AAA V.
CARBONELL
Facts: In a rape case, private complainant failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness
stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that the
complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.”
issue: Is Judge Carbonell correct?
held:
No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government, several judges issued, on different dates, a total of 42
search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers. The search warrants
directed to any peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of their personal property such as books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). Those items were described as "the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means
of committing the offense," which is in "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
ISSUE: Whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made are valid or not.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the search warrants issued were illegal and thus, it violated the
constitutional provision against unreasonable search. Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. The search warrants were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
VALEROSO V. CA
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at
Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire
who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an
operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team
was not armed with a search warrant.
ISSUE: whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of Valeroso’s firearm and ammunition is valid.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty
and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect,
but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
In this case, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
LUZ V. PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer, testified that he saw the
accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving
a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in
front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that
he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have
a weapon inside it; one turned out to be shabu.
.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and the search and seizure of the alleged shabu is valid.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.Arrest
is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been under arrest.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. The evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view.
It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal search;
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
MARTINEZ V. PEOPLE
FACTS: At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, who were all assigned to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
(SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street,
Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putang-ina mo! Limang-daan na ba ito?"
For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)
which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty
his pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and
brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the former marked the item with the latter’s initials, "RMG."
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime of possession
of dangerous drugs.
RULING: Yes, the petition is meritorious. Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted
intrusions by the government pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine constitution.
Effects secured by government authorities in contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested
the warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from
Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above
discussed constitutional provision.
CABALLES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221, January 15, 2002
PONENTE: PUNO
FACTS:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods,
the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers checked the
cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to
the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. In
defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.
RULING:
NO. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES,
FACTS:
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods,
and explosives.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile,
saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed
to take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest
room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Which turned out to be shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused appellant is entitled art. 3 sec. 12 of Constitution which requires a valid search
warrant and seizure?
HELD:
No. The supreme court ruled that art. 3 sec. 12 cannot be applied because of the certain exceptions, namely:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SECRETARY V. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented.
Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He
adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD:
No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
JESSE LUCAS V. JESUS LUCAS, 2011
FACTS:
petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission
of Parties to DNA Testing) [2] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated
that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain Ate
Belen (Belen) who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated
in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order for DNA testing is considered as unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
No. a DNA testing order is not a matter of right. There should be first a finding of probable cause before the
court will grant the DNA testing. The Supreme Court adopted the decision of SC Louisiana that Although a paternity
action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case
must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
PEOPLE vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL
FACTS: PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue when he saw Nazareno
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de
Leon alighted from his motorcycle and approached Nazareno whom he recognized as someone he had previously
arrested from illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, Nazareno tried to escape but was quickly
apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. PO3 de Leon was able board Nazareno on to his motorcycle and
confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
HELD. NO. Nazareno’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands even if they appeared to
be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 of
Rule 113.
“Probable Cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged.
