LITERAL RULE

1. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless however that leads to some
absurdity or there is something in the context that suggest to the contrary.
2. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous the courts are bound to construe
them in their ordinary sense.
3. In the last many years, the courts have modified the rule and look for purpose and
intention. Now, the emphasis is on coherence and consistency of provisions.
4. Words to be given a rational meaning, unless it could be shown in the context that they
were used in a special sense different from grammatical sense.
5. Litera Scripta & Litera Legis- Actual words in which an enactment is expressed as in
emphasis on the grammar as well as text. Now, the literal words could be controlled or
altered depending upon the context…to be found in the Preamble, Title of the statute etc.
6. Suthendran v. Immigration: S.14(1) of the Immigration Act, 1971 - A person who has
a limited leave: These words cannot be construed to include a person “who has had” such
limited leave. It would apply only to a person who at the time he lodged his appeal was
lawfully in the UK and whose leave had not expired at the time of lodging of appeal.
7. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India- Sec.6 (7) of the Press Council Act, 1978:
‘A retiring member shall be eligible for re-nomination for not more than one term’.
The provision applied to a member “just retiring” and not to a retired member. Thus, a
retired member who had held office earlier sometime in the past is not debarred from
being nominated again.
8. Popular Meaning:

(i) Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Asst. Sales Tax Officer-

Sec.6 of the Sales Tax Act, 1947: Sec.6(1) No tax shall be payable under this Act on the
sale of goods specified in the second column of Schedule II, subject to the conditions and
exception, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof.
Item 6 Vegetables- Except when sold in sealed containers.
Item 36 “Betel Leaves”
Whether ‘vegetables’ included ‘betel leaves’?
Supreme Court: Being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense,
meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the
statute is dealing would attribute to it. Vegetable is that which is grown in kitchen garden.
The intention of the legislature in regard to what is vegetables is shown by its specifying
vegetables and betel leaves as separate items in the Schedule.
The previous cases also have suggested “vegetables” in taxing statutes is to be
understood as in common parlance.

(ii) Forest Range Officer v. Khushboo Enterprises-

Sec. 2(f) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961- Forest produce to include the following
whether found in or brought from a forest or not that is to say: ‘timber, charcoal, wood-
oil’.
Whether sandal wood-oil is wood-oil as used in the above definition?
The argument before the Supreme Court- Wood oil is a natural produce of the forest
derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest. It will not include sandalwood oil
which is a bye product from sandal wood by industrial process. The Supreme Court
rejected the above argument.
The object of the Act was to conserve forest wealth and there was no indication in the
Act to exclude what was ordinarily and in common parlance spoken of as wood oil within
the definition of forest produce.

(iii) M/s Motipur Zamindari Co. v. State of Bihar-

The Appellant Co. was the assessee under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and took
objections to assessment of Sales Tax.
Whether “sugar-cane” falls within the term “green vegetables” and is therefore
exempt from Sales Tax.
Sugar-cane cannot be included under the term ‘vegetable’ as understood by the common
man- it indicates vegetable in the common parlance which is either grown in a kitchen
garden or in a farm and or is used in the table. Thereby, appeal stands dismissed.
The true test for classification is therefore, the test of commercial identity and not
the functional test. Words used in common parlance.

(iv) Dinesh Chandra Jamnadas Gandhi v. State of Gujarat AIR 1989 SC 1011
Whether ‘betel-nut’ is a fruit product within Rule 29(f) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1955?
It is not the technical or scientific sense but the sense as understood in common parlance
that generally matters in construing statutes.

(v) M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC 1491-

The appellant is a dealer in butter. The Food Inspector of the Thana Municipality visited
the shop and purchased some quantity of butter. After purchasing the butter, the Food
Inspector notified his intention to the appellant that he was going to get the butter
analyzed. The Butter was put into three different bottles- sealed in the presence of two
panchas. Report stated: ADULTERATED BUTTER
Rule 5: “Butter” to mean “the product prepared exclusively from the milk or cream
of cow or buffalo or both, or without the addition of salt and annatto and shall
contain not less than 80% milk and not more than 16% moisture” and no
preservative permissible in butter.
The Main Contention of the Appellant: The food article, namely Butter is not
adulterated because what he produces is not Butter as prescribed within the definition of
the Food Adulteration Act. He prepares butter out of curd, which is not covered under the
definition of Butter. Since the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act prescribes
punishment… it must be construed strictly and that too in favor of the accused.
Some relevant rules: A.11.01. Milk means the normal clean and fresh secretion obtained
by complete milking of the udder of a healthy cow, buffalo, goat or sheep during the
period following at least 72 hours after calving. A. 11.06. Dahi or curd: (a) Whole milk
dahi or curd means the product obtained from fresh whole milk either of cow or buffalo
by souring. A. 11.10. Cream means the portion of milk rich in milk fat which has risen to
the surface of milk on standing and has been removed or which has been separated from
milk by centrifugal force. A. 11.14. Ghee means the pure clarified fat derived solely
from milk or from milk curds or from cream to which no coloring matter or preservative
has been added.
Hence, milk, cream and curd=obtained. Ghee=derived. Butter=prepared.
The Court highlighting the process of Butter making in India: Rule should not be
made a dead-letter. Gist of the offence is adulteration of Butter
Butter is a favorite edible fat. It is consumed by different ways throughout this country.
Butter is prepared throughout this country by the indigenous process of churning soured
milk. Only in a few cities butter is prepared directly from milk.
The Court referred to the case of Sadashiv v. P. V. Bhalerao, ILR 1959 Bom.1800
thus: The emphasis is on the basic material from which butter is prepared and not on the
process by which it is made. Dahi is prepared from milk by souring it. Butter prepared
from Dahi can, therefore, be said to be butter prepared from milk itself, after it has
undergone the process of souring. There is also a third method, which is used in some
dairies and that is produce butter directly from milk itself. In all these cases, the basic
material from which butter is made is milk. Only the processes adopted for making it are
different.
The Court referring to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on literal rule: “It is
now recognized that the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the
language of the legislature honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to
promote its object.”
Therefore, Butter prepared out of curd falls within the plain meaning of the words in
the said rule.

(vi) Justification of the Rule of Popular Meaning: Justice Frankfurter: “After all
legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to common run of
men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the
ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed.”
9. Exact Meaning preferred to loose meaning: A. There is a presumption that words are
used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. B.
Those who assert that the rule is broken, the burden of establishing their proposition lies
heavily. C. The burden may only be discharged by pointing to something in the context
which goes to show that the loose and inexact meaning must be preferred.
Spillers Ltd. v. Caradix Assessment Committee & Pritchard - ‘contiguous’ - Exact
meaning is ‘touching’; loose meaning is ‘neighboring’
Mayor, Councillors and Burgesses v. Taranki Electric Power Board - ‘adjoining’ - Exact
meaning is ‘conterminous’; loose meaning is ‘near’ or ‘neighboring’
10. Technical words in technical sense: Special meaning in trade, business, etc. In
legislations relating to particular trade, business, Art etc. ordinary words are understood
as having a meaning understood in the context of the subject matter. ‘Special meaning’ is
therefore different from ‘common meaning’.
(a) Words & expressions should be construed in a sense in which they are
understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer.
(b) How is the product identified by the class or section of people that are dealing
with or using the product?
(c) Such special meaning should be ‘understood and accepted’ by those conversant
with the industry.
(d) Labour Inspector, Central v. Chittapur Stone Quarrying Co. Ltd.
Item 8 in the Sch. to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 reads: ‘EMPLOYMENT IN
STONE BREAKING OR STONE CRUSHING’
The Court held “Stone Crushing” to mean that activity by which common stock is
reduced to fragments by mechanical means. The incidental activity of breaking stones to
get at manganese in a manganese mine is not held to be stone breaking or stone crushing.
11. Technical meaning due to legislative use: When words acquire a technical meaning due
to consistent use by the legislature in a particular sense, they are understood in that sense
in subsequent legislation. When a word has acquired a special connotation in law, there
emerges a legal interpretation of that word.
• State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.- ‘Sale’ or ‘sale of goods’ - Agreement to
sell movable for a price; Property passing therein pursuant to that agreement.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation- Supply of materials under a building contract does
not amount to sale. The ratio of the rule of interpretation that words of legal import
occurring in a statute should be construed in their legal sense is that those words have, in
law, acquired a definite and precise sense and that, accordingly, the legislature must be
given to have intended that they should be understood in that sense.”
12. Limitations must be kept in view:
(a) The special meaning must be understood by all those conversant with the trade,
business or industry concerned
 (b) The special meaning must be understood by the whole class rather than a portion
only.
• London & Northeastern Railway Co. v. Berriman: General understanding and
acceptance of a special meaning must have been in vogue at the time of the passing of the
Act. Courts can adduce the benefit of expert advice for economic and technological laws.
• Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.: Excise duty on ‘refined oil’
What is refined oil? Process of manufacture of oil after deodorizing it before it is
marketed. Evidence of manufacturers of refined oil; specification of refined oil by the
Indian Standards Institution.

