1. v.

G.R. No.
Date
Topic:
Petitioners:
Respondents:
Ponente:
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
●

ISSUE/S
●

HELD:

1
 1. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. Camposano
G.R. No. 157684 Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298
April 27, 2005 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case
Topic: Administrative due process filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to
Petitioners: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC).
Respondents: PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, Consequently, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH.
and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J. I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and
DOCTRINE: Administrative due process requires that, prior to guidance, a certified copy of Administrative Order No. 298
imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make dated October 25, 1996 entitled 'CREATING AN AD HOC
an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH DIRECTOR
its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND
and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.
the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed
of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal After the investigation, it issued a resolution finding respondents guilty
intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in as charged. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 390 dismissing the
a democracy. respondents from service as recommended by the PCAGC in their
resolution. Subsequently, respondents filed a motion for
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) reconsideration of said order, but the Secretary of Health denied the
Department Of Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) same. Thus, respondents filed a notice of appeal.

FACTS: Respondents and Cabrera filed their separate appeal with the CSC
Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former employees which was both denied. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
of the Department Of Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR). denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabrera’s motion for
Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents,
DOH Resident Ombudsman Ringpis against Dir. Majarais, Acting however, received the resolution denying their motion for
Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and respondents, arising reconsideration on November 2001 which was promulgated on. Thus,
out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to the CA the CSC’s resolutions
of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid ahead of respondents.
capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.
'WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed
Thereafter, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby SET ASIDE.
report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal 'Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative
administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against charges against him. The Civil Service Commission is hereby
respondents and their co-respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary ORDERED:
of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA '(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights;
3019. and

2
'(2) To pay petitioner's back salaries from the time his preventive so that proper steps can be taken to correct the due-process errors
suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall not be charged pointed out in this Decision.
against his leave credits
1. YES. PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous
Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC of their appeal, respondents transaction involving respondents. Executive Order No. 151 granted
brought the matter to the CA which nonetheless used the same legal the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints
bases for annulling the CSC’s Resolution against respondents and against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and
held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that
pertain only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against
power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its Preamble,
simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary specifically in its “Whereas” clauses, the EO “specifically tasked the
of health failed to comply with administrative due process. Hence, the PCAGC to investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and
Petition. corruption” More pointedly, Section 3 states that the “Commission
shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft
ISSUE/S and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential
1. W/N Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential appointees. The Court notes, however, that respondents were not
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) did not investigated pursuant to EO 151.
have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction
involving respondents. YES "Section 3. Jurisdiction. — The Commission shall have
2. W/N Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft
investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of and corruption Gled in any form or manner against
Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a presidential appointees, including those in government-
mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of owned or controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied)
respondents from government service.
3. W/N the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an The investigation was authorized under AO No. 298, which had
exhaustive investigation was already conducted by the created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption filed against [Link] Investigating Committee was
(PCAGC) which resulted in the finding that the anomalous composed of all the members of the PCAGC. The Chief Executive’s
contract for the purchase of medicines without the required power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
public bidding is patently illegal." doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President
HELD: has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of
Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in the sense that the the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact
authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
Administrative Order 298 is SUSTAINED. Being violative of composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the
administrative due process, the May 8, 1998 and the June 5, 1998 latter in conducting the inquiry. Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum
Orders of the health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non- presidential appointees
the records of this case be REMANDED to the Department of Health, was rectified in Executive Order No. 12. which created the PAGC. Non
Presidential appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who

3
may have been involved with a presidential appointee, may now be (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
investigated by the PAGC (4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
2. The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
they are necessarily intertwined. disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the
the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary controversy and must not have simply accepted the
actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction. views of a subordinate; and
Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was issues involved.
under the jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the
"power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint." While the Chief The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been
Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth
recognized the health secretary's disciplinary authority over requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order
respondents when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them dismissing the respondents. Furthermore, The Order of Secretary
for the secretary's "appropriate action." Reodica denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration also failed
to correct the deficiency in the initial Order. She improperly relied on
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may the President’s findings in AO 390 which, however, pertain only to the
utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents.
decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary effectively To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary
delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health secretary who
should have followed the manner in which the President had rendered
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating his action on the recommendation. The President’s endorsement of
Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any the records of the case for the “appropriate action” of the health
administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
conducting investigations and preparing their findings and respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary
recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal
disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the
imposing penalties. bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal
intelligently, if they so desired. Inasmuch as the health secretary’s twin
Due process in administrative proceedings requires Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err
compliance with the following in refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGC’s or the Ad Hoc
cardinal principles: Committee’s recommendations. Such a discussion should have been
made by the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the
(1) the respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right CA. In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General
to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and, like Dr.
be observed; Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

4
the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely due
process.

In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end
does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty
imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the essence of
fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

5
 2. FLORES v. MONTEMAYOR Assets and liabilities (SSAL) in 2001-2002. Where he bought 2
G.R. No. 170146 expensive cars registered in his name.
JUNE 8 2011 The charge: Violated Sec 7 RA 2019 in relation to Sec 8 (A) of RA
Topic: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS 6713.
Petitioners: HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the PAGC
Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. (Presidential Anti-Graft Commission) –penalty of Dismissal with all
ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive accessory penalties.
Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL MR grounds: (1) Montemayor was subjected to 2
ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) administrative/criminal investigations which violated his constitutional
Respondents: ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR right against double jeopardy;(2) what Gov Agency decision should be
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J. followed, where 2 gov agencies involving the same facts and issues
DOCTRINE: affecting Montemayor; (3) Montemayor’s right to due process was
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the violated; (4) Penalties are too harsh and severe on the alleged offense
opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the committed.
action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the Montemayor Argues: (1) PAGC charge involving non-declaration in
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject of investigation by
due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the OMB along with the complaint for unexplained wealth hence
the denial of the opportunity to be heard. This Court has repeatedly PAGC can no longer pursue the case without violating the rule on
stressed that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the double jeopardy; (2) OMB as a constitutional body, pursuant to its
opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases
denial of due process. Having persisted in his refusal to file his cognizable by the SB (Sandiganbayan), as against the PAGC which
pleadings and evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly is not a constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP. Under said
claim that his right to due process was violated. law, it is the OMB who has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government, such as herein Montemayor.
The rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated
by the brevity of the decision rendered by the Office of the President ISSUES & RATIO:
(OP) incorporating the findings and conclusions of an administrative 1. WON there was a violation of the rule against DOUBLE
body, for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has JEOPARDY? NO. There’s no violation.
been satisfied Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before
a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has
OP- Office of the President been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted,
OMB- Ombudsman or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
PAGC- Presidential Anti-Graft Commission express consent of the accused. We have held that none of these
requisites applies where the OMB only conducted a preliminary
FACTS: investigation of the same criminal offense against the Montemayor
This case resolves the MR of the SC decision in Aug 25, 2010 which public officer. The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation
set aside the decision of the CA and reinstating the decision of Office does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not
of the President (March 23, 2004), which found Montemayor being part of the trial.
administratively liable for failure to declare his Sworn Statement of 3-fold Liability Rule of a Public Officer

6
The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him Montemayor argues: OMB who has primary jurisdiction over the
to civil, administrative and criminal liabilities. administrative complaint filed against him. Notwithstanding the
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan: public official or employee is under a three- consolidation of the administrative offense (non-declaration in the
fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8
A public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised Penal
liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act Code, as amended) before the Office of the OMB— This cannot be
results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held sustained.
civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. Thus, if such violation or ● The investigative authority of the OMB is defined in Section
wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may 15 of R.A. No. 6770 (see notes). However, this is not
be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated exclusive.
attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished ● It is shared with other similarly authorized government
criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial
removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil preliminary investigation on charges against public
liabilities. employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with
● Dismissal of a criminal action does not prohibit the institution the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent. Government Code in 1991, the OMB retains concurrent
Dismissal also does not carry relief from administrative jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local
liability. Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective
● Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of officials.
causes of action. ● Montemayor is a presidential appointee is under the
● OMB decision dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be disciplinary authority of the OP. EO 12 dated April 16, 2001
considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal created the PAGC which was granted the authority to
complaint, the OMB only had the power to investigate and file investigate presidential and also non-presidential employees
the appropriate case before the SB. "who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been
Montemayor v. Bundalian: dismissal of similar charges against the involved with a presidential appointee or ranking officer
accused before the OMB did not rendered the administrative case mentioned.
against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. ● So it is wrong for Montemayor to argue that PAGC should
● OMB decision did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC have deferred to OMB instead of proceeding with the
case. Res Judicata only applies in judicial and quasi-judicial administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his
proceedings and NOT in the exercise of administrative petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGC’s
powers. jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once
● As a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
by virtue of the administrative power and control of the continues until the case is terminated.
President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of ● On March 19, 2004 Montemayor was directed to submit his
petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res counter-affidavit by OMB. However, PAGC investigation had
judicata finds no application in the case at bar. long commenced and in fact, the PAGC issued an order
directing Montemayor to file his counter-affidavit/verified
2. Who has jurisdiction over the case? OMB or PAGC? answer as early as May 19, 2003. The rule is that initial
PAGC retained Jurisdiction over Administrative Case acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction

