G.R. No.

L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
he respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot
and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where
the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
nd in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.)
In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F.
2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.
It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose
of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a
local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in
our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the
supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evid

[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A.
Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL
Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel
V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994,
his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board
of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official
documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even
submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With
the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field
trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules
and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total
amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the
falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two
previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order
appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix
Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and
recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued,
however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondents complaints. The
committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,[4] Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public
servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He
claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondents execution of an affidavit of desistance.[5]
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was
the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR.
He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in
Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it
was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify
that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on
their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who
readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline.
Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990.[6] With respect to the accusation
that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error
committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00,
Lumiqued presented a certification[7] of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record as of
December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but
was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications for leave of
absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her
second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted
that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash
accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount on January
18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs
that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing,[8] alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992,[9]
State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date
was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and
inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the
Committee of respondents condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already
being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with
the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992,[10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to
establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established
by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase
price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed
of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the
gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government
has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the
payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also
admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondents act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but
also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and
auditing rules. His cash advances totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers
covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these
concrete evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on
December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondents order relieving the
complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of
the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to
have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos
dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of desistance[11] would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the matter considering
that what was at stake was not only the violation of complainants (herein private respondents) personal rights but also the competence and fitness of the
respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for a punitive action against the respondent on
the initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of the findings of the Committee with the DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S.
Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating committee.[13] In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating committee informed
Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to act on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already
been forwarded to the Office of the President and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ.[14] Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52),[16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is
untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily
established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations. This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27,
1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and
attested to petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were altered.[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during
the hearing.[19] On May 19, 1994,[20] however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994,[21] Secretary Quisumbing
denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the
October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a
nutshell, it prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the
backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the
hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created x x
x.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after
finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system,[26]
conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to perform such other functions as may be provided by law, [27] prosecutors may
be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent
himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.[28] In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section
32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260[29] (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292[30] (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued[31] clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent
himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative
Investigation stating that a respondent in an administrative complaint must be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his choice,[32] is
inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission.[33] Secondly, said resolution,
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation,[34] much later than the July 1992
hearings of the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding
Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his option to secure services of counsel:

Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment.[38]

The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the
committee of his confinement. Consequently, because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-
affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los
Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training seminars
both here and abroad.[39] Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was
the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, That is my concern, one could detect that it had been uttered testily, if
not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself? despite his
having positively asserted earlier, Yes, I am confident. He was obviously convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him
that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee
could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General,[40] the Court said:
x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings.[41] An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process.[42] As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.[43] Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[44] Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.[45]
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[46] In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal
[47] the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or
agency. This jurisprudential pronoucement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as
follows:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence,
the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[48] In this case, it has
been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or preponderant.[49] The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[50]
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committees recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not
necessary to rebut that presumption,[51] which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement
benefits and other benefits plus backwages from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the President is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697

Complainant, Bar Matter No. 1227

- versus - A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, Present:

Respondent. PANGANIBAN, C. J.,

x-------------------------x PUNO,

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, QUISUMBING,

INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

x-------------------------x
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE

CARPIO,
VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR
MARTINEZ,
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH CORONA,
DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY,
ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM
FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR CARPIO MORALES,
ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS. CALLEJO,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA and

VELASCO JJ.

Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty.
Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second
refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the
antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera
based on the following grounds:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429.
Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys most noble
profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President.
Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients
money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if
such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against
the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing
this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January
2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed
as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and
EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached
to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently
consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at
this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to
withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of
the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty.
de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said
Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP
Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the
decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of
the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution,
dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that
the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect
thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.
[11]
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter
captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution
Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to
Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an
unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even
the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice
President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint
against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after
receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to
testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser,
prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his
motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.[13]
(Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to
this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a
recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of
Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the
decision to withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the
Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the
extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He
deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the
IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in
favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi
may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or
pressure from the Supreme Court.[15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts
inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his
expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13
June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP
position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the
person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP
National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National
President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors
and as EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]
In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to
remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his
removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio
Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the
IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove
him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition
questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de
Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election
until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death,
resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of
death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to
hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at
the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only
provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is
contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other
region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article
VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards position but
because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is
his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty.
de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the
day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov.
Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section
47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the
rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter:
1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already
argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in
Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon
by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which
are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer.
xxx
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how
the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal
of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of
residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register
his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers.
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously
substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring
court personnel under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary
authority over membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De
Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second
time for an act which he had already answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative
Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be
permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative
case. The complainants contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that
while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of
the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral
Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute
a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities
in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter,
and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the
qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the
subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post
as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de
Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP
By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that
sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we
held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants
were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings;
hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him
from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because
the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each
member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For
another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the
position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through
a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course
pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left
for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine
Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the
practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for
the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar
of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera,
no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered
his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon
which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under
Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
Malpractice.[36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose
from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by
the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for
the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;
[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40]
and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave
him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis
testified under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis
funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and
that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic
about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on
the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this
admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he
himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points
out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.[46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly
authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from
relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the
use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did
not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied
that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48]
Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his
client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00,
respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the
amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground
for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias
and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the
rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant
stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP
Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months
immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one
may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that --
based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13
May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently
assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any
reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the
members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining
members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very
basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine
the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could
vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to
refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the
Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and
that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP
of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required
to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning
for all purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible
of more than one general statement.[57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances and varies with the
subject matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right
to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available
trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all
that due process requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential[62] especially under the factual
milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript
of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to
defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge
at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited
himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary
2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his
motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it
(including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining
members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested
parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be
stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion
while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues
that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member
whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and
the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a
valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom
of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially
of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be
the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that
invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by
a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the 10 th National IBP Convention were
detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it
cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body
will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the
majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors,
automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since
it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over
the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure,
and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day
affairs, without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are
elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. [65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in
accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or
malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity,
which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be
persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 [67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises
only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As
has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well
within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty.
de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP;
thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70]
Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of
Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and
By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and
confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the
2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the
authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically
become President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz
as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M.
No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the
question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP,
upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as
IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors,
as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine
[9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by
the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the
nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation
of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to
the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already
produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and
EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in
harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend
to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP
EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It
should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the
highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By
electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of
2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the
members of the House of Delegates of the region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in was about a month before the expiration of the term
of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years
prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as
to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from region
from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of
experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a
succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the
IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse
of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014
LUCENA D. DEMAALA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was
deprived of his day in court.

This Petition for Certiorari With Urgent Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order 1 assails the May 23, 2006
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Criminal Case Nos. 27208, 27210, 27212, 27214, 27216-27219, and 27223-27228, which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the February 9, 2006 Resolution 3 ordering her suspension pendente lite as Mayor of Narra, Palawan

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 27208, 27210, 27212, 27214, 27216-
27219, and 27223-27228 for violations of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 4 (RA 3019), which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA
30195 arguing that under Section 13 of RA 3019, 6 petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory. Petitioner opposed 7 the motion claiming that there is
no proof that the evidence against her was strong; that her continuance in office does not prejudice the cases against her nor pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the evidence and records in her office; and that her re-election to office justifies the denial of suspension.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On February 9, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion to suspend, thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion of the Prosecution is hereby GRANTED. As prayed for, this Court hereby
ORDERS the suspension pendente lite of herein accused, Lucena Diaz Demaala, from her present position as Municipal Mayor of Narra,
Palawan, and from any other public position he [sic] may now be holding. His [sic] suspension from office shall be for a period of ninety
(90) days only, to take effect upon the finality of this Resolution.

Let the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, and the Provincial Governor of Palawan be furnished
copies of this Resolution.

Once this Resolution shall have become final and executory, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government shall be informed accordingly for the implementation of the suspension of herein accused.

Thereafter, the Court shall be informed of the actual date of implementation of the suspension of the accused.

SO ORDERED.8crallawlibrary

The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension was proper to prevent petitioner from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It stated
further that petitioner’s re-election to office does not necessarily prevent her suspension, citing this Court’s ruling in Oliveros v. Judge Villaluz9 that
pending prosecutions for violations of RA 3019 committed by an elective official during one term may be the basis for his suspension in a subsequent term
should he be re-elected to the same position or office. The court added that by her arraignment, petitioner is deemed to have recognized the validity of the
Informations against her; thus, the order of suspension should issue as a matter of course.

On March 23, 2006, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration. 10 She argued that the motion to suspend should have been filed earlier and not when
the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of its evidence; that the prosecution evidence indicates that petitioner’s acts are not covered by
Section 3(h) of RA 3019, and thus not punishable under said law; that the evidence failed to show that petitioner was committing further acts of
malfeasance in office; and that suspension - while mandatory - is not necessarily automatic. Petitioner scheduled the hearing of her Motion for
Reconsideration on April 26, 2006, thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
NOTICE OF HEARING

To: Pros. Manuel T. Soriano, Jr.

Office of the Special Prosecutor
Sandiganbayan Bldg.
Commonwealth Avenue
Quezon City

GREETINGS:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 Please take notice that on Wednesday, April 26, 2006 at 1:30 o’clock P.M. or as soon as [sic] thereafter as counsels may be heard, the
undersigned will submit the foregoing Motion for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court.

(signed)
ZOILO C. CRUZAT11crallawlibrary

The Ombudsman (prosecution) opposed12 petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 19, 2006, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006. 13 It sought to reset the
scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a later date. The manifestation and motion
to reset trial was scheduled for hearing on April 21, 2006. It states, in part, that -
Per the January 19, 2006 Order of the Honorable Court, trial of these cases will continue on April 26 and 27, 2006, both at 1:30 in
the afternoon.

x x x x

In view of the foregoing and in order not to make the government unnecessarily pay for the expenses of the intended witnesses who were
in Palawan, the prosecution did not issue a subpoena to its next witnesses anymore.

Unfortunately, to date, the parties are yet to meet and discuss matters that would be included in the joint stipulations, as the two (2)
scheduled meetings at the Office of the Special Prosecutor between the prosecution and the defense did not materialize. Nevertheless, the
accused has not filed any manifestation to inform the Honorable Court that the accused is no longer willing to enter into stipulations.
Hence, there is a possibility that the parties will eventually come up with a joint stipulation of facts.14 (Emphasis supplied)

On April 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order15 granting the prosecution’s motion to reset trial and scheduled the continuation thereof on August
2 and 3, 2006. The Order reads, as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 filed by the Prosecution and finding the same to be
meritorious, the motion is hereby granted. Thus, trial on April 26 and 27, 2006 is cancelled and reset on August 2 and 3, 2006, both at
1:30 in the afternoon.

Notify the parties and counsels accordingly.

SO ORDERED.16crallawlibrary

On May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner’s March 23, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration,
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused Mayor Lucena Diaz
Demaala, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our ruling in our Resolution of February 9, 2006 is MAINTAINED.