GOLDEN RULE: REGARD TO CONSEQUENCES

1. (a) A modification of the literal rule

(b) Judge is allowed to depart from a normal meaning
(c) Only to avoid absurd consequences
2. Golden Rule purports to avoid such results which cause:
(a) Hardship
(b) Serious Inconvenience
(c) Creates friction in the system
(d) Inconsistency or Uncertainty
(e) Absurdity or Anomaly
3. Golden rule gives words their plain, ordinary meaning. When plain words give irrational
results (something which was unlikely to be the legislative intention) then the judge may
depart from this meaning.
4. History and evolution: The rule is usually based on part of Becke v Smith (1836) per
Justice Park, which states: It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere
to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless
that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute
itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may
be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.
5. Illustrations:
(a) U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950- Land ‘held’ by an
individual; Court construed it as meaning ‘lawfully held’. There is a presumption that
law makers enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and reasonable.
(b) Provision: ‘Whosoever being married shall marry another person during the life
of the former husband or wife’ is guilty of bigamy. The word ‘former’ may mean
that the original marriage no longer exists. But then the person marrying again would
not be guilty of bigamy. A person who purports to marry another while his/her wife
or husband is still alive is guilty of bigamy.
6. Lee v. Knapp, (1966), 3 All ER 961
S. 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960- If any case owing to the presence of a motor
vehicle on a road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than
that motor vehicle, the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and, if required so to do by
any person having reasonable ground for so requiring, give his name and address and also
the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle.
Construction of the word “stop” - Stopping temporarily would not fulfill the intent of
the provision. Sensible meaning of the word “Stop” - The driver of the vehicle shall
stop it and remain where he has stopped it for a reasonable period of time so as to be able
to provide information as required from him under the section.
Literal reading of the word ‘stop’ would create absurdity. Hence, golden rule of
interpretation to be adopted. A momentary pause will not exempt the driver. Sec.
envisaged necessity of stopping for providing information. Therefore, Modification to be
done to live up to the intent of the statute.
7. Central India Spinning Weaving & Manufacuring Co. Nagpur v. Mun. Comm.,
Wardha, 1958 SCR 1102
Sec. 66(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922- Authorized
imposition of terminal tax on goods or animals ‘imported into or exported from’ the
limits of a Municipality.
Whether the said clause empowered the Municipality to levy a tax on goods in
transit?
High Court: Arrived at a derivative meaning of the word ‘import’ and ‘export’ i.e. to
bring in and to carry away and therefore held that the municipality had the power to levy
tax on goods in transit.
Supreme Court: Ordinary commercial understanding of ‘import’ and ‘export’ do not
refer to goods in transit. Effect of the HC’s ruling would make transit through a railway
station within the limits of a municipality liable to imposition of tax on their arrival as
well as departure. Hence, commercial meaning to be applied over derivative meaning, to
avoid absurdity.
8. V.V. Shivprasad v. Kothuri Venkateshwarlu, AIR 2000 SC 434
Hindu Widows Remarriage Act, 1856- Widow’s rights on her deceased husband’s
property ceases on her remarriage
Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention) Act, 1949- Prohibits Bigamy
Functioning of the two legislations- Hindu widow re-married & ceased to remain an
heir to her deceased husband. She married a man whose wife was alive, thus void
marriage. Still, it was held that such a marriage amounted to ‘re-marriage’ within Sec.2
of the 1856 Act and the widow ceased to hold any rights in the property of her deceased
husband.
 Court held that sensible Meaning has to be given: The Act prevents double benefit, as
on her re-marriage she gets rights in the property of her new husband. This right
crystallizes only when the marriage is valid.
9. Avoid Construction which leads to anomalies:
(a) Clear & gross anomaly
(b) Parliament could not have envisaged such anomaly
(c) The anomaly can be obviated without detriment to leg. objective
(d) Language is susceptible to modification to cure the anomaly
10. Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, AIR 2002 SC 1432
Part- I Sec. 2(2) Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996- This part shall apply where the
place of arbitration is in India.
The High Courts of Bombay, Orissa, Madras, Delhi and Calcutta took the view that Part-I
of the Act does not apply where the place of arbitration is not in India.
The Supreme Court in Bhatia International: The views of the High Courts would lead
to anomalous results and will leave a party remedy-less in obtaining an interim relief in
international commercial arbitration. The Court noted that the Sec. 2 does not
categorically exclude India. Part-I would apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings
relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India the provisions of Part- I would
compulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by the
derogable provisions of Part-I. In cases of international commercial arbitrations held out
of India provisions of Part-I would apply unless the parties by agreement express or
implied exclude all or any of its provisions.
11. Nyadar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1979
Rule 11 (VI) of the Central Services (Classification, Appeal and Control) Rules,
1965- Empowers the imposition of the penalty of “reduction to a lower time scale of pay,
grade, post, or service”.
Pursuant to disciplinary proceedings the penalty of ‘reduction in rank’ was imposed on
the appellants, reducing them to a post lower than the one to which they were directly and
initially recruited.
The Appellants- Due to the penalty, they were reduced in rank to posts lower than the one
to which they were initially recruited. Hence, inappropriate construction.
The Respondents- The word ‘reduction in rank’ is distinct from ‘reversion’ as the former
was imposed by way of penalty. Hence, reduction in rank to a post below the one that the
appellant initially held was appropriate.
‘Reversion’ & ‘Reduction’ in post- Reduction in rank extends even to a rank which the
officer concerned never held; wider than reversion. Reversion to a post means a post held
earlier. Back to the original post.
Supreme Court: Could a Doctor be reduced in rank to the post of a Compounder?
Reduction means and refers to promotional posts, otherwise the policy of recruitment
itself will become meaningless, hence producing absurd results. A wide meaning of the
 word ‘reduction’ does not get along with the larger scheme of things within the policy of
recruitment. Therefore, a person initially recruited to a higher time scale, grade, post or
service cannot be reduced to a post in a lower time-scale, grade, post or service or to a
lower post. Though the language of the rule is wide, a restricted construction was placed
to avoid the anomaly which a wider construction would have produced.
12. Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272
Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Abatement of appeal, when the legal
representatives of the appellants die during the pendency of the appeal.
The entire appeal was abated, on the death of one of the representatives, as it was not
brought on record in time.
Supreme Court: Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the
object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on
the merits of substantial rights of citizens. Procedure has always been viewed as the
handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice. Technical objections
which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and delay substantial and effective justice
should be strictly viewed for being discouraged except when mandate of the law
inevitably necessitates it.
13. [Link] v. G. Pannerselvam
Legislative Council Elections qualifications in Art.171 (3) - Electorate: It is a body of
persons who elect. Enumerates functional or occupational representation in a
heterogeneous group.
The appellant contested and won election to the Madras Legislative Council from the
Madras District Graduates’ Constituency.
Whether he was qualified to stand for election to the Graduates’ Constituency?
HC- Set aside the election by holding that the appellant didn’t possess the requisite
educational qualifications.
Supreme Court- Graduates are not an occupational or vocational group. It is a body of
persons with particular educational qualifications. For elections to each house, the
Parliament has prescribed separate qualifications for elector & elected.
The High Court erroneously travelled outside the four corners of the statutory provisions
when there was no ambiguity at all in the language, and by resorting to a presumed
legislative intent, it added a qualification to those expressly laid down in the Constitution
and other statutory provisions contravening the rule of plain meaning.
(a) Language used is plain and history of Art.171 clearly gives us intention
(b) A deliberate omission of the requirement that the representative of the Graduates
should also be a graduate.
(c) No absurdity results if we presume such intention
Therefore, election of Appellant is valid in law.
14. Applying the rule with caution:
(a) Consideration of hardship etc. must be applied with great care
 (b) Inconvenience not only great but “absurd” or ab inconvenienti
(c) Individual cases of hardship have no bearing only general hardship
(d) Individual cases of hardship or injustice have no bearing for rejecting natural
construction, and it is only when the natural construction leads to a general hardship
or injustice and some other construction is reasonably open that the natural
construction may be departed from.

