situation.

Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-evidence.231

FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE

 (1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital Statements made by:
and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among several (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital
locations. As of 0600H of 24 May 2017, members of the (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of the (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo Carlos;
Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they held hostage the (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard Arevalo;
employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth and
office located thereat (Proclamation No. 216 and (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra denying that the
Report); hospital was attacked by the Maute Group citing online
news articles of Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo
Radyo.232

2. that the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Statements made by PNP Director General Ronald dela
Marawi Police Station (Proclamation No. 216 and the Rosa and Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra in the
Report); online news reports of ABS-CBN News and CNN
Philippines233 denying that the Maute group occupied
the Marawi Police Station.

3. that lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Statement made by the bank officials in the on-line
Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered one of news article of Philstar234 that the Marawi City branch
its armored vehicles (Report); was not ransacked but sustained damages from the
attacks.

4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was Statements in the on-line news article of
burned (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Schools Division
Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto denying that the
school was burned and Department of Education
Assistant Secretary Tonisito Umali stating that they
have not received any report of damage.

5. that the Maute Group attacked various government Statement in the on-line news article of Inquirer236 made
facilities (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report). by Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra stating that the
ASG and the Maute Terror Groups have not taken over
any government facility in Marawi City.

However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the
authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure
such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay
evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth
of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted
online news articles238 as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis.

Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in these cases. As long as
there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.

d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections not
Applicable.

Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be admitted on grounds of
relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear
that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial." 240 Here, the question is
not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the
view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.

e) There are other independent

facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists
and that public safety requires it.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged
false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public
safety requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the
alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's Report.
Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman
admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there
is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude
the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.

Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.

X. Public safety requires the declaration of

martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety
requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. 242 In
addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; 243 road blockades and checkpoints were set
up;244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were
targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; 250 and the security of the entire
Mindanao Island was compromised.251

These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last
paragraph of his Report, the President declared:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of
invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 252

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there
being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

XI. Whole of Mindanao

a) The overriding and

paramount concern of martial law is
the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
public.

Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos regime, one would expect the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional
writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again,
bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.

Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the
security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might
[curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire
country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like
Mindanao."254

Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public safety. It is worthy of
mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present.
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant,
classified, and live information which
equip and assist him in making
decisions.

In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for Proclamation No. 216. For
the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety
requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the
President believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and
events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At
this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and
information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons
of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock
of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during
the closed door session held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or
Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the
President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of
facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President." 255

It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is for the President as
[C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied
that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ." 256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents
is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed." 257

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the
means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.

c) The Court has no machinery

or tool equal to that of the
Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground
conditions.

In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However, this should not be considered
as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to
determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination
by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the
[E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the Court, 260 which it did
during the closed door session last June 15, 2017.

d) The 1987 Constitution

grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage
or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the
President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part
thereof under martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the President as
Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating
the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession
that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening
on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner
nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any
part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.

e) The Constitution has

provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in-
Chief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only
be discouraged but also avoided.

Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would engender apprehensions
among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of
martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of
martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to
the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is
vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond
our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and
unsubstantiated assumptions.

Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down
the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the]
experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration
was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers
of the Court and Congress.

Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted his colleagues in the
Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed
safeguards:

MR. MONSOD. x x x

Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial law for a fixed period not
exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous violations of human rights, the
predominance of the military forever and in untold sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion.
We may not have any freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That
might prevent the President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like to suggest that, perhaps,
we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking at a very specific case. We are only looking at a case
of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in
those cases.262

Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards against presidential abuses and
commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress,
Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite my concern for human rights, I believe
that a good President can also safeguard human rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate
the powers of the President. Xxx263

Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:

MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.

x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and delicate nature. A free people are
naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to be one of no
ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress
can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the
power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy
hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same
time equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms against each other and the constituted authorities are unable
to execute the laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x264 (Emphasis supplied)

At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers are
already in place and that no further emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards.
The Constitution recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would
not generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a whole. Thus:

MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of these encumbrances on the President
and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by
opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just
declaring a revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x x 265 (Emphasis
supplied)

f) Rebellion and public safety;

nature, scope, and range.

It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government;"266 and
that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a
priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could
not be measured by exact metes and bounds.

To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the
Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their
motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the
Philippines, particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.

Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we validly say that the rebellion
is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the
nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could
not be discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's
compound.

Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because
there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it
must be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should
congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for the
attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and
engaged in an armed public uprising against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on
which the armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual I
rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve
the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.

Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable cause that there exists
actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?

To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law
lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the
armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since
at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion
in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose
martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is
infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned
by the Constitution.

Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's
compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time,
however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion
is not confined within predetermined bounds.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of and
protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage,
such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent
or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.

Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity
where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The
crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance". 270 Direct
271 272 273 274 275 276
assault, murder, homicide, arson, robbery, and kidnapping, just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of
rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge." 277 Jurisprudence also
teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as
Presidential Decree No. 1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense". 279 "All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.280

Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in furtherance of the crime of
rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed
in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where
the armed public uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of
the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.

In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual
rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory
and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only
be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the
President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual
rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to
prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply
lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there
is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and
useless.

g) The Court must stay within

the confines of its power.

The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's
territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot
indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation
of our republican system."281

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of
other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if
it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours
after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand
souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places
also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato
Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to
predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best
serve as forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary
and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao.
It is on this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in
Mindanao.

Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded into using "the sword of
Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"282 by attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act."283

Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the President a nudge, so to
speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to
judge President Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point,
the Court quotes the insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:

MR. OPLE. x x x

xxxx
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive branch of the government impotent,
as though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is also
important to understand that the extraordinary measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical
state of war existing in this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially
if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum flexibility to cope with
such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in
any manner, shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and balances, including the possible
revocation at any time of a proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination of these
extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to
do so because the emergency persists.

So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it is attuned to the freedom and the rights
of the citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a vigorous representation of
the people through their Congress when an emergency measure is in force and effect. 284

h) Several local armed groups

have formed linkages aimed at
committing rebellion and acts in
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao.

With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South." 285 On April 15, 1980, it was
conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal',
meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or coming." 287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao.
In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of
all roads in Mindanao.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and
strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed
groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor
passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior
to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi,
Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, 289 must
also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao
the end.

Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:

a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A
civilian was killed while another was wounded. 290

b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak, Tawi-Tawi.291

c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan resulting in the death of two
children and the wounding of three others. 292

d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao. These
resulted in the death and wounding of several personalities. 293

e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu.294

f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebels and government troops.295

g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde. 296

h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days later. 297

There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups.
All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.

Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed
uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply
disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege,
and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. 298 The Court cannot simply take
the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe
that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.

i) Terrorism neither negates

nor absorbs rebellion.

It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought
legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the
crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the
various means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its
purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among
the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is
traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of
rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its
laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the
Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such
as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the
crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the
crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going
on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in
any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security
Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies
with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his
extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the
extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail
or diminish such powers.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive
of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And
while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements.300

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or correctness of the varied and
contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the
Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity
and act as one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.

Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only God or Allah knows when it
would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that
were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.

Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences and prejudices?

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it
as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Constitutionality of Martial Law in Mindanao

Title: Lagman vs. Medialdea

Citation: G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017,
a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also
highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines
as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of
the lawless groups.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full support to the martial
law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the
same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives
likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No.
216.

Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed several petitions, essentially
invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216;
and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

ISSUES:

1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?

2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,:

a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or

c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove
the situation to have not been accurately reported?

3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately?

4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus?
 a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief?

6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:

a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region?

7. Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress sufficient
bases;

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region?

8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient
to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other
parts of the Mindanao region?

RULING:

1. YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.

Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing
as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII considering the limited period within which the Court has to promulgate its decision.

In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any
action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court.
2.

a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into
the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify
the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.

To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of
his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the
correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.

b. NO. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military
officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law.

A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not
subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides,
it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his
mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

c. YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of the Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power to declare martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted
by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As
to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at
all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but
not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

3. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information
and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to “undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior
to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of
the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by
a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power
of revocation of Congress.

4. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose
of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the
crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

b. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

5. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of
the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

6.

a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words
that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which
it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines,
general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act
committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations,
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be
deemed a trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7. YES. A review of the facts available to the President that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of
which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his power and prerogatives leading to President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime
of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending
to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In
fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the
standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. YES. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must
be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the
acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb
threats were issued, road blockades and checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian hostages
were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were targeted, young male Muslims were forced to join their group, medical
services and delivery of basic services were hampered, reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were
hindered, and the security of the entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216
has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the
martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

9.

a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence
in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where he called upon the Armed Forces and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from
spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.

