petitions they directly instituted before it.

The Constitutional provision cited reads: “The

VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 277
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.” The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004. *

and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR., presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as “not (being)
petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLEY justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents. qualifications of the President or Vice President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress,
on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent
G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
*

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004. *
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS parliamentary form of govern-
279
and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 279
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for ment under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s decision on a the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to, and could well be paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.—Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and
cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule Phrases; Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election scenario;
65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two
reads—“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A office.—Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last postelection scenario.Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to
itself. dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal”promulgated by the Supreme
_______________ Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court defined by
*EN BANC. Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly brought before it
278
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.—The rules
78
categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
lower courts as may be established by law which power “includes the duty of the courts of justice second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” It is directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and presidency before the elections are held.
could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land. who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.—Perhaps, the
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and 1973 earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in
contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not (being) justiciable” controversies the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its
280
and disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice President; The statutory set-up under Republic Act No. 1793 would now be deemed revived 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
under the present Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution.—Petitioners Tecson, et al., in
G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, 80
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the
 significance if only to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to eighteen hundred and ninety eight.” Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant
his private interests to the general interest of society. who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries, from before 11 April 1899.
simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship, Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines
social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
internationalization of citizenship.—The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which known as the principle of territoriality, governed.—Controversy arose on to the status of children
established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship
liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. The writing at the time,
20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on 282
the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing
and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well 82
be the internationalization of citizenship. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”—There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” In church records, the Archipelago within that period.
natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and
Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer Phrases; With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The
extended by Royal Decrees. Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of
ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American citizens, they, some other country.—With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus issued passports citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.— first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as
281
the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 281 the Act of Congress in 1912—x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her
date, not a citizen of some other country.
sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an
international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all, jus
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While there was, at one
intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the
United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress—x
for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship.
x x Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands,
they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens” under
resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiring such children to still elect
entitled to the protection of the United States.
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns.—Subsection (4), Article
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provi-
States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first 283
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 283
Philippines—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the Philippine
 sions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their the lifetime of the presumed parent.
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child; There is little, if any, to
concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State; Civil law has been defined as the
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution. mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of society for the
Certificates; Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage protection of private interests.—It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr., acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the
constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—Being public documents, the death certificate of traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate
provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his that the legitimate or illegitimate
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially 285
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The trustworthiness of VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 285
public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the
sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil
might have occurred. Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code of particularly—Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization
Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August 1950 when the of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
paternity.—Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines private interests.”
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was Article 15 of the Civil Code.—The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that—“Laws relating to family rights and
only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to the new code duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case of an Philippines, even though living abroad”—that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
illegiti- reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
284 civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
84 extended only to define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should remain only in
mate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law—the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible
proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining a child’s citizenship should be deemed
to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child,
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.—Civil
or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.” In order that the
law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950 Civil
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. These distinctions between
or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the
legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.—The 1950 Civil Code
Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law
categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
from and not inextricably tied
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized 286
or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
86
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.—In
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions. father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section 39, Rule presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
130, of the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.” For the above rule to light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
288
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
88
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines Same; Election Law; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; While the totality of the
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the evidence may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the
long dead parent could be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.—But while
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
Court of Appeals,this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing—“Parentage born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
DNA or a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish willful.
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the ap-
287 DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 287
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The actions
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular
propriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA election contests and quo warranto.—Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.” Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the child; provision of the Constitution are postelection remedies, namely, regular election contests
Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution states that among the and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”—Where as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a certificate of
so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, which are implemented in
alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to actions do not, however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant Citizenship; For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to
and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither follow the citizenship of his putative father.—Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier
are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an
to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly
filiation is enough for the child to observed.—These sworn statements were submitted to the COMELEC en banc by the
289 respondent Poe. Instead of traversing them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 289 considered on the technical grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence before the
COMELEC and that they cannot be the subject of judicial notice. Petitioner, however, overlooks
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and hence is not bound by the technical rules of
follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of evidence. It can accept evidence which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the
the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the rules of court on evidence are strictly observed. It can accord weight to such evidence depending
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, on its trustworthiness. In any event, petitioner cannot complain they are hearsay for he was
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads: Section given an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who executed the foregoing
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the sworn statements.
Philippines. Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; For failure of petitioner Fornier to discharge the
burden of proof, respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the petition—Poe need not
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion: present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him.—These are all the
evidence presented by the petitioner. Even a sweep eye contact both with these evidence will
show that petitioner failed todischarge the burden of proving that respondent Poe is not a
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Words and Phrases; The
natural-born citizen. Petitioner was more dismal in trying to prove that respondent
word “contest” in Art. VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution means that the jurisdiction of the
Poe willfullyand deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born citizen. For one, the
Supreme Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice
Manapat evidence appears to have been manufactured evidence. For another, these and the
President—there can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.—The Court is unanimous on
other evidence are irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that they ever crossed the attention
the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners
of respondent Poe. On the other hand, the evidence unerringly show that respondent Poe, from
cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides: The Supreme
the time of his involuntary birth here, has always conducted himself as a Filipino. He is a
Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
registered voter, he owns land, he is married to a Filipina, he carries a Filipino passport—he
qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
has always lived the life of a Filipino (Exhibits “16,” “17” to “19”). Thus, there is no iota of doubt
The word “contest” in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked
that petitioner miserably
after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no “contest” 291
before a winner is proclaimed.
Same; Certiorari; The Supreme Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 291
on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.—We start with the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
elementary proposition that the certiorari power of this Court to review decisions of the failed to discharge his burden of proving that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented
COMELEC is a limited one. This Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on that he is a natural-born citizen. For failure of petitioner to discharge the burden of proof,
the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Respondent Poe need
has a well defined meaning in our jurisprudence. It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious. A not present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him. Prescinding
decision supported by substantial evidence is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. Neither is a from these premises, this Court cannot hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
decision interpreting a novel or difficult question of law with logical reasons. A mere discretion when it ruled that no substantial evidence was offered by petitioner to disqualify
disagreement with COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its interpretation respondent Poe.
of some difficult provisions of law is no basis to strike down the COMELEC decision as despotic, Same; Same; Same; The Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do
arbitrary or whimsical. More so when the case involves election law where the expertise of not follow any political god.—In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curiae, it is daylight
COMELEC ought to be conceded. clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wrong with his facts but also wrong with his
Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; In order that a law. Considering that petitioner is wrong both with his facts and the law, the Court has no
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled on the ground of material option but to dismiss the petition at bar which espouses nothing but errors. This Court will be
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and compounding the wrongs committed by petitioner Fornier with another wrong if it remands the
willful.—To stress petition at bar to the COMELEC. A remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC
290
when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated. Remand means the petitioner will
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED be gifted with another chance to prove facts which he have failed to prove before.
90 Remand means the petitioner will be given the extra-ordinary privilege of correcting his
erroneous understanding of the law on who are natural-born Filipino citizens. These are favors
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections which cannot be extended to a litigant without shattering the Court’s stance of political
again, the petition of Fornier was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due neutrality. The Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any
course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe on the ground of material political god.
misrepresentation under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Allegedly, respondent Poe misrepresented Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Citizenship; The complex issue of
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC we held that natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in an appropriate
the misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willfull. Petitioner, proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election—the citizenship issue in a quo
therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial evidence the following facts: (1) that warranto proceeding will be determined in full length proceedings.—The Fornier petition was
respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy; (2) that the treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
misrepresentation is material to the position of which he is a candidate; and (3) that the under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. The principal issue on a Section 78 petition is whether the
material misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully. respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. In
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Evidence; The COMELEC is a quasi-judicial the particular petition at bar, the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented
body and hence is not bound by the technical rules of evidence—it can accept evidence which that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether respondent Poe is in truth a
natural-born citizen is considered only because it is necessary to determine the deliberateness civil law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children.—We follow the
and the willfulness of the material misrepresentation. The proceedings are summary in principle of jus sanguinis, the rule of blood relationship. Proof that Allan F. Poe, a Filipino
character for the central issue to be resolved is the deliberateness of the material citizen, is the father of respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the veins
misrepresentation, as the issue of natural-born citizenship is a mere incident. In fine, the of respondent Poe. No other proof is required for the principle of jus sanguinis to apply. There
complex issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in is no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in
an appropriate proceeding such as a quo warrantoproceeding after election. The civil law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. Our
292 Constitutions from 1935 merely state—“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” The
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ineluctable conclusion is that the only proof required for the principle of jus sanguinis to operate
is filiation, i.e.,that one’s father is a citizen of the Philippines. No other kind of proof is
92 required. In fine, the quantity and quality of proof or the standard of proof is provided by the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Constitution itself. We cannot alter this standard by suggesting either a strict or liberal
citizenship issue in a quo warranto proceeding will be determined in full-length approach.
proceedings. Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Convention on the Rights of the
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Supreme Court cannot change the nature Child; A milestone treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child abolished all
of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power.—The remand of the case to the discriminations against children including discriminations on account of “birth or other
COMELEC will change the character of a Section 78 proceeding. The citizenship ofrespondent status.”—The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of
Poe will no longer be inquired into as a mere incident necessary to determine whether the United Nations on November 20, 1989. The Philippines was the 31st state to ratify the
he deliberatelymade a material misrepresentation that he is a natural-born citizen. It will now Convention in July 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution 109. The Convention entered into force
be determined as if it is the main issue in a Section 78 proceeding. This Court cannot change the on September 2, 1990. A milestone treaty, it abolished all discriminations against children
nature of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power. It is Congress by law that including discriminations on account of “birth or other status.” x x x The Convention protects in
defined the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is only Congress that can change it by the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights, civil rights, social rights,
another law. We cannot engage in judicial legislation. economic rights and cultural rights. It adopted the principle of interdependence and
Same; Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Due Process; The COMELEC is composed of seven indivisibility of children’s rights. A violation of one right is considered a violation of the other
commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased—the right to due process is the rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should consider
right to be heard by seven unbiased COMELEC commissioners.—There is a more compelling the “best interests” of the child.
294
reason why the petition, at bar should not be remanded to the COMELEC for relitigation. The
COMELEC that will resolve the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino has 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ceased to be an impartial tribunal. Three of its members, Commissioners Tuazon, Barcelona 94
and Garcellano, submitted separate Comments to this Court expressing the firm view that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born Filipino. Their views are contrary to the decision of the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
COMELEC under review by this Court. It is improper enough for individual commissioners to Same; Same; Same; Same; International Law; Pacta Sunct Servanda; We shall be
assail the decision of the COMELEC of which they are members. It is worse in the case of violating the Convention on the Rights of the Child if we disqualify FPJ just because he
Commissioners Barcelona and Garcellano, who are not even sitting commissioners when the happened to be an illegitimate child—it is our bounden duty to comply with our treaty obligation
COMELEC promulgated its decision under review. This is plain and simple prejudgment and it pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.—Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
is not even disguised prejudgment that needs to be unmasked. The COMELEC is composed 1987 Constitution, this Convention on the Rights of the child became valid and effective on us in
of seven commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased. The right to due July 1990 upon concurrence by the Senate. We shall be violating the Convention if we disqualify
process of respondent Poe is the right to be heard by sevenunbiased COMELEC respondent Poe just because he happened to be an illegitimate child. It is our bounden duty to
commissioners—not 1, not 2, not 3, not 4, but by 7unbiased members. We do not have such a comply with our treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.
COMELEC. Same; Same; Same; Same; To disqualify FPJ due to his illegitimacy is against the trend
Same; Equal Protection Clause; The right to run for public office includes the right to in civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate
equal chance to compete—any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the child.—Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is against the trend in
defeat of the disfavored.—It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on the qualification of respondent civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate
Poe to run as President is prejudicial to his presidential bid and favorable to his political child. Called originally as nullius filius or no one’s child, an illegitimate child started without
opponents. The right to run for a public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The any birthright of significance. The passage of time, however, brought about the enlightenment
right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished or denied a candidate. This chance to win that an illegitimate should not be punished for the illicit liaison of his parents of which he
may amount to a played no part. No less than our Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a Commissioner of
293 the Constitutional Commission, proposed the adoption of the following radical provision in the
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 293 1987 Constitution, viz.: “All children regardless of filiations shall enjoy thesame social
protection.”
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Election Law; Political Questions; On political questions, the Supreme Court may err but
mere chimera if the disqualification of respondent Poe will be left hanging in the air for a the sovereign people will not—to be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members
long time. It is the solemn duty of this Court to equalize the chances of winning of all candidates of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people.—Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is
to a public office. Any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the defeat of qualified to run for President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less
the disfavored. dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of
Citizenship; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Jus Sanguinis Principle; Proof that first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and international law. Given
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the father of Fernando Poe, Jr. is proof that the blood of Allan the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let
F. Poe flows in the veins of FPJ—no other proof is required for the principle of jus sanguinis to the people decide who will be the next President. For on political questions, this Court may err
apply, no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in
but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected to violence. In some countries, incumbents have manipulated every resource at their disposal to
members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people. eliminate electoral choice. The result is a frustrated and angry public; a public that has no place
to express this anger because the electoral system is rigged to guarantee the re-election of the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion: incumbents in office. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we know that when democracy
operates as intended, an aroused public can replace those who govern in a manner beyond the
parameters established by public consent.
Election Law; Suffrage; Judicial Review; Political Questions; While the campaign for the Same; The Supreme Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the
Presidency is on, the Supreme Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to disqualify a right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.—This Court, as the last guardian of
candidate.—I submit that while the democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.
295
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “every
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 295 citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . .to vote and be elected at genuine periodic
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”There can be no genuine, free and fair
campaign for the Presidency is on, this Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to
election when the people’s right to choose, is manipulated or eliminated. Political liberty cannot
disqualify a candidate. That would definitely wreck the constitutional right of the people to
be subverted to the personal ambitions of some politicians. This Court should take an active
choose their candidate. Only after the election is over and a winner is proclaimed and the result
stance in crushing the devious ploy, for in the last analysis, its handling of the electoral issues is
of the election is contested, may this Court participate and decide the contest. How is the
the fundamental measure of the present government’s credibility.
President elected? Only by “direct vote of the people.” He shall not be chosen by the incumbent
Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Burden of
President. He shall not be elected by Congress nor by the Commission on Elections. And neither
Proof; He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove—petitioner has the burden of establishing
by this Court. Only by “direct vote of the people.”
his allegations of respondent’s material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy.—It
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not allow the intervention of the
bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of establishing his allegations of respondent’s
Supreme Court to intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by
material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non
removing Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President, thereby
que negat, otherwise stated, “he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.”What I observe
constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the people to vote (or not
from his allegations is a misconception as to whom the burden of proof lies.
to vote) for FPJ.—Petitioner Fornier would have this Court, in the exercise of its “judicial
Same; Statutory Construction; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The ascertainment of
power,” intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by removing
the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with the language of the document itself,
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President, thereby
the words to be understood, as much as possible, in the sense they have in common use and given
constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the people to vote (or not
their
to vote) for respondent Poe. The Constitution does not allow such intervention. Mr. Justice 297
Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,said, “In my view, the issue in this case is whether the Commission on VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 297
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of ordinary meaning—the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially
candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo that of the people; As Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between a
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum.” The assailed ruling of the COMELEC legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a
dismissing Fornier’s petition is consistent with the above view. distinction.—The ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in the the language of the document itself. The words of the Constitution should as much as possible
right of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested right to elect by be understood in the sense they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning. The
“direct vote” the President.—What is at stake is not just the candidacy of respondent Poe or the reason for this is because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially
right of the “masses” to vote for him. Equally at stake is the credibility of this Court. It should that of the people, in whose consciousness is should even be present as an important condition
not enter the “political thicket.” Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in the right for the rule of law to prevail. Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is very clear. As the
of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested right to elect by “direct provision does not distinguish between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino
vote” the President. father, we should not make a distinction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to choose is the single factor that controls the
ambitions of those who would impose—through force or stealth—their will on the majority of
citizens.—Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is political liberty, CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
which is the right and opportunity to choose those who will lead the governed with their
296 Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; The conduct of an election necessarily
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public office
in an election.—The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all
96 candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections function to “[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
consent. This right to choose cannot be subtly interfered with through the elimination of election.” The initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with
the electoral choice. The present bid to disqualify respondent Poe from the presidential race is a the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec.
clear attempt to eliminate him as one of the choices. This Court should resist such attempt. The The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified
right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would impose— under existing laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list
through force or stealth—their will on the majority of citizens. We should not only welcome of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections
electoral competition, we should cherish it. Disqualifying a candidate, particularly the popular unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of
one, on the basis of doubtful claims does not result to a genuine, free and fair election. It results candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.
 Same; Same; Same; The power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily not a natural born citizen. The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force
includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for in 1939, are the governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine
election to public office.—Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship
Comelec to “[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional
x.”The power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the power to definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one
decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a
office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely natural-born citizen.
to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal, remedy. If Same; Parent and Child; Legitimate and Illegitimate
one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for Children; Acknowledgment; Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be
President, the Comelec is given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born
298 citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to acquire
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or perfect their Philippine citizenship.—If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth,
the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child
98 does not possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act—the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections acknowledgement of the Filipino father—is required for the child to acquire or perfect his
certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be given
no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified. effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born citizens as
Same; Same; The Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine perfect their Philippine citizenship.
citizen.—However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual Same; Same; Same; If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption
bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father—there is only a
presented—whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother.—If the illegitimacy of a child
the First Division ruling that “[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed
the respondent is a natural-born citizen.” In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for to be the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the
President to run in the coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a mother. If an illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the
natural-born Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of child’s father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as
discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, required by law.
the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother
in relation to Rule 65. claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to
Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an
to determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the elections would lead to illegitimate child
300
an absurd situation—the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine
citizen must be decided before the election.—To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an 00
absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before
he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as President before he is finally has the blood of the putative father; Citizenship, being a matter of public and State
disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that “[N]o person interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.” The clear and putative Filipino father.—Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the
specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood
citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child
must be decided before the election. has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the birth
Citizenship; Natural-Born Citizens; A person’s citizenship at the time of his birth depends of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative or judicial approval that such blood
on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth—any subsequent legislation relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law. Citizenship, being a matter of public
cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere
violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim
from birth.—Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien
birth depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth. FPJ’s citizenship mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a Philippine
at the time of his birth in 1939, citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate children in China.
299 The State cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 299 children born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father
acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections or judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine Same; Same; Same; Natural-Born Citizens; The rationale behind requiring that only
citizen. Natural-born Philippine citizens are “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices is to ensure that the holders of these
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” If a person high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines; The
has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy
subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later a natural-
born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be
paternity.—The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain affected by the Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
high public offices is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they Same; Same; Same; Natural-Born Citizens; The Convention cannot amend the definition
were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they knew they owed from in the Constitution of who are natural-born citizens.—The Convention has the status of a
birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country claims their allegiance, they municipal law and its ratification by the Philippines could not have amended the express
would be faithful and. loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be
particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The President. While the Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are
President of the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have not, that is the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive
grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention
of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are “those who are
recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later a natural-born Philippine citizen citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity. their Philippine citizenship.”
301 Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 301 birth, but merely “the right to acquire a nationality” in accordance with municipal law.—In any
event, the Convention guarantees a child “the right to acquire a nationality,” and requires
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections States Parties to “ensure the implementation” of this right, “in particular where the child would
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acknowledgment; An acknowledgment executed after birth otherwise be stateless.” Thus, as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the
does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since the Conventionguarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be
acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.—To stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely “the right
establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a to acquire a nationality” in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was
record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth FPJ also had
birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father
from the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless.
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Same; Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The inexorable direction of the law,
because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest.— both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because between legitimate and illegitimate children.—Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to
citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable direction of the law, both international and
petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and
admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a natural- illegitimate children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and
born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not
person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doc-
admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as 303
representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 303
Philippine citizen.
Same; Parent and Child; Legitimation; Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code, Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage—there was no retroactivity of the effects of trine upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning theChing
legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child.—Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code, Leng doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights
legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the
legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the
of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born citizens.
Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year
earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,Separate Opinion:
legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939. Besides, legitimation vests
only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child.
Same; Same; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Prior to the proclamation of winners, questions on
Convention on the Rights of the Child since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he the eligibility and qualifications of a candidate may be addressed to the COMELEC only if they
was born half a century before the Convention came into existence.—The Philippines signed the fall under Section 78 of the B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).—The Supreme Court, as a
Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on 21 August Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
1990. The Convention defines a child to mean “every human being below the age of eighteen Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and
years unless, under the law applicable to exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as “sole judge of all
