ARANETA VS.

DINGLASAN chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency

Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Executive Power in times
ceased to have any force and effect.
of war/national emergency
Act No. 671 Secs 3 ;4:
FACTS: The petitions challenge the validity of
executive orders of the President avowedly issued AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. PROMULGATE RULES AND
Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
of First Instance of Manila for violation of the EMERGENCY.
provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as
the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge
soon as practicable upon the convening of the
and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the
Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control
rules and regulations promulgated by him under
exports from the Philippines.
the powers herein granted.
In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its
mandamus to compel the Administrator of the
approval and the rules and regulations
Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the
until the Congress of the Philippines shall
petitioner.
otherwise provide.
Both official refuse to issue the required export
ISSUE: WON CA NO 671: EMERGENCY
license on the ground that the exportation of shoes
POWERS ACT CEASED TO HAVE ANY
from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive
FORCE AND EFFECT
Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order
No. 225, which appropriates funds for the RULING: YES. Section 26 of Article VI of the
operation of the Government of the Republic of Constitution provides:
the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949
to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The
petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, In time of war or other national emergency, the
an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is to carry out a declared national policy.
Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates
P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection Article VI of the Constitution provides that any
with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national law passed by virtue thereof should be “;for a
elections to be held in November, 1949. limited

The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax- Period” & ”Limited” has been defined to mean
payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent “the “restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within
respondents from disbursing, spending or positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or
otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of scope” (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.,
it.” 669; Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The
words “limited period” as used in the Constitution
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the duration. Emergency, in order to justify the
petitioners do not press the point in their oral delegation of emergency powers, “must be
argument and memorandum. They rest their case temporary or it cannot be said to be an
emergency”; (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of President could not only make new rules and
Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., regulations but he could restore the ones already
937, 938.). annulled by the legislature.
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
671 was approved with this limitation in view. The Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225
that the legislature is deemed to have full and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its setting the session of Congress instead of the first
powers. The assertion that new legislation is special session preceded it as the point of
needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the
with the Constitution either. If a new and different purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In
law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the a special session, the Congress may “consider
period for the delegation, it has been correctly general legislation or only such as he (President)
pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, may designate.”; (Section 9, Article VI of the
negative and uncertain; “that which was intended Constitution.) In a regular session, the power
to meet a temporary emergency may become Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except
permanent law” (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions
if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval will be granted.
of the President, and the Congress might not be
able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would Rodriguez v. Gella (1953)
create the anomaly that, while Congress might Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 671, passed in
delegate its powers by simple majority, it might pursuance of section 26 of Article VI of the
not be able to recall them except by a two-third Constitution, declared the national policy that “In
vote. In other words, it would be easier for times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
1948 ed., p. 160. reg-ulations to carry out a declared national
policy.”
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention
of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates The petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders
that “the rules and regulations promulgated Nos. 545 and 546, the first appropriating the sum
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise works, and the second setting aside the sum of
provide.” The silence of the law regarding the Pl11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
express provision for the repeal of the rules and volcanic action and other calamities.
regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National They contend that a law which delegates such
Assembly that there was no necessity to provide powers to the President for an indefinite period
for the former. It would be strange if having no would be unconstitutional because it is against the
idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act express provision of the Constitution. If the law
was to be effective the National Assemble failed to which dele-gates legislative powers does not fix or
make a provision for this termination in the same provide for a period of time within or during which
way that it did for the termination of the effects the President may exercise them and there is
and incidents of the delegation. There would be no dispute or doubt as to whether the national
point in repealing or annulling the rules and emergency which prompted the Congress to pass
regulations promulgated under a law if the law the law delegating legislative powers to the
itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President continues or has ceased. It would be an
abdication of legislative powers. While the emergency” that may arise as an after-effect of
Philippines is still technically at war with Japan, war or from natural causes such as widespread
the pending of the ratifica-tion of Act No. 671 earth-quakes, typhoons, floods, and the like.
referred to a factual war. Secondly, the last world
Even under the theory that insofar as the Congress
war was between the United States and Japan, the
had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given
Philippines was involved only because it was then
matter, the emergency powers delegated in
under American sovereignty. Thirdly, the United
Commonwealth Act No. 671 are pro tanto
States had already signed a peace treaty with
withdrawn, the President cannot set aside funds for
Japan, and-the Philippines has become an
special purposes, since the Congress has been
independent country since 1946.
approving appropriation acts. If the President had
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except ceased to have powers with respect to general
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The appropriations, none can remain in respect of
authority or power to appropriate government special appropriations; otherwise he may do
funds to be spent for public purposes is lodged indirectly what he cannot do directly.
exclusively in the Congress because it is purely
and essentially a legislative function. The
legislative power to appropriate government funds Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement
for public purposes lodged exclusively in the Manufacturers Association of the Philippines
Congress may, however, be delegated to the G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004
President “in times of war or other national
emergency,” &” for a limited period and subject to Doctrine:
such restrictions as it may prescribe” & ”to carry Delegation of Powers
out a declared national policy”
Facts:
Issues: WON Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 The petitioner, Southern Cross Cement
must be declared as having no legal anchorage. Corporation, is a domestic domestic corporation
engaged in the business of cement manufacturing,
Ruling: Yes. Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 production, importation and exportation. While, the
are hereby declared null and void, and the respondent, Philippine Cement Manufacturers
respondents are ordered to desist from expending Corporation ("Philcemcor"), is an association of
the public funds set aside. domestic cement manufacturers. It has 18 members,
per Record.
Being a deviation from the principle of separation Philcemcor sought an imposition of
of powers the delegation of legislative powers definitive safeguard measures on the import of
authorized by the Constitution may validly be Portland cement, in pursuant to Safeguard Measures
made only by adhering strictly to its spirit and Act (SMA), due to the declines in domestic
letter. The legislative authority or power to be production capacity utilization, market share, sales
granted or delegated to the President by the and employment; as well as caused depressed local
Congress must be “in times of war or other prices. After the preliminary investigation of the
national emergency” and “for a limited period and Bureau of Import Services of the DTI to determine
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe” the critical circumstances justifying the provisional
measures, the latter issued a measure posting a tariff
and the Congress has to pass a law for that
of 20.60 pesos per 40kg of Portland cement within
purpose.
200 days. In the meantime, the Tariff Commission
Notes: Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution received a request from DTI to have a formal
authorizes the delegation of powers by the investigation of determine whether or not to impose
Congress a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray
Portland cement. The Tariff Commission, in
(1) in times of war or (2) other national conclusion of the study, recommends that “the
emergency. The emergency spoken of in elements of serious injury and imminent threat of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is one “in time of serious injury not having been established, it is
war” as distinguished from “other national hereby recommended that no definitive general
safeguard measure be imposed on the importation
of gray Portland cement.” The DTI disagreed. by Congress take on the mantle of a constitutional
However, after having the opinion of the DOJ on command, which the executive branch is obliged to
the scope of DTI’s options in acting on the decision observe.
of the Tariff Commission, DTI has no options but
to abide to the latter’s recommendation.