The President’s calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of
course, it may also be precluded to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

b. NO. Under the “operative fact doctrine”, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is
declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination of constitutionality is an operative
fact that may have consequence which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to the invalidy may have to be considered in various aspects- with respect to particular regulations, individual and
corporate and particular conduct, private and official.

Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of Mindanao

We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is
no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually
transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial
sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he
need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the
case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could
declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.

Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's
compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time,
however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion
is not confined within predetermined bounds.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion
and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract
nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn
from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from
Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao.
Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the
purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby
making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and
strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed
groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"
there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23,
2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and
Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, must also be
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.

x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking
to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the
Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated
24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. 3 In the Memorandum, the President
expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention
program including increased police patrols.4 The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary.5 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.6 Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary
in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. 7

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:

xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the
conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national
security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates
whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-
above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines
in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by
active or former police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila
streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-
armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine
Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other
serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the
AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized
crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts
to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military
and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services
to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local
Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the
security situation.

xxx.8

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center,
Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. 9

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN
THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION
OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF

GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE
MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, 11 dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General
to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending,
among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial
scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which
feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
in the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the
President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether
or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition.
Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit
a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. 13 The term "interest" means
a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest.14 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."15

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of
the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the
Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the
judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National
President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as
a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that
their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
"militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than
good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative
and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment
of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional
issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to
obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. 16 In not a few cases, the Court has
adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people.17 Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure.18 In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issue now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the
armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment
of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force.
It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays
that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment." 19
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the
review powers of this Court.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial
review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution of the
controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the
parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of
the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.20 For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this
decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-
chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

xxx21

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the President’s power to call out the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.

We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because
it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. 22 It pertains
to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does
not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for
resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere
with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law
and the Constitution.

As Tañada v. Cuenco23 puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters
for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political
question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,24 "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on the one question."

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." 25 Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that
the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.26 Moreover, the jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.27 When political questions are involved, the Constitution
limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. 28
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 29 Under this
definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But
while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question
of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. 30 A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may
give rise to justiciable controversy.31

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of
the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces.
There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation" 32 before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt
is to sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out
the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also
implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 33 That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter
says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment
is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National
Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence:
"The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel
that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First
Sentence: "The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their
Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review. 34

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the wri t
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion
and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces.
The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the
exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court
cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces
is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that
the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for
the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances,
the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of
the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster,
as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the
President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he
categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to
occur in Metro Manila..."35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation, especially in the light
of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the
shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of
the police force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that
by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3, Article II 36 of
the Constitution.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging
to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols.37 Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. 39 It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military
in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.41

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in
civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real
authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols.
As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The
Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and
execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious
activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military
together in a relationship of cooperation, are:

1. Elections;42

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross; 43

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters; 44

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;45

5. Development of the culture and the arts;46

6. Conservation of natural resources;47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program; 48

8. Enforcement of customs laws;49

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;50

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;52
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;53

13. Sanitary inspections;54

14. Conduct of census work;55

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;56

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices; 57

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. 59 What we have here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes
has persisted,60 and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military
personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present
deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act61 of the US, the use of the military in civilian law
enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:

§ 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 62

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courts63 apply
the following standards, to wit:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that
the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory64 George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for
assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH:
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152,
1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?

xxx

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when
not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually
regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief.1âwphi1 A mere threat of some future injury
would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use
of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in
the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A 65 does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military
power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6, 66 8(k)67 and 9(a)68 of Annex A.
These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)69 of Annex A, all arrested persons are
brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials
or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)70 of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The
conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a
handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement. 71

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain
ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to
call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the
deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil
liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s determination of the factual basis for the calling
of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his
political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace,
tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in
full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy
constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

IBP vs ZAMORA

GR No 141284

Petitioners: INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN.
ANGELO REYES

Ponente: Kapunan, J

Facts:

Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as commander in chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence in Metro Manila in
the light of the escalating cases of crime and lawlessness in the city. The President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti - crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved. Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the
“PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review.

2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling:

1. No. The discretion exercised by the president is a question of wisdom, and not the legality of law. There is no
provision under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reason for the
difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to callout because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. The petitioners failed to establish that the
calling of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be deployed in Metro Manila for peacekeeping purposes was not
without factual basis. There was escalating crime and lawlessness in the city.

2. No. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real
 authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition.

