NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHA, CUTTACK

TOPIC: COLUMBIA’S DENIAL TO THE

PEACE AGREEMENT

SUBMITTED BY ROLL NO.

MUSKAAN VIJAY 18BA064
SHIVANI SINGH 18BA099

SUBMITTED TO: PROF. SUVRASHREE PANDA

Contents
Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 4
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT .................................................................................................... 5
Peace agreement referendum ........................................................................................................ 11
THE REVISED DEAL ................................................................................................................. 15
Contents of the agreements ........................................................................................................... 16
END OF CONFLICT .................................................................................................................... 20
POLITICAL IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT ............................................................................ 23
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 26
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“Gratitude turns what we have into enough.”

This project is the outcome of the guidance and support of some people who if we don‘t
acknowledge, we'll be committing a sin.

The completion of this project on the topic ‘Columbia’s Denial to the Peace Agreement’ needed
a lot of work and guidance and we have been extremely fortunate to have had that all through the
project.

Firstly, we would like to thank the almighty without whose blessings; this project could not have
been completed.

We convey our heartfelt thanks to Associate Professor of Law, Ms. Suvrashree Panda whose
constant encouragement and being readily available to clear any doubts regarding the subject
matter, showed us the right direction to go ahead in.

We have been guided and had cleared all of our doubts about the issue by them. We owe much
thanks to them for accepting our request to proceed with this topic and helping us understand and
be able to present a paper on it.
 INTRODUCTION

The Colombian conflict began in the mid-1960s and is a low-intensity asymmetric war between
the government of Colombia, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates and communist guerrillas
such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation
Army (ELN), fighting each other to increase their influence in Colombian territory. The most
important international contributors to the Colombian conflict are multinational corporations and
the government of the United States.

It is historically rooted in the conflict known as La Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948
assassination of populist political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, and in the aftermath of United
States-backed strong anti-communist repression in rural Colombia in the 1960s that
led liberal and communist militants to re-organize into FARC.

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements
claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from government
violence and to provide social justice through communism. The Colombian government claims
to be fighting for order and stability, and to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The
paramilitary groups claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements. All sides
have engaged in drug trafficking and terrorism and have been criticized for numerous human
rights violations.

According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 220,000 people
have died in the conflict between 1958 and 2013, most of them civilians (177,307 civilians and
40,787 fighters) and more than five million civilians were forced from their homes between 1985
– 2012, generating the world's second largest population of internally displaced
persons (IDPs). 16.9% of the population in Colombia has been a direct victim of the war. 2.3
million children have been displaced from their homes, and 45,000 children killed, according to
national figures cited by Unicef. In total, one in three of the 7.6 million registered victims of the
conflict are children, and since 1985, 8,000 minors have disappeared. A Special Unit was created
to search for persons deemed as missing within the context of and due to the armed conflict.
 HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
Civil conflict in Colombia, one of the United States’ closest allies in Latin America, has left as
many as 220,000 dead, 25,000 disappeared, and 5.7 million displaced over the last half century.1
The Colombian conflict began in the mid-1960s and is a low-intensity asymmetric war between
the government of Colombia, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates and communist guerrillas
such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation
Army (ELN), fighting each other to increase their influence in Colombian territory. The most
important international contributors to the Colombian conflict are multinational corporations and
the government of the United States. It is historically rooted in the conflict known as La
Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948 assassination of populist political leader Jorge
Eliécer Gaitán, and in the aftermath of United States-backed strong anti-communist repression
in rural Colombia in the 1960s that led liberal and communist militants to re-organize into
FARC.2

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements
claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from government
violence and to provide social justice through communism. The Colombian government claims
to be fighting for order and stability, and to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The
paramilitary groups claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements. All sides
have engaged in drug trafficking and terrorism and have been criticized for numerous human
rights violations.

The FARC and the National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, ELN) were
founded in the 1960s after a decade of political violence. Excluded from a power-sharing
agreement that ended the fighting, communist guerrillas took up arms against the government.
The FARC was composed of militant communists and peasant self-defense groups, while the
ELN’s ranks were dominated by students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals who
hoped to replicate Fidel Castro’s communist revolution.3 The U.S. State Department

