G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 h) 24-hour security guard service.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from
vs. date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges
Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his until such time that such improvements shall have been completed. 1
capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent
Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been
completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.
FELICIANO, J.: For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was
able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice.
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective
and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr.
Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell
executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand
Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which
was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing
Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract,
installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the
including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of
improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period
up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed
falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads: to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the
Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by
Mr. Yuson.
Clause 17. — SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the
subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER
hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with
Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May 1977
which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo
b) Underground drainage system
Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of Case No. 2123 with
several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the
c) Asphalt paved roads NHA. In an Order issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and
scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
d) Independent water system
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts. the Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of
account for the monthly amortizations from November 1976 to the present;
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976 our jurisdiction,7 basically because the need for special competence and experience has
to the date of the statement of account; and been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized
character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in have remained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs.
the statement of account. 2 Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in
process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized
the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and
not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's
Contract to Sell. intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to
cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it
did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General
making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot
Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the
or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the
the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
complainant.
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for certiorari and United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051.
Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and,
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter. 4
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without of discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court
prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court,
was denied on 29 January 1979. the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this
Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative agency]" ' (NFL v.
President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public respondent Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6 of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking
authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the complaint of private award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D.
respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . .
parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean
authorized to perform. duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings
and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim."
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of
judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in
Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling
within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in hear and decide cases of the following nature:
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A. Unsound real estate business practices:
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or
may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on or salesman; and
the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such
powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.(emphasis supplied.)
rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts.
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are
found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads:
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be
determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a
follows: buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted
to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer,
after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due
National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time
accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied) limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.
indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide: (emphasis supplied.)
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems lighting systems and other similar Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
buyers; under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private
respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent in favor of petitioner.
purchasers for value — . (emphasis supplied)
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the
grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms: parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct
ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on
in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally to the original contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly
empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. We think
administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted,
obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. the debtor shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitable and just reading that
may be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. This in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat
assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot
Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be
duly served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to
of said copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if it be assumed, condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an expressively harsh
arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private
not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already
previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to Sell. At the same
petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for time, the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty
reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due interest. The suspension of installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not the
process must hence sound even more hollow. 16 private respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original
period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In the words of the NHA
resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears."
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had
accrued during the period from September 1972 to October 1976, when private respondent
had suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is
in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract
to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 — October 1976 period: period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2)
months, during which extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. No
pronouncement as to costs.
installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have been
completed. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the
improvements have been completed. Monthly installments during the period SO ORDERED.
of suspension of payment did not become due and demandable Neither did
they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in
suspending payments. If the suspension is lifted the debtor shall resume
payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the
arrears due during the period of suspension of payment is null and
void. Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the
s that were not due and demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and amplification. The
NHA correctly held that no installment payments should be considered as having accrued
during the period of suspension of payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the
installment payments which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of
suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA
resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the
Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to the period of