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter
effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of
legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court –

(1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and
Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari
and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6,
2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly,
the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a
particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general
instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in
respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular warrants of
arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary
investigations will henceforth be conducted.

(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)

With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."

Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799
(Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the
extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to
determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person
subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons.
Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention.
All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).1âwphi1.nêt

Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar.

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering
that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event
that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court,
for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued warrant.

As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to
be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are
not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in
proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-
an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to
petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award
(Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in
imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner
will not be arrested without a warrant.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary
which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration
of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…" Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established
since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive
at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a
need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. x x x

(at pp.22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is
no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

G.R. No. 147810

Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center
v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to
the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for
the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed,
or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is
invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction
of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and
147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without
the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, separate opinion.

Kapunan, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., on leave.

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless arrests for acts related to, or connected with,
the May 1st incident but respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of the petitions for being said to be moot
and academic. The petitions have raised important constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully
addressed.

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been characterized as belonging "in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms."

Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror
in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.1

Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar
O. Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or injunction from the Court against their impending warrantless
arrests upon order of the Secretary of Justice.2 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to enjoin
the arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan and General Panfilo Lacson.3 Separate petitioners were also filed by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile.4 Former Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda,5 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,6 Senator Gregorio B. Honasan,7 and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8

Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and police officers stems from the following facts:

On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon the warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan in
connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several hundreds of policemen were deployed to effect his
arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's supporters, who were then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills
Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ batons
and water hoses to control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada
and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then brought to Camp Crame where, with full media coverage,
their fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.

Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA Shrine to show its support for the deposed
President. Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates including petitioner Lacson, as well as
other political personalities, spoke before the crowd during these rallies.

In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were brought to the Veterans memorial Medical Center for a
medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would be transferred to Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to march to Malacañang Palace. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) to guard the premises of the presidential
residence. The marchers were able to penetrate the barricades put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola
and were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañan. As they were being dispersed with warning shots, tear gas and water canons,
the rallyists hurled stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted. Scores of people, including some policemen, were hurt.

At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:

Presidential Proclamation No. 38

DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated
and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
Government and forcibly seize power, and have and continue to rise publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms against
the duly constituted Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;

WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic) to rise
publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize political power;

WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law hereby recognize
and confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion compelling me to declare a state of rebellion;

In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO. 1 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National police to suppress and quell the rebellion.

City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 which reads:

GENERAL ORDER NO. 1

DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIENS AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS
THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated
and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
Government and forcibly seize political power, and have and continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up arms
against the duly constituted Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and prerogatives
which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;

WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic) to rise
publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted Government and seize political power;

WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 38, dated May 1, 2001, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine national
police to suppress and quell the rebellion.

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and
the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

City of Manila, May 1, 2001.

Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested. Senator Enrile was arrested
without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Likewise arrested without warrant the following day was
former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. Senator Honasan and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities
have so far failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released upon recognizance while Senator
Ponce Enrile was ordered released by the Court on cash bond.

The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest or impending arrest without warrant, pursuant to
a declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President of the above-mentioned persons and unnamed other persons similarly
situated suspected of having committed rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the
Bill of Rights under the Constitution.

The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless
violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion. 9 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public
safety requires, also (a) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the
Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless
violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give
the President more power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of
this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-
protected rights, such as the right to due process, 10 the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances,11 and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,12 among others.

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the Court held that:

x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the write
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

xxx

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the "calling out" power because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial
law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by this Court.

On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is to arrest persons without warrant and
detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for the citizens' civil liberties, the so-called "state of
rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law without declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye so as to practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution.14 In
an ironic sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect warrantless arrest and detention for an unbailable
offense places a heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus the declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The
period for martial law or suspension is limited to a period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is mandated to submit
a report to Congress within forty-eight hours from the proclamation or suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is
subject to review by Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in session, it shall
convene in 24 hours without need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis thereof or its extension is subject to
review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding. 15

No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without these rights, all other individual rights may not exist.
Thus, the very first section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against government impairment, Section 2 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting under her direction to make
unwarranted arrests. The existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only authorizes the President to call out the
"armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."

Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law authorizes the
President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not
by itself authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII
makes the following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration
of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court. In very circumscribed instances, however,
the Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 provides:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A police officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights that a person may
only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a "judge" after determining "personally" the existence of
"probable cause" after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its
requirements should, therefore, be scrupulously met:

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. 16

A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts and circumstances before him which, had they been
before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of probable cause of the commission of an offense and that
the person arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that
when arrested, the person "arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" in the
presence of the arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which had "just been committed," that the police officer
making the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it."

Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule
113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17 where this Court held:

The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.18

Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit" rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as the rebellion persists.

Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although effected a day or days after the commission of the
violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because at the time of their respective arrests, they were
members of organizations such as the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United
Front Commission, then outlawed groups under the Anti-Subversion Act. Their mere membership in said illegal
organizations amounted to committing the offense of subversion19 which justified their arrests without warrants.

In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged participation in the "rebellion" on May 1,
2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to overthrow the government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing that the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit the offense of rebellion.20 In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of
rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21 the term" in his [the arresting
officer's] presence" was defined thus:

An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the view of an arresting officer or private citizen when such
officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. 22

This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of Senator Enrile. In the Court's Resolution of May 5, 2001
in the petition for habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court noted that the sworn statements of the policemen who
purportedly arrested him were hearsay.23 Senator Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious
speeches. Consequently, his arrest without warrant cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest without
a warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer or private person has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person arrested has committed
the offense.

At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to the cases at bar, Umil is not without any strong dissents.
It merely re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case decided during the Marcos martial law regime. 25 It cannot apply when
the country is supposed to be under the regime of freedom and democracy.
G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,

(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and
MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:

We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons,1 Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial Warden
of Bohol3 and Torres v. Gonzales,4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the
President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate
the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the
pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely
executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now.

In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his
immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April
18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.6

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted
of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President"
an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that:

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice
is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9

Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is no adequate
basis for us to oblige him.

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted
criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms
of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the
pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision
of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions
of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest
and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of
presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively
in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon
upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may
be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him
subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation
of his right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the
instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon
which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have
served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and
of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee
from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by
the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms
of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon
revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded
and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion
for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.

Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local
Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its
4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without
the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city
treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982;
that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. On
April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:

We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was
convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in
public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon,
of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position.
...

Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement
on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that,
notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. 3

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf We gave
due course on October 13, 1987.

Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach
and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict
of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of
the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4

It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal
penalty. 5 Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such disqualification to last
during the term of the sentence. 6 Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties
remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one
of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office. 8

The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal
consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent
particularly in describing the effects of pardon.

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath. But Philippine
jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law.

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance." 8-a

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as
amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures,
and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. 9

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying
that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her
appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner
is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.

Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation to the
decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.

In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the various consequences
of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action;
that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ...
(W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to
atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction.

The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the unmistakable application of the
doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence
despite the fact that much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American decisions.

Consider the following broad statements:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full,
it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent
upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. 14
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The modern trend of authorities now
rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been
made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. 16

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party
from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of
guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty
of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and
the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints
upon him following his conviction." 18

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for
which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a
major number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but
requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong,
and that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from
the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which
has been definitely fixed. 22

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the
penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of
an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the
judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict
in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the
actor." 23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose
of the privilege.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or
forfeited by reason of the conviction 25 although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office. 26

The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should
be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The
Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss
of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. 27

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15,
1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J.
AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB.
CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO,
SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL
JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS – KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE
PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A.
RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA,
ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO
SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary. 1 Superior strength – the use
of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional
rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the
scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with
a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity." 2

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
(PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people
combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes
license?3

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted
and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the growth
of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions
and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and
present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies
of the democratic Philippine State – and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth
of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and
the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and
present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts
of terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act
of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA),
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim
to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP
1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned
Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio
Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people
to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets
in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings
and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected
targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. 6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo
decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and
detonated at the PMA parade ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the
National People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive
documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February
24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."

On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force
were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any
defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen
and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine
reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President
Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander
of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo."8

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and
armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there
was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of
command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines
Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal
declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the
coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable
to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly
announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties
suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field."
He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions,
plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding
stage in the first half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also
considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in
Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering
its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. 10

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess
the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men
and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble
that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for
purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members
of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from
various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA
site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The
same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan
Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala
Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor
at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president
of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it
would take over any media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national
emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards – and the standards are - if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017
– we will recommend a ‘takeover.’" National Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio
networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced
reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned
that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media
coverage when the national security is threatened.14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest
dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the
Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo
Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.

Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and
golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador
was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.

Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are
not being raised in these petitions.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding
the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency"
refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants
the issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members
of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza,
and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of
freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion
in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing
that there is necessity to do so."