Philcemcor’s application is denied. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. CIVIL
Philcemcor, after receiving a copy of the AERONAUTICS BOARD, 270 SCRA 538
DTI’s decision, filed from the Court of Appeals (1997)
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
DOCTRINE: DELEGATION OF POWERS
seeking to set aside the DTI Decision. However, the
petitioner commented that the Court of Appeals has FACTS:
no jurisdiction over the petition for it is on the Court
of Tax Appeals hat the SMA conferred jurisdiction Petitioner seeks to prohibit respondent Civil
to review rulings of the Secretary in connection Aeronautics Board(CAB) from exercising
with the imposition of a safeguard measure. It jurisdiction over private respondent's Application
likewise argued that Philcemcor's resort to the for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
special civil action of certiorari is improper, Convenience and Necessity, and to annul and set
considering that what Philcemcor sought to rectify aside a temporary operating permit issued by the
is an error of judgment and not an error of Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. International Airways (GrandAir, for brevity)
The petition was denied. The petitioner allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic
appealed before this Court. air transportation services, particularly the Manila-
Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes.
Issue: The main reason submitted by petitioner
W/N the Court of Appeals have the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to support its
jurisdiction over the appeal on the Decision of the petition is the fact that GrandAir does not possess
DTI regarding the issue. a legislative franchise authorizing it to engage in
air transportation service within the Philippines or
Ruling: elsewhere. Such franchise is, allegedly, a requisite
No. The Court ruled, through Justice Tinga, for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
that the CA has no jurisdiction over the appeal, Convenience or Necessity by the respondent
instead it is the Court of Tax Appeals. Board, as mandated under Section 11, Article XII
Section 29 of the SMA clearly stated that of the Constitution.
any interested party who is adversely affected by
the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the Respondent GrandAir, on the other hand, posits
imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the that a legislative franchise is no longer a
CTA. The Court has long recognized the legislative requirement for the issuance of a Certificate of
determination to vest sole and exclusive jurisdiction Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary
on matters involving internal revenue and customs Operating Permit, following the Court's
duties to such a specialized court. The CTA is pronouncements in the case of Albano
dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration vs. Reyes, 1 as restated by the Court of Appeals in
of tax problems and has necessarily developed an Avia Filipinas International vs. Civil Aeronautics
expertise on the subject. The law expressly confers Board 2 and Silangan Airways, Inc. v. Grand
on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized International Airways, Inc., and the Hon. Civil
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of Aeronautics Board. 3
judicial review without mention of any other court
that may exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction On November 24, 1994, private respondent
in relation to the SMA. GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public
The delegation of the taxation power by the Convenience and Necessity with the Board.
legislative to the executive is authorized by the On December 14, 1994, GrandAir filed its
Constitution itself. At the same time, the Compliance, and requested for the issuance of a
Constitution also grants the delegating authority Temporary Operating Permit. Petitioner, itself the
(Congress) the right to impose restrictions and holder of a legislative franchise to operate air
limitations on the taxation power delegated to the transport services, filed an Opposition to the
President. The restrictions and limitations imposed
application for a Certificate of Public Convenience legislative franchise to engage in scheduled
and Necessity on December 16, 1995 on the domestic air transportation. A legislative franchise
following grounds: is necessary before anyone may engage in air
transport services, and a franchise may only be
A. The CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the granted by Congress. This is the meaning given by
petitioner's application until the latter has first the petitioner upon a reading of Section 11, Article
obtained a franchise to operate from Congress. XII, 9 and Section 1, Article VI, 10 of the
B. The petitioner's application is deficient in form Constitution.
and substance
C. Approval of petitioner's application would ISSUE:
violate the equal protection clause of the WON the Civil Aeronautics Board can issue the
constitution. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or
D. There is no urgent need and demand for the Temporary Operating Permit to a prospective
services applied for. domestic air transport operator who does not
possess a legislative franchise to operate as such
E. To grant petitioner's application would only
result in ruinous competition contrary to Section
4(d) of R.A. 776. 5 HELD:

At the initial hearing for the application, petitioner Yes. It is generally recognized that a
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the franchise may be derived indirectly from the
Board to hear the application because GrandAir state through a duly designated agency, and to
did not possess a legislative franchise. this extent, the power to grant franchises has
frequently been delegated, even to agencies other
On December 20, 1994, the Chief Hearing Officer than those of a legislative nature.
of CAB issued an Order denying petitioner's Congress has granted certain administrative
Opposition. agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to
authorize the operation of, certain public utilities.
On December 22, 1994, petitioner this time,
With the growing complexity of modern life, the
opposed private respondent's application for a
multiplication of the subjects of governmental
temporary permit maintaining that:
regulation, and the increased difficulty of
1. The applicant does not possess the required administering the laws, there is a constantly
fitness and capability of operating the services growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
applied for under RA 776; and, powers by the legislature, and towards the approval
of the practice by the courts. It is generally
2. Applicant has failed to prove that there is clear recognized that a franchise may be derived
and urgent public need for the services applied indirectly from the state through a duly designated
for. 6 agency, and to this extent, the power to grant
On December 23, 1994, the Board promulgated franchises has frequently been delegated, even to
Resolution No. 119(92) approving the issuance of agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In
a Temporary Operating Permit in favor of Grand pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges
Air 7 for a period of three months, i.e., from conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for
December 22, 1994 to March 22, 1994. Petitioner the state constitute as much a legislative franchise
moved for the reconsideration of the issuance of as though the grant had been made by an act of the
the Temporary Operating Permit on January 11, Legislature.
1995, but the same was denied The trend of modern legislation is to vest
the Public Service Commissioner with the power
Petitioners argue that the respondent Board acted to regulate and control the operation of public
beyond its powers and jurisdiction in taking services under reasonable rules and regulations,
cognizance of GrandAir's application for the and as a general rule, courts will not interfere with
issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience the exercise of that discretion when it is just and
and Necessity, and in issuing a temporary reasonable and founded upon a legal right.
operating permit in the meantime, since GrandAir Given the foregoing postulates, we find that
has not been granted and does not possess a the Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to
issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely
Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a an administrative issuance of then President
domestic air transport operator, who, though Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be
not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue
the other requirements prescribed by the law. that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be
Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to
of R.A. No. 776. fix pilotage rates.
There is nothing in the law nor in the
Constitution, which indicates that a legislative Issue: WON respondents acted in excess of
franchise is an indispensable requirement for an jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
entity to operate as a domestic air transport amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving
operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII Resolution No. 860 and in enacting Philippine
recognizes Congress’ control over any franchise, Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88
certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it
does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to Ruling: The contention has no merit. The fixing of
issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are rates is essentially a legislative power. E.O. No.
not required before each and every public utility 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty
may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may
it fit to delegate this function to government increase the rates but it may not decrease them
agencies, specialized particularly in their respective below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally,
areas of public service. the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088
or alter it. Much less could the PPA abrogate the
rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage
Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the service to the contracting parties as it did through
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (1997) A.O. No. 02-88, §3.