7
 divests another of its own jurisdiction. PAGC having already dismissed after the expiration of the 60-day temporary
taken cognizance of the complaint against the Montemayor restraining order issued on June 23, 2003 by the CA.
involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, the ● March 23, 2004: OP rendered its decision adopting the
PAGC thus retained jurisdiction over Montemayor’s findings of PAGC.
administrative case notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a ● 10 months passed from the order for Montemayor to file his
supplemental complaint before the OMB charging him with counter-affidavit in his administrative case. Therefore, it
the same violation. cannot be said that PAGC and OP proceeded with undue
haste in determining Montemayor’s guilt.
3. WON Right to Due Process was Violated? NO ● OP decision on March 23, 2004 was received by Montemayor
Montemayor was given several opportunities to answer the charge then he filed his petition for review with SC assailing the CA’s
against him and present evidence on his defense, which he stubbornly dismissal of his appeal. However, despite the denial of his
ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit the petition, respondent still refused to recognize PAGC’s
required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting jurisdiction and continued to assail the same before the CA in
evidence shall be construed as waiver on his part of the right to do so. CA-G.R. SP No. 84254, a petition for review under Rule 43
● As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard from the OP’s March 23, 2004 Decision and May 13, 2004
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are Resolution. In any event, respondent was served with a copy
sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the OP Decision, was able to seek reconsideration of the
of the opportunity to be heard. said decision, and appeal the same to the CA.
● Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who choose not to ● Nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated
avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against and submitting the case for resolution based on available
them cannot complain of a denial of due process.15 Having evidence upon failure of the respondent to file his counter-
persisted in his refusal to file his pleadings and evidence affidavit or answer despite giving him ample opportunity to do
before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his so. This is allowed by the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC.
right to due process was violated. The PAGC is also not required to furnish the respondent and
● In this case there was a dissenting opinion by J. Bersamin complainant copy of its resolution.
(see notes), however SC cannot adopt the reasons for the Justice Bersamin’s dissent: assails the OP’s complete reliance on the
alleged violations of due process. PAGC’s findings and recommendation which "constituted a gross
● August 26, 2003: CA already rendered a decision dismissing violation of administrative due process as set forth in Ang Tibay v.
respondent’s petition challenging the jurisdiction of the PAGC. Court of Industrial Relations “tribunal or any of its judges must act on
à MR also denied à appeal to SC via petition for certiorari also its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of
denied. the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
● SC 1st division: Jan 26, 2004, denied for failure of Montemayor arriving at a decision” thus concludes that the OP should have itself
to show that CA committed any reversible error in the assailed reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and independently
decision and resolution. Resolution became final and considered the facts and the law of the controversy."—SC disagrees
executory on April 27, 2004. Thus, at the time respondent ● Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna: this Court ruled that the rights
submitted his counter-affidavit before the Ombudsman on of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated by
May 21, 2004, there was already a final resolution of his the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating
petition challenging the PAGC’s investigative authority. the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use
● Sept 1, 2003: PAGC submitted to the OP its resolution finding Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional
respondent guilty as charged and recommending that he be requirement of due process has been satisfied.

8
● OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the ● WON dismissal is justified? YES. Penalty of dismissal from
liability of respondent who was administratively charged, in the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given
the exercise of its disciplinary authority over presidential for the non-declaration of the two expensive cars in his 2001
appointees. and 2002 SSAL.
● Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply ● Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of
to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the the law "proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be
case at bar. sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
● The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against
violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due him." Respondent’s deliberate attempt to evade the
process has been satisfied. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, see notes for mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period
cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings) covered was evident when he first claimed that the vehicles
● among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the were lumped under the entry "Machineries/Equipment" or still
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the mortgaged, and later averred that these were already sold by
record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent.
decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for
reasons for the decisions rendered."— Note that there is no reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. NOTES:
For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on
evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs RA 6770 SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the
the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
due process requirement is satisfied. (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
● Decision of the OP fully complied with both administrative due person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
Constitution. improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
● OP did not violate Montemayor’s right to due process when it cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well- agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
informed as to how the Decision of the OP was arrived at, as
well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein ANG TIBAY CASE: 1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right
because the Office of the President attached to and made an to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.
integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board 2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. 3) The decision must have something to support itself.
● Montemayor repeatedly refused to answer the administrative 4) The evidence must be substantial.
charge against him despite notice and warning by the PAGC, 5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
he submitted his evidence only after an adverse decision was hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for affected.
reconsideration.

9
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

Dissenting opinion: (1) the right of Montemayor was violated due to

the unilateral investigation by PAGC when Montemayor was not
furnished with a copy of the prejudicial PAGC investigation; (2) there
was a "rush" on the part of the PAGC to find the respondent guilty of
the charge. Manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its resolution
even without taking into consideration any explanation and refutation
of the charges that he (Montemayor) might make, and even before the
CA could finally resolve his suit to challenge the PAGC’s jurisdiction
to investigate him; (3) non-submission by respondent of his counter-
affidavit or verified answer as directed by the PAGC should not be
taken against him. Respondent’s refusal was "not motivated by bad
faith, considering his firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction to
administratively or disciplinarily investigate him."

10
· ● Atty. Acuña and Pizarro also discovered three (3) real
4. IGLESIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN properties in Pangasinan under Iglesias' name that were not
G.R. No. 180745 declared in her SALNs. They further asserted that Iglesias
August 30, 2017 acquired several real and personal properties from 1999 to
2002 amounting to P15,230,000.00, which was
Topic: Administrative due process disproportionate to her lawful source of income. They
Petitioners: ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS contended that the several of her properties were unlawfully
Respondents: THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GEORGE M. acquired.
JEREOS, ROBERTO G. GEOTINA, JUAN T. TAN, KRISTINE ● Finally, Atty. Acuña and Pizarro averred that Iglesias made
false representations when she declared in her letter to then
MORALES, AND ALBERTO LINA
President Gloria Macapagat-Arroyo that she was taking up
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
Masters in Customs Administration, instead of Masters in
Management. They also alleged that Iglesias falsified her
DOCTRINE: In observing administrative due process, it is essential Personal Data Sheet when she antedated its execution.
that the accused be accorded the right to be informed of the ● They charged Iglesias with the following:
accusations against him or her. Fair play requires that the accused be
equipped with the necessary information for the preparation of his or a) Making untruthful statements in her SAL[N]s and failing to
her defense. disclose all of her properties in her SALNs;
b) Failing to submit her SALNs;
FACTS: c) Engaging in acts of dishonesty and misconduct by making
● Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector false representations about her education to Her Excellency,
by the Bureau of Customs on October 1, 2002. She was Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and by indicating a false date on her
assigned at the Port of San Fernando, La Union by Personal Data Sheet; and
Commissioner Antonio Bernardo. d) Acquiring, during her incumbency an amount of property
● On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance, through and/or money manifestly out of proportion to her salary and to
Atty. Leon L. Acuña (Atty. Acuña) and Troy Francis C. Pizarro her other lawful income; and
(Pizarro), filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Iglesias before e) Concealing unlawfully acquired property.
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Acuña and Pizarro
claimed that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of Assets, ● The administrative case was docketed as OMB-L-A-04-0057-
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to the year 2000. B, while the criminal case was docketed as OMB-L-C-04-
● They also alleged that Iglesias made false entries in her 2000, 0083-B.
2001, and 2002 SALNs with respect to two (2) real properties ● On April 12, 2004, Iglesias filed her Counter-Affidavit with
in Quezon City and Pangasinan. The Quezon City property's Counter- Complaint in the administrative case. She produced
tax declarations revealed that Iglesias purchased the property copies of her filed annual SALNs since 1989 and attached
on August 1, 1996 from the spouses Rosario and Elpidio them to her Counter-Affldavit.
Ablang. Likewise, the Pangasinan property's Transfer ● Iglesias countered that she did not falsify the mode of
Certificate of Title was issued by virtue of a deed of sale acquisition of the Pangasinan and Quezon City properties in
showing that she purchased a portion of this property from her SALNs. Iglesias and her sister, Rosario de Joya-Ablang
Marina Lopez de Joya (Marina). However, in her SALNs, (Rosario), inherited the Quezon City property from their
Iglesias indicated that these properties were acquired through parents. She "merely bought out her sister's share of their joint
inheritance.

