Obligations (EC-36/DG.16 dated 4 March 2004, Corr.1 dated 15 Conference of the States Parties (C-9/6, dated 2 December 2004).

March 2004 and Add.1 dated 25 March 2004); Information on 13

the Implementation of the Plan of Action for the Implementation Conference decision C-9/DEC.4 dated 30 November 2004,
of Article VII Obligations (S/433/2004 dated 25 June 2004); Second [Link].
Progress Report on the OPCW Plan of Action Regarding the 14
Note by the Director-General: Report on the Plan of Action
Implementation of Article VII Obligations (EC-38/DG.16 dated Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations (EC-
15 September 2004; Corr.1 dated 24 September 2004; and Corr.2 42/DG.8 C-10/DG.4 and Corr.1 respectively dated 7 and 26
dated 13 October 2004); Report on the OPCW Plan of Action September 2005; EC-M-25/DG.1 C-10/DG.4/Rev.1, Add.1 and
Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations (C-9/ Corr.1, respectively dated 2, 8 and 10 November 2005).
DG.7 dated 23 November 2004); Third Progress Report on the 15
OPCW Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article One-hundred and fifty-six drafts have been submitted by 93
VII Obligations (EC-40/DG.11 dated 16 February 2005; Corr.1 States Parties. In some cases, States Parties have requested
dated 21 April 2005; Add.1 dated 11 March 2005; and Add.1/ advice on drafts several times during their governmental
Corr.1 dated 14 March 2005); Further Update on the Plan of consultative process. Most of the drafts commented on are still
Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations going through the process of parliamentary approval.
(EC-41/DG.12 dated 15 June 2005 and Corr.1 dated 24 June 2005); 16
United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, dated 28 April
Report on the Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of 2004.
Article VII Obligations (EC-42/DG.8 C-10/DG.4, dated 7 September 17
2005; Corr.1 dated 26 September 2005; C-10/DG.4/Rev.1 EC-M- See further, Article IV of the UN-OPCW Relationship Agreement,
25/DG.1 dated 2 November 2005; Add.1 dated 8 November 2005; Council document EC-MXI/DEC.1 dated 1 September 2000,
and Corr.1 dated 10 November 2005). adopted by the Conference in C-VI/DEC.5 dated 17 May 2001.
18
11
Reports on the sessions of the Council: paragraph 6 of EC-36/ The follow-up decision expresses the objective “measures … to
3, dated 26 March 2004; paragraph 7 of EC-38/2 dated 15 October ensure fulfilment by all States Parties of their Article VII
2004; subparagraphs 6.1 to 6.3 of EC-40/2 dated 18 March 2005; obligations,” (operative paragraph 14) in contrast to the original
subparagraphs 5.11 to 5.13 of EC-41/5 dated 1 July 2005; Action Plan decision language, “measures … to ensure
paragraph 7 of EC-42/5 dated 30 September 2005; and compliance by all States Parties with Article VII” (operative
subparagraphs 3.1 to 3.3 of EC-M-25/4 dated 11 November 2005. paragraph 19).
19
12
Subparagraph 9.1 of the Report of the Ninth Session of the C-10/DG.4/Rev.1 EC-M-25/DG.1, page 3, paragraph 12.

Historical Note no. 5

Alibek, Tularaemia and The Battle of Stalingrad

Erhard Geissler
Professor of Genetics and, until his retirement, Head of the Bioethical Research Group at the
Max-Delbrück Centre for Molecular Medicine, Berlin-Buch, Germany.