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding Rate-fixing orders previously issued by the
to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in Philippine Ports Authority were in the nature of
pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the
PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED exercise of delegated power, and as such these
RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES could only be amended or revised by law.—
RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE There is no basis for petitioners’ argument that rate
VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC fixing is merely an exercise of administrative
PORTS. The executive order increased power; that if President Marcos had power to
substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA
previously fixed by the PPA. through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA
could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 4386, which
order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely
and without prior consultation: that its left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the
enforcement would create disorder in the ports as agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders
the operators and owners of the maritime vessels previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of
had expressed opposition to its implementation; subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the
and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, exercise of delegated power. As such these could
was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. only be amended or revised by law, as the
President did by E.O. No. 1088. It is not an answer
The UHPAP then announced its intention to to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered
implement E.O. No. 1088 effective. This in turn a statute because that would imply the withdrawal
drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary of power from the PPA. What determines whether
sanctions would be applied to those who would an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not
charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA its form but its nature. Here, as have already said,
instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,
fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those including pilotage service, has always been
provided in E.O. No. 1088. regarded as legislative in character.
Judicial Review; An inquiry into legislative Filipinos. It then allowed WAIVER or
motivation is not proper since the only relevant SUSPENSION any existing retirement of housing
question is whether in issuing it the President plan by employers on the grounds that its
violated constitutional and statutory retirement/housing plan is superior than the
restrictions on his power.—Moreover, an inquiry HDMF. Initially, the HDMF approved the Yazaki
into legislative motivation is not proper since the Torres’ request to waive contributions but their
only relevant question is whether in issuing it the request for renewal was denied by the HDMF
President violated constitutional and statutory Executive Office deeming their retirement plan as
restrictions on his power. The PPA did not have not superior from what the HDMF provided.
any objection to the order based on constitutional Ordering its employees to register with the Fund
ground. In fact the nearest to a challenge on and remit their monthly contributions, the Yazaki
constitutional grounds was that mounted not by the Torres appealed to the HDMF Board of Trustees but
PPA but by the intervenors below which claimed was denied. They also filed to the CA for review but
that the rates fixed in E.O. No. 1088 were was denied as well, claiming that the existing rules
exorbitant and unreasonable. However, both the and regulations cannot be amended unless RA No.
trial court and the Court of Appeals overruled the 7742 did so. The CA argues that it was stated under
objections and the intervenors apparently accepted said provision that waiver or suspension may be
the ruling because they did not appeal further to granted, not promising a definite approval by the
this Court. HDMF and said grant is merely a privilege which
the State in the exercise of its police power has the
Notes: The authority given by the LTFRB to the right to not renew.
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over
and above the authorized existing fare is illegal Petitioner then contends that the CA acted
and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue with grave abuse of discretion by upholding the
delegation of legislative authority. HDMF’s Resolution to deny their renewal of waiver
and in confirming its authority to amend the IRRs
In subordinate, delegated rule-making by since they are only an administrative agency and
administrative agencies, all that may be reasonably can only promulgate them, not repeal or amend said
demanded is a showing that the delegated provision.
legislation consisting of administrative regulations
are germane to the general purposes projected by
the governing or enabling statute. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion
YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING INC., 2. Whether or not the HDMF has the power to
Petitioners amend RA No. 7742
vs.
RULING:
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, through 1. No. It is clear that the request for renewal
its Board of Trustees, and HONORABLE was denied after conducting the necessary
ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, in her investigation, comparison, evaluation and
capacity as President of the Home Development deliberation of their retirement plan and
Mutual Fund, Respondents. was not denied out of baseless judgment.
Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the
FACTS: grant of waiver or exemption from the Fund
is a privilege granted by the State, hence,
Petitioners file for a petition for certiorari
it can be withdrawn when it has found that
on the grounds that the Court of Appeals had
a person or group is not entitled to it
committed grave abuse of discretion regarding their
anymore.
case against the Home Development Mutual Fund.
2. No. Under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Under R.A. 7742, the Home Development Constitution provides legislative power to
Mutual Fund, a government agency administrated be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
the PAG-IBIG Fund in which it sourced mandatory which is generally described as the power
contributions from all-gainfully employed to make, alter and repeal laws as well as
amend, change or modify a law. More
 importantly, administrative agencies are taxpayer, instituted the present special
delegated with power to make rules and civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
regulations in order to address preliminary injunction, against Auditor
contingencies in problems multiple General, to restrain him from passing in
government entities may face regarding the audit any expenditure of public funds in
newly implemented laws. “In general, implementation of said executive orders
rules and regulations issued by an and/or any disbursement by any
administrative agency, pursuant to the municipalities.
authority conferred upon it by law, have  Petitioner alleges that said executive
the force and effect, or partake of the orders are null and void, upon the ground
nature, of a statute.” that said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
The HDMF is part of the administrative agencies of the constitutes an undue delegation of
government hence, they are authorized and follows legislative power.
the doctrine of necessary implication of  Petitioner argues, accordingly: “If the
formulation IRRs regarding statues to amend, President, under the new law, cannot even
revise, alter or repeal the same. create a barrio, can he create a
The petition is DISMISSED, and the CA’s decision is municipality which is composed of several
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. barrios. Since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
 The third paragraph of Sec 3 of R.A. 2370
Notes: reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names
Doctrine of necessary implication. That which is
changed except under the provisions of
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as this Act or by Act of Congress.”
much a part of it as that which is expressed  Respondent herein relies upon
*implementing rules and regulations by Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
administrative agencies of Binañgonan, alleging that the power of
the President to create municipalities
Pelaez v Auditor General under this section does not amount to
Doctrines: undue delegation of legislative power.

Principle of separation of powers – it is a Issue:

fundamental principle in our system of WON Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code
government. It obtains not through express
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
provision but by actual division in our power. – YES
Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its Ruling:
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in
The Constitution has provided for the elaborate question are hereby declared null and void ab
system of checks and balances to secure initio and the respondent permanently
coordination in the workings of various restrained from passing in audit any
departments of the government. expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said Executive Orders or any disbursement
by the municipalities above referred to. It is so
Facts: ordered.
 During the period from Sept 4 to Oct 29,
Ratio:
2964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental
the Revised Administrative Code, issued law ordains:
Executive Orders; creating 33 “The President shall have control of all the
municipalities. executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
 Nov 10, 1964 – petitioner Emmanuel exercise general supervision over all local
Palaez, as VP of the Philippines and as a
governments as may be provided by law, and take By virtue of Executive Order No. 174 issued by
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal
Instead of giving the President less power over district of San Andres was later officially
local governments than that vested in him over the recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. The
by conferring upon him more power over executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this
municipal corporations than that which he has over municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed
said executive departments, bureaus or offices. in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House
of Representatives.”