SO ORDERED.17crallawlibrary

In denying the motion, the Sandiganbayan held that the grounds relied upon and arguments raised therein were mere reiterations of those contained in
petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Suspend the Accused; that contrary to petitioner’s submission that the motion to suspend should have been filed
earlier and not when the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of its evidence, the suspension of an accused public officer is allowed so long as
his case remains pending with the court; that the issue of whether petitioner’s acts constitute violations of RA 3019 is better threshed out during trial; and
that while it is not shown that petitioner was committing further acts of malfeasance while in office, the presumption remains that unless she is suspended,
she might intimidate the witnesses, frustrate prosecution, or further commit acts of malfeasance. 18crallawlibrary

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition.

On August 9, 2006, the Court issued a Status Quo Order19 enjoining the implementation of the Sandiganbayan’s February 9, 2006 Resolution.
Issue

Petitioner claims that she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration
even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006 hearings.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The Petition is premised on the argument that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration - of the February 9, 2006 Resolution ordering her suspension from
office - was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, but upon motion by the prosecution, the same was reset to August 2 and 3, 2006; nonetheless,
before the said date could arrive, or on May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny her Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, she was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard on her Motion for Reconsideration on the appointed dates - August 2 and 3, 2006, thus rendering the court’s May 23, 2006
Resolution void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In her Reply,20 petitioner adds that her counsel intentionally set the hearing of her Motion for Reconsideration on April 26 and 27, 2006 in order to
coincide with the main trial of the criminal cases; that since the court rescheduled the April 26 and 27 hearings, she no longer bothered to go to court on
April 26, 2006 as “she had no business to be there”. Petitioner further claims that she did not file any pleading seeking to reset the hearing of her Motion
for Reconsideration because the same had already been scheduled for hearing on August 2 and 3, 2006 at the initiative of the prosecution.

Petitioner now prays that the February 9 and May 23, 2006 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be set aside, and that injunctive relief be granted to enjoin
her suspension from office.

Respondent’s Arguments

Praying that the Petition be dismissed, the prosecution argues in its Comment21 that petitioner’s arguments are misleading. It stresses that the prosecution’s
Manifestation with Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the
continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, and not the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. It
clarifies that a reading of its manifestation and motion to reset trial would reveal that what was sought to be rescheduled was the hearing proper and not the
hearing on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration; in the same vein, what the Sandiganbayan granted in its April 21, 2006 Order was the rescheduling of
the April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, and not the April 26, 2006 hearing of petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. For this reason, it cannot be said that petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed May 23,
2006 Resolution.

The prosecution adds that petitioner should have gone to court on April 21, 2006 to attend the hearing of its manifestation and motion to reset trial to
reiterate her Motion for Reconsideration.

Next, the prosecution argues that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was not denied outright; the Sandiganbayan resolved her motion on the merits
and painstakingly addressed each argument raised therein. Moreover, the prosecution filed its written opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, which
thus joined the issues and rendered the motion ripe for resolution. As such, petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit her
evidence on the motion. It cites the ruling in Batul v. Bayron22 stating that “‘to be heard’ does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court.
One may also be heard through pleadings and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.”23crallawlibrary
Our Ruling

The Court dismisses the Petition.

The only issue is whether petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon.

Petitioner’s cause of action lies in the argument that her Motion for Reconsideration, which was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, was reset to
August 2 and 3, 2006 via the Sandiganbayan’s April 21, 2006 Order. Nonetheless, before the said date could arrive, the anti-graft court supposedly
precipitately issued the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the opportunity to be heard.

The above premise, however, is grossly erroneous.

A reading and understanding of the April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates that what it referred to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and
27, 2006 covering the continuation of the trial proper - the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence - and not the single hearing date of April 26,
2006 for the determination of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial itself unmistakably
specified that what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 pursuant to the court’s previous January 19, 2006
Order; it had nothing at all to do with petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

If petitioner truly believed that the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial referred to the April 26, 2006 hearing of her Motion for
Reconsideration, then she should have attended the scheduled April 21, 2006 hearing thereof to reiterate her motion or object to a resetting. Her failure to
attend said hearing is a strong indication that she did not consider the manifestation and motion to reset trial as covering or pertaining to her Motion for
Reconsideration which she set for hearing on April 26, 2006.

On the other hand, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her
excuse - that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since “she had no business to be there” - is unavailing. By being absent at the April
21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, it was incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the
Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted.

Consequently, there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan. The contention that
petitioner was deprived of her day in court is plainly specious; it simply does not follow. Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. It should be said that petitioner was
accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings, such conclusion being consistent with the Court’s ruling in Batul v. Bayron, later reiterated
in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,24 thus -
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through
 pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 25crallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The August 9, 2006 Status Quo Order is LIFTED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its constitutional
mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the position of Chief
Justice vis-à-vis the appointing power of the President, the period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight appointments as set
forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBC’s composition and
membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The heart of
the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power. More significantly,
this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal
of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before
his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated
position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate
Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014,
Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of
the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the
JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting
witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2)
allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same
conditions that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and
4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote
would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by
Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a
confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him
that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as
dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that
he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should
also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself
Jardeleza’s explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written
statement6 expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the next day to
act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which included:
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway
with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President,
"without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue." 8 The said resolution was accompanied by an
extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the position taken by the
majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to
include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to
qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was
raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court en
bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated action on his letter-petition
to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the
shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against
his integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of nominees.
Jardeleza’s Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardeleza’s arguments, as follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30,
2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof
and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process
when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made
known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his
application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC fail
to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-
009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable
cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant
to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified
against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno.
The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution
itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it dispense with the
need to honor petitioner’s right to due process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity
requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicant’s
integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking
hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a situation
where all thata member has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without need for
factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject [Link] 1, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC.
The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of
the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the President’s constitutional power to [Link]’s exclusion from the
shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees, when
five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a process
tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the petitioner
has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant favorable
action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.11 The
JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a pending case, 12 Jardeleza
himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus
must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right to be included in
the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to
legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of
the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the
JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his
integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and his general
explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against his application.
On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations
against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so that he would know
of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the
voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a fact-finding
body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of the accusations
against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a hearing to
determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or
opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or her own
appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an
affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of
all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he needed the
votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B.
Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority rule" was
considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all
pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while retaining the
office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his
personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics.
Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the said
capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary
relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be
filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an
injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject JBC rule
impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise
to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a majority vote, is to object to
his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and full participation of the other members
in the nomination process. A lone objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the JBC and the very
purpose for which it was created— to shield the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative
of due process for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC
rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In
this case, Jardeleza’s allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously show that he was neither informed ofthe accusations against
him nor given the chance to muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be
operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential. In
the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains
their respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion
of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15,
2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the JBC, this
time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the Integrity
Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s Reply consisted only of his arguments against the JBC’s original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of the
Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S.
Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-
Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC
and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the
conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10
JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it
bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of the
rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which the gaping
wound presented to the Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY"
AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES
WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT.

The Court’s Ruling

I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their [Link] ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied
with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s principal
allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a
writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is a
term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature." 18 It asserts that in the
performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. Hence, the resort
tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on
integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the
position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been
tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best
for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given
this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria had to be
established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of
him" and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True
enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21 "soundness of physical and mental condition,22
and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-
governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which
shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration
of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant
is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes
"unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential
qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the
JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions
only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to Jardeleza’s case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his
actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of integrity: a
supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza’s
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardeleza’s manner of representing the government in a legal
dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she
expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required tobe a member of the Court. 27 In the same meeting, the Chief Justice shared
withthe other JBC members the details of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s position in a case and how this could have been
detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim against Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof
were only supplied to the Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s demand to make the accusations
against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its significant bearing on
the country’s foreign relations and national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in this disposition. The
confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the
country’s position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on
Jardeleza’s integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral
character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications of
immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act
of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement" in legal
strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For
said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise ofhis discretion
as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s
interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28 provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing
on his moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified
as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear
indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different manner
of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that
Jardeleza’s acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final say on the conduct of the country’s
advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the country’s trust and interest. While this point does
notentail that only the President may challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a
treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the Executive Secretary expressly
prayed for Jardeleza’s inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging
case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a
connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives,
therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time
onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its
origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza. 32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the
"immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of San
Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants," it might as
well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion supra. Unlike the first ground which centered onJardeleza’s stance on the tactical approach in
pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical
and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate
could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than professional, more
than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 36 Moral character is
not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic
ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in one’s values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not
only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in the Judiciary. This is no longer
a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market.40 Manipulative devices and deceptive practices,
including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair advantage in
the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock
marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would eventuallyfeel
more secure with their money invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of material
information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person toengage in fraudulent
activities that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on
integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the
basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the
unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the
subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within which any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in
writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and
7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidate’s right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a
body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but
toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights
insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza
refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose totread on his view
that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments, the
Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of
guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to
the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence.
Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access tothe rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their
peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience
and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an applicant's
trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part
of the roster from which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. 44 Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand
finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest,
the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capriciousassessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties
mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and
receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010, 46 squarely
applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-
010 recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder
consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION [Link] complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly
relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as
well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from
receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION [Link] Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates
and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for
its further consideration.
SECTION [Link] Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the dateand place of the interview.
SECTION [Link] interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among
other things, the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates
which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be
gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC.
Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or
falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s
integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory, however, is that if the
JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe JBC conduct a
full-blown trial when objections to an application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due process is a part of JBC’s
discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances, testimonials, and
discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on
the application of a fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates
his right to explain himself.
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the
grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that: any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing,
under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him; the
candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate
can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers "any"
complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC-010
does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to answer the
accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardeleza’s Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events
leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact
that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice
Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound
questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with public interest; 48 2]
reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was
precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC [Link] asserted that a candidate must be
given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in
writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After
Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already
completed the process required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s
deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances
still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same
would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members.
Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact
that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council
expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next
meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource
person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition,
why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every
possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in the
invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the
privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him
based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be informed and to explain himself would have
been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously
provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical
presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he
would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza
was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the
right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his
response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to
answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a magistrate
of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or
not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for
the government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would
have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend
nomineesto the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under
JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his
integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity
rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but
this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the
Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the
Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be
deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction
with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to
propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him
a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBC’s
Internal Rules
In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and
should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting
in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any
assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members in
view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote ofthe
Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been,
used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise definition.
Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process.
As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted
should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court. 1âwphi1 In deference to the
Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the
shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(No part)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

(No part)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

Please see my separate Opinion concurring with the Ponencia of

Pls. See: Separate Concurring Opinion
Justice Mendoza And the separate opinion of Justice Brion
ARTURO D. BRION
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See separate opinion In corporating explanation of vote I also join the separate opinion of J, De Castro & J. Brion
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Leonen I dissent. See separate opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the ooinion of the Court.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Acting Chairperson