False allegations of the development, production and/or use Francisella tularensis, the agent causing tularaemia, is
of biological weapons (BW) were major triggers for the one of the most pathogenic bacteria known, and can be easily
biological arms race that took place after World War I,1 and disseminated. For these reasons, it is considered a candidate
in the end led to the invasion in Iraq by the US and their allies. BW agent.5 Experts of a CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup
In this paper, I will deal with claims that the Soviet Red placed F. tularensis in that category of biological agents that
Army used Francisella tularensis as a biological weapon in “have the greatest potential for adverse public health impact
WW II. Throughout WW II the Germans were very afraid with mass casualities”.6 In the past, F. tularensis has been
of enemy use of BW following the discovery of the French studied, produced, weaponized, and stockpiled by Japan, by
BW facility Laboratoire de prophylaxie at the Poudrerie the US, and by the Soviet Union.7 France likewise at least
nationale du Bouchet in Vert le Petit.2 Every outbreak of considered the use of F. tularensis before WWII.8 Recently,
infectious diseases or intoxinations in the homeland and in concerns have once again focused on the possible use of this
occupied regions, especially those deviating from the norm, agent for bioterrorism,9 and F. tularensis was indeed procured
had been thoroughly investigated.3 But by the end of WW II, by the Rajneeshee sect while planning their bioterrorist
only a few cases of biosabotage had been detected by the activities in 1984,10 though in the end, they decided to use
Germans.4 Salmonella typhimurium as a sabotage agent instead.11
So when Ken Alibek, alias Kantjan Alibekov, a former However, there had been no claims that this agent had
director of the Soviet BW organization Biopreparat, alleged ever actually been used for hostile purposes.
after his defection to the West that the Soviet Red Army had But in a hearing in 1998, Alibek mentioned: “My own
used Francisella tularensis as a weapon against German analysis of a tularaemia outbreak among German troops in
troops in WW II, it was not only scholars of BW history who southern Russia in 1942 indicates that this incident was very
took notice. likely the result of the USSR’s use of biological weapons.” 12

CBWCB 69+70 page 10 September / December2005

Alibek repeated and substantiated this claim in his widely read German panzer troops late in the summer of 1942.
book Biohazard. A similar claim was made recently in the Within a week of the initial German outbreak,
Russian newspaper Pravda.13. thousands of Russian soldiers and civilians living in
As a cadet in 1973, Alibek was reportedly requested by the Volga region also came down with tularaemia.28
one of his professors to evaluate a “mysterious outbreak of Likewise, according to the article in Pravda “[t]he
tularaemia on the German-Soviet front shortly before the use of infected rats against the Nazi army had an
Battle of Stalingrad in 1942”. He assessed the voluminous inverse effect too: the disease came over the front line,
History of Soviet Military Medicine in the Great Patriotic and infected a lot of Soviet soldiers”.
War¨1941-1945 as well as scientific journals from the war-
time period, and he came to the conclusion mentioned above.14 But: The outbreak did not affect German troops first. When
But one should have some reservations about Alibek’s German troops approached the region some soldiers developed
claims, not least because he based them neither on personal tularaemia “subsequent to infections among the Russian
experience nor on documents conclusively proving the alleged civilian population”.29 Gerhard Rose, Chief Consultant in
use of F. tularensis as BW by the Red Army. Moreover, in Tropical Medicine to the German Air Force, pointed out in an
the absence of hard facts, Alibek’s claims are not convincingly interrogation “that the Germans were greatly surprised to find
supported by his arguments, which are summarized below. extensive epidemics of tularaemia in Russia among the civilian
Hence, the members of a “Working Group on Civilian population in the Donetz Basin and along the Black Sea”.30
Biodefense”, convened by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Besides, the outbreaks of tularaemia did not start in the