MISCHIEF RULE: Purposive rule of construction

1. The importance of Interpretation in Context:
(a) Words carry different shades of meaning
(b) Different shades of ambiguity
(c) Statute to be applied to particular facts & circumstances in the light of suitable
context
2. Regard to Subject and Object: The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their
meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject
of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found
not so much in a strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its
popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion in which they are used, and the object to
be attained.
3. The classic Heydon’s case (1584)- Suppress the Mischief & Advance the Remedy
A Religious college in England had given tenancy in the manor to a man and his son.
This tenancy was granted by way of a copyhold & was a long-running lease.
Subsequently, the manor was also leased to a man named ‘Heydon’ for a period of 80
years. This rendered several rents severally for several parcels of land. A year later, the
Parliament enacted the ‘Act of Dissolution’ declaring the said lease void.
The statute dissolved religious colleges and such leases that were created were declared
void. But one particular provision in the statute which kept in force, for a term of life, any
grants that had been made “more than a year prior to the date on which the statute had
been enacted.”
Whether the copyhold estate of Ware and Ware, which had been created for their
lifetime, be called ‘estate for a lifetime’ and thereby continue to have legal validity?
It was unanimously decided that the lease granted to Ware and Ware continued to
have legal validity; the lease made to Heydon was void as the said lease clearly fell
within the words and meaning of the enacting statute.
Lord Coke: to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact
conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act. And for the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial; restrictive or
enlarging four things are to be discerned and considered.
4. Cornerstone of the Mischief Rule- The Four Questions:
(a) What was the common law before making of the Act?
(b) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
(c) What is the remedy that the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the Commonwealth?
(d) What is the reason of the remedy?
5. Heydon’s case:
(a) What was the common law before making of the Act?
The religious and ecclesiastical houses could make leases for as many years as
possible
(b) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
The mischief was that when the religious houses perceived the possibility of a
situation wherein their manors & houses would be dissolved, they engaged in
creation of long and unreasonable leases- such unreasonable leases- the common
law failed to provide for.
(c) What is the remedy that the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the Commonwealth?
After the ‘Act of Dissolution’, such unreasonable leases would be dissolved; and
any estate or interest for life would be declared as null and void.
(d) What is the reason of the remedy?
Main intent was preventing the doubling of estates. Simultaneous existence of
estates for two lives at the same time has to be stopped.
Court held: When an Act of Parliament alters the service, tenure and interest of the land
in prejudice of the tenant, the general words of an Act of Parliament shall not extent to
estates created by way of [Link] when an Act of Parliament is made for the good
of the general public itself, and no prejudice would accrue, then such copyhold estates
would be under the purview of the Act.
6. Factors that need to be suppressed:
(a) Factors adding to mischief
(b) Factors hiding mischief
(c) Factors continuing mischief
(d) Factors advancing mischief
7. The judges are to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief
and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico. This principle is also known as the rule of Purposive
Construction.
8. Smith v. Hughes
S.1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959- It shall be an offence for a common prostitute
to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.
 The prostitutes were soliciting customers from the house adjoining the street. They were
calling out to the men in the street from the balcony, tapping the windows of the first and
second floor of the house.
Whether in the circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street or public
place? The provision does not specifically say that the person who is soliciting must be
in the street. It does not also say that the person who receives solicitation is in the street.
Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people
to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
Viewed in this way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the
street or in a doorway or in a balcony, or at a window; in each case her solicitation is
projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part I am content
to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.
9. Purpose should not be frustrated:
(a) Harmonizes the subject of the statute and object of the Legislature
(b) Advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief.
(c) Object Oriented Approach
10. Limitations of the Mischief Rule:
(a) Cannot cause violence to the plain language of the statute
(b) Cannot be used when no uncertainty, ambiguity or gaps
(c) No re-writing of the section or substituting the words
11. Limits to the Heydon’s rule:
(a) Ambiguity due to more than one meaning
(b) Words must be read in the context of the statute
(c) Use of this rule should not lead to absurd results
(d) Wide ordinary meaning cannot be confined to remedy the single identified mischief
12. If there were many problems before the enactment of the statute it does not follow that in
an effort to solve some of them the Parliament intended to solve all. After the words
construed in their context and found that the language is capable of bearing only one
construction, the rule in Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling and gives way to plain
meaning rule.
13. [Link] Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore
U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 came for the purpose of implementing the Bhoodan
movement. This movement aimed at distribution of land to landless laborers who were
versed in agriculture and who had no means of subsistence. It was held that the
expression ‘landless persons’ in S.14 was limited to landless laborers as described above
and did not include landless businessman residing in a city.
14. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
Sec. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Industrial dispute means any dispute or
difference between employers and employees or between employers and workmen, or
 between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-
employment or with the conditions of labour of any person.
Two crucial limitations to the expression ‘any person’:
Must be a real dispute- Capable of settlement or adjudication; One party giving necessary
relief to the other
Parties to the dispute have a direct and substantial interest- Dispute regarding
employment, non-employment, terms of employment etc.; The parties to the dispute have
a direct or substantial interest
15. [Link] v. P. Jayarajan
Sec 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951- ‘A person convicted of any
offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years is disqualified for
being chosen as and for being a member of the Legislature of a State.’
Is it necessary that the term of imprisonment for not less than 2 years must be in
respect of one single offence to attract the disqualification?
Supreme Court:
Relevant for purpose of S.8(3)- Actual Period of Imprisonment that a convict has to
undergo
In a factual scenario- He may be sentenced to different terms of imprisonment, for
different offences. Individually the term may be less than 2 years, but collectively or
added together it may exceed 2 years.
The court interpreting the word ‘any’- ‘Any’ may mean all, every, each, some or ‘one
or many out of several’; ‘any’ may have several meanings according to context &
circumstances; ‘any’ may have several meanings according to context & circumstances.
For all meanings actual period of imprisonment is necessary
The Purpose of the provision- The section uses ‘any’ as an adjective qualifying the
word ‘offence’ to suggest not the number of offence but the nature of the offence. Purpose
is to prevent criminalization of politics. Those who break the law should not make the
law.
16. Reema Agarwal v. Anupam & Others
The appellant was admitted to the hospital for consuming poison. She was married to the
defendant Anupam; was harassed by parents-in-law and brother-in-law for dowry and
was made to drink poison. She started vomiting and in unconscious state admitted to the
hospital. This was the second marriage for both the parties.
Whether offence under S.498-A & 304-B, IPC pre-suppose valid marriage between
the parties? Marriage is a legal union of a man and woman as H and W and cannot
extend to a legally void marriage. Reference was made to Ss 5(i), 11 and 16 of HMA,
1955. The language used in S. 498-A is “husband or relative of the husband”.
Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a shelter
behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid marriage the
question of dowry does not arise?
 Meaning of ‘husband’ u/s 498-A, IPC; Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act- Any
property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by
one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the
marriage” as a “consideration” for the marriage.
The purpose behind the IPC provisions- The purpose for which Ss 498A and 304B
IPC and 113B of the IEA were introduced cannot be lost sight of.
The obvious social objective- To prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a
marital relationship from becoming a victim of the greed for money.
Restricted Meaning would not further legislative intent- Hyper-technical approach,
legalistic niceties destroys the purpose of legislations with public policy. Legislations
with public policy cannot be interpreted pedantically. Hairsplitting legalistic approach to
be avoided.
17. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628
Petitioners engaged in promoting and conducting ‘prize competitions’ in different States
of India. Provisions of the Prize Competition Act, 1956 are challenged by the
petitioners. The object of the act is to provide for the CONTROL and REGULATION of
prize competitions”, involving gambling.
Sec 2(d) of the Act defines “Prize Competition”: “any competition” (whether called a
cross word prize competition, missing-word or picture prize competition or by any other
name), in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building-
up, arrangement, combination or permutation of letters, words or figures.”
Whether in view of the definition u/s. 2(d), the Act applies to competitions which
involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of gambling
Petitioners contented that Prize Competition include competitions in which success
depends upon chance and substantial degree of skill. The Act encroaches upon the right
to carry on trade and is violative of Art.19(1)(g). The impugned law constituted a single
inseparable enactment and so it must fail in its entirety in respect of both classes of
competitions.
Respondents contented that ‘Prize Competition means and includes only competitions in
which success does not depend upon any substantial degree or skill and are essentially
gambling in their character; Gambling Activities are not trade or business w/in the
meaning of Art. 19(1)(g). The reasonable restrictions u/Art 19(6) are protected and that
would not affect the validity of the enactment as regards the competitions which are in
the nature of gambling. The Act is severable in its application.
Court’s observations: Art 19(1)(g) and 301 protect lawful trading activities. ‘Gambling’
is not lawful; it is res extra commercium. Therefore, ‘gambling’ does not fall within the
purview of such Articles. Competitions involving substantial skill, are business activities
which are protected by Art. 19(1)(g). To ascertain the intent, the court has to find out
from the words actually used i.e. literal rule be given prima facie preference. When literal
 rule is leading to a different intention, then to arrive at the real meaning. Thereafter, look
into exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act.
History, Purpose, Mischief:
‘Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions (Control and Tax) Act’, 1948: Object of
controlling and taxing lotteries and prize competitions within the province of Bombay.
To avoid the taxing provisions, people shifted the venue of their activities to the
neighboring states like Mysore etc. Parliament enacted the Central Legislation for the
control and regulation of Prize Competitions. Therefore, prize competitions of a
gambling character are to be regulated and controlled and Competitions involving
skills are only to be regulated, not controlled.
Object & History of the Act- The competitions which are sought to be controlled and
regulated by the Act are the ones of GAMBLING in character. Severable Provisions: The
provisions are SEVERABLE in their application to competitions in the nature of
gambling. Therefore, the Act was passed with an avowed object of controlling and
regulating the gambling activities.
18. PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION: An EXTENSION of the Mischief rule. There is a
definite purpose and spirit behind every Act in pursuance of which it was enacted by the
Parliament. The Courts in the guise of interpretation, have to do the job to promote that
intended purpose and spirit of the Act.
(i) “The word mischief is traditional”. The facts known to Parliament when the Bill
came before it. The unsatisfactory state of affairs disclosed by these facts which
the Parliament is supposed to have intended to remedy.
(ii) When two competing Acts construed to further the purposes behind them produce
a conflict, the court may resolve a conflict by taking into consideration as to
which Act represents “the superior purpose” in addition to other relevant factors.
(iii) CIT v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832- Sodra Devi entered into partnership with her
major children and included the minors into the benefits of partnership.
Whether the word ‘individual’ in S.16(3) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 (amended
in 1937), includes a female.
Whether the income of minor sons from a partnership, to the benefits of
which they were admitted, was liable to be included in computing the total
income of the mother who was a member of the partnership.
Sec. 16(3) of the Act- In computing the total income of any individual for the
purpose of assessment, there shall be included-
(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises
directly or indirectly:
(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner;
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of the partnership in a firm of
which such individual is a partner;
 (iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband
otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to
live apart; or
Meaning of ‘any individual’: Respondent contented The word “individual” is
not used in its generic sense but is used in a restricted and narrower sense and
means only a male is capable of having a wife or minor child or both, and that
individual can only be a male of the species and not a female.
The court examining the background of the provision: ‘any individual’-
ambiguous;
The state of law before the enactment has to be seen. Income Tax Enquiry
Report, 1936: Widespread practice of husbands entering into nominal
partnerships with their wives; and fathers are admitting their minor children to the
benefits of partnerships to which they were members.
The only intention of the Legislature by putting the words “any individual” could
only have been meant as restricted to the male and not including the female of the
species. Therefore, the words “individual” in S. 16(3) and S.16(3)(a) of the Act
are restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the species.
(iv) AIR Karmachari Sangh v. AIR Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 1325
‘Newspaper’ defined u/s 2(b) of the Act: Printed periodical work containing
public news or comments on public news and includes such other class of printed
periodical work as may, from time to time be notified by the Central Government.
‘Newspaper employee’ is defined by S2(c): Any working journalist and includes
any other person employed to do day to day work in, or in relation to, any
newspaper establishment.
The appellants were the employees of the, AIR Ltd. Cen. Govt. constituted
Tribunals to make recommendations in respect of fixing or revising wages or
working and non-working journalists.
Whether the law reports published by the respondent are newspapers within
the meaning of the Act and whether the employees engaged in production or
publication of the said law reports are entitled to the benefits of the Award?
Court: News not defined in the Act. Oxford Dictionary defines news as tidings,
new information of recent events etc. Oxford Dictionary defines news as tidings,
new information of recent events etc. Publication of recent judgments is news. It
may after sometime cease to be a newspaper and become a book of reference.
Beneficent Legislation: Enacted for the purpose of improving conditions of
employees. If 2 opinions are possible, the one advancing the remedy should be
employed. In favour of the persons for whom the law has been passed. Therefore,
the said law reports are newspapers and employees receive the benefit.
HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION: Avoiding Inconsistency & Resolving
Conflict
1. AVOID “HEAD-ON” CLASH: The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be
used to defeat those of another “unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between
them.”
2. A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with
reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the
whole statute.
3. When two legal provisions are so placed that they are seemingly opposite to each other,
then it is the duty of the Court to so harmonize both, as effect could be given to both of
them.
4. The legislature never intended to contradict itself by enacting two contradictory
provisions. The Parliament never intended to give with one hand what it took away with
the other.
5. CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers , (2003) 3 SCC 57:
(a) The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
(b) The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in
another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.
(c) When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory
provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to
both the provisions as much as possible.
(d) Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a
useless number or dead is NOT harmonious construction.
(e) To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless.
6. ESSENCE OF THE RULE: Two provisions + Difficult to reconcile = Interpreted so as
to give effect to both.
7. Harmonious Construction opposed to nugatory effect: To harmonize is not to destroy.
A construction that renders the provisions futile or dead letter is not harmonious
construction. Find out general and specific provisions.
8. Generalia specialibus non derogant: General things do not derogate from the special
things. Generalibus specialia derogant: Special derogates from the general.
(a) General or Special has to be determined with respect to the area and extent of their
application.
(b) Provisions of a general statute must yield to those of a special one.
(c) Special provision on a matter excludes the application of a general provision on that
matter.
(d) The above principle is not applied when the two provisions deal with remedies.
9. Inconsistency between the remedies: Even if the remedies are inconsistent, the person
has a right to choose from until he elects one of them.
10. Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255
Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, 1947: Section 3 (1) enacts that,
“Notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary, persons belonging to the
excluded classes shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship therein in
the same manner and to the same extent as Hindus in general”
Art. 25. (2)- Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or
prevent the State from making any law.
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Art. 26.- Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or
any section thereof shall have the right- (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion
Whether the rights of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters
of religion guaranteed under Art 26(b) can be subjected to, and controlled by a law
protected by Art 25(2)(b) throwing the suit temple open to all classes and sections of
Hindus?
Court: Two provisions of equal authority. How the apparent conflict between the two be
resolved? They should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both.
Full effect can be given to Art 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to this that as
regards one aspect of them i.e. entry into a temple for worship, the rights declared under
Art 25(2)(b) will prevail. So, Art 26(b) must be read subject to Art. 25(2)(b).
Art.26(b) must be read subject to Art.25(2)(b). Art.25(2)(b) to be construed liberally,
right to enter into a temple. But the right is not absolute or unlimited in character. A
temple cannot be kept open for all the hours and the Pujas or services are to be performed
by the Archakas.
11. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112
Jury’s verdict ‘Not Guilty’. High Court convicted the petitioner u/S.302 of the IPC. On
the same day, the Governor of Bombay suspended his sentence in exercise of his power
u/Art.161. Arrest Warrant could not be served to the accused. In the meantime an
application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was made. For exemption
from compliance with Order 21, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court rules.
Power of suspension of sentence: The President of India, The Supreme Court of India:
Art. 142 Power of the Supreme Court to do complete justice, Governor of a State: Art.
161 Power of the Governor to grant pardon.
Whether the order of suspension passed by the Governor under Art. 161 could
operate when the Supreme Court had been moved for granting special leave to
appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court, as the matter had become
sub-judice on filing the SLP?
 Contentions before the Supreme Court:
(a) The power of pardon, including the lesser power of remission and suspension of a
sentence etc. is of a plenary character and is unfettered.
(b) The power of pardon is vested in the Head of State as an index of sovereign authority.
(c) The power of the executive to grant pardon and of the judiciary is completely
different and there is no question of conflict between them.
(d) The exercise of power u/Art. 161 is not fettered by Art. 142 of the Constitution.
(e) The power of pardon is vested in the Governor by virtue of Art 161 & in the President
by Art 72.
(f) Art 142 gives power to the Supreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as
is necessary for doing complete justice in a matter pending before it.
(g) The same power dealing with the matter of suspension of sentence is vested both in
the Supreme Court and also in the Governor.

Observations of the Supreme Court: When both the provisions are thus unfettered,
they have to be harmonized so that there may be no conflict between them. The ambit of
Art 161 is very much wider and it is only in a narrow field that the power contained in
161 is also contained in 142. Art 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence
during the time that Art 142 is in operation and the matter is sub-judice in the Supreme
Court. If in respect of the same period, both provisions operate, it would lead to a conflict
of jurisdiction between the executive and judiciary. Therefore, the order of the Governor
granting suspension of the sentence could only operate until the matters became sub-
judice in the Supreme Court on the filing of the SLP.

12. Sirsilk Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 160

Sec. 17 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- “Every award ‘shall’ within a period of 30 days
from the date of its receipt by the Appropriate Government be published in the manner as
the Appropriate Government thinks fit.”
Sec. 18(1)- “a settlement arrived at between the parties shall be binding on the parties to
the agreement.”
Sec. 18(3)- “an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on all parties to the
dispute.”
Dispute between the workers & employers referred to the industrial tribunal: The
tribunal passed an award and sent it to the Government for it to be published by the
Appropriate Government within 30 days. Before the award could be published the parties
arrived at a settlement and sent a letter to the govt. not to publish the award.
Decision of the High Court: Sec. 17 was mandatory and it was not open for the
government to withhold publication of an award sent to it by an industrial tribunal.
Whether Sec 17 was mandatory or directory or was it possible for the government
to stop the publication of the award?
 Both are mandatory provisions: ‘Shall be published’ / ‘Shall be binding on getting
published’ The only way to resolve the possible conflict between Sec 18(1) and Sec 18(3)
is to ‘withhold the publication’ of the award once the government has been informed
jointly by the parties that a settlement binding under Sec 18(1) has been arrived at.
13. Krishna Kumar v. State of Rajasthan
14. M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha
Art.194(3) v. Art.19(1)(a)
The Fundamental Right of freedom of speech and expression under Art.19(1)(a) was
subject to the privileges of Houses guaranteed by Art.194(3). The petition was therefore
dismissed. Avoid uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to
regulate. Where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be
chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute
purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce
uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.
15. When reconciliation not possible: Last must prevail; The last intention of the makers
takes precedence. Make best efforts to reconcile. If that is not possible, determine which
is the leading provision and which is the subordinate. Therefore, determine which one
would give way to the other.
16. Steps for employing the doctrine of Harmonious Construction:
(a) Both provisions should be read as a whole
(b) Effect given to both of them
(c) Choose wider & narrower scope of the two
(d) From the wider subtract the narrow and see the consequence.
(e) If the consequence is reasonable to harmonize and giving effect to both, no further
enquiry is required.

