1.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 60741-43 December 22, 1989

NEEDLE QUEEN CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
MANUELA A. NICOLAS, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION OF
THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND THE MINISTER OF LABOR, respondents.

Belmonte, Vega & Associates for petitioner.

Romeo R. Lobregat for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the
Resolution of the respondent Minister of Labor dated January 22, 1982 (p. 56, Rollo) in cases NCR-
STF-3-1894-80, NCR-STF-3-2039-80, NCR-STF 42150-80, entitled, "Manuela A. Nicolas, et al.,
Complainants, versus Needle Queen Corporation, Respondent," which ed the order of the Regional
Director awarding separation pay and other monetary benefits to complainants.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On March 10, 1980, the Board of Directors of petitioner corporation decided to close its business and
cease operations due to business losses and financial reverses. Thus, the Board amended accordingly
the corporation's Articles of Incorporation to provide for the dissolution of its existence On the same
date, the petitioner corporation terminated the employment of private respondents.

It was only on March 17, 1980 that petitioner corporation filed with the Ministry of Labor (now
Department of Labor) an application for clearance to shutdown and/or report the termination of private
respondents.

On March 21, 26, 31 and April 7, 1980, private respondents filed their complaints with the Ministry of
Labor (now Department of Labor) for illegal dismissal, separation pay, unfair labor practice, non-
payment of service incentive leave, emergency allowance, and 13th month pay, in opposition to the
application for clearance to shutdown by petitioner.

On July 8, 1980, the Regional Director issued an order, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay individual

complainants separation pay benefits equivalent to one-half month salary for every
 year of service. Likewise, respondent is ordered to pay the complainants the deficiency
in emergency allowance from 1977 up to 1979 service incentive leave for 1977 as well
as the 13th month bonus owing to the complainants for l977 and their proportionate
bonus for the year 1980. The complaint for unfair labor practice is dismissed for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 43-44, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the order of the Regional Director, petitioner corporation appealed to the Minister of
Labor (now Secretary of Labor). On January 22, 1982, the respondent Minister of Labor issued an
order which provides, inter alia:

After a careful review, we find no cogent reason to alter, modify or reverse the Order
appealed from it being well supported by the facts and law applicable.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby affirmed and the appeal of
respondent dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." (p. 57, Rollo)

Hence, the instant petition was filed on the ground that the respondent Minister of Labor committed
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the order of the
Regional Director.

Petitioner contends that the Regional Director had no legal basis and authority in ordering petitioner
the payment of separation pay to respondents-employees for its failure to obtain a clearance from the
Ministry of Labor before dismissing its employees; that such order is contrary to his (Regional Director)
own finding that under the Labor Code, the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
enterprise due to serious business reverses is a valid cause for termination of employment, in which
case, the employees affected will not be entitled to reinstatement with backwages or to the payment
of separation pay.

The contentions of petitioner are devoid of merit.

Article 283 of the Labor Code, then in force provides, in part:

Art. 283. Termination by employer an employer may terminate an employment without

a definite period for any of the following just causes:

a) The closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or

enterprise, or where the employer has to reduce his workforce by more
than one-half (1/2) due to serious business reverses, unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provision of this
Chapter;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision clearly allows an employer to terminate the services of his employees in case
of closure of business as a result of grave financial losses. As found by the Regional Director and
Ministry of Labor, the petitioner corporation was compelled to shut-down its business establishment
and dismiss the employees because of serious business losses as proven by the company's audited
financial statements for the years 1978 and 1979. However, they also found that petitioner corporation
did not comply with the clearance and/or report requirement under the Labor Code and its
implementing rules before terminating the employment of complainants-employees.

The above findings being factual in nature are binding and conclusive upon Us, since there is no
indication that they are unsubstantiated by evidence.

On the matter of the clearance requirement of the law, Article 278 Section (b) of the Labor Code, then
in force, states:

Article 278. ...

xxx xxx xxx

b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down

his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of
employees with at least one year of service during the last two years,
whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written
authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations as the
Secretary may promulgate.

xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis ours)

Moreover, Rule XIV Section 2 of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code which was still in force at
that time, likewise provides:

Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance any shutdown or

dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director
shall, in such case, order the immediate reinstatement of the employee
and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or
dismissal until the time of reinstatement.

It is undisputed that despite the legality and justifiableness of the ground for the dismissal of the
employees, no clearance to terminate was secured by petitioner corporation prior to the termination
of their employment. Hence, the dismissal of the employees must be conclusively presumed to be
without just cause.