Studies, Johns Hopkins University Schools of Medicine, summer but in the winter: the 1941-42 outbreak lasted from
mentioned rather cautiously that “Ken Alibek has suggested October until June, with a peak in January (14,000 cases)31,
that tularaemia outbreaks affecting tens of thousands of Soviet and the 1942-43 epidemic started in November and lasted
and German soldiers on the eastern European front during until the end of February.32
World War II may have been the result of intentional use”15
[emphasis added]. Other experts pointed out, that Alibek’s 3. According to Alibek, the number of cases of tularaemia
“report has not been substantiated”.16 Croddy and Krcalova, rose from a normal figure of about 10,000 in 1941 to
in evaluating several reports published in Soviet-Russian more than 100,000 in 1942, whereas the incidence of
journals, concluded that the epidemic was not caused by the the disease returned to 10,000 in 1943.
deliberate dissemination of F. tularensis but rather “was a
natural outbreak” caused by “a complete breakdown in public But this assertion is to be doubted, too. The peak of the 1942-
health infrastructure”.17 43 epidemic was not reached in 1942 but in mid-January
Up to now, only a few contemporary German sources 1943.33
have been considered 18 in order to prove or disprove Alibek’s Furthermore, according to the leading Soviet epidemiologist
claim. Therefore, encouraged by Stefan Winkle19 I undertook Victor Zhdanov, about 100,000 cases per annum had been
to assess – in addition to some Russian papers – more reported throughout the 1940s and not only in that particular
contemporary reports published by German medical officers year.34 And in any case, independently of the difference in
– three of whom were serving in a panzer army at the time these figures, the following numbers make it clear how
in question – and to compare them with the arguments made marginal the impact of the epidemic actually was on the
by Alibek and the author of the Pravda paper, respectively: capability of the German troops: While Gerhard Rose recalled
that the cases of tularaemia among the Russian people during
1. A “mysterious outbreak of tularaemia on the German- the war “numbered hundreds of thousands”35, only 130
Soviet front [occurred] shortly before the Battle of German soldiers suffered from tularaemia in 1941-4236, and
Stalingrad in 1942”.20 during the period 1939-4337 altogether 1771 cases of tulara-
emia had been diagnosed in the German field forces (plus an
But: The outbreak of 1942 was not “mysterious” at all, since additional two in the replacement forces). Moreover, these
it was not the first epidemic of tularaemia in the land-bridge figures include cases diagnosed among troops serving in
between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Since 192621 Norway. Hence, the claim made in the Pravda article that
several large outbreaks had been reported:22 in 1938 there “about 50 percent of German prisoners who were taken
was an epidemic causing several thousand cases of captive after the battle of Stalingrad, were suffering from
tularaemia,23 and another large outbreak occurred during the classic symptoms of tularaemia”38 is simply not credible.
winter of 1941-42.24 From a German perspective, tularaemia was indeed a war
Tularaemia was in fact endemic in that region.25 For this disease, but of much less importance than other diseases39.
reason, an effective protective system had been organized In fact, in a contemporary monograph on war diseases,
by the Soviet administration before the German occupation. tularaemia was not even mentioned at all40.
An important element of the protective system involved wiping 4. Alibek mentioned that most of the journals he studied
out mice and other murine rodents (the main transmitters of in the course of his evaluation “reported this as a
the disease − and of plague, which was also endemic in that naturally occurring epidemic”. Nevertheless, he came
area) by the use of so-called “deratisators”.26 In January 1941, to a different conclusion41.
recommendations had also been issued by the High Command
of the Soviet Southwest army in order to prevent tularaemia.27 But like Winkle42 and like Croddy and Krcalova43 I am
convinced that the journals studied by Alibek drew the correct
2. Alibek claims that a large outbreak of tularaemia conclusions. One of the papers which should have been
suddenly occurred in the Volga region first among available to Alibek during his studies in 1973 was published

