University of San Carlos Publications

A Theoretical Review on Philippine Policy-making: The Weak State-Elitist Framework and

the Pluralist Perspective
Author(s): Bing Baltazar C. Brillo
Source: Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 54-76
Published by: University of San Carlos Publications
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Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society
Vol. 39(1): 54-76
© 2011, University of San Carlos Press

A Theoretical Review on Philippine

Policy-making: The Weak State-Elitist
Framework and the Pluralist Perspective1

Bing Baltazar C. Brillo

The Elite Conceptualization and Philippine Policy-Making

Over the years, scholars have examined the intricacies of
policy-making in the Philippines. The studies mostly showed
preference for the elitist perspective in analyzing the politics behind
the policies. Political power in Philippine society is presumed to be
skewed and concentrated in one dominant group, an elite that
controls policy-making most of the time. Among the early scholarship
under this genre is the work of Carl Lande using the patron-client
framework to explain the incoherence of policies (Lande 1958; see
also Lynch 1959; Hollnsteiner 1963). Lande (1965:1) observed that
unlike polities of most present-day Western democracies, Philippine
polity "is structured less by organized interest groups or by
individuals who in politics think of themselves as members of
categories, i.e., of distinctive social classes or occupations, than by a
network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individuals."
These dyadic relationships involve exchanges between the
prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients. The

Bing Baltazar C. Brillo is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social

Sciences, University of the Philippines-Los Baños and is pursuing a PhD in
Development Studies at De la Salle University. He can be reached at
[email protected].

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 55

political elite that controls the government and its policy-making

apparatus are those who have the wealth and position to do favors for
large numbers of ordinary people. These have profound consequences
on policies, as the heavy reliance on vertical and horizontal dyadic
relationships steers policy-making towards the pursuit of providing
rewards (e.g., special privileges, monopolies, or unwarranted
exemptions], while offering little incentives to pursue categorical
programs. The legislative program becomes more personal rather
than ideological or party-based. As the overarching intention is to
satisfy clientele demands, policy-making is continually marred by
accommodations and concessions that lead to inconsistent or aimless
policies.
Some scholars modify the patron-client framework by
adopting the political machine perspective, where material rewards
rather than personal ties are the center of analysis. James Scott (1969;
1972] declares that the traditional patron-client relation based on
loyalty and deference is being transformed into a political machine
(see also Nowak and Snyder 1970; Wolters 1984; Magno A. 1988;
Magno F. 1989; Gutierrez 1994]. Other scholars focus on conflict and
coercion rather than symbiotic personal ties. For instance, Benedict
Kerkvliet (1977; 1995] concludes that the amiable dyadic model is
deficient in explaining the uncongenial and antagonistic relationships
between people of unequal status and class positions as well as in
marginalizing the importance of values, ideas, organizations and
conflicts. Likewise, John Sidel (1989] asserts that the patron-client
framework fails to adequately account for the change and continuity
in Philippine rural politics as well as the role of coercion and the
autonomy of localities from central control. Although the means have
changed from personal ties to material rewards or coercion, the
implication for policy-making is the same—the political elite controls
policy-making and outcomes to secure political relevance and
continuity.

Other scholars use the dependency or neocolonial framework

in rationalizing foreign influence in policy-making and outcome.2
Devotees echo the idea that the Philippine polity must be seen in view
of the persistence of foreign influence and control over the
government (see Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973; Bello and Rivera

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56 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

1977). This fundamental premise assumes that the "American-given"

Philippine independence in 1946 did not totally free the country from
foreign domination; instead, neocolonialism particularly in the
economy was instituted [Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973; Stauffer
1973; Shalom 1981). By implication, the status of the Filipino political
elite in shaping policies was upheld but downgraded to an accomplice
of foreign interest (especially American interest), as major policies are
deemed as dictated from the outside. This interpretation presupposes
a subservient domestic elite and a policy-making manipulated by
external powers.
With the re-democratization after the fall of Marcos regime, the
appeal of the other frameworks faded.3 Scholars began to embrace the
elite democracy framework and its variants that quickly became the
dominant perspective in depicting Philippine politics. The strength of
the perspective is its inclusiveness; compared to the patron-client
framework, it takes into consideration more variables (such as
corruption, fraud, coercion and violence), and compared to the
dependency framework, it acknowledges that foreign interests at
times infringe on Philippine sovereignty but it does not suggest an
exaggerated view (Kerkvliet 1995; Quimpo 2005).
Beginning with what is generally considered a pioneering
work, Dante Simbulan (1965), in studying the socio-economic elites,
contends that Philippine politics revolves around the elite families.
These elites, which profoundly benefited during the Spanish and
American colonial period, are resilient. As these families continue to
hold political (and economic) power, they, in effect, continuously
monopolize policy-making over the years. Simbulan's thesis is echoed
by Benedict Anderson (1988) in Cacique Democracy, where he
discusses the continuity of the elite families from the Spanish
caciquism to the American electoralism and to the present. In
particular, Anderson notes that the transformation of the caciques to
political dynasties occurred during the American colonial period
when they secured the newly created elective offices and filled the
bureaucracy with their relatives and supporters, and that this so
called "cacique democracy" continues with its heyday in 1954 to 1972.
He further asserts that after the Marcos dictatorship cacique
democracy was restored. The traditional families again dominated the