The Nature of the Legislative Power to Create
the Area For Local Government The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for
The legislative power to create an area of the local quo warranto with the RTC against the officials of
government involves two things: (1) the the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought
determination of whether a local area shall be the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.
created or not; (2) the determination of whether 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of
said decision shall have the force of law. To leave the Municipality of San Andres be permanently
the decision to another agency or person to create ordered to refrain from performing the duties and
or not to create and to determine the conditions functions of their respective offices.
under which he would create, or to have discretion
whether to follow or not to follow the rule laid Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
down in law, would be undue delegation of Auditor General, the petitioning municipality
legislative power. contended that Executive Order No. 353, a
presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the
The power of control under this provision implies inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
the right of the President to interfere in the of the constitutional principle of separation of
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the
law in the officers of the executive departments, officials of the Municipality or Municipal District
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties
well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power and functions of their respective offices that
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of
insofar as local governments are concerned. With the Municipality of San Narciso.
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits
him to wield no more authority than that of The respondents asked for the dismissal of the
checking whether said local governments or the petition on the grounds that since it was at the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by instance of petitioner municipality that the
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot Municipality of San Andres was given life with the
interfere with local governments, so long as the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner
same or its officers act within the scope of their municipality) should be deemed estopped from
authority. questioning the creation of the new municipality;
that because the Municipality of San Andres had
been in existence since 1959, its corporate
Municipality of San Narciso Quezon vs Mendez personality could no longer be assailed; and that,
considering the petition to be one for quo warranto,
petitioner municipality was not the proper party to
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to
Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and the State acting through the Solicitor General.
2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the After the parties had submitted their respective pre-
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer action on
segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the
the same province, the barrios of San Andres, pleadings.
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala
along with their respective sitios. On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San
Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that
the case had become moot and academic with the Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, constituted as municipal circuits, in the
which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, the country, certain municipalities that comprised
reading thusly: the municipal circuits organized under
Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978,
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 537. Under this administrative order, the
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-
operate as such. Existing municipal districts San Andres for the province of Quezon.
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective At the present time, all doubts on the de jure
set of elective municipal officials holding office at standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)
henceforth be considered as regular apportioning the seats of the House of
municipalities. Representatives, appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
ISSUE: WON the creation of Municipality of been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
San Andres is valid municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
RULING: YES. The de jure status of the 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect
Municipality of San Andres in the province of that municipal districts "organized pursuant to
Quezon must now be conceded. presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective
Whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal officials holding office at the time of the
municipal districts by the President pursuant to effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) considered as regular municipalities." No
cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section
known as Local Government Code of 1991. 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred.
The power to create political subdivisions is a
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
complete nullity for being the result of an when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts
could offer a choice other than to consider the done that would have been invalid under existing
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"
a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal the usual qualification against impairment of vested
corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it rights.
to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more than six ULTAN OSOP B. CAMID Petitioners
years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. vs.
Auditor General was promulgated. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
On the contrary, certain governmental acts all LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS
pointed to the State's recognition of the continued REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO,
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
after more than five years as a municipal district, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
Executive Order No. 174 classified the MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
municipality after having surpassed the income Respondents.
requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
 FACTS: existed in the first place as its creation was
completely eradicated.
The Municipality of Andong was created
under Executive Order No. 107, as well as 32 other In the petitioner’s pursuant of Section
municipalities, by Diosdado Macapagal on October 442(d) of the Local Government Code, it should be
01, 1964. The President jusitified the creation of noted that Andong does not meet the requisites set
these municipalities of his powers under Section 68 forth by said provision in order to receive
of the Administrative Code but was found to have recognition since they “must have their respective
been repealed by RA No. 2370, declaring his order, set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the EO No. 107, to be an undue delegation of the time of the effectivity of the Code” which
legislative power and therefore, null and void. Andong does not possess, seeing that they have
Presently, Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid never elected municipal officers at all. The Court
petitions for certiorari contending on the continuing clarifies that said provision does not serve to affirm
existence of Andong and should possess a legal or reconstitute the judicially dissolve municipalities
personality and given judicial affirmation. such as Andong, which had been created previously
by presidential issuances or EOs.
Camid presents a Certification issued by
the Office of the Community Environment and The Court advises the petitioner to seek
Natural Resources (CENRO) of the DENR which legislative confirmation, rather than judicial
was created under EO No. 107 and a Certification confirmation of void title, which necessitates
issued by the Provincial Statistics of Marawi City expedient and legislative solution if Andong is truly
that Andong holds 14,059 residents, as well as a list governed by an “Interim Government.” Thus, the
of governmental agencies and private groups that Court cannot sanction Andong’s judicial
allegedly recognize Andong as an existing personality on the basis of its judicial dissolution.
municipality. Moreover, petitioner insists in the
continuing validity of EO No. 107 under the Section The Court DISMISSES the petition.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991
wherein “municipalities existing as of the date of Notes:
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.” The case is an example of a citizen’s
ignorance on a legal reality and the persistence of
ISSUES: performing alleged governmental functions by a
Whether or not Andong shall be recognized as a municipal without jurisdiction nor capacity to
municipality and affirm the effectivity of EO No. execute governing powers.
107 It also raised the question of whether the Court
RULING: has the capacity to re-affirm or reinstate void
statutes (which is not allowed).
No. The Court duly notes that the case is
not fit to be subject for civil actions of certiorari and
mandamus since it pertains to eh de novo Sema v. Commissino on Elections
appreciation of factual questions. G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
The Court finds it clearly essential to have
a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise Doctrine:
of corporate powers by its municipal corporation Delegation of Powers
which Camid has no opportunity to show at this
point as he should have undergone the usual Facts:
administrative procedure and filed first with the ARMM or Autonomous Region of Muslim
Court of Appeals which has the power to make the Mindanao, was created through its organic act RA
necessary factual determinations. More 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Cotabato city,
importantly, the Court argues that Executive Order though part of first legislative district of
No. 107 was declared void ab initio and judicially Maguindanao which is a province in ARMM, is not
annulled in 1965 which means that from the very part of the latter. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s
beginning, Andong was considered to have never legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the with any provision of the Constitution. A province
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the cannot be created without a legislative district
eight municipalities in the first district of because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of
Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite. Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
In the creation of the the Shariff Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
Kabunsuan, there was a confusion whether province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
Cotabato City will be part of Shariff Kabunsuan or same time the power to create a legislative district.
it will have a separate identity from Shariff the power to increase the allowable membership in
Kabunsuan. The COMELEC issued resolution no. the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
07-0407 clarifying the status quo of the city to legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
maintan the status of Cotabato City as part of Congress. The Constitution empowered Congress
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
of Maguindanao. In the course of election, regional assemblies. It is axiomatic that organic acts
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district Constitution.
is composed only of Cotabato City because of the The Court declared Section 19, Article VI
enactment of MMA Act 201 However, the of Republic Act No. 9054 unconstitutional. The
COMELEC, again, issued resolution no. 7902 Court void eclare VOID Muslim Mindanao
ammending the previous resolution by renaming the Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of
legislative district in question as "Shariff Shariff Kabunsuan.