September / December 2005 page 11 CBWCB 69+70

by leading Soviet expert I.I. Rogozin44. Rogozin observed that from pulmonary tularaemia60. And a Russian expert
there had been a massive multiplication of infected rodents. reported that 95.2% of Soviet soldiers were affected
He concluded that “a decisive source of the infection [with F. by pulmonary tularaemia in December 1942 – January
tularensis] revealed the inhalation of dust when contaminated 1943 61 .
straw was used as mattresses”. This assessment is to be
taken very seriously since Rogozin was head of the anti- But this high percentage of pulmonary infections is not a
epidemic department of the People’s Health Commissariat proof of the hostile spread of the pathogens. Pulmonary
(i.e. the Ministry of Health) who himself studied the outbreak tularaemia arises not only after a deliberate spread of F.
in 1942 on the spot45 a. Correspondingly, according to a Soviet tularensis, but also because of inhaled dust from contaminated
monograph, since the fighting persisted in the region throughout straw, hay or soil. Most of the cases of inhalationary tularaemia
the normal period of the grain harvest, the crops were left had been caused by the use of hay for bedding in dug-outs
standing in the fields, providing ample food for the murine and trenches62. Rogozin concluded from such data that the
rodents, and causing an intensive multiplication in their inhalation of dust was the decisive factor for the infection63.
numbers. That supported their infection with Francisella In some cases, the occurrence of the disease disappeared
tularensis. In consequence, the infected animals contaminated within days when a military camp was moved from a field to
large areas of the regions of Rostov, Stalingrad and a forest. On the other hand, soldiers developed tularaemia
Woroschilowgrad and caused outbreaks of tularaemia in that within a short time - even within 36 hours - when a bivouac
area 46. was transferred from a forest to a field64.
These conclusions totally correspond with assessments
drawn and published during WW II by German medical 6. When Alibek told his professor that the pattern of the
officers in at least eight articles. Each of these papers describe disease “suggests that this epidemic was caused
more or less at length that the outbreak was caused by field intentionally”, the professor asked him not to talk
mice, forest mice, shrews and other rodents, which multiplied about this assumption again and never to mention it
rapidly because crops remained unharvested and the grass to anyone 65. This reaction “convinced” Alibek that
uncut because of the war, thus providing a large source of the “Soviet troops must have sprayed tularaemia at
food for the rodents47. the Germans. A sudden change in the direction of the
Another reason for the enormous multiplication of the wind, or contaminated rodents passing through the
rodents – according to both German and Russian experts – lines, had infected our soldiers and the disease had
was that the systems established to prevent plague and then spread through the region”66.
tularaemia had totally collapsed as a consequence of the
war48, 49. But the reaction of the professor is clearly not proof
The animals – a high percentage of which were infected substantiating Alibek’s assumption. On the contrary, the
with Francisella tularensis50 – excreted the bacteria with professor might have been attempting to prevent his student
their faeces so that the bacteria were disseminated with the from spreading a crazy unproven idea.
dust from the fields and/or with contaminated bread and other
food51. The majority of soldiers treated in a military hospital 7. Later Alibek met an elderly lieutenant colonel of the
specializing in tularaemia had been infected orally by Red Army, who worked in a secret BW laboratory in
contaminated bread and other food.52 Gerhard Rose recalled Kirov during WW II. The officer told him that a
that tularaemia “was transmitted by direct contact through tularaemia weapon had been developed in 1941. He
food, or by mice and rats”53. Occasionally the bacteria had left Alibek “with no doubt that the weapon had been
been transmitted also by insects (especially mosquitos and used” 67 .
ticks)54, by contaminated water55and – sometimes – by biting Presumably the Soviet pre-war BW programme did
mice56. (The outbreaks of 1926 and 1928 were caused by indeed already include activities with F. tularensis68.
water rats who were present in consequence of the flooding According to leading BW expert Professor Heinrich
of the river Volga57.) Kliewe, a Soviet prisoner of war had testified before
In order to protect the German troops from tularaemia, the German Abwehr in 1942 that “joint experiments
the soldiers were advised to follow the recommendations - with tularaemia agents were made with good success
issued by the Soviet Southwest army back in 1941 - not to on the Isle of Wosroschdenije. The bacteria emulsions
take up quarters in contaminated villages or, better still, to were supposedly filled in ‘tanks’ fastened to motor
bypass the villages altogether. Contaminated hay or straw vehicles. They were dispersed as microbe clouds under
should be contained in trenches and burned. Such activities high pressure in the direction of the wind; also little
should be performed preferably “by civilians who had already glass balloons and infected metal darts were dropped
survived tularaemia”58. from airplanes”69. This information prompted Kliewe
5. Because 70 percent of the infected persons suffered in 1943 to recommend measures for protection from
from pulmonary tularaemia, Alibek concluded that hostile spread of F. tularensis and other pathogens70.
“only exposure to a sudden and concentrated quantity By the way, allegations regarding the misuse of
of tularaemia could explain the onslaught of infections Francisella tularensis have a long tradition in the
in the German troops alone” and that the pneumonic USSR. In 1931 German epidemiologist Professor
form of the disease “could only have been caused by Heinrich Zeiss was expelled from the Soviet Union after
purposeful dissemination”.59 Indeed, according to a being involved in the control of plague, tularaemia
German publication, 80% of the patients did suffer and other infectious diseases for more than ten years.

CBWCB 69+70 page 12 September / December2005

 Zeiss was accused of having provided German Acknowledgements
facilities with F. tularensis “for military purposes” (note I thank Professor [Link]. Stefan Winkle for numerous
71). 48 of his Russian collaborators were imprisoned. suggestions and critical review of this article; Oberstarzt
About ten years later leading Soviet microbiologists [Link]. Ernst-Juergen Finke for the German translation of
have been accused and imprisoned again, some of Rogozin’s article and of some paragraphs of Smirnov et al.
whom even executed, because they had allegedly as well as for the provision of several documents and helpful
performed biosabotage and spread, inter alia, comments; [Link]. Ernst Buder for the German translation
tularaemia between 1939-41 (Merkulov, note 72). of Belousowa’s paper.