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 57

electoral-political arena and by implication the governmental

decision-making. Alfred McCoy (1993:10), focusing more on
contemporary Philippine politics, concludes that one of the key
elements to have contributed directly to the formation of powerful
political families is "the rise of "rents' as a significant share of the
nation's economy." Here, McCoy is suggesting that the policy decisions
made in the past, specifically on policies enacted to benefit the elite
families, have built up, transformed and reinforced those policies. In
general, the Simbulan-Anderson-McCoy observations on political
elites are shared by many scholars who believe that the post-EDSA
politics was a reversion to the pre-Martial Law elite democracy where
political elites conveniently used elections as a relatively peaceful way
of competing and alternating political power among themselves (see
Hawes 1987; Bello and Gershman 1990; Stauffer 1990; Timberman
1991; Caoili 1993; Rocamora 1998; Teehankee 2001; Thompson
2010).
Other studies under the elite democracy genre specifically
focus on the relationship with elite rule, particularistic policies, and
development. For instance, Paul Hutchcroft (1991) contends that the
powerful and conservative elites who enjoy autonomy from the state
have resisted change. Using the concept of a patrimonial state, where
the political administration is treated as a personal affair, he argues
that the Philippine government is continually choked by
particularistic demands and actions coming from and on behalf of
oligarchs and cronies. Likewise, Olivia Caoili (1993, 2006a, 2006b),
focusing on the Philippine Congress, points out that having a
legislature traditionally dominated by exclusivistic political elite has
had a profound effect on substantive policy-making, as lawmakers
tend to be more preoccupied with local bills or particularistic
legislation. In a similar vein, Shiela Coronel et al. (2004; viii), in
examining the character of the contemporary Congress, admit the
existence of some changes in the elite-dominated Congress (such as
the entry of professionals, celebrities, media people, individuals from
the middle class, and incorporation of the party-list representatives),
but they say that the legislature continues to be "an elite body that
defends the interests of the wealthy and the powerful while
occasionally being open to demands from below." These studies

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58 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

demonstrate the adverse effect of the longevity of elite rule, as elite

families tend to use political power to benefit themselves and their
supporters. In policy-making, this practice translates to particularistic
policies that cater to private interests rather than the collective good.
As aptly resonated by the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD): "the
continued control of these families over politics and wealth is one of
the most formidable structural obstacles to democratization and
development" (Gutierrez 1994:302].
The more recent alternative perspective—the contested
democracy framework—incorporates the actions of forces below (e.g.,
ordinary individuals, subordinate classes, marginalized communities],
but still acknowledges the ascendancy of the elites in policy-making
(see Wurfel 1988; Kerkvliet 1995; Franco 2001; Quimpo 2005]. "The
oligarchs, caciques, bosses, and trapos are still very dominant in
Philippine politics, but their predatory rule has been challenged and
continues to be challenged by the poor and marginalized" (Quimpo
2005:243]. For example, Jose Magadia (2003], illustrating the
unevenness and inconsistencies in societal participation in policy
making, surveyed three major social policies of the Aquino
administration—agrarian reform, labor relations reform, and urban
reform policies. Although the elitist Congress still determines national
policies, he argues that the higher the level of political catalysis (the
process of accelerating state-society interaction where state and
society actors send a signal of willingness to engage each other], the
greater the participation of societal organizations in policy
deliberations. More recently, Teresa Tadem (2009], in discussing the
contemporary technocratic-elite control over decision-making on
economic policy, notes the continual challenge presented by civil
society and social movements. As in the formulation of the Philippine
government position in the World Trade Organization (WTO]
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA], she observes that the experience
reflects the emergence of "reformist" technocrats who are open to
negotiating with civil society actors in formulating policies. These
studies suggest that, to some extent, the forces below are moderating
the elite influence on substantive policy-making.