Footnotes
* No part.
** On official leave.
1 G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010, 676 SCRA 579.
2 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 618 SCRA 639.
3 JBC-009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, promulgated on September 23, 2002.
4 Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. – In every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not
otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members ofthe Council must be obtained for the
favourable consideration of his nomination.
5 Docketed as A.M. No. 14-07-01-SC-JBC, Re: Jardeleza For the Position of Associate Justice Vacated By Justice Roberto A. Abad, rollo, pp.
79-88.
6 Id. at 33-36.
7 [Link] 37-38.
8 Id. at 95.
9 Id. at 97-106.
10 Id. at 12.
11 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
12 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, docketed as G.R. No. 211833 (still pending).
13 Rollo,pp. 170-217.
14 Id. at 128-169.
15 Id. at 220-233.
16 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 142.
17 Paloma v. Mora, 507 Phil. 697 (2005).
18 Chamber of Real Estate And Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) And Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO),G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010, 624 SCRA 556.
19 Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
20 Rule 3 SEC 1. Guidelines in determining competence. - In determining the competence of the applicant or recommendee for appointment,
the Council shall consider his educational preparation, experience, performance and other accomplishments including the completion of the
prejudicature program of the Philippine Judicial Academy; provided, however, that in places where the number of applicants or recommendees
is insufficient and the prolonged vacancy in the court concerned will prejudice the administration of justice, strict compliance with the
requirement of completion of the prejudicature program shall be deemed directory." (Effective Dec. 1, 2003)SEC. 2. Educational preparation. -
The Council shall evaluate the applicant's (a) scholastic record up to completion of the degree in law and other baccalaureate and post-graduate
degrees obtained; (b) bar examination performance; (c) civil service eligibilities and grades in other government examinations; (d) academic
awards, scholarships or grants received/obtained; and (e) membership in local or international honor societies or professional organizations.
SEC. 3. Experience. - The experience of the applicant inthe following shall be considered:
(a) Government service, which includes that in the Judiciary (Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and courts of the first and second
levels); the Executive Department (Office of the President proper and the agencies attached thereto and the Cabinet); the Legislative
Department (elective or appointive positions); Constitutional Commissions or Offices; Local Government Units (elective and
appointive positions); and quasi-judicial bodies.
(b) Private Practice, which may either begeneral practice, especially in courts of justice, as proven by, among other documents,
certifications from Members of the Judiciary and the IBP and the affidavits of reputable persons; or specialized practice, as proven
by, among other documents, certifications from the IBP and appropriate government agencies or professional organizations, as well
as teaching or administrative experience in the academe; and
(c) Others, such as service in international organizations or with foreign governments or other agencies.
SEC. 4. Performance. - (a) The applicant who is in government service shall submit his performance ratings, which shall include a
verified statement as to such performance for the past three years.
(b) For incumbent Members of the Judiciary who seek a promotional or lateral appointment, performance may be based on landmark
decisions penned; court records as to status of docket; reports of the Office of the Court Administrator; verified feedback from the
IBP; and a verified statement as to his performance for the past three years, which shall include his caseload, his average monthly
output in all actions and proceedings, the number of cases deemed submitted and the date they were deemed submitted, and the
number of his decisions during the immediately preceding two-year period appealedto a higher court and the percentage of
affirmance thereof.
 SEC. 5. Other accomplishments. - The Council shall likewise consider other accomplishments of the applicant, such as authorship of
law books, treatises, articles and other legal writings, whether published or not; and leadership in professional, civic or other
organizations.
21 Rule 5 SECTION 1. Evidence of probity and independence.- Any evidence relevantto the candidate's probity and independence such as, but
not limited to, decisions he has rendered if he is an incumbent member of the judiciary or reflective of the soundness of his judgment, courage,
rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character shall be considered.
SEC. 2. Testimonials of probity and independence. - The Council may likewise consider validated testimonies of the applicant's
probity and independence from reputable officials and impartial organizations.
22 Rule 6 SECTION 1. Good health. - Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a
critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. The applicant or the recommending party shall
submit together with his application or the recommendation a sworn medical certificate or the results of an executive medical examination
issued or conducted, as the case may be, within two months prior to the filing of the application or recommendation. At its discretion, the
Council may require the applicant to submit himself to another medical and physical examination if it still has some doubts on the findings
contained in the medical certificate or the results of the executive medical examination.
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. - The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the
Supreme Court MedicalClinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
23 Rule 4 SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for
honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall
submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and
clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SEC. 2. Background check. - The Council may order a discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SEC. 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on ground of his moral fitness and, at its
discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the
applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SEC. 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on
its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct
a discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
SEC. 5. Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least
a fine of more than ₱10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
SEC. 6. Other instances of disqualification.- Incumbent judges, officials orpersonnel of the Judiciary who are facing administrative
complaints under informal preliminary investigation (IPI) by the Office of the Court Administrator may likewise be disqualified
frombeing nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges are serious or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant
for nomination.
For purposes of this Section and of the preceding Section 5 insofar as pending regular administrative cases are concerned, the
Secretary of the Council shall, from time to time, furnish the Office of the Court Administrator the name of an applicant upon receipt
of the application/recommendation and completion of the required papers; and within ten days from receiptthereof the Court
Administrator shall report in writing to the Council whether or not the applicant is facing a regular administrative case or an IPI case
and the status thereof. In regard to the IPI case, the Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the complaint and the
comment of the respondent.

42 Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of the accused, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the
right to enjoy due process under the law, and the right to a speedy, public trial. Those accused must be informed of the charges against them and
must be given access to competent, independent counsel, and the opportunity to post bail, except in instances where there is strong evidence that
the crime could result in the maximum punishment of life imprisonment. Habeas corpus protection is extended to all except in cases of invasion
or rebellion. During a trial,the accused are entitled to be present at every proceeding, to compel witnesses, to testify and cross-examine them and
to testify or be exempt as a witness. Finally, all are guaranteed freedom from double jeopardy and, if convicted, the right to appeal.
43 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
 conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable fr

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 193791, August 02, 2014
PRIMANILA PLANS, INC., HEREIN REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO S. MADRID, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Primanila Plans, Inc. (Primanila) to assail the Decision 2
dated March 9, 2010 and Resolution3 dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104083. The CA affirmed in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104083 the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) issuance of an Order 4 dated April 9, 2008, which was a cease and desist order upon
Primanila with the following dispositive portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in the Commission, PRIMANILA PLANS, INC., its respective officers, directors,
agents, representatives, and any and all persons, conduit entities and subsidiaries claiming and acting under their authority, are hereby
ordered to immediately CEASE AND DESIST from further engaging in activities of selling, offering for sale Primasa plans and to
refrain from further collecting payments and amortizations for Primasa plans to protect the interest of investors and the public in general.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 64.3 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
parties subject of this Cease and Desist Order may file a formal request or motion for the lifting of this Order within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.5chanrobleslaw

The Facts

Primanila was registered with the SEC on October 17, 1988 and was issued Certificate of Registration No. 156350. Based on its amended articles of
incorporation, the company’s primary purpose was “to organize, establish, develop, conduct, provide, maintain, operate, offer, issue, market and sell
pension plans under which the savings of professionals, officers, directors and other personnel of corporations, firms, or entities, and self employed
individuals can be pooled together, accumulated and invested in profitable placements and productive enterprises so as to build an Accumulated Fund for
each individual participant or planholder for his retirement, monthly pension or for other [foreseeable] needs in the future.” Primanila then operated as a
pre-need company and maintained a business office in Makati City. 6cralawred

On April 9, 2008, the SEC was prompted to issue the subject cease and desist order after an investigation conducted by the SEC’s Compliance and
Enforcement Department (CED) on Primanila yielded the following factual findings duly explained in the cease and desist
order:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The office of [Primanila] located at 20 th Floor, Philippine AXA Life Centre, Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City was closed. No
notices were posted outside said office to inform the public of the reason for such closure. x x x

2. [Primanila]’s website ([Link]) was offering a pension plan product called Primasa Plan. The website contains
detailed instructions as to how interested persons can apply for the said plan and where initial contributions and succeeding
installment payments can be made by applicants and planholders. According to the website, applicants and planholders can
pay directly at the head office, any of its field offices or may deposit the payments in PRIMANILA’s METROBANK Account
No. 066-3-06631031-1. This was discovered by [CED] when a member of CED visited [Primanila’s] website on February 12,
2008.

3. [PRIMANILA] failed to renew its Dealer’s License for 2008. In view of the expiration of the said license, the [SEC’s
Non-Traditional Securities and Instruments Department (NTD)], through its Acting Director Jose P. Aquino, issued a letter
dated January 3, 2008 addressed to [Primanila’s] Chairman and CEO Mr. Eduardo S. Madrid, enjoining [Primanila] from
selling and/or offering for sale pre-need plans to the public.

4. [Primanila] has not been issued a secondary license to act as dealer or general agent for pre-need pension plans for 2008.
Also, no registration statement has been filed by [Primanila] for the approval of a pension plan product called Primasa Plan.
This is shown in the certification dated February 15, 2008 issued by NTD upon the request of Atty. Hubert B. Guevara of
CED.
 5. [Primanila’s] Bank Account is still active. This was discovered by CED when it deposited on March 6, 2008 the sum of Php
50.00 which was duly received by METROBANK Robinson’s Branch as shown by the deposit slip.

6. Among the many planholders of [PRIMANILA] are enlisted personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Premium
collections for Primaplans via salary deductions were religiously remitted to [Primanila] on a monthly basis. x x x

7. PNP remitted the total amount of Php 2,072,149.38 to respondent PRIMANILA representing the aforementioned premium
collections via salary deductions of the 410 enlisted personnel of PNP who are planholders. This is shown in the table
prepared by the remittance clerk of the PNP, Ms. Mercedita A. Almeda.

8. [PRIMANILA] failed to deposit the required monthly contributions to the trust fund in violation of Pre-need Rule 19.1. This
is shown in the Trust Fund Reports for the months of November and December 2007 prepared by ASIATRUST BANK, the
trustee of [Primanila].

9. [PRIMANILA] under-declared the total amount of its collections as shown in its SEC Monthly Collection Reports which
it submitted to NTD. Its reports show that it only collected the total amount of Php 302,081.00 from January to
September 2007. However, the remittance report of the PNP shows that [Primanila] received the amount of Php
1,688,965.22 from the PNP planholders alone for the said period. Therefore, it under-declared its report by Php
1,386,884.22.7

From these findings, the SEC declared that Primanila committed a flagrant violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities
Regulation Code (SRC), particularly Section 16 thereof which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Pre-Need Plans. – No person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need plan except in accordance with rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Such rules shall regulate the sale of pre-need plans by, among other things, requiring
the registration of pre-need plans, licensing persons involved in the sale of pre-need plans, requiring disclosures to prospective plan
holders, prescribing advertising guidelines, providing for uniform accounting system, reports and record keeping with respect to such
plans, imposing capital, bonding and other financial responsibility and establishing trust funds for the payment of benefits under such
plans.