But Kliewe did not mention any alleged or actual use of

bacteria as weapons by Soviet troops or saboteurs73. Apart Notes
from Alibek’s claims, there have been no reports on the actual 1
Geißler, E. Anthrax und das Versagen der Geheimdienste. Berlin:
use of F. tularensis as a warfare agent or in bioterrorist attacks. Kai Homilius Verlag, 2003.
There have been also no other reports regarding an alleged 2
Geißler, E. Biologische Waffen – nicht in Hitlers Arsenalen.
use of BW by the Red Army which was obviously not prepared Biologische und Toxin-Kampfmittel in Deutschland von 1915
to use such weapons during WW II for several reasons74. bis 1945. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2nd revised ed., 1999, pp. 293-
Neither German medical officers nor Soviet authors 300.
considered in their publications the possibility of a hostile spread 3
Geißler 1999, [Link]., pp. 423-438.
of tularaemia agents as a possible source for the infections
4
observed. Likewise, the sanitary officers did not discuss such ibid.
a possibility in private contacts with Eduard Boecker of the 5
World Health Organization 1970, Health Aspects of Chemical
Robert Koch-Institute, Berlin, who was involved in the and Biological Weapons. Report of a WHO Group of
diagnostics of tularaemia and other diseases during the war75. Consultants, Geneva, pp 75-76; World Health Organization,
After the war Kliewe mentioned the “alleged possibility of Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons:
the Russians using bacterial clouds of plague and tularaemia”76 WHO Guidance, 2nd ed., Geneva: World Health Organization,
but testified that “although there seems to have been a belief 2004, pp 250-254; Dennis, T., T.V. Inglesby, D.A. Henderson et
that the Russians were all ready to use BW there is complete al. “Tularemia as a biological weapons. Medical and public health
absence of any documentary proof of this, despite the fact management”, [Link]. vol 285 no 21 (2001), pp 2763-
73.
that the Germans overran two of the alleged BW stations”77.
6
Similarly, Walter Hirsch, head of the German BW committee Rotz, L.D., A.S. Khan, S.R. Lillibridge et al. “Public health
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Blitzableiter reported that “[o]nly the assessment of potential terrorism agents”, Emerging Infectious
employment by the [BW ]agents [presumably studied by the Diseases vol 8 no 2 (2002), pp 225-230.
Russians] in the hinterland, mainly in Warsaw, and few other 7
Dennis et al., [Link].
large places in the zone of communications such as Kiew 8
Kliewe,H. 1941, “Vortragsnotiz für den Herrn Chef des Stabes”.
and Minsk could be ascertained by the Germans”78. Geheim. National Archives College Park, Record Group 319, Box
1, Folder BW 2, pp 15-18.
8. According to Alibek, “such large numbers” of German 9
panzer troops suffered from tularaemia that the Nazi Oyston, P.C.F., A. Sjostedt and R.W. Titball, “Tularaemia:
campaign in southern Russia ground to a temporary bioterrorism defence renews interest in Francisella tularensis”,
Nature Reviews/Microbiology vol 2 (December 2004), pp 967-
halt, thus suggesting that the German defeat at 78. [Link]/ reviews/micro.
Stalingrad was at least partially caused by that
10
outbreak 79 . Miller, J., S. Engelberg and W. Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons
and America’s Secret War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, p
The 4th Panzer Army did indeed interrupt their advance 27.
towards Stalingrad, but already in July 1942 – five months 11
Török, T.J., [Link], R.P. Wise et al. “A large community
before the first cases of tularaemia occurred in November outbreak of salmonellosis caused by intentional contamination
of that year 80. The advance of the troops towards Stalingrad of restaurant salad bars”, [Link]. vol 278 no 5 (1997),
was not delayed by the disease, but by Hitler. On 13 July pp 389-95.
1942 he gave orders to change the direction of their advance 12
Alibek, K. “Terrorist and intelligence operations: potential impact
southward to support the 1st Panzer Army, that had orders to on the U.S. economy”. Statement before the Joint Economic
cross river Don south of Stalingrad near Rostov, and to Committee, U.S. Congress, 20 May 1998. www/[Link]/jec/
approach the Caucasus Mountains81. This decision was hearings/intell/[Link]
revised only 18 days later when Hitler ordered instead that 13
“Soviet army used ‘rat weapon’ during WWII” [In Russian].
the 4th Panzer Army were to attack Stalingrad82. Pravda 5 February 2005. [Link]
[Link]?news_id=14923. Quoted in The CBW Conventions
According to the well-known military expert Basil Henry Bulletin No 68 (June 2005), p 21.
Liddell Hart, Hitler’s order of 13 July was a major cause for 14
Alibek, K. with S. Handelman. Biohazard, New York: Random
the German defeat in the battle of Stalingrad83. The Führer House, 1999, pp 29-30.
was responsible for the disaster, and not Francisella 15
tularensis (independent of whether the disease was Dennis et al. 2001, [Link].
weaponized and spread by the Red Army or not). 16
Oyston et al. 2004, [Link].