Despite the variations among the frameworks, overall, one

common element shared by them is the centrality of the concept of the

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 59

elite in Philippine policy-making. Patron-client dynamics involve a

reciprocal relationship between elites (patrons] and dependent
clients; dependency comprises the collaboration between the
domestic elites and imperialist elites; elite democracy fundamentally
consists of the dominance, alliances, and rivalry among the elites; and
contested democracy includes the challenge posed by the poor and
marginalized against an elite-dominated government (see Table 1].
This encompassing utilization of the concept of elites parallels the
inclination of scholars towards a weak conception of the state, as
political dynamics are generally explained in terms of the correlation
between a powerful elite and a weak state. The weak state-elitist
explanation is anchored on a zero-sum relationship, where the rise of
the predatory elite results in the decline of government power, and
thus, diminishing the capacity to produce public-oriented policies.

Table 1. The Centrality of the Concept of the Elite in Philippine Polity.

Political Frameworks Depicting the "Elite"

Patron-client the reciprocal relationship between elites

(patrons) and dependent clients

Dependency the collaboration between the domestic elites

and imperialist elites

Elite democracy the dominance, alliances, and rivalry among

the elites

Contested democracy the challenge posed by the poor and

marginalized against an elite dominated
government

The Philippine Weak State: Elite-Captured and

Foreign-Dominated
Philippine history is characterized by powerful political
oligarchies and a weak state (McCoy 1993). The weak state-predatory
elite explanation of society is encased in the broader weak state
strong society framework and is grounded on two key variables: the
centrality of powerful Filipino families (for pioneering studies, see Fox

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60 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

1959; Grossholtz 1964; Simbulan 1965; Agpalo 1972; Green 1973]

and a weak Philippine state. The weak state-strong society framework
has been popularized by Joel Migdal [1988], as he argues that the
weakness of third world states can be traced to powerful social forces
[commonly the dominance of elite clans] that continue to compete
with the government for authority. This makes the government
ineffective in carrying out development-oriented policies and
programs. Following this logic, the Philippine weak state is more often
than not acted upon rather than being an independent actor that can
initiate and undertake reform; important government actions, such as
assignment of privileges, are largely determined by the personal
discretion of the oligarchs controlling or holding official positions
(Hutchcroft 1991; 1993; 1998].
The Philippine weak state conception has been extensively
utilized by scholars. Temario Rivera [1991] depicts the Philippine
state as captured by competing societal interests, with little autonomy
from dominant social classes and entrenched particularistic groups.
Francisco Magno [1992] shows the inability of the Philippine state to
enforce its rules, particularly on forest regulation policies. Patricio
Abinales [1992] points out the role played by distance [spatial and
demographic factors] in tipping the balance for societal actors and
weakening the Philippine state. In another work, Abinales [1998]
opines that "the caciques prospered well under the weak state
structures" [158). Felipe Miranda (1992) argues that the Philippine
weak state is intertwined with a structurally strong and dominant
presidency. Jose Almonte (1993) describes a weak state as unable to
intervene and democratize the economy, particularly in wresting
economic control from the Filipino oligarchs. Amado Doronila (1994)
argues that decentralizing the authority and resources of the central
government in favor of the local governments is creating mutually
exclusive tensions that contribute significantly to the weakening of
the state. Joel Rocamora (1998) characterizes the weakness of the
state as the inability of the Philippine government "to formulate and
implement a coherent economic development strategy or to develop
political institutions capable of providing a reliable regulatory
framework for the economy" (4).