11
 inherited property[.]" Regarding the Pangasinan property, ● On August 27, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Iglesias reasoned that she acquired the property through Luzon issued an Order requiring the parties to present their
purchase and donation when her mother, Marina, sold it to her arguments in their respective position papers. Iglesias
for an amount well below its true value. submitted her position paper on September 20, 2004
● Iglesias explained that she did not declare the three (3) reiterating her arguments. The Department of Finance
Pangasinan properties because these were classified as submitted its position paper on October 5, 2004 and disclosed
public lands and the Department of Environment and Natural new information regarding the business interest of Iglesias in
Resources had yet to award the properties to her. She Golden Grove Realty and Development Corporation. Its
contended that she was merely considered an applicant for position paper also included records of cases filed against
the grant of the public lands. lglesias.
● On the alleged illegally acquired properties, Iglesias disclosed ● On October 12, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecution
that she acquired these properties either by purchase or Officer I Robert C. Reñido (Prosecution Officer Reñido) of the
inheritance. She obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint
Philippine National Bank to buy out Rosario's share and to Resolution resolving the administrative and criminal cases.
purchase the Novaliches and Baguio properties. She also Prosecution Officer Reñido considered Iglesias' Counter-
sold a property in Baguio to purchase the Parañaque Affidavit in the administrative cae as her counter-affidavit in
property. To pay her obligations, she leased her Quezon City the criminal case "[f]or purposes of exigency and in the
property from July 15, 2000 to January 2004. She acquired interest of justice and due process."
another loan of P2,000,000.00 from Philippine National Bank- ● Prosecution Officer Reñido found that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro
Dagupan Branch to start her trucking business. did not conduct an intensive investigation before they filed the
● Iglesias asserted that the foreclosure of the Quezon City complaint against Iglesias, who was able to submit authentic
property for non-payment of her loan "belies the false copies of her filed SALNs from 1989 to 1999.
accusation . . . that [she] is a corrupt government official[.]" ● He gave merit to Iglesias' explanation that the Quezon City
● Iglesias argued that her educational attainment was correctly and Pangasinan properties were part of her inheritance from
stated in her resume. She initially took up a master's degree her parents Since Iglesias inherited a great portion of the
in Customs Administration but was not able to finish the Quezon City property from her parent, she did not err in
degree and eventually shifted to Management. Lastly, the declaring the property as acquired through inheritance.
false date on her Personal Data Sheet was a typographical Meanwhile, the Pangasinan property was intended to be
error. donated to Iglesias by her mother. They relied on the
● She claimed that the allegations against her were false and credibility of the lawyer who made a deed of sale instead of a
baseless and that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro should be held deed of donation to facilitate the transaction.
"criminally liable for malicious prosecution" and "for making ● Prosecution Officer Reñido held that Iglesias was correct in
untruthful statements under oath in their Complaint-Affidavit." not declaring the three (3) Pangasinan properties in her
● Iglesias filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter SALNs, as she had not yet acquired them, On thalleged
-Affidavit in the criminal case. However, she was still unable illegally acquired properties, he stated that Iglesias "was able
to file her counter-affidavit. to shed light on how she was able to lawfully acquire [these]
● On April 15, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for assets."
Luzon issued an Order in connection with the administrative ● On the allegation that Iglesias falsified her educational
case, preventively suspending Iglesias for six (6) months attainment, Prosecution Officer Reñido ruled that Iglesias had
while the investigation was on-going. sufficiently proven that she shifted to Management upon

12
 learning that the Civil Service Commission did not require a ● As for Iglesias' allegation of leasing her Quezon City property
specific genre of a master's degree. He also found that the and starting a trucking business, Ombudsman Marcelo stated
alleged falsification of Iglesias' Personal Data Sheet was a that there was no evidence presented to support her claims.
mere typographical error. She also failed to declare the alleged trucking business in her
● Prosecution Officer Reñido recommended the dismissal of SALN.
both cases. Likewise, he recommended that the preventive ● Ombudsman Marcelo held that the acts of Iglesias constitute
suspension be lifted upon the Joint Resolution's approval. dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal
● Director Emilio A. Gonzalez III of the Office of the Deputy from service under Rule IV, Section 52(A) of the Uniform
Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution. Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in relation
However, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez to Book V, Sections 9 and 22 of the Administrative Code of
recommended its disapproval. 1987.
● On February 7, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a ● The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
Resolution reviewing the October 12, 2004 Joint Resolution.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) held WHEREFORE, the 12 October 2004 Joint Resolution is
that Iglesias failed to justify the substantial increase in her net DISAPPROVED. Respondent ALBERTA DE JOYA-
worth. In just one (1) year, her net worth as declared in her IGLESIAS is hereby found guilty of the administrative offense
SALN increased from P245,000.00 in 1989 to P1,685,000.00 of DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Thus, she is
in 1990. ordered DISMISSED from the service, with cancellation of
● Ombudsman Marcelo discovered that Iglesias' cash eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
declaration escalated from P250,000.00 in her 1991 SALN to and disqualification for reemployment in the government
P1,770,000.00 in her 1992 SALN. She also acquired the service.
Baguio, Parañaque, and Novaliches properties from 1994 to
2000. Moreover, sufficient probable cause exists to hold respondent
● In examining Iglesias' SALNs, Ombudsman Marcelo found ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS liable for violation of Art. 171
that she obtained housing loans of P14,000,000.00 in 1994, (Falsification) and Art. 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal
P26,000,000.00 in 1998, and P29,000,000.00 in 1999.58 Code. Let the Informations charging her with the said offenses
Since the housing loans were not supported by evidence, be forthwith filed against her before the appropriate court.
Ombudsman Marcelo considered them "spurious or non-
existent, meant only to cover up the rapidly increasing assets Additionally, let a Petition for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
of [Iglesias]." Properties be filed before the proper court against respondent
● According to Ombudsman Marcelo, Iglesias also falsified her in view of the herein found accumulation of unexplained
Personal Data Sheet "when she denied having any criminal wealth.
charges ever filed against her . . . despite evidence to the
contrary." Iglesias had two (2) pending estafa cases and three The Field Investigation Office (FIO) is hereby ordered to
(3) dismissed cases before the lower courts, as stated in the investigate the matter regarding the false valuation made on
National Bureau of Investigation's May 22, 2001 Certification. the Deed of Sale covering the Pampanga property transferred
She likewise committed falsification when she did not declare in favor of respondent and secure the necessary documentary
the true value of the Pampanga property and reported its evidence for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint for
worth at only P50,000.00. Falsification against her.

13
 SO ORDERED. ● Petitioner alleges that respondent Tan took her place as
Acting District Collector during her preventive suspension.
● Iglesias moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the However, after the termination of her six (6)-month
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in its February 21, suspension, she was not automatically reinstated to her
2005 Joint Order. position and respondent Tan was confirmed as Acting District
● Iglesias appealed the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the Collector. Petitioner claims that she was demoted as Deputy
Office of the Ombudsman and the February 21, 2005 Joint Collector for Operations without due process.
Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ● Petitioner asserts that respondents Commissioner Jereos and
before the Court of Appeals. Deputy Commissioner Geotina immediately implemented the
● Iglesias argued that she was denied administrative due dismissal order while her motion for reconsideration of the
process. She claimed that there was a failure to meet the February 7, 2005 Resolution was still pending before the
substantial evidence requirement in administrative Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Thus,
proceedings. Further, she asserted that her defense of denial respondent Morales immediately withheld her salary and
and the presence of mitigating circumstances should have other benefits. Respondent Commissioner Lina was included
been considered by the Office of the Ombudsman and the as a nominal party-respondent.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. ● Petitioner prays that the December 22, 2006 Decision and
● In its December 22, 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals November 21, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals be
affirmed the assailed February 7, 2005 Resolution and nullified and set aside. Petitioner likewise prayed that
February 21, 2005 Joint Order. It held that there was no denial judgment be rendered absolving her of any criminal and
of due process since Iglesias was able to explain her side in administrative liability and reinstating her to her former
her Counter-Affidavit and her Motion for Reconsideration of position as Acting District Collector at the Port of San
the February 7, 2005 Resolution. Femando.
● The Court of Appeals declared that the assailed Resolution
and Joint Order rest on substantial evidence; hence, the ISSUE: WON Iglesias was denied administrative due process.
Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Deputy NO.
Ombudsman for Luzon did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion. It added that Iglesias' defense of denial and the HELD:
alleged mitigating circumstances were bereft of merit.
● Iglesias moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the ● Petitioner argues that she was not given an opportunity to
Court of Appeals in its November 21, 2007 Resolution. refute the new accusations and charges against her which
● Hence, on January 17, 2008, Iglesias filed this Petition for were not stated in the Complaint-Affidavit. Her filing of a
Review with an application for temporary restraining order Motion for Reconsideration did "not address the fact that she
against the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of was never informed of the true allegations against her." Thus,
Finance officers, namely, Commissioner George M. Jereos she claims that "her right to be informed of the accusations
(Commissioner Jereos), Deputy Commissioner Roberto G. against her and to be afforded with due process of law has
Geotina (Deputy Commissioner Geotina), Acting Collector been violated."
Juan T. Tan (Tan), Acting Disbursement Officer Kristine ● On April 25, 2000, respondents officers of the Department of
Morales (Morales), and Commissioner Alberto Lina Finance, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
(Commissioner Lina) (collectively, respondents). Comment and prayed for the denial of the Petition. They
assert that petitioner was properly informed of the charges