It also breached the New Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans, specifically Rule Nos. 3 and 15 thereof, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 3. Registration of Pre-Need Plans. – No corporation shall issue, offer for sale, or sell Pre-Need Plans unless such plans shall have
been registered under Rule 4.

Rule 15. Registration of Dealers, General Agents and Salesmen of Pre-Need Plans.

15.1. Any issuer selling its own Pre-Need Plans shall be deemed a dealer in securities and shall be required to be registered as such and
comply with all the provisions hereof; provided that the issuer selling different types of Pre-Need Plans shall be required to be registered
as dealer only once for the different types of plans.

The SEC then issued the subject cease and desist order “in order to prevent further violations and in order to protect the interest of its plan holders and the
public.”8cralawred

Feeling aggrieved, Primanila filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Lift Cease and Desist Order, 9 arguing that it was denied due process as the order was
released without any prior issuance by the SEC of a notice or formal charge that could have allowed the company to defend itself. 10 Primanila further
argued that it was neither selling nor collecting premium payments for the product Primasa plans. The product was previously developed but was never
launched and sold to the public following the resignation from the company in 2006 by Benjamin Munda, the one who crafted it. The Primanila company
website that included details on the Primasa product was not updated; the advertisement of the product on the website was the result of mere
inadvertence.11 Thus, the cease and desist order against Primanila would allegedly not accomplish anything, but only prejudice the interest and claims of
its other planholders.12cralawred

On June 5, 2008, the SEC issued its Order 13 denying Primanila’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The cease and desist order issued on April 9,
2008 was then made permanent.

Unyielding, Primanila appealed to the CA via a petition for review. On March 9, 2010, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition and affirming
in toto the issuances of the SEC.

The Present Petition

Following the CA’s denial of its motion to reconsider, Primanila filed the present petition which cites the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT SEC CONSIDERING THAT
THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD [STATE] OTHERWISE;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT [PRIMANILA] WAS GIVEN DUE PROCESS BY RESPONDENT SEC AS
[PRIMANILA] WAS ABLE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND

THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PUBLIC WILL NOT SUFFER GREATLY AND IRREPARABLY BY
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT SEC.14

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Due Process of Law

Contrary to its stance, Primanila was accorded due process notwithstanding the SEC’s immediate issuance of the cease and desist order on April 9, 2008.
The authority of the SEC and the manner by which it can issue cease and desist orders are provided in Section 64 of the SRC, and we
quote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 64. Cease and Desist Order. –

64.1. The Commission, after proper investigation or verification, motu proprio, or upon verified complaint by any aggrieved party,
may issue a cease and desist order without the necessity of a prior hearing if in its judgment the act or practice, unless restrained, will
operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public.

64.2. Until the Commission issues a cease and desist order, the fact that an investigation has been initiated or that a complaint has been
filed, including the contents of the complaint, shall be confidential. Upon issuance of a cease and desist order, the Commission shall
make public such order and a copy thereof shall be immediately furnished to each person subject to the order.

64.3. Any person against whom a cease and desist order was issued may, within five (5) days from receipt of the order, file a formal
request for lifting thereof. Said request shall be set for hearing by the Commission not later than fifteen (15) days from its filing and the
resolution thereof shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the termination of the hearing. If the Commission fails to resolve the
request within the time herein prescribed, the cease and desist order shall automatically be lifted. (Emphasis ours)

The law is clear on the point that a cease and desist order may be issued by the SEC motu proprio, it being unnecessary that it results from a verified
complaint from an aggrieved party. A prior hearing is also not required whenever the Commission finds it appropriate to issue a cease and desist order that
aims to curtail fraud or grave or irreparable injury to investors. There is good reason for this provision, as any delay in the restraint of acts that yield such
results can only generate further injury to the public that the SEC is obliged to protect.

To equally protect individuals and corporations from baseless and improvident issuances, the authority of the SEC under this rule is nonetheless with
defined limits. A cease and desist order may only be issued by the Commission after proper investigation or verification, and upon showing that the acts
sought to be restrained could result in injury or fraud to the investing public. Without doubt, these requisites were duly satisfied by the SEC prior to its
issuance of the subject cease and desist order.

Records indicate the prior conduct of a proper investigation on Primanila’s activities by the Commission’s CED. Investigators of the CED personally
conducted an ocular inspection of Primanila’s declared office, only to confirm reports that it had closed even without the prior approval of the SEC.
Members of CED also visited the company website of Primanila, and discovered the company’s offer for sale thereon of the pension plan product called
Primasa Plan, with instructions on how interested applicants and planholders could pay their premium payments for the plan. One of the payment options
was through bank deposit to Primanila’s given Metrobank account which, following an actual deposit made by the CED was confirmed to be active.

As part of their investigation, the SEC also looked into records relevant to Primanila’s business. Records with the SEC’s Non-Traditional Securities and
Instruments Department (NTD) disclosed Primanila’s failure to renew its dealer’s license for 2008, or to apply for a secondary license as dealer or general
agent for pre-need pension plans for the same year. SEC records also confirmed Primanila’s failure to file a registration statement for Primasa Plan, to
fully remit premium collections from planholders, and to declare truthfully its premium collections from January to September 2007.

The SEC was not mandated to allow Primanila to participate in the investigation conducted by the Commission prior to the cease and desist order’s
issuance. Given the circumstances, it was sufficient for the satisfaction of the demands of due process that the company was amply apprised of the results
of the SEC investigation, and then given the reasonable opportunity to present its defense. Primanila was able to do this via its motion to reconsider and
lift the cease and desist order. After the CED filed its comment on the motion, Primanila was further given the chance to explain its side to the SEC
through the filing of its reply. “Trite to state, a formal trial or hearing is not necessary to comply with the requirements of due process. Its essence is
simply the opportunity to explain one’s position.”15 As the Court held in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:16cralawred
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.17chanrobleslaw

Validity of the Cease and

Desist Order
The validity of the SEC’s cease and desist order is further sustained for having sufficient factual and legal bases.

The acts specifically restrained by the subject cease and desist order were Primanila’s sale, offer for sale and collection of payments specifically for its
Primasa plans. Notwithstanding the findings of both the SEC and the CA on Primanila’s activities, the company still argued in its petition that it neither
sold nor collected premiums for the Primasa product. Primanila argued that the offer for sale of Primasa through the Primanila website was the result of
mere inadvertence, after the website developer whom it hired got hold of a copy of an old Primasa brochure and then included its contents in the company
website even without the knowledge and prior approval of Primanila.

It bears emphasis that the arguments of Primanila on the matter present factual issues, which as a rule, are beyond the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari. We underscore the basic rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented, for a
question of fact would arise in such event. 18 Thus, it is equally settled that the factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the SEC, are generally
held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. 19cralawred

In ruling on the petition’s denial, we rely on the substantial evidence that supports the SEC’s and CA’s findings. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
defines “substantial evidence” as such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 20 In the instant case,
this substantial evidence is derived from the results of the SEC investigation on Primanila’s activities. Specifically on the product Primasa plans, the SEC
ascertained that there were detailed instructions on Primanila’s website as to how interested persons could apply for a plan, together with the manner by
which premium payments therefor could be effected. A money deposit by CED to Primanila’s Metrobank account indicated in the advertisement
confirmed that the bank account was active.

There could be no better conclusion from the foregoing circumstances that Primanila was engaged in the sale or, at the very least, an offer for sale to the
public of the Primasa plans. The offer for Primasa was direct and its reach was even expansive, especially as it utilized its website as a medium and visits
to it were, as could be expected, from prospective clients.

The Court finds weak and implausible the argument of Primanila that the inclusion of the Primasa advertisement on its website was due to mere
inadvertence. It was very unlikely that Primanila’s website developer would include in the Primanila website sections or items that were not sanctioned by
the company. As a hiree of the company, the website developer could have only acted upon the orders and specific instructions of the company. As
prudence requires, there also normally are employees of a company who are specifically tasked to monitor contents and activities in its company website.
It was therefore inconceivable that Primanila only knew of the Primasa post on its website after it received the subject cease and desist order. In any case,
Primanila should be held responsible for the truthfulness of all data or information that appeared on its website, especially as these were supplied by
persons who were working under its authority.

It is beyond dispute that Primasa plans were not registered with the SEC. Primanila was then barred from selling and offering for sale the said plan
product. A continued sale by the company would operate as fraud to its investors, and would cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing
public, grounds which could justify the issuance of a cease and desist order under Section 64 of the SRC. Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the
subject cease and desist order, Primanila was already enjoined by the SEC from selling and/or offering for sale pre-need products to the public. The SEC
Order dated April 9, 2008 declared that Primanila failed to renew its dealer’s license for 2008, prompting the SEC’s NTD to issue a letter dated January 3,
2008 addressed to Primanila’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Eduardo S. Madrid, enjoining the company from selling and/or offering for sale pre-
need plans to the public. It also had not obtained a secondary license to act as dealer or general agent for pre-need pension plans for 2008. 21cralawred

In view of the foregoing, Primanila clearly violated Section 16 of the SRC and pertinent rules which barred the sale or offer for sale to the public of a pre-
need product except in accordance with SEC rules and regulations. Under Section 16 of the SRC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 16. Pre-Need Plans. – No person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need plan except in accordance with rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Such rules shall regulate the sale of pre-need plans by, among other things, requiring
the registration of pre-need plans, licensing persons involved in the sale of pre-need plans, requiring disclosures to prospective plan
holders, prescribing advertising guidelines, providing for uniform plans, imposing capital, bonding and other financial responsibility, and
establishing trust funds for the payment of benefits under such plans.