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City”.
The petitioner, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema, was
a candidate for representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the BINAMIRA v. Garrucho, Jr., 188 SCRA 154
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 (1990)
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast
in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended DOCTRINE: DELEGATIONS OF POWERS
that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one FACTS:
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority from which he claims to have
been removed without just cause in violation of his
Issue: security of tenure.
W/N Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, The petitioner bases his claim on the following
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the communication addressed to him by the Minister of
power to create provinces, is constitutional. Tourism on April 7, 1986 designating him as the
general manager of the Philippine Tourism
Ruling: Authority.
No. The Court ruled, through Justice Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office
Carpio, that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, on the same date.
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought
power to create provinces is unconstitutional. approval from President Aquino of the composition
The creation of any of the four local of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which
government units – province, city, municipality or included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his
barangay – must comply with three conditions. capacity as General Manager. This approval was
First, the creation of a local government unit must given by the President on the same date.
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Binamira claims that since assuming office, he
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager
any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and
be a plebiscite in the political units affected. had been acknowledged as such by various
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the government offices, including the Office of the
power to create local government units, subject to President.
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
 He complains, though, that on January 2,1990, any other officer. Appointment involves the
his resignation was demanded by respondent exercise of discretion, which because of its
Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it
Binamira's demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume
that led to his filing of a complaint against the the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights. President. The appointment (or designation) of the
On January 4,1990, President Aquino sent petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
respondent Garrucho a memorandum stating that ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
since the general manager of PTA was not subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be
designated by the President required by P.D. No. a member of the Cabinet.
564 as amended but only by the Secretary of Indeed, even on the assumption that the power
Tourism, such designation is invalid. conferred on the President could be validly
On April 6, 1990, the President of the exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept
Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as that the act of the latter, as an extension or
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism "projection" of the personality of the President,
Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position
respondent. in question. The petitioner's conclusion that
Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of
ISSUE: President Aquino is based only on half the doctrine
he vigorously invokes,
WON the Secretary of Tourism validly
appointed the general manager of PTA and thus
entitled for reinstatement LLMAS v. ORBOS (1991)

HELD: Delegation of Powers

No. Appointment may be defined as the FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a Tarlac and assumed, by virtue of a decision of the
given office. When completed, usually with its Office of the President, the governorship. Private
confirmation, the appointment results in security of respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and
at pleasure because of the nature of his office. was suspended from office for a period of 90 days.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive
imposition by law of additional duties on an Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, and is being impleaded, by authority of the
the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of President, the assailed Resolution grant executive
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism clemency to respondent governor.
Authority. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is Sometime in 1989, the petitioner filed a verified
legislative in nature. complaint against respondent governor before the
Where the person is merely designated and then Department of Local Government (DLG, for
not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold short), charging him with alleged violation of
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In as the Local Government Code, and other
this sense, the designation is considered only an appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and
acting or temporary appointment, which does not Corrupt Practices Act. Prior to that, petitioner filed
confer security of tenure on the person named. with the Office of the Ombudsman a verified
Even if so understood, that is, as an complaint against respondent governor for the
appointment, the designation of the petitioner latter's alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint before the
removed. The reason is that the decree clearly DLG was subsequently tried, where both petitioner
provides that the appointment of the General and respondent governor presented their respective
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall evidence.
be made by the President of the Philippines, not by
Petitioner maintains that the respondent governor, As will be recalled, the DLG Secretary imposed
in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of the penalty of suspension upon his finding that
Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan petitioner was guilty of serious neglect of duty
Agreement with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan
Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc.
headed by the governor himself as chairman and (LTFI) grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to
controlled by his brother-in-law as executive Tarlac Province. In his letter-petition, thereby
director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan pleading for a thirty (30)-day reduction of his
Agreement was never authorized and approved by suspension, petitioner invited attention to the DLG
the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the Secretary's decision clearing him of having
provisions of the Local Government Code; that the personally benefited from the questioned
said Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the transaction. The petitioner's act, vis-a-vis the loan
Foundation and grossly inimical to the interest of to LTFI, may have been prompted by an over
the Provincial Government (because it did not eagerness to accelerate the delivery of livelihood
provide for interest or for any type of security and services to his provincemates. As the truism goes,
it did not provide for surely ship and however, the end does not always justify the
comptrollership or audit to control the safe means. Be that as it may, but without belaboring
disbursement of said loans); that a total amount of the impropriety of the loan agreement
P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to the aforesaid aforementioned, some measure of leniency may be
Foundation; that the transactions constitute a accorded petitioner as the purpose of his
fraudulent scheme to defraud the Provincial suspension may have made its mark.
Government; and that the said Agreement is
wholly unconstitutional, illegal, and immoral. Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III was granted
executive clemency in the sense that his ninety-day
On the other hand, it is the contention of suspension is hereby reduced to the period already
respondent governor that "the funds were intended served.
to generate livelihood projects among the residents
of Tarlac and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac By virtue of the resolution, respondent governor
Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and reassumed the governorship of the province,
considered the best alternative as a matter of allegedly without any notification made to the
judgment."; that he resigned from the said petitioner.
Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion that
he would influence it; that it is not true that the The petitioner also contends that since respondent
Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing governor refused to recognize his suspension
audit by the Provincial Government because the (having reassumed the governorship in gross
Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise; defiance of the suspension order), executive
and that the Agreement is not manifestly and clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to
grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial due process were violated because the grant of
Government and respondent governor did not and executive clemency was so sudden that he was not
would not profit thereby because it provided even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by
sufficient safeguards for repayment. public respondent of impropriety in the loan
transaction entered into by respondent governor,
After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of the former failed to justify the reduction of the
Local Government rendered a decision finding the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner
governor guilty. Parenthetically, be it noted that further alleges that the executive clemency granted
the Resolution imposed not a preventive by public respondent was "the product of a hocus-
suspension but a penalty of suspension. pocus strategy" because there was allegedly no real
Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 petition for the grant of executive clemency filed
of BP. Blg. 337, to the effect that the decision of by respondent governor.
the Office of the President in administrative
suspension of local officials shall be immediately ISSUES AND RULINGS:
executory without prejudice to appeal to 1. Whether or not the President of the
appropriate courts, petitioner took his oath of Philippines has the power to grant
office as acting governor. executive clemency in administrative
cases.
