IVLER v.

MODESTO-SAN PEDRO provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
17 November 2010 | Carpio, J. | Art. 48 & Art. 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts
Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is held
PETITIONER: Jason Ivler that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, Judge of regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
MTC Br. 71, Pasig City, and Evangeline Ponce penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
SUMMARY: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, Ivler was 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
charged before the MTC, with two separate offenses: Reckless Imprudence splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent filed in the same first level court.
respondent Ponce, and Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband and DOCTRINE 1: The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Ivler posted bail for his temporary a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
release in both cases. On 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge on the first crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information for the second delict for resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
reckless imprudence. MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses Diaz, decided in 1954.
in the two cases. Ivler elevated the matter to the RTC, in a petition for DOCTRINE 2: Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1)
in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
question. Without acting on Ivler’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a
arraignment and, because of Ivler’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered necessary means for committing the other; Article 365 is a substantive rule
his arrest. 7 days after, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s penalizing not an act, defined as a felony but the mental attitude xxx behind
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight xxx, a single
his arrest. Ivler sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
the motion remained unresolved. Issues: 1) WoN Ivler forfeited his standing
to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following FACTS:
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. NO — 1. Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, (Ivler) was charged before the MeTC of Pasig City, Br. 71, with two
the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on separate offenses:
its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he a. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
acquitted. 2) WoN Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (Ponce); and
Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. YES – The
accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of b. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
punishment for the same offense" protects him from post-conviction Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. The two charges against 2. Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
3. September 7, 2004 – Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.
Case No. 82367(Reckles imprudence resulting to Slight Physical
injuries), and was penalized with public censure. 15. Invoking jurisprudence, Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to
be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars
4. Invoking the aforementioned conviction, Ivler moved to quash the his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously
Infromation in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366.

5. MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two 16. Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision
cases. forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803.

6. Ivler elevated the matter to the RTC of Pasig, Br. 157 in a petition for 17. On the merits, Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). holding that light offenses (e.g.slight physical injuries) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or
7. Meanwhile, Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of less grave felonies (e.g.homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and
damage to property.
8. The MeTC still proceeded with the arraignment and because of Ivler’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. ISSUES:
1. Whether Ivler forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when
9. 7 days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying Ivler’s motion to the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. NO — Under Section 21,
arrest. Ivler sought reconsideration but as of filing of this petition, the Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s
motion remained unresolved. absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
10. RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
Ivler’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. convicted or acquitted.
2. Whether Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
11. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. YES – The
effectively affirmed the MeTC. Ivler sought reconsideration but this accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy
proved unavailing. of punishment for the same offense" protects him from post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
12. Hence, this petition. rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.
13. Ivler denies absconding. He explains in his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the
Case No. 82366. Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
14. Ivler distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not
RATIO: failed to attend the scheduled proceeding” at the MeTC is belied by
Issue 1 the records.
3. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from 11. Days before the arraignment, Ivler sought the suspension of the
custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this 12. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for
Court or the Court of Appeals to “also, upon motion of the appellee which was released days after the MeTC ordered Ivler’s arrest), Ivler
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during filing of this petition.
the pendency of the appeal.” Issue 2
4. The “appeal” contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to 13. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in
review judgments of convictions. jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” protects him from ,
5. The RTC’s dismissal of Ivler’s special civil action for certiorari to post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. information.
82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.
6. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas undercuts the cogency of its 14. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No.
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
ruling. charge.
a. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused
who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs 15. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366
even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the “same offense.”
and convicted in absentia. 16. Ivler adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
b. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to
Section 8 of Rule 124. 17. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
7. The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of Ivler’s non-appearance at his Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Property “as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post- other does not.”
arraignment hearings.
8. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal 18. The Court agrees with Ivler.
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the 19. Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the and property are material only to determine the penalty.
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, 20. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as amended, which
9. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the is Art. 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
a. Penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of imprudence and
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without
negligence (par. 1-2)
standing.
10. The RTC’s observation that Ivler provided “no explanation why he b. Modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
 (par. 3-4, 6 and 9) 26. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of
felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
c. Generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (par. 5) be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
d. Definition of “reckless imprudence” and “simple committed.
imprudence” (par. 7-8)
27. The theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
21. Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, committed willfully.
the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features 28. Instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
amended. felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all
the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case.
22. The notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the a. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
23. The Court sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon 29. This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes
v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga that “reckless less imprudence is is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it” on 3 points of property.
analysis:
30. People v. Diaz: the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal
a. the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information of
intentional crimes); damage to property through reckless imprudence based on the same
b. the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses negligent act of the accused.
(as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating 31. People v. Belga: dismissal of an information for physical injuries
circumstance of minimal intent) through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two
c. the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for
intentional crimes damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for
multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision.
24. The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the RPC) that “reckless
imprudence” is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it 32. The Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
to deserve unqualified assent. quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
25. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or based.
foresight, the imprudencia punible.
33. Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense.
34. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single 41. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes quasi-offense not falling under either models—that of
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light,
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of less grave or grave offenses.
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting
with People v. Diaz. 42. Jurisprudence adopts both approaches.

35. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the 43. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless jeopardy) applied Article 48 by “complexing” one quasi-crime with
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi- its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to a light
offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand,
the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
affirmative. charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting
acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first
36. Hence, we find merit in Ivler’s submission that the lower courts level courts.
erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 44. The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
37. Art. 48 does not apply to acts penalized under Art. 365 of the RPC. one charge, regardless of their number or severity, penalizing each
consequence separately.
38. Art. 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: 45. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave
a. when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies) and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
b. when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit 46. Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious consequences.
crime.
47. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
39. Art. 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an actdefined as a felony penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.
but “the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,” a single mental attitude 48. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Art. 365 was crafted only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
49. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge
40. Art. 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, Double Jeopardy Clause.
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts
Art. 365, RPC
and their consequences.
“Imprudence and negligence.—Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.”