PARTS OF A STATUTE:
1. Operative part- enacted provisions
Non-operative part- internal aids to construction: long title, preamble, definition clause,
headings, marginal notes, punctuations, proviso, explanation, schedules.
2. LONG TITLE: guide to the act for scope, object and purpose. It is a permissible aid to
construction as it is a part of the Act which precedes the Preamble. Long Title ordinarily
starts with the words ‘An Act’. Short title, on the other hand, is not a permissible aid and
is used only for reference.
3. It is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be
referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on its
construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment.
4. Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 418
 Sec. 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act 1940: Save as otherwise provided by this Act,
every shop or commercial establishment shall remain closed on a close day.
The choice of a close day shall rest with the occupier of a shop or commercial
establishment and shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within two months of the
date on which this Act comes into force.
Court: Sec. 7 is constitutional as it is designed for the protection of workmen. The
inclusion of a reasonable margin to ensure effective enforcement will not stamp a law
otherwise valid. The long title of the Act is a guide for the determination of the scope and
policy underlying the legislation, but cannot, control the express operative provisions of
the Act.
5. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404
Sec 4 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949- The
State Govt. is empowered to choose as to which particular case should go for reference to
the Special Court be tried under a special procedure.
Sec.4 was challenged as violative of Art. 14. The Apex Court aimed to ascertain the real
purpose for which the statute was brought into force.
Long title of the Act- an Act to provide for the more speedy trial and more effective
punishment of certain offences.
Court held that the long title is clearly indicating the legislative intent of vesting
discretion in the hands of the state government as to which offences deserved to be tried
by the special courts under a special procedure.
6. A long title is a legitimate aid that may be looked into in case of ambiguity or in case of
doubt in the enacting provisions. But if statute is clear and giving a wide meaning, long
title may not be read as to restrict the provision [R v. Bates and Russell].
7. PREAMBLE: Admissible aid to construction. It is not an enacting part of a statute.
Expresses the scope, object & purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long
title. Used as an Aid when the provision is ambiguous. It cannot control otherwise the
plain meaning of a provision.
8. Preamble is not of much help when:
(a) For construing provisions which embody qualifications or exceptions
(b) The repeal of a Preamble simpliciter will not affect the construction of the statute.
(c) Preamble retrospectively inserted into an earlier Act
9. Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajastha, AIR 1957 SC 510
The Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949
Sec 3: This Ordinance to remain in force for two years unless the period was further
extended by the Rajpramukh.
Sec 4: During the continuance of the Ordinance no tenant could be ejected or
dispossessed.
Sec 15: The Government is authorized to exempt any person or class of persons from the
operation of the Ordinance.
 Preamble: ‘Whereas with a view to putting a check on the growing tendency of landlords
to eject or dispossess tenants from their holdings and in the wider national interest of
increasing the production of food grains, it is expedient to make provisions for the
protection of tenants in Rajasthan from ejectment or dispossession from their holdings.’
Court: The Preamble of the Ordinance clearly recited the state of facts necessitating the
enactment of the law; the power to extend the life of the Act conferred on the
Rajpramukh was conditional legislation and not delegated legislation. Hence, the power
under Sec.15 was not unfettered and not violative of Art. 14.
10. [Link] v. Bandaru Pavani (2009) 1 SCC 714
Sec.5, HMA: A marriage ‘may’ be solemnized between any two Hindus.
Can a Hindu marry a Christian under this section?
Preamble: ‘An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus.’
Court: Marriage between Hindu and Christian is void under the said provision.
Definition of Hindu under section 2 and the Preamble were referred. Therefore, ‘may’ be
treated as mandatory.
11. Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India
The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957
Sec. 4(1): ‘Whenever it appears to the Central Government that coal is likely to be
obtained from land in any locality, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, give
notice of its intention to prospect for coal therein.’
Sec 4(2): On issue of such a notification in respect of any land any prospecting license or
mining lease granted to any person ceases to have effect and provision is made for
acquisition of land so notified as also for payment of compensation etc.
Preamble: ‘An Act to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control
over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the
State of un-worked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of right in or over
such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any
agreement, lease, license or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith’.
Issue: The Act applied only to virgin lands and not to those lands which are being
worked or were worked in the past.
Court held that Preamble cannot control the plain language. Sec. 4 empowers the Central
Government to issue a notification with respect to its intention of prospecting any land in
a locality and not only such land as is virgin.
12. Tribhuvan Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 540
Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1950-
Sec 2(f). Any claim registered under the Displaced Persons (Claim) Act, 1950 in respect
of which a ‘final order has been passed under that Act’.
Sec 5. Power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise any ‘verified’ claim.
Preamble: It was enacted to provide for the disposal of certain proceedings ‘pending’
under the 1950 Act and for matters connected therewith.
 Even though the Section states ‘final order’ and Preamble states ‘pending proceedings’,
the words of Sec. 5 read with the definition of verified claim under Sec.2(f) are clear. A
preamble is a key to open the mind of the legislature but it cannot be used to control or
qualify precise and unambiguous language of the enactment.
13. Preamble of the Constitution: The Preamble is a part of the Constitution [Minerva Mills
& Keshavananda Bharti rulings] The Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the
Constitution. Preamble is neither source of any substantive power nor as a source of
any prohibition or limitation. Preamble furnishes the key to open the mind of the
Constitution makers
Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana (1986) 2 SCC 249
Constitutional Validity of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was in question. This Act
provides the right of pre-emption on the basis of consanguinity and Agnatic theory of
succession
Violative of Articles 14 & 15 of the Constitution. The Act is ultra vires the Constitution
as pre-emption on ‘kinsfolk-basis’ is intrinsically defective and agnatic theory of
succession is unreasonable. The Preamble enshrines progressive ideals of socialist state.
14. Definition Sections or Interpretation Clauses used:
a) To establish that a term is not being used in a usual meaning or is being used in one
of the several meanings.
b) To avoid excessive repetition.
c) To allow the use of an abbreviation.
d) To signal the use of unusual or novel term.
15. Definition by reference: A definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier Act
and the definitions so borrowed may not necessarily be in the definition section but may
be in some other provision of the earlier Act.
16. Legislature has the power to define a word even artificially. Restrictive/exhaustive
definitions use the word ‘mean’. Extensive definitions use the word ‘includes’, ‘any’,
‘apply to’.
17. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat AIR 1991 SC 2176
Art 129: The Supreme Court is a court of record and it shall have all powers of such a
court ‘including’ the power to punish for contempt of itself.
The power to punish for contempt of itself is in addition to the other powers. The
expression ‘including’ is not restrictive but extensive in nature. The expression
‘including’ is not superfluous or redundant.
18. ‘Means and includes’: Ordinary meaning of the ‘means’ part + All that is mentioned in
the ‘Includes’ part = Exhaustive Definition
Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997
Act: ‘owner’ means the owner and includes bailee of a public carrier vehicle or any
manager acting on behalf of a public carrier.
 Just because the definition has “includes” does not mean that it could be applied to
exclude the actual owner and free him from liability. The natural meaning of the ‘means’
part of the definition is not narrowed down by the ‘includes’ part.
19. Mahalaxmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 235
Def of Tobacco: ‘Tobacco’ means any form of tobacco whether cured or uncured and
whether manufactured or not and includes the leaf stalks and stems of the tobacco plant.’
Can ‘tobacco seeds’ be included?
The definition is exhaustive and tobacco seeds, which are not mentioned in the inclusive
part, do not fall within the definition.
20. South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat
The Minimum Wages Act, 1948: Entry 22: For the purposes of this entry potteries
industry includes the manufacture of the following articles of pottery namely- (a)
Crockery, (b) Sanitary appliances, (c) Refractories, (d) Jars, (e) Electrical Accessories, (f)
Hospital Wares, (g) Textile accessories, (h) Toys, (i) Glazed Tiles.
Can Mangalore pattern roof-tiles be covered under this definition?
The items included in it were plainly comprised in the expression ‘potteries industry’
which indicates that the word ‘includes’ was not used to extend the normal meaning of
this expression. ‘Includes’ was used in the sense of ‘means’ and the definition provided
by the explanation was exhaustive. Hence, ‘Mangalore pattern roofing tiles’ were not
covered under this section.
21. If the definition section of an Act in which various terms have been defined opens with
the words: ‘in this Act unless the context otherwise requires’ this would indicate that the
definitions which are indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it
was otherwise required by the context.
22. Ambiguous Definitions: The Courts look into the Object of the Act.
23. Definitions are subject to contrary context: Sometimes the meaning given in the
definition clause is inapplicable. Definition is Subject to ‘unless there is anything
repugnant to the subject or context’.
24. PROVISO: It qualifies or creates an exception to the generality of the main enactment.
But for the proviso, the enactment would have included the subject-matter.
4-Pronged Purpose of a Proviso:
(a) Qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment.
(b) It may entirely impact the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by
insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make enactment
workable.
(c) It may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the
enactment and thus acquire the tenor and color of the substantive enactment itself.
(d) May be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole
object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.
(I) When the words in the main enactment are clear a proviso can have no
repercussion by implication. It neither includes nor excludes something from
the enactment.

G.G. in Council v. Municipal Council, Madura AIR 1949 PC 39

Sec. 11(1)(b) of the Railways Act, 1890: A railway administration is bound to
make and maintain all necessary arches, tunnels, culverts etc., ‘of such
dimensions as will, in the opinion of the Provincial Government, be sufficient at
all times to convey water as freely from or to the lands lying near or affected by
the railway as before the making of the railway, or as nearly so as may be.’
Sec. 11(3)(b): the aforesaid duty is subject to a proviso that, ‘a railway
administration shall not, except on the requisition of the Provincial Government,
be compelled to defray the cost of executing any further or additional
accommodation works for the use of the owners or occupiers of the lands after the
expiration of ten years from the date on which the railway passing through the
lands was first opened for public traffic.’
Railway opened in 1902 in Madura. A Culvert was constructed by the Railway
Administration for conveying water of a water channel. With the growth of the
town, the culvert was found insufficient. In 1938, the Prov. Govt. ordered the
railway to widen the channel at its own cost.
The obligation imposed upon the Railway is to make & maintain a culvert which
will be sufficient to convey water to the lands affected due to the making of the
railway. The proviso does not purport to vest any new rights in any person or to
impose any new duty upon the railway. The landowners are given an opportunity
within a limited time for making a fresh demand. It is not unreasonable to give
unlimited time to the Government for making fresh demands considering the
circumstances prevailing in the country.
(II) Proviso to be construed to the section or sections to which it is appended
State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath AIR 1989 SC 558
Rule 2.2: Punjab Civil Service Rules: The Government has a right to withhold or
withdraw a pension if the pensioner is subsequently found guilty of grave
misconduct or negligence during the period of his service in a departmental or
judicial proceeding.
Proviso: No such judicial proceeding, if not instituted while the officer was in
service- shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event
which took place more than four years before such institution.
The proviso had to be read as an exception to the main provision meaning that if
the proceeding is not instituted within 4 years, the Government will not have the
right to withdraw the pension after the expiry of that period.
 (III) Proviso could be used as guide to construction of enactment
Jennings v. Kelly (1939) 4 All ER 464
Sec 9(c) Intoxicating Liquor Act, 1923: Where owing to an increase of not less
than 25% of the population according to the last census, there is growth or
extension of any city or town, and the licensing authority is satisfied after hearing
any evidence tendered to it by any resident or owner of property in such city or
town that the restrictions in this section on the granting of licenses may be
relaxed, the licensing authority may grant a license to any applicant
notwithstanding that the same would be otherwise forbidden by this section:
Proviso: Provided that such license shall be granted only for premises situated in
the ward or district electoral division in which such increase of population has
taken place within the city or town.
What constituted 25% increase in the population (of town, ward or electoral
division)? Deriving assistance from the proviso it was held that 25% increase in
the population, meant the increase in some ward or electoral division.

SUBSIDIARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION:

I. Noscitur A Sociis: Words derive their meaning with respect to words found in
immediate connection with them. When two or more words are clubbed together, they
are understood to be used in their cognate sense.”
Applies when there is doubt about meaning. The words must be employed in the
same sense or that they are susceptible of analogous meaning. Associated words
explain & limit each other.
Does not apply when the intention of the legislature is clear & meaning of the words
is clear. The words have been given a wider connotation intentionally, the doctrine
cannot be invoked to narrow down the meaning of the words used in the statute.