14
 against her. Moreover, her right to due process was not ● On July 8, 2009, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the
violated since she was given enough opportunity to counter parties to submit their respective memoranda. Petitioner filed
the allegations: her Memorandum on September 18, 2009, while respondent
Office of the Ombudsman filed its Memorandum on October
In this case, petitioner was able to file her Counter-Affidavit 1, 2009. Both parties reiterated their arguments in their earlier
dated April 6, 2004 in OMB-L-A-04-0057-B. She was likewise pleadings. Respondents officers of the Department of Finance
given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit in OMB-L-C- failed to file their memorandum.
04-0083-B but she failed to do so despite her having filed a ● On September 30, 2010, petitioner also filed a Supplement to
Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit dated the Supplemental Memorandum.
March 19, 2004. Based on the Comment dated September ● On October 17, 2011, petitioner again filed a Supplemental
21, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner even Memorandum. She stated that Branch 45, Metropolitan Trial
filed a Motion for Early Resolution and Lifting of Preventive Court of Pasay City issued a Joint Decision acquitting her of
Suspension, and a Position Paper. Moreover, she likewise three (3) counts of perjury in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1160, 05-
filed her Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14, 2005. 1161, and 05-1162. The perjury cases alleged that petitioner
made untruthful statements in connection with three (3) real
Clearly, petitioner was given an opportunity to explain her side properties on her December 31, 2000 SALN. Petitioner
and she moved for reconsideration of the challenged contends that since she was able to counter the anomalies in
Resolution dated February 7, 2005. She was never denied her her statements, she "should only be held liable for simple
right to due process. neglect of duty."
● On January 21, 2015, petitioner filed her last Supplemental
● On May 5, 2008, respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed Memorandum. Petitioner informed this Com1 that the other
its Comment and likewise prayed for the denial of the Petition. falsification and perjury cases related to the present case
It argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling "that were dismissed by the trial courts.
petitioner was afforded due process by the Office of the ● This Court resolves the main issue of whether or not petitioner
Ombudsman and [that] the questioned resolutions were was denied of administrative due process when the
supported by substantial evidence and based on the records Resolution dismissing her appeal was based on allegations
and evidence at hand." that were not contained in the Complaint. Resolving this main
● The Office of the Ombudsman counters that petitioner was not issue will pass on the issues of whether or not petitioner was
denied due process since "petitioner had the opportunity to denied of her right to be informed of the charges against her
present her side, submit countervailing evidence to refute the and whether or not petitioner was denied of her right to due
Department of Finance's claims and even move for a process. Since these issues are interrelated, they will be
reconsideration of the decision." Further, it asserts that addressed jointly.
"petitioner was sufficiently informed of the charges against her ● Petitioner's contention has no merit.
as shown in her Counter-Affidavit, Motion for Early Resolution ● Administrative due process demands that the party being
and Lifting of Preventive Suspension, Position Paper and the charged is given an opportunity to be heard. Due process is
assailed Resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman." complied with "if the party who is properly notified of
● On May 14, 2008, petitioner filed her Reply and reiterated that allegations against him or her is given an opportunity to
she was denied due process since she was not informed of defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such
the offenses charged against her. defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own
independent conclusions."

15
● In F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: "Respondent's 1991 and 1992 SALN likewise reflected the
meteoric rise of her assets. From the declared cash of
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the P250,000.00 in 1991, the same soared high to the amount of
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or P1,770,000.00 which was not sufficiently justified or explained
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of by her income from the government, or her reported total new
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so loans of P610,000.00, consisting of jewelry loan in the amount
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the of P110,000.00 and an agricultural loan in the amount of
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due P500,000.00.
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an "Apart from the properties in New Manila, Quezon City, and
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling Pampanga which respondent justified as to have been
complained of. inherited by her from her parents, respondent is likewise the
owner of several properties located in Baguio City, Parañaque
● An important component of due process is the right of the City, and Novaliches, Quezon City, which she acquired
accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against beginning 1994 to 2000."
him or her. A proper appraisal of the accusations would give
the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his or ● Considering the above, this Court finds that there was a
her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be violation of due process with respect to the other charges
undermined. which were not in the original complaint. This Court sternly
● In this case, petitioner insists that the February 7, 2005 reminds the Ombudsman that he cannot add new findings
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was based on which were not part of the original complaint. To do so would
new accusations that were not included in the Complaint violate the right of the accused to due process.
Affidavit filed by Atty. Acuña and Pizarro. She anchors her ● However, there were charges in the original complaint which
argument on the findings of the Ombudsman: should prosper. A reading of the Office of the Ombudsman
Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from service not
"In her first year in the government service, respondent solely on the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs
reported a net worth of P245,000.00 in her 1989 SALN, which but also because of anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002
swiftly grew to P1,685,000.00 during her second year (1990 SALNs, which she was informed of and was given the
SALN). The additional P1,440,000.00 accumulated by opportunity to refute. Petitioner conveniently left out in her
respondent is a 60% jump from her 1989 net worth. During pleadings the other findings of the Office of the Ombudsman.
that same period, respondent was able to purchase a property ● Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999
in Paco, Manila, in the amount of P800,000.00, acquired SALNs were disregarded, petitioner would still be liable for the
additional jewelry worth P250,000.00, and maintained cash in discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002 [Link]
the bank in the amount of P400,000.00. This sudden upsurge discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit and were
in respondent's net worth, within the short period of one (1) given clarification by petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit and
year, is unjustified considering that she had no other Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move for
employment, business activity or financial interests from reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman February 7,
which the acquisitions can be funded other than her 2005 Resolution. These circumstances preclude petitioner
employment in the Bureau of Customs. from claiming that she was denied her right to due process.

16
 ● On a final note, this Court endeavors to strike a balance
between the accountability of public officers as a result of
public office being a privilege, on the one hand, and their right
to privacy as protected in the Bill of Rights, on the other.
Although this Court has held that the requirement of
submitting a SALN does not violate the right to privacy of
public officers, it does not mean that they should completely
shed this right. Therefore, minor or explainable errors in the
SALN, which cannot be related to an attempt to conceal illicit
activities should not be punishable. This Court may relax the
rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where minor
errors were committed since these may simply be used to
harass and obstruct public officers in the performance of their
duties. However, the errors in this case were so substantial
and glaring that they should not escape prosecution.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 22, 2006 and the

Resolution dated November 1, 4007 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 89585 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias is GUILTY of DISHONESTY and

GRAVE MISCONDUCT based on the anomalies found in her 2000 to
2002 Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Thus, she is
DISMISSED from service, which includes the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government
service.

Accordingly, the criminal case against petitioner Alberta de Joya

Iglesias shall proceed on the basis of the anomalies found in her 2000
to 2002 Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.

This is without prejudice to other administrative and criminal charges

that may be filed against her.

17
 5. Republic of the Philippines v. Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc. of Brgy. Signal Village and generally not available for
G.R. No. 143135 government projects. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration
April 4, 2003 of this resolution, but COSLAP denied its motion in an order 5
Topic: Quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) power dated September 4, 1998.
Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc. ● Petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under
Ponente: Quisumbing, J. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It dismissed it
DOCTRINE: Cases from Quasi-judicial agencies are to be appealed in a decision promulgated on March 15, 2000, for being the
to the Court of Appeals. This is in accordance with Rule 43 of the 1997 wrong mode of appeal, thus:
Rules of Civil Procedure and with jurisprudence ○ Both Executive Order No. 561, Creating the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,
FACTS: and the Rules of Procedure adopted and promulgated
● Petitioner assails the decision of the CA dated March 15, by COSLAP explicitly provides that the mode of
2000, which denied for allegedly being a wrong remedy the appeal from the final order, decision or resolution of
petition for review filed by petitioner disputing a resolution of the Commission shall be appealable by certiorari only
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems to the Supreme Court.
(COSLAP). In that resolution, COSLAP declared the area ○ Thus, under par. 4, Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,
subject of the present controversy as part of Barangay Signal an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the
Village, and not part of government land as claimed by Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode
petitioner for one of its housing projects. shall be dismissed.

● Respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc. is a registered non- ● Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
stock, non-profit corporation existing under Philippine laws. Its
members are residents of Purok 14, Zone 3B, Signal Village, ISSUE/S
Taguig, Metro Manila. They are claiming an area that forms ● To which court should the decision of the COSLAP be
part of a vast tract of land segregated from Fort Bonifacio appealed? =To the Court of Appeals
which was declared open for disposition by Presidential
proclamation. HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
● Petitioner is represented herein by the Armed Forces of the Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2000, denying the petition in CA-
Philippines Housing Administration (AFPHA), an G.R. SP No. 49274, and its resolution dated May 9, 2000, denying the
unincorporated office within the Armed Forces of the motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is
Philippines (AFP), organized pursuant to GHO General Order hereby ordered to take cognizance of the petition for review filed by
No. 91 dated February 27, 1979. petitioner Republic of the Philippines for resolution without further
delay. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED
● Respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., filed a complaint
before the COSLAP, alleging that petitioner herein had ● This issue is no longer pristine. In Henry Sy v. Commission on
encroached upon an area comprising 10,600 square meters Settlement of Land Problems and Femina Mina (September
of Lot 1, SWO-13-00258, in Barangay Signal Village. After 12, 2001) The SC has ruled squarely on that question.
due hearing, the COSLAP rendered a resolution declaring, ○ Private respondent Mina had bought parcels of land
among others, some 98,207 sqm.s of the contested lot as part that she discovered were occupied by entities

18
 claiming to be owners thereof, including the mall ○ Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of
called SM Fairview. She filed a complaint before the appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this
COSLAP, which in turn summoned Henry Sy as case is an act of creating a new right of appeal
manager of SM Fairview. The latter's counsel, because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer
through a "Special Appearance," moved to dismiss appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can
denied, prompting Sy to file before this Court a we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of because the parties have still a remedy and still a
the Rules of Court, based on Section 3 (2) of EO No. competent tribunal to administer that remedy.
561, the law creating COSLAP. ○ Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to
● As held in Sy v. Commission, aforecited, the appeal from the another, are procedural and remedial merely and
orders, resolutions or decisions of COSLAP shall be taken to that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending
the CA, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case
○ It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly,
may not be brought directly before us in view of Rule even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi,
45, Section 1. Likewise, if a petition for certiorari the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to
under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the Court of the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of
the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it ● In other words, all appeals from orders, resolutions or
cannot be doubted that the COSLAP is among those decisions of public respondent (COSLAP) shall be taken
quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the
functions. No convincing reason exists why appeals 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
from the COSLAP should be treated differently from
other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders, ● Accordingly, The appellate court erred in its assailed decision
resolutions or decision are directly appealable to the dismissing the petition by herein petitioner against respondent
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc. Petitioner properly brought its
Civil Procedure. Moreover, the enumeration of the petition to the Court of Appeals seeking a review of a
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. In that resolution of COSLAP as a quasi-judicial agency.
sense, Section 3 (2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that
the COSLAP's orders, resolutions or decisions are
appealable exclusively to this Court is erroneous in
the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