302 contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of the President and Vice-
President, Senators, and, Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate
02 has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner. Prior to the proclamation of
the child, majority is attained earlier.” Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention winners, questions on the eligibility and qualifications of a candidate may be addressed to the
since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half a century before the
COMELEC only if they fall under Section 78 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 305
Election Code).
Same; Same; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Burden of Proof; One who alleges Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
malice has the burden of proving the same.—The Certificate of Candidacy was executed by settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.” Thus, the subject
respondent FPJ under oath. The law always presumes good faith. One who alleges malice has matter of such a contest is “the title or claim of title” to an elective office itself and not merely
the burden of proving the same. It is elementary that contentions must be proved by competent the qualifications or absence of qualifications of a candidate for such office.
evidence and reliance must be based on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon Same; Same; Same; Quo Warranto; Quo warranto literally means “by what authority” and
the weakness of the opponent’s defense. To lay the burden of proof upon FPJ to prove his the object of a quo warranto proceeding is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise
citizenship simply because petitioner assails the Fame is anathema to the well-recognized rule of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded,
on the burden of proof. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege; Actions falling under par. 7, Sec. 4 of Art. VII
is given on either side. In other words, petitioner should have established by competent of the Constitution may only be directed against the persons occupying or having title to the
evidence before the COMELEC that the subject material representation is false and that it position of President (or Vice President) and not against the candidates for said electoral
must have been made by respondent FPJ deliberately to deceive the electorate as to his offices.—Quo warranto literally means “by what authority.” It has been defined as an
eligibility for the position of President of the Philippines. extraordinary legal remedy whereby a person or entity is challenged to show by what authority
304
he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. The object of a quo warranto proceeding
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
04
enjoy the privilege. Hence, actions falling under paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Constitution may only be directed against the persons occupying or having title to the position
Citizenship; Parent and Child; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Statutory of President (and Vice President)—i.e. the incumbent President (and Vice President) or the
Construction; The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary President-elect (and Vice-President-elect)—and not against the candidates for said electoral
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision offices who do not, as such, hold or have any title thereto.
itself; Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not provide for a qualification that the child be Same; Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; The
a product of a legitimate union for the child to acquire the nationality of the Filipino father.— cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary source from which clearly separate and distinct from the election contests contemplated in par. (2) of Sec. 2, Article
to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The IX-C of the Constitution.—The cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the Omnibus Election Code is clearly separate and distinct from the election contests contemplated
objective sought to be attained. Otherwise stated, verba legis still prevails. Only when the in paragraph (2) of Section 2, Article IX-C. The former involves a measure to enforce compliance
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of with the statutory requirements for the filing of certificates of candidacy, while the latter is an
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or adversarial proceeding involving the title or claim of title to an elective office. That there are
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision grounds common to both does not detract from the fact that each has a separate subject matter
being construed. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not provide for a and purpose.
qualification that the child be a product of a legitimate union for the child to acquire Same; Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the nationality of the Filipino father.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere the questioned resolutions, first, by resolving to dismiss the petition for disqualification without
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should we. There should be no distinction stating the factual bases therefor, and second, by resolving to dismiss the petition without ruling
in the application of the fundamental law where none is indicated. The drafters of the categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.—A careful review of the questioned COMELEC
Constitution, in making no qualification in the use of the general word “father” must have Resolutions of January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 shows that the COMELEC did indeed act
intended no distinction at law. The Courts could only distinguish where there are facts or with grave abuse of discre-
306
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case,
the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the framers of the 1935 Constitution simply provided
06
that when paternity is known or established, the child follows the father’s citizenship, otherwise,
the citizenship of the mother is followed.—Clearly, the framers of the 1935 Constitution simply Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
provided that when paternity is known or established, the child follows the father’s citizenship; tion in issuing them: first, by resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for
otherwise, the citizenship of the mother is followed. If we concede that the framers of the Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefor: and second, by resolving to dismiss
Constitution intended a qualification that the child be the product of a legitimate union, such the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.
would lead to clear injustice, and a restricted interpretation, by creating a distinction when the Same; Same; Same; Same; It was the duty of the COMELEC to determine, on the basis of
language of the law is clear and unambiguous. the evidence adduced, whether FPJ is in fact a “natural-born Filipino citizen.”—It is apparent
then that the COMELEC avoided ruling squarely, one way or the other, on the issue of FPJ’s
CARPIO-MORALES, J.,Dissenting Opinion: citizenship. Considering that Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a candidate
must state under oath that he is eligible for the office for which he is announcing his candidacy
and that Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution clearly provides that “[n]o person may be
Election Law; Election Contests; Words and Phrases; The subject matter of an electoral
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,” it was the duty of the
contest is “the title or claim of title” to an office itself and not merely the qualifications or absence
COMELEC in the Petition for Disqualification to determine, on the basis of the evidence
of qualifications of a candidate for such office.—An “electoral contest” has been defined as an
adduced, whether FPJ is in fact a “natural-born Filipino citizen.” In resolving to dismiss the
adversarial proceeding “by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office,
Petition without performing this duty, the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of
made before or after the proclamation of the winner, is
305 discretion.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; A false statement as to a qualification for elective office—in the parties and amici curiae, I agree with the view of FPJ and the amici curiaethat indeed a
this case, natural-born citizenship—is always material, and if the truth remains undisclosed, it textual examination of the relevant provisions of the Consti-
would definitely deceive the electorate as to a candidate’s qualifications for office.—The import of 308
this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II is clearly that Ermelita Cacao’s use of the surname “Salcedo,” 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
assuming it to be a misrepresentation, was not a “false material representation” in the context
of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code since it did not deceive the electorate as to either 08
her identity or her qualifications for the position of mayor. In contrast, a false statement as to a Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
qualification for elective office—in this case, natural-born citizenship—is always tution shows the same do not distinguish between legitimate or illegitimate children. As
material and, if the truth remains undisclosed, it would definitely deceive the electorate as priorly observed, the Philippines has adopted the principle of jus sanguinis, orblood
to a candidate’s qualifications for office. xxx xxx As applied to the present petitions, it is relationship, as the rule in determining citizenship. Consequently, the civil law status of
the status of FPJ’s being a natural-born Filipino citizen, not the statement to that effect, which legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of Philippine citizenship.
is material since it is the status of being a natural-born Filipino which is decisivein Same; Same; Paternity; Presumptions; The practical fact of the matter is that, at the point
determining whether the Constitutional and statutory requirements have been fulfilled. of conception and perhaps even until and beyond the point of birth, the identity of the father
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Derived from the Latin word “cives”, the term “citizen” remains a secret known only to God and hidden from men—the child’s father included; Human
conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state or government and participation in biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the identity of the mother is immediately known at birth,
its function.—Citizenship is a political status denoting membership, more or less permanent in but that of the father is not, and to manage this uncertainty as well as preserve, protect and
character, in a political society and implying the duty of allegiance on the part of the member promote the family as a social institution, the law steps in and creates certain strong
and a duty of protection on the part of society. Thus, a citizen is one who, by birth, presumptions as to paternity.—The rationale for the rule that the citizenship of an illegitimate
naturalization, or otherwise, is a nember of a political community, and as such is subject to its child follows that of his or her mother appears to be two-fold: first, as an illegitimate child, he or
laws and entitled to its protection in all his rights incident to that relation. Derived from the she does not have an identifiable father and, unless he is identified, considered nullus filius or
Latin word the child of no one; second, because the father is unknown, an unacknowledged illegitimate
307
child acquires no rights with respect to his father. Both reasons appear to possess some
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 307 practical value. Undoubtedly, citizenship is a political right which flows not from legitimacy but
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections from paternity. But, while it is impossible to argue with the statement of Fr. Bernas that
“paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and not upon marriage
“cives”the term “citizen” conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state or
or legitimation,” the practical fact of the matter is that, at the point of conception and perhaps
government and participation in its function. It denotes possession within that particular
even until and beyond the point of birth, the identity of the father remains a secret known only
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as
to God and hidden from men—the child’s father included. Put differently, the recognition that
minority.
an illegitimate child may derive citizenship from his Filipino father does not resolve all issues
Same; In the Philippines, citizenship is essential not only for the exercise of political rights
as to his citizenship. All the amici curiae agree that an essential prerequisite is that the identity
and the right to hold public office, but for the exercise of a number of important economic
of the illegitimate child’s father should be firmly established—he should be legally known.
privileges which the Constitution reserves exclusively to Philippine citizens as well.—In the
Human biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the identity of the mother is immediately known
Philippines, citizenship is essential not only for the exercise of political rights and the right to
at birth, but that of the father is not. To manage this uncertainty as well as preserve, protect
hold public office, but for the exercise of a number of important economic privileges which the
and promote the family as a social institution, the law steps in and creates certain strong
Constitution reserves exclusively to Philippine citizens as well. A comparison of the 1935, 1973
presumptions as to paternity.
and present 1987 Constitution shows that a number of economic privileges reserved exclusively
Same; Natural Born Citizenship; The expansion of the requirement of natural-born
to Philippine citizens has increased over time. These “nationalist provisions” make the question
citizenship to other high public offices may prove prophetic in the context of the increasing
of citizenship of even greater importance and “deserving of the most serious consideration.”
importance of global trade and the intensity of global economic competition.—That more high
Thus, it has been said that “[to] those who are citizens by birth it is a precious heritage, while to
ranking public officials are required to be natural-born Philippine citizens under the present
those who acquire it thru naturalization it is a priceless acquisition.”
1987 Constitution than in previous Constitutions may be interpreted to be further measures
Same; Treaty of Paris; Article IX of the Treaty of Paris contemplated two distinct classes of
taken by the Constitutional Commissioners to ensure that the nationalist provisions of the
persons—(a) the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and (b) Spanish subjects who were
Constitution, political, social and economic, are carried out by men and women who are of
natives of the Peninsula; The native inhabitants immediately became citizens of the Philippine
unquestionable
Islands with no option whatsoever to retain Spanish citizenship while natives of Spain had to 309
satisfy certain conditions to become citizens of the Philippine Islands.—From the foregoing, it
can be gathered that Article IX of the Treaty of Paris contemplated two distinct classes of VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 309
persons: (a) the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and (b) Spanish subjects who were Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
natives of the Peninsula. The native inhabitants immediately became citizens of the Philippine loyalty to the Philippines, whether in war or in peace. It may be further remarked that
Islands with no option whatsoever to retain Spanish citizenship. However, for the natives of this expansion of the requirement of natural-born citizenship to other high public offices may
Spain to become citizens of the Philippine Islands, the following conditions had to be met: (1) prove prophetic in the context of the increasing importance of global trade and the intensity of
they had to be residents of the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899: (2) they had to maintain global economic competition.
actual residence therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11, 1900: (3) without their Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; The claim that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant of the
making an express declaration of intention to retain Spanish citizenship. The absence of any of Philippine Islands when on 10 December 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the
these requisites prevented them from becoming citizens of the Philippine Islands. Philippine Islands to the United States must be supported by a record of birth evidencing his
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; A textual examination of the relevant birth in the Philippine Islands, testimonial evidence to that effect, or some other competent
provisions of the Constitution shows the same do not distinguish between legitimate or evidence of that fact.—Following the cases of In re Mallari andValles v. Commission on
illegitimate children—the civil law status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not Elections,the claim that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands when on
determinative of Philippine citizenship.—After due consideration of the arguments, presented by December 10, 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States must be supported by a record of birth evidencing his birth in the Philippine failure of the petitioner to prove the essential requisites for the cancellation of the certificate of
Islands, testimonial evidence to that effect, or some other competent evidence of that fact. candidacy of respondent Poe under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The well-
Moreover, the admission that Lorenzo Pou was a subject of Spain and not merely a native of the entrenched principle is that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of
Philippine Islands opens the possibility that he was a native of the Spanish Peninsula. If such the utmost gravity, the conclusion rendered by the COMELEC on a matter that falls within its
were the case, then he would have had to comply with the requirements prescribed in In Re: competence is entitled to utmost respect. Not every abuse of discretion justifies the original
Bosque, to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands. To reiterate, these requirements are: (1) action of certiorari; it must be grave. The test therefore is whether the petitioner has
he should have been a resident of the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899; (2) he should have demonstrated convincingly that the tribunal has committed grave abuse of discretion.
maintained actual residence therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11, 1900; (3) 311
without their making an express declaration of intention to retain his Spanish citizenship. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 311
Same; Same; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Greater weight may be given to the
date and fact of FPJ’s birth as recorded in the Birth Certificate, but less weighty with respect to Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
the entries regarding his legitimacy or paternity.—In appreciating the evidentiary weight of each Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Elements; The
document, it is observed that the Birth Certificate was prepared by the attending physician who entries in a certificate of candidacy are prima facie correct.—A petition for the cancellation of a
would have had personal knowledge of the fact and date of birth, but would have had to rely on certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code must aver three
hearsay information given to him as regards the other entries including legitimacy of FPJ. essential elements: (a) the candidate makes a representation in his, certificate of candidacy; (b)
Hence, greater weight may be given to the date and fact of FPJ’s birth as recorded in the Birth the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of
Certificate, but less weighty with respect to the entries regarding his legitimacy or paternity. As the candidate—the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate of candidacy; (c)
for the marriage contract, since the two contracting parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the candidate makes the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to
participated in its execution, the entry, therein with respect to the date of their marriage should his qualification for public office or deliberately attempts to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
be given greater weight. which would otherwise render him ineligible. If the petition fails to state the three essential
Same; Same; An illegitimate child of an alien mother who claims to be an offspring of a elements, the petitioner would have no cause of action for the cancellation of the certificate of
Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the candidacy of the respondent candidate; hence, the petition must be dismissed. The entries in a
latter at birth, thus leaving the certificate of candidacy are prima facie correct. In making the said entries, the candidate is
310 presumed to have acted in good faith.
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; Same; Same; Respondent FPJ’s statement in his Certificate of Candidacy that he
was a natural-born Filipino citizen does not ipso facto amount to an erroneous and deliberate
10 statement of a material fact which would constitute “material misrepresentation.”—The
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections respondent Poe’s statement, in his CoC that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen does not ipso
factoamount to an erroneous and deliberate statement of a material fact which would constitute
illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship.—Following
“material misrepresentation.” Indeed, the determination of whether one is “a natural-born
the suggestion of Justice Mendoza, I am adopting the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-
citizen” as defined by our Constitution is, ultimately, a conclusion of law. Corollarily,
mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born
granting arguendo that respondent Poe’s statement in his CoC later turned out to be erroneous
citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child
or inexact, the same is not entirely groundless, having been honestly based on admitted and
with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship. Assuming arguendo, therefore,
authentic public records. Such error could not be considered a falsity within the meaning of
that Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ, was indeed a Filipino citizen at the time of his
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because expressing an erroneous conclusion of law
birth, no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as
cannot be considered a deliberate untruthful statement of a fact.
his own son at birth. In fact, as emphasized by petitioner Fornier, in the course of the
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; In the final analysis, the party upon whom the
proceedings before the COMELEC, both parties verified that there was no such
ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the
acknowledgment by Allan F. Poe on the dorsal portion of FPJ’s Birth Certificate. Since FPJ then
defendant.—Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the party who initiated
was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino
the action. But in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be
parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born
determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for
Philippine citizen.
determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if
he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to
CALLEJO, SR., J.,Separate Opinion: obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful if he offers no
evidence.
312
Election Law; Administrative Law; Certiorari; The well-entrenched principle is that in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rendered by the COMELEC on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to utmost
respect.—At the outset, it bears stressing that resort to a special civil action for certiorari under 12
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as in the present recourse, is limited to the resolution of Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Vested Rights; Words and Phrases; There is
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal rendering the assailed decision, no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity provided in Art. 256
order or resolution. Thus—There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of the Family Code to the effect that, “[T]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of laws”; Vested right is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual longer open to doubt or controversy, a concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Simply stated then, natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action.—The provisions of the Old
the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of Civil Code adverted to by the petitioner should not be made to apply in the present case. There
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition before it, for
is no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity provided in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino
Article 256 of the Family Code to the effect that, “[T]his Code shall have retroactive effect citizen in his Certificate of Candidacy. One caveat. The resolution of the issue in the present
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil petition will be without prejudice to the filing by the proper party of the appropriate quo
Code or other laws.” “Vested right” is a right in property which has become fixed and warranto petition before the Court En Banc to assail respondent Poe’s eligibility in case he wins
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present the elections and there to litigate all the issues raised in as much detail as may be deemed
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary necessary or apropos.
State action.” In the present case, there appears to be no substantial evidence on record to prove
that vested rights will be prejudiced or impaired by a confirmation, that is, of respondent Poe’s AZCUNA, J., Separate Opinion:
legitimate status since he has, since birth, been regarded a legitimate child by his parents,
siblings and other relatives. Consequently, the provisions of Articles 177, 178, 179 and 180 of
the Family Code may be applied retroactively to respondent Poe’s case. As a corollary, Parent and Child; Legitimation; While it is true that under the Old Civil Code, the effects
respondent Poe’s legitimation, became the necessary legal consequence of the subsequent of legitimation retroact only to the time of the mar-
314
marriage of his parents, the effects of which would retroact to the time of respondent Poe’s birth
in 1939. 3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; “Legitimacy” or the lack of it cannot by itself be made determinative of a 14
child’s citizenship—the legitimate status of a child emanates from civil law which regulates the
private relations of the members of civil society, while citizenship is political in character and the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
ways in which it should be conferred lies outside the ambit of the Civil Code.—As correctly riage, and not to the time of birth, the New Civil Code made the effects retroact to the time
maintained by the COMELEC, the issue of legitimacy bears no direct relevance to the of birth of the child.—It is true that under the Old Civil Code, prevailing when Poe, Jr. was
determination of respondent Poe’s citizenship in the petition at bar. Contrary to the petitioner’s born, the effects of legitimation retroact only to the time of the marriage, and not to the time of
protestations, “legitimacy” or the lack of it cannot by itself be made determinative of a child’s birth. However, the New Civil Code, effective on August 30, 1950, made the effects retroact to
citizenship. The fact of legitimacy cannot, even if successfully concluded, be used as a spring the time of the birth of the child. It is also true that the Old Civil Code required, in addition to
board to secure a declaration of a child’s citizenship. The legitimate status of a child emanates the marriage, an acknowledgment by the parent(s) in the birth certificate, a will or any public
from civil law which regulates the private relations of the members of civil society, while instrument. Under the New Civil Code, however, this was liberalized so that acknowledgment
citizenship is political in character and the ways in which it should be conferred lie outside the can be done also in a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when Furthermore, these new provisions of the law are made expressly applicable to persons born
citizenship is to be acquired. This is precisely evinced by the fact that the right to acquire the under the old regime if these are beneficial to them. And, finally, under the Family Code of
parents’ citizenship is not among the enumerated rights of a legitimate child under our civil 1988, even the need for acknowledgment has been dropped, and retroactivity is also provided
laws. for, without prejudice to vested rights.
313 Same; Same; I hold the view that the new legislations retroact to benefit FPJ so that he
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 313 must be deemed legitimated as of his birth.—Now, what we are concerned with here are not the
civil rights of the person—whether to support or to succession in the estate. And, as admitted by
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Fornier’s counsel during the oral arguments, violation of vested rights are not presumed but
Same; Same; There appears to be no substantial distinction between legitimate and must be proved, which has not been done here. Accordingly, at issue here is simply political
illegitimate children to justify their disparate treatment vis-à-vis the possession of the status of status as a citizen, as ably pointed out by amicus curiae Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. Therefore,
and the exercise of a political privilege, including the right to run for and be elected to public I hold the view that the new legislations retroact to benefit Poe, Jr., so that he must be deemed
office—the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, bears no relation to the individual’s legitimated as of his birth. Since a legitimated child has all the rights of a legitimate child (and
ability to participate in and contribute to society.—To circumscribe the application of the here, as stated, we refer only to citizenship), it is clear that, pursuant to the law, not being
endowed political privilege under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution only to the illegitimate at birth, Poe, Jr. does not follow the citizenship of his mother.
legitimate children of Filipino fathers would be clearly violative of the equal protection clause of Citizenship; Natural Born Citizens; The definition in the Constitution refers to those who
the Constitution. There appears to be no substantial distinction between legitimate and are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship—
illegitimate children to justify their disparate treatment vis-à-visthe possession of the status of it speaks of an act having to be done by the child, to acquire or perfect his citizenship, and does
and the exercise of a political privilege, including the right to run for and be elected to public not cover acts of his parents.—As to the point that such legitimation needed an act after birth,
office. The legal states of illegitimacy, however defined, bears no relation to the individual’s namely, the marriage of the parents, the same would not detract from the concept of a natural-
ability to participate in and contribute to society. The only purported purpose of the “natural- born citizen. For the definition in the Constitution refers to those who are citizens from
born citizen” requirement is to ensure the elected public officer’s allegiance to the Republic. The birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship (Art. IV, Sec. 2,
petitioners have failed to demonstrate how legitimate or illegitimate birth affects loyalty to the Constitution). Thus, it speaks of an act having to be done by the child, to acquire or perfect his
Republic. Not to be overlooked is the fact that a natural child’s conception may take place under citizenship, and does not cover acts of his parents.
circumstances that render it practically indistinguishable from that of a legitimate child, except
for the absence of a marriage ceremony between the parents. To hold that a child’s illegitimacy
TINGA, J.,Dissenting Opinion:
can bear significance on his right to acquire citizenship is to step from the bounds of law, into
the realm of inequitable and bigoted rationalism.
Same; Quo Warranto; The resolution of the issue in the present petition will be without Election Law; Certiorari; The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure introduced the mode of review
prejudice to the filing by the proper party of the appropriate quo warranto petition before the under Rule 64 as separate and distinct from the
315
Court En Banc to assail FPJ’s eligibility in case he wins the elections and there to litigate all the
issues raised in as much detail as may be deemed necessary or apropos.—Accordingly, the VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 315
petition in G.R. 161824 must be dismissed for failure to show that respondent COMELEC
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition a quo as the petitioner failed to
establish that respondent Poe committed a material misrepresentation, within the meaning of
 Rule 65 special civil action, and is consonant with the constitutional provision which Melo. Justice Mendoza filed a separate opinion too, in which Chief Justice Narvasa concurred.
allows the institution of a new review modality for rulings of the constitutional commissions.— Justices Romero and Francisco each had separate opinions. Except for Chief Justice Narvasa
The petition invokes as its basis Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is captioned “Review of and Justice Mendoza, the Justices in the majority voted to grant Rep. Marcos’ petition on the
Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the ground that she reestablished her domicile in Leyte upon being widowed by the death of former
Commission on Audit.” The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure introduced this mode of review as President Marcos. On the other hand, the reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement
separate and distinct from the Rule 65 special civil action. The innovation is consonant with the in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum. The Court dismissed the disqualification case on the ground
constitutional provision which allows the institution of a new review modality for rulings of that the respondent’s use of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy is not a
constitutional commissions. It ordains that “(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or material representation since the entry does not refer to her qualification for elective office.
by law,” the mode of review is certiorari. The Supreme Court introduced the new mode in the Being what it is, the Salcedo obiter cannot elevate the Kapunan pronouncement to the level of a
exercise of its power under the Constitution to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and doctrine regardless of how many Justices voted for Salcedo. Significantly, Justice Puno
procedure in all courts. concurred in the result only.
Same; Same; Rule 64 appears to be a fusion of sorts of at least three other Rules, i.e., Rule Same; Same; Citizenship; A candidate’s citizenship eligibility in particular is determined
65, Rule 46 and Rule 43; As a new and independent mode of review a Rule 64 petition may as by law, not by his good faith.—Thus, in this case, it does not matter that respondent knows that
well be treated as a petition for review, under which errors of fact or law may also be rectified.— he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and, knowing such fact, proceeded to state otherwise
Rule 64 appears to be a fusion of sorts of at least three other Rules, i.e.,Rule 65, Rule 46 and in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate. A candidate’s citizenship
Rule 43. Notably, as in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Commission eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith. It was, therefore, improper
concerned is joined as party respondent unlike in an ordinary appeal or petition for review; the for the COMELEC to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove intent to
contents of the petition are similar to those required under Section 3 of Rule 46; the order to mislead on the part of respondent.
comment is similar to Section 6 of Rule 65; the effect of filing a petition is similar to Section 12 317
of Rule 43; and the provision on when the case is deemed submitted for decision is similar to VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 317
Section 13 of Rule 43. A Rule 64 petition must be filed within thirty days from notice of the
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,whereas a Rule 65 petition for Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
certiorari calls for a sixty day period. The distinction gains greater significance in the context Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to
that great public interest inheres in the goal to secure expeditious resolution of election cases make a determination of the findings of fact, as well as rule on the evidence before it.—I submit,
before the COMELEC. In form, a petition under Rule 64 takes on the characteristics of a Rule therefore, that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to make a
43 petition, which may allege errors of fact or law. Similar to Rule 43, Rule 64 also provides that determination of the findings of fact, as well as rule on the evidence before it. This failure is
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are binding. As a new and even violative of the Constitution, as well as relevant statutes and rules of procedure.Especially
independent mode of review a Rule 64 petition may as well be treated as a petition for review, blatant to my mind was the conclusion of the COMELEC that Lorenzo Pou “had ceased to be a
under which errors of fact or law may also be rectified. Spanish subject and had become a Filipino citizen” by operation of the Philippine Bill of 1902
Same; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; The pronouncements in Romualdez- and the Jones Law, despite the absence of substantial evidence to support this claim. The
Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), and Salcedo II v. Commission on relevant provisions of these laws are explicit. Those who were considered citizens of the
Elections, 312 SCRA 447 (1999), are clearly not supported by a plain reading of the law— Philippines under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law were those who, on 11 April
nowhere in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is it stated or implied that there be an 1899, were inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects, and then resided in the
intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled.—The Philippines, and did not elect to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain.
pronouncements in Romualdez-MarcosandSalcedo II, however, are clearly not supported by a Citizenship; No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
plain reading of the law. Nowhere citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State; There
316 may be several matters under the law that may be liberally construed, but I believe citizenship is
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not one of them; To cheapen citizenship by according it through haphazard presumptions is
tantamount to cheapening out nation’s worth and soul.—I am very mindful of the Court’s
16 pronouncement that no presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. This
doctrine provides the Court guidance on how to resolve the several doubtful factual issues in the
in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate
case. There may be several matters under the law that may be liberally construed, but I believe
of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. All the law requires is that the “material
citizenship is not one of them. Filipino citizenship is conferred by law and nothing else, not even
representation contained [in the certificate of candidacy] as required under Section 74 . . . . is
good faith or colorable possession thereof. Citizenship is a privilege, and not a right. To cheapen
false.” Be it noted that a hearing under Section 78 and Rule 23 is a quasi-judicial proceeding
citizenship by according it through haphazard presumptions is tantamount to cheapening our
where the intent of the respondent is irrelevant. Also drawing on the principles of criminal law
nation’s worth and soul. Thus, any unresolved doubt cannot be adjudged in favor of Poe. His
for analogy, the “offense” of material representation is malum prohibitum not malum in
claim to natural-born citizenship must be established by law, and evidence in accord with the
se. Intent is irrelevant. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
law.
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
Same; Admissions; Estoppel; The rule on judicial admissions is but an application of the
Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; The Kapunan pronouncement in Romualdez-Marcos
law on estoppel.—The paternity of Ronald Allan Poe has not been conclusively established.
did not establish a doctrine—it is not supported by law, and it smacks of judicial legislation; The
Some may take stock in the purported admission of petitioner Fornier in his pleadings before
reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum.—The Kapunan
both the COMELEC and this Court that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe. I am not as
pronouncement in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not establish a doctrine. It is not supported
hasty to conclude that such an admission dispenses with proof. The rule on judicial admissions
by law, and it smacks of judicial legislation. Moreover, such judicial legislation becomes even
is but an application of the law on estoppel. The State is not put in estoppel by the mistakes or
more egregious considering that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6% of
errors of its officials, much less by those who, not being an agent thereof, is in no position to
a Supreme Court. While several other Justices joined Justice Kapunan in upholding the
bind it. To hold otherwise would be to compel the State to recognize as a
residence qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they did not share his dictum. It was 318
his by his lonesome. Justice Puno had a separate opinion, concurred in by Justices Bellosillo and
 a person, otherwise disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy such rights and
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
privileges by representing—or mistaking—himself to be a Filipino: It was incumbent upon the
18 respondent, who claims natural-born status, to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he
really is such. Failing thus, and, as no presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Philippine citizenship, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the State.
citizen one who is not by its most fundamental of laws, and in effect “sanction a
monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel.”
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Illegitimate birth does not carry any SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
presumption on paternity.—In the end, there is nothing left but the Birth Certificate of 1939 and
the Marriage Contract of 1940 that could be taken as proper evidence to establish filiation. Not The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
only do they fail to prove filiation, they actually caution us against any hasty presumptions of Andresito X. Fornier and Themistocles A. Sano, Jr.for petitioner in G.R. No.
paternity. These documents establish the illegitimacy of Poe, and illegitimate birth does not 161824.
carry any presumption on paternity. Indeed, paternity has to be established by independent
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Gertrude A. De Leon, Maricar T. Martinez & Alberto
evidence. No such independent evidence is before this Court.
Same; International Law; It is municipal law, not international law, that determines
A. Sales for petitioners in G.R. No. 161434.
citizenship and the qualifications of a candidate for public office.—It has been urged that Romulo V. Borja for Zoilo Antonio G. Velez in G.R. No. 161634.
disqualifying Poe as a consequence of ruling that he follows the citizenship of his mother would Ireneo E. Guardino for petitioner-in-intervention.
constitute a violation of international law, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.
Child. The Convention proscribes the commission of discriminatory acts against any person by 320
reason of birth. The submission proceeds from the conviction that the paternity of Poe and, 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
therefore, his Filipino citizenship, have been duly established. Truly, the Convention would find
full application if it were so, but, sadly, it has not. Surely, it is not suggested that, regardless of Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
his not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, respondent is eligible to be President by virtue of
such Convention. Obviously, it is municipal law, not international law, that determines the VITUG, J.:
qualifications of a candidate for public office. It is also municipal law, not international law,
that determines citizenship.
Same; It is the fact of presence on 11 April 1899 that renders operative the grant of mass Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
naturalization.—There is no evidence adduced that Lorenzo Pou was born in the Philippines, or deserving of the privilege. It is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
was even present in the Philippines up until the first few decades of the 20th century. However, acquisition,” that cannot be taken lightly by anyone—either by those who enjoy it or
1