(a) Commissioners v. Savoy Hotel

A provision of Purchase Tax Act: ‘manufactured beverages including fruit-juices
and bottled waters and syrups, etc.’ Can freshly squeezed unsweetened orange
juice be covered under this expression? The description ‘fruit juices’ should be
construed in the context of the preceding words, which use preservatives, not
freshly squeezed juices.
(b) Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordon (1976) 3 All ER 775
Sec.4(1) of the Obscene Publication Act, 1959: accused has to prove that
publication of the article in question is justified as being for public good on the
ground that it is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or of ‘other
objects of general concern’. The material that was seized was hardcore
 pornography. The Court held that ‘other objects of general concern’ operated in
the same area as science, literature, art. These words did not fall in a totally
different area of sexual behavior.
(c) State of Rajasthan v. Sripal Jain AIR 1963 SC 1323
Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Rules of Business states: ‘proposals for dismissing,
removing or compulsory retiring of an Officer’, should be referred to the
Governor. The phrase ‘compulsory retirement’ appears along with ‘dismissal’ and
removal’ must be taken to cover cases of punishment and not normal cases of
compulsory retirement such as those which result on attaining superannuation age
etc.
(d) Rainbow Steels Limited v. Commissioner of Sales Tax
Entry 15 of the Schedule to the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 reads ‘old, discarded,
unserviceable or obsolete machinery stores or vehicles including waste products.’
When some articles are grouped together in an entry in the schedule, each word in
the entry draws a colour from the other words therein on the principle of noscitur
a sociis. Therefore, the expression ‘old’ was construed to refer to old machinery
which had become non-functional or non-usable.
(e) Dr. Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat AIR 1969 SC 63
The App’t, a doctor had a dispensary was prosecuted for non-maintenance of a
register of employees as required the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act,
1948. He contended that his dispensary was not a commercial establishment as
defined in s. 2(4) of the Act.
Whether a Doctor’s dispensary is a “commercial establishment” within the
meaning of the Act?
Sec. 2(4) of the Act: “Commercial establishment means an establishment which
carries on, any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or
incidental or ancillary to any business, trade or profession and includes a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act and a charitable or other trust,
whether registered or not, which carries on whether for purposes of gain or not
any business, trade or profession or work in connection with or incidental or
ancillary thereto but does not include a factory, shop, residential hotel,
restaurant…or other public amusement..”
Appellant’s Contention: Emphasis was NOT on the place but on the NATURE of
activity that must be a commercial activity. Section 2(4) has used words of very
wide import and grammatically it may even include consulting room as well.
In noscitur a sociis: The words take their color from each other and the more
general are restricted to a sense analogous to less general. ‘commercial
establishment’ and ‘profession’ are used along with the words ‘business and
trade’ and must therefore be restricted to activity analogous to business or trade.
An activity cannot be treated as within the definition of s. 2(4) unless it is
 organized as trade and business are organized. The appellant’s private dispensary
did not fall within the purview of the Act and his conviction was illegal.

II. Ejusdem generis: of the same ‘class’ or ‘genus’

1. Where general words follow particular words, the general words are construed as limited
to things “of the same kind” as those which are specified. The rule is an attempt “to
reconcile incompatibility between the specific & general words” in view of the other
rules of interpretation. Statute has to be construed as a whole. No words in a statute are
presumed to be superfluous.
2. The ‘pointers’ of Ejusdem Generis: Particular Words; General Words; General Words
‘coming after’ particular words; Meaning of general words depends upon the particular
words; Meaning of general words is restricted to the meaning of particular words.
3. How the rule is applied: The ‘legislative intention is not in favor of attaching a broader
meaning’ to the general words. The general words follow specific words. Statute contains
a list of specific words constituting a class. The class is not exhausted by the list.
4. Exceptions to the Rule of Ejusdem Generis:
i. If both preceding & succeeding terms are general
ii. When specified words exhaust the whole genus
iii. Where the enumerated objects are diverse in character

(a) Siddheshwari Cotton Miills Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 1019
Sec.2(f)(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944: ‘Manufacture’ to include
bleaching, dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organic
processing or any other process. The processes contemplate change of a lasting
character to the fabric by adding some chemical or otherwise. ‘Any other processes’
must be construed to understand manufacture in the extended sense.
(b) R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal
Def of refugee: A person owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his origin and is unable or owing to such fear is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. Membership of a
particular social group on the basis of race, colour etc. The grounds indicate towards
an ‘immutable characteristic’: A characteristic that is beyond the power of an
individual to change or fundamental to an individual.
(c) Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corporation (1958) 1 All ER 205
Sec. 21 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 provided for certain local authorities to
make “orders for the route to be observed by all carts, carriages, horses, and
persons, and for preventing obstruction of the streets… in all times of public-
processions, rejoicings or illuminations, and in any case when the streets are thronged
or liable to be obstructed…”
 In the context in which they appear, “in any case” ought to be treated as intended only
to cover ‘cases’ of the same class or “genus” as the three preceding instances. The
words ought not to be construed as covering the case of ordinary day to day life.
(d) National Association of Local Govt. Officers v. Bolton Corporation (1942)
Def of workman: Any person who entered into or works under a contract with an
employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour, clerical work or
otherwise.
Court held that ‘or otherwise’ does not bring into play the ejusdem generis principle.
As ‘manual labor’ and ‘clerical work’ do not belong to a single limited genus.
(e) Sun Fire Office v. Hart
In a policy of insurance, the insurers were given an option to terminate the policy if
they so desired ‘by reason of such change or from any other cause whatsoever’. The
phrase ‘by reason of such change’ covers all the antecedent clauses whereby any and
every act done to the insured property whereby the risk of fire increased.
The phrase ‘by reason of such change exhausts the complete genus. The phrase ‘or
from any other cause whatsoever’ccould be construed as if the insurers could
terminate the policy at will.
5. Words of rank: Statutes that deal with persons or things of inferior rank cannot extend
to those of superior degree by introduction of general words. General words following
particular words will not cover anything of a class superior to those to which the
particular words relate.
6. Distinction between Noscitur rule and Ejusdem Generis Rule:
i. Ejusdem generis is applied where general term follows the specific words.
ii. Noscitur is when 2 or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning
are compiled together.
iii. The ejusdem generis rule looks into the preceding words that must form a ‘genus’
or a ‘class’ or ‘category’ and they must be specific.
iv. While applying Noscitur rule the meaning of more general words takes colour
from the associated words.

III. Reddendo Singula Singulis ~By referring each to each~

1. Words to be read distributively. Same as the word “respectively”, “whenever necessary”
or “as applicable”. Used when statute contains several antecedents and several
consequences.
(a) Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v. [Link] Baliga
Proviso to Art.304 of the Constitution: No Bill or amendment for the purpose of
clause(b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the
previous sanction of the President. The word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the
word ‘moved’ to ‘Amendment’.
 (b) Bishop v. Deakin (1936) 1 All ER 255
Sec.59(1) of the Local Government Act, 1933 reads: ‘A person shall be disqualified for
being elected or being a member of a local authority if he has within five years before the
day of election or since his election been convicted of any offence and ordered to be
imprisoned for a period of not less than three months without the option of fine.’
Application of RRS: 1st disqualification applicable to a conviction prior to election. 2nd
disqualification applicable to a conviction prior to election.

IV. Non-obstante clause

1. A clause beginning with ‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some
particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being
in force’. Begins with Notwithstanding; Gives overriding effect to the enacting clause in
case of conflict with provision or Act mentioned in the clause; Enactment following the
non-obstante clause will have full operation.
(a) The ordinary effect of a non-obstante clause is to give an overriding effect to the
main provision.
(b) Generally, where there are two non-obstante clauses, the latter shall prevail.
(c) The court endeavors to adopt the rule of harmonious construction.
(d) The ultimate conclusion would depend upon the limited context of the statute.
2. Prevents reliance on any other law to the contrary. Non obstante clause in a statute makes
the provision independent of other provisions contained in the law even if other
provisions provide to the contrary.
Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A. Irani AIR 1954 SC 596
Suit for delivery of peaceful possession of Irani Manzil. The Resp. was the owner of this
property, the property was requisitioned in April 1943, by the Collector in exercise of his
powers u/DoI Rules, u/the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the possession was given to
the Food Controller.
Requisition of Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946: Continuance of
Requisition.- Notwithstanding the expiration of the Defence of India Act, 1939, and the rules
made there under, all requisitioned lands shall continue to be subject to requisition until the
expiry of the Ordinance and the appropriate Government may use or deal with any requisitioned
land in such a manner as may appear to it to be expedient.
On a plain and grammatical reading it was obvious that once you had an immovable
property which when the Act expired, on the 30.09.1946, was subject to any requisition
effected under the Act, that immovable property continued to be subject to requisition
until the expiry of the Ordinance, no matter whether the requisition order to which the
immovable property was subject was of a limited duration or an indefinite duration.
Proximity b/w non-obstante & operative provision. But it need not be co-extensive
with the operative part i.e., it cannot have the effect of cutting down the clear terms
of the enactment. Clear words of the enactment must be given plain, grammatical
meaning. Non-obstante clause cannot restrict the scope of its operation
3. If there are 2 or more enactments operating in the same field, each containing a non-
obstante clause in such cases, conflict is resolved by consideration of purpose & policy of
the enactments and the language used in them. The later enactment normally prevails
over the earlier one. Special enactment to prevail over general enactment even though
general enactment is later in point of time.
R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka AIR 1992 SC 81
Facts: ‘A’ appointed as Inspector of Motor Vehicles. Promoted to Asst. Regional
Transport Officer. In 1976, the Karnataka General Service (Motor Vehicles Branch)
(Recruitment) Rules, brought in force. In 1977 Karnataka Civil Services (General
Recruitment) Rules, came into being. ‘A’ was promoted as Regional Transport Officer in
1981. The 1977 Rules amended in 1982 and Rule 3(2) was inserted as per which. ‘R’ was
promoted as Dep. Comm’r of Transport on seniority-cum-merit basis. ‘A’ questioned the
promotion of ‘R’ as it should have been made by selection and not on seniority-cum-
merit basis.
Karnataka Civil Service Gen. Recruitment Rules 1977
Method of recruitment.-(1) recruitment to any service or post shall be made by direct
recruitment which may be either by competitive examination or by selection, or by
promotion which may be either by selection or on the basis of seniority- cum- merit. The
methods of recruitment and qualifications shall be as specified in the rules of recruitment
‘specially’ made in that behalf.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the rules of recruitment
specially made in respect of any service or (a) the promotion to the post of HoD or the
post of an Additional HoD, if it is in a grade equivalent to that of the HoD concerned,
shall be by selection; Provided that for the purpose of promotion by selection, the number
of persons to be considered shall be such number of persons eligible for promotion in the
order of seniority, as is equal to five times the number of vacancies to be filled. (b) the
promotion to all other posts shall be on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
Court: General rules is not enacted to supersede Special Rules. Non-obstante clause
clarifies the scope of the enactment. There should be a clear inconsistency between the
two enactments before giving an overriding effect to the non-obstante clause. In this case,
there is no patent inconsistency between any general or special rules. The object of the
Gen. Rules is to broadly provide for rules of recruitment which are not covered by Sp.
Rules.
4. Purpose of the non-obstante clause is that provision shall prevail over any other
provision. If discrepancy b/w non-obstante & any other provision the previous prevails.
Smt. P.E.K. Kalani Amma v. K. Devi AIR 1996 SC 1963
S.11, HMA: Void marriages- Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this
Act shall be null and void…if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in
clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Sec.5
 S.16 Legitimacy of Children of Void & Voidable Marriages- Notwithstanding that a
marriage is null and void u/s.11, any child of such marriage who would have been
legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate, whether such child is born
before or after the commencement of the marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, and
whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and
whether or not the marriage is held to be void o/wise than on a petition u/this Act.
Sec.16 (1) stands delinked from Sec. 11. It confers legitimacy on children born of void
marriages before or after the enforcement of the Act. Benefit of legitimacy has been
conferred upon all the children
Mischief or the vice which was the basis of unconstitutionality of un-amended S.16 has
been effectively removed by amendment. S.16 (1) now stands on its own strength and
operates independently of other Sections. S.16 contains a legal fiction treating
illegitimate, as legitimate notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable.
Children from P.E.K. Amma born prior to the amendments in S.16(1) would,
notwithstanding that the marriage between their parents had taken place at a time when
there was a legislative prohibition on the second marriage, be treated as legitimate, and
would, therefore, inherit the properties of their father, Raman Nair, u/s 16(3) of the Act.
5. If a non-obstante clause is very widely worded its scope may be restricted by construction
having regard to the intention of the Legislature gathered from the enacting clause or
other related provisions of the Act. This may be particularly so when the notwithstanding
clause “does not refer to any particular provision” which it intends to override but refers
to the provisions of the statute generally.
[Link] v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1998 SC 1388
Sec. 21-A of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961
‘Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec.22 or in any other provision of this Act and
in any other law for the time being in force, where after the 15th day of February, 1970
but before the 2nd day of October, 1970-
(a) any person has effected by means of registered instrument a partition of his holding or
part thereof
Definition of Stridhana land in Sec.3(42)- “Stridhan land” means any land held on the
date of commencement of this Act by any female member of the family in her own name
Facts: The partition was executed on 24-9-1970, giving certain lands to the mother in lieu
of her right of maintenance. Since she did not hold them as ‘owner’ the land given to the
mother on the said partition was held not to have become her Stridhana land. But the
wide meaning of the non obstante clause and the enacting words following it cannot be
curtailed when the use of wide language accords with the object of the Act.
6. The quality of non-obstante clause along with other words in the enactment matters in
determining its sweep
Maktool Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1999 SC 1131
 Sec.32A of the NDPS Act, 1985- Notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC, 1973
or any other law for the time being in force - no sentence awarded under this Act shall be
suspended or remitted or commuted.
Sec.36 provides for appeals & revision to the High Court- The High Court may exercise,
so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the
CrPC, 1973
Whether the High Court could exercise its power of suspending the sentence under
section 389 which occurs in Chapter XXIX of the CrPC, pending an appeal?
Having regard to the width of the notwithstanding clause in section 36 A, which refers to
the entire CrPC, and any other law for the time being in force. Also, the qualifying words
‘so far as may be applicable’ in sec. 36B. Therefore, the High Court has no power and
cannot suspend the sentence awarded under the NDPS Act pending an appeal before it.