In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance
was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to
redress their grievances.

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI,
and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by
the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners
argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition,
petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code."

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for
being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access
to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this
regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for
being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et
al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free
expression and redress of grievances.

On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may
be summarized as follows:

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated
in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers
limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these
limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and
thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the
courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may exercise such power
only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have
to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 24

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It
is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy,
contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26 so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case 28 or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These
are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not
a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 31 second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 32 third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military
and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. 35 And lastly, respondents’ contested
actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very
statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception
to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing
discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 37 In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either
case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first
laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter,
he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the
duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise
of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental
importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino
v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of
cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations
to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. 51

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed
to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases:

(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to
information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe
the petitioner with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental importance of the
issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of
direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers
absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of
constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can
it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct injury"
test with respect to concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the
citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."

In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-
in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing
to sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of
Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice
Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true
with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting
from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor
General does not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the
issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law
are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen
in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Tañada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We
take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no
legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer
as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the
Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner
have locus standi.

In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations
of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue
as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her
claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these
issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court
may relax the standing rules.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of
judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the
validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very
critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it
in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation
of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.69

B. SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power
has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile
era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line
defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government." 75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that
the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and
conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the
conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their
constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and
balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him
by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court
of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity
of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. 78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly
diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in
great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle
similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under
the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. 81 It speaks
of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go
no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily."
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. 83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further
ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis"
and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of
the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape
of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing
to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power
or duty must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various
political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.

John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the
problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even
a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a
prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and
sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative
powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke
readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they
have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time
of emergency. According to him:

The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render
them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State…

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation.
Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...

If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate
a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there
is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish.86

Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it would
more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon
a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88

Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an
ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political
theory, thus:

Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra –constitutional measures; for although they
may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will
in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not
by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it. 89

Machiavelli – in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill – sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of
standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted
forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of
emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.90

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional
democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why
absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect
established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed
by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of
emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive,
while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of
constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must
be relatively short…Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character…Final authority to determine the
need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator himself…"94 and the objective of such an
emergency dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism."

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. 95 "It is a problem of concentrating power – in a
government where power has consciously been divided – to cope with… situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity.
There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when,
for how long, and to what end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency
powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means – i.e., he must be legitimate;
he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised
under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional
order."97

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar,
Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the
vexing problems presented by emergency. 98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the
"constitutional dictatorship," thus:

1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even
indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order…

2) …the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute
the dictator…

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination…

4) …all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit
of constitutional or legal requirements…

5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely
necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or
effect…

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of
the existing constitutional order. . .

8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of
the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .

10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted…

11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental
conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship…99

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would
secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith
in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees. 100

Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, "the
suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger
to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional
dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is
used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering
emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of
the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H.
McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is
consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means
necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed
upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power
in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of
constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to
equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and
substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not
in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant
difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain
meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two
fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal
limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101

In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of
prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of constitutionalism"
--- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of
discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of
political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s
"balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and
the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times
of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency,
our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief
Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

a. "Facial Challenge"

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached
on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the
citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme
Court held that "we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment" (freedom of speech).

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,105 it was held:

It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such
summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’
toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive – falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
"spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains
that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a
last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the
Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its
flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness
of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not
even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the
same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application
of PP 1017.

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
insurrection or rebellion"

Second provision:

"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction;"

Third provision:

"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier,
considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s
vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion"
(in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a
"state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP
1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines
the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of
law."113

In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114 an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare
Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It
cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose
of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact,
Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act
done contrary to its command is ultra vires.

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are
powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial
Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as
well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as
President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws." 116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if
needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government. 119

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza
Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress.
They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction."

Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?

PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction."

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation
or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary
interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued
by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding
force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.121

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such
as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national
emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of
Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,
without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of
the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17,
Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national
emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare
a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion
then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different
clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously
quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency
powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise
its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.
And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that
presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed
on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though
"theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property
in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military
authorities.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power
to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article
says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126

Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami,"
"typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to
life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety,
and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,128 b) natural
disaster,129 and c) national security.130

"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is evident in
the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee’s definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It
reads:

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.

MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.

MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?

MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."

MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.132

xxxxxx

MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could this
be economic emergency?"