The prior clearance rule was not a "trivial technicality." (Cebu Royal Plant (San Miguel Corporation) v.
Deputy Minister of Labor, G.R. 58639, August 12, 1987). This requirement is part of due process which
must not be denied the employee (National Labor Union v. NLRC, G. R. 61500, August 21, 1987,153
SCRA 228). The fact that petitioner corporation shutdown and closed operations due to business
reverses is immaterial. The Rules cited above are clear that clearance was likewise required before
one could shutdown his business (Murillo, et al. v. Sun Valley Realty Inc., G.R. No. L-67272, June 30,
1988,163 SCRA 271).

Under the circumstances, where there was a valid and reasonable ground for the dismissal of the
employee, but no prior clearance was obtained by the employer, the award of both backwages and
separation pay would be unduly harsh. Payment only of separation pay to the dismissed employees
is considered equitable under the premises (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus. Co. (BLTB Co.) v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 69875, October 28, 1988,166 SCRA 721). In the case at bar, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service computed from the date of employment
to the date of the dismissal.

Petitioner further submits that the Regional Director gravely erred in ruling that the emergency cost of
living allowance of P 240.00 monthly is mandatory, and in ordering petitioner corporation to pay the
deficiency of P 50.00 a month to its employees from 1977 to 1979, who were paid only P192.00 a
month. Regarding this matter, the Regional Director made the following finding:

With respect to the claim for emergency allowance, this Office finds that the
complainants have not been paid the correct amount of emergency living allowance.
To show the violation is to illustrate how respondent company computes the benefits
of their employees. Thus, the company, for instance, obtained the equivalent daily
allowance of each employee at P 8.00 daily by dividing the applicable monthly
allowance, let us say of P 240.00 under PD 1634 by thirty (30) days and then multiply
the daily allowance of P 8.00 by the number of days actually worked by the employee
which normally is 24 days a month to arrive at the sum of only Pl92.00 in our example.
Thus, it could be seen that the rest days of the worker had been totally omitted in the
formula, considering that in a given week there are six (6) working days, excluding a
rest day. Therefore, by multiplying 24 days by P 8.00 is equal to only Pl92.00 as against
the mandatory monthly allowance of P 240.00 or a deficiency of P 50.00 to each of
respondent's workers.' (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

The above findings bear great weight. Section 12 of the Rules Implementing New Emergency living
Allowance under PD 1634 which became effective on August 30, 1979 retained the same provision
found in the old rules implementing PD 1123 which became effective on March 22, 1977. The rule
states:

Section 12. Allowances of full-time and part-time Employees.-Employees shall be paid

in full the required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular working
days if they incur no absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay,
the amounts corresponding to the absences may be deducted from the monthly
allowance provided that in determining the equivalent daily allowance for purposes of
such deduction, the applicable monthly allowance shall be divided by thirty (30) days.
(Italics supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

The above rule requires that the fun amount of the cost of living allowance mandated by law should
be given monthly to each employee if the latter has worked continuously for each month, regardless
of the number of the regular working days. The daily allowance which is arrived at by dividing the
monthly allowance by thirty days applies only for purposes of deduction from the monthly allowance if
the employee has not completed the whole month and has worked only for a certain number of days
or has incurred absences without pay during the month. In any case, however, the amount of monthly
allowance fixed by law cannot be reduced or diminished for those employees who worked for the
whole month.

Further, findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review
by the Supreme Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Worker Union v.
San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 51002-06, May 30, 1983,122 SCRA 557).

Finally, petitioner's contention that it should not be made liable to pay service incentive leave and 13th
month bonus for 1977 and bonus for 1980 is without merit. Aside from the weight given by this Court
to the findings of the labor officers, the rule is also settled that in the interpretation of the labor laws
and its implementing rules, this Court adopts the liberal approach which favors labor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of respondent Minister of Labor dated
January 22, 1982, and the order of the Regional Director dated July 8, 1980 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

2.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que
no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada
vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o
cunado se termine la obra;
 2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos
por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados
u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a
readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a
un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos
por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather
soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
 9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for
a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary
to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of
the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court
of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial
of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion
of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains
what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements
of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike
a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute
is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy
and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing
and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by
the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry
or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid
by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There
is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September
13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations
is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section
20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose
of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And
in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even
in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both
a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila
vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
(Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed.
860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33
 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220,
225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No.
4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected
in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local
board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners
or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission,
but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to
the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A),
the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a
national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents
that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the
petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang
Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have
come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence
as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.
So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.