it is insisted that Lorenzo Pou obtained his citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the by those who dispute it.
Philippine Bill of 1902. I earlier concluded that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question
discretion in adopting this theory without any substantial evidence. Again, there is no proof of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
that exists that Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject, was already present in the Philippines on 11
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of
April 1899. It is the fact of presence on that date that renders operative the grant of mass
naturalization. It is a fact that must be established, and sadly, the evidence fails to do so. the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Same; Presumptions; The presumption of inference of the continued existence of a Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for
condition or state of facts is generally considered to be prospective, not retrospective—the the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
presumption never runs backward.—Even conceding that the presence of Lorenzo Pou in the The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
Philippines was estab- colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
319
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 319 less than distinctly Filipino.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Antecedent Case Settings
lished as of 1916, when Allan F. Poe was born, the rule is that proof of the existence at a On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
particular time of a fact of a continuous nature gives rise to an inference, that it exists at Poe, Jr. (hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
a subsequenttime. No similar inference can be drawn that such fact existed prior to the time it President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
had been established. The presumption of inference of the continued existence of a condition or
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
state of facts is generally considered to be prospective, not retrospective. Indeed, the
presumption never runs backward. The presence of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines in 1916 or
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
1954 does not establish his presence in the Philippines in 1899. In 1916, he was already 46 stated his name to be “Fernando, Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, his date of birth to be
years old, the average lifespan of the average male during that period, and yet it remains 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
unanswered where he was prior to that time and more so in 1899. Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier,
Same; Respondent FPJ may indeed be at heart, and in mind, a natural-born Filipino and Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
may speak the vernacular, partake of the native ale, and portray the Filipino hero, and may have known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,” initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
even exercised rights and enjoyed privileges reserved to Filipino citizens but all these, however, do docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) to
not constitute conclusive proof that he is one.—Respondent may indeed be at heart, and in mind,
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
a natural-born Filipino. He may speak the vernacular, partake of the native ale, and portray the
Filipino hero. He may have even exercised rights and enjoy privileges reserved to Filipino
the thesis that FPJ made a material
citizens. All these, however do not constitute conclusive proof that he is one. For it may be that
_______________ February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
1Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31, 1269. Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
321
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 321 stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, would include G.R.
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. vs. The
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.‘Fernando Poo, Jr.’), and
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Victorino X. Fornier,” and the other, docketed G.R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Antonio G. Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,” both
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
on two assertions—first,Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Jurisdiction of the Court
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior In G.R. No. 161824
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
ofrespondent. deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits—1) a copy the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Code—
Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and 323
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 323
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, “Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false”—
certification from the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives Division cf the National
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
Omnibus Election Code—
National Archives regarding thebirth of Allan F. Poe.
“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.—In addition to the powers
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
the more significant ones being—a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for
the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections”—
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives “any interested party” to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised
2 3

Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads—
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections 2 Sec. 2. Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule
name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of 65, except as hereinafter provided. (Rule 64)
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
3

functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II. facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Rule 65)
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED view, i.e.,to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology
in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought support this premise—
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or “Rule 12. Jurisdiction.—The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless “Rule 13. How Initiated.—An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warrantoshall not include an election
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” protest.
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial “Rule 14. Election Protest.—Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may
by law which power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to after the proclamation of the winner.”
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” _______________

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly
17 SCRA 761 (1966).
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
4

326
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest 326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
government post in the land. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634 The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04- warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context,
5

instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario.In Rule 14, only a
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
rules for the purpose.” election scenario.
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribu- Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
325 brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 325 vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.,” and G.R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio Velez
nal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.” would have to be dismissed for
this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or
want of jurisdiction.
4

disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the

President or Vice President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June The Citizenship Issue
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent Now, to the basic issue, it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the on the concept of citizenship.
Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle,
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw
6

the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of its significance if only to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to
No. 1793, the statutory setup, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the achieve a self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would both
7

present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post- loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements,
election scenario.Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warrantowhich, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in _______________
 See Rule 66, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
the Philippine Islands, and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870,
17

The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, Oxford University Press, London,
which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
6

1946, at p. 93.
Id., at p. 95.
7 July 1870. 18

327
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 327 _______________

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance with the common law, royal orders and other laws of
on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting,
8 the kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired residence therein. (Leon T. Garcia, The Problems of
Citizenship in the Philippines,” Rex Bookstore, 1949, at p. 4)
a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private 14 Garcia, supra, at p. 3.
interests to the general interest of society. 15 Justices Malcolm, Recto and Florentino Torres believed that the law was effective in the Philippines.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th Those who entertained the contrary view were Justices Imperial and Villareal. (Garcia, supra, at 4.).
century, the concept was limited, by and large, tocivil citizenship, which established 16 Garcia, supra, pp. 5-6.
Under the Royal Decree of August 23, 1868; the following were considered foreigners—(1) The
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal
17

legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another independent state, and the
liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
9
unrecognized and natural and other illegitimate children of a mother belonging to another State born outside
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political of the Spanish dominions, (2) The children specified in the preceding paragraph, born in the Spanish
dominions or on board Spanish vessels on the high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority fixed in
power. The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
10

the laws of the Kingdom, elect Spanish nationality, (3) Those being Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and well by renouncing the first as by accepting employment, from another government without the authority of
social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare
11 the sovereign and (4) The woman who contracts marriage with a subject of another State. (Garcia, supra, pp.
state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of 6-7)
Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All persons born of foreign parents outside of the
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
18

Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of foreign fathers and Spanish mothers
the internationalization of citizenship. 12
while they do
329
The Local Setting—from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 329
“subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” In 13
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
_______________
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be governed by special
8Introduction, “The Conditions of Citizenship,” edited by Bart Van Steenbergen, Sage Publications,
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi (1994). laws. 19

Ibid.
9 It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
Ibid.
10
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Ibid.
Spanish citizens.—
11

Ibid.
12

13Under the codified Novisima Recopilacion promulgated in Spain in 1805, the following were considered
denizens (vecinos) all foreigners who obtained the privilege of naturalization, those who were born in these
kingdoms, those who residing therein may be converted to the holy Catholic faith; those, being self-
1. “(a)Persons born in Spanish territory,
supporting, established their domicile therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who married a native man, 2. “(b)Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
she thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who Spain,
establish themselves in the country by acquiring real property; those who have trade or profession and go 3. “(c)Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
there to practice the same; also those who practice some mechanical trade therein or keep a retail
store;....those who reside for a period of ten years in a home of his 4. “(d)Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
328 of any town of the Monarchy.” 20

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for the
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
virtually intact.
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and
14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima

the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status
21

Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was
of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be
extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among
determined by its Congress—
experts; however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
15

“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
Spaniards in the Philippines—the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal 16
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to Controversy arose on the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
sell or dis- 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
_______________
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
not claim Spanish nationality, (3) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign parents or foreign fathers and Spanish
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those
mothers while they do not make that claim, (4) Spaniards who may have lost their nationality, (5) Those born outside of the born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. More about this later.
25

Spanish territory of parents who may have lost their Spanish nationality; and (6), the Spanish woman married to a foreigner.
(Garcia, supra, p. 7)
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
19 Velayo, infra, p. 11. amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902—
20 Article 17, The Civil Code of Spain.
“Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
21 Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7.

330
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.” 26

pose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens”
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft,
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance the first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made mention of
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912—
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside. “That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
Thus— April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
the United States shall be determined by the Congress.” 22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States _______________
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, 24 Garcia, supra, at pp. 31-32.
25 Garcia, supra, pp. 23-26.
also ceased to be “aliens” under American laws and were thus issued passports 26 Velayo, supra, p. 31.

describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the 332
United States. 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
Philippines— signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the Philippine by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.”
eighteen hundred and ninety eight.”
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
23

citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11

_______________
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
Ramon M. Velayo, “Philippine Citizenship And Naturalization,” Central Book Supply, Manila (1965),
22
citizen of some other country.
pp. 22-23. While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
Ibid., p. 30.
23
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
331 link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 331 relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship—
“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines—
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
Constitution.
“inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who 2. “(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands offoreign parents who, before the adoption of
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
on or before 11 April 1899. 24
3. “(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
 4. “(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of The term “natural-born citizens,” is defined to include “those who are citizens of the
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
5. “(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.” Philippine citizenship.” 27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose citizenship—naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis —had been in
28

their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,could qualify a person to being a
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
29

333 reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
30

VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 333 relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old
the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution
at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of
on citizenship to reflect such concerns—
FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father,
“Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution—The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner
was an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Constitution.
2. “(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
3. “(3)Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley
4. “(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
_______________

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that—
Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Constitution.
27

“A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, Per amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ.
28

unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship.” 23 Phil. 315 (1912).
29

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, Supra, which held that jus soli was never applied in the Philippines.
30

except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation 335
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 335
Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate
of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years
Constitution.
2. “(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. old and married.
3. “(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;and entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
4. “(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.” parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from
the documents would be that—
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: 1. 1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
334 2. 2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
3. 3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections 4. 4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
“No person may be elected President unless he is anatural-born citizen of the 5. 5.At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on old.
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.”
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148.
31

337
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 337
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
the COMELEC. 1902.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit “A” for petitioner and Exhibit “3”
for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was Proof of Paternity and Filiation
submitted as Exhibit “21” for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was Under Civil Law.
submitted by respondent as his Exhibit “5”. While the last two documents were Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status
reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e.,the marriage certificate in of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate
relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1964 in San Carlos, Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
originals. paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that— compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
336 putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED will, or a public document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
32

Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
“Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
the following cases: acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
“x x x xxx xxx identified.”
“(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
public office.”
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima
being an authoritative document of recognition. In Mendoza vs. Mella, the Court
facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
33 34

“Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a ruled—
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” _______________
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the Article 131, Old Civil Code.
32

Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729.

33

statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) 17 SCRA 788 (1966).
34

the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of 338
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
occurred. 31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed “Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is
whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit “1”), which is merely a certified copy of the registry
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still
record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as
his or her own.”
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
_______________
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be “some other public document.” “The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
In Pareja vs. Pareja, this Court defined what could constitute such a document as
35
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
proof of voluntary acknowledgment: brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
“Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent reads:
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of 340
the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class.” 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
“Art. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled:
court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor
36

“We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that ‘the
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. was born before the effectivity of this body of laws’ or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 273
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, may be given retroactive effect.”
and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
_______________ idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
95 Phil. 167.
35
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
339 little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 339 individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code,
such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
law; particularly—
presumed parent.
“Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, “authentic and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
writing,” so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other interests.” 37

competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, the Court has held: 38

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and “In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
Article 175 provide: and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: they reside in a

_______________
1. “(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. “(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten 36 125 SCRA 835 (1983).
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 37 Vicente J. Fransisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Bk. 1, 1953 at p. 5.
38 29 Phil. 606.
341
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 341

1. “(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
2. “(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. foreign country; that, in consequence, ‘all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with
the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property,
“Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
the action.
governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife.”
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in
“x x x xxx x x x. Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that—
“Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
and on the same evidence as legitimate children. persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional 2. (2)With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the
Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and family
39

343
rela-
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 343
_______________
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
39
as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
situated. under civil law and not his political status.
41

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family,
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
by the laws of the country in which they are executed. monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of theRepublic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
execution. uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
342 impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on
tions. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his
40

proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
_______________
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in “Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’
allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
Philippine. where these facts occurred, and the names
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not
be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been
executed. _______________
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
40Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul general, consul or 1. (3)With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated
vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for their Extrinsic validity.
civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by
said consular official.
41 See Ching Leng vs. Galang, L-11931, October 1958, unreported.
Article 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to 344
contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. 344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein
required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Article 26. x x x of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.”
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
Article 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in the marriage settlements, the property relations of declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
and their residence. This rule shall not apply:
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
1. (1)Where both spouses are aliens;
 Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit “20” before the COMELEC, might be accepted science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with deny progress.”
FPJ, i.e.,living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent Petitioner’s Argument For
FPJ) in one house, and as one family— Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
“I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner,
1. “1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. “2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
_______________
3. “3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or ‘FPJ’.
354 SCRA 17 (2001).
4. “4.Ronald Allan Poe ‘FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital,
42

346
Magdalena Street, Manila.
5. x x x xxx xxx 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6. “7.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year. prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
7. “8.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938. marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie
8. “9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944. respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage
9. “10.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
after Ronald Allan Poe.
father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
345
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child FPJ so followed the citizenship of
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 345 his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon and Serra vs. Republic.
43 44 45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas,
SJ, is most convincing; he states—
1. “x x x xxx xxx. “We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
2. “18.I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguiniswas on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
Sr. irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
“Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004. cases.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas “First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It
Declarant was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a
Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather.
DNA Testing Nothing about jus sanguinisthere. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or stepfather.
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained “Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution.
In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
42 No one was illegitimate here.
DNA testing—
“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and _______________
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science 20 SCRA 562 (1967), Paa vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753 (1967).
43

Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA 82 Phil. 771.
44

typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the 91 Phil. 914, unreported.
45

347
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 347
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
“Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship
none provided.
46

of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, Quintin therefore In Sum—
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his 1. (1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a jurisdiction over the petition in G.R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
Filipino. relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
“The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin’s father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
“x x x x x x x x x
contention that FPJ has committed material misrepresentation in his
“Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but of the Philippines.
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate 349
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
“The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 349
vs. Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
47
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
“x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What 1. (2)The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public petitions in G.R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve
of the a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
_______________
only after, not before, the elections are held.
46 21 SCRA 753 (1967).
2. (3)In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
47 68 Phil. 12. been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
348 whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
reprobated.” sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail. the “en masseFilipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate children are legitimate or illegitimate.
against him. 3. (4)But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
 held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate SEPARATE OPINION
of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
there has been material misrepresentation, which,
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent
350
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed falsity in a material
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
48
representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a natural-born
deliberate and willful. Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not, since he is the illegitimate son of
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS— Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The case was
docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First
Division.
1. 1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan offered FPJ’s record of birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. “Fernando Poe, Jr.”) and Victorino X. Fornier, Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez.
Respondents,” and G.R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio Velez, Upon the other hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., whose parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens. He adduced in
Respondent,” for want of jurisdiction. evidence a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that
2. 2.G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versusHon. they were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC
Fernando Poe, Jr.,” for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part dismissed COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that
of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA COMELEC’s jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and
No. 04-003. qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of
national officials like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the
No Costs. issue of citizenship of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
SO ORDERED. Code on petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), See separate opinion, concurring. that any material
Puno, J., On leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion. 352
Panganiban, J., On official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote 352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
on the merits.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Quisumbing, J., I join the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should
have been REMANDED. representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by
Ynares-Santiago, J., I concur and also with J. Puno’s Separate Opinion. petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I concur (Please see my Separate Opinion. material representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion. natural-born Filipino citizen.
Austria-Martinez, J., I concur. Please see my separate opinion. His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been
Corona, J., I join the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales. denied, petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed
Carpio-Morales, J., See my dissenting opinion. as G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came
_______________ to this Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
248 SCRA 300 (1995).
48 over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court has
351 jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 351 the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections election returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
Callejo, Sr., J., Please see my concurring opinion. rules for the purpose.
Azcuna, J., I concur in a separate opinion. On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was
Tinga, J., I dissent please see my separate opinion. docketed G.R. No. 161634.
 The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the 354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
oral argument, are as follows:
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the
1. (1)Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course
following facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either
to or cancel certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;
in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the
2. (2)Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a)
parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments:
Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
3. (3)Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. 1. 1.FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. 2.FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. 3.Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
4. 4.Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as
subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of
provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and
the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground that he is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said
provision of the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular election From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of
contests and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre- his parents. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a
election remedies, such as natural child if both his parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or (b)
353 an illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another woman who was
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 353 still alive at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded
those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69 paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as
which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae.Since paternity or filiation is
These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
jurisdiction of this Court. discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:
COMELEC has the original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
whether a candidate for an elective office is eligible for the office for which he filed his ...
certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification. Its I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between
jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is, therefore, beyond question. legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Fornier’s petition (G.R. No. 355

161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides: VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 355
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
matter brought before it within sixty, days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged or
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the recognized by the father.
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, SEPARATE OPINION
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC PUNO, J.:
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 Why bastard? Wherefore
of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as follows: When my dimensions are well
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as compact,
may be established by law. My mind as generous, and my shape
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies as true
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not As honest madam’s issue?
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part Why brand they us
of nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.
354
With base? With baseness
 Bastardy? Base, base? 2. 2.ONE NICKNAME OR STAGE NAME (by which I am generally or
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature popularly known): FPJ
take 3. 3.OFFICIALLY NOMINATED BY: KNP
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull stale, tired 357
bed, VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 357
Got ‘tween sleep and wake?
—well then, Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your
land: 1. 4.DATE OF BIRTH: 20 August 1939 PLACE OF BIRTH: MANILA SEX: MALE
Our father’s love is to the bastard 2. 5.CIVIL STATUS: M IF MARRIED, FULL NAME OF SPOUSE: JESUSA SONORA
Edmund. 3. 6.I AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN
As to the legitimate: fine word— 4. 7.PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: MOVIE PRODUCER/ ACTOR
legitimate! 5. 8.RESIDENCE: 23 LINCOLN ST., GREENHILLS, SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA
6. 9.RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 10, 2004: 64 Years
Well my legitimate, if this letter
and 8 Months
speed, 7. 10.I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 227
And my invention thrive, Edmund A,BARANGAYGREENHILLS CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, PROVINCE
the base OF METRO MANILA
Shall top the legitimate, I grow; I 8. 11.I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR MIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
prosper – COUNTRY.
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! 9. 12.I AM ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the
(Edmund, Bastard Son Constitution of the Philippines, and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
to Gloster,
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this
King Lear, Act I, Scene II) obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
356
evasion, I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED personal knowledge.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
31 December 2003
I. Prologue (thumbmarked) (sgd) RONALD ALLAN K. POE
The petitions at bar seek the disqualification of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. from SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of Dec. 2003 at Manila, affiant
running for the Presidency in the May 2004 national elections. But the issues posed exhibiting to me his/her Community Tax Certificate No. 11835585 issued on 8 Jan. 2003 at San
by the petitions at bar transcend the person of respondent Poe. These issues affect Juan, M. Mla.
some of our most deeply held values in democracy—the protection of the exercise of Doc. No. 92 (sgd) ATTY. KEVIN NARCE B. VIVERO
political rights, such as the right to run for public office against irrelevant
Page No. 20 NOTARY PUBLIC
impediments, the levelling of the political playing field, the disapprobation of political
loyalty in our temples of justice, elimination of all invidious discrimination against Book No. III until December 31, 2003
non-marital children, and the continued enthronement of the sovereignty of the Series of 2003 PTR NO. 881104, JAN. 09, 2003, MANILA
people in the election of our leaders. The petitions at bar concern all these democratic 358
values. It is the people on the line. It is us. 358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
II. The Facts and the Proceedings Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Let us first look at the facts for they are staring at us. On December 31, 2003,
On January 9, 2004, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, Victorino X. Fornier, filed with
respondent Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. filed with the
the COMELEC a “Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald
Commission on Elections his Certificate of Candidacy for President in the May 10,
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.” Fornier alleged that respondent
2004 elections. He made the following declarations under oath in his certificate of
Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines, much less a natural-born citizen, and as such,
candidacy:
lacks one of the essential qualifications for the position of President of the Republic of
Certificate of Candidacy for President the Philippines. Fornier presented a photocopy of the marriage contract of Allan
I hereby announce my candidacy for the position of PRESIDENT, Republic of the Fernando Poe, respondent Poe’s father, and a certain Paulita Gomez which appears
Philippines, in the May 10, 2004 elections; and after having been sworn in accordance to have been executed on July 5, 1936. Said marriage contract indicates that Allan
1

with law, hereby state the following: Fernando Poe’s nationality was “Español”,and that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and
Marta Reyes, were both Spanish citizens. The copy presented by Fornier was certified
1. 1.FULL NAME: POE, FERNANDO, JR./RONALD ALLAN KELLEY by Ricardo Manapat, Chief of the Records Management and Archives Office. Based 2
on said document Fornier alleged that respondent Poe could not have acquired as Filipino from birth. He is a registered voter and has voted in every election; he
Filipino citizenship from his father. Fornier added that even if respondent Poe’s holds a Philippine passport; he owns real properties which only citizens of this coun-
11

father were a Filipino citizen, he still could not have validly acquired Filipino
citizenship from the former because the prior marriage of Allan Fernando Poe and _______________
Paulita Gomez renders the marriage of his parents, Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie
Kelley, void, thus making him an illegitimate child. He contended that an 5Exh. “5”.
Exhs. “6”; “6-A”; “6-B”; “6-C”; “6-D”.
illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the legally known parent which is the
6

7Exh. “7”.
mother. Respondent Poe’s mother, Bessie Kelley, was admittedly an American 8Exh. “8-b”.
citizen. In addition to the copy of the marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe
3 9Exh. “9”.
and Paulita Gomez, petitioner Fornier also presented a photocopy of the affidavit of Exh. “3”.
10

Exh. “16”.
11

Paulita Gomez stating that she filed a bigamy case against Allan Fernando 360
Poe. Petitioner prayed that respondent Poe be disqualified from running for the
4

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

position of President of the Republic of the Philippines and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be denied due course or cancelled. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
In his Answer, respondent Poe asserted that he is a Filipino citizen and denied try may do; he represented himself as a citizen of the Philippines in all contracts or
12

Fornier’s allegation that his father and his grandparents were Spanish subjects. He transactions. Respondent dismissed as a “worthless piece of paper” the alleged
likewise denied the alleged prior marriage between Allan Fernando Poe and one marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez for the following
Paulita Go- reasons: (1) it is only a Xerox copy which is not even represented to be a xerox copy of
an original document; (2) no averment is made whether an original exists and where
_______________ it is located; (3) assuming an original exists, its genuineness and due execution may
not be assumed and no proof is offered; and (4) it is not evidence, much less
1Exh. “B-2”. persuasive evidence of the citizenship of the parties. Respondent further presented
Exh. “B-2-a”.
the sworn statement of Ms. Ruby Kelley Mangahas, a surviving sister of Bessie
2

3Exh. “A” (Certificate of Birth of Ronald Allan Poe).