Yes. Petitioner's main argument is that the Constitution the President may grant executive
President may grant executive clemency only in clemency in administrative cases. We must not
criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of overlook the fact that the exercise by the President
the Constitution which reads: of her power of executive clemency is subject to
constitutional limitations. We will merely check
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, whether the particular measure in question has
or as otherwise provided in this been in accordance with law. The judiciary is the
Constitution, the President may grant department which is charged with the special
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and duty of determining the limitations which the
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction law places upon all official action. In so doing,
by final judgment. We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or
motives which actuated the President as such is
He shall also have the power to grant clearly beyond our power of judicial review.
amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court
Congress. has been conferred an expanded jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the other branches and
According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase agencies of the government to determine whether
after conviction by final judgment applies solely to or not they have acted within the bounds of the
criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1).
of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who
has been convicted in an administrative case, 3. Whether or not the questioned act was
allegedly because the word conviction refers only characterized by grave abuse of discretion
to criminal cases. Petitioner, however, describes, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
in his very own words, respondent governor as one
who has been convicted in an administrative case. No. We do not clearly see any valid and
Thus, petitioner concedes that the word conviction convincing reason why the President cannot grant
may be used either in a criminal case or in an executive clemency in administrative cases. It is
administrative case. Our considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
Applying the doctrine ubi lex non distinguit, nec fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
nos distinguire debemos, We cannot sustain more reason can she grant executive clemency in
petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
not distinguish, the court must not distinguish. than. criminal offenses.
The Constitution does not distinguish between
which cases executive clemency may be exercised WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1)
by the President, with the sole exclusion of DECLARING that the President did not act
impeachment cases. arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Resolution granting on the
2. Whether or not the grant of executive grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to
clemency and the reason therefor, are political respondent governor and that, accordingly, the
questions beyond judicial review. same is not unconstitutional (without prejudice to
criminal proceedings which have been filed or may
No. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into be filed against respondent governor), and (2)
the manner in which the President's discretionary DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition
powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its for being unmeritorious, moot and academic.
exercise, when the issue involved concerns the
validity of such discretionary powers or
whether said powers are within the limits G.R. No. 156208 September 26, 2006
prescribed by the Constitution, the Courts will NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS
not decline to exercise their power of judicial ASSOCIATION (NPC DAMA), Petitioners
review. vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC),
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for Respondents.
determination is not purely political. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether under the
FACTS:
 Petitioners file for an injunction to enjoin No. Under Section 48 the Court presents
respondents from implementing the National Power the composition of the NPB’s Board of Directors
Board (NPB) Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. and to approve said Resolution in the absence of
2002-125 which entails the termination of all NPC the four and using only representatives thus, they
employees in line with their restructuring of the cannot delegate their duties and power to vote or
NPC. approve board resolutions on the NPB since
personal judgment must be exercised.
Under Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001, the “EPIRA Law,” The Court rules that the votes casted by
the Department of Energy created the Energy the representatives shall not be considered as valid
Restructuring Steering Committee (Restructuring votes, making the number of votes gathered to be
Committee) to manage the privatization and only THREE OUT OF NINE, making the voting
restricting of the NPC, the National Transportation regarding the approval of resolution void and have
Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector no legal effect.
Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALM). Said
provision is to provide an orderly and transparent The Court declares Resolutions No. 2002-
privatization of the assets and liabilities of the NPC 124 and No. 2002-125 to be VOID and
and provide a framework in restructuring the WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT. The petition for
electric power industry. Injuction is GRANTED and ENJOINED from
implemented said resolutions.
In 2002, the Restructuring Committee reviewed the
proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and assisted
in implementing its Phase I, recommending after to People v. Dacuycuy
the NPD the approval of adopting measures
regarding the separation and hiring of NPC Doctrines/Principles:
personnel. From this, the NPC amended the
Restructuring Plan and approved NPB Resolution The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670
No. 2002-53. provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall
Petitioners contend that the NPB Resolutions are wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any
void and without force and effect and invokes teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by
Section 78 of the EPIRA Law which states that “The this Act or who shall in any other manner commit
implementation of the provisions of this Act shall any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act
not be restrained or enjoined except by an order shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.” less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
They also argue that said Resolutions were not thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the
passed and issued by majority of the Board of discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Directors since only three members were present Two alternative and distinct penalties are
while the remaining four department heads who consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
signed were mere representatives and not the from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It
secretaries of the department hence, violative of the is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or
well-settled principle that “delegated power cannot term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment.
be further delegated.” While a minimum and maximum amount for the
penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent
Furthemore, the Resolutions would lead to the provision for the penalty of imprisonment,
unemployment of 2,730 employees which is although both appear to be qualified by the phrase
contrary to the Constitution’s mandate of promoting "in the discretion of the court.
employment and security of tenure. Facts:
 On April 4, 1975, private respondents
ISSUES: Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval,
and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school
1. Whether or not the Resolutions No. 2002- officials from Leyte were charged before
124 and No. 2002-125 were properly the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for
enacted. violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers).
RULING:
  The respondents pleaded not guilty and ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial
petitioned for certeriori and prohibition Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
with preliminary injunction before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII Ratio:
alleging that: In the case under consideration, the respondent
a.) The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction judge erroneously assumed that since the penalty
over the case due to the correctional nature of the of imprisonment has been provided for by the
penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. legislature, the court is endowed with the
No. 4670) prescribed for the offense discretion to ascertain the term or period of
b.) Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, imprisonment. We cannot agree with this
(1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of
to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue imprisonment where no points of reference have
delegation of legislative power, the duration of the been provided by the legislature. What valid
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the delegation presupposes and sanctions is an
discretion of the court as if the latter were the exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of
legislative department of the Government. a term of imprisonment which must be
 On March 20, 1976 – the petition was encompassed within specific or designated limits
transferred to Branch IV where the provided by law, the absence of which designated
respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy, ruled limits well constitute such exercise as an undue
that RA No. 4670 is valid and delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or
constitutional but cases for its violation assumption, of legislative power.
fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for
an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
ISSUES: neither a minimum nor a maximum duration
1. WON the municipal and city courts have having been set by the legislative authority. The
jurisdiction over violation of RA No. courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion
4670. to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the
benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the
 YES, the municipal and city courts have duration thereof may range, in the words of
jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act. respondent judge, from one minute to the life span
No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
3828, considers crimes punishable by fine allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under essentially legislative in nature and which, as
the original jurisdiction of municipal applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
courts. separation of powers as well as the non-
delegability of legislative powers. This time, the
2. WON Section 32 of said RA No. 4670 is presumption of constitutionality has to yield.
constitutional.