1
Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict” (2017), CFR, accessed on 16 August 2019,
<[Link]
2
“History, Colombian Conflict”, (conciliation resources), accessed on 16 August 2019, < [Link]
[Link]/where-we-work/latin-america/history-colombian-conflict>
3
Lily Rothman, “What to know about Colombia’s FARC” (2016) TIME, accessed on 16 august 2019 <
[Link]
has designated both groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Although some say the ELN is
more ideological than the FARC, the two have similar programs. Both oppose the privatization
of natural resources and claim to represent the rural poor against Colombia’s wealthy.
Historically they have cooperated in some parts of the country and clashed in others. Right-wing
paramilitary groups with links to the state military emerged in the 1980s as landowners
organized to protect themselves from the guerrilla groups. The largest paramilitary group, the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was on the U.S. State Department’s list of
foreign terrorist organizations until July 2014. The group formally disbanded in 2006, but
splinter groups, known as bacrim (short, in Spanish, for criminal gangs) remain.4

The FARC and ELN long used violence, kidnappings, and extortion as sources of leverage and
income. In one of its most high-profile kidnappings, the FARC abducted presidential candidate
Ingrid Betancourt in 2002. The group held her along with three U.S. military contractors until
2008, when Colombian forces rescued them and twelve other hostages. Other notable incidents
include the FARC’s assassination of a former culture minister in 2001 and its hijacking of a
domestic commercial flight in 2002, during which rebels kidnapped a senator. Colombia’s
National Center for Historical Memory estimates that guerrilla groups kidnapped twenty-five
thousand people between 1970 and 2010. More than ten thousand people, including nearly four
thousand civilians, have been killed or maimed by landmines, most of which were planted by the
FARC, according to the Colombian government.

ARMED CONFLICT:

The armed conflict in Colombia emerged due to a combination of economic, political and social
factors in the country. Various organizations and scholars that have studied the conflict trace it
back to a long history of political violence, a high social and economic inequality, the lack of
strong state capable of providing for its citizens, conflict of political ideologies, and an unequal
distribution of land, power and wealth in the country. The precise date of the conflict's beginning
is still disputed, with some scholars claiming it started in 1958 with the start of the Frente
Nacional ("National Front") and the end of La Violencia ("The Violence") meanwhile others

4
Alan Yuhas, “Colombia’s half-century of conflict that led to historic peace deal” (2016), The Guardian, accessed

on 16 august 2019 < [Link]

believe it was in 1964 with the creation of the FARC and the end of the National Front.5 Some
scholars even trace it back to the 1920s, with the unequal distribution of land in the country
which has been one of the main causes and disputes of the conflict throughout the years. In the
early period (1970s), guerrilla groups like the FARC, the ELN and others focused on a slogan of
greater equality through communism, which came to be supported by many people, mostly in
low-income and rural areas of the country. During this year the violence was of low-intensity and
mainly focused in remote parts of the country. However, the balance of power and influence
shifted in the mid-1980s when Colombia granted greater political and fiscal autonomy to local
governments, strengthening the position of the Colombian Government in more remote regions
of the country.

In the 1980s the conflict's levels of violence largely increased as a cause of the beginning of the
drug trafficking in the country. Initially, a group of Americans began to smuggle marijuana
during the decades of the sixties and seventies. Later, the American Mafia began to establish
drug trafficking in Colombia in cooperation with local marijuana producers. Cocaine
manufactured in Colombia was historically mostly consumed in the US as well as Europe.
Organized crime in Colombia grew increasingly powerful in the 1970s and 80s with the
introduction of massive drug trafficking to the United States from Colombia.6 After the
Colombian Government dismantled many of the drug cartels that appeared in the country during
the 1980s, left-wing guerrilla groups and rightwing paramilitary organizations resumed some of
their drug-trafficking activities and resorted to extortion and kidnapping for financing, activities
which led to a loss of support from the local population.

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS:

The United States has been heavily involved in the conflict since its beginnings, when in the
early 1960s the U.S. government encouraged the Colombian military to attack leftist militias in
rural Colombia. This was part of the U.S. fight against communism. In October 1959, the United

5
“Colombia: Armed Conflict” (peace insight), accessed on 17 August 2019,
<[Link]
6
“Colombian Armed Conflict” (Justice for Colombia), accessed on 17 August 2019, <
[Link]
States sent a "Special Survey Team", composed of counterinsurgency experts, to investigate
Colombia's internal security situation. In February 1962, a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special
Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough,
visited Colombia for a second survey.7 In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a paramilitary force to commit
sabotage and terrorist acts against communists. The first paramilitary groups were organized
following recommendations made by U.S. military counterinsurgency advisers who were sent to
Colombia during the Cold War to combat leftist political activists and armed guerrilla groups.
Multinational corporations have also been directly tied to paramilitary death squads. Chiquita
Brands International was fined as part of a settlement with the United States Justice Department
for having ties to paramilitary groups8. The conflict timeline starts from the early 1960’s and
continues till 2106 with number of attacks and conflicts.