V. Legal fiction
1. It is not an actual reality but which the ‘law recognizes’ and the ‘court accepts’ as a
reality. A presumption of the existence of the state of affairs which in actuality is non-
existent.
2. Leg. can create a chain of legal fictions by the same Act. When a fiction is created by
statute it must be given its full effect. However, it should not be applied to a point not
contemplated by the legislature

VI. Mandatory and directory provisions

1. There is no universal rule as to when a statute is mandatory or directory. It depends on
the intent and not on the language in which the intent is clothed. Duty of the courts to
ascertain the intention & real scope of the statute
2. For ascertaining real intention of the leg.:
(a) Nature & design of the statute
(b) Consequences of non-compliance
(c) Is non-compliance visited by penalty?
(d) Impact of other provisions whereby necessity of compliance is avoided
(e) The object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered
3. Indicators of ‘Mandatory’ provisions: ‘Shall’; ‘at least’. Act done in breach is invalid.
Non-compliance may invite penalty. Such provisions must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly.
Indicators of ‘Directory’ provisions: ‘May’; ‘as nearly as may be’. Act done in breach
will be valid. Although non-compliance may give rise to penalty. Substantial compliance
may be required. Directory Provisions are of two kinds:
(a) Those which should be substantially complied with to make the Act valid;
(b) Those which even if not at all complied with have no effect on the Act.
4. Where mandatory & directory are lumped together. Substantial compliance of enactment
is insisted. If mandatory part is complied with it will be called substantial compliance.
Notwithstanding the non-compliance of directory requirements.
5. State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa (1987) 2 SCC 602
Facts: IG, Police Haryana, from 30-6-1979 to 25-7- 1980. His performance was assessed
during this period and certain adverse remarks were made by the Home Secretary to the
Govt. of Haryana against him. The remarks were duly accepted by the competent
authority. The remarks were communicated to him by the Home Secretary 2 yrs 3 months
after the close of the relevant period.
The relevant Service rules u/the All-India Services (Confidential Rolls) Rules, 1970:
Rules 5, 6, 6A and 7 of the Rules require that the whole process from the writing of the
confidential reports assessing the performance, character conduct and qualities of every
member of the service, to the communication of the adverse remarks should be completed
within a period of ‘seven months’.
The Purpose of writing Adverse Remarks: The whole object of communication of
adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his
performance, conduct or character, as the case may be, and this object would be lost if
they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay.
Therefore, the combined effect of the provisions make some parts mandatory and some
directory which calls for substantial compliance. But, where compliance after an
inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provision, such
compliance would not be substantial compliance.
6. Directory provision not the same as discretionary power. Directory provision is intended
to be obeyed. Failure to obey it does not render a thing duly done in disobedience of the
provision, a nullity. Discretionary power leaves the donee of the power free to use it or
not to use it at his discretion.
7. Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh AIR 2002 SC 2031
Facts: A case u/Ss.302 &34 IPC was registered against X & others. The Court of
Sessions framed charges against them, arrest warrants were issued against them & they
be tried together including the Respondent (R). The respondent challenged this order but
during the pendency of R’s challenge the trial against X was concluded and he was
convicted u/S.302 IPC.
S.319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence
Whether, the order against Respondent would become ineffective and inoperative as
a result of the conclusion of trial against X before Respondent could be proceeded
with for the offence for which warrants were issued against him in pursuance to an
order passed u/Sec.319 of the Code?
Effect of conclusion of trial u/s 319(1) is to be examined in the light of S.319 (4) which
stipulates a de novo trial in respect of the newly added persons. The power to proceed
against a person other than the accused, in the course of any enquiry, or trial of an
 offence. At this stage, the safeguard provided to the accused is that a fresh trial to be
commenced and witnesses re-heard.
The provision is directory as words ‘could be tried together with the accused’ appear to
be Directory. ‘Could be’ cannot be treated as ‘Must be’. De novo trial mandatory as it
affects the rights of a person. The general rule is that the non-compliance of mandatory
requirement results in nullification of the Act done.
8. Non-compliance with a procedural requirement: Procedural requirement is designed to
facilitate justice and further its ends. If the consequence of non-compliance is not
provided, the requirement may be held to be directory.
9. Question raised by Lord Woolf:
(a) The Substantial Compliance Question: Is the statutory requirement fulfilled if there
has been substantial compliance with the requirement, even though there has not been
a strict compliance; and, if so, has there been a substantial compliance in the case in
issue?
(b) The Discretionary Question: Is the non-compliance capable of being waived, and if
so, has it or can it and should it be waived in this particular case?
(c) The Consequence Question: If it is not capable of being waived or is not waived then
what is the consequence of non-compliance?
10. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal
Rule 13(3) of the Asylum Appeal(Procedure) Rules, 1993: If the Sec’y of State seeks to
challenge the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal ‘an application for leave shall
be made by serving upon the Tribunal, in the form prescribed in the Schedule.’
Rule 38: Any irregularity resulting from failure to comply with the rules shall not by
itself render the proceedings void and if the appellate authority finds that any person may
have been prejudiced, it may before reaching the decision take such steps as it thinks fit
to cure the irregularity.
Dispute: A procedural omission happened due to absence of a declaration of truth as
required in the form. This omission was a substantial non-compliance, but the irregularity
was cured by R. 38. R. 38 conferred a power on the Appellate authority to waive or cure
any irregularity resulting from failure to comply with the Rules.
Where no such power is to cure is conferred, failure to comply with the procedural
requirement which is held mandatory and cannot be waived by the party may be fatal.
But such cases would be few and in majority of cases, the Court’s task will be to seek to
do what is just in all circumstances of the case.
11. Lachmi Narain v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 714
Sec. 6 of Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941: (1) No tax shall be payable under this
Act on the sale of goods specified in the first column of the Schedule subject to the
conditions and
 (2) The State Government after giving by notification in the official gazette not less than
3 months notice of its intention to do so, may add to or omit from or otherwise amend the
Schedule and thereupon the Schedule shall be amended accordingly.
Interpretation of the Court: The tax is to be quantified and assessed on the quarterly
turnover. To avoid any inconvenience to the dealer as well as the Revenue. The period of
not less than 3 months’ notice conforms to the scheme. The span of notice was thus the
essence of the legislative mandate. The ‘necessity’ & the ‘span’ of notice both are
integral to the scheme of the provision and it cannot be split up into essential and non-
essential components, the whole of it being mandatory.
12. ‘May’ can become mandatory in the following cases:
(a) ‘May’ can also be construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to
effectuate a legal right.
(b) When legislature confers a power on courts to be exercised in the circumstances
pointed out by the statute it becomes the duty of the Court to exercise that power on
proof of those circumstances. Courtesy of the legislature shown in dealing with the
Judicature. Permissive words are used to give a mandatory effect.
Examples: 1. A rule required that the Court ‘may’ engage a counsel to defend the
person in a capital sentence case. This was held to cast an obligatory duty on the court
to provide a Counsel if the conditions of that rule were satisfied. 2. The Magistrate
may take cognizance of any cognizable offence in Sec.190(1)(b) of the CrPC. This
has been construed to mean “must take cognizance” leaving no discretion to the
Magistrate.
(c) The word ‘may’ may be used to mean ‘shall’ or ‘must’ by the Legislature while
conferring power on a high dignitary.
Examples: ‘The State Government may make a grant of money or pension- for
suitable maintenance of any family of a descendant from a former ruling chief.’ The
word ‘may’ had to be read as ‘must’ in the above matter where the conditions were
fulfilled.
State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh 1963 AIR 1618
Facts: Respondent appointed as Naib Tehsildar. He was suspended by the
Administration on complaints received against him. Respondent pleaded that the
enquiry might be entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the
Rules. This plea was rejected.
Provisions of the Service Rules: Rule 4(1): The Governor may refer to the tribunal
cases relating to an individual government servant or class of government servants or
government servants in a particular area only in respect of matters involving
corruption, inefficiency etc. Rule 4(2): The Governor may, in respect of a gazetted
government servant on his own request, refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of
matters referred to in sub-rule (1).
 Court: R 4(1) Confers discretion on the Governor to refer the matter. Govt. Servant
cannot claim that the enquiry should be referred to the Tribunal. The object for R 4(2)
is to provide an option to the ‘Gazetted Govt. servants’ to request the Governor that
their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise. At times, the leg. uses
“may” out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the
obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed. Thus, non fulfillment of the
obligation on the Governor to grant the request, the appeal got dismissed.
13. Difference between power and duty
Where a statute imposes a public duty it lays down the manner & the time within which it
is to be performed. If rigid adherence to this causes inconvenience or injustice then it can
be considered as directory. The officer can perform within reasonable time and not exact
time.
Wang v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1995) 1 All ER 367
When a question of failure of time- compliance arises it is better to avoid the two words
‘mandatory and directory’ and to ask two questions:
1. Whether the Legislature intended the person making the determination to comply
with the time provision, whether a fixed time or a reasonable time?
2. Did the legislature intend that a failure to comply with such a time provision would
deprive the decision maker of jurisdiction and render any decision which he purported
to make null and void?
Court: In this case the legislature did intend that the Commissioner should make his
determination within a reasonable time. If the Commissioner failed to act within a
reasonable time he could be compelled to act by an order of mandamus. It does not
follow that his jurisdiction to make a determination disappears the moment a reasonable
time has elapsed.
14. Where a statute confers a power to be exercised on certain conditions, the conditions
prescribed are normally held to be mandatory. Where a power is given to do a certain
thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of
performance are necessarily forbidden. When statutes conferring powers can deprive
the liberty of citizens, the conditions prescribed for the exercise of power, including
implied conditions and procedural requirements, must be strictly followed.

OPERATION OF A STATUTE
I. THE RULE OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
1. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis: Every new enactment
should affect future and not past times. Unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide
or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to
take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability
otherwise than as regards a matter of procedure. Unless there are words in the statute
 sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is “deemed
to be prospective only”.
II. RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES
1. Whenever a new law affects either past legal relationships or decisions made by private
parties in reliance on prior law, the question of prospective or retrospective application of
the new law becomes significant.
2. Retrospective law can affect pre-existing legal relationships; affect the plans and
expectations of the parties; change the scenario/basis on which the legal relationship was
created.
3. The inhibition against retrospective construction must vary secundum subjectam
materiam. “The basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness which ought to be the
basis of every legal rule.”
4. Statutes dealing with substantive rights: “Provisions which touch a right in existence
at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express
enactment or necessary intendment.” Every statue that takes away or impairs vested
rights; creates new obligations; imposes new duty; creates new disability is presumed not
to have retrospective effect.