September / December 2005 page 13 CBWCB 69+70

17 43
Croddy, E. and S. Krcalova. “Tularemia, biological warfare, and Croddy and Krcalova 2001, [Link].
the battle for Stalingrad”, Military Med. vol 166 no 10 (2001), pp 44
837-38. Rogozin, I.I. 1970, “Prophylaxis of tularaemia during the Great
Patriotic War” [in Russian]. Zh. [Link].
18
Geißler 1999, [Link]., pp 890-91. Immunobiol. vol 47 no 5 (1970), pp 23-26.
19 45
Winkle, S. “Biowaffen-Legende von Stalingrad”, Hamburger Belousowa, T. 1998, “Plague“ [in Russian], Sowerschenno
Ärzteblatt, no 5 (2005) pp 232-37; Winkle, S, Geißeln der Sekretno, No. 10, pp 18-19.
Menschheit. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Seuchen 4th revised 46
ed., Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler, (2005), pp 1155-66. Smirnov, E.I., W.A. Lebedinskij and N.S. Garin. War and
Epidemics [in Russian], Moscow, 1988.
20
Alibek 1999, [Link]., p 30. 47
Gaede and Kairies, 1943, [Link]; Randerath, E.“Zur
21
Zeiss, H.“V. Die Pest in Rußland. I. Pestähnliche pathologischen Anatomie und zur Frage der Einteilung der
Lymphdrüsenentzündungen im Wolgadelta 1926. (Tularämie?)”, Erscheinungsformen der Tularämie des Menschen”, Münchener
Münchener [Link], no 27 (1929), pp 1137-39. [Link]. vol 90 no 32/33 (1943), pp 461-64; Schulten, H. and
22 Scheppach “Das klinische Bild der Tularämie”, Münchener
Jusatz, H. 1964, “Die geographische Verbreitung der Tularämie [Link], vol 90 no 32/33 (1943), pp 464-66; Bogendörfer.
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Geoepidemiologischer Atlas, vol 3 (1964), pp 35-37. 1945, [Link].
23
Bogendörfer, L., Saleck and H. Kairies. “Über das Auftreten von 48
Rogozin 1970, [Link].
Tularämieerkrankungen an der Ostfront“. Der Deutsche
49
Militärarzt vol 7no 11 (1942), pp 669-73. Walther 1944[?], [Link].
24 50
ibid. Schad. “Beitrag zur Epidemiologie, Bakteriologie und Serologie
25 der Tularämie”, Der Deutsche Militärarzt, vol 8 (1943), pp 620-
Zeiss, H. “Die Geomedizin des Ostraumes”, Deutsches 21.
Ärzteblatt vol 73 (1943), pp 130-142.
51
26 Landsiedl, A. 1942, “Ein Beitrag zur Epidemiologie und
Walther, K. “Seuchenvorkommen und Seuchenbekämpfung in Symptomatologie der Tularämie”, Der Deutsche Militärarzt. vol
Südostrußland”, unpublished manuscript, 1944[?]. 7 no 10 (1942), pp 644-47.
27
Quoted by Bogendörfer et al. 1942, [Link]. 52
Holler, G. and H. Wagner.“Erfahrungsbericht. Betr.:
28
Alibek 1999, [Link]., p 30. Berichterstattung über die Beobachtungen bei Tularämie-
29
Kranken im Reserve-Lazarett Gablitz in der Zeit vom 30.7.1942
Gaede, D. and A. Kairies. “Untersuchungen zur Epidemiologie bis 8.4.1943”. Bundesarchiv – Militärarchiv, Freiburg [Link]., RH
und Diagnostik der Tularämie”, Der Deutsche Militärarzt, vol 8 12-23/159, 1943.
no 1 (1943), pp 30-35.
53
30
Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee 1945, [Link].
Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.
54
“Interrogation of General Gerhard Rose, Vice-President of the Rogozin 1970, [Link].; Gaede and Kairies, 1943, [Link].
Robert Koch-Institute, Berlin, and Chief Consultant in Tropical 55
Rogozin 1970, [Link].; Bogendörfer 1943, [Link].
Medicine to the German Air Force”. CIOS Target N. 24/329
56
Medical, 25-26 June 1945. Public Record Office, Kew, UK, WO Bogendörfer et al. 1942, [Link]., Schulten und Scheppach 1943,
208/3971. [Link].
31 57
Jusatz 1964, [Link]. Zeiss, H.”VI. Die Pest in Rußland. II. Die pestähnlichen Seuchen
32 an der Oka und dem Ural im Jahre 1928. Tularämie?”, Münchener
Korth, W. “Serologische und bakteriologische Ergebnisse medizinische Wochschr. no 32 (1929), pp 1342-45.
während einer Tularämie-Epidemie im Osten”, Zbl. Bakteriol. I
58
Orig. vol 151 (1945) pp 394-99. Bogendörfer et al. 1942, [Link].
33 59
ibid. ibid.
34 60
Zhdanov, V. 1960, opening speech, 13th WHO General Assembly, Schulten and Scheppach 1943, [Link].
3 May, quoted by [Link] 1964, [Link]. 61
Boldyrev,T.T. ”Experiences of Soviet Medicine during the Great
35
Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee 1945, [Link]. Patriotic War” [in Russian], quoted by Rogozin, [Link].
36 62
Müller, H. “Vorläufiger Sanitätsbericht des deutschen Heeres Bogendorfer et al. 1942, [Link].
1939-1943”. Unpublished manuscript, 1944[?]. 63
Rogozin 1970, [Link].
37
Fischer, H. Der deutsche Sanitätsdienst 1921-1945. Osnabrück: 64
Biblio Verlag, , vol 4C (1985), p 3430. Schad 1943. [Link].
65
38
Pravda 2005, [Link]. Alibek, [Link]., p 30.
66
39
Kupplich, Y. Funktion und Leistungen der Beratenden ibid.
Internisten im Heeressanitätsdienst der deutschen Wehrmacht 67
Alibek 1999, [Link]., p 31.
1939-1945, Dissertation: Universität Leipzig, 1996. 68
Hirsch, W. Soviet Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare
40
Schloßberger, H. Kriegsseuchen. Jena: Gustav Fischer Verlag, Preparations and Capabilities, Washington, DC; US Army
1945. Chemical Intelligence Branch, 104, 1951. Sussex Harvard
41
Alibek 1999, [Link]. p 30. Information Bank.
69
42
Winkle 2005, [Link]. Kliewe, H.1943A, “Der Bakterienkrieg”. Geheime
Kommandosache. [Link] 1943, National Archives, College