In 2000, U.S. lawmakers approved Plan Colombia, an aid package that aimed to help the country
combat guerrilla violence, strengthen its institutions, and stem drug production and trafficking.
The White House stated in February 2016 that Plan Colombia was "instrumental in paving the
way" for subsequent peace talks, but some critics have regarded U.S. funding for the country,
which has amounted to more than $10 billion since Plan Colombia’s start, as the cause of
potentially thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of internal displacements9.
Washington has also sought to bind the two countries closer through expanded trade. The United
States is Colombia’s largest trading partner, and a bilateral free trade agreement between the two
entered into force in 2012.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT:

The destruction of physical infrastructure has represented high costs for several sectors of the
economy, directly altering production and distribution networks. The costs generated by damage

7
Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict” (2017), CFR, accessed on 16 August 2019,
<[Link]
8
Ibid
9
“Colombia :Background and US relations” (Congressional Research Service), Accessed on 17 August 2019, <
[Link]
to the oil infrastructure have shown a substantial increase since 1990. This is mainly explained
by the increase in attacks on oil pipelines by groups outside the law. The partial interruption of
the roads directly affects the transport sector, food and other private guilds, which in turn assume
costs for these damages. However, generally these have not been quantified, because of the
difficulty they have to be directly calculated. This tends to present itself as a generalized problem
in quantifying the costs associated with conflict. This is explained, in part, by the tendency in the
various economic sectors not to denounce this type of actions that, in one way or another,
interrupt the normal functioning of economic activities.

There was loss of human capital and productivity due to labor absenteeism in 2003. On the other
hand, the loss of land productivity, which translates into a negative impact on administration,
investment in physical and social capital, and the price of land in subsectors such as livestock
and commercial agriculture is one of the consequences associated with the presence of an armed
conflict. This cost is mainly assumed by farmers who experience the pressure of armed actions in
their areas of operation. Within this context, the most serious consequences are related to the
devaluation of the properties, the loss of productivity of the land -represented in the products that
could potentially have been cultivated in these lands- and the difficulty in managing the efficient
production of the lands10. Although the agents adjust their investment behavior, that is, they
internalize the phenomenon of violence, assuming it as a change in the structures of the economy
in the long term the investment of both the State and the private sector is diminished in
substantial ways. In the Colombian case, the loss in private investment diminished, due to the
public order conditions that arise directly from the presence of an armed conflict.

Recently in light, came a group known as FARC dissidents. FARC dissidents are a group
formerly part of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, who have refused to lay down
their arms after the FARC-government peace treaty came into effect in 2016. The FARC
dissidents have become "an increasing headache" for the Colombian armed forces, as they have
to fight them. These fighters are believed to be heavily involved in the production and sale of
cocaine. Dissidents of FARC’s 1st Front are located in the eastern plains of Colombia.

10
Fransico Serrano, “The Economics of the Colombia-FARC peace accord”(2017), Foreign Affairs, accessed on 17
august 2019, < [Link]
accord>
MAKING A DEAL FOR PEACE:

Santos, who was elected president in 2010, and his administration began formal peace talks with
the FARC in 2012. The governments of Chile, Cuba, Norway, and Venezuela acted as hosts,
mediators, and observers to the Havana-based process, which became the fourth round of talks
between the government and the rebel group in thirty years. His negotiations were centered on 5
points11:

 future political participation of FARC members,

 rebels’ reintegration into civilian life,
 illegal crop eradication,
 transitional justice and reparations, and
 rebel disarmament and implementation of the peace deal.

The peace agreement calls for the FARC’s rebels to gather in twenty-three hamlets across the
country and turn in their arms to a UN commission. The accord also outlines a plan for the
military to clear landmines scattered throughout the countryside, which have killed or injured
eleven thousand people over the last twenty-five years. Santos has appealed for international
support to finance development, public services, and justice institutions in former conflict areas.
Most of that support has so far come from the United States. In June 2016, the U.S. House
appropriated aid with a portion of the funds dependent on Colombia reaching a peace deal. The
two sides reached a cease-fire in mid-2016, and Santos and FARC leader signed a peace treaty in
the Caribbean city of Cartagena in September 201612. A week later Colombians narrowly
rejected the accord in a referendum, sowing uncertainty over peace prospects.

The vote appeared to reflect public unease that the rebels were being treated too leniently after
decades of committing serious abuses. Government and FARC leaders had agreed to establish
a special tribunal made up of Colombian and international judges to collect testimony and
evidence, oversee reparations, and mete out punishments to those found guilty of serious crimes.
Opponents of the peace deal found the proposed tribunal system to be insufficient, as it did not

11
Nicholas Casey, “Colombia’s peace deal promising a new era” New York Times, accessed on 17 august 2019,
<[Link]
12
Ibid
allow for prison time for former rebels. Some argued it would amount to amnesty for human
rights violators. The rejected deal also would have allowed for former FARC members to create
a political party and run for elected office.