4Exh. “B”; Exh. “B-3” (English translation). Kelley belying, among others, petitioner’s claim of the prior marriage between Allan
359 Fenando Poe and Paulita Gomez. 13

VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 359 Meanwhile, Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., aswell as Zoilo
Antonio Velez, filed their separate petitions with this Court, also seeking the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
disqualification of respondent Poe from the presidential elections on the ground that
mez. He maintained that his father, Allan Fernando Poe, and grandfather, Lorenzo he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Petitioners Tecson and
Pou, were Filipino citizens. He alleged that since the Constitution provides that Desiderio contended that respondent Poe is an illegitimate child and therefore follows
14

“those whose fathers are citizens ofthe Philippines” are Filipinos, he is therefore a the citizenship of his mother. Petitioners cite the marriage certificate of Poe’s parents
Filipino citizen. Respondent presented a certification from the Office of the Civil which shows that they were married in 1940, while Poe was born in 1939. They
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan stating the contents of page 32 of Book 4 of contend that it does not appear that Poe has been legitimated by the subsequent
the Register of Death of San Carlos City which show, among others, that Lorenzo Pou marriage of his parents as he had not been acknowledged by his father. The same
died a Filipino citizen. Respondent alleged that Lorenzo Pou was born a Spanish
5

arguments were advanced by petitioner Velez. 15

subject; he was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands when Spain ceded the The Senate also conducted two public hearings on January 21, 2004 and
Philippine Islands to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris on December February 2, 2004 on the authenticity of the following documents submitted by
10, 1898; and he became a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of the petitioner Fornier to the COMELEC: (1) the alleged birth certificate of Allan
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law. Respondent further averred that in his Fernando Poe; (2) the alleged marriage certificate between Allan Fernando Poe and
lifetime, Lorenzo Pou comported himself a Philippine citizen—he voted in elections; Paulita Gomez; and (3) the alleged bigamy charge filed by Paulita Gomez against
he did not register as an alien; and he owned real properties. Respondent Poe also
6

Allan Fernando Poe. The Senate issued subpoena duces tecumand ad

presented the death certificate of his father, Allan Fernando Poe, which states that testificandum to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of
he died as Filipino. Respondent further alleged that his father was born in the
7

documents, equipment and other materials relevant to the investigation. Witnesses

Philippines in 1916, before the 1935 Constitution took effect, hence, a Filipino by from the Records Man-
reason of his birthplace. He stated that Allan Fernando Poe acted as a Filipino
during his lifetime. He was called to active duty to serve in the Philippine Army; he _______________
was inducted into the USAFFE; he fought in Bulacan and was in the “Death March”;
and after the war, he reverted to inactive status with the rank of Captain; he was
8
Exhs. “5”; “17”; “18”; “19”.
12

awarded the Gold Cross and served the guerilla movement during the Japanese
9 Exh. “20”.
13

occupation. Respondent Poe also presented his own Certificate of Birth which 10
G.R. No. 161434.
14

G.R. No. 161634.

15

indicates that he is a Filipino citizen and that his father, Allan F. Poe, was Filipino. 361
Like his father and grandfather, respondent Poe represented and conducted himself
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 361
 Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Pou became a citizen of
agement and Archives Office came forward and testified that they have been the Philippine Islands or of the Philippines.
unwitting instruments in the fabrication of the documents in question. The Senate 4. 4.Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and
Committee Report No. 517, signed by Senators Edgardo Angara, Teresa Aquino- even acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
Oreta, Rodolfo Biazon, Loren Legarda, Aquilino Pimentel, Sergio Osmeña, Juan jurisdiction, in concluding that, under the 1935 Constitution, respondent
Flavier and Vicente C. Sotto III, recommended the criminal prosecution of Director FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen despite his illegitimacy.
Ricardo Manapat for falsification of public documents, perjury, incriminatory 5. 5.Assuming arguendo that respondent Comelec’s jurisdiction is limited to
machination, theft, infidelity in the custody of document, violation of the Anti-Graft denying due course or cancelling certificate of candidacy on the ground of
and Corrupt Practices Act and obstruction of justice. The Report was submitted by material misrepresentation, respondent Comelec committed grave and
the respondent to the COMELEC en banc. reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
After hearing the parties, the First Division of the COMELEC, on January 23, tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that respondent
2004, issued a Resolution dismissing Fornier’s petition for disqualification for lack of FPJ’s certificate of candidacy does not contain a material
merit. The First Division stated that its jurisdiction is limited to all contests relating misrepresentation or falsity as to his being a natural-born Filipino citizen.
to elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city 6. 6.Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and
officials. It, however, has authority to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national even acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
officials in actions under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, in jurisdiction, in concluding that respondent FPJ should not be declared as
Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that disqualified to run for President in the May 2004 elections, and in
any material representation contained therein is false. Thus, the First Division of the consequently dismissing the petition of petitioner Fornier.
COMELEC proceeded to assess the evidence presented by the parties to resolve the 7. 7.In any event, regardless of whether or not respondent Comelec has
issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The COMELEC jurisdiction to rule on the disqualification case below which is grounded on
First Division concluded: “(c)onsidering that the evidence presented by the petitioner the fact that respondent FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus
is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material lacks an essential qualification, the Honorable Court can take cognizance
misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a of said issue and rule on the qualifications of respondent FPJ to run for the
natural-born Filipino citizen.” position of President for the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner Fornier moved to reconsider the Resolution of the First Division.
On February 6, 2004, the Commission En Banc affirmed the Resolution of the III. The Issues
First Division. On February 23, 2004, the Court held a session to discuss the cases at bar. The issues
Thus, petitioner Fornier filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing discussed were the following: (1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Tecson
the Resolution of the Commission En Banc. He cited the following grounds for the and Valdez petitions and the Fornier petition; (2) Assuming the Court has
petition: jurisdiction,
363
1. 1.Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law and even VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 363
acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
jurisdiction when it arbitrarily and whimsically ruled, in violation of the
whether the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
Constitution, existing laws, jurisprudence and its own rules and issuance,
Fornier petition on the ground that Fornier failed to prove that respondent Poe
that it had no jurisdiction over the disqualification case below grounded on
deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino; (3) Assuming there is
no grave abuse of discretion, whether the issue of the citizenship of respondent Poe
362
should now be resolved; and (4) Assuming the issue will now be resolved, whether the
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Court should resolve it on the basis of the evidence on record or whether it should be
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections remanded to the COMELEC to enable the parties to adduce further evidence on the
acknowledgment made by Allan F. Poe of respondent Poe as his son.
These issues shall be discussed in seriatim.
1. the lack of essential qualification of respondent FPJ and on his
disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. IV. Discussion
2. 2.Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and A. JURISDICTION
even acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the
jurisdiction, in concluding that under the law Lorenzo Pou became a citizen Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7
of the Philippine Islands. of the Constitution which provides:
3. 3.Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
even acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its
jurisdiction, in concluding that, under law and Constitution, Allan F. rules for the purpose.”
The word “contest” in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only respondent Poe is based on
be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President.
There can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed. substantial evidence, hence is not
On the other hand, the Court is also unanimous in its view that it has jurisdiction despotic, whimsical or capricious.
over the Fornier petition. The COMELEC treated the Fornier petition as a petition to To stress again, the petition of Fornier was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of B.P. Blg. deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe on the
881 which provides: ground of material misrepresentation under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Allegedly,
B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A respondent Poe misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed In Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC we held that the misrepresentation must not
16

by any person exclusively only be material but also deliberate and willfull.
364
Petitioner, therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial evidence the
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED following facts: (1) that respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in his Certificate of
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Candidacy; (2) that the misrepresentation is material to the position of which he is a
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 candidate; and (3) that the material misrepresentation was made deliberately and
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the willfully. Let us now examine the evidence presented by petitioner Fornier to
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and determine whether he was able to discharge the burden of evidence.
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Analysis of Petitioner’s
Article IX (C), Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Evidence
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within The first evidence of petitioner is Exhibit “A” which is the Certificate of Birth of
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” respondent Poe. This evidence proved the date of birth of respondent Poe, i.e.,August
The Fornier petition is before this Court on review under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 20, 1939. It is no proof that he is not a natural-born citizen. Nor is it proof that
65 of the Ruls of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is therefore unassailable. respondent Poe knew that he was not a natural-born citizen and deliberately
B. THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN represented himself as such in his Certificate of Candidacy.
The second evidence of petitioner are Exhibits “B”, “B-1” and “B-2” Exhibits “B”
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL
and “B-1” is the Sworn Statement of Paulita Gomez charging Allan F. Poe with
EVIDENCE THE CHARGE THAT RESPONDENT POE DELIBERATELY bigamy. Exhibit “B-2” is the alleged marriage contract between Allan F. Poe and
MISREPRESENTED THAT HE IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IN HIS Paulita Gomez. Ex-
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.
_______________
Certiorari power of this Court to
review COMELEC decisions is a 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
16

366
limited power.
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
We start with the elementary proposition that the certiorari power of this Court to
review decisions of the COMELEC is a limited one. This Court can only reverse or Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
change the COMELEC decision on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave hibits “B”, “B-1” and “B-2” were presented thru Director Manapat. These exhibits do
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion has a well defined meaning in our not prove anything. They are out and out fabrications. The sworn Statements of Mr.
jurisprudence. It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious. A decision supported by Remmel G. Talabis, Mr. Emman A. Llamora, Ms. Vicelyn G. Tarin, all employees of
substantial evidence is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. Neither is a decision the Records Management and Archives Office as well as the sworn statements of Mr.
interpreting a novel or difficult question of law with logical reasons. A mere William Duff and Mr. Victorino Floro III of Florofoto proved the fabrications of
disagreement with COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its Director Manapat.
interpretation of some difficult provisions of law is no basis to strike down the The sworn statement of Remmel Talabis states:
COMELEC decision as despotic, arbitrary or
365 REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 365 SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

whimsical. More so when the case involves election law where the expertise of
COMELEC ought to be conceded. Ako Si Remmel G. Talabis, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 149 P. Gomez
The ruling of the COMELEC St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

denying the petition to disqualify

 1. 1.Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang Store Keeper I 2. 6.2Iminungkahi ko sa kanya na kung gusto nyang paliitin ang marriage contract ay
sa Supplies Section. Inilipat ako ni Dir. Ricardo Manapat sa aming Computer mas maigi na i-print ito ng actual size at pagkatapos ay i-scan muli at pagkatapos
Section dahil sa ako ay nagtapos ng Computer Technology. ay i-paste sa MS Word para madali tong i-resize. Pumayag naman siya at ito nga
2. 2.Noong magkakatapusan ng buwan ng Nobyembre 2003 ay ipinatawag ako ni Dir. ang aming ginawa. Ayon sa kanya ay gawin namin itong katulad lamang ng laki ng
Manapat sa kanyang tanggapan at ako ay inutusang mag-scan ng mga birth record isang lumang litrato sa Archives Library.
sa Archives, Paco. Nakahanda na raw ang mga ito at ii-scan na lang. Ang mga birth 3. 6.3Pinalagyan din niya ng parang wavy line na border ang ipina-print nyang
record na ito ay mula sa mga taong 1936 hanggang 1941.Matapos kong i-scan ang marriage contract sa akin. Pagkatapos ay pinadagdagan na naman niya ito ng isa
mga birth record at makabalik sa opisina ay inutusan naman niya ako na linisin ang pang border para
mga ito at alisin ang mga datos na nakalagay dito at pagkatapos ay gawan ko raw
ito ng black and white copy. Ginawa ko ito sa Adobe Photoshop. Nagpaprint din siya 368
ng mga kopya nito.
3. 3.Muli na naman akong ipinatawag ni Dir. Manapat noong kaagahan ng buwan ng 368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Disyembre 2003 at ako ay inutusan na naman niya na mag-scan ng birth record sa Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Archives, Paco. Ayon sa kanya ang kailangan niya raw na record ay para sa taon ng
1915 o 1916 pero ang pinakamaagang kopya lang ng birth record na nasa Archives,
Paco ay para sa taon ng 1928 lang. Kaya yun na lang ang ipina-scan niya sa akin. 1. raw magmukhang naka ipit. Pina-print niya ito ulit sa akin gamit ang isang
newsprint na papel.
2. 7.Ang sumunod naman nyang ipinagawa sa akin ay ang paglalagay naman ng pirma
1. 3.1Nang matapos kong i-scan ang birth record ay inutusan niya ako uli na linisin ang
ng isang Paulita Gomez sa gilid ng isang dokumento at pirma ng isang
birth record, alisin ang mga datos nito at gawing black and white copy. Inutusan din
nagngangalang Cordero sa ikalawang pahina ng pareho ring dokumento na
niya ako na dagdagan ng entrada ang black and white na kopya ng 1928 birth record
nakasaad sa wikang espanyol. Dati ng may nakalagay na pirma ni Paulita Gomez sa
ng in-scan ko, para sa “province” at “munici-
ibabaw ng pangalan nito sa ikalawang pahina ng documento. Nang matapos ko ang
pinagagawa niya, ipina-print niya sa akin ang nasabing dokumento gamit ang isang
367 newsprint na papel.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 367 3. 8.Makaraan pa ng ilang araw, pinatawag akong muli ni Dir. Manapat upang ipa-scan
naman ang isang birth record na may pangalan ng isang Allan Fernando Poe.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Inutusan po ako na mag-print ng isang negative copy at isang positive copy.

1. pality.” Pina-alis din niya ang numero “2” sa lahat ng “192_” na entrada. Nagpa-print 1. 8.1Nang makita ko ang Xerox copy ng minarkahang “Exhibit C” sa kasong
siya ng kopya nito. disqualification sa COMELEC ay katulad ito ng ipina scan at ipinalinis na birth
2. 3.2Pinahanap din ako ni Dir. Manapat ng katulad na font na ginamit sa 1928 birth record sa akin ni Dir. Manapat noong Disyembre 2003.
record na in-scan ko pero hindi ako makakita kaya “nag-cut and paste” na lang ako
ng mga letra mula din sa nasabing dokumento at ipinagdugtong-dugtong ko na lang
1. 9.Nito nga pong nakaraang lingo ay inutusan na naman ako ni Dir. Manapat na i-scan
para mabuo ang mga salitang isisingit.
uli yung mga dokumento na ipina print nya sa akin noon (marriage contract at
dokumento ni Paulita Gomez). Napansin ko na sinunog ang mga gilid ng
1. 4.Bago mag-pasko ay ipinatawag niya akong muli sa kanyang tanggapan. Inutusan dokumento. Nagpa print po siya uli ng isang negative copy at isang positive copy ng
niya ako na kopyahin ang isang faxed copy ng marriage certificate at gawan ito ng mga nabanggit na dokumento.
“form.” Naumpisahan kong gawin ang porma ngunit hindi ko natapos dahil sumapit 2. 10.Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya
na ang takdang araw ng aking forced leave na na-file. Nang mga panahon ding iyon ni minsan binanggit kung ano at para saan gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa
ay inuutusan na rin niya ako na mag scan ng mga pirma mula sa iba’t-ibang akin.
documento at linisin ang nga iyon.
1. 4.1Tinawagan ko si Emman Llamera upang pakiusapan na siya na lang
(sgd) Remmel Talabis
ang tumapos duon sa iniuutos sa akin ni Dir. Manapat. Pumayag naman
Nagsalaysay
siya dahil wala ng ibang gagawa noon.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant
2. 5.Nakaraan ang ilang araw ay nakatanggap naman ako ng tawag mula kay Dir.
exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 15325884, issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela
Manapat na nagtatanong kung paano lilinisin ang pirma na ilalagay sa MS Word
City.
document. Sinabi ko na sa Adobe Photoshop ang gamitin para malinis ang mga
NOTARY PUBLIC
dumi.
(sgd) ATTY. KENNETH S. TAMPAL
3. 6.Matapos iyon ay wala na kaming komunikasyon hanggang sa ako’y pumasok ng
Notary Public
Enero 5, 2004. Ipinatawag niya ako muli sa kanyang tanggapan at inutusan na i-
Until Dec. 31, 2005
print ang isang Marriage Contract. Ito yung “form” ng Marriage Contract na
PTR No. 50648646
pinagawa niya sa akin noong Disyembre.
Quezon City

1. 6.1Nang aking suriin ang documento, nakita ko na meron nang mga entrada tulad ng Doc. No. 673;
pangalan, pirma, selyo, atbp. Pero gusto ni Dir. Manapat na paliitin ito. Sinabi ko sa Page No. 135;
kanya na mahirap gawin yun sa isang Word Document. Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.
 369 (sgd) Emman A. Llamera
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 369 Nagsalaysay
Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 01477379, issued on April 10, 2003 at City of Manila.
The sworn statement of Emman A. Llamera states: NOTARY PUBLIC
(sgd) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS) Notary Public
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s.
Doc. No. 672;
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.
Ako si Emman A. Llamera, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 825 Rosarito
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:
The sworn statement of Vicelyn G. Tarin states:
1. 1.Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
contractual, na may alam sa lahat ng gawain pang computer, at direktang
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s.
nagrereport sa opisina ni Dir. Ricardo Manapat. Ako po nagtatapos ng computer
science at isinabay ang kursong computer technician, at nagpatuloy sa pag-aral
bilang computer engineer hanggang sa ikaapat na taon. SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
2. 2.Noong bago magkatapusan ng Disyembre ng taong nagdaan, may ipinasa si Remmel
Talabis sa akin na trabaho na ipinapagawa sa kanya ni Dir. Manapat. Nakisuyo si Ako si Vicelyn G. Tarin, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 3150 Gen. T. de
Remmel sa akin na ipagpatuloy ko yong naumpisahan niyang trabaho at ibigay na Leon, Valenzuela City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:
lang kay Mr. Manapat pag natapos ko.
3. 3.Nang humarap ako sa computer ni Dir. Manapat, nakita ko sa unang pagkakataon
1. 1.Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang Records
ang isang blankong porma ng Marriage Contract. Pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
Management Analyst I. Bahagi ng aking katungkulan ay ang wastong paggamit at
kinausap ako ni Dir. Manapat at may pinakita at ibinigay sa akin na kopya ng
pagsusuri ng mga iba’t-ibang anyo ng mga dokumento at kasulatan. Ako ay
Marriage Contract na may lamang datos at entrada na gawa sa sulat kamay niya.
pansamantalang inilipat noong Agosto, 2002 sa computer section ng aming
Ang sabi niya, kopyahin ko daw ang mga datos at entrada at ilipat ang mga ito sa
tanggapan. Naging bahagi ng aking panibagong tungkulin ang humawak ng
blankong porma ng Marriage Certificate na nakasalang sa computer.
anumang gawain hinggil sa computer.
2. 2.Noong Disyembre 30, 2003 ng gawing hapon, inutusan ako ni G. Ricardo L.
1. 3.1Inumpisahan ko na ipinil-up sa blankong porma ng Marriage Contract na nasa Manapat na mag-scan ng mga dokumento.
computer ang mga pangalan nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez at iba pang
impormasyon na nakalagay sa papel na binigay ni Dir. Manapat.
1. 2.1 Iniabot ni G. Manapat sa akin ang dalawang piraso ng papel para i-scan. Iyung
2. 3.2Nang matapos na naming makompleto ang mga datos at entrada sa Marriage
isang papel ay naglalaman ng maraming pirmang “Allan Poe”; at iyung isa naman
Contract ay dahan-dahan ko namang in-insert ang tatlong pirma na ang
ay naglala
natatandaan ko po lamang ay ang pirma ng isang nagngangalang Mata, na
nakalagay sa gitna sa bandang baba ng dokumento. Nang matapos kong mailagay
lahat ang tatlong pirma ay ipinapaprint na ni Dir. Mata. Di nagtagal, pinauwi na 371
niya ako dakong mag-aalas singko na. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 371
3. 3.3Wala pang nakalagay na pirma sa pangalan nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita
Gomez. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

370 1. man ng maraming pirmang “Paulita Gomez”. Iniutos ni G. Manapat na mamili kami
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ni Leizl Punongbayan ng pinakamaayos na pirma.
2. 2.2Pagkatapos kong i-scan ang buong papel, krinap (crop) ko iyong pinakamaayos na
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections pirma nina “Allan Poe” at “Paulita Gomez”, at nilinis sa pamamagitan ng software
na Adobe Photoshop. Pagkatapos noon, “Ininsert” ko yung dalawang napili kong
lagda sa MS Word at I-save sa diskette.
1. 3.4Nakabantay sa tabi ko si Dir. Manapat habang nagtratrabaho ako, mula umpisa
3. 2.3Nang matapos kong I-save sa diskette ang lahat ng aking mga nagawa ay iniwan
hanggang matapos ko ang pinagawa niya.
ko na lang ito kay Leizl para ibigay kay G. Manapat sa kadahilanang may kausap si
G. Manapat sa kaniyang opisina noong mga oras na iyon.
1. 4.Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at pinagawa ni Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya ni
minsan binanggit kung ano at para saan gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa
1. 3.Matapos ang ilang araw, pinatawag ako muli ni G. Manapat para baguhin ang
akin.
pirma ni Paulita Gomez dahil masyado daw malaki ang tipo at sukat. Nang
pumunta ako sa computer niya, doon ko na muling nakita na iyong ini-scan kong
 mga pirma ay nakapaloob na sa isang file o “softcopy” ng isang dokumento na may 3. 3.Dumating si Director Manapat mga dakong alas-onse ng umaga. Mahigit mga 30 to
titulo na “Marriage Contract”. 50 dokumento ang iniwan niya na minicrofilm ko. Mga deed of sale na nakasaad sa
espanyol ang mga naturang documento.
1. 3.1Inedit ko yung pirma ni Paulita Gomez sa pamamagitan ng Adobe Photoshop.
Nang matapos kong baguhin ito ayon sa kagustuhan ni G. Manapat, I-ninsert ko 1. 3.1Tinanong ako ni Mr. Manapat kung ilang oras ko magagawa ito? Ang sabi ko,
muli sa MS Word at si-nave ko ito sa isang diskette. Binigay ko ang diskette na sandali lang mga 30 minutes to 1 hour. Iiwanan ko na lang kay Emy, sekretarya ni
naglalaman ng edited version ng pirma ni Paulita Gomez kay G. Manapat mismo. Mr. Floro ang mga dokumento para doon na lang niya kunin.
2. 3.2Kinuha ni Director Manapat ang mga naturang documento bandang hapon kay
Emy.
1. 4.Makaraan ang isang linggo nakita ko muli sa ikalawang pagkakataon yung
dokumento na may titulong “Marriage Contract” kung saan nakapaloob na ang mga
pirma nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez na ini-scan at trinabaho ko sa 1. 4.Noong ika-labindalawa ng Enero, tinawagan ako ng processor ng film at sinabihan
mismong loob ng kuwarto namin ni Remmel Talabis. Napagalaman ko kay Remmel na hindi daw malinaw at mabasa ang microfilm na ginawa ko.
na inutusan siya ni G. Manapat na I-print na yung kopya ng “Marriage Contract”.
2. 5.Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong kusa at laya upang patotohanan 373
ang lahat ng mga nakasaad dito.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 373
(sgd) VICELYN G. TARIN Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Nagsalaysay
Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant
1. 4.1Agad-agad kong tinawag si Director Manapat sa kanyang opisina at pinakiusapang
exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 15325883, issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela
ibalik ang mga dokumento na minicrofilm ko dahil hindi ito mabasa at kukunan ko
City.
ulit.
NOTARY PUBLIC
2. 4.2Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na hintayin ako noong oras ding iyon.
(Sgd.) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
372
Dumating siya mga dakong alas-onse na ng umaga at may dalang dalawang bundle
ng mga dokumento. Ang tantiya ko, iyong isang bundle naglalaman ng humigit
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED kumulang tatlong daang dokumento, at iyong isa naman ay may humigit kumulang
limang daang dokumento.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
3. 4.3Sinabihan ko si Direktor Manapat na gagawin ko agad at balikan na lang niya.
Notary Public
Napagalaman ko na mga birth certificate ang laman ng isang folder at mga deed of
Until Dec. 31, 2005
sale naman ang laman noong isang folder.
PTR No. 50648641

Doc. No. 674; 1. 5.Bumalik si Director Manapat mga dakong 12:30 ng hapon habang kasalukuyang
Page No. 135; akong nag-mimicrofilmako ng mga deed of sale. Nang tinanong ako ang kalagayan
Book No XIII; ng trabaho, sinabi ko na tapos na yong mga birth certificates at pwede na niyang
Series of 2004. kunin. Iyong mga deed of sale, balikan na lang niya at matatagalan pa. Iwanan ko
na lang uli sa sekretarya ni Mr. Floro at doon niya kunin ang mga dokumento.