● As with other administrative agencies discharging quasi-

judicial functions, recourse must first be had through the CA.
There is nothing novel or objectionable to this, for as
emphasized in Fabian,

19
 6. Phillips Seafood v. BOI ground of lack of jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22
G.R. No. September 2004. The Office of the President likewise
Date denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an
Topic: Administrative Appeal and Review Order dated 14 March 2005.
Petitioners: Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation ○ On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review
Respondents: Board of Investments before the Court of Appeals, questioning the
Ponente: Tinga, J. dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the
DOCTRINE: President. The petition argued that the executive
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right - it power of control over the acts of officials under the
is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available Office of the President is superior to the appellate
only if granted or provided by statute. It may be exercised only in the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions of
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the quasi-judicial agencies under the 1997 Rules of Civil
law. Procedure
... "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of ○ After respondent BOI filed its comment on the
the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees petition, petitioner filed an omnibus motion asking for
of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve leave to file an amended petition to counter the issues
of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by raised in the comment for the first time and to
law, or by judicial decisions. suspend the period for filing a reply.
FACTS: ○ On 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the
● Phillips Seafood is a domestic corporation engaged in the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s omnibus
export of processed crabmeat and seafood products. motion and dismissing its petition for review. The
● Petitioner was granted an Income Tax Holiday (ITH) for six (6) appellate court denied petitioner’s omnibus motion on
years beginning July 1993 to July 1999 for locating in a less- the ground that the same was filed with intent to delay
developed area in accordance with Article 40 of Executive the case.
Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as The Omnibus ○ Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the
Investments Code of 1987. petition for review for having been filed out of time as
● After buying up failed affiliate Phillips Seafood (Phils.) Inc. and petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the
learning that its ITH will be extended to 12 August 2000, the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the
following happened: Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. On
○ In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI 24 November 2006, the Court of Appeals issued the
informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted second assailed resolution denying petitioner’s
would be applicable only to the period from 13 August motion for reconsideration.
1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioner’s
transfer to a "not less-developed area." Petitioner ISSUE/S
wrote respondent BOI requesting for a ● WoN appeal should have been made to the Office of the
reconsideration of its decision. President or to the Court of Appeals - Court of Appeals
○ On 03 May 2004, petitioner received by fax BOI’s
letter denying its motion for reconsideration. HELD:
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the ● In the main, petitioner argues that the review by the Office of
President, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the the President of the decisions of respondent BOI must be

20
 allowed; otherwise, the President’s constitutional power to ● Art. 50. Cause for Cancellation of Certificate of Authority or
review the decisions of department secretaries will be Payment of Fine. — A violation of any of the requirements set
rendered illusory if said decisions may be reviewed only by forth in Article 49 of the terms and conditions which the Board
the Court of Appeals. may impose shall be sufficient cause to cancel the certificate
● The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent of authority issued pursuant to this Book and/or subject firms
right – it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, to the payment of fines in accordance with the rules and
therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. It regulations issued by the Board: x x x Provided, further, That
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in where the issuance of said license has been irregular or
accordance with, the provisions of the law. Thus, in contrary to law, any person adversely affected thereby may
determining the appellate procedure governing administrative file an action with the Regional Trial Court where said alien or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or regulatory functions such foreign business organization resides or has its principal office
as respondent BOI, a perusal of the legislative enactments to cancel said license. In such cases, no injunction shall issue
creating them is imperative. without notice and hearing; and appeals and other
● E.O. No. 226 also provides for various remedies from the proceedings for review shall be filed directly with the
action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the Supreme Court.
controversy. These remedies, which are interspersed among ● Art. 82. Judicial Relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board
the provisions of E.O. No. 226, are as follows: in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall
● Art. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board. — The Board shall be immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or
responsible for the regulation and promotion of investments in decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall
the Philippines. x x x The presence of four (4) governors shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall
constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of four (4) be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
governors in a meeting validly held shall be necessary to days from receipt of the order or decision. [Emphasis
exercise its powers and perform its duties, which shall be as supplied]
follows: ● This means that there are indeed two avenues for appeal.
○ (4) After due hearing, decide controversies However, appeal to the President is only for two instances:
concerning the implementation of the relevant books first, in the decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning
of this Code that may arise between registered the implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226
enterprises or investors therein and government that may arise between registered enterprises or investors
agencies, within thirty (30) days after the controversy and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an
has been submitted for decision: Provided, That the action of the BOI over applications for registration under the
investor or the registered enterprise may appeal investment priorities plan under Article 36.
the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days ● Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the catch-all provision allowing the
from receipt thereof to the President; appeal to the courts from all other decisions of respondent
● Art. 36. Appeal from Board’s Decision. — Any order or BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226. The
decision of the Board shall be final and executory after thirty intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate
(30) days from its promulgation. Within the said period of judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI, save in
thirty (30) days, said order or decision may be appealed cases mentioned under Articles 7 and 36.
to the Office of the President. Where an appeal has been ● In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of
filed, said order or decision shall be final and executory ninety the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes
(90) days after the perfection of the appeal, unless reversed. respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose

21
 judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of making power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the
Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from Court pursuant to
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now ● Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in the procedure in all courts.
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi- ● Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly
judicial agencies. recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office
● Petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of of the President from the decisions of executive departments
Appeals the denial by respondent BOI of its application for an and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order
ITH. From the letter dated 09 October 2003 of respondent issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
BOI, which informed petitioner that its ITH would be extended the Office of the President when there is a special law that
only from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999, petitioner provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case,
appealed to the Office of the President, a recourse that is not the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly
sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH.
E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over
A further contention on the alleged absolutism of the ability of the A.O. No. 18.
President to review acts of department secretaries: ● WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
● Petitioner further contends that from the decision of DENIED and the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 24
respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the President should May 2006 and 24 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89327
be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
President to review acts of department secretaries will be
rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.
● The executive power of control over the acts of department
secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the
"power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter."
● Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the
structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and
supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It
may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate
procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in
nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court’s rule-

22
 7. National Housing Authority v. Almeida mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz, protested
G.R. No. 162784 the application.
June 22, 2007 ● NHA: Granted the application made by Francisca.
Topic: Quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) power ● On appeal by Almeida, the OP affirmed the NHA Resolution.
Petitioners: National Housing Authority ● February 1, 1987: Francisca died. Her heirs executed an
Respondents: Segunda Almeida, CA, and RTC of San Pedro, extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the
Laguna NHA.
Ponente: Puno ● NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of
DOCTRINE: Francisca. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca directed Almeida to
leave the premises that she was occupying.
FACTS: ● Feeling aggrieved, private respondent Almeida sought the
● June 28, 1959: The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca.
to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of She filed a Complaint for Nullification of Government Lot’s
the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. Award with the RTC of San Pedro.
● By virtue of RA 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the DAR. In ● RTC: Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
1975, by virtue of PD 757, DAR was succeeded by the NHA. ● CA: Reversed the RTC and held that the RTC had jurisdiction to
Thus, NHA is the petitioner in this case. hear and decide the case involving title and possession to real
● The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: property within its jurisdiction. The case was then remanded for
Beatriz and Francisca. Beatriz predeceased her mother and left further proceedings on the merits.
heirs. ● RTC (upon remand): Set aside the resolution of the NHA and the
● Margarita passed away on Oct 25, 1971. OP awarding the lots in favor of Francisca.
● Francisca, the remaining child of the late Margarita executed a ○ It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA void. The
Deed of Self-Adjudication (Deed) claiming that she is the only RD of Laguna was ordered to cancel the TCT issued.
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the ○ The Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an assignment of
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of rights but a disposition of a property which shall take
Margarita. effect upon death. Thus, it must first be submitted to
● The Deed was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly probate.
executed by Margarita Herrera. ● CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
○ “5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na ● Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay
ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman ISSUE:
sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang 1. (Relevant) Whether the resolution of the NHA and the decision of
loteng nasasabi sa unahan.” the OP have attained finality, and if so, whether or not the principle of
● The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of administrative res judicata bars the court from further determining who
the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the CFI of Laguna. between the parties has preferential rights for award of the subject
● CFI: Rendered the deed null and void. lots.
● During the trial on the merits of the case, Francisca filed an 2. Whether the award of the subject lots was arbitrary.
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting
therewith a copy of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” executed by her RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the respondents.
1.

23
● Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court ● Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the
● But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting of the Government." Courts have an expanded role under the
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the
general judicial powers... It has been declared that whenever grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to
final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the check whether the other branches of government committed an
property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion
Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
may be pleaded as res judicata."
● To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the 2. Yes.
doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to ● When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered
decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts the estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to stand in
without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera
to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.
conferred. ● Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263
● In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, the (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the
Court held that the rule prescribing that "administrative orders deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there
cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent
statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi- who may claim the property after a testate or intestate
judicial agencies. proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in
● In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will the award of the lots.
always be subject to true judicial power—that which is held by
the courts. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing
● Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of
This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No.
of public administrative officers or bodies who are required B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
● However, administrative agencies are not considered courts,
in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers
reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is
co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.