In December 2016, Colombia’s Congress approved a revised peace agreement, which was not
put to a national referendum. Under the new terms, the FARC pledged to hand over all of its
assets for reparations, and the punishments that former FARC members would face, short of
prison time, were better defined. The provision allowing political representation remained, but
former members were banned from running for office in former conflict zones. Two weeks after
the agreement won congressional approval, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of a
government plan to expedite its implementation. On December 28, Congress approved an
amnesty for perpetrators of minor crimes, an element of the deal the rebel group demanded be in
place before they demobilized and disarmed.13 Former FARC members then began moving to
designated demobilization zones, marking the start of the first stage of a government plan to
achieve full disarmament by April 2017.

PEACE AGREEMENT REFERENDUM

PLEBISCITE VOTE

It means a vote by which the people of an entire country or district express an opinion for or
against a proposal especially on a choice of government or ruler.

Plebiscite vote in Colombia and why it failed

Everything about Colombia’s plebiscite for peace was unexpected. Not just the dramatic result –
a rejection of the peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) that was supposed to end 52 years of civil war.

The deal had been widely expected to pass. Low voter turnout and an impassioned opposition to
the deal, led by the nation’s former president, resulted in a defeat.

13
“Alternatives to war: colombia’s peace process” (conciliation resources), accessed on 17 august 2019, <
[Link]
Pundits in and out of Colombia never imagined the deal would be voted down, but the outcome
was hardly inexplicable. The reason for the outcome was not, as official advertising in favour of
the referendum for the peace deal insinuated, that those campaigning for a No “want war.”14

Nor was there any truth to the claim, advanced in the violent rhetoric of the opposition campaign,
that those who voted Sí were “surrendering to terror”.15

As to the question of the peace deal itself, many Colombians refused the government’s premise
that the only alternative to this peace deal was a continuation of violence.

The deal included plans for reintegrating former guerrillas into society that were deemed too
lenient by a significant slice of a Colombian electorate fed up with the FARC. Almost all
Colombians wanted peace, but disagreed over whether the accord amounted to a necessary
political settlement or unwarranted amnesty for criminals.

But beyond the merits or demerits of the peace accord, the No’s triumph was also the product of
government manipulation of the plebiscitary process that is all too common in direct democracy.

And, paradoxically, the manipulation occurred in in the context of a plebiscite that was
institutionally unnecessary. The government was not required to submit this referendum to
people; it chose to.

Manipulation

What’s the story behind this manipulation – and the boomerang against the peace deal? It’s
important to start with the recognition that even in the best democracies, all electoral acts, be
they to choose our representatives or to decide a matter via a direct vote, can be abused.

Robust democracies have a number of institutional mechanisms – from poll observers to full and
free media coverage – that can counter such attempts to abuse the process. But there is no perfect
system.

14
“Alternatives to war: colombia’s peace process” (conciliation resources), accessed on 17 august 2019, <
[Link]
15
Aila M. Matanock and Miguel García-Sánchez, “the Colombian paradox: peace processes, elite divisions and
popular plebiscides” Daedalus, accessed on 17 August 2019, <[Link]
paradox-peace-processes-elite-divisions-popular-plebiscites>
Modern direct democracy is open to manipulation. You can bias a vote in how you draft the
question that is put to voters. Sometimes the campaigning and civic discussion can happen too
quickly.

The design of the election, from how polling places are selected to how public employees deal
with voters and ballots, can be changed to favour one side or another.

Deep media bias can also be a factor, with one side able to flood the public with information,
overwhelming contrary information and opinions.

Severe problems

In the run-up to the Colombia plebiscite, the manipulation included all of these elements,
simultaneously. Some problems were particularly severe.

The question posed to voters was clearly biased in favor of the peace deal: “Do you support the
final agreement to end the conflict and the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace?”16

There was little time for discussion or decanting of ideas and positions. The election institution
tinkered with the process — specifically the quorums for participation and approval — to seek
advantage for the Sí side.

The state was not neutral on the question; public employees were allowed to be actively for only
one of the options. And finally there was an advertising blitz that amounted to emotional
blackmail: if you vote No, voters were told, you wanted to the continuation of conflict.

Put all these issues together, and Colombia’s plebiscite couldn’t pass the minimum test of
democratic fairness.