This is not all. Equally damaging to the credibility of Director Manapat are the sworn
statements of Mr. William Duff and Mr. Victorino A. Floro III of Florofoto. The sworn 1. 5.1Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na magdagdag ng isa pang kopya para sa mga
deed of sale.
statement of Mr. Duff states:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS) 1. 6.Pagkatapos ko pong magawa ang mga microfilm, pinadala ko sa planta namin para
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s. sa developing. Sinabihan ko ang supervisor ng aming planta na kabilin-bilinan ni
Director Manapat kay Mr. Floro na “highly confidential” ang laman ng microfilms.
2. 7.Noon ika-labingpito ng Enero, bumalik si Director Manapat para kunin ang mga
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
rolyo ng developed film. Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na mag-print ng mga
kopya ng microfilms.
Ako si William Bautista Duff, may sapat na gulang, may asawa, kasalukuyang namamasukan
sa Florofoto na may address sa No. 502, C. Palanca St., Quiapo, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa
ay nagsasabing: 1. 7.1Sinita ako dahil nag-iisa ang kopya ng microfilm na naglalaman ng mga deed of
sale.
2. 7.2Agad akong tumawag sa planta namin para magpakopya pa ng isa. Sinabi ni
1. 1.Ako po ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan bilang isang service supervisor sa naturang Director Manapat na siya lang ang magdadala ng film sa isang planta. Ito ay
tanggapan. pinaalam ko kay Mr. Floro.
2. 2.Noong ika-sampu ng Enero ngayong taong kasalukuyan, sabado ng umaga,
sinabihan ako ni Mr. Floro na i-setup ang aming kamera dahil may ipapamicrofilm
si Director Manapat na “confidential in nature”. 1. 8.Gusto ni Director Manapat ng print copies kaya pina-basa ko sa makina ang rolyo
ng birth certificate. Habang ginagawa ko ito, pinatigil ako sa isang image. Nakita ko
ang birth certificate ng isang Allan Fernando Poe. Nag-print ako ng kopya sa utos ni
 Director Manapat. Malabo po ang lumabas na printout. Lahat na ng paraan ginawa I,VICTORINO A. FLORO III, of legal age, married, with business address at No. 502 Carlos
namin para gumanda ang printout ngunit di namin magawa. Palanca St., Quiapo, Manila, under oath, states:

374 1. 1.I am the Vice-President of Florofoto;

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 2. 2.Floro International, a sister company of Florofoto has a standing business
agreement with the Records and Management and Archives Office (RMAO) for the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections supply of microfilms;
3. 3.Sometime in the first week of January, 2004, Mr. Ricardo L. Manapat, Director of
the RMAO, called me up, asking if Florofoto could microfilm some confidential
1. 8.1Iyong isang rolyo na naglalaman ng mga deed of sale naman ang isinunud naming
documents;
ipabasa sa makina. Pinatigil ako ni Director Manapat sa isang image. Nakita ko ang
4. 4.On January 10, 2004, Mr. Manapat brought to my office a set of documents,
marriage contract ni Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez. Nakita ko rin ang isang
numbering about 20 to 30 pages, and requested that the same be microfilmed;
image na nakasulat sa espanyol na may pangalang Paulita Gomez. Sa utos niya,
5. 5.On January 12, 2004, our technician, Mr. William Duff informed me that the
nag-print ako ng isang kopya ngunit katulad ng dati malabo ang printout.
microfilm was unreadable;
6. 6.On January 17, 2004, Mr. Manapat came to pick up the microfilm rolls;
1. 9.Para luminaw ang mga printout, pinalaki ko ang mga microfilms gamit ang isang 7. 7.Mr. Duff, with whom Mr. Manapat communicated directly on the matter of the
enlarger. Doon lumabas ng maganda ang mga imahen sa loob ng dalawang production of the microfilms will be most willing to give details in the transactions
microfilm. Nagprint ako ng kopya ng marriage contract, birth certificate at ang he had with Mr. Manapat;
dalawang pahinang documento na nakasulat sa espanyol na may pangalang Paulita 8. 8.Florofoto had absolutely no knowledge of the intention of Mr. Manapat on what he
Gomez. Natapos ko lahat ng mga ito dakong alas-4 na ng hapon. Kinuha mismo ni intended to do with the microfilms he asked our company to produce;
Director Manapat ang mga microfilms at mga printouts sa akin. 9. 9.I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of the Senate hearing.
2. 10.Gusto akong ihatid ni Director Manapat sa bahay ko ngunit sinabihan kong
madami pa akong gagawin.
Affiant further sayeth naught.
3. 11.Ang lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni Director Manapat sa akin ay bahagi
(sgd.) VICTORINO A. FLORO III
lamang ng aking katungkulan. Ni minsan po ay hindi nabanggit kung ano at para
Affiant
saan gagamitin ang mga trabahong ipinagagawa sa akin.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2nd day of February, 2004, Affiant
4. 12.Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong kusa at laya upang patotohanan
exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 12356783, issued on January 6, 2004 at Manila.
ang lahat ng mga nakasaad dito.
NOTARY PUBLIC
(sgd.) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
(sgd) WILLIAM B. DUFF Notary Public
Nagsalaysay 376
Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2nd day of February, 2004, Affiant 376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
exhibiting to me his Information Tax No. 109-998-007, issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
NOTARY PUBLIC Until Dec. 31, 2005
(sgd) KENNETH S. TAMPAL PTR No. 50648641
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2005 Doc. No. 695;
PTR No. 50648641 Page No. 140;
Book No. XIII;
Doc. No. 696; Series of 2004.
Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
These sworn statements were submitted to the COMELEC en banc by the respondent
Series of 2004.
Poe. Instead of traversing them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be
375
considered on the technical grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence
before the COMELEC and that they cannot be the subject of judicial notice.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 375 Petitioner, however, overlooks that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and hence
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections is not bound by the technical rules of evidence. It can accept evidence which cannot
The sworn statement of Mr. Floro is as follows: be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly
observed. It can accord weight to such evidence depending on its trustworthiness. In
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS) any event, petitioner cannot complain they are hearsay for he was given an
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s. opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who executed the foregoing
sworn statements.
AFFIDAVIT The third evidence of petitioner is Exhibit “C” which is the birth certificate of
Allan F. Poe. This is part of the Manapat fabricated evidence with a zero value. But
even assuming it has a value, it merely proves the fact of birth of Allan F. Poe as all Remand to the COMELEC to give
birth certificates merely do. It does not prove that respondent Poe is not a natural-
born citizen. Neither does it prove that respondent Poe deliberatelymisrepresented the petitioner a second opportunity
that he is a natural-born citizen. to prove his case is a palpable error.
The fourth evidence of petitioner is Exhibit “D,” the certification of Director As aforediscussed, petitioner has the following burden of proof in the COMELEC: (1)
Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or prove that respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen, and (2) prove that knowing
resided in the Philippines before 1907. Again, this is part of the Manapat he is not a natural-born citizen, he willfully and deliberately misrepresented that fact
manufactured evidence which can only be given the value of a cypher. But even if it is in his Certificate of Candidacy.
admissible, it has little weight for there is no evidence that the National Archives has The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition of Fornier for failure to prove
a complete record of all persons who lived in the Philippines during the Spanish and these operative facts by substantial evidence. After the 12-hour marathon hearing of
American occupation of our country. Needless to state, petitioner again failed to the case at bar before this Court, the hope of petitioner to disqualify respondent Poe
prove that Lorenzo Pou, grandfather of respondent Poe, was a Spanish subject. became dimmer. Petitioner’s principal thesis that respondent Poe is an illegitimate
The fifth and last evidence of the petitioner is Exhibit “E” (also Exhibit “I” of child and therefore follows the American citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, was
respondent Poe). It is a certification of Estrella M. Domingo, OIC, Archives Division completely smothered by the learned opinions of the amici curiae. They opined that
that the Register of Births for the respondent Poe’s illegitimacy is immaterial in resolving the issue of whether he is a
377 natural-born citizen and whether he has a political right to run for President. They
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 377 further submitted the view that all that is required is clear proof of his filiation—
i.e.,that his father is Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen. Mr. Justice Mendoza left it to
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
the Court to determine the standard of proof that should be imposed to prove this
municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan in the year 1916 is not on file with the filiation.
National Archives, hence, there is no available information about the birth of Allan In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curiae, it is daylight clear that
Poe to the spouses Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes in San Carlos, Pangasinan. This petitioner Fornier is not only wrong with his facts but also wrong with his
lack of information is not proof that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that law. Considering that petitioner is wrong both with his facts and the law, the Court
he is a natural-born citizen. Law and logic bar that non sequiturconclusion. has no option but to dismiss the petition at bar which espouses nothing but errors.
These are all the evidence presented by the petitioner. Even a sweep eye contact This Court will be compounding the wrongs committed by petitioner Fornier with
both with these evidence will show that peti– tioner failed todischarge the burden of another wrong if it remands the petition at bar to the COMELEC. A remand means a
proving that respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen. Petitioner was more dismal new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been closed
in trying to prove that respondent Poe willfullyand deliberately misrepresented and terminated. Remand means the petitioner will be gifted with another chance to
himself as a natural-born citizen. For one, the Manapat evidence appears to have prove facts which he have failed to prove before. Remand means the petitioner will be
been manufactured evidence. For another, these and the other evidence are given the extra-ordinary privilege of correcting his erroneous understanding of the
irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that they ever crossed the attention of law on who are natural-born Filipino citizens. These are favors which cannot be
respondent Poe. On the other hand, the evidence unerringly show that respondent extended to a litigant without shattering the Court’s stance of political neutrality. The
Poe, from the time of his involuntary birth here, has always conducted himself as a Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any political
Filipino. He is a registered voter, he owns land, he is married to a Filipina, he carries god.
a Filipino passport—he has always lived the life of a Filipino (Exhibits “16,” “17” to 379
“19”). Thus, there is no iota of doubt that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 379
burden of proving that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a
natural-born citizen. For failure of petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Respondent Remand will change the nature of a
Poe need not present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to
him. Prescinding from these premises, this Court cannot hold that the COMELEC Section 78 proceeding by judicial
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that no substantial evidence was legislation, hence, unconstitutional.
offered by petitioner to disqualify respondent Poe. The Fornier petition was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due course
C. ASSUMING THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JURISDICTION AND or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. The principal
issue on a Section 78 petition is whether the respondent deliberately made a material
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER RESPONDENT POE IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. In the particular petition at bar,
SHOULD NOW BE RESOLVED, THE FORNIER PETITION NEED NOT BE RE- the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-
MANDED TO THE COMELEC FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether respondent Poe is in truth a natural-born
378 citizen is considered only because it is necessary to determine the deliberateness and
the willfulness of the material misrepresentation. The proceedings are summary in
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
character for the central issue to be resolved is the deliberateness of the material
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections misrepresentation, as the issue of natural-born citizenship is a mere incident. In fine,
the complex issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still respondent Poe will be left hanging in the air for a long time. It is the solemn duty of
be raised in an appropriate proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after this Court to equalize the chances of winning of all candidates to a public office. Any
election. The citizenship issue in a quo warrantoproceeding will be determined in failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the defeat of the
full-length proceedings. disfavored.
The remand of the case to the COMELEC will change the character of a Section 381
78 proceeding. The citizenship ofrespondent Poe will no longer be inquired into as a VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 381
mere incident necessary to determine whether he deliberatelymade a material
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
misrepresentation that he is a natural-born citizen. It will now be determined as if it
is the main issue in a Section 78 proceeding. This Court cannot change the nature of D. TO AVOID DELAY, THE COURT SHOULD ITSELF DECIDE THE ISSUE AND
a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power. It is Congress by law DECLARE RESPONDENT POE AS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN ON THE BASIS
that defined the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is only Congress that can
OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THE COMELEC.
change it by another law. We cannot engage in judicial legislation.
Whether respondent Poe is
Remand will violate respondent
illegitimate is irrelevant in
Poe’s right to due process, hence,
determining his status as natural-
unconstitutional.
There is a more compelling reason why the petition, at bar should not be remanded to born citizen—that is the law.
the COMELEC for re-litigation. The COMELEC that will resolve the issue of Petitioner has always submitted the legal thesis that: (1) respondent Poe is an
whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino has ceased to be an impartial illegitimate child as he was born out of wedlock, i.e.,he was born before the marriage
tribunal. of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) as an illegitimate child, he follows the
380 American citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley; therefore, (3) he is not a natural-
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED born citizen. Petitioner contends that evidence of respondent Poe himself, Exhibits
“3” and “21,” prove these facts.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
This interpretation of the law by the petitioner is erroneous. The amici
Three of its members, Commissioners Tuazon, Barcelona and Garcellano, submitted curiae have opined that the illegitimacy of respondent Poe is immaterial in
separate Comments to this Court expressing the firm view that respondent Poe is not determining his status as natural-born citizen. I quote the learned opinion of Father
a natural-born Filipino. Their views are contrary to the decision of the COMELEC Joaquin Bernas:
under review by this Court. It is improper enough for individual commissioners to
assail the decision of the COMELEC of which they are members. It is worse in the
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF A FILIPINO FATHER IS BORN A FILIPINO AND
case of Commissioners Barcelona and Garcellano, who are not even sitting
IS THEREFORE A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN. PUT DIFFERENTLY,
commissioners when the COMELEC promulgated its decision under review. This is
THE PRINCIPLE OF JUS SANGUINIS APPLIES EVEN TO ILLEGITIMATE
plain and simple prejudgment and it is not even disguised prejudgment that needs to
CHILDREN
be unmasked. The COMELEC is composed of seven commissioners all of whom must
be independent, and unbiased. The right to due process of respondent Poe is the right
I now come to the question whether jus sanguinis applies to illegitimate children. We have
to be heard by seven unbiased COMELEC commissioners—not 1, not 2, not 3, not 4, many decisions which say that jus sanguinis applies to the illegitimate children of Filipino
but by 7 unbiased members. We do not have such a COMELEC. mothers because the mother is the only known or acknowledged parent. But does the law make
Remand will delay the resolution of a distinction and say that jus sanguinisdoes not apply to the illegitimate children of Filipino
fathers even if paternity is clearly established?
the issue of whether respondent Poe No law or constitutional provision supports this distinction. On the contrary, the
is qualified. Delay will also Constitution clearly says without distinction that among those who are citizens of the
Philippines are those whose father is a Filipino citizen. Hence, what is needed for the
prejudice his candidacy and will application of jus sanguinis according to the clear letter of the law is not legitimacy of the child
favor his political opponents. but proof of paternity.
Remand of the petition at bar to the COMELEC will inevitably delay the resolution Having said that, however, we must contend with four cases promulgated by the Supreme
Court which contain the statement that illegitimate
of the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue 382
will not be finally resolved by the COMELEC. The decision of the COMELEC can
still be appealed to this Court. Given the temperature of the present presidential 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
contest, such an appeal can be assumed. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on the qualification of respondent Poe to run children do not follow the Filipino citizenship of the father. These cases are: Morano v. Vivo, 20
as President is prejudicial to his presidential bid and favorable to his political SCRA 562 (1967), which in turn cites Chiongbian v. De Leon, 46 O.G. 3652 and Serra v.
opponents. The right to run for a public office includes the right to equal chance to Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, and finally Paa v. Chan, 21 SCRA 753(1967).
compete. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished or denied a We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguiniswas on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
candidate. This chance to win may amount to a mere chimera if the disqualification of
decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was improving the standards of the legal profession. Such distinction cannot be made the basis for
irrelevant to the lis mota,the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter disqualifying women from the practice of law or sitting in the Supreme Court.
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these It is the same thing with respect to the exercise of political rights. What is the relevance of
cases. legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for
First, Morano v.Vivo. This case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness ofpolitical rights
Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public
Nothing about jus sanguinisthere. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality
stepfather. in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
Second, Chiongbian v. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public 384
office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. 384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra v. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was The delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention, honorable men that they were, must
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be have been aware of the injustice ofpunishing the child politically for the indiscretion of his or
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis. her parents. I invite the honorable Court to peruse the debates of the 1935 Constitutional
Finally, Paa v. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Convention. When the delegates were debating jus sanguinis, there was not the slightest
Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, suggestion to make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. For
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued them sanguis,or blood, whether injected legitimately or illegimately was the same blood and
that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was had the same political effect—citizenship of the offspring.
no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son ofa Filipina mother. The Court therefore The only time the Convention distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son was in relation to the right of children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers to elect
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino. Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority. But it was an unnecessary distinction. When
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Delegate Rafols raised the question whether the right to elect belonged to both legitimate and
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin’s father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be illegitimate children, Delegate Cuaderno answered that only legitimate children could elect
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to because only legitimate children needed to elect. Illegitimate children already had the Filipino
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. Quintin was already on the floor and citizenship of their mother flowing in their veins.
the Court still kicked him. It was obiter dictum pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter What then should be done with the obiter dicta in the four cases cited by the petitioners? I
dictum in Morano v.Vivo. I submit that the petitioners in this case as well as three Comelec answer this question with what the Court said when it declared in Tan Chong v.Secretary of
Commissioners including Labor that Roa v. Collector of Customs was wrong in holding that jus soli was put in effect in
383 the Philippines. The Court said: “The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 383 or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.” Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil.
249 (1947).
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections The four cases cited by petitioners are not even decisions. They do not come under stare
the two new ones and also the Solicitor General have merely been repeating without any decisis. They are obiter dicta more easily repudiated and should be repudiated.
semblance of analysis the obiter dicta in these four cases. In conclusion, therefore, when the Constitution says: “The following are citizens of the
The clear conclusion from all these four cases is that their statements to the effect that jus Philippines . . . ‘Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,’” the Constitution means
sanguinis applies only to legitimate children were all obiter dicta which decided nothing. The just that without invidious distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit ne nos distinguere
Court had purported to offer a solution to a non-existent problem. Obiter dicta do not establish debemus,especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no
constitutional doctrine even if repeated endlessly. Obiter dicta are not decisions and therefore state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. What flow from legitimacy
they do not constitute stare decisis. They therefore cannot be used to resolve constitutional are civil rights; citizenship is a political right which flows not from legitimacy but from
issues today. paternity. And paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and not
Now to Fernando Poe, Jr. If indeed he is an illegitimate son of a Filipino father, should the upon marriage or legitimation.
Court now pronounce a new doctrine that an illegitimate son of a Filipino father is not born a As to Fernando Poe, Jr., therefore, if it is established by competent proof that he is the son
Filipino citizen even if paternity is established? There is compelling constitutional reason why of a Filipino father, legitimate or illegitimate, he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
the Court should not do so. Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no The former Dean of the UP College of Law Merlin Magallona espoused the same
textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the scholarly view. I quote him:
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a 385
legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child ofa Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 385
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People v. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children rests on
real differences even if the differences are not as pleasurable as the differences between male
4. Transmissive Essence of Citizenship
and female. But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
Among the four requirements of allowable distinction is that the distinction must he 4.1 It is an essential feature of citizenship that it is transmissible. The key issue is: What
germane to the purpose of the law. Thus, the distinction between male and female is real, and principle governs its transmissibility? The Philippine Bill of 1902 as well the Jones Law defines
we thank God for that. But such distinction would not be relevant for purposes of, for instance, the conditions by which persons, similarly situated as Lorenzo Pou as a Spanish subject “shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands.” Over and above that, these laws relationship. In this provision of law, the father and the mother stand in equality. Both are
provide for the means by which Lorenzo Pou’s Philippine citizenship would be transmitted when derivative of citizenshipon the same principle of blood relationship.
they declare that their or his “children born subsequent” to the date of exchange of ratifications 4.10 The approach to the problem of citizenship from the angle of transmissive essence of
of the Treaty of Paris’ as “citizens of the Philippine Islands” as well. citizenship receives authoritative support from Chief Justice Manuel Moran speaking for this
4.2 While the text of the law speaks of children of Spanish subjects who are deemed to be Honorable Court in Chiongbian v. De Leon (82 Phil. 771 [1949]). In question was the
“citizens of the Philippine Islands,” it is at that same time an embodiment of a core principle of interpretation of the provision in the 1935 Constitution declaring that “Those born in the
blood relationship or jus sanguinis. The word children becomes merely a reflection of the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
transmissive essence of citizenship which lies in blood relationship. In this sense, the elected to public office.” (Art. IV, Section 1, subsection 2). It was contended that citizenship thus
transmissibility of citizenship, such as that of Lorenzo Pou, is not limited to the immediate acquired is personal and cannot be transmitted to the children. In response, Chief Justice
generation to which Allan R. Pou belonged; it continues to run through all children across Moran emphasized the “transmissive essence of citizenship,” saying that this provision does not
generations, barring naturalization and other methods of extradition. stand alone and requires its application together with the provi-
4.3 The operation of the core principle of transmissibility in blood relation finds affirmation 387
and, more significantly, continuity in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions in which blood VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 387
relationship becomes a principal derivation and transmissibility of citizenship. All Constitutions
embody this transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. In the determination as to Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
who are citizens of the Philippines, they have a common provision that those whose fathers are sion that “Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,” thus bringing in the
citizens of the Philippines are citizens. transmissibility of citizenship on the principle of blood relationship.
4.4 The interconnection between the Philippine citizenship of children born to Spanish Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a former member of this Court and an expert
subjects under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law and the said provision common to in Constitutional Law, similarly opined:
the three Philippine Constitutions becomes a long line of generations that illustrates the The cases, in interpreting Art. IV, Section 1 (3), do not exclude illegitimate children of Filipino
transmissive essence of citizenship. fathers from this class of citizens of the Philippines. They do not say that only legitimate
4.5 Under the circumstances defined by the Treaty of Paris in correlation with the children or natural children, who are legitimated as a result of the subsequent marriage of their
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the Philippine citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and his son parents and their acknowledgment before or after the marriage, belong to this class of citizens
Allan R. Pou were further affirmed by the application of subsection (1), Section 1, Article IV of of the Philippines (“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines”). Nor, on the other hand,
the 1935 Constitution, by which citizenship is defined on the part of: by holding that illegitimate children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers as the “only
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of legally recognized parents,” do some of the cases exclude instances in which an illegitimate child
the adoption of this Constitution. may have been acknowledged by his Filipino father. Indeed, cases holding that illegitimate
4.6 On his own account, having become citizen of the Philippine Islands as a child of children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers involve situations in which the fathers
Lorenzo Pou born subsequent to the date of exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Paris are not Filipinos. (United States v. Ong Tianse,supra;Serra v. Republic,supra; Santos Co v.
under Section 4 of the Philippine Bill Government of the Philippine Islands, 52 Phil. 543 [1928]; Ratunil Sy Quimsuan v. Republic, 92
386
Phil. 675 [1953]). To hold that the illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his Filipino mother
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED but that an illegitimate child does not follow the citizenship of his Filipino father would be to
make an invidious discrimination. To be sure this Court has not ruled thus.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections What is only needed is that the illegitimate child must be acknowledged by the father to
of 1902 and Section 2 of the Jones Law, Allan R. Pou has the benefit of subsection (1), Section 1, establish his filiation to the latter. The acknowledgment and establishment of filiation of such
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, quoted above. child may not be sufficient to entitle him to support, successional rights, and other benefits
4.7 As thus defined, Philippine citizenship on the part of Allan R. Pou is not limited to his under Civil Law, but, for purposes of determining his political status as a citizen of the
person; his citizenship is transmissible by its nature. The principle governing the Philippines, such proof of acknowledgment and filiation is all that is required.
transmissibility of his citizenship to his children is provided by subsection 3, Section 1, Article A ruling by this Court that the constitutional provision (that those whose fathers are
IV of the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines— citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines themselves) will require no overruling
Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. of prior decisions. After all, none of the prior decisions of this Court deal with a situation in
4.8 The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood which the Filipino parent of the illegitimate child is the father.
relationship or jus sanguinis. On this account, the derivation of citizenship from a person or the If this Court interprets the constitutional provision as including in the class of citizens
transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from a person or the transmission of citizenship illegitimate children whose filiation to their Filipino fathers is established, the Court will
to his child, springs from the fact that he is the father. Thus, paternity as manifestation of blood simply be adding a third category of citizens. In 1949, Chiongbian v. De Leon, supra,this Court
relationship is all that is needed to be established. To introduce a distinction between legitimacy held that “a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his Filipino father.” This is the first
or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father category. In 1967, in Paa v. Chan, supra,it was held that a
defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. The text of the law which 388
reads “Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” becomes an embodiment of the
kernel principle of blood relationship, which provides no room for the notion of citizenship by 388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
legitimacy or legitimation. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
4.9 The transmissive essence of citizenship as outlined above may receive further legitimated natural child, whose father is a Filipino, is also Filipino. This is the second category
clarification in the 1987 Constitution, in which it is provided in subsection 2, Section 1 of Article of citizens whose fathers are Filipinos.
IV that Philippine citizenship is derived as follows: By holding that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his Filipino father provided
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. he is acknowledged or his filiation to him is duly proven, this Court will be creating a third
(Emphasis added.) category of Filipino citizens “whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” For there is really no
A woman becomes a derivation of citizenship not because of the illegitimate status of her difference in principle between, on the one hand, the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and
child but for the reason that she is a mother and as mother she is the medium of blood an alien father, and, on the other hand, the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien
mother. As long as the child’s filiation to his supposed father is established, it does not matter 1. 5.1Respondent Poe’s alleged Certificate of Birth indicated
whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child. that hisparents are Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley.
These opinions of the amici curiae support the ruling of the First Division of the 2. 5.2Respondent Poe’s alleged Certificate of Birth indicated that his mother,
COMELEC that: Bessie Kelley, is an American citizen.
xxx 3. 5.3However, the alleged Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe falsely or
Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not have a qualifying term,
incorrectly indicated the real citizenship of his father Allan F. Poe, since he
“legitimate” after the words “those whose fathers” and before the phrase “are citizens of the
Philippines.” Legitimacy therefore is beside the point. As long as the father is a Filipino, the child is legally not a Filipino citizen, as shown below.
will always be a Filipino. As we have discussed early on, since Allan Fernando Poe is a Filipino,
his son Ronald Allan Poe, the respondent herein, is a natural-born Filipino. 1. 6.Contrary to what was falsely indicated in the alleged Certificate of Birth of
This ruling was unanimously affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. respondent Poe, the latter’s father, Allan F. Poe, is not a Filipino, but an
If petitioner Fornier is wrong in his understanding of the law on who are natural- alien, specifically, a citizen of Spain.
born citizens of the Philippines, how can he be right in assailing the status of
respondent Poe?
1. 6.1On 05 July 1936, Allan F. Poe expressly and categorically, declared in a
To establish that respondent Poe is public instrument that he was a Spanish citizen. A copy of the Marriage
a natural-born citizen, all that is Contract executed by Allan F. Poe, and one Paulita Gomez at the Convento
de Santo Domingo at Intramuros, Manila is attached and made an integral
needed is proof of his filiation to his
part hereof as Annex “C.”
father Allan R. Poe, a Filipino
citizen—that is the critical fact. 390
The critical fact in the determination of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
citizen is his filiation with Allan F. Poe, a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe is notdisputed. It is an admitted fact.
Petitioner Fornier from Day 1 proceeded from the premise that respondent Poe is the
son of Allan F. Poe. 1. 6.2Moreover, in said Marriage Contract, Allan F. Poe likewise categorically
389 and expressly admitted that both of his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 389 Reyes are also citizens of Spain.
2. 6.3Clearly respondent Poe’s father is a Spanish citizen whose parents are
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
both Spanish citizens.
The records of the case at bar speak for themselves. Let us first examine
the Petition filed by Fornier in SPA No. 04-003 before the First Division of the
COMELEC. The Petition never questioned the fact that Allan F. Poe is the father of 1. 7.Thus, respondent Poe could not have possibly acquired Filipino
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. What it questioned is the alleged Filipino citizenship of citizenship from his father, Allan F. Poe since the latter is a Spanish
Allan F. Poe. I quote the Petition inextenso: citizen.
2. 8.But even assuming arguendo that respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, as indicated in respondent Poe’s Certificate of Birth
1. x x x (Annex “B” hereof), still respondent Poe could not have validly acquired
2. 3.Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the qualifications of Filipino citizenship from his father due to the fact that the purported
the President of the Republic of the Philippines are enumerated as follows: marriage of his parents, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, is void.