As the foregoing provisions are necessary for the protection of investors and the public in general, even the Pre-Need Code, 22 which now governs pre-need
companies and their activities, contains similar conditions for the regulation of pre-need plans.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 9, 2010 and Resolution dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 104083 are AFFIRMED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205870 August 13, 2014
LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123633 which nullified and set aside (a) the Resolution 4 dated March 15, 2010 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 01-22111-06-RI finding petitioner Lei Sheryll Fernandez (Fernandez) to have been illegally dismissed by
respondent Guadalupe Jose (Jose), and (b) the Order5 dated August 17, 2010 of Labor Arbiter (LA) Napoleon V. Fernando granting the issuance of a writ
of execution of the foregoing NLRC resolution.
The Facts
On November 14, 2002, Fernandez was hired as a trainee at Botica Claudio,6 a drugstore located at Tomas Claudio Street, Morong, Rizal,7 which is owned
and operated by Jose. In January 2003, she was promoted as sales clerk/pharmacy aide, which position she held until the termination of her services on
January 15, 2006.8 Due to her termination, Fernandez filed a complaint9 for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of her statutory benefits against
Jose before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IV, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-01-22111-06, alleging that: (a) during her
employment, she was paid a salary of 180.00 per day,10 and worked from 8 o’clock in the morning until 8 o’clock in the evening, and sometimes, even up
to 10 o’clock at night, but was never paid any overtime pay and/or holiday pay, and that her Social Security System (SSS) contributions were not duly
remitted;11 (b) Jose merely fabricated the charges against her in order tojustify her dismissal; and (c) she did not go on absence without official leave
(AWOL).12
Jose denied the foregoing allegations, and contended that Fernandez’s dismissal was valid given that she went on AWOL; this, in addition to the various
infractions she committed during her employment, particularly, her acts of (a) dispensing wrong medicines, (b) allowing some clients to buy medicines on
credit without her employer’s consent, and (c) dishonesty. Further, Jose claimed that all of her employees, including Fernandez, were paid their
corresponding benefits, and that their SSS contributions were all duly remitted.13
The LA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 11, 2007, the LA held that while just cause attended Fernandez’s dismissal from work based on the finding that she went
on AWOL, the same was nonetheless effected without procedural due process.15 Thus, the LA ordered Jose to pay Fernandez 11,700.00 as separation pay
as well as14,040.00 representing three (3) years of her unpaid 13th month pay, but denied her claims for overtime pay and moral/exemplary damages for
lackof factual and legal bases.16
Dissatisfied with the LA’s ruling, Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal17 with Memorandum of Appeal18 on February 8, 2008 before the NLRC. Copies of
the same were purportedly sent by registered mail to one "Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., Counsel for respondents, No. 5 Sto. Nino St., SFDM, 1100 Quezon
City."19
The Proceedings Before the NLRC
On March 15, 2010, the NLRC rendered a Resolution20 (NLRC Resolution) granting Fernandez’s appeal, and thereby reversing the LA’s ruling.
It found Fernandez to have been illegally dismissed by her employer, Jose, without a valid cause and observance of procedural due process. 21 It observed
that the pieces of evidence presented by Jose to substantiate Fernandez’s purported infractions were merely fabricated, and that there was no indication that
Fernandez was apprised of her supposed offenses before her dismissal.22 Accordingly, it ordered Jose to pay Fernandez the aggregate amount of
₱297,522.45, consisting of ₱254,831.85 as backwages, ₱42,120.00 as separation pay,and ₱570.60 as overtime pay. 23
On June 1, 2010, an Entry of Judgment24 was issued by the NLRC, declaring its Resolution to have become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
Consequently, the LA issued an Order25 dated August 17, 2010 (LA Order) granting Fernandez’s motion for execution.26
Without disclosing the date when the foregoing resolution was received, Jose filed a motion for reconsideration 27 dated January 20, 2011 before the
NLRC, insisting that just causes attended Fernandez’s dismissal, albeit the same was made withoutprocedural due process. Despite the fact that the NLRC
had yet to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, Jose filed a second motion for reconsideration 28 dated February 2, 2011 before the same
tribunal.29
Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, Jose filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA, claiming to have secured a
copy of the NLRCResolution and LA Order only upon personal verification on February 8, 201031 and filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom on
April 12, 2011,32 referring to her second motion for reconsideration dated February 2, 2011.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision33 dated September 13, 2012,the CA granted Jose’s petition for certiorari, holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in taking
cognizance of Fernandez’s appeal despite the latter’s failure to furnish Jose copies of her notice of appeal and appeal memorandum in violation of Article
223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure.34 Said pronouncement was based on the CA’s finding that copies of Fernandez’s notice of
appeal and appeal memorandum were sent to one Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., who was her (Fernandez’s) own former counsel, and not Jose’s. Thus, in view
of Fernandez’s failure to comply with the requirements for the perfection of her appeal, the CA held that Jose was deprived of her right to due process, and
that Fernandez’s appeal of the LA Decision had never been perfected, thereby rendering said decision final and executory, 35 and the NLRC without any
authority to entertain Fernandez’s recourse.36 Accordingly, the CA declared the NLRC Resolution as well as the corresponding entry of judgment and the
LA Order null and void,37 and reinstated the LA Decision.38
Aggrieved, Fernandez sought reconsideration39 but the same was denied in a Resolution40
dated February 11, 2013, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
Fernandez’s appeal.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to respondent’s Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding
that the latter still had a pending motion for reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15, 2010 before the NLRC.41 It is settled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a
petition for certiorari.42 This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes, if any. 43 Hence, the more prudent recourse
for respondent should have been to move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for
certioraribefore the CA.44 Having failed to do so, her petition for certiorariwas prematurely filed,45 and the CA should have dismissed the same.
On the merits, the Court finds that the CA erred in declaring that the failure of Fernandez to furnish Jose with copies of her notice of appeal and
memorandum of appeal before the NLRC deprived the latter of her right to due process.46
While Article 22347 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC 48 require the party intending to appeal
from the LA’s ruling to furnish the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has heldthat the mere failure to serve the same upon the
opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due course to an appeal.49 Such failure is only treatedas a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and,
hence, not a jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal of an appeal.50 Instead, the NLRC should require the appellant to provide the opposing party
copies of the notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal.51
In this case, however, the NLRC could not be expected to require compliance from Fernandez, the appellant, since it was not aware that the opposing party,
Jose, was not notified of her appeal. Hence, it cannot be faulted in relying on Fernandez’s representation that she had sent Jose, through her counsel, a copy
of her memorandum of appeal by registered mail,52 as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 006511.53
More significantly, it is undisputed thatJose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration
from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. As held in the case ofAngeles v. Fernandez,54 the availment
of the opportunity toseek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due process.55 After all, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied in administrative proceedings, anopportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, thus, an aggrieved party
cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunityto ventilate his side, as Jose was in this case.56
Accordingly, the Court finds thatthe CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in taking cognizance of Fernandez’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is [Link] Decision dated September 13, 2012 and the Resolution dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 123633 are hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 15, 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission and
the Order dated August 17, 2010 of the Labor Arbiter are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-28.
2 Id. at 32-43. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela,
concurring.
3 Id. at 46-47.
4 Id. at 123-130. Penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., with Commissioners Alex A. Lopez and Gregorio 0. Bilog Ill, concurring.
5 Id. at 223-225. Docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-01-22111-06-RI.
6 Id. at 33.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 33.
9 Id. at 51.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 34.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 105-108. Penned by LA Jose G. De Vera.
15 Id. at 107.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 109-110.
18 Id. at 111-119.
19 Id. at 110 and 119.
20 Id. at 123-130.
21 Id. at 127.
22 Id. at 126-127.
23 Id. at 128-129.
24 Id. at 131.
25 Id. at 223-225.
26 Id. at 37.
27 Id. at 132-134.
28 Id. at 190-194.
29 Id. at 9-10.
30 Id. at 158-188.
31 Id. at 162.
32 Id. at 170.
33 Id. at 32-44.
34 Id. at 38-40.
35 Id. at 41.
36 Id. at 42.
37 Id. at 39-40.
38 Id. at 43.
39 Id. at 292-296.
40 Id. at 46-47.
41 See id. at 37.
42 Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI),G.R. No. 178593, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 199, 205. See also Dr. Santos v. CA, 563
Phil. 240, 245 (2007).
43 Dr. Santos v. CA, id.
44 See id. at 246.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 39.
47 Art. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or ordersof the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall file an answer not later than
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
xxxx
 48 Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002
provides:
RULE VI
Appeals