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 74
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Report from Geneva Review no 24

The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, 2005

As reported in Bulletin 68 (June 2005), the Meeting of This provided the States Parties with an excellent starting
Experts of the States Parties of the Biological and Toxin point from which to develop language to meet the requirement
Weapons Convention (BWC) on 13 to 24 June 2005 had made of the mandate for the Meeting of State Parties in December
significant progress in considering the single topic identified 2005 to ‘discuss, and promote common understandings
for 2005: and effective action’.

v. The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes Preparations for the Meeting of States Parties, 2005
of conduct for scientists; The Final Report (BWC/MSP/2004/MX/3 dated 5 August
2005) of the Meeting of Experts comprised a report of 5 pages
by producing a report (BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3 dated 5 August together with Annex I, a 39 page listing of the considerations,
2005 – this and other official BWC documentation is available lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions, and
at [Link] Attached to the report as Annex I proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working
was a paper prepared by the Chairman listing the papers and interventions made by delegations on the topic
considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, under discussion at the Meeting; and Annex II, a 6 page listing
conclusions, and proposals drawn from the presentations, of the documents of the Meeting of Experts.
statements, working papers and interventions made by The Chairman, Ambassador John Freeman of the UK,
delegations on the topics under discussion at the Meeting. wrote to the States Parties on 20 September 2004 to say that
The report, as in the report from MX/2004 a year earlier, he intended to continue to follow precedent established in
stated that ‘[t]he Meeting of Experts noted that it was the previous years of this process and will work with the regional
Chairman’s view that the paper could assist delegations in groups and individual States Parties closely and transparently.
their preparations for the Meeting of States Parties in To that end he attached a five page synthesis of the Annex to
December 2005 and in its consideration of how best to the report of the Meeting of Experts encompassing the
“discuss, and promote common understanding and considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations,
effective action on” the topic in accordance with the decision conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations,
of the Fifth Review Conference.’ statements, working papers and interventions from that
September / December 2005 page 15 CBWCB 69+70