Public sentiment

The self-righteous nature of the government’s campaign in favour of its accord led many voters
inclined to vote No to avoid tipping their hands prior to the election.

As a result, pollsters failed to capture public sentiment.

16
Aila M. Matanock and Miguel García-Sánchez, “the Colombian paradox: peace processes, elite divisions and
popular plebiscides” Daedalus, accessed on 17 August 2019, <[Link]
paradox-peace-processes-elite-divisions-popular-plebiscites>
Imagine a typical average voter with some sympathy to the option No, because of concern about
the particular terms of this peace deal. If that person had government business, he or she would
find public employees wearing the “Sí” logos, with doves, in any public office. “Sí” posters
supporting the deal would be all over the office.17

New Venezuela

At the same time, the opposition was hardly without sin; it offered a wicked campaign, backed
by some of the society’s most reactionary sectors, that argued the government, through the peace
deal, was delivering the country to the terrorists of FARC.

The government was accused of appeasement, and the opposition raised the specter of the peace
deal turning the country into a new Venezuela.

In the face of such pressure, the polite and expedient social norm among many Colombians
before the plebiscite , was to say nothing about the peace accord if you had nothing to say.

The simplistic messaging on behalf of the “Sí” as a vote for peace got in the way of an honest
pitch for the details of plan.

Inevitable

The government itself seemed to believe its own propaganda, that a vote for the deal was
inevitable. Witness the world preview party in Cartagena for the vote, attended by United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and authorities around the world, all celebrating the end
of violence.

The vote’s outcome was seen as a fait accompli. It was this impression of a fait accompli that led
to the defeat.

Actually, the way in which the plebiscite was being sold was backfiring under the surface.

17
Annette Idler, “Colombia votes no on the plebiscide” The Washington Post, accessed on 17 august 2019, <
[Link]
for-peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/>
For one thing, why go to vote Yes if the vote is all but certain? In the end, turnout was less than
37% of Colombia’s electorate of nearly 34.9 million, with just 6.38 million voting yes, or 18% of
eligible citizens.18

Far from ideal

For another, it’s possible that some people who might have voted Yes with huge doubts,
assuming a clear victory for the yes, felt comfortable voting no as a way of expressing that the
agreement is far from ideal, in the belief they wouldn’t harm the final results of the plebiscite.

The government was guilty of not living up to Colombia’s status as a democracy. It failed to give
the minimum consideration to the opposition, much less respect.

The vote would have gone better if the wording of the question and the media coverage had been
balanced, if the quorums had not been touched, and if public employees had been barred from
campaigning so actively

THE REVISED DEAL

After four years of formal talks between rebel and government negotiators, the two sides reached
an agreement. The deal was signed in an emotional ceremony before world leaders in the
Colombian city of Cartagena on 26 September.

But Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos had said from the start of the negotiations that he
wanted the Colombian people to have a say in the peace process. He had asked them to endorse
or reject the peace agreement in a popular vote held on 2 October. Polls had suggested the deal
would pass by a comfortable margin but in a shock result it was narrowly rejected. A bilateral
ceasefire was extended until the end of the year to give the two sides time to plan their next
steps.

18
Annette Idler, “Colombia votes no on the plebiscide” The Washington Post, accessed on 17 august 2019, <
[Link]
for-peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/>
President Santos met former President Alvaro Uribe, a vociferous opponent of the peace deal, to
listen to his objections. The government and the FARC then went back to the negotiating table to
try to strike a new deal acceptable to those who had voted "no". Changes were made to all but
one of the 57 points in the original agreement.19

The five main points which have been changed are:

 The FARC will have to declare all their assets and hand them over. The money will be
used for reparation payments for the victims of the conflict
 Concerns by religious groups that the agreement undermined family values have been
addressed
 A time limit of 10 years has been set for the transitional justice system
 FARC rebels will be expected to provide exhaustive information about any drug
trafficking they may have been involved in
 The peace agreement will not form part of Colombia's constitution

The new revised agreement was to be submitted to Congress for approval, rather than put to a
popular vote.

But opposition groups believed it still does not go far enough in punishing rebels for human
rights abuses.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and Rodrigo Londono, the leader of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, signed a new peace agreement despite lingering opposition
to the deal.

CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENTS

Comprehensive rural development

The main measures laid out include:

19
Charlotte Mitchell, “Colombia: Fragile peace a year after FARC referendum” (2017), accessed on 17 august 2019,
<[Link]
[Link]>
  A Land Fund would be created, to provide 'comprehensive access' to land for landless or
land-poor peasants. The lands would be acquired through judicial expiration of
ownership, recovery of illegally acquired land, expropriation for the social interest or
public utility or unexploited lands.
 The creation of an agricultural jurisdiction to ensure effective legal protection for rural
inhabitants' property rights.20
 Update and modernization of the rural cadastre and rural property tax. Creation of a
new high-level body formulating general guidelines for land use and implementing
reconversion programs. The agreement would strengthen citizen participation in land use
planning, with mechanisms for consultation with all levels of government and ethnic
minorities.
 The government would delimit the agricultural frontier and protect areas of special
environmental interest.
 The establishment of special development programs with a territorial
approach (PDET) to achieve structural transformation of rural Colombia, in priority
those regions which have been most affected by the conflict and poverty. The action
plans would be developed in a participatory manner aimed at fostering regional
transformation.
 Implementation of national plans for comprehensive rural reform, aimed at reducing
poverty by 50% and eradicating extreme poverty within a transitional phase of 10 years21.

Political participation

The main measures are

 Creation of a statute of the opposition following the signature of the final agreement,
following discussions in a commission made of legally recognized political parties and

20
Lilian Yaffe, “armed conflict in Colombia: analyzing the economic, social, and institutional causes of violent
opposition”(2013), accessed on 18 august 2019,
<[Link]
133/1509>
21
Ibid
 movements. No legislation defining guarantees for opposition parties has ever been
adopted, despite being required by article 112 of the 1991 Constitution22.
 Security guarantees for political activities, through the creation of a Comprehensive
Security System. These security guarantees would be aimed at protecting those who
participate in politics by respecting their human rights and dignity, preventing violence
and instilling a culture of tolerance and coexistence to prevent stigmatization and
persecution of political leaders.
 Creation of 16 Special Temporary Peace Constituencies for the election of
representatives to the Chamber of Representatives for two terms (2018-2022, 2022-
2026). These districts would be created in the regions most affected by the conflict,
which are also the regions where the FARC are strongest.23 The inhabitants of these
regions would be able to elect, during the transitional phase and on a temporary basis,
additional members to the lower house with special rules. Candidates must be regular
residents of the districts or displaced from them in the proc
 Facilitate the creation of new political parties and detach the attainment and
conservation of parties' legal status from the requirement to surpass the threshold in
congressional elections. During a transitional period of eight years, the state would give
special support to the creation of new parties through funding and outreach programs.
Adopt measures to promote equality of conditions during electoral campaigns.
 Promotion of electoral participation through national registration, education,
information and outreach campaigns.
 Increase the transparency of the electoral process and transparency in the allocation of
government advertising, by creating a national court for electoral guarantees,
strengthening the investigation of electoral crimes and ensuring greater transparency in
campaign financing.24

22
“Improved political participation in Colombia: a burning need in the midst of uncertainty” (NIMD), accessed on
18 August 2019, < [Link]
uncertainty/>
23
“Improved political participation in Colombia: a burning need in the midst of uncertainty” (NIMD), accessed on
18 August 2019, < [Link]
uncertainty/>
24
Ibid
  Electoral reform, including reform of the electoral bodies, to be discussed by a special
electoral mission.
 Promotion of a democratic and participatory political culture based on respect for
democratic values and principles, transparent management of public management
(banning patronage and corruption) and integration of marginalized communities
(women, LGBT, Afro-Columbians and indigenous peoples).
 A guarantees law for social organizations and movements which will, among other
things, guarantee their access to information, right to reply and correction and
participation in decision making.
 Guarantees for social protests, including both protesters and other citizens.
 Increased civic participation in institutional, regional and local media in order to inform
about the activities of different civil society organizations.
 Promote the participation and influence of citizens in territorial planning and budgeting,
with the creation of Territorial Planning Councils which would draw from various
organizations and movements.

Illicit drugs

The main measures announced are:

 Substitution of illicit crops, through a joint process of participatory planning with the
affected communities to ensure their active and effective participation in the decision-
making process and in the joint construction of solutions.
 Participatory planning processes to find solutions to illicit crops and poverty, in order
to establish a new alliance between the communities and the three levels of government
to solve communities' problems.
 Immediate assistance plans for illicit crops growers would be put in place. These would
include immediate food assistance, projects of quick income generation, options of
seasonal employment for migrant collectors, education, early childhood assistance,
generation of employment options, infrastructure projects.
 An evidence-based public health and human rights policy approach to the problem of
drug use, based on the view that drug use is a phenomenon of a multi-causal nature. State
 institutions, in coordination with communities and families, would establish a national
attention system including rehabilitation and social insertion measures.
 Strengthen the fight against money laundering in all economic sectors.
 Establish strict controls on the production and trafficking of chemical inputs for drug
production.
 Promotion of an international conference within the framework of the United Nations to
objectively evaluate the war on drugs and seek to build a new consensus around the
adjustments deemed necessary, taking into account the discussions and new international
developments on the matter.