 NO, RA No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional LINA VS. PURISIMA
prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power by vesting in the court the DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Political Question vs.
responsibility of imposing a duration on the Justiciable Question
punishment of imprisonment, as if the
courts were the legislative department of FACTS: Petition in this case is for the writ of
the government. mandamus to compel respondents 'to restore
petitioner to the position she was excluded from' in
Held: the Philippine Veterans Bank.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of While the petition avers that respondent Esteban
respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and Cabanos, as President of the Bank, 'in grave abuse
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed of discretion and authority forcibly excluded
against private respondents herein is hereby petitioner from the position without valid cause, nor
basis in law, it also states that the removal of
petitioner was 'upon recommendation of Branch court process. This is one of the express hesitations
Manager, Julio Tamondong, which upon the power of Courts imposed by General
recommendation and action of respondent Esteban Order No. 3 issued by the President on September
Cabanos was later approved by the Board of 22, 1972. Said general order provides:
Directors of the said Bank.
I do hereby further order that the Judiciary shall
The allegation in the petition that respondent continue to function in accordance with its present
Cabanos committed "grave abuse of discretion and organization and personnel, and shall try and
authority" in dismissing petitioner from her office is decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal
a legal conclusion, not a statement of the ultimate and civil cases, except the following cases:
facts giving rise to the cause of action being
asserted. 1. Those involving the validity, legality, or
constitutionality of any decree, order or act
It is equally noticeable that while annexed to the issued, promulgated or performed by me or by
petition is the letter of Assistant Executive my duly designated representative pursuant to
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to Atty. Pantaleon Z. Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21, 1972.
Salcedo informing him of the denial of petitioner's 2. Those involving the validity, legality or
request for reconsideration as contained in the constitutionality of any rules, orders or acts
therewith enclosed copy of the 2nd endorsement of issued, promulgated or performed by public
said office, the petition before the Court does not servants pursuant to decrees, orders, rules and
include said enclosure as an annex, nor copied regulations issued and promulgated by me or
therein, which should show why the said request for by my duly designated representative pursuant
reconsideration was denied, one of the ultimate to Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21,
facts which must necessarily be looked into should 1972.
the petition be given due course. For that matter,
neither is the letter or notice of petitioner's removal However, Respondent court's invocation of General
from office included in the petition. Considering the Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing short
foregoing observations, the Court does not find the of an unwarranted abdication of judicial
petition to be sufficient in form. authority, which no judge duly imbued with the
In an attempt to cure the suppose defects pointed out implications of the paramount principle of
in the foregoing order, petitioner filed an amended independence of the judiciary should ever think of
petition, which, however, was denied as well. The doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent
petitioner filed another motion containing the judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter of
documents not annexed to the original petition. highly significant historical fact that this Court
has always deemed General Order No. 3,
As it shows in the annexes of the amended petition, including its amendment by General Orders No.
the petitioner was dismissed by respondent 3-a, as practically inoperative even in the light of
president of the Philippine Veterans Bank Proclamation 1081 of September 21, 1972 and
pursuant to Letters of Instruction No. 14 and No. Proclamation 1104 of January 17, 1973 placing
19-A, for being notoriously undesirable. This the whole Philippines under martial law. While
being the case, petitioner had a right to appeal from the members of the Court are not agreed on whether
her dismissal, and the venue of the appeal is the or not particular instances of attack against the
Office of the President. She did appeal, but the validity of certain Presidential Decrees raise
appeal was denied. political questions which the judiciary would not
interfere with, there is unanimity among us in the
ISSUE: WON the court can take cognizance of view that it is for the Court rather than the
the case at bar Executive to determine whether or not We may
take cognizance of any given case involving the
RULING: YES. It may be inferred that since the validity of acts of the Executive Department
removal of petitioner is pursuant to a Letter of purportedly under the authority of the martial
Instruction issued by the President pursuant to law proclamations.
Proclamation No. 1081, the validity or legality of
said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, In this regard, to the credit of President Marcos, it
much less modify or reverse, whether by means of has been noted by the Court that the President has
the writ of certiorari and/or mandamus, or any other publicly acknowledged as one of the distinctive
cardinal features of the prevailing martial law  The term "political question"
regime that the constitutional authority, connotes what it means in ordinary
prerogatives and jurisdiction of the Supreme parlance, namely, a question of
Court, as they have ever existed in normal times, policy. It refers to those questions
remain integrally unimpaired despite the which under the Constitution, are to be
proclamation of martial law. In plainer terms, it decided by the people in their sovereign
has been repeatedly announced by the President, capacity; or in regard to which full
even to international or foreign audiences, that discretionary authority has been
our martial law government is subject, as by delegated to the legislative or executive
constitutional mandate it should always be, to branch of the government. It is
the authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme concerned with issues dependent
Court. And undoubtedly, in appropriate cases, such upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
pronouncements can apply to the judiciary as a particular measure.”
whole. Accordingly, We do not hesitate to reject the
reasoning advanced by respondent court as a  A purely justiciable question or
constitutionally-uncalled- for submissiveness to the controversy as it implies a given
Executive, certainly unworthy of the judicial office. right, legally demandable and
We hold that the legal premise of the impugned enforceable, an act or omission
order is absolutely erroneous from the point of view violative of said right, and a remedy,
of sacred constitutional principles. Such an order granted or sanctioned by law, for
does not deserve to be given sanction by this Court said breach of right
as being in keeping with the role of the courts in this
momentous era of our national existence as a RODOLFO R. MAGO, Complainant,
democratic republic committed to hold inviolate the vs.
independence of the judiciary at all times, so long JUDGE AUREA G. PEÑALOSA-FERMO,
as the constitution continues to be in force. MTC, LABO, CAMARINES
NORTE, Respondent.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the respondent
court's order of September 3, 1974 is hereby Facts:
declared null and void and set aside, and Civil
Case No. 94986 is deemed terminated in Rodolfo R. Mago (Mago) alleged that Judge Aurea
accordance with the terms of this decision. The G. Peñalosa-Fermo, committed gross ignorance of
Court further rules that petitioner should report for the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint
work within thirty (30) days from service of this and of the counter-charge against him. Mago claims
decision upon her counsel of record, on pain of her that when he filed a complaint for Grave Coercion
losing her job, if she fails to do so. Respondents' against one Alex Roberto Angeles, he received a
tender of her back salaries and expenses in subpoena to attend the preliminary investigation of
accordance with their manifestations before the said criminal case. In compliance, he and his
Court of May 22, 1975 and November 12, 1976 is witnesses attended and they were examined through
declared well taken, and whether or not petitioner a prepared set of questions handed to them by the
returns for work as herein indicated, she should be stenographer. Judge Peñalosa-Fermo was not
paid what she has been promised which, for clarity, present then.