24
 ● Petitioner’s Contention in her Counter-Affidavit: I had no
participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the
8 Odchigue-Bondoc. V. Tan Tiong Bio (Henry Tan) Complaint-Affidavit. As a Corporate Secretary, I have never
G.R. No 186652. been involved in the management and day-to-day operations
Oct. 6 2010 of [Fil-Estate]
Topic: Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate-fixing powers ● [Herein respondent] alleges:
Petitioners: Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc - Corporate Secretary of ● "The letter showed that the request was approved by [herein
Fil-Estate petitioner], provided that the transfer fee was paid, and that
Respondents: Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a Henry Tan there be payment of full downpayment, with the balance
Ponente: Carpio Morales payable in two years."
DOCTRINE: ● “The handwritten approval and endorsement, however, are
not mine. I have never transacted, either directly or
A preliminary investigation partakes of an investigative or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or [herein respondent]” -Atty.
inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information Odchigue-Bondoc
on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken. ● A Complaint for Perjury was filed against Petitioner before
Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, and dismissed by it for
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public insufficiency of evidence.
prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will ● Denied the MR of Respondents
establish probable cause in filing a criminal information, courts will not ● Respondent - Petition for review to the DOJ Secretary,
interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with dismissed the petition outright finding no reversible error.
petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a ● Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
criminal complaint is dismissed or given due course ● CA: Set aside the DOJ dismissal it committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend petition for review without therein expressing clearly and
to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Since it is not a distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in
quasi-judicial body. violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.*see
notes
FACTS: ● The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of
● Respondent had fully paid the installments on a 683 sqm lot disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated, not under
in Manila Southwoods Residential Estates. Section 12 but, under Section 7 of the NPS[National
● It is a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil- Prosecution Service] Rule on Appeal which categorically
Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to directs the Secretary to dismiss outright an appeal or a
him the title covering the lot, despite repeated demands. Fil- petition for review filed after arraignment; and that under
Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he
purchase price. finds the same to be patently without merit, or manifestly
● Respondent later learned that the Lot “sold” to him did not intended for delay, or when the issues raised are too
exist and thus filed a case of estafa against Fil-Estate unsubstantial to require consideration
[Link] Petitioner Odchigue-Bondoc the Corporate ● Petitioner’s MR denied by CA
Secretary. ● Petitioner Filed Petition for review on Certiorari via rule 45 with
the SC.

25
 ● Petitioner’s arguments:
● That the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of justice" Not bound by the Constitutional Provision Sec. 14 Art. VIII
● Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,cra1aw the constitutional
provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
executive departments such as the DOJ; and that Section functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is
12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
petition for review motu proprio, and the use of the word reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to
"outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply means "altogether," prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
"entirely" or "openly." the merits and has no purpose except that of,
● Respondent claims that the constitutional requirement is not [Meaning of Preliminary Investigation] determining whether a
limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto and in Adasa v. to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
Abalosa the DOJ "muddled" the distinction between Sections
7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an "outright" While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to
dismissal is not allowed since the DOJ must set the be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
reasons why it finds no reversible error. judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor]

Balangauan v CA - In favor of Petitioner

ISSUE/S
● WON the Public Prosecutor Committed GADALEJ - NO Iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a
● WON the Public Prosecutor is bound by the provision of prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review
Section 14 Art. VIII of the CONSTI - NO cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ
● WON Sec 7 and 12 of the NPS Rules on Appeal are is not a quasi-judicial body.”
mutually exclusive - NO, it is a 2 step approach.
Respondent’s argument against Balangauan -
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is Balangauan finds no application in the present case for, as the
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 Supreme Court stated, the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its first
and January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED. resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein]
respondent’s motion for reconsideration." Respondent’s position
No Gadalej by Pub. Prosec. - Outright dismissal is allowed. fails.

When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution
does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can in resolving the therein respondent’s motion for reconsideration
decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the is immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from
appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In other words, settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the DOJ
Secretary’s review power. (Behest Loans v Desierto) & (Adasa v Ablosa) not applicable

26
Behest Loans v Desierto
SEC. 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright
Respondents citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee dismissal of a petition for review. These are (a) when the petition is
on Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the patently without merit; (b) when the petition is manifestly intended for
therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation. The delay; (c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
Ombudsman merely evaluated the complaint pursuant to Section 2, require consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman arraigned in court.
which reads:

SEC. 2. [Link] evaluating the complaint, the investigating

officer shall recommend whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to

respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office
or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the
appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred
for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.

Adasa v Ablosa

Unlike in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner has not been arraigned
as in fact no Information has been filed against her.

Notes:

[Art VIII Section 14] No decision shall be rendered by any court

without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.

[National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal]

SEC. 12. Disposition of the [Link] Secretary may reverse,

affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio
or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the
following grounds:

(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;

27
 9. Encinas v. Agustin (DILG) Act of 1990. The record is not clear as to why this Complaint
G.R No. 187317 was later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for
April 11, 2013 violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Topic: Administrative Law - Fact finding, investigative, licensing and The BFP complaint stated that Chief Inspector Encinas relieved them
rate-fixing powers from their present assignment and transferred them to a different far
Petitioners: Carlito Encinas place without any cause and due process of law based from the BFP
Respondents: PO1 Alfredo Agustin Jr and PO1 Joel Caubang Manual. The reason was due to their failure to give the money he was
Ponente: CJ. Sereno asking from them in the amount of P5,000 in exchange for their
Doctrine: present assignment to be retained.

FACTS: On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts,

respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision dated Nov 20, Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office
2008 and resolution dated March 30, 2009 issued by the CA. Affirming in Cabanatuan City, their Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO
the findings of the CSC, the CA found petitioner Carlito C. Encinas Complaint). This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section
(petitioner) administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
prejudicial to the best interest of service- offenses proscribed by for Public Officials and Employees.
Section 46(b)(4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the
Administrative Code of 1987 - and affirmed his dismissal. On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted
in connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., prejudicial to the best interest of service. He was required to file an
petitioner who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija answer within five (5) days from notice.
informed them that unless they gave him P5,000, they would be
relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far- Although it was not specifically mentioned in the records, the
flung areas. Respondent Agustin would supposedly be transferred to offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Caubang to the best interest of service can be found in Section 46(b)(1), (4) and
Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they (27), Book V, respectively, of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain record does not indicate whether petitioner was formally charged
"Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give only with violation of R.A. No. 6713.
P2,000, prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the
balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, BFP Complaint
petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents
Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively. Petitioner claimed that in an alleged Confidential Investigation Report
dated 31 July 2000, no copy of which was attached to the record, the
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with investigating body recommended that charges against him be
the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP dropped for insufficiency of evidence. Instead, it recommended that
Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized fire safety
R.A. No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government

28
inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers, both in Granting that they committed illegal acts prior to their
violation of the rules. reassignment, this allegation nevertheless did not rebut their
claims that petitioner had extorted money from them. The
The Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP issued a Resolution dated admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their
05 July 2005, recommending that the administrative complaint against reassignment did not disprove the accusation of extortion, but
petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The IAS ruled merely established that there was indeed an order to reassign
that the reassignment of respondents was within the ambit of authority them.
of the head of office. Thus, said reassignment may have been ordered ● Petitioner filed an MR. He argued that the sworn statements
as long as the exigencies of the service so required. of his witnesses should have been given weight instead of
respondents testimonies. He explained that Mrs. Mrs.
CSRO Complaint Calanoc,, owner of Reynand Gas Dealer, confirmed that
respondents had conducted a physical inspection of her
In his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, establishment, after which they recommended that she pay
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, petitioner conveyance permit fees as a requisite for the issuance of a
claimed that the CSCRO Complaint was an offshoot of the Fire Safety Certificate. Also, Carlito Umali confirmed that he
reassignment of respondents. He alleged that they were reassigned had indeed accompanied petitioner when the latter
after it was discovered that they had conducted a fire safety inspection investigated the Complaint filed by Mrs. Calanoc against
of establishments within Nueva Ecija without any mission order. In respondents. Furthermore, Myrna Villanueva the owner of the
relation to this operation, they supposedly sold fire extinguishers to the house where respondents supposedly paid petitioner P2,000
owners of the establishments they had inspected. He cited the alleged claimed that she did not know them personally or recall either
Confidential Report in which the investigating body recommended the petitioner or respondents ever visiting her house. Likewise,
dropping of charges against him. He further added that, in view of his Supt. Tutaan confirmed that he had instructed petitioner to
exemplary and faithful service, the then-incumbent governor even cause the transfer of [Link] latter also argued that
requested the continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of the BFP Complaint had already been dismissed by virtue of
Nueva Ecija. In his Position Paper, petitioner claimed that the Confidential Report, and that the dismissal had already
respondents' transfer had been made in compliance with the directive served as a bar to the further prosecution of any
of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan (Supt. Tutaan) and pursuant to [Link] administrative charge against him.
● The MR was denied. The CSRO affirmed its previous ruling
CSCRO Ruling that the statements of petitioner’s witnesses were
incompetent andimmaterial, having been failed to disprove
● Found petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct that petitioner had indeed extorted money from respondents.
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and It likewise rejected the argument of res judicata proffered by
orders his dismissal from service. petitioner and ruled that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint
● Respondents, through their testimonies were able to establish by virtue of the Confidential Report was not a judgment on the
the fact that petitioner demanded from the amount of P5,000 merits rendered by a competent tribunal. Furthermore, the
in exchange for their non-reassignment to far flung fire Confidential Report was the result of the recommendation of
stations. The fact that they did not present any document to a fact-finding committee formed to determine the veracity of
show that petitioner received P2,000 did not preclude a the Complaint charging petitioner with extortion, unjustified
finding of administrative liability. The consistency of their oral transfer of BFP personnel, and malversation of [Link]
testimonies already constituted substantial evidence. judicata cannot be raised as a defense, since the dismissal of