END OF CONFLICT
The government and the FARC reached an agreement on three of the main points - bilateral and
definite ceasefire, decommissioning of weapons and security guarantees - of the third item on the
agenda, 'end of the conflict', on June 23, 2016.

Bilateral and definite ceasefire

The bilateral and definite ceasefire is the definite end of hostilities and offensive actions between
the government and the FARC. Following the announcement of the final agreement on August
24, President Juan Manuel Santos declared that the bilateral and definite ceasefire would begin at
midnight on Monday, August 29, 2016. 25

Monitoring and Verification Mechanism

A tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MM&V) would monitor and verify
implementation of the agreement and compliance with the rules governing the ceasefire and
decommissioning of weapons. The MM&V would be integrated by representatives of the
Colombian government, the FARC and an International Component made up of unarmed United
Nations (UN) observers from Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
member states26. The mechanism would have three instances or levels: one national, eight

25
Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict” (2017), CFR, accessed on 16 August 2019,
<[Link]
26
“End-Of-Conflict: Evidence From Colombian’s Peace Agreement” (2018), accessed on 18 august 2019, <
[Link]
regional verifying structures and 'some' local monitoring structures. The International
Component would preside over all levels of the mechanism, resolve disagreements (such as
incidents and violations of the ceasefire or disarmament), present recommendations and present
written reports.

Decommissioning

The decommissioning of weapons is a "technical, traceable and verifiable procedure through

which the UN receives all the weapons of the FARC to destine them to the construction of 3
monuments. The FARC's decommissioning involved the following technical procedures:
registration, identification, monitoring and verification of possession, collection, storage,
disablement, removal and final disposition. In short, after the UN registered, identified and
verified possession of weapons, it collected all of the FARC's weapons, stored them in specific
containers, removed them from the zone and disposed of them by building three monuments.

Five days after the formal signature of the final agreement, the FARC provided the UN with the
necessary information for the decommissioning. The FARC contributed by different means,
including the provision of information and the cleaning and decontamination of areas affected
by landmines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnances and explosive remnants of
war.

The decommissioning took place gradually over 6 months (180 days) from the formal signature
of the final agreement ('D-day'). All stages of the decommissioning process were verified by the
MM&V.

Security guarantees

On June 23, the government and the FARC also announced a set of security guarantees to protect
the security of all inhabitants, and specific measures for the protection of communities, social
movements, political movements and the FARC's future political movement. In addition, the
agreement includes the implementation of measures to intensify the effectiveness and
comprehensiveness of the fight against criminal organizations which threaten the peace. Some of
the main objectives of these security guarantees are respect, protection and promotion of human
rights; ensure the State's legitimate monopoly one the use of force throughout the territory and
strengthening the administration of justice.
The main security guarantees and measures are:

 A national political pact from the regions and with all political parties and movements,
unions, civil society and all other major participants in the civic life of Colombia
rejecting the use of arms in politics or the promotion of violent organizations like
paramilitarism.
 A National Commission of Security Guarantees presided by the President would have the
goal of designing and monitoring public and criminal policy on the dismantlement of all
criminal organizations and persecution of other criminal conducts threatening the peace
agreement.
 A Special Investigation Unit within the Attorney General's office for the dismantlement
of all criminal organizations and paramilitary successor organizations. It would
investigation, prosecution and indictment of criminal organizations responsible for
homicides, massacres, gender violence or attacks on social and political movements.
 POLITICAL IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT
In 2002 Alvaro Uribe was elected president and instituted a policy of “Democratic Security” that
mobilized resources for war. With strong U.S. support, he successfully used the Colombian
Army and regained state control over key areas of the country, forcing FARC into defensive
positions. The president’s popularity surged. After Colombia’s Congress amended the
constitution to allow Uribe to run for a second successive four-year term, he successfully ran for
re-election in 200627. During the 2002 campaign, Uribe had announced that he would reach a
peace settlement with paramilitary groups. His administration conducted negotiations and
announced that the groups had agreed to disarm. From 2003 to 2006, more than 30,000 fighters
demobilized, motivated in part by the promise of a general pardon of fighters, and reduced prison
sentences for mid- and high-level commanders with criminal responsibility for grave crimes. The
demobilization process, however, proved faulty, and several paramilitary groups reemerged. The
special criminal procedure established under the Justice and Peace Law documented atrocities
committed by paramilitaries and the groups’ links to government officials and institutions. But
the partial confessions of only about 150 paramilitary members have been processed, and none
of the criminal cases that began in 2006 is near an end28. In May 2008 the government took a
step back from truth-seeking and justice by extraditing 15 demobilized paramilitary members to
the United States on drug charges, including seven top military commanders. In October 2008
judges in U.S. federal courts sentenced two of the extradited men to prison terms of more than 20
years. After receiving the sentence, one of the commanders announced that he would no longer
collaborate with the Colombian process. 29