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133

It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to
delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are
exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.

"x x x

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains
that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the
commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given
notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is,
under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no
matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in
ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department – unless we
regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that
Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is
that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances ‘the
various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,’ given the ability to act, are called upon ‘to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation,
he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot
decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article
VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the
guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights
are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against
warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights
suffered the greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants
on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of
the arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the
CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office
as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away and
dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.

A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects
in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to
command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts?
The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for
the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the
absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted
arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and commands
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules
issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules
and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them. 139 They
are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.140 For these
reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably
associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept.
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our country,
but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans
when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists
of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria
that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these military actions – or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United
States against Iraq – consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups
such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter." The apparent
contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that
leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed
Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the
time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts – the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually
legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic
issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those
who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or
military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign
occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of
organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel and a
liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims – the Kashmiri resistance groups – who are terrorists in the perception of India,
liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier Contras in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists
for the Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the
Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for
the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled
in any way – because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and
its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of
states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an
occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself
as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not
of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these
conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a
non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital
issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.

This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states – and not of peoples, in spite of the
emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! – has become even more serious in the present global power
constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era
as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141

The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An
illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider
the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression
on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such
and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted
by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion
and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the
following provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x."

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law
defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of
all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These
acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise,
such acts are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)

The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." 142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 143

In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon
City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by
policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.

Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation
that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner
David was the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for
the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147

But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated,
but also their right to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression,
the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of
a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public
place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation
of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge
v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action
cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which
the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend
the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes
elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted
for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as
the basis for a criminal charge.

On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et
al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive
canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits
to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance
is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists
committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction
between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the
presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their
permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a
person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair,
reasonable, and according to procedure.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press.
Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third,
the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in
the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed
themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.

Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as
saying that such raid was "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that
would help the rebels in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not
follow the standards –and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do
not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’" National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government
for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the
closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national
security is threatened.151

The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two
(2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct
that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case
a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests
in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that --

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We
Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print.
This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers
in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the
arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is
permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. 153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant
disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs
is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the seizure
of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of
gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the
admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible
for any purpose.155

xxxxxxxxx

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why
do you have to go there at 1 o’clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the
evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017.

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and
inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Is it based on any law?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don’t know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If
the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156

Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and
cannot be condoned, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I don’t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as
I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are
acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility. 157

The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no
constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At
this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the
police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.

In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part
of this ponencia.

SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered this
case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance
thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been
media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent."
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent
future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the
relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence
as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with
public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief –
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard –
that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined
and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been
denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the
limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not
authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the
individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil
complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary
due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves.
How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights
is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth
and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is
that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to
the governed.158

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes
a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017,
i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on
the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel;
and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176051 February 11, 2009

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,
JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON, Petitioners,
vs.
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT OF
APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176222 February 11, 2009

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by
Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
represented by Rep. Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel
Pastores, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with
the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo
L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353,
upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex
"A," committed as follows:

"That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused’s (sic), being then members of the United States Marine
Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design
and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of
the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal
knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned
by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW."1

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered
into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the
proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security
reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT.
CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps
assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine
Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE
defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance
with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with
the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United
States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J.
SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.2

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought
to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between
the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United
States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney (Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree
that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal
Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG)
Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by
U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in
compliance with the terms of the VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become moot. 3

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void
and unconstitutional.
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v.
Zamora,4 brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous
ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well
as a specific mandate of the Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States military bases in the
country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually,
for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from
Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases
and facilities, which the United States retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained
by the US.

Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States.
Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity
in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea
is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces
in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed
Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,5 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status
as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States
law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and
consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking
agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days
from ratification.6

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951.
This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:7

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace
with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy
and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against
external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the
Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending
the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or
diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered and to refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.

Article II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional
processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of
the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on
the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the
Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international
peace and security.

Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been
exchanged by them at Manila.

Article VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given
to the other party.

In withness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) Carlos P. Romulo

(Sgd.) Joaquin M. Elizalde

(Sgd.) Vicente J. Francisco

(Sgd.) Diosdado Macapagal

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) Dean Acheson

(Sgd.) John Foster Dulles

(Sgd.) Tom Connally

(Sgd.) Alexander Wiley8

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall
squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to
provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen
international and regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:9

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA
to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e.,
a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. 10

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US
Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:

Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay,
make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense
with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the
United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event
Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations
under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not
include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue
that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that
accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a
foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.11

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction,
except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in
terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle
remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed
upon by the parties.12

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
one State do not extend or apply – except to the extent agreed upon – to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction
(such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of
the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the Constitution
states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art.
II, Sec. 2).