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. – (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying withthe other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174996 December 3, 2014
BRO. BERNARD OCA, FSC, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, FSC, MRS. CIRILA MOJICA, MRS. JOSEFINA PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS
SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 dated September 16, 2005 as well as
the Resolution2 dated October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791, entitled "Bro. Bernard Oca, FSC, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, FSC,
Mrs. Cirila Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. v. Hon. Norbert J. Quisumbing, Jr., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, and Mrs. Laurita Custodio". Through said rulings, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the
Orders dated August 5, 2003,3 August 21, 20034 and October 8, 20035 issued by Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite in SEC
Case No. 024-02, entitled "Laurita Custodio, plaintiff, versus Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Mrs. Cirila Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, and St.
Francis School, defendants."
The factual backdrop of the case
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On July 9, 1973, petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. (School) was organized and established as a non-stock and non-profit
educational institution. The organization and establishment of the school was accomplished through the assistance of the La Salle Brothers without any
formal agreement with the School. Thus, the incorporators of the School consist of the following persons: private respondent Custodio, petitioner Cirila
Mojica (Mojica), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Pascual), Rev. Msgr. Feliz Perez, Bro. Vernon Poore, FSC. The five original incorporators served as the
School’s Members and Board of Trustees until the deaths of Bro. Poore and Msgr. Perez.
On September 8, 1988, to formalize the relationship between the De La Salle Greenhills (DLSG) and the School, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
was executed. This agreement permitted DLSG to exercise supervisory powers over the School’s academic affairs. Pursuant to the terms of the MOA,
DLSG appointed supervisors who sit in the meetings of the Board of Trustees without any voting rights. The first such supervisor was Bro. Victor Franco.
Later on, Bro. Franco also became a member of the Board of Trustees and President of the School. Then, on September 8, 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard
Oca joined Bro. Franco as DLSG supervisor. In a while, Bro. Oca also served as a member of the Board of Trustees and President of the School. Bro.
Dennis Magbanua also joined Bro. Franco and Bro. Oca as DLSG supervisor and also as a Treasurer of the School.
Petitioners declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the Board of Trustee[s] as its officers was valid since an election was conducted to that
effect.
On the other hand, Custodio challenges the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and their purported election as officers of the School. The
legality of the membership and election of the DLSG Brothers is the main issue of the case in the lower court.
Custodio alleges that sometime in 1992, Bro. Franco was invited by Mrs. Mojica to act as President of the School. This is because there was only the Tres
Marias (referring to the original incorporators, Pascual, Mojica and Custodio) who [were] left tomanage the affairs of the school. Bro. Franco accepted the
invitation. However, while Bro. Franco acted as President and presided over meetingsof the Tres Marias, he never participated in the operation of the
School and never exercised voting rights.
Custodio further alleges that on September 8, 1998, during one of the informal meetings held at the School, Bro. Franco unilaterally declared the said
meeting as the Board of Trustees’ Meeting and at the same time an Annual Meeting of the Members of the Corporation. During the meeting, Bro. Franco
declared that the corporation is composed of the Tres Marias and their husbands, Dr. Castaneda and himself (Bro. Franco) as members. On the other hand,
the Board of Trustees was declared to be composed of Bro. Oca, the Tres Marias and himself (Bro. Franco).
According to Custodio, when Bro. Franco eventually left and became inactive in the School, Bro. Oca assumed his position as President and Chairman of
the Board of Trustees, without being formally admitted as member of the School and without the benefit of an actual election. Custodio further states that
on December 6, 2000, Bro. Magbanua was introduced to the original incorporators for the first time. Automatically, he was declared as Member of the
School and at the same time, Treasurer by Bro. Oca, also without any formal admission into the corporate membership and without the benefit of an actual
election.
Custodio alleges that clearly the composition of the membership of the School had no basis there being no formal admission as members nor election as
officers.
It appears that the legality of the membership and assumption as officers of the DLSG Brothers was questioned by Custodio following a disagreement
regarding a proposed MOA that would replace the existing MOA with the DLSG Brothers and her removal as Curriculum Administrator through the Board
of Trustee[s].
Under the proposed MOA, DLSG will supervise and control not only the academic affairs of the School but also the matters of the finance, administration
and operations of the latter. Custodio vigorously opposed the proposed MOA. Consequently, unable to convince Custodio and the academic populace to
accept the MOA, the DLSG brothers withdrew [their] academic support from the School. A day after the rejection of the proposed MOA, Mojica and
Pascual retired as Administrators for Finance and Physical Resource Development (PRD), respectively. However, they maintained their positions as
Members and Trustees of the School.
Custodio contends that while Pascual and Mojica remained to be Members and Trustees of the School, upon retirement, they stopped reporting for work.
Mr. Al Mojica, son of Mrs. Mojica, who was then the school cashier, also stopped reporting for work. Thus, Custodio avers that being the only remaining
Administrator, she served as the Over-all Director of the School. Being the Over-all Director, Custodio made appointments to fill in the vacuum created by
the sudden retirement of Pascual and Mojica. Hence, she appointed Mr. Joseph Custodio as OIC both for Finance and PRD and [Ms. Herminia] Reynante
as Cashier.
Upon the appointment of Joseph Custodio and Reynante, a special meeting was called by Bro. Oca in which the petitioners alleged that the prior
organizational structure was restored, and the retirement of Pascual and Mojica disapproved by proper corporate action. It was agreed to in the meeting that
the school was going to revert to the three-man co-equal structure with Pascual as PRD head, Mojica as Finance head and Custodio as Curriculum
Administrator.
In the same meeting, petitioners alleged that Custodio admitted to having opened an account with the Luzon Development Bank in her own name for the
alleged purpose of depositing funds for and in behalf of the School. Petitioners alleged that a directive was issued for the immediate closing of this account.
Still, Custodio refused to close such account.
Subsequently, on January 31, 2002, Mojica and Pascual formally resigned from their administrative posts. As such as a replacement, Atty. Eleuterio A.
Pascual and Mr. Florante N. Mojica[,] Jr. were appointed by the Board of Trustees as PRD Administrator and Finance Administrator respectively.
According to petitioners, due to the repeated refusal of Custodio to close the account she opened in her own name with the Luzon Development Bank, the
Board of Trustees, in a meeting held on March 7, 2002, approved a resolution to file a case against the latter. Consequently, the Board of Trustees also
approved resolutions to the effect that Custodio, Mr. Joseph Custodio and Reynante be stopped from performing their functions in the School.
On June 7, 2002, Custodio filed a Complaint in the RTC of Trece Martirez City, questioning the legality of the Board of the School. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. TMCV-0033-02, entitled Laurita Custodio v. Bro. Bernard Oca, et al. Custodio prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of preventing Bro. Oca as President of the corporation, from calling a special membership meeting to
remove Custodio as Member of the School and the Board of Trustees. The case was dismissed on July 4, 2002.6
Summary of the legal proceedings involved
in the present controversy
On July 8, 2002, the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School resolved to remove respondent Laurita Custodio as a member of the Board of Trustees and as
a member of the Corporation pursuant to Sections 28 and 91 of the Corporation Code as indicated in Resolution No. 011-2002.7
Subsequently, respondent was issued a Memorandum dated July 23, 2002 and signed by petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, wherein she was informed of her immediate removal as Curriculum Administrator of St. Francis School on the grounds of willful breach
of trust and loss of confidence and for failure to explain the charges against her despite notice from the Board of Trustees.8
In reaction to her removal, respondent filed with the trial court, on October 3, 2002, a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
against petitioners again assailing the legality of the membership of the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School.9
During the submission of pleadings, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion. She alleged that on October 8, 2002, her son,Joseph Custodio, was being
prevented from entering the premises of the school. Also, respondent alleges that a meeting with the parents of the School’s students was convened wherein
the parents were informed that she had been removed as Member of the corporation and the Board of Trustees, and as Curriculum Administrator. As such,
petitioners directed the parents to give all payments regarding matriculation and other fees to the corporate treasurer.10
On October 14, 2002, respondent filed another Motion for Clarification asking the trial court toissue an order as to whom the matriculation fees should be
paid pending the hearing of the complaint and the earlier Manifestation and Motion.11
Acting on the motions filed by respondent, the trial court in an Order dated October 21, 2002, appointed Herminia Reynante (Reynante) as cashier of the
school and required all parties to turn over all money previously collected with respect to matriculation fees and other related collectibles of the school to
the latter.12
At this point, it should be noted that petitioners Cirila Mojica and Josefina Pascual put up another school called the Academy of St. John with the same
structure as petitioner St. Francis School. This fact was testified to by petitioners’ counsel Atty. Armando Fojas during the preliminary hearings on the main
case.13
On October 30, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the October 21, 2002 Order of the trial court. Petitioners aver that
had they been given an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to oppose the appointment ofReynante, proof would have been adduced to
demonstrate the latter’s lackof moral integrity to act as court appointed cashier.14
Subsequently, on February 19, 2003, petitioners filed a Manifestation informing the trial court that in compliance with its October 21, 2002 Order, they
took steps to turn over the amount of ₱397,127.64, representing collections from matriculation fees, but the same was not accepted by the court appointed
cashier, Reynante, who preferred to receive the amount in cash.15
On February 26, 2003, respondent filed her Comment in which she averred that contrary to petitioners’ claim, petitioners had not complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order for failure to include in their accounting, the funds allegedly in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 and Special Savings Deposit No.
459 or the retirement fund for the teachers of the School, amounts paid by the canteen concessionaire, and amounts paid to three resigned teachers.16
In an Order17 dated March 24, 2003, the trial court acted upon petitioners’ February 19, 2003 Manifestation and respondent’s February 26, 2003
Comment. The text of the said March 24, 2003 Order is reproduced herein:
This treats of the defendant’s explanation, manifestation and plaintiff’s comment thereto.
A perusal of the allegations of the defendants’ pleadings shows that they merely turned-over a manager’s check in the amount of ₱397,127.64 representing
money collected from the students from October 2002 to December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr.
Al Mojica to turn over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from
whom and the dates collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from receipt hereof, to submit a reportand to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all
money collected by them, more particularly:
1. ₱4,339,607.54 deposited in the Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.);
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.);
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
5. Accounting on how and how muchdefendants are paying Ms. Daisy Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.18
On April 18, 2003, petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion to the March 24, 2003 Order of the trial court which
contests the inclusion of specific funds to be turned over to Reynante.19
In the first questioned Order20 dated August 5, 2003, the lower court denied the Manifestation and Motion of petitioners and reiterated its order for
petitioners to turn over the items enumerated in its March 24, 2003 Order.
Subsequently, in the second questioned Order21 dated August 21, 2003, the trial court, acting favorably on private respondent’s October 9, 2002
Manifestation and Motion ruled: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is granted. Accordingly, a status quoorder is hereby issued wherein
the plaintiff is hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer to continue performing their duties until the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is
resolved.22
On September 1, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification of the August 5, 2003 Order.23
In an Order24 dated October 8, 2003, the court ruled, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order[s] dated March 24 and
August 5, 2003.
Defendants are further directed toinform the court of the total amount of the funds deposited reserved for teachers’ retirement, and in what bank and under
what account the same is deposited.25
Dissatisfied with the rulings made by the trial court, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the Orders dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003 that were issued by the trial court.
However, the Court of Appeals frustrated petitioners’ move through the issuance of the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision which dismissed outright
petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was also thwarted by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
October 9,2006 Resolution.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and submitted the following issues for consideration in their Memorandum26 dated October 3, 2007:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21
AUGUST 2003 AND 8 OCTOBER 2003.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR INTRACORPORATE CONTROVERSIES PERTAINING TO THE ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUOORDER AND THE
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF.27
On the other hand, respondent puts forward the following arguments in her Memorandum28 dated October 9, 2007:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) HAD NOT
DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21 AUGUST 2003 AND 8
OCTOBER 2003.

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A STATUS QUOORDER.29
In fine, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion inissuing the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003,
August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed September 16, 2005 Decision, failed to consider that no adequate proceedings had been accorded
to the petitioners by the trial court for the exercise of its right to be heard on the matters subject of the questioned Orders. Furthermore, petitioners point out
that the Court of Appeals erroneously gave its imprimatur to the trial court’s issuance of the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 without first
requiring and accepting from respondent the requisite bond that is required under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that the manner of the issuance of the assailed Orders of the trial court did not violate the due process rights of
petitioners. Respondent also claims that a valid ground for the issuance of the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 did exist and that the
alleged failure of the trial court to require the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a status quoorder was mooted by the assailed Order dated October
8, 2003 which required respondent and Reynante to file a bond in the amount of ₱300,000.00 each.
We find the petition to be partly meritorious.
In the case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary,30 we reiterated what grave abuse of discretion means in this jurisdiction, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process safeguards the opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time and again held that where the opportunity to be
heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial
of due process because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.31
In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due process by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003, August
21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records would show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate their arguments through pleadings and that
the same pleadings were acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court on the basis of denial of due process.
However, with respect to the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003, we find that the trial court has failed to comply with the pertinent
procedural rules regarding the issuance of a status quo order.
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the
controversy. It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and
desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.32
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quoorder in an intra-corporate suit such asthe case at bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads:
SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. - A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the
purposes. However, no temporary restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the
posting of a bond.
In the case before us, the trial court’s August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order conflicted with the rules and jurisprudence in the following manner:
First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as school director and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an
act already consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief and not of a status quo order which is limited only
to maintaining the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which immediately preceded the controversy. It must be remembered that
respondentwas already removed as trustee, member of the corporation and curriculum administrator by the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School of
General Trias, Cavite, Inc. months prior to her filing of the present case in the trial court.
Second, the trial court’s omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before the issuance of the Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 is in
contravention with the express instruction of Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies. Even the subsequent
order to post a bond as indicated in the assailed October 8, 2003 Order did not cure this defect because a careful reading of the nature and purpose of the
bond would reveal that it was meant by the trial court as security solely for the teachers’ retirement fund, the possession of which was given by the trial
court to respondent and Reynante.1âwphi1 It was never intended and can never be considered as the requisite security, in compliance with the express
directive of procedural law, for the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003. In any event, there is nothing on record to indicate that respondent
had complied with the posting of the bond as directed in the October 8, 2003 Order except for the respondent’s unsubstantiated claim to the contrary as
asserted in her Memorandum.33
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond.34 In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion,
through which respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and was unverified.
In conclusion, we rule that no grave abuse of discretion was present in the issuance of the assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial
court. However, we find that the issuance of the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order was unwarranted for non-compliance with the rules. Therefore,
the said status quo order must be set aside.
At this point, the Court finds it apropos to note that the Status Quo Order on its face states that the same is effective until the application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order is resolved. However, respondent's prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in her
Complaint still appears to be pending before the trial court. For this reason, the Court deems it necessary to direct the trial court to resolve the same at the
soonest possible time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated
October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the assailed August 5, 2003 and
October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court. They are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order which is hereby SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is further DIRECTED to resolve respondent's application for injunctive relief
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 9-27; penned by Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice), concurring.
2 Id. at 29-30; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
3 Id. at 169-171.
4 Id. at 172-173.
5 Id. at 458-459.
6 The trial court found that the case was not in reality a case for injunction but for quo warranto and thus dismissed the case. In any event,
private respondent allegedly withdrew her Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal order after learning that said court had no jurisdiction
since it was not designated as a special commercial court. (Id. at 10-14.)
7 Id. at 270-271.
8 Id. at 211.
9 Id. at 212-236.
10 Id. at 303-307.
11 Id. at 308-310.
12 Id. at 313.
13 TSN, June 17, 2003, pp. 10-21.
14 Rollo, pp. 314-320.
15 Id. at 321-322.
16 Id. at 329-338.
17 Id. at 339.
18 Id.
19 Records, Vol. I, pp. 325-337.
20 Rollo, pp. 169-171.
21 Id. at 172-173.
22 Id. at 173.
23 Id. at 174-179.
24 Id. at 458-459.
25 Id. at 459.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015
EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND DIGNA MATALANG COCHING,
Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the October 30, 2009 decision 2 and the October 1, 2010 resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision4 of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution 5 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary earlier affirmed the orders dated December 1, 2003 6 and July 26, 2004 7 of the DENR Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.8