Despite the armed conflict, Colombia maintains a strong array of rule-of-law institutions. The
1991 constitution includes a comprehensive bill of rights, provisions securing the independence
of the judiciary, and other checks and balances on executive power. Since 1991 the
Constitutional Court has developed a progressive jurisprudence that affirms the rights of victims
of human rights violations and protects individual liberties. Criminal legislation generally
incorporates international obligations. Moreover, several laws exist that address victims’ rights

27
“An Overview of Conflict in Colombia”, (ICJT), accessed on 18 august 2019,
<[Link]
28
Ibid
29
Alexandra Phelan, “Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's
Political Participation”, taylor and francis online, accessed on 18 august 2019, <
[Link]
generally, protect internally displaced persons and seek to combat forced disappearances. But
there is a vast gap between the law and its enforcement in many areas of the country. The
judiciary’s standards for adjudicating conflicts over complex social issues—from abortion and
the rights of sexual minorities to war atrocities—are far more progressive than most others in the
hemisphere. Some cases involving human rights violations that go through the criminal justice
system and judicial reparations process do in fact bring justice. Judicial authorities successfully
bring to trial corrupt officials, crime rings, mob-bosses, military officials and members of illegal
armed groups. 30

While the Peace Agreement provides implementation mechanisms that support the insurgency's
transition from armed group to political party, it also complements the FARC's political strategy
that has traditionally maintained consistency. This agreement brought to an end an armed
conflict which had debilitated the people of Colombia for more than 50 years, and which had
profound economic, political and social effects, creating painful divisions in Colombian society,
its social fabric and within families. once the Agreement was signed, a series of murderous
attacks was unleashed against the FARC ex-combatants and their families as well as against
leaders and activists on the political Left, human rights defenders, environmentalists, peasants,
students, indigenous people, and Afro-descendants, a relentless wave of criminal extermination
that reminds us of the dark period when the Patriotic Union was obliterated31. For its part, the
Colombian State has failed to fulfill its commitment to combat and dismantle the paramilitary
forces and to make them subject to the force of the law. ‘La Violencia’ came to an end through a
constitutionally sanctioned power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative
parties, known as the ‘National Front’. The accord, however, eliminated political competition.
Any political activity outside these two options was often repressed, and attacks on Communist
enclaves led to the transformation of the peasant communities into mobile guerrilla groups,
especially following the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

Preventing further violence hinges on effective collective reintegration and reincorporating

former combatants into society, compensating victims and returning their lands, and addressing

30
Alexandra Phelan, “Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's
Political Participation”, taylor and francis online, accessed on 18 august 2019, <
[Link]
31
Ibid
the socioeconomic disparities and political exclusion at the root of the conflict. The government
has also continued to pursue peace negotiations with a smaller insurgency, the National
Liberation Army. Now the Colombian government even considers the rights of women, youth,
the LGBTQ community, Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, it creates a more
sustainable foundation for peace.
 CONCLUSION

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia—People's Army (the FARC-EP or FARC) commits to reforming political
participation, especially of traditionally marginalized sectors throughout the country to
consolidate Colombian democracy. While the Peace Agreement provides implementation
mechanisms that support the insurgency's transition from armed group to political party, it also
complements the FARC's political strategy that has traditionally maintained consistency. A
historic peace accord ended the 50-year armed conflict between the Colombian government and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016. Following the terms of the
agreement, in 2017, more than 10,000 FARC combatants surrendered over 8,000 weapons and
consolidated into 26 encampments, transitioning to civilian life. Implementing the accord —
which means cementing the agreement into national legislation and ensuring its provisions reach
all corners of the country equitably — remains difficult. Amidst all this the US institute of peace
has worked for Columbia’s peace process. In 2014, USIP launched the Initiative to Measure
Peace and Conflict Outcomes (IMPACT) to develop simple, but rigorous, data-collection tools to
monitor peace building programs and assess progress toward meaningful objectives, like
reducing violent incidents, resolving disputes, and increasing trust in local government. In
Colombia, the IMPACT team works with five local peace building organizations to support
innovative programming and identifies best practices to measure success. Unlike other
monitoring techniques, IMPACT is simple, cost-effective, scalable, and applicable for a wide
range of organizations.