Section 2. No person may be elected president unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
1. 8.1Under Philippine jurisprudence, an illegitimate child, i.e., a child
on the day of the election, and resident of the Philippines for at least ten years conceived and born outside a valid marriage, follows the citizenship of his
immediately preceding such election. mother. (United States vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332 [1915])
2. 8.2As previously stated, respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe, married
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936, which marriage was subsisting at the time
3. 4.Respondent Poe, however, is not even a citizen of the Philippines, much
of the purported marriage of respondent Poe’s father to his mother, Bessie
more a natural-born citizen, and as such lacks the essential qualifications
Kelley. (cf. Annex “C” hereof)
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines since both of
3. 8.3Moreover, it appears that Allan F. Poe’s first wife, Paulita Gomez, even
his parents are not Filipino citizens.
filed a case of bigamy and concubinage against him after discovering his
4. 5.Based on respondent Poe’s alleged Certificate of Birth, he was born on 20
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley. A copy of the Affidavit dated 13
August 1939. A copy of the said Certificate of Birth is attached and made
July 1939 executed by Paulita Gomez in Spanish attesting to the foregoing
integral part hereof as Annex “B.”
facts, together with an English translation, thereof, are attached and made
an integral parts hereof asAnnexes “D” and “D-1” respectively.
 1. 9.Verily, having been born out of void marriage, respondent Poe is an natural-born Filipino citizen and is, therefore, disqualified to run for
illegitimate child of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley. Consequently, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, and that he made a material
citizenship of respondent Poe follows that of his mother, Bessie Kelley, who misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy as to his true and real
is undeniably an American citizen. citizenship.
2. 10.Under the 1935 Constitution, which was then applicable at the time of 3. 1.8.1.As Exhibit “A”—A copy of FPJ’s Certificate of Birth, indicating that
respondent Poe’s birth, only the following are considered Filipino respondent Poe was born on 20 August 1939 and that his parents are
citizens:Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan F. Poe, allegedly a Filipino
citizen.
1. 1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption 4. 1.8.2.As Exhibits “B” and “B-1”—A certified photocopy of an Affidavit
of this Constitution; executed on 13 July 1939 by Paulita Poe y Gomez in Spanish, attesting to
2. 2)Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the the fact that she filed a case of bigamy and concubi-
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands; 392
3. 3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines; 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
391
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 391
1. nage against respondent’s father, Allan F. Poe, after discovering the latter’s
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections bigamous relationship with respondent’s mother, Bessie Kelley.
2. 18.3.Exhibit “B-2”—A certified photocopy of the Marriage Contract entered
1. 4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching into on.5 July 1936 by and between respondent’s father, Allan Fernando
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship; and Poe and Paulita Gomez, showing that respondent’s father is “Español”; and
2. 5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes, were “Español”and
“Mestiza Española”respectively.
3. 18.4.As Exhibit “B-3”—An English translation of the Affidavit dated 13 July
1. 11.Clearly, respondent Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines, much more a 1939 executed by Paulita Poe y Gomez.
natural-born Filipino citizen, considering that both of his parents are 4. 18.5.As Exhibit “C”—A certified photocopy of the Certificate of Birth of Allan
aliens. Also, even assuming arguendo that respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Fernando Poe showing that he was born on May 17, 1915, and that his
Poe, is a Filipino citizen, as indicated in his Certificate of Birth (Annex “B”
father, Lorenzo Poe, is “Español”and his mother, Marta Reyes, is “Mestiza,
hereof), since respondent Poe is an illegitimate child of his father with
Española.”
Bessie Kelley, an American, he acquired the citizenship of the latter. 5. 18.6.As Exhibit “D”—A certification dated 16 January 2004 issued by
(United States vs. Ong Tianse,supra) Ricardo L. Manapat, Director of the Records Management and Archives
2. 12.Hence, respondent Poe, not being a natural-born citizen of the Office, certifying that the National Archives does not possess any record of
Philippines, lacks an essential qualification and corollarily possesses a a certain Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou residing or entering the Philippines
disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of the Philippines,
before 1907.
as expressly required under the 1987 Constitution.
6. 18.7.As Exhibit “E” (also respondent’s Exhibit “1”)—Certification dated 12
3. 13.In view of the foregoing, respondent Poe should be disqualified from being January 2004 issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of the Archives Division
a candidate for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines of the National Archives, certifying that there is no available information
in the coming 10 May 2004 elections.
in the files of the National Archives, regarding the birth of “Allan R. Pou,”
alleged to have been born on November 27, 1916.
The Answer of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. did not touch on the fact that his father
is Allan F. Poe as that is a non-issue. Rather, it discussed the citizenship of Lorenzo Again, it is plain to see that petitioner offered no evidence to impugn the fact that
Pou, the grandfather of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., the citizenship of Allan F. Poe, Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. Indeed, petitioner’s Exhibits
the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., and the Philippine citizenship of
“A,” “B,” “B-1” and “B-2” recognized that Allan F. Poe is the father of the respondent.
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. himself.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC in its Resolution of January
After the evidence of the parties were received by the First Division of the 23, 2004 treated the fact that Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Poe as an
COMELEC, petitioner offered the following evidence as narrated in his admitted fact. Page 7 of the Resolution states:
Memorandum, viz.: xxx
To assail respondent’s claim of eligibility, petitioner asserts that respondent is not a
1. x x x natural-born Filipino citizen. According to him, Exhibit “B-2” (alleged Marriage Contract
2. 1.8.In support of the petition, the petitioner presented and offered in between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez) shows that the nationality of the father of
Allan Fernando Poe, Lorenzo Poe is Español. Allan Fernando Poe is admittedly the father of the
evidence the following documentary evidence showing that FPJis not a
respondent. In the same Exhibit “B-2” appears an entry that the nationality of Allan Fernando The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that the
Poe is also Español. Petitioner’s line of argument is evidence presented do not controvert the declaration of the respondent in his certificate of
393 candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 393
IV.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
that respondent could not have acquired Filipino citizenship from his father since the latter
The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that
is Español.
legitimacy is beside the point in determining the citizenship of the respondent.
Page 8 of the Resolution reiterated: On February 4, 2004, petitioner filed his Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner’s
xxx
Parenthetically, petitioner and respondent agreed on the fact that Allan Fernando Poe is the
Motion For Reconsideration. As to be expected, petitioner did not again assail the fact
father of Ronald Allan Poe. Hence, if Allan Fernando Poe is Filipino, necessarily, Ronald Allan that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe. 18

Poe, his son is likewise a Filipino. In its February 6, 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto,the
Page 11 of the Resolution is similarly emphatic that respondent Poe, is the son of resolution of its First Division that respondent Poe, “x x x did not commit any
Allan F. Poe, viz.: material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is
xxx a natural-born Filipino citizen.” Significantly, it did not waste any word on whether
Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not have a qualifying term Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. The paternity of
“legitimate” after the words “those whose fathers” and before the phrase “are citizens of the respondentFernando Poe, Jr., is conceded, a nonissue.
Philippines.” Legitimacy therefore is beside the point. As long as the father is a Filipino, the In the Petition for Certiorari dated February 9, 2004 and filed with this Court,
child will always be a Filipino. As we have discussed early on, since Allan Fernando Poe is a
petitioner again proceeded from the premise that Allan Poe is the father of
Filipino, his son Ronald Allan Poe, the respondent herein, is a natural-born Filipino.
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. The pertinent portion of the Petition states:
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 2004. In this Motion
xxx
for Reconsideration, petitioner always conceded that respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., is
the son of Allan F. Poe. Petitioner simply continued to allege that the evidence does
17

_______________
not show that the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou (grandfather of respondent Poe) and
Allan F. Poe (father of respondent Poe) is Filipino. Petitioner insisted in the See pp. 20, 21, 23, 28, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 41 and 45 of the Memorandum.
18

conclusion that respondent Poe is not a Filipino, let alone a natural-born Filipino. 395
Again, this is evident from the grounds invoked by petitioner in his Motion for VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 395
Reconsideration, viz.:
xxx Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

Grounds The Relevant Facts

I. 8. Briefly stated, the pertinent facts concern the circumstances of Lorenzo Pou—respondent
FPJ’s grandfather, of Allan F. Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Poe—
The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that it is respondent FPJ’s father, of Bessie Kelley—respondent FPJ’s mother, and accordingly of
not the proper forum to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born respondent FPJ himself.
Filipino citizen. The fact that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe is a judicial admission. It does
not require proof. 19

_______________ Aside from these admissions, the filiation of respondent Poe is also proved by the
declaration of Mrs. Ruby Kelley Mangahas, Exhibit “20” of the respondent. Mrs.
See pp. 18, 19, 29, 33, 35 and 39 of Motion.
17 Mangahas is the sister of Bessie Kelly, mother of the respondent. Her sworn
394 statement states:
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
DECLARATION OF
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS

II. I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law, do hereby declare that:
The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in not appreciating all
the evidence presented by the parties in determining whether or not respondent made a
1. 1.I am the sister of the late BESSIE KELLEY POE.
material misrepresentation or false material representation regarding his real citizenship in his
2. 2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of FERNANDO POE, SR.
certificate of candidacy.
3. 3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by name of RONALD ALLAN POE, more
popularly known in the Philippines as “Fernando Poe, Jr.,” or “FPJ.”
III.
 4. 4.Ronald Allan Poe “FPJ” was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital, 397
Magdalena St., Manila. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 397
5. 5.At the time of Ronald Allan Poe’s birth, his father, Fernando Poe, Sr., was a Filipino
citizen and his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American citizen. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
6. 6.Considering the existing citizenship law at that time, Ronald Allan Poe respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the veins of respondent
automatically assumed the citizenship of his father, a Filipino, and has always Poe. No other proof is required for the principle of jus sanguinis to apply. There is no
identified himself as such. needfor other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used
7. 7.Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
in civil law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children.
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr. by my sister that same year. Our Constitutions from 1935 merely state—“those whose fathers are citizens of the
8. 8.Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie had their first child in 1938. Philippines.” The ineluctable conclusion is that the only proof required for the
principle of jus sanguinis to operate is filiation, i.e.,that one’s father is a citizen of the
_______________ Philippines. No other kind of proof is required. In fine, the quantity and quality of
proof or the standard of proof is provided by the Constitution itself. We cannot alter
Rule 129, Section 4.
19 this standard by suggesting either a strict or liberal approach.
396 In any event, if further poof of acknowledgment is required, Exhibit “8-a” of the
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED respondent Poe, should be considered. It is entitled “Affidavit for Philippine Army
Personnel,” executed by Allan F. Poe. In this Affidavit, Allan F. Poe declared and
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections acknowledged his children to be Elizabeth, 6 years old, Ronnie, 5 years old and
Fernando II, 3 years old. This Affidavit is not refuted.
1. 9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie, and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald
Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe,
Allan, and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in respondent’s father is well established.
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944. The Filipino citizenship of respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe, is well established
2. 10.Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children by evidence. Allan F. Poe’s father is Lorenzo Pou. Lorenzo Pou was a Spanish subject.
after Ronald Allan Poe. He was an inhabitant of the Philippines on December 10, 1898 when Spain ceded the
3. 11.From the very first time I met Fernando Poe, Sr., in 1936, until his death in 1951, I
Philippines to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. Said Treaty
never heard my sister mention anything about her husband having had a marital
relationship prior to their marriage.
pertinently provides:
4. 12.During the entire life of Fernando Poe, Sr., as my brother-in-law, I never heard of a xxx
case filed against him by a woman purporting to be his wife. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
5. 13.Considering the status of Fernando Poe. Sr., as a leading movie personality during present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may
that time, a case of this nature could not have escaped publicity. remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
6. 14.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the case was never published in any sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
newspaper or magazine, but was in fact filed in court, I would haveknown about it their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
because my sister would have been an indispensable party to the case, and she could applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
not have kept an emotionally serious matter from me. allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date
7. 15.This is the first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard Fernando Poe, Sr., of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
being maliciously accused of being a married man prior to his marriage to my sister. allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
398
8. 16.This is the first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard the name Paulita Poe
y Gomez as being the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr. 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
9. 17.There was no Paulita Poe y Gomez, or any complainant for that matter, in or out of
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
court, when my sister gave birth to six (6) children, all fathered by Fernando Poe, Sr.
10. 18.I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality to the territory in which they may
Poe isa natural-born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
Sr. ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.
In relation to this Treaty, the Philippine Bill of 1902, provided as follows:
SEC. 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Done in the City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12thday of January 2004. Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April eighteen hundred ninety-nine, and then resided in
the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto shall be deemed and held to
(Sgd.) RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS be citizens of the Philippine Islandsand as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
Declarant except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
The allegation of Mrs. Mangahas that respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is the son of signed at Pans December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Allan F. Poe stands unchallenged. while the Jones Law provided as follows:
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
We follow the principle of jus sanguinis,the rule of blood relationship. Proof that
day of April eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the father of children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in sunct servanda. As we held in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, viz.: 21

accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, xxx
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be enforced or not at the whims
have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates a legally binding obligation on the parties
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine founded on the generally accepted principle of international law of pacta sunct servanda which
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing has been adopted as part of the law of our land. (Constitution, Article II, Section 3)
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons Indeed there is no reason to refuse compliance with the Convention for it is in perfect
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become accord with our Constitution and with our laws.
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States residing therein.
Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is against the trend
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, Exhibit “S” shows he died at age 84 in San
in civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a
Carlos, Pangasinan. By the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
legitimate child. Called originally as nullius filius or no one’s child, an illegitimate
Law, Lorenzo Pou was a citizen of the Philippines. Allan F. Poe followed the
child started without any birthright of significance. The passage of time, however,
citizenship of his father (Lorenzo) as a Filipino. Allan F. Poe can also be considered
brought about the enlightenment that an illegitimate should not be punished for the
as a Filipino by birth. He was born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, before
illicit liaison of his parents of which he played no part. No less than our Chief Justice
the 1935 Constitution. He studied, worked,
399
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a Commissioner of the Constitutional Commission,
proposed the adoption of the following radical provision in the 1987
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 399 Constitution, viz.: “All children regardless of filiations shall enjoy thesame social
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections protection.” Inan exchange with Commissioner Nolledo, he explained its rationale as
lived and died in the Philippines. His Filipino citizenship is transmitted to his son,
20 follows: 22

respondent Poe. The attempt of petitioner to cast doubt on the Filipino citizenship of xxx
Allan F. Poe is an exercise in futility. Mr. Nolledo. Would it be appropriate to say that social protection is earned and
should not be imposed by legal mandate?
E. TO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT POE BECAUSE HE IS ILLEGITIMATE WILL
Mr. Davide. Mr. Presiding Officer, it is not, it may not be imposed but we are framing
VIOLATE OUR TREATY OBLIGATION. a Constitution to provide for a directive policy or directive principles of state
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of policy, there is no harm in making it as a directive principle or a state
the United Nations on November 20, 1989. The Philippines was the 31st state to policy especially if it would affect the lives of citizens who, I would like to state
ratify the Convention in July 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution 109. The again, are not responsible for a misfortune in life.
Convention entered into force on September 2, 1990. A milestone treaty, it abolished Following the undeniable injustice committed to illegitimate children due alone to
all discriminations against children including discriminations on account of “birth or the accident of their birth, the universal trend of laws today is to abolish all invidious
other status.” Part 1, Article 2 (1) of the Convention explicitly provides: discriminations against their
Article 2
1. State Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to _______________
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination ofany kind, irrespective of the child’s
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race colour, sex, language religion, political or other
129 SCRA 373 (1984).
21

opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. V Record 67, Sept. 25, 1986, p. 69.
22

The Convention protects in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: 401
political rights, civil rights, social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. It VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 401
adopted the principle of interdependence and Indivisibility of children’s rights. A
violation of one right is considered a violation of the other rights. It also embraced Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should consider the “best rights. Slowly, they were granted more rights until their civil, rights are now equal to
interests” of the child. the rights of legitimate children. The Philippines has joined the civilized treatment of
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, this Convention on illegitimate children. Hence, under Article 178 of our New Family Code, a child born
the Rights of the child became valid and effective on us in July 1990 upon out of wedlock of parents without any impediment to marry (like the parents of
concurrence by the Senate. We shall be violating the Convention if we disqualify respondent Poe) can be legitimated. If legitimated, Article 179 of the same Code
respondent Poe just because he happened to be an illegitimate child. It is our provides that the child shall enjoy the same civil rights as a legitimate child. In Ilano
bounden duty to comply with our treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta vs. Court of Appeals, this Court expressed the enlightened policy that illegitimate
23

children “were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to
_______________ surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.” The
march towards equality of rights between legitimate and illegitimate children is
Exhibit “7.”
20
irreversible. We will be medieval in our outlook if we refuse to be in cadence with this
400 worldwide movement.
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED V. EPILOGUE
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a How is the President elected? Only by “direct vote of the people.” He shall not be
constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down chosen by the incumbent President. He shall not be elected by Congress nor by the
the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made Commission on Elections. And neither by this Court. Only by “direct vote of the
more difficult by the interplay of national and international law. Given the people.”
indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy approach is While the President is elected by “direct vote of the people,” they may only vote
to let the people decide who will be the next President. For on political questions, this for one who is a candidate. It does not matter whether they believe he would not be
Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not the best President.
grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people. Petitioner Fornier would have this Court, in the exercise of its “judicial power,”
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by removing
DISMISSED. respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President,
thereby constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the
_______________ people to vote (or not to vote) for respondent Poe.
The Constitution does not allow such intervention. Mr. Justice Vicente V.
230 SCRA 242 (1994).
23
Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion in Romualdez-
402
Marcos vs. COMELEC, said, “In my view, the issue in this case is whether the
3