29
 the BFP Complaint did not constitute a bar by former ● No forum-shopping committed by respondents, and that
judgment. substantial evidence existed to hold petitioner administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
So petitioner filed an appeal memorandum with the CSC main office. interest of the service.
● The CSCRO Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6713,
● He argued that respondents committed forum shopping for while the BFP Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6975. It
filing 2 separate administrative complaints before the CSRP further ruled that, although both Complaints were anchored
and before the BFP/DILG and that they failed to attach the on a similar set of facts, there was no identity of causes of
certificate of non forum shopping. He also argued that the action: thus, even if they were successively filed before
CSCRO only had appellate jurisdiction or authority to decide different fora, no forum-shopping existed. Although an
cases brought before it by the head of agency or the BFP. He investigation was then ongoing at the BFP when the CSCRO
explained that the administrative Complaint was investigated took cognizance of the case, no forum-shopping resulted. A
and heard by the BFP/DILG. The BFP department head or fire perusal of the proceedings conducted at the BFP shows that
director, Rogelio F. Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution only a preliminary investigation was initiated by the IAS-BFP,
dated 05 July 2005, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency a fact-finding committee that recommended the dismissal of
of [Link] the basis of the dismissal of the case, and the case, which was accordingly approved by the fire director.
there being no appeal or petition filed pertaining thereto, the The approval of this recommendation cannot be regarded as
CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as one based on merits. Otherwise, it would bar the filing of
[Link] further argued that the CSCRO erred in another case, particularly, with the CSCRO.
concluding that the resolution of the fact-finding committee ● Respondents clearly established that petitioner had
was not a judgment on the merits. The BFP being an agency demanded P5,000 in exchange for their reassignment. It was
of the government, any decision or resolution it arrives at is contrary to human nature for respondents, who were merely
also a judgment on the merits. rank-and-file employees, to impute such a grave act to their
boss. Their disparity in rank would show that respondents
CSRO’s answer: could not have fabricated their charges. It further ruled that
the withdrawal of the complaint would not result in their
● No forum shopping considering that the BFP complaint was outright dismissal or absolve the person complained of from
based on a different cause of action. The Complaint, which administrative liability
pertained to the alleged illegal transfer of personnel under
R.A. No. 6975, was docketed for preliminary investigation of Hence, petitioner filed a rule 43 petition with the CA.
the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act or R.A. No. 3019. ● That the CSC erred in not dismissing respondents' Complaint
● No res judicata since the dismissal of the BFP Complaint by despite the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping
virtue of the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was not a and respondent's actual forum-shopping, as well as the lack
judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. The of substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable.
dismissal was, instead, the result of the recommendation of ● That the causes of action in the 2 complaints were similar.
the preliminary investigators of the Internal Audit Service ● That the testimonies of respondents should not be given
(IAS) of the BFP weight, as their credibility had been rendered questionable by
their dismissal from service. Also, they had withdrawn their
CSC Ruling: petitioners appeal was denied.

30
 complaints against him in the affidavit of desistance for I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping. - NO
misapprehension of facts and misunderstanding.
II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to
Respondent Caubang denounced the supposed execution of the hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and
Affidavit. He claimed that he did not sign it, and that his purported conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. - NO
signature therein was a forgery. RULING: Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner is administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
CA Ruling: denied petitioner’s appeal and MR. interest of the service under the Admin code. Affirmed his
dismissal. PETITION DISMISSED.
● It was not the letter-complaint filed by respondents that
commenced the administrative proceedings against I. No forum shopping
petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty.
Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are
CSCRO's fact-finding investigation. Considering that the present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping. following requisites:
● Respondents' act of simultaneously filing Complaints against (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not constitute representing the same interests in both actions;
forum-shopping. While it was conceded that the two
Complaints were founded on the same set of facts involving (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
the same parties, they were nonetheless based on different being founded on the same facts; and
causes of action more specifically, the BFP Complaint was for
alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of would amount to res judicata in the other case.
administrative powers.
The dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata
● With regard to the administrative liability, it was supported by in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping
substantial evidence. on the part of respondents.
Now petitioner’s contentions before the SC: Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays down the rule
(1) the CA erred in affirming the CSC Resolution and in ruling that an existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered
that respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping; and without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
(2) substantial evidence does not exist to hold petitioner their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points and matters in
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. issue in the first suit.

ISSUES:

31
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent Bedol v. Commission on Elections: Quasi-judicial or administrative
action, the following requisites must concur: adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It
(a) the former judgment must be final; is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
over the subject matter and the parties; standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially
of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
(d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
of cause of action. carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
nature.
objections;"or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.” administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory
functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the
Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding
evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and
investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise
conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and
of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining
purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
against petitioner. It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking 2005 itself that the purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine
and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing of an
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported appropriate administrative offense against petitioner.
by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves
The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority,
a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the
CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission
law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties
ruled as follows:
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties.

32
 "That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the
the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
the service so require but subject to the condition that there
will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP
Bongbong vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court Complaint cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, forum-shopping
ruled held [sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be is unavailing in this case.
transferred as to the exigencies of the service require" II. There is substantial evidence to hold petitioner
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened The findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with
to a public prosecutor's preliminary investigation, which entails a by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported
accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed. by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not
different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon
has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body has
other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the latter
through either adjudication or rule-making." to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion, had the
evidence been properly appreciated. This rule is rooted in the doctrine
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does that this Court is not a trier of facts. By reason of the special knowledge
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of those matters.
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime
and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is The Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there by the administrative agencies involved after their own thorough
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While investigations and hearings, as well as their consideration of the
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as evidence presented before them and their findings thereon, especially
a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the when affirmed by the CA is regarded with great respect and finality by
accused, not the fiscal. the Court.

The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct The alleged dismissal of respondents from service would not suffice
of a preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the to discredit them as witnesses. In jurisprudence, even a prior criminal
evidence presented, further action should be taken through the filing conviction does not by itself suffice to discredit a witness. The
of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP testimony of that witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly
exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine the same way the testimonies of other witnesses must be examined
whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further for their relevance and credibility. This pronouncement is even more
administrative action in the form of a formal charge should be taken significant in this case, as what petitioner is alleging is not any past
criminal conviction of respondents, but merely their dismissal from the

33
service. The testimonies of respondents carried more weight than Furthermore, petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to
petitioner’s self-serving statements and blanket denials. the best interest of the service.
Respondents, through their testimonies, were able to establish that Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa: the Court elaborated on the
petitioner told them that unless they paid him P5,000, they would be specific acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to
re-assigned to far-flung areas. The consistency of their testimonies the best interest of the service, considering that no concrete
was further bolstered by the fact that they had been cross-examined description is provided under the Civil Service Law and rules. The
by petitioner's counsel. Petitioner was unable to rebut their claims Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of public funds,
other than by mere denials. Even the admission of Supt. Tutaan that abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior
he gave the instructions to reassign respondents cannot disprove the notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making
latter's claims. As regards the testimonies of the witnesses of false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders.
petitioner, we hold that even these testimonies are irrelevant in
disproving the alleged extortion he committed, as these were mainly Applying those principles to the case, the SC hold that petitioner’s
related to respondents' supposed illegal activities, which are not the offense is of the same gravity or odiousness as that of the
issue in this case. aforementioned acts and would likewise amount to conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
Even assuming that an Affidavit of Desistance was indeed executed
by respondents, petitioner is still not exonerated from liability. The As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense
subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. The penalty of
proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. On
not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
the public service. The subsequent desistance by respondents does is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty of
not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an administrative suspension of six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day to one ( 1) year for the
proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that
principle that a public office is a public trust. A complaint for petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of
malfeasance or misfeasance against a public servant of whatever rank dismissal from the service-the penalty corresponding to the most
cannot be withdrawn at any time for whatever reason by a serious offense-was properly imposed
complainant, as a withdrawal would be "anathema to the preservation
of the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their government, its
agencies and instrumentalities." Administrative proceedings "should
not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants
who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein."
Petitioner’s act of demanding money from respondents in exchange
for their non-reassignment constitutes grave misconduct1.