(a) Mithilesh Kumari & Anr. v. Prem Bihari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247
‘R’ filed a suit requesting the court to declare him the sole and real owner of the
property and also to permanently restrain ‘A’ from transferring the suit property. It
was decreed in all the courts. The parties living as Husband & Wife. Man purchased
some property in the name of wife out of affection. The man had purchased the house
benami for the appellant. During the pendency of the appeal, the Benami
Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came into force.
Sec. 4 Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988: No suit to enforce ‘any right
in respect of any property held benami’ shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming
to be the real owner; and ‘no defence based on any right in respect of any property
held benami shall be allowed in any suit by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
the real owner’.
Court: Retrospective Operation not given unless provided by the language.
Presumption against retrospective application is strong if it affects past transactions.
However a statute is not called retrospective just because a part of the requisite for its
action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Although every law that takes
away or impairs rights vested is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws
made for the benefit of the community may relate to time antecedent to their
commitment. The presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by
necessary implication from the language of the statute.
Declaratory Act: When an Act is declaratory in nature, the presumption against
retrospectivity is not applicable. The Parliament has jurisdiction to pass a declaratory
 legislation. A statute in effect declaring the benami transactions to be unenforceable
belongs to this type. The Law Commission wanted the legislation replacing the
Benami transaction to be retroactive in operation. The interpretation of the plain
meaning of the definition ‘any property held benami’ ‘at the moment of the Act
coming into force’. All such properties may be affected irrespective of their
beginning, duration and origin. Therefore, Sec 4 “any property held benami” is not
limited to any particular time, date or duration. Sweep of Sec 4. envisages past
benami transactions also within its retroactivity.

5. Applicability of Amending Act to Pending Cases: When the law is amended during the
pendency of an action, the rights of parties are decided according to law, as it existed,
when the case had ‘begun’, unless a new statute shows a clear intention to the contrary.
If the rights are ‘accrued’, then the new law will not affect those rights.
6. Retrospectivity in Statutes dealing with Procedure:
i. Matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction
is textually inadmissible.
ii. If the new Act affects matters of procedure only, then “it applies to all actions
pending as well as future.”
iii. “No person has a vested right in any course of procedure.”
7. Right of Appeal: A Substantive Right
8. Appeal- Central Idea is that of a ‘Right’. Right to appeal vests in a suitor at the time of
institution of proceedings. It is a vested right, hence is presumably substantive. Institution
of suit carries the implication that right of appeal is preserved. It is a vested right & it
accrues to the litigant on the institution of the suit.
9. Classification of a statute as substantive or procedural does not necessarily determine
whether it may have a retrospective operation. The true principle is: Fairness. Value of
rights which the statute affects; Extent to which the value is extinguished or diminished;
Unfairness of adversely affecting rights; Clarity of the language used by the Parliament;
The circumstances in which the legislation was created.
(a) Antonelli v. Secretary of State for Trade & Industry (1998) 1 All ER 997 (CA)
S.3(1)(a)(i) of the Estate Agents Act, 1979: The Director is authorized to make an
order prohibiting a person from doing any estate agency work when he considers him
to be unfit to practice on the ground that ‘he has been convicted of an offence
involving fraud or other dishonesty or violence.’
Whether a conviction which occurred prior to the Act could enable the Director
to make a disqualification order?
The power was intended for the protection of the Public. Test of fairness is satisfied.
Director had the discretion to consider the conviction for disqualifying the person.
(b) Vijay v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 6 SCC 289
 ‘No person shall be a member of the Panchayat or continue as such who has been
elected as a councilor of Zila Parishad or as a member of the Panchayat Samiti.’
Court: The provision is retrospective and is applicable to existing members of a
Panchayat. If literal reading giving retrospective effect is not producing absurdity, the
same would not be construed as prospective. The doctrine of fairness is to be applied.
When a new law is enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole even in
absence of a provision, the statute may be held to be retrospective.
10. Statutes regulating Succession: To be given prospective effect. Such statutes would not
affect successions that are already opened. As otherwise, it will affect persons of their
vested rights.
(a) Eramma v. Veerupanna
Sec 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Male “dying intestate” after the
commencement of this Act. The material point of time is the date when succession
opens. No retrospective effect: It has no application where the succession opened
before the Act. If the property is already vested in a person u/the old Hindu Law, he
cannot be divested.
(b) Kotturuswami v. Veeravva
Sec.14 of the HSA, 1956: Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full
owner. Language is retrospective: The Hindu female should have possessed the estate
at the time the Act came into force. Retrospectivity not to be read broadly. If the
female had alienated the estate prior to the coming into force of the Act, neither she
nor the alienee get the right of full ownership under the section.

11. PENAL STATUTES

i. Mollification: The prohibition of Art.20 of the Constitution to enact retrospective
penal laws has no application to a law which only mollifies the rigor of an
existing penal law. Art 15.1 of the ICCPR, 1966 which was ratified by India in
1979 provides: ‘If subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made
by law for imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.’
(a) Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab
The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
Act didn’t apply to the area where the offence was committed at the time of
commission of the offence but it was extended to that area where his appeal
was pending. The Supreme Court held that the benefit of the Act could be
given to the accused.
(b) State v. Gian Singh
The accused was convicted u/TADA. Punishment prescribed for the offence
was ‘death’. The TADA Act expired in 1985. But the proceedings continued
 u/the Saving clause. The old TADA was replaced by new TADA Act, 1987.
In the new Act harshness was reduced to ‘death or life-imprisonment’
Where the appeal of the accused for continuation of death sentence were
pending, whether the benefit of the dilution to life imprisonment could be
given to the accused? The Apex Court gave the benefit of the provision to the
accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment. If subsequent legislation
downgrades the punishment, it would be salutary principle to extend the
benevolence to the accused awaiting sentencing. The 1987 Act gave an
overriding effect to the Act over any enactment in case of inconsistency. The
old Act after expiry became inconsistent with the present Act with respect to
sentence.
(c) Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005)
JJ Act, 1986 repealed in 2000 by JJ (Care & Protection) Act, 2000. Sec.20
gives the benefit of the new Act to pending cases to those who are juveniles
under the new Act even though not so under the Old Act.
Benefit of the new Act for pending cases may be extended in respect to
matters pertaining to age. This is also consistent with Art.20 of the
Constitution.
(d) Limits to mollification: Not extended to ‘ingredients’ of substantive offence
after conviction during pendency of appeal.
Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan
Food Inspector took a sample of hard boiled sugar from the shop of the
appellant sent the sample for analysis. Sample found adulterated due to
presence of mineral oil. Food Inspector filed a complaint on 29/1/1980. Found
guilty by the CJM & was sentenced. During the pendency of the appeal, a
Notification was issued whereby Cen. Govt. amended the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1955. The presence of mineral oil was permitted subject
to two conditions 1st that the mineral oil was of food grade if used as a
lubricant 2nd it did not exceed 0.2 % by weight.
The amendment did not unconditionally permit the presence of mineral oil.
Mollification of rigors of criminal law does not fall within the said
prohibition. Question of retrospectivity depends on principles of
interpretation. Considering the facts of this case, mollification cannot be
provided in these circumstances.
(e) N.P. Basheer v. State of Kerala
The Constitutional validity of the proviso to Sub-section 1 of Section 41 of
the NDPS (Amendment) Act, 2001
NDPS Act, 1985 prescribed for severe deterrent punishment for the
possession of any quantity of drugs etc. R.I. of 10 years & 1 lakh fine was the
minimum punishment. The provisions of bail was stringent due to which
 hardly anyone could get bail. The 1985 Act was amended in 2001. The
Amending Act did 2 things: Rationalized the structure of punishment by
providing graded sentences linked to the quantity of narcotic drug or
psychotropic substance. The application of strict bail provisions restricted
only to those offenders who indulged in serious offences.
The 2001 Act provided that for ‘small quantity’ lesser punishment was
prescribed and for ‘commercial quantity’, greater punishment.
Sec 41 of the Act: Application of this Act to pending cases. (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 1, all cases
pending before the courts or under investigation at the commencement of this
Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act
as amended by this Act and accordingly, any person found guilty of any
offence punishable under the principal Act, as it stood immediately before
such commencement, shall be liable for a punishment which is lesser than the
punishment for which he is otherwise liable at the date of the commission of
such offence: Provided that nothing in this Section shall apply to cases
pending in appeal.
Parliamentary objectives: 1) Avoidance of Delay in Trials 2) Rationalization
of sentencing structure.
Court: If the cases already tried are re-tried, then the first objective is
defeated i.e. avoiding delay in such trials. Hence, Parliament appears to have
removed this class of cases from the ambit of the amendments and excluded
them from the scope of the Amending Act so that the pending appeals could
be disposed off expeditiously by applying the un-amended Act without the
possibility of reopening the concluded trials.

ii. Strict Construction of Penal Statutes

iii. Art.15.1 of the ICCPR, 1966
iv. Liberty cannot be wrongfully compromised
v. Protection Against Ex Post Facto Laws
Art. 20(1): No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the
law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be
subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the
law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. Ordinarily a criminal
legislation imposing heavier suffering must be so interpreted as to speak
futuristically. Expectations of convicted citizens of regaining freedom or
existing legal practice should not be frustrated by subsequent legislation or
practice unless the language is beyond doubt.
(a) Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, Jammu & Kashmir Industries
Ltd.
 Facts: Service rules of the J&K Industries Employees was amended in 1983,
amendment added more grounds of termination. The Supreme Court held
period of un-authorized absence prior to the date of amendment could not be
taken into consideration. Presumption against Retroactivity not only
applicable for criminal offences but applies also to laws which provide for
other penal consequences of a severe nature.
It is a basic principle of natural justice that no one can be penalised on the
ground of a conduct which was not penal on the day it was committed.

12. Statutes prescribing posterior disqualification on past conduct: No man has a vested
right in his past crimes and their consequences as would entitle him to insist that in no
future legislation shall any regard whatever be had to his previous history. This is when
the object of the statute is to protect the public and not inflict punishment.
State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramachandra: A person was convicted for theft prior to
1949. S.57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951: Authorized the removal of a person ‘who
has been convicted’ of certain offences including theft.
The Act does not create a new offence. It is designed to protect the public from the
activities of undesirable persons who have been convicted of offences of a particular
kind.
13. Fiscal statutes: The law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless
otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. Applies to charging sections.
Does not apply to machinery or procedural provisions. Assessment creates a vested
right. Assessee cannot be subjected to reassessment unless a provision to that effect
inserted either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective.

REPEAL
1. Repeal means to abrogate, revoke, cancel etc. A statute is repealed expressly or
impliedly. Express repeal: A subsequent statute stating that certain prior statutory
provisions are hereby repealed. Implied repeal: By enacting matter contrary to and
inconsistent with the prior legislation.
2. General Clauses Act, 1897- Section 6: Effect of Repeal
Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this
Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability ‘acquired’, ‘accrued’ or ‘incurred’
under any enactment so repealed; or
 (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence
committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any
such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced,
and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or
Regulation had not been passed.
Hence, a saving clause can save the acts done under the repealed Act. Further, 6
GCA applies to: All kinds of repeal; Express as well as implied; Temporary statutes that
are repealed; Limited to Central Acts or regulations; Not applicable when Repeal is
brought about by the Constitution.
6, GCA does not: Revive; Affect the previous operation or anything duly done; Affect
any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued; Affect any penalty,
forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence; Affect any investigation,
legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment.
3. PERPETUAL & TEMPORARY STATUTES: Temporary- Duration is only for a
specified period. Expires on the expiry of the specified period. May be repealed before its
expiry. Duration may be extended by a fresh statute or by exercise of power under the
original statute. After it expires it cannot be made effective by merely amending the
same. For reviving expired statute it must be re-enacted.
Perpetual- No date is fixed. It can come to an end on repeal.
4. Subject to any constitutional restriction, the general rule is the power of a legislative body
to repeal a law is co-extensive with its power to enact such a law and a Legislature
which has no power to enact a law on a particular subject-matter has also no power to
repeal the same.” An Act can be repealed by a later “distinct and repealing enactment”
or by an enactment “inconsistent and irreconcilable therewith”.
5. Power to repeal implies power to repeal by ‘implication’. If an Act says that its
provisions shall apply unless ‘expressly excluded’ by any special law, this does not mean
that it cannot be impliedly repealed. Repeal by necessary implication will be equally
effective.
6. A repeal, express or implied cannot be brought about by subordinate legislation. A power
to repeal cannot be delegated either by Union Parliament or State Legislatures. Doctrine
of implied repeal has limited application: Limited to Ordinary Statutes and is not
applicable to Constitution Acts.
7. Shambhu Dayal v. State of U.P. AIR 1986 SC 515
Facts: The appellant was charged and convicted for an offence under the Food
Adulteration Act (PFAA). The offence took place on 1-11-1966 and the Food Inspector
took samples and sent it to Public Analyst for examination.
 Chronology of developments: Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Amendment in
1964; Offence took place on 1/11/1966; Food Analyst appointed by the State Govt. on
15/04/1968 with retrospective effect from 1/03/1965
The Relevant Provisions of the Acts:
Food Adulteration Act, 1954
Sec.8: Public Analysts. – The State Govt. may by notification in the Official Gazette,
appoint such persons as it thinks fit, and possessing such qualifications as may be
prescribed to be Public Analyst
Sec.9: Food Inspectors.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of Sec.14 the State Govt. may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint persons in such number as it thinks fit, having the prescribed
qualifications’ to be Food Inspectors for the purposes of this Act
Food Adulteration Act, 1964
Sec.8: Public Analysts. – The Central Govt. or the State Govt. may by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications
to be Public Analyst
Sec.9 Food Inspectors.- (1) The Central Govt. or the State Govt. may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit, having the prescribed
qualifications’ to be Food Inspectors for such local areas as may be assigned to them by
the Central Govt. or the State Govt., as the case may be.
Appellant: PFAA came into force in 1954 u/which the power to appoint the Public
Analyst and Food Inspector rested with the State Government only. By an amendment to
the Act in 1964 it provided that the Cen. Govt. or the State Govt. may appoint a Public
Analyst and a Food Inspector. The State Government by notification dated 15/04/1968,
appointed Food Inspectors with retrospective effect from 1/03/1965. When the offence
took place on 1st Nov. 1966 neither the Food Inspector nor the Public Analyst was
empowered to function as Food Inspector or Public Analyst as the notification was made
very much later on 15/04/1968.
Court: The new sections do not repeal the old. For the effect of the amendment the
language has to be seen. The amending provisions should be read as a part of the original
statute. Both amended & un-amended to be applied and read together. The amending
sections merely ‘add to’ not ‘repeal’ the existing provisions. The appointments made by
the State Govt. will be preserved.
8. Some formulae blur the distinction between express and implied repeal: where the
Act repealed provides substantially for all matters contained in the Act effecting the
repeal there is correspondence between the two Acts; and the earlier Act would thus stand
repealed. It is not necessary that there should be complete identity between the repealing
Act and the Act repealed in every respect.
9. (a) When there is total correspondence between the repealing & repealed Act dealing
with the same subject matter. Old Act is repealed.
 (b)When there is Partial Correspondence dealing partially in some sections the result is
Partial Repeal.
(c) When there is no correspondence then previous Act is not repealed.

CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL: All proceedings obliterated. All inchoate rights destroyed.

All cause of action comes to an end.
1. When Parliament has the power to repeal outright without any savings, it can have power
to make the pending proceedings continue. Since wider power includes the narrower &
smaller power.
2. If the repealing legislation prescribes for fresh procedures. Then the new code will apply
for pending procedures under the old code. For no person has a vested right in a matter of
procedure unless it has been expressly preserved.
3. Revival: If Statute A is repealed by Statute B. Next Statute B is repealed by Statute C.
Then on such repeal of B; ‘A’ is not revived, unless expressly so provided. Revival can
however happen when repeal has happened due to ‘substitution’ and the Act making the
substitution is invalid due to want of competence.
4. Saving of rights ‘ACQUIRED’: Prevents the obliteration of the rights on repeal if the
rights have been acquired. Hence, ‘anything done’ under the statute will not be
invalidated after the repeal but it will be rendered abortive if no right was acquired or no
liability had been incurred prior to repeal.
5. If in a repealed enactment, a right has been given, but that, in respect of it, some
investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved
on repeal. It will be preserved even if process of quantification is necessary. But there is
a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation
which is to decide whether some right should be or should not be given. On a repeal the
former is preserved; the latter is not.
6. Aitken v. South Hams District Council (1994) 3 All ER 400
Power prescribed in the Control of Pollution Act: The Authority is empowered to serve a
notice requiring abatement of a nuisance within a stated time. The person served with the
notice and contravening its provisions shall be liable for a criminal offence. After service
of the notice but before its expiry, the Act got repealed.
Court: The effectiveness of the notice continued (anything done). The obligation to
comply with it was preserved (liability incurred). ‘Real and continuing obligation.’ A
person contravening the notice after repeal of the Act was liable to be punished for the
offence under the repealed Act.
7. Right ‘acquired’ & Right ‘accrued’ -A fine difference- ‘Acquired’: Where some step
after the act came into force is needed. This additional step should have been taken before
the repeal. Where some step, after the Act came into force is needed to be taken by the
claimant for getting the right. ‘Accrued’: When accrued on the mere force of the Act
itself no additional step has to be taken. Where the Act, without anything being further
 done by the claimant, confers the right. Therefore, if a right has crystallized and liability
has arisen under the repealed act, it is deemed to be continuing even when the legislation
has been obliterated and remains unaffected by the repeal. The right/liability/penalty
should have been perfected before the repeal.
8. Ogden Industries v. Lucas (1969) 1 All ER 121 (PC)
Facts: Workman’s Compensation Act provided for compensation under two heads (i)
Injury (ii) Death due to injury. The workman suffered injury under first head, after which
the Act got substituted. The new Act brought enhanced compensation for the dependants
in case of death. Therefore, the court noted that the right of dependants to claim
compensation accrues on workman’s death, not at the time of injury.
The two aspects are triggered at the same time: The right of the dependants to claim
compensation and the liability of the employer. When the law is changed after injury but
before death providing for enhanced compensation, it is not open to the employer to
contend that he had incurred the liability when the injury was caused and was not liable
to pay enhanced compensation. The right of dependants and the liability of the employer
towards them arises at the same time i.e. at the happening of the death of the workman.
Therefore, enhanced compensation has to be paid.
9. The way of Repeal & determining the scope of Section 6:
Type of repeal: 1. Bare (hardly any contrary intention, Sec 6 can apply) 2. Repeal
accompanied by fresh legislation (provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into).
Karam Singh Sobti v. Pratap Chand AIR 1964 SC 1305
Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 repealed and replaced by The Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. A suit was filed for the ejection of tenant who had sublet the
premises w/out the landlord’s consent. When this suit was pending in the High Court, the
new Act came into force. The ground on which eviction was sought ceased to be a good
ground.
Sec.57(2) of the 1958 Act: “Notwithstanding such repeal all suits and other proceedings
under the said Act pending at the commencement of this Act, before any court or other
authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provision of the said
Act, as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been passed: provided
that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a
tenant from any premises… the court or other authority shall have regard to the
provisions of this Act.”
As there is an apparent conflict b/w section and proviso, harmonious construction will be
applied. Pending proceedings under the old Act, modification of new act could be
applied.
10. Sec. 6 subject to contrary intention: Intention of the ‘Repealing Act’ to be looked into
and not the repealed act. Line of inquiry: Whether the new Act manifests the intention to
destroy the rights and not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and
liabilities.
 11. Consequence of a general repeal: Statute is completely effaced. Subordinate
legislation made under repealed statute also ceases to have effect. This can be
avoided by inserting a saving clause providing for the contrary.
Sec.24 of the General Clauses Act: When a statute is repealed & re-enacted, all orders,
rules, notifications etc under the Old Act shall continue under the new Act unless
contrary is stated. Subordinate legislation shall continue to be in force “as if enacted in
the Act.” The continuance of subordinate legislation u/s24 is subject to qualification that
it is not inconsistent with the provision re-enacted.

IMPLIED REPEAL

1. Presumption is always against repeal by implication: When a statute does not provide
repealing provision, legislative intention is not to repeal. Burden of proof is on the person
asserting repeal. Foundation of the presumption regarding this Principle: Ut res magis
valeat quam pereat: Leg. has knowledge of all existing laws.
2. When can repeal be possible by necessary implication:
(a) If provisions of the Act are plainly repugnant to those of the subsequent statute
(b) If the entire subject-matter of the first is taken away by the second
(c) If the two standing together would lead to wholly absurd consequences
(d) The statutes are so inconsistent & repugnant that they CANNOT STAND EACH
OTHER
(e) If the leg. intent is to lay down an exhaustive code on the subject-matter and the two
laws occupy the same field.
3. Sec.6, GCA Applicable in Implied Repeals, such repeals are just as effective as Express
Repeals.
4. Prior particular law and later general law: It is a sound principle of all jurisprudence
that a prior particular law is no easily to be held abrogated by a posterior law, expressed
in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and
covering a number of cases, of which the particular law is but one.” A prior particular
law is not readily held to be impliedly repealed by later general enactment. Generalia
specialibus non derogant. The particular act is construed as an exception or qualification
to the general Act.
5. Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph
Two Acts were passed each empowering different bodies to provide for bus stands.
The Travancore District Municipalities Act, 1939: Sec. 286 empowers the Municipal
Council to construct or provide public halting places and cart stands and levy fees for
their use.
The Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1950: Sec. 72 empowers the State
Government or an authority authorized by it to determine in consultation with a local
authority places at which motor vehicles may stand or halt.
 No repeal in this case as the earlier was a special law applying to Municipal Areas, and
the later was a general law applying to all areas in general. Both the provisions were
enabling ones. Both the provisions can co-exist and repeal CANNOT be implied here.
The latter is a continuity of the earlier, It could be availed by the appropriate authority as
& when it chose. Both provisions can co-exist They being affirmative in nature.
6. A general statute applies to all persons and special to a limited category of persons or
places. Sometimes, the general law may contain special provisions on certain matters and
in respect of these matters it would be considered as special law. If the general law by its
own terms recognizes the existence or continuance of special law on the subject, no
question of inconsistency or repeal arises.
7. However, where the intention to supersede the special law is clearly evinced the later
general law will prevail over the prior particular law by an express repeal or by making
inconsistent provisions.
8. [Link] v. K.M. Kurien
Earlier Act: Kerala Agricultural and Income Tax and Sales Tax Service Rules: The
percentage or ratio for filling up the vacancies should be fixed by taking into account the
successive substantive vacancies arising at a particular time.
Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 added a note in 1992: The number of
vacancies to be filled in from direct recruits and transferees should be decided by
applying the fixed ratio or percentage to the cadre strength whenever a ratio or percentage
is fixed for different method of recruitment and not to the vacancies existing at that time.
The clear intention of the subsequent general law to abrogate the prior particular
law is evinced. This is supported by the Object & Reasons for introducing Note 3 which
makes the intention clear.
9. Prior General Law and Later Particular Law: Generalibus Specialia Derogant
Delhi Municipality v. Shiv Shankar AIR 1971 SC 815
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954- The Respondent was prosecuted for
selling adulterated vinegar.
Essential Commodities Act, 1955- Fruit Products Order, 1955; Respondent had taken
license under this order.
When there is no inconsistency between the general rule and special statute, the latter
may be considered as supplementary.
Object and purpose of Food Adulteration Act is to eliminate the danger to human life and
health from the sale of unwholesome articles of food. Object and purpose of Essential
Commodities Act is the control of the production, supply, distribution in essential
commodities.
Identification of fields of operations of both acts: Different restrictions in both Acts.
The provisions are supplementary & cumulative in operation. The former do not render
the compliance with the latter impossible.
10. Affirmative enactments: One affirmative enactment is not easily taken as repealed by
another affirmative enactment. No legal bar in creating 2 sources of power to achieve the
same purpose. If there is no real inconsistency between the orders of 2 authorities then
both of them are considered to be supplementary to each other if the obedience of one
does not involve any disobedience of the other.
Mohammed Jacoo Sait vs District Collector of Trichur
The repeal of one enactment by another is particularly difficult to imply where both are
framed in the affirmative, or where they are negative in form but, this being so merely
because the purpose of each is to subtract from an existing rule, are to be treated inter se
as affirmative.
Ram Chandra Mawa Lal & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors.
One of the tests for ascertaining whether the inconsistency is an irreconcilable or
intolerable one, is to pose this question: Can the State law be obeyed or respected without
flouting or violating the Central law in letter and spirit? If the answer is in the
affirmative, the State law cannot be invalidated. Not at any rate when the State law
merely ‘promotes’ the real object of both the laws, and is in the real sense ‘supplementary
or complementary’ to the Central law.
Parliament can create two sources of power. Both can deal with the same subject-matter.
There is no irregularity in acting under both if both laws can be obeyed without
disobeying each other. Then no case of repugnance is generated. Both laws are
supplementary to each other.
11. Laws defining Offences and Penalties: Later statute describes an offence created by an
earlier statute, imposes a different punishment or varies the procedure. The earlier statue
is repealed by implication. Sec. 26 of the GCA: Where an act or omission constitutes an
offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be punished
under either or any of those enactments; but shall not be liable to be punished twice for
the same offence.