The Antecedents9

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan, which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing
establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who
allegedly occupied the land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512
and 4514. According to the respondent spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed
by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr., 10 and Digna
Matalang Coching (another respondent in this case), also registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR. On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order
giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25, 2004, through registered mail, an Appeal
Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was paid on
September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed her appeal (which adopted the
appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of Finality 11 declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26,
2004 orders final and executory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512,
4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the
coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos.
4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held
that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum,
instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent
spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.
The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report 14 prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048, 15 which purportedly showed that Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 are parts of the six (6) hectare
timberland occupied by the petitioner's father during his lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the statements of two former Barangay Captains of Port
Barton and the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six (6) hectare timberland supporting the petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006. 16

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 in view of her sweeping allegation that the
said lots are part of the six (6) hectare timberland, which his father possessed in his lifetime and whose possession she tacked. The DENR Secretary asked:
if indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she was the actual occupant over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey
claimants of the said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. Rogelio Maranon, the registered survey
claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived and transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent spouses in a duly-notarized Affidavit of
Waiver of Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered
survey claimants, who executed a duly-notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that these are the legal
and vital documents (disregarded by the chief of Forest Management Services) which support the preferential rights of the respondent spouses over Lot
Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution 17 dated October 17, 2006. He ruled that the respondent spouses failed
to perfect the appeal because they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal contrary to Section 1(a) of DENR Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.18

The Office of the President's Ruling19

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation prohibiting an appellant to file an appeal memorandum,
instead of a notice of appeal, to the office concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself serves as a sufficient notice of the party's intention
to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President observed that in a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR,
rather than with the RED, which practice has not since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal of the appeal. Finally, it found that
the respondent spouses paid the appeal fees. All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 but Lot No. 4741,
which is entirely different and distinct from the contested lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon and the
Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No
countervailing proof was presented by the petitioner to impugn these affidavits.
The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before
administrative bodies. They are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not to override substantial
justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.
The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. She submits that the respondent spouses failed
to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings. She argues that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.
She adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear application in the present case because the respondents failed to adequately explain their
non-compliance therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual questions.

Respondent's Comment20
The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence in
upholding the ruling of the Office of the President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense with the determination of the party having preferential
right on the disputed lots and could cause the perpetuation of a wrong. They maintain that the cases cited by the petitioner, where procedural rules were
strictly enforced by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the trial court, the CA or before this Court, and not before an administrative
agency like the DENR. In sum, the respondent spouses contend that the orders of the RED have not attained finality, thus, said orders are still subject to
reversal, amendment or modification on appeal.
Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:21

I. WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY FILED TO THE DENR
SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87,
SERIES OF 1990;

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR SECRETARY WAS PERFECTED
DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;
 III. WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF
RESPONDENTS;

IV. WHETHER THE ASSAILED ORDERS, ISSUED ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26, 2004, OF THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN DENR CASE NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY
FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

V. WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF
1990 IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND

VI. WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE MODIFIED AND SET
ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have attained finality because the
respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the RED.
The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal was fatal to the respondent spouses' case.

We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:
Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, appeals from the decisions/orders of the
DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of
by the party adversely affected, by tiling with the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies
thereof upon the prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees. [Emphasis ours.]

According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that respondents filed a defective appeal because: (i) they filed a
Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) directly to the DENR and not to the Regional Office, which adjudicated the case; and (iii) no
docket fee was paid.22

The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not oniy
mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,23 the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his brief within the time provided by the Rules of
Court. The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time based on a cogent ground
before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we held that liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be
invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 we affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for reconsideration pro forma for not containing a
notice of hearing. We held that a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does
not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,25 the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible 15-day period to file a Petition for Review from
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner failed to file the petition despite the extension. We held that the requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC,26 we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner's appeal because of its failure to explain why another
mode of service other than personal service was resorted to. We held that an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made to
the other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not
resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,27 the issue was whether the petitioner properly filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We held that as a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final
order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file the appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to
use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal,

In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party who avails of such right must comply with the
law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.
To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the trial court, the CA or before this Court. They do not
involved violation of administrative rules of procedure. They are not strictly applicable in the present case.

The Nature of Administrative

Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. This has been consistently held in
relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. 28 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed
liberally in order to promote their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses.29

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,30 we held:
It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict
and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance
fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party . Every party-
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by
technical rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process. 31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor.32
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process
is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of . Administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained. 33

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that
liberal construction has no application when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of
procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due
process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

Liberal Construction as
Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary within
the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-day period. These violate Section 1 (a) of DAO No. 87
which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the reglementary period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of procedure? Is there basis for the liberal construction of
the rules?

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the
respondent spouses right to due process as this would result to a denial of their right to appeal.

We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was timely filed, albeit not directly to the office which
issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.

We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's right to due process was not breached.

Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner did not deny .34

We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially served the purpose of the Notice of Appeal. The
filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed: inform the RED that his order is sought to be
appealed to the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The petitioner subsequently filed her opposition
thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard was not compromised despite the wrong mode of
appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late payment of appeal fees at the administrative level in order to
render substantial justice.35

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to appeal decisions of the Regional Offices to the
DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings of the former. To disallow appeal in this case would not only work injustice to the respondent
spouses, it would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the decision of the RED. It would deny the DENR Secretary the opportunity to
correct, at the earliest opportunity, "errors of judgment" of his subordinates. This is obviously not the intent of DAO No. 87.

Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not claim that her right to due process was violated as
a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and affirm the orders of the RED, which
according to her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal application in order to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply these rules in a manner that would give effect rather than defeat their
intended purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision and October 1, 2010 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August 13, 2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.
EN BANC
FELIX B. PEREZ and G.R. No. 152048
AMANTE G. DORIA,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION and
PERALTA, JJ.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANY and
JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 7, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and

supervisor, respectively, in PT&Ts Shipping Section, Materials Management Group.

Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the

matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping

documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly.[1] Their suspension was

extended for 15 days twice: first on October 3, 1993[2] and second on October 18, 1993.[3]

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by respondents:

In line with the recommendation of the AVP-Audit as presented in his report of October 15, 1993 (copy attached) and the subsequent filing of criminal
charges against the parties mentioned therein, [Mr. Felix Perez and Mr. Amante Doria are] hereby dismissed from the service for having falsified company
documents.[4] (emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal.[5] They alleged that they were dismissed on November 8,

1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petitioners suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay

petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with backwages and 13 th month pay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that

they were accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days (without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of

petitioners illegal suspension).[6]

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its January 29, 2002 decision,[7] the CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners illegal

suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process.

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision. They contend that there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process

and that they were illegally suspended for 30 days.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE JUST

CAUSE AND TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS
The CA, in upholding the NLRCs decision, reasoned that there was sufficient basis for respondents to lose their confidence in petitioners [8] for allegedly

tampering with the shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to a

cargo forwarder.[9]

We disagree.

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the

facts from which the loss of confidence resulted.[10] Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners hands at some

point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping

requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the

alleged tampering of shipping documents.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control

of or access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the

employer that it has lost confidence in its employee.[11]

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. [12] However,

in General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA,[13] we said:

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence
may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the

Constitution and the Labor Code. The employers evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee

may be fairly made to rest.[14] It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence.[15] Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the

dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and

giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all

circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.[16]

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from

work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found

that respondents failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

Petitioners likewise contended that due process was not observed in the absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the

evidence against them.

There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code

and its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to

defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires:

ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines
set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (emphasis supplied)
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the

opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him:[17]

Section 2. Security of Tenure. x x x

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination. (emphasis supplied)
Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases involving the dismissal of an employee? Can the apparent conflict between

the law and its IRR be reconciled?

At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.[18] The

authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the

provisions of the enabling statute.[19] As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.[20]
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee must be given ample opportunity to be heard and to

defend himself. Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word ample which ordinarily means considerably

more than adequate or sufficient.[21] In this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover

actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article

277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or

conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure

guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The

ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employees right to be heard to a solitary form

narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist

interpretation is overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable

situation.[22]

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of

flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its

spirit.

Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process

outlined therein shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute,

mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of

the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to

controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into

account in the adjudication of the controversy.[23] To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as

effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings.[24] Therefore, while the phrase ample opportunity to be heard may in fact include an

actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an actual, formal trial-type hearing, although preferred, is not

absolutely necessary to satisfy the employees right to be heard.

This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing.

Thus, we categorically declared in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad:[25]

The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. (emphasis supplied)
In Autobus Workers Union v. NLRC,[26] we ruled:

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance
to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
xxxxxxxxx
A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even
mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the Labor Arbiter. (emphasis supplied)
In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development Corporation,[27] we had the occasion to state:

[W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees.
It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be
effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee
of the employers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to
be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.
In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both apprised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They were also
required to submit their written explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the reports. Yet, neither of them complied. Had they found the 12-hour period
too short, they should have requested for an extension of time. Further, notices of termination were also sent to them informing them of the basis of their
dismissal. In fine, petitioners were given due process before they were dismissed. Even if no hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process
had been met since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy. (emphasis supplied)
Our holding in National Semiconductor HK Distribution, Ltd. v. NLRC[28] is of similar import:

That the investigations conducted by petitioner may not be considered formal or recorded hearings or investigations is immaterial. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the natural sequence of notice,
hearing and judgment.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the

assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against

him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.