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has
none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event
CONCURRING OPINION they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the
appropriate forum.”
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: *
The assailed ruling of the COMELEC dismissing Fornier’s petition is consistent
with the above view.
This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign The impact of a proceeding to disqualify a candidate, particularly a leading
will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In cases where the sovereignty candidate for President, after the electoral process has started, is shown by the
of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. contemporary events. The instant cases have agitated the people. Those who support
We cannot fail by making the people succeed. “In resolving election cases, a
1
respondent Poe, and their number is not miniscule, openly accuse the supporters of
dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate x x x. We President Arroyo as those behind the effort to disqualify respondent Poe. From well-
cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In publicized reports of the campaign, his campaign sorties have been welcomed with
case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people’s political enthusiasm exceeding those of President Estrada. What can not be ignored is that
judgment.” 2
those who support respondent Poe come principally from the “masses”—those whose
I May this Court exercise its “judicial power” to disqualify a candidate before “voices,” albeit an integral part of the sovereign will of the people, are generally silent
and heard only through the ballots. The intervention by this Court, through the
the election?
exercise of its “judicial
The candidates for President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fernando Poe (or FPJ), Raul
Roco, Ping Lacson, and Eddie Villanueva are on the campaign trail. But petitioner _______________
Fornier would have this Court pull out FPJ from the track.
I submit that while the campaign for the Presidency is on, this Court may not Supra.
3

exercise its “judicial power” to disqualify a candidate. That would definitely wreck 404
the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidate. Only after the election 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
is over and a winner is proclaimed and the result of the election is contested, may
this Court participate and decide the contest. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
power” on grounds that are at best highly disputable, can not but be viewed as
_______________ political. Indeed, what is worrisome is that the termination of the candidacy of
respondent Poe, who appears to be a leading candidate, will in the long term impair
I concur in the ratiocination and conclusion of the majority that this Court has no jurisdiction over these
* the mandate of the people.
petitions: G.R. No. 161434, Tecson, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.; and G.R. No. 161634, Velez What is at stake is not just the candidacy of respondent Poe or the right of the
vs. Poe.
1Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.
“masses” to vote for him. Equally at stake is the credibility of this Court. It should
2Concurring Opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. not enter the “political thicket.” Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse,
No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 364-365. in the right of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested
403 right to elect by “direct vote” the President.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 403 History will judge whether this Court ought to have declined in determining if
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen even before the presidential election. I am not
certain whether history will judge kindly. What I can foresee is that disqualifying
respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the “masses,” a situation not When the people vote on May 10 and cast their ballots for President, they will be
allowed by the Constitution. exercising a sovereign right. They may vote for respondent Poe, or they may not.
While this Court, in exercising its judicial power, should not cater to popular When they vote, they will consider a myriad of issues, some relevant, others trivial,
support, the force of its Decisions springs from the faith of the people reposed in its including the eligibility of the candidates, their qualities of leadership, their honesty
fairness and integrity. That faith is not strengthened and respect and obedience to its and sincerity, perhaps including their legitimacy. That is
Decisions are not enhanced had this Court intruded in the choice of President by the 406
people. 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is political
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
liberty, which is the right and opportunity to choose those who will lead the governed
with their consent. This right to choose cannot be subtly interfered with through the their prerogative. After the election, and only after, and that is what the Constitution
mandates—the election of whoever is proclaimed winner may be challenged in an
elimination of the electoral choice. The present bid to disqualify respondent Poe from
the presidential race is a clear attempt to eliminate him as one of the choices. This election contest or a petition for quo warranto. Where the challenge is because of
Court should resist such attempt. The right to choose is the single factor that controls ineligibility, he will be ousted only if this Court “exerts utmost effort to resolve the
the ambitions of those who would impose—through force or stealth—their will on the issue in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
majority of citizens. We should not only welcome electoral competition, we should sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of
the majority.”
cherish it. Disqualifying a candidate, particularly the popular one, on the basis of
4

doubtful claims does not result to a genuine, free and fair election. It results to II Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
violence. In some countries, incumbents have manipulated every resource at their Fornier’s petition for disqualification against respondent.
disposal to eliminate electoral choice. The result is a frustrated and angry public; a To begin with, in Salcedo II vs. Commission on Elections, we emphasized that there
5

public that has no place to express this anger because the electoral system is rigged is only one instance where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
to guarantee the re-election of candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be
405
raised before election. That only instance is when the petition is based on Section 78
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 405 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted as follows:
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections “Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
the incumbents in office. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we know that when person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
democracy operates as intended, an aroused public can replace those who govern in a required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
manner beyond the parameters established by public consent. twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
The Philippines is not alone in her predicament. Iran is besieged by the same after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.’
political crisis. The Guardian Council, an unelected hard-line constitutional As stated in the above provisions, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate
watchdog, has barred more than 3,000 of the 8,200 candidates in the 290-member of candidacy, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to
parliament. State broadcast media controlled by hard-liners said that the candidates a material matter for the sanctions imposed by this provision would affect the
were disqualified because they lack “the necessary legal qualifications.” This substantive rights of a candidate—the right to run for the elective post for which he
prompted Iran’s largest reformist party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front, to filed the certificate of candidacy. 6

state: “We consider the disqualification as national treason and an attempt to

transform the Republic into a despotic establishment. Disqualifications deny the _______________
people of their constitutional right to choose and be chosen. . .”Thus, threatening to
resign, Iran’s reformist government stressed that, “if the government feels that it Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
4

G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 456-457, citing Aznar vs. Commission on
cannot fulfill its responsibilities in protecting legitimate freedoms, such as defending
5

Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990).

the rights of the nation for a free and fair elections, then it does not believe that there Ibid.,atp. 455.
6

is any reason to stay in power.” 407

This Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 407
our nation to a genuine, free and fair election. Article 25 of the International
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “every citizen shall have the
right and the opportunity. . .to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”There can be no genuine, would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with
7

free and fair election when the people’s right to choose, is manipulated or eliminated. an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. 8

Political liberty cannot be subverted to the personal ambitions of some politicians. The Fornier petition before this Court is one brought under Rule 65of the 1997
This Court should take an active stance in crushing the devious ploy, for in the last Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. What is to be determined, therefore, is
analysis, its handling of the electoral issues is the fundamental measure of the whether the COMELEC acted with “grave abuse of discretion” in issuing its assailed
present government’s credibility. Resolutions of January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 holding that “considering that
the evidence presented by petitioner is not substantial, we declare that respondent
 _______________
did not commit any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he is natural born Filipino citizen.”
Balanay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112924, October 20, 2000, 344 SCRA 1.
Petitioner Fornier’s basic allegations in his petition filed with the COMELEC are:
9

G.R. No. 120267, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 248, 255, citing Transpacific Supplies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,235 SCRA
10

494, 502 (1994); Geraldez vs. Court of Appeals,230 SCRA 320, 330 (1994); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 290, 301
(1990) and Summa Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,253 SCRA 175(1996).
1. 1.Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his 409
Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen; and VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 409
2. 2.He knowingly made such false representation.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
required to obtain a favorable judgment, and he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if
According to petitioner, respondent Poe is in fact “not a citizen of the Philippines, no evidence were given on either side.”
much more a natural born Filipino citizen, considering that both his parents are Obviously, petitioner Fornier failed to prove his allegations. The documentary
aliens.” Annexed to the petition as its principal basis is a copy of a “Marriage evidence he presented in support of his allegation that respondent Poe made a false
Contract” dated July 5, 1936 between “Allan Fernando Poe” and “Paulita Gomez.” material representation that he is a natural born Filipino citizen are falsified.
Since the “Marriage Contract” states the “nationality” of respondent’s father, Allan Likewise, Fornier’s allegation that respondent Poe fully knew such false
Fernando Poe, and his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, as Español,” respondent Poe is also representation, has not been substantiated. Indeed, his allegations remain as mere
“Español.” Even assuming that Allan Fernando Poe is a Filipino, still, respondent allegations. Hence, the COMELEC correctly dismissed his petition.
Poe could not have validly acquired Filipino citizenship from his father because the The only way petitioner can be entitled to a writ of certiorari from this Court is to
marriage of his parents is void. Respondent Poe’s father married Paulita Gomez on show that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. For this Court to
July 5, 1936, which marriage as subsisting at the time of the marriage of respondent issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body must
Poe’s father to his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen. Fornier then have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and despotic
concluded that respondent Poe, being illegitimate, follows the citizenship of his manner. Grave abuse of discretion means “such capricious and whimsical exercise of
11

mother. judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
_______________ hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, supra atp. 326.
contemplation of law.”
7
12
8Salcedo II vs. Commission on Elections, supra at p. 459.
408 We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing Fornier’s petition. Indeed, his availment of the
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
III Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation
Devastating to the Fornier petition is that the “Contract of Marriage” between “Allan
Fernando Poe” and “Paulita Gomez” (Annex “C,” Petition; Exhibits “B,” “B-1,” “B-2”) when he declared in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born
and the “Birth Certificate” of Allan Fernando Poe (Exhibit “C”), appear to have been Filipino citizen.
falsified by Director Ricardo L. Manapat of the National Archives. The records of the
hearing of the Senate Committee on “Constitutional Amendments, and Revisions of _______________
Codes and Laws” held on January 21, 2004 and February 2, 2004, which incidentally
were shown live on television and aired over the radio, show in shocking detail how Malinias vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 480.
11

Benito vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 705, 713-714,
the falsification was so brazenly done. The Court may not gloss over these casually.
12

citing Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals,289 SCRA 159 (1998).

The details are spread in the record of these proceedings. Given this pathetic state of 410
petitioner’s evidence, we cannot conclude that he has proved his allegations by
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sufficient evidence. Without doubt, the COMELEC, in dismissing Fornier’s petition
for lack of substantial evidence, did not gravely abuse its discretion. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of establishing his allegations of At any rate, in order to show that respondent Poe did not commit a false material
respondent’s material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. representation in his certificate of candidacy, I believe that this Court should decide
Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non que negat,otherwise stated, “he who asserts, whether respondent Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen on the basis of the evidence
not he who denies, must prove.” What I observe from his allegations is a
9 at hand.
misconception as to whom the burden of proof lies. The COMELEC’s First Division held that respondent Poe did not commit any
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is
“Sec. 1. Burden of proof.—Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts a natural born Filipino citizen because his father, Allan Fernando Poe, is a Filipino
in issue necessary to establish his claim x x x by the amount of evidence required by law.” citizen; and that by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis, he is also a Filipino
In Borlongan vs. Madrideo, we held:
10
citizen under the 1935 Constitution.
“The burden of proof x x x is on the plaintiff who is the party asserting the affirmative of an
issue. He has the burden of presenting evidence
 In Valles vs. Commission on Elections, we emphasized that “the Philippine law
13 such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his birth.” December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.”
Respondent’s Certificate of Birth reveals that he was born on August 20, 1939 at Likewise, the Jones Law provides as follows:
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
St. Luke’s Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila to Allan Fernando Poe, a Filipino
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
citizen,and Bessie Kelley, an American citizen. This was almost four (4) years after born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
the 1935 Constitution took effect. Under Section 3, Article IV, the following are except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
citizens of the Philippines: accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
412

1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
adoption of this Constitution. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
2. (2)Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: x x x.”
Philippine Islands. We held in the case of In Re Bosque: 14

3. (3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. “With respect to Spanish residents, it was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave
4. (4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new sovereign, or to continue to reside
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. in the territory, in which case the expiration of the term of eighteen months (April 11, 1899 to
5. (5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.” October 1900) without their making an express declaration of intention to retain their Spanish
nationality resulted in the loss of the latter, such persons thereby becoming subjects of the new
sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these islands.”
Pursuant to the above provision, the law in force at the time of his birth, respondent Likewise, in Palanca vs. Republic, we ruled: 15

Poe is a citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a Filipino father. “A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain
That respondent Poe is the son of Allan Fernando Poe is admitted by the parties. on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act
According to petitioner, Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain as shown by the of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the
“Marriage Contract” between him and Paulita Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.”
_______________ Under the above provisions and jurisprudence, Lorenzo Pou was a citizen of the
Philippines. In turn, his son Allan Fernando Poe, followed his (Lorenzo’s) citizenship
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 543, 549.
13 as a Filipino. Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution states that “those whose
411 fathers are citizens of the Philippines” are Filipino citizens. We thus follow the
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 411 principle of jus sanguinis,the rule of blood relationship. Consequently, since Allan
Fernando Poe is a Filipino citizen, it follows that respondent Poe is also a Filipino
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
citizen. That he is a natural born Filipino citizen is beyond question. The following
Gomez stating that his parents, Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes, are citizens of Spain. provisions are in point:
It follows that Allan Fernando Poe is also a Spanish citizen. And clearly, “respondent “SECTION 4. A natural born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
Poe could not have possibly acquired Filipino citizenship from his father, Allan having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.” (Article III of the
Fernando Poe, since the latter is a Spanish citizen.” 1973 Constitution)
Suffice it to state that this allegation must fail because the “Marriage Contract” “SECTION 2. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez has been shown to be falsified. without having to perform any act to acquire or
It bears reiterating that petitioner Fornier does not dispute that Allan Fernando
_______________
Poe is the father of respondent Poe. Allan’s father is Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject
and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11, 1899 when Spain ceded the 14 G.R. No. 666, January 14, 1902,1 Phil. 88.
Philippines to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. Specifically, this 15 G.R. No. L-301, April 7, 1948, 80 Phil. 578, 584.
Treaty provides that: 413
“Spanish subjects x x x may remain in such territory x x x. In case they remain in the territory VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 413
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, a declaration of their Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x.” (Article IV of the 1987 Constitution).
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.” Respondent Poe, being a Filipino citizen from birth without having to perform any
Relative to this Treaty, Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 provides: act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship is, therefore, a natural born
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish Filipino citizen.
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen Hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided to Still, petitioner insists that even if respondent Poe’s father is a Filipino citizen, he
the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto shall be deemed and held to (respondent) is not a natural born Filipino citizen because he is an illegitimate child
be citizens of the Philippines and such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
whose citizenship follows that of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen.
 On this point, the following amici curiae have a common opinion—the Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections (“Comelec”) a “Petition
illegitimacy of respondent Poe is inconsequential in determining whether he is a for Disqualification of Presidential Candi-
natural born Filipino citizen.
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said: _______________
“For there is really no difference in principle between, on the one hand, the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother and an alien father, and, on the other hand, the illegitimate child of a Separate Opinion of J.Gutierrez in Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives, G.R. Nos.
16

Filipino father and an alien mother. As long as the child’s filiation to his supposed father is 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160365, 160370,
established, it does not matter whether he is legitimate or an illegitimate child.” 160376, 160392, 160397, 160403 & 160405, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, citing J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc.
vs. Land Tenure Administra-tion,31 SCRA 413 (1970); Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections,192 SCRA
Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, former Constitutional Commissioner, advanced the 100 (1990); Occeña vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755 (1980); and Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
following view: 1995 Ed. at p. 344.
“In conclusion, therefore, when the Constitution says: ‘The following are citizens of the 415
Philippines: . . . ‘Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,’ the Constitution means just
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 415
that without invidious distinction.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. What flow from legitimacy date Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.” on the ground that Fernando
are civil rights; citizenship is a political right which flows not from legitimacy but from Poe, Jr. (“FPJ”) is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec First Division
paternity. And paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and not
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence
upon marriage or legitimation.”
that FPJ committed “any material misrepresentation when he stated in his
Dean Merlin M. Magallona’s theory is reproduced as follows:
“The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood relationship Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen.” On motion for
or jussanguinis. On this account, the derivation of citizenship from a person or the transmission reconsideration, the Comelec En Bancaffirmed the ruling of the First Division.
of citizenship to his child springs from the fact that he is the father. Thus, paternity as Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec En Banc resolution under Rule 64 in
manifestation of blood relationship is all that is needed to be established. To introduce a relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the derivation of
The Undisputed Facts
his citizenship from the father defeats the
414 The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first
document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August 1939.
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ. The second document is the Marriage
1

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage took place
transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. The text of the law which reads ‘Those on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate is also an evidence of
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines’ becomes an embodiment of the kernel principle of FPJ. Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley was an American citizen.
2 3

blood relationship, which provides no room for the notion of citizenship by legitimacy or Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ
legitimation.”
was born out of wedlock and therefore illegitimate, and (2) the mother of FPJ was an
4

The ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with
American citizen.
the language of the document itself. The words of the Constitution should as much as
possible be understood in the sense they have in common use and given their The Issues
ordinary meaning. The reason for this is because the Constitution is not primarily a The issues raised in Fornier’s petition are:
lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness is
should even be present as an important condition for the rule of law to 1. (a)Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as
prevail. Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is very clear. As the provision
16
a candidate for President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born
does not distinguish between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino Philippine citizen;
father, we should not make a distinction. 2. (b)Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
rendering its assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004. _______________
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with
Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s 1FPJ’s Memorandum before the Comelec dated 4 February 2004, pp. 2-3.
petition. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
2

3FPJ’s Answer before the Comelec dated 16 January 2004, pp. 5 and 21.
DISSENTING OPINION 4Article 108, Spanish Civil Code; Article 255, New Civil Code; Article 165, Family Code.
416
CARPIO, J.: 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
I dissent from the majority opinion.
Jurisdiction
The Antecedent Proceedings The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all
candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the
power and function to “[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the coming elections
the conduct of an election.” The initial determination of who are qualified to file without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1,
constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has
includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates will relation to Rule 65.
be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections
unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election _______________
dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the
Comelec. 5
Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article K-C of the Constitution.
6

Romualdez Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, 13 September 1995, 248 SCRA
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec
7

300; Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 130 Phil. 275; 22 SCRA 288 (1968).
to “[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 8793, 23 June 1989, 174 SCRA 245.
8

x.” The power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the 418
power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
election to public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting
elections is left without any legal, remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a
Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation.
certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he
is no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified. could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after
Under Rule 25 on “Disqualification of Candidates” of the Comelec Rules of the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as President
Procedure, a voter may question before the Comelec the qualifications of any before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says
candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25 provides: when it provides that “[N]o person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification.—Any candidate who does not possess all the born citizen of the Philippines.” The clear and specific language of the Constitution
9

qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of
whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be
_______________ decided before the election.
5 Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6646. See Bautista v. Commission on
Governing Laws
Elections, 359 Phil. 1; 298 SCRA 480 (1998); Fernandez v. Fernandez, et al., 146 Phil. 605; 36 SCRA 1 (1970). Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his
417 birth depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth. FPJ’s 10

VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 417 citizenship at the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939,
determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Natural-born Philippine citizens are “those who are citizens of the Philippines
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification.—Any citizen of voting age, or duly citizenship.” If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative
11

registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law or judicial proceeding, that an eventsubsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling
Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law. him to Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural born citizen. 12

(Emphasis supplied) The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to the governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine
promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite the disposition of cases or
6
citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the
controversies falling within its jurisdiction. citizenship
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the
Constitution provides that some other body shall be the “sole judge” of the _______________
qualifications of the holders of the public offices involved. The Court has upheld the
jurisdiction of Comelec to issue such rulings, even when the issue is the citizenship of
7 Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
9

a candidate. Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if FPJ meets
8
United States v. Lim Bin, 36 Phil. 924 (1917); Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).
10

Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution; Section 4, Article III of the 1973 Constitution.
11

the citizenship qualification to run for President. The only exception is that specified in Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, which means
12

However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual that there can be no other exception to this rule.
bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue 419
presented—whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 419
Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that “[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen.” In short, the
at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of
constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood
citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an
cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a natural-born citizen. illegitimate child has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father
General Principles admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of
born within wedlock is presumed to be the son of the father and thus carries the
13
paternity as required by law.
blood of the father. Under the doctrine of jussanguinis,as provided for in Section 1(3), Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on
Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy, an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino
automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim of paternity.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien
any father unless the father acknowledges the child at birth. The law has always
14
mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a
required that “in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several
proved.” The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of
15
illegitimate children in China. The State can-
421
illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the
mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 421
illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only legally known parent— Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
the mother. not be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate children
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father
relation of illegitimate child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an
established in accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino administrative or judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father
father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate is true.
children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution that “[T]hose whose fathers are The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese
citizens of the Philippines” are Philippine citizens.
16
mothers and allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in
Vietnam, many of them studying there until high school. These children grew up
_______________
knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought
them, together with their Vietnamese mothers, to the Philippines as Saigon fell to
See note 4.
the communists. The mothers of these children became stateless when the Republic
13

Sebbano v. Aragon, 22 Phil. 10 (1912).

14

Article 887, New Civil Code.

15 of (South) Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The Department of Justice rendered
Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution.
16
Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these
420
Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3),
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-
born Philippine citizen. However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the
17

Nature of Citizenship illegitimate Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens “it is necessary
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a in every case referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient and convincing
natural-born Philippine citizen because no other act after his birth is required to documentary evidence.” 18

acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the qualifications In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial
to be a Philippine citizen at birth. authority the paternity of the alleged Filipino father by “sufficient and convincing
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine documentary evidence.” Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is necessary to
citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim
all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act—the of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the mere acknowledgment
acknowledgement of the Filipino father—is required for the child to acquire or perfect of the alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship on
his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment the child. The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve the
cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to acquire or
of natural-born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having perfect Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. become Philippine citi-
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child
has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive _______________
presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims
to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the child’s father, such blood 17 Supra,note 3 at pp. 8-9.
relation must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as required by law. 18 Department of Justice Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995.
 422 natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no
subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
zens only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial authority approve
and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers. Burden of Proof
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his
high public offices is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up
19
Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President
knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of
knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born
country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and. loyal to the Philippines of citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born
which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who is citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The President of the Philippines must
20
with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v.Chan: 23

owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up knowing that It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of
the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth State.
recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later a natural-born 21

Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born
Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his out of wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino
paternity. father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the
22 _______________
following as proof of filiation of a natural child:
128 Phil. 815; 21 SCRA 753 (1967).
23

424
1. a.acknowledgment in a record of birth;
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

_______________ Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

Such blood relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings in
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
19
accordance with law.
Under the United States Constitution, the President, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
20
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person
forces, is required to be a natural-born citizen. The rationale for this is to insure that no foreigner or former
foreigner becomes the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This is culled from John Jay’s letter to George because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State
Washington when the qualifications for President of the United States were being discussed in the interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son
constitutional convention. SeeJill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty,Yale Law Review, April 1988.
Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the minimum age requirement to run for
21
FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen.
President is forty years of age. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a natural-born Philippine citizen
Article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code provides: “The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made
22
just because the private party litigants have admitted or stipulated on such a status.
in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.” In the present case, the Solicitor General, as representative of the Government, is
423
strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 423
Legitimation
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of
24

marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the
1. b.acknowledgment in a will; legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child
2. c.acknowledgment in some other public document. only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year earlier
on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F, Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an
of legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939. Besides,
acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public
legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the Court
document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth
held in Ching Leng:
does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such
25

The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate

acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or
therein political questions. Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the
perfect Philippine citizenship.
Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except that which
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent
refers all matters of “naturalization,” as well as those related to the
legislation liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a
“loss and reacquisition of citizenship” to “special laws.” Consistently with this policy, to the child, majority is attained earlier.” Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the
our Civil Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half
Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship. (Italics in the original) a century before the Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in
1939 could not in any way be affected by the Convention which entered into force
_______________ only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law and its ratification by the
29

Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code provides: “Legitimation shall produce its effects in any case from
24
Philippines could not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that
the date of the marriage.”
No. L-11931, 27 October 1958, 104 Phil. 1058 (unreported).
25
only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the
425 Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is
the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive Department
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 425
nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are “those
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”
rights to FPJ. In any event, the Convention guarantees a child “the right to acquire a
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902 nationality,” and requires States Parties to “ensure the implementation” of this
30

FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to right, “in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” Thus, as far as
31

the Philippines from Spain. To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty
26
nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Conventionguarantees the right of the child
of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless. The Convention does not
was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely “the right to acquire a
established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 nationality” in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was
April 1899, then he is presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship under the apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth 32

Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. Being an inhabitant and
27
FPJ also
resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall under the
coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. 28
_______________

There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine
Emerald Garments Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, 29 December 1995, 251
inhabitant and resident on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the
29

SCRA 600.
Philippines is not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he Paragraph 1, Article 7, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
30

could not benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Paragraph 2, Ibid.
31

See Daniel Levy, U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Handbook, December 2003, stating in Chapter 4:
the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was
32

4:29. OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDREN

naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can be no 427
presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 427
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and
the alleged father of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged
citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court Filipino father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in
can decide this case without determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a
Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not natural-born Philippine citizen.
material in resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an
_______________ alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known
parent. The illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the
Supra,note 3 at p. 14.
Filipino father, cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this
26