We hold includes (a) payment of petitioner's back
salaries from October 16, 1972, the date of her Judge Peñalosa-Fermo admitted that the court
dismissal up to one month or thirty (30) days after stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions
her counsel's receipt of the respondents' during the preliminary examination but she claimed
Manifestation and Comment of November 12, 1976 that this is for the convenience of the court
above referred to and (b) reimbursement of her stenographer and the witnesses.
expenses actually incurred in connection with this
case, including attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10) The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge
per centum of the amount of total recovery as herein Peñalosa-Fermo guilty of gross ignorance of the law
allowed. or procedure.
Notes:
ISSUE: lackof knowledge of procedure, thereby
contributing to the erosion of public confidence in
WON Judge Peñalosa-Fermo committed gross the judicial system.
ignorance of the law or procedure. – YES
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Director of
HELD: Labor Relations
G.R. No. L-48931, July 16, 1979
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent, Judge
Aurea G. Peñalosa-Fermo of the Municipal Trial Doctrine:
Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, guilty of Gross Separation of Powers
Ignorance of the Law or Procedure. She is FINED
in the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000) Pesos Facts:
and warned that a commission of another infraction This is a certification election case.
which is tantamount to the same charge shall be The petitioner, Ilaw at Buklod ng
dealt with more severely. Manggagawa, is a duly registered labor union. It
filed a petition of certification election prior to the
Ratio: expiration of the unregistered collective bargaining
agreement between the Associated Labor Unions
Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules and the General Milling Corporation. It was
112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M. No. 05- granted. The med-arbiter ordered the holding of a
8-26-SC, Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of certification election within twenty days from
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by notice among the rank-and-file employees of the
Removing the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation company. The The Associated Labor Unions
from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of appealed from that order to the Director of Labor
municipal trial courts were empowered to Relations. However, the Director of Labor
conduct preliminary investigations in which they Relations over the record of the case to the Trade
exercised discretion in determining whether Union Congress of the Philippines or TUCP, a
there was probable cause to hale the respondent federation of labor unions, alleging that by virtue of
into court. Such being the case, they could not an arrangement between the Ministry of Labor and
delegate the discretion to another. the said federation that cases involving its member-
An officer to whom discretion is entrusted unions must first be referred to it for possible
cannot delegate it to another, the presumption settlement in accordance with its Code of Ethics..
being that he was chosen because he was deemed The TUCP has not decided on the controversy
fit and competent to exercise that judgment and within the twenty months after receiving it.
discretion, and unless the power to substitute After the twentieth month, the petitioner
another in his place has been given to him, he filed before this Court instant petition for
cannot delegate his duties to another. Then, as mandamus.
now, a personal examination of the complainant in
a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Issue:
Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised W/N it was legal and proper for the
Rules of Court before its amendment, the Director of Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the
“investigating fiscal” was required to “certify under appeal of the Associated Labor Unions in a
oath that he, or as shown by the record, an certification election case.
authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses . . . “ Ruling:
By the Judge Peñalosa-Fermo ‘s delegation of the Yes. The Court ruled, through Justice
examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave Aquino, that the referral was of the Appeal to TUCP
threats case to the stenographer, and worse, by was illegal and void. The Labor Code never
allowing the witnesses to “read/study the written intended that the Director of Labor Relations should
questions” to be propounded to them and to “write abdicate, delegate, and relinquish his arbitrational
their answers thereto” upon the judge‘s justification prerogatives in favor of a private person or entity or
that the scheme was for the convenience of the to a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender of
stenographers, Judge Peñalosa-Fermo betrayed her official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and
censurable renunciation of the Director's growth and development of the coconut and
adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation cases. other palm oil industry.” They also contend to be
The Court declared that the Trade Union pursuant of President Aquino’s Presidential
Congress of the Philippines is ordered to return to Memorandum in 1988 for the establishment of new
the Director of Labor Relations within forty- eight DCN plants.
hours from notice the original record of BLR Case
No. A-536-76 (LRD Case No. CE-0018). ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Resolution granted
by the PCA shall be null and void base
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998 on the given arguments by the APCD.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
DESSICATORS, Petitioners 2. Whether or not the Resolution is valid
vs. as pursuant of Presidential
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, Memorandum
Respondents.
RULING:
FACTS:
1. Yes. EO No. 826 was created in order
Petitioner Association of Philippine to control the establishment of new
Coconut Dessicators (APCD) petitions for plants due to the limited market that
certiorari and mandamus against Philippine would consequently create a cutthroat
Coconut Authority (PCA) due to its governing competition between the existing
board to issue Resolution No. 018-93, “POLICY processing plants. PCS was bestowed
DECLARATION DEREGULATING THE as the authority to reduce the number of
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUT existing desiccated coconut processing
PROCESSING PLANTS” which withdraws the plants to a level which will insure the
PCA’s regulation of the coconut processing survival of the remaining plants.
industry, enabling the swift registration of those
who wish to engage in said industry as the PCA will The Court finds PCA to have disregarded
now limit its registration through the monitor of their legislative purpose of protecting the
volume production and administration of quality Desiccated Coconut Industry in relation to the
standards. market demands, production capacity, level and
flow of raw materials and circumstances that
Petitioner contends that said Resolution would affect the growth and viability of the
violates the PCA Administrative Order No. 02, industry since the questioned Resolution allows an
series of 1991 since applicants sought permits to indiscriminate opening of new coconut
operate in areas that are “congested” under the AO. processing plants as well as the virtual
Nevertheless, the new “certificates of registration” dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure,
issued by the PCS has enabled a number of new forsaking controls as they limit their function to
coconut mills to operate. The APCD alleges that the only “monitoring” the mills.
Resolution should become null and void as it is
With regards to the PD No. 1468, the
1. an undue exercise of legislative power by Court states that other provisions also mandate its
an administrative body regulation, and the issue at hand is whether it can
2. said Resolution is baseless, arbitrary, and renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law
unreasonable therefore in violation of creating it since that is what the Resolution
substantive due process of law. basically promulgates. Thus, the Court finds that
3. In passing the Resolution, PCA violated the repudiating its role of regulating coconut mills it
procedural due process requirement of puts other statutory provisions at risk, mainly PD
consultation provided in PD No. 1644, EO No. 1644 as it dictates “The PCA shall have full
No. 826 and PCA AO No. 002, Series of power and authority to regulate the marketing and
1991. export of copra, coconut oil, and their by-
products, in furtherance of the steps being taken to
rationalize the coconut oil milling industry.”
Respondent PCA’s defense is that under PD No.
1468, its mandate is “to promote the accelerated
2. No. The PCA cannot rely on the
memorandum of Pres. Aquino to adopt the
Resolution since it also states that the
establishment of new DCN plants are still
subjected to the guidelines of PCA. More
importantly, it was a mere memoranda to the PCA
and not intended to amend several
abovementioned laws regarding the regulation of
DCN plants. She was also no longer vested with
legislative authority.
The petition is GRANTED, declaring PCA
Resolution No. 018-93 to be NULL and VOID
for having been issued in excess of the power of
the PCA.