After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a

letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time

records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or

counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also include a request that a

formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist

substantial evidentiary disputes[29] or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. To this

extent, we refine the decisions we have rendered so far on this point of law.

This interpretation of Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the ample opportunity to be

heard standard under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code without unduly restricting the language of the law or excessively burdening the employer. This not

only respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay down the guidelines for the

implementation of Article 277(b). More importantly, this is faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the implementation

and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:

(a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges

against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable

way.

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary

disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

(c) the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or conference requirement in the

implementing rules and regulations.

PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY

SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS
An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which

the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.[30]

In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid during the two 15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension.

Respondents failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the ruling of the labor arbiter on this point.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the

employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or

their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.[31] In this case, however,

reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. [32] Fourteen years have

transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical

purpose.[33]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50536 finding that

petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not accorded due process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is

SET ASIDE. The decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 11-06930-93 is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that petitioners should be paid their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO (On Official Leave)

Associate Justice MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 CER TIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* On official leave.
[1] Records, pp. 70-71.
[2] Id., pp. 72-73.
[3] Id., pp. 74-75.
[4] Id., p. 76.
[5] Id., p. 39.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash
between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other
establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments
from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against
our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court
of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality
of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels,
motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or
the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the
same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of
Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed
repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila
it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of
only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
(STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. 8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule
64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. 15 A month later, on
March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was
made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 19 where the legitimate purpose of
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution
dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos
fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the
assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is
being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered
with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection
rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support
that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, 26 sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27 The constitutional component of standing
doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. 28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal
interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially
in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the
United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation
of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held
that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who
have this kind of confidential relation to them."36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has
standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function." 38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine
comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time
frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a
prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel
or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the
annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the
constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated
by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited
by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many
political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our
respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than
through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process
evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper
formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. 50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it
can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a
liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." 52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational
basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56
While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases
as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. 57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant
the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly,
these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter
gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where
the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that
most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65] In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[ 66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject
establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’" 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,
borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they
are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience
is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will
of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the
room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,
the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, 76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict
our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the
grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as
Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus
attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not
trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained
by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public
attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration
on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by
the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by
reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face
of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHUR

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Sick Leave)

TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
 2 See rollo, pp. 4-41.
[Link] 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez (later, Solicitor-General) and
Antonio P. Solano.
4 Id. at 46.
5 Id. at 62-69.
6 Id. at 45-46.
7 Id. at 70-77.
8 Id. at 47.
9Id.

10Id.

11Id. at 48.
12Id. at 81.
13Id. at 82-83.
14Id. at 84-99.
15 Id. at 104-105.
16 Id. at 49.
17 Id. at 52.
18Id. at 120.
19 No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659.
20 Rollo, pp. 129-145.
21 Id. at 158.
22 Id. at 53.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 43-59.
25 Id. at 4-40.
26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
27 Const., Art. VIII , Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
[G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas
placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore
thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria
Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not
materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic
sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale.[1]
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty[2] to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes
Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a
telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose
duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No.
26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around
4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to
see around six (6) persons in the houses sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to
provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in
hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged
illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen
Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.[3]
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National Police who
was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with
Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted,
but Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m.,
the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported
scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the team
posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the teams cue
to enter the house.[4]
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside. There, she saw another
woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza
was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked
Fermindoza what position she was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work so long as she could go
abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements
were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza
replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form,
three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got
their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted permission after the raiding party
introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were
in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment.
Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers[5] on
the table.[6]
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation.[7]
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused
was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators.[8] A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused was not
licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment.[9] A certification[10] dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-
in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato
Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements.[11]
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandros house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra
Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmines house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit
down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta
and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and the
rest will be salary deduction. Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she was not yet sure.
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at
the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it happened.[12]
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandros house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was someone
recruiting in Jasmines house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by Jasmine.
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like a good opportunity since
a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for
the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured
Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave
back the money to Lourdes after the raid.[13]
Denial comprised the accuseds defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the
Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the
Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that
occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a
certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father
received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of
Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmines telephone number, address and a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents
to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicays cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At around
noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine
came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicays message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked
Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicays mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send something for Malicay when the
accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmines house. After
the meeting with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then
proceeded to Jasmines residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, Are you Carol from Singapore? The accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for her.
The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The
woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up and went out. A minute after,
three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of the CIS and informed her that they received a call
that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the
occupants of the house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmines room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested
Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the
applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicays) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmines residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to
whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information
sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.[14]
The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen
Malicays message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes
only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter.
Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see Carol
distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.[15]
The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City,
for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not notice that she conducted any recruitment.[16]
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this case under the condition
set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA AND
CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2)
OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE
 RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE
SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME,
BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME
WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS
COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE
POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY
PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET
SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL,
HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.[18]
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining recruitment and placement violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her
sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.[19]
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties.[20] A criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness.[21] The constitutional vice
in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.[22]
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:[23]
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all because one may never know in advance
what annoys some people but does not annoy others.
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin which case, it may be saved by proper
construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment
or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations,
shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,[24] where this Court, to use appellants term,
criticized the definition of recruitment and placement as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision, appellant asks, what more the ordinary citizen who does not possess the
necessary [legal] knowledge?
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment,
a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellants reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment
could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. The Court held in the negative,
explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic
rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity
dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words shall be deemed create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful
demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall
be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word shall be deemed should by the same token be given the force of a
disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many
Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be
awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the
lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a
reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b),
therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was
salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the
rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.
An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if
men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those
intrusted therewith.[25]
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an
applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends
concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as
the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.[26]
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,[27] for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election
propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged
provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The
prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case,
however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of recruitment and placement that would
render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause[28] in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,
remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana
while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.[29] Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.[30]
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
[31] Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws.[32] The unlawful administration by officers of a statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to
be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or
person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.[33] Appellant has failed to show that, in
charging appellant in court, that there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecutions sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense.[34] The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,[35] and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellants prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission
of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for
unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be
extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of
a crime.[36]
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result
would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.[37]
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.[38] In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[39]
In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage
in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the
briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses were incited by any motive to
testify falsely against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain
that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[40]
Appellants denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the
fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony.[41]
That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not; it suffices that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into the second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of
appellants arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto
and the articles so seized are rendered inadmissible in evidence.[42] Here, even if the documents seized were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would
stand in view of Araneta and Modestos testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecutions case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly planted the
application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of frame-up, like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to
prove.[43] Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at
any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[44]
Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present,
appellant, at the very least, is liable for simple illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually
or as a group.[45] In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the
complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the
offense was committed against three or more persons.[46] In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The
only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the
briefing and that they (she and her friends) filled up application forms.
The affidavit[47] Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Aranetas testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed, by
Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.[48] In any case, hearsay evidence,
such as the said affidavit, has little probative value.[49]
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994.
Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does not include
Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment
and placement of persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her.[50]
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the accused, and also to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify the accused.[51]
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her recruitment by the accused and immediately before the
recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in this case, Your Honor.[52]
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that she was instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution.[53]
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered,[54] and the purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not include
the proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it charges her with committing illegal recruitment in large scale
on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she committed the crime on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime does not vary from that charged in the information. Both
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence, appellant offered them employment for a fee.
Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime had already been committed three (3) days earlier on January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well as the constitutionality of
the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.[55]
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed
recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that recruitment be
committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of simple illegal recruitment, one for that committed against
Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to
six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that the proper imposable
penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Id., at 28.
[3] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 3-13, 26-39.
[4] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 7-14, 35-56, 82-88, 102-110.
[5] The documents seized include: Exhibit C, the application form of one Josilyn Villa, consisting of four (4) pages; Exhibit D, the application form of one
Shirley Estrada, consisting of nine (9) pages; Exhibit E, the application form of one Cora Iglesia, with an annex of nine (9) pages; Exhibit F, the application
form of Jocelyn Santos. Exhibit G, the application form of Jennifer Alejandro; Exhibit H, the application form of one Geraldine Reyes; Exhibit I, the
application form of Lilibeth Estrada, consisting of six (6) pages; Exhibit J, is the application form of Geraldine Sunga; Exhibit K, is the diploma of Shirley
Estrada, together with a photocopy of her passport; Exhibit L, a certification that Jasmine Alejandro rendered services as Staff Nurse with the Camp
Navarro General Hospital.
[6] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 88-101, 110-124.
[7] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 28-34.
[8] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 18-19; TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 18.
[9] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 21-22.
[10] Exhibit A.
[11] Exhibits M and N. Araneta and Baez executed a Joint Affidavit.
[12] TSN, August 15, 1994, pp. 4-18.
[13] Id., at 21-35.
[14] TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 5-39.
[15] TSN, September 28, 1994, pp. 4-8.
[16] TSN, October 13, 1994, pp. 2-7.
[17] Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 24.
[18] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 1-4.
[19] Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
[20] Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 70 L Ed 322 46 S Ct 126 (1926).
[21] Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US 379, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675 (1979).
[22] American Communications Asso. v. Douds, 339 US 382, 94 L Ed 925, 70 S Ct 674 (1950).
[23] 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
[24] 142 SCRA 664 (1986).
[25] People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).
[26] Wright vs. Georgia, 373 US 284, 10 L Ed 2d 349, 83 S Ct 1240 (1963).
[27] 207 SCRA 712 (1992).
[28] Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
[29] American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 US 637, 48 L Ed 2d 263, 96 S Ct 1800 (1976).
[30] Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L Ed 1012, 18 S Ct 583 (1886), cited in Genaro Reyes Construction, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 16
(1994).
[31] Application of Finn, 356 P.2d 685 (1960).
[32] Snowden v. Hughes, 321 US 1, 88 L Ed 497, 64 S Ct 397 (1943).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 292 SCRA 452 (1998).
[35] Rules Of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 (m).
[36] People v. Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).
[37] State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 (1958).
[38] Abaca vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 657 (1998); Darvin vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 534 (1998); People vs. Juego, 298 SCRA 22 (1998).
[39] People vs. Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319 (1998); People vs. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 92 (1998); People vs. Sanchez, 291 SCRA 333 (1998); People vs. Saley,
291 SCRA 715 (1998); People vs. Ganaden, 299 SCRA 433 (1998).
[40] People vs. Badozo, 215 SCRA 33 (1992).
[41] People vs. Santos, 276 SCRA 329 (1997).
[42] E.g., Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
[43] Espano vs. Court of Appeals, supra; People vs. Alegro, 275 SCRA 216 (1997).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the
State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot
tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to
withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness
of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for
non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of
fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright
collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1]
as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by
the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for
violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and
3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably,
the grounds raised were only lack of prelimin