27Article IX, Treaty of Paris, 10 December 1898; Section 4, Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ibid.
28 definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v.Galang, which involved the illegitimate
33

426 minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino
and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are
Convention on the Rights of the Child as follows:
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated
and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean May 2, 1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed
“every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong
Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra;Gallofin v. Ordoñez, 70 Phil
minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption gives “to the adopted
An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption proper, this Court granted the same in person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter,” pursuant to
a decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have already seen that the rights therein alluded to are
obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and merely those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of the nationality of
purposes the children of the adopter Ching the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term “children” could
_______________ not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal
fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child
Out-of-wedlock children born to a U.S. citizen mother between May 24, 1934 and January 13, 1941, acquired U.S. would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are
citizenship at birth through the general provision of the 1934 act, which granted U.S. citizenship to children born abroad to a illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not affectsubstantially the legal
U.S. citizen parent. Since the natural father in such cases is not considered the legal father, the retention requirement when one
parent is a non-citizen does not apply. The citizenship acquired under this provision is not affected by subsequent legitimation situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the
of the child. status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil
33Supra,note 25.
Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. (Bold italics supplied)
428
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED unanimous decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions,
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections including Paa v. Chan and Morano, et al. v. Vivo have cited the doctrine laid down
35 36

Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by in Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935 Constitution stating “those whose
law. fathers are citizens of the Philippines” refers only to legitimate children. When the
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did not attempt to change the
pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became intent of this provision, even as they were presumably aware of the Ching
Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a Leng doctrine.
communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine.
alien certificate of registration of the said minors be cancelled.(Bold italics supplied)
The inexorable direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100
InChing Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of “minor child or
years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children” in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law; as well as the meaning of children 34

children.
“whose parents are citizens of the Philippines” under the Constitution. The Court
categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only, and not to _______________
illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases “minor children” and “minor child,” used in these provisions, Supra,note 23.
35

include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, 128 Phil. 923; 20 SCRA 562 (1967).
36

for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word “children” or “child” is used 430
in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the
Constitution provides that “those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines,” and Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines,” who shall electPhilippine Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
citizenship “upon reaching the age of majority,” are
children, we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not
_______________
involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Lengdoctrine upholds
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine
34 Section 15 of the Naturalization Law provided as follows: is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights of
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine
Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on
citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only
during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen
the status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution
even after becoming of age. itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born citizens.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after
reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an
necessary oath of allegiance.
429
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother automatically becomes a
Philippine citizen at birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 429 not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections blood relation is proved as provided by law. Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly
37

citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our provides that “[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. proved.” The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he
Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952). establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful established after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-
wedlock, when the adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are
born Philippine citizen since an act is required after birth to acquire or perfect his
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the
illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Gov’t of the
Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe
cally and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively
acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a
as “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of
Philippine citizen “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
the President and Vice-President, Senators, and, Representatives. In a litany of 3

cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise
_______________
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed
Reyes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 220 Phil. 116; 135 SCRA 439(1985); Colorado v. Court of
37
winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
4

Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 47; Berciles, et al. v. GSIS, et al., 213 Phil. 48; 128 Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo
5

SCRA 53(1984); Divinagracia v. Rovira, G.R. No. L-42615, 10 August 1976, 72 SCRA 307; Noble v. Noble, 125 warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.
Phil. 123; 18 SCRA 1104 (1966); Rep. of the Phils. v. WCC and Espiritu, 121 Phil. 261; 13 SCRA
Prior to the proclamation of winners, questions on the eligibility and
272 (1965); Paulino v. Paulino, G.R. No. L-15091, 28 December 1961, 3 SCRA 730.
431 qualifications of a candidate may be addressed to the COME-
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 431
_______________
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
perfect” his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. . . .
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral
meet this citizenship qualification.
3

Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 (1988); Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to 692 (1991); and,Chavez vs. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 315, 322 (1992).
dismiss the petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo See O’Hara vs. Commission on Elections, 379 SCRA 247 (2002); Dumayas, Jr. vs. Commission on
4

Antonio Velez on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of Elections, 357 SCRA 358 (2001); Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 458 (2000); Barroso vs.
Ampig, Jr., 328 SCRA 530 (2000); Caruncho III vs. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 693 (1999); Rasul
the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are vs.Commission on Elections, 313 SCRA 18 (1999); Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA
premature, there being no election contest in this case. 400(1995); Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300(1995); Pangilinan vs. Commission
on Elections, 228 SCRA 36 (1993); Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807 (1992); Lazatin vs. Commission on
SEPARATE OPINION Elections, 157 SCRA 337, 338 (1988) Lomugdang vs. Javier, 21 SCRA 402(1967); and Vda. de De Mesa vs.
Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 (1966).
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal read as follows:
5

RULE 14. Election Protest.—Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received
the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days from the proclamation of
There are three petitions before this Court which seek the disqualification of a the winner.
prominent presidential aspirant in the forthcoming May 10, 2004 elections. The RULE 15. Quo Warranto.—A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice-President
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any voter within ten (10)
petitions are common in their allegation that Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is not a days after the proclamation of the winner. (Emphasis supplied)
qualified candidate for the position of the President of the Philippines since he is not 433
a natural-born Filipino citizen for the following reasons: (a) FPJ’s father, Allan F. VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 433
Poe, was not a Filipino citizen, but a Spanish citizen; (b) FPJ is an illegitimate child
having been born out of wedlock; (c) the subsequent marriage of his parents did not Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
inure to his benefit since they failed to comply with the procedural requirements for LEC only if they fall under Section 78 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
legitimation; and (d) FPJ, as an illegitimate child, follows the citizenship of his Election Code) which provides:
American mother, Bessie Kelley. Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invokes the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under the
filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the 1

contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for prematurity.
6

at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said petitions. candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal In his Certificate of Candidacy, respondent FPJ asserts that he is a natural-born
(HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifi-
2
citizen and therefore eligible to the position of President of the
Philippines. Petitioner assails the truthfulness of such material representation.
7

_______________ Thus, the issue whether or not respondent Poe made a material representation which
is false is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve under Section 78 of the
1 SEC. 4. . . . The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the Omnibus Election Code. And when the COMELEC denied
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rule for the
purpose.
2 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: _______________
SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
432
 6SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office;if for Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or must be based on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status, his date of weakness of the opponent’s defense. To lay the burden of proof upon FPJ to prove his
12

birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; citizenship simply because petitioner assails the Fame is anathema to the well-
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he recognized rule on the burden of proof.
is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. (Emphasis supplied)
on either side. 13

... ... ... In other words, petitioner should have established by competent evidence before
7Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution provides: the COMELEC that the subject material representation is false and that it must
Section 2. No person may be elected president unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
have been made by respondent FPJ deliberately to deceive the electorate as to his
immediately preceding such election. eligibility for the position of President of the Philippines.
434 Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, has extensively discussed the evidence that
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED were correctly considered by the COMELEC as weak and not convincing to which I
fully subscribe, with the following additional observations:
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Under Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, the following are citizens
the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy, petitioner, ascribing grave abuse of
of the Philippines:
discretion on the part of COMELEC in denying his petition, appropriately filed G.R.
No. 161824 under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides
that the mode of review of a judgment of the COMELEC may be brought by the 1. 1.Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
aggrieved party to the Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Needless to stress, Constitution.
certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that can be availed of only for an error of 2. . . .
jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer 3. 3.Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of 4. 4.Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 8
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
In Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, the Court held that in order to justify the
9
5. . . .
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, it is essential that: (1) the false representation mentioned therein pertains to Pertinent in the determination of who were the citizens of the Philippines at the time
a material matter on the contents of the certificate of candidacy as provided in of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution are the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the
Section 74, that is, the qualifications for elective office as provided in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, otherwise known as
Constitution; and (2) the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to the Jones Law.
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. _______________
The Court’s jurisdiction in the present petition for certiorari is limited only to the
question whether the COMELEC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678; Heirs of Anastacio Fabela
12

vs. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 531, 547 (2001); Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 498, 504 (1994);
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that the evidence of petitioner is weak and
and, Pornellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration, 110 Phil. 986, 991; 1 SCRA 375 (1961).
not convincing. Is it a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion? The Summa Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185 (1996).
13

answer is definitely in the negative. 436

The Certificate of Candidacy was executed by respondent FPJ under oath. The 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
law always presumes good faith. One who alleges malice has the burden of proving
10

the same. It is elementary that contentions must be proved by competent evidence

11
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
and reliance Article IX of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 reads:
Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
_______________
by the present treaty relinquished or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights or property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have
Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 642 (1998).
8

312 SCRA 447 (1999). See also Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989); Abella vs.
9
the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof
Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 297 (1992); Frivaldo vs. to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they
Commission on Elections, 232 SCRA 785 (1996); and, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
727 (1996). record, a year from the date of the exchange of ratification of this treaty, a
Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 341, 345 (1995).
10
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance’ in default of which
Bernardino vs. Ignacio, 253 SCRA 641, 644 (1996); Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
11
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
SCRA 320, 329 (1997); Cancio vs. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268, 286 (1999). nationality of the territory in which they may reside. (Emphasis supplied)
435
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 enacted by U.S. Congress, reads:
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 435
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be It is suggested that the case be remanded to the COMELEC or the Court of Appeals
citizens of the Philippine Islands,except such as shall have elected to preserve their for the presentation of additional evidence to enable the Court to finally determine
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace the citizenship of respondent Poe. With all due respect to the proponents, I submit
between the United States and Spain, signed in Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and that to do so would not only be contrary to basic fair play but also it is not within the
ninety eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other jurisdiction of the Court to make a final determination of respondent FPJ’s
country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to citizenship in the present petition for certiorari which is specifically on the ground of
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
grave abuse of discretion in not canceling the certificate of candidacy under Section
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippines Islands who are citizens
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The issue on citizenship may be properly dealt with
of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the in a quo warranto proceeding which is available to protesters only after elections
United States if residing therein. (Emphasis supplied) under Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 2 of the Jones Law reads: As a last pitch effort to disqualify respondent FPJ, petitioner posits that the
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the phrase “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines’’in the 1935 Constitution
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said should refer only to legitimate children, relying upon the cases of Chiongbian vs. De
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be Leon, Serra vs. Republic, Morano vs. Vivo, and Paa vs. Chan; that inasmuch as it
14 15 16 17

citizens of the Philippine Islands,except such as shall have elected to appears that respondent Poe is an illegitimate son, then he follows the citizenship of
437
his mother who was an American citizen per respondent FPJ’s birth certificate.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 437 However, the cited cases are inapplicable because they are not squarely in point.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections These cases did not involve an illegitimate child of a Filipino father or the issue of
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of citizenship in relation to the exercise of the right to be elected into office. Besides, the
peace between the United states and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred Court’s pronouncements in these cases that illegitimacy in relation to citizenship are
and ninety eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other merely obiter dicta, obviously non sequitur. Obiter dictum simply means words of a
country: Provided, that the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to prior opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case or an incidental and 18

provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine collateral opinion uttered by a judge and therefore not material to his decision or
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions judgment and not binding. As such, the pronouncements therein on illegitimacy in
19

of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens
relation to citizenship must be disregarded as the ruling of the Court cannot
of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
Petitioner’s Exhibit “D,” a certification of the National Archives that it has no record
that respondent’s grandfather Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines
46 O.G. 3652.
before 1907, seeks to establish that respondent FPJ is Spanish as his grandfather
14

L-4223, May 12, 1952.

15

was a Spanish citizen for which reason, his son, Allan Poe, FPJ’s father, was a 20 SCRA 562 (1967).
16

Spanish citizen under the aforequoted provisions of the Treaty of Paris and 21 SCRA 753 (1967).
17

Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1222, citing Noel vs. Olds, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 155.
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said exhibit is neither here nor there considering that, as
18

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 1555.

19

noted by Justice Puno, the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the National 439
Archives has a complete record of all persons who lived in the Philippines during the
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 439
Spanish and American occupation.
Moreover, petitioner Fornier failed to present competent evidence that respondent Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
FPJ’s grandfather had preserved his allegiance to the Crown of Spain by having made be duly extended to expand the main thrust of the decisions beyond their true import.
a declaration to that effect before a court of record, pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary
Consequently, in the absence of such evidence, it cannot be validly concluded that source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
FPJ’s grandfather remained a Spanish citizen and transmitted his citizenship to provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
FPJ’s father. It is also true that neither could anyone conclusively conclude on that provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. Otherwise
basis, that FPJ’s grandfather did not retain his Spanish citizenship. In either case, it stated, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
sustains the view of the COMELEC that the evidence of petitioner is weak and not and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
convincing. interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
As earlier stated, the onus probandi is on petitioner to prove his claim, failing Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
which his petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent FPJ must provision being construed. 20

necessarily fail. The COMELEC’s assessment of the evidence presented before it Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not provide for a
must perforce be accorded full respect. qualification that the child be a product of a legitimate union for the child
438 to acquire the nationality of the Filipino father.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should we. There
should be no distinction in the application of the fundamental law where none is _______________
indicated. The drafters of the Constitution, in making no qualification in the use of
the general word “father” must have intended no distinction at law. The Courts could 1CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 2.
Id.,Art. IV, Sec. 2.
2

only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver 441
intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 441
effect to the lawgiver’s intent. 21

Clearly, the framers of the 1935 Constitution simply provided that when Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
paternity is known or established, the child follows the father’s citizenship; the measurable qualifications as demanded of him by the Constitution.
otherwise, the citizenship of the mother is followed. If we concede that the framers of This Court is once again mandated to interpret the law and apply it to breathe
the Constitution intended a qualification that the child be the product of a legitimate life to its language and give expression to its spirit in the context of real facts. In the
union, such would lead to clear injustice, and a restricted interpre- present controversy which brings to fore the real import of the Constitutional
imposition that a candidate for President of the Philippines must be a natural-born
_______________ Filipino, it is specifically tasked to craft a rule of law that will govern the
determination of one’s citizenship in all cases, now and in the future, without
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698, 724 (2001),
20
regard for whoever are the personalities involved.
citing JM Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corp.
vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259, 264 (1938); Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311.
The consolidated petitions subject of the present Decision, all seek to disqualify
Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections,supra, Note No. 4, p. 468, citing Social Security System vs. City of
21 respondent Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) or
Bacolod, 115 SCRA 412, 415 (1982). Ronnie Poe, from seeking election as President of the Republic of the Philippines on
440 the ground that he is not a natural-born Filipino and, thus, not qualified for the office
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of Chief Executive.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections In G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, petitioners Maria Jeannette C. Tecson and Felix
B. Desiderio, Jr. (Tecson et al.) and Zoilo Antonio Velez (Velez), through separate
tation, by creating a distinction when the language of the law is clear and
original petitions filed with this Court, all invoke this Court’s jurisdiction as “sole
unambiguous.
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and “qualifications of the
Thus, based on the evidence presented before it, the COMELEC did not commit
President” of the Philippines to determine whether FPJ is eligible for the presidency
any grave abuse of discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to present
3

in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of Article VII of the

substantial evidence that FPJ has knowingly or deliberately committed a material
Constitution, viz:
representation that is false in his certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss all the petitions. Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
DISSENTING OPINION the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election. (Emphasis supplied),
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: in relation to Sections 1 and 2 of Article IV thereof, viz:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

The Constitution, in unmistakable terms, declares that—

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a 1. (1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and Constitution;
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. 1
2. (2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Foremost, thus, in the qualifications for one to seek to become the highest official of
the land is that he must be a natural-born Filipino, a “citizen of the Philippines _______________
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.” 2
3CONST. art. VII, sec. 4, par. 7.
442
As citizens of a nation which has its own political, social, and cultural identity
and independence, it is axiomatic that we elect to the Philippine presidency only a 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
citizen whose fealty to the Filipinos’ most cherished ideals and aspirations as a Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
people is above suspicion or whatever approximates an unfailing allegiance to the
Philippine State. The President, with all his multifarious powers and functions, is a
1. (3)Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
focal point in this nation’s governance as shown by the legacies and lessons of history citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
and the continuing realities of the present. The process, therefore, of selecting the 2. (4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law.
person for the Office of the President partakes not only of a moral obligation to
choose the one best suited for the job but also, and more importantly perhaps, of the
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
matter of ensuring that he indeed possesses without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 still not have derived Philippine citizenship from him since, as an illegitimate child,
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) he followed the citizenship of his American mother. 10

In G.R. No. 161824, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier (Fornier), via a petition 4

Petitioner Fornier thus concluded that FPJ, “not being a natural-born citizen of
for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeks the the Philippines, lacks an essential qualification and corollarily possesses a
review by this Court of the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, as
(COMELEC) dismissing a Petition for Disqualification in COMELEC SPA 04-003 expressly required under the
filed by him under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code: _______________
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any 5G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 75.
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein 6G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 67-74.
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later 7G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 72.
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be 8G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 69.
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis 9G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 69-70.
G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I at p. 71.
supplied)
10

444
in relation to Section 74 thereof:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party 1987 Constitution,” and, therefore, FPJ “should be disqualified from being a
11

to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all candidate for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution coming 10 May 2004 elections.” 12

of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the On January 16, 2004, FPJ filed his Answer to the Petition for Disqualification,
13

laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a maintaining that he is a natural born Filipino since his father, Allan F. Poe, and
permanent resident or immigrant grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, were both Filipino; his father was never married to a
Paulita Gomez; and he is the legitimate son of Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie
14

_______________
Kelley.
4 Atty. Fornier is a private respondent in G.R. No. 161434. However, for ease of reference, he is consistently referred to in
In his Answer, FPJ expressly admitted the authenticity of the copies of his
this Decision as petitioner Fornier. Certificate of Candidacy and Birth Certificate attached to petitioner Fornier’s
15

443 Petition for Disqualification, but denied that of the other attached documents.
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 443 Attached to FPJ’s Answer was a certified copy of Marriage Contract between 16 17

Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley which shows that Fernando R. Pou, Filipino,
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
was married to Bessie Kelley, American, on September 16, 1940 at 906 Dakota
to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of Street,8 Manila in a ceremony officiated by Rev. Rito Aramil, and witnessed by
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. Roman Despi and Marta Gatbunton.
x x x (Emphasis supplied) By Resolution No. 6558 of January 17, 2004, the COMELEC gave due course to
FPJ’s Certificate of Candidacy and included him among the six qualified candidate
Statement of the Case
for President.
On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed with the COMELEC his Certificate of Candidacy for
On January 22, 2004, petitioners Tecson and Desiderio, Jr. filed their Petition
President indicating therein that, among others things, he is a natural-born Filipino
5

(With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order) with
citizen, born on August 20, 1939 in the City of Manila.
18

this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the Petition for
On January 9, 2004, petitioner Fornier filed a “Petition for Disqualification of
Disqualification. In their petition, Tecson, et al. argue that:
Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.” (Petition for Disqualification) with the COMELEC, which was docketed as
6

COMELEC SPA No. 04-003. Said Petition for Disqualification prayed that FPJ “be 1. (1)The COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over the Petition for
disqualified from running for the position of President of the Republic of the Disqualification filed by petitioner Fornier against FPJ since paragraph 7
Philippines, and that his Certificate of Candidacy be denied due course, or cancelled.” 7 of Section 4, Article VII of the Consti
In support of his Petition for Disqualification, petitioner Fornier asserted that: (1)
Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ, was a Spanish citizen, hence, FPJ could not have derived _______________
Philippine citizenship from him; (2) Allan F. Poe’s marriage to FPJ’s mother, Bessie
8

Kelley, an American citizen, was void because of the prior subsisting marriage of 11 G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. 1 at p. 71.
G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. 1 at p. 71.
Allan F. Poe to one Paulita Gomez; and (3) given that the marriage of FPJ’s parents
12
9

13 G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. 1 at p. 82-113.

was void, even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, FPJ could 14 G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. 1 at pp. 89-90.
15 G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. 1 at p. 88.
16 Certified by Florendo G. Suba, Administrative Officer III, of the Manila Civil Registrar’s Office.
 G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 115.
17
2. (3)While the COMELEC is “not at liberty to finally declare whether or not
G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 24; docketed as G.R. No. 161434.
the respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen” since it is “not the proper
18

445
forum,” nevertheless it may establish FPJ’s citizenship as an incident to
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 445 the action to deny due course or cancel his Certificate of Candidacy under
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 24

3. (4)Petitioner Fornier’s Petition for Disqualification did not allege that FPJ’s
Certificate of Candidacy contained a material misrepresentation.
1. tution provides that this Court is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
Moreover, the Petition and the evidence presented by him failed to show
qualification of the President. Moreover, this Court’s authority to act as the
convincingly and strongly that FPJ’s declaration that he is a natural-born
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
Filipino is false.
is all-encompassing and covers all matters related thereto from beginning
25

4. (5)The 1935 Constitution provided that “[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of
to end, including those arising before the proclamation of winners. 19

the Philippines” are likewise Filipino. Both petitioner Fornier and FPJ
2. (2)FPJ was an illegitimate child since his Birth Certificate shows that he
26

agree that the latter is the son of Allan Fernando Poe. Hence, if Allan
was born on August 20, 1939, while the Marriage Contract between
Fernando Poe is a Filipino, necessarily, FPJ is likewise a Filipino.
Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley attached to FPJ’s Answer to the
27

5. (6)The purported marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and one
Petition for Disqualification shows that they were married on September
Paulita Gomez submitted by petitioner Fornier states that he is the son of
16, 1940.
Lorenzo Poe, a Spaniard. However, by operation of law and upon the
3. (3)FPJ was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage in 1940 of his
cession of the Philippines to the United States of America by Spain,
parents since, under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which was then in
Lorenzo Poe ceased to be a Spaniard and became a citizen of the Philippine
force, only acknowledged natural children can be legitimated, and it has
Islands and later a citizen of the Philippines. Consequently, Allan
not been shown that FPJ was acknowledged by his parents whether before
Fernando Poe, following the citizenship of his father, was also Filipino.
or after their marriage. Moreover, FPJ’s parents failed to comply with the
28

20

6. (7)Since paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does

procedural requirements to legitimate him, through either voluntary
not distinguish between legitimate and ille
acknowledgment under Article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code or compulsory
acknowledgment under Articles 135 and 136 thereof. 21

_______________
4. (4)The citizenship requirement under Section 2, Article VII of the
Constitution must be interpreted strictly. Since he was illegitimate, FPJ
G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 241.
follows the nationality of his only legally recognized parent, his mother,
23

G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at pp. 243-245.

24

who is an American. 22
G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 246.
25

Const. (1935), art. IV, sec. 1, par. 3.

26

G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I, at p. 247.

27

By Resolution of January 23, 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed G.R. No. 161824, Rollo, Vol. I, at p. 249.
28

petitioner Fornier’s Petition for Disqualification for lack of merit, holding that: 447
VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 447
1. (1)The COMELEC’s jurisdiction under the Constitution islimited to contests Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
relating toelections, returns and qualifications of elective regional
provincial and city officials, and does notinclude national elective offices.
1. gitimate children, FPJ’s legitimacy is beside the point. Since his father was a
_______________
Filipino, FPJ is a natural-born Filipino. 29

G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at pp. 10-11.

19 On January 26, 2004, petitioner Fornier filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 18.
20
COMELEC First Division Resolution in the Petition for Disqualification.
G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 18.
On the same day, in light of the January 23, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC
21

G.R. No. 161434, Rollo, at p. 18.

22

446 First Division, petitioners Tecson, et al. filed a Supplemental Petition arguing that:
30

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(1) The COMELEC First Division Resolution is void since, as COMELEC itself
admitted, it has no jurisdiction to determine the “core issue” of whether FPJ is a
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections natural-born citizen; and (2) the COMELEC’s ruling that FPJ is a natural-born
citizen under paragraph 3, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution is fatally flawed. 31

1. (2)However, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC In their Supplemental Petition, petitioners Tecson, et alreiterate their arguments
has the power to deny due course or to cancel Certificates of Candidacy that FPJ is not a natural-born citizen, he being an illegitimate child and, therefore,
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained follows the citizenship of his American mother; and even assuming that FPJ was
32

therein is false. 23 legitimated by the subsequent marriage and acknowledgment of his parents, Article
123 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that the effects of suc