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as
against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following
provision of the VFA:

Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction,
because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only
that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall
be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because
such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No.
06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their
domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them
enforceable.1avvphi1

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v.
Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the
following points:

1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto
Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are
not domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-
executory" and is ratified on these terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-executory or because there exists
legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there
proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no part."

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as
it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from
their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has
been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.1avvphi1

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not
self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected
in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 – Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic courts varies from country
to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN
NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other
contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation
and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, 13 an executive agreement is a "treaty" within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the
US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to
Filipinos in the US Bases here.

Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
US Constitution.

2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be
submitted to the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress
within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the
Congress and may be implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated
January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby
ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities
under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until
further orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the petition
for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.
GR No. L-23846 September 9, 1977

GO TEK petitioner-appelle,
vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.

Teodoro C. Ronquillo for appelle.

Solicitor-General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor general Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for
appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a deportation case. On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek
a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz Manila.

It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched
an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the
"Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged
sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.

It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated article
168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien.

The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the President of the Philippines the . immediate
deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable alien, "his presence in this country having been, and will always be and a menace
to the peace , welfare, and security of the community". Case No. R1116).

Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature bemuse them was a pending case against
him in the city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of article 168 (IS 64-7267). He contended that the board had no jurisdiction
to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868, 875, that the t may deport
aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.

The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A. Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its resolution of April 21, 1964
denied Go Teks motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State my exercise its
rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding.

In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go Tek on June 10, 1964 filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition
action against the Board. On July 8, 1964 the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the board from hearing
Go Tek's case.

After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C. Alikpala presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the writ prohibition
and the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the Go Tek.

The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground
for deportation under the Immigration Law; that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having
been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a
conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was
premature.

The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor General contends that the
trial court erred in assuming that the President may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law; in holding
that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation and that a criminal conviction is necessary, and
in not finding that the Board has jurisdiction over Go Tek's case.

The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of
undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein."

The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified
in section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the aliens has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.

We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his
alleged "guerilla" activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under article
168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the Board was not premature.

The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case invoked by Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of
this case. In the Qua Chee Gan case the aliens were with economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under
Republic Act No. 503.

The ratio decidendi of the Qua Chee Gan case is that the provision of Executive Order No. 398, of 1951, the Deportation
Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien, is "illegal" or unconstitutional because
it is contrary to the provinsion in section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue upon to be de by
the judge after e under oath the t and the witness he may produce. (Note that under section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution cause may be determined "by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law". See
Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration L-25694, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 96, per Fernando, J.)

A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition
action of Go Tek The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided
for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:

SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not
be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon
prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is
contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are
specified in section 37 (See Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, L-24792, February 14, 1975, 62 SCRA 363, 368).

So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation
Board, supra).

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40
Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace
and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive rinds that there are aliens whose
continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them (Forbes
vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and
unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).

The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman , the solicitor General, and a
representative of the Secretary of National Defense (Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).

SECTION 69 and Executive Order No. 398, the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation Paragraph
l(a) of Executive Order No. 398 merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person
is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to
determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to recommend
to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien."

As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutes provision defining the power to deport aliens because the
intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is
so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory." (Tan Tong vs.
Deportation Board 96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board, 104 PhiL 868, 872).

It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the
deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to
reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. (Martin vs. Mott 12 Wheat., 19, 31, cited in In
re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62).
In the Dick case it was noted "that every alien forfeits his right to asylum in the country in which he resides, in the absence
of treaty provisions to the contrary when his conduct or his mode of life renders his prance there inimical to the public
interests". "The reasons may be summed up and co in a single word: the public interest of the State ." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100).

"It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case" (Ang Bong
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a
of the charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not
constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not n to warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743,
note 40, citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S. ex.. Mastoras vs. McCandless 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama
Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).

And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled that the Deportation Board could take cognizance of the charge of illegal
importation against an alien as a ground for deportation, even if he of the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory.
The Chief Executive has to approve the board's recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by the prosecutor or by the
Board should first be brought to his attention.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved. The case
is to the Deportation Board for further proceedings. Costs against the petitioner-appellee.

SO ORDERED.