1
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the substantial evidence

34
 10. Remolona v. Civil Service Commission fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher’s
board examinations.
G.R. No. 137473
· On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
July 23, 1998 Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Bella
Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona’s eligibility,
Topic: Powers of Administrative Agencies; Fact-finding, Investigative. after verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central
Licensing, and Rate-Fixing Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona’s name is not in the list
of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for
Petitioners: Estelito v. Remolona December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona.
Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of
Respondents: Civil Service commission rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the
examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%."
Ponente: Puno, J.
· During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G.
DOCTRINE: Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City, Quezon,
only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of
The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be facts 6 regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person Mrs. Remolona, which is summarized in the Memorandum submitted
charged. by Director Pasion as follows:
o That sometime in the first week of
The exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but Bus from Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo
not to those made in an administrative investigation. In an City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging sounded) who happened to be sitting beside him;
the services of counsel or not. o That a conversation broke out between them
until he was able to confide his problem to Atty.
FACTS:rary Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in acquiring
an eligibility;
· Petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal o That Atty. Salupadin who represented
Office Service in Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help for
teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School. a fee of P3,000.00;
o That the following day they met at the
· In a letter 3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his wife;
Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports at
o That the following week, Thursday, at around
Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan where he
as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who
handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00
purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by
the National Board for Teachers. Mr. America likewise disclosed that plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the
he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a

35
 Report of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a CSC
passing grade, then they parted;w 1ibrary
o That sometime in the last week of · Said recommendation was adopted by the CSC which issued a
September, he showed the Report of Rating to the resolution on April 20, 1995, finding the spouses guilty of dishonesty
District Supervisor, Francisco America who informed and imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties
her (sic) that there was no vacancy; (loss and forfeiture of benefits). The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin
o That he went to Lucena City and complained was held in abeyance pending proof of his identity.
to Dr. Magsino in writing . . . that Mr. America is asking
for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife · In its Resolution dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the
but failed to make good his promise. He attached the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona, absolved
corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda Nery Remolona from liability and reinstated her to her former position
Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. as a teacher with back salaries and other benefits.
Remolona.
o That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was
able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus o The CSC exonerated her on the basis that there
bonus of Nery C. Remolona; was no evidence to show that Nely Remolona had
o That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or
felt that Mr. America would verify the authenticity of promotion. She did not indicate in her Personal Data
his wife’s Report of Rating, he burned the original." Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It was
pointed out that it was her husband who unilaterally
worked to secure a fake eligibility for her

· Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in CA

acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge
thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. · On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing
Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the the petition for review filed by petitioner Remolona. His motion for
appropriate administrative action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise denied. Hence, this
Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown that she petition for review.
willfully participated in the commission of the offense.
ISSUE/S:
CSC Regional Director
1. Whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the
· A Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner government service for an offense which is not work-related or which
Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for is not connected with the performance of his official duty? YES
possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. A formal
hearing ensued wherein the parties presented their respective 2. Whether petitioners right to due process was violated? NO
evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan
issued a Memorandum dated February 14, 1995 9 recommending that Dispositive Portion:
the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged
and be meted the corresponding penalty.

36
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
toto. removed or suspended except for cause." Although the offense of
dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service law, Remolona
Held: opines that such act must have been committed in the performance of
his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of
1st Issue dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his
wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his office and hence,
(Aside from the first issue Remolona also put up other arguments he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition
which the Court discussed with the first issue) The main issue posed is untenable.
for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed
from the government service for an offense which is not work-related It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense
or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule
Petitioner also averred that his motion for new trial should be granted XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
on the ground that the transcript of stenographic notes taken during And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not
the hearing of the case before the Regional Office of the CSC was not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. He also argued that the penalty of charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh considering the employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
nature of the offense for which he was convicted, the length of his even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they
service in government, that this is his first offense, and the fact that no affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate
damage was caused to the government. in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty
investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason
is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power
cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his
Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be
investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal. segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the
fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial and morale of the service.
admission and that he merely signed a blank form cannot be given
credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but
circumspect in his actions specially where he is being administratively the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
charged with a grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal public’s faith and confidence in the government.
from service.
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are
process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the Constitution which accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this

37
Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of utmost responsibility in the public service.
evidence. Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of factual
matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise 2nd Issue
of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis
of the evidence received. The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice Remolona contends that there was a violation of his right to due
will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are process during the preliminary investigation because he was not
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless assisted by counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission
there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made
abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and to sign a blank form. The submission of Remolona that his alleged
whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted
jurisdiction. by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12
paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we consideration.
find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and
the Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is replete The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
with details that could have been known only to him. No ill-motive or protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation.
bad faith was ever imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is
investigation. The presumption that official duty has been regularly no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
performed remains unrebutted. focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law
formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The
of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation.
agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
original records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it. the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the
pleadings filed by the parties. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that there was no assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
never used to get an appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an
Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the government, there administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging
was still falsification of an official document that constitutes gross the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of
dishonesty which cannot be countenanced, considering that he was Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as
an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive position. The Code of the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on

38
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive 11. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc v. Defensor
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). G.R. No. 163980
Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative August 3, 2006
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to Topic: Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate-fixing powers
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure Petitioners: Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., and Nestor
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of Apolinario in his capacity as President of HSH Association
maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing Respondents: Sec. Michael Defensor as Chairman of Housing and
conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo
prosecution. Pamintuan as General Manager of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), Percival Chavez as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
for the Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte as Mayor of
QC, Sec. Elisea Gozun as Secretary of DENR, and Sec. Florente
Soriquez as Secretary of DPWH
Ponente: Ting, J.
DOCTRINE: Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly
stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision
does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with
the standards prescribed by the law.

FACTS:
● The Association is a homeowners association from the West
Side of the National Government Center (NGC) while the
respondents are the ex-officio members of the National
Government Center Administration Committee (Committee)
● Prior to the passage of RA 9207 (NGC Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003), a number of presidential issuances
authorized the creation and development of what is now NGC
○ March 5, 1972: President Marcos issued Proc. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, QC as
a national site to be known as NGC
○ August 11, 1987: President Cory Aquino issued Proc.
137 excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved
site and authorizing the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents
○ September 7, 1993: President Ramos issued Proc.
248 authorizing the vertical development of the

39
 excluded portion to maximize the number of families affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved
who can effectively become beneficiaries of the by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
government’s socialized housing program
● On May 14, 2003, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9207. ● The petitioners contend that the provisions are constitutionally
In accordance with Sec. 5, the Committee formulated the IRR infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with
of RA 9207 on June 29, 2004 the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented
● The petitioners then filed the instant petition for prohibition, ○ The limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified
seeking to prevent the respondents from enforcing the IRR beneficiaries of the IRR is not in harmony with the
and assailing the following provisions: provisions of RA 9207 which mandates that the lot
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on
bonafide residents the area actually used or occupied by bona fide
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries residents without limitation to area
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be ○ While the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at Php
based on the Code of Policies and subject to the condition that 700 per sq. m., RA 9207 does not provide for the
a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a price. The IRR also penalizes a beneficiary who
minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject fails to execute a contract to sell within 6 months
further to the availability of lots. from the approval of the subdivision plan by
imposing a price escalation while there is no such
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be penalty imposed by RA 9207
processed and evaluated based on the Code of Policies ○ Adoption of the IRR suffers from a procedural flaw as
including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. it was adopted and concurred in by several
m. and 60 sq. m. representatives of people’s organizations contrary to
the express mandate of RA 9207 that only 2
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell representatives from duly recognized people’s
(a) Westside organizations must compose the NGCAC
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract
to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60) days from the effectivity ISSUE/S
of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per ● W/N the assailed provisions should be declared null and
sq. m. void for being inconsistent with the law it seeks to
implement -NO
(c) for both eastside and westside ● W/N the Committee has the authority to fix the selling
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute price of the lots -YES (topic)
CTS on the deadline set in item a.1 above in case of
westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
lot price escalation.
Rate fixing
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
the National Housing Authority factoring therein the contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of

40
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation ***Just in case:
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the Allocation to qualified beneficiaries
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into
standards prescribed by the law. two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within
the NGC site and certain government institutions including the local
In Sec. 5 of RA 9207, the Committee is granted the power to government. Sec. 3, RA 9207 mandates the allocation of additional
administer, formulate guidelines and policies,and implement the property within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and
disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority the manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified
and the statute's objective of urban poor housing is the power of the beneficiaries. Sec. 4, RA 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Sec. 4 of RA
may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on
Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the law's
of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries
governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement consisting of the local government, socioeconomic, charitable,
the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the educational and religious institutions which do not have specific lot
statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no
because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is
expertise over these matters. likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.

The Committee's authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be Petitioners' interpretation is also not supported by the policy of RA
likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of 9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the government's policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the only the urban poor but also the local government and various
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable,
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express educational and religious purposes. Thus, although Proc. 137
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a
this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the third of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition
lots is unreasonable. subject to the condition that those portions being used or earmarked
for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed on housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and
a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the optimal land use can be read in Proc. 248 issued by then President
prescribed period is also within the Committee's authority to formulate Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in
guidelines and policies to implement RA 9207. The Committee has the the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional
power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized
of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the previously by Proc. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily not adequately provide for the housing needs of all bona fide residents
be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good in the NGC.
customs, public order, or public policy.

41
In addition, as provided in Sec. 4 of RA 9207, the institutional
beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them;
hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed
and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus,
the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be
equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In
order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area
to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary
consequence.

Procedural Flaw
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or
regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process
requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of
more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption
of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.

42