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 61

Hutchcroft (1998] portrays the Philippine state as a

patrimonial oligarchic state, which is preyed upon by an economically
autonomous oligarchy that uses the government and its
instrumentalities as the principal means to further accumulate wealth
and entrench their position. Herman Joseph Kraft (2003) equates the
growth and persistence of terrorism in the country as indicative of a
weak Philippine state, as the government is unable to mobilize the
requisite economic and political resources needed to address the
multi-faceted challenges it currently is facing. Walden Bello et al.
(2004) argue that "the American pattern of a weak central authority
coexisting with a powerful upper-class social organization ["civil
society" in today's parlance] was reproduced in the Philippines,
creating a weak state that was constantly captured by upperclass
interests and preventing the emergence of the activist 'developmental'
state" (4). Abinales and Amoroso (2005) define state weakness as "the
persistent inability of the state to provide basic services, guarantee
peace and order, and foster economic development" and is
"manifested in uncollected taxes and uncontrolled crime, bloated
bureaucracies and denuded forests, low teacher salaries, and high
emigration rates" (1).
Abinales (2008), in his more recent work, observes that the
resilience of Philippine Presidents can be attributed to another
dimension of a weak state. Although state weakness is primarily the
result of social forces expropriating state resources and programs to
advance patrimonial interests, he says that this attitude for plunder
enables the Presidents to secure support from social forces and to
"govern" as they craft mutually beneficial compromises with local
political clans, strong men and women, warlords and bosses and make
state largesse available in exchange for fidelity to their authority. Ben
Reid (2008) assesses that in a weak state dynamic where clientelism
and semi-clientilism predominate, even civil society which is
supposed to be a conditioning force is ultimately absorbed by the
clientelist relationships. And more recently, Alex Magno (2009)
defines the weak state as transactional, as it responds to
particularistic political stimulus from specific constituencies, i.f
vulnerable to political accommodation, compromises the integrity r
policies to suit immediate contingencies, and acts on constituenci

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62 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

that are insistently noisy rather than on ideas that are fundamentally
sound.

Overall, these discussions show the overwhelming tendency

among scholars of using the weak state-elitist framework as the
preferred explanation for the "negativities" (e.g., economic debacle,
bureaucratic weakness, impotency in enforcement, inability to
intervene, persistence of terrorism, and occurrence of particularistic
policies) in the Philippines (see Table 2).

Table 2. The Pervasiveness of the Weak State Thesis in Philippine Political

Literature

Scholars Utilization of the Concept

Temario Rivera (1991)

The weak state concept is
Francisco Magno (1992)
generally used as the
Patricio Abinales (1992, 1998,
preferred and
explanation 2008)
for the
Felipe Miranda (1992) many "negativities" in
Jose Almonte (1993) Philippine polity, such as:
Amado Doronila (1994)
economic debacle,
Joel Rocamora (1998)
bureaucratic weakness,
Hutchcroft (1998)
impotency in enforcement,
Herman Joseph Kraft (2003)
inability to intervene,
Walden Bello et al. (2004)persistence of terrorism,
Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso and occurrence of

(2005) particularistic policies.

Ben Reid (2008)
Alex Magno (2009)

Even in the few studies made in policy-making, the trend

continues to follow the weak state-elitist framework. In general, the
studies contend that the legislative process is controlled and
manipulated by coherent political elites, and as a consequence, policy
outcomes reflect their vested interest. For instance, Paul Hutchcroft
(who is considered to have made the most extensive studies under
this genre], in examining the politics of preferential credit policy and
banking policy, respectively, maintains a state dominated by
socioeconomic elites. Hutchcroft (1993] attributes the incoherence of

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 63

the credit policy to the weak and patrimonial nature of the Philippine
state, where policy is captured by special interests resulting in the
abuse of public finances and the private banking sector. In his other
work, Hutchcroft (1998), analyzing the effect of the relationship
between the state and elite families in the banking sector, concludes
that because of rampant favoritism and weak state regulations, the
oligarchs are able to plunder the banking sector by abusing their loan
portfolios and engaging in cartel practices. This practice, he further
asserts, persists despite regime change. Moreover, Hutchcroft,
applying the concept of booty capitalism, equates the domination of
oligarchic clans to the unpredictability and inconsistency in banking
policies and the dismal state of the Philippine economy. The
archetypal example here is the well-documented "abuse" of the
Philippine National Bank by the oligarchic sugar bloc (Quirinol974;
McCoy 1988; Rivera 1994).
In still another study, Emmanuel De Dios (1990), analyzing the
Philippine political economy, notes the conspicuous continuity in
economic policy in the country despite the post-EDSA transition to
democratic processes and institutions. The continuance of policy from
pre-Martial Law to post-1986, he explains, is due to the persistence of
the "old" political economy, where the economic and political elites
dominate the state's policy-making. Rivera (1994), examining the
process of industrialization in the Philippines based on the
development of the domestic sector from 1950 to 1986, observes that
the persistence of protectionist policies is traceable to "the internal
structuring and class formation of the ISI (import-substitution
industrialization) bourgeoisie—its linkages with the export-landlord
class, with foreign capital, and with the state apparatus" (20). He
concludes that the failure of Philippine industrialization is caused by
three interlinked factors: first, the control of the landed families over
the manufacturing sector; second, the alliance between the landed
families and foreign investors; and lastly, a weak state lacking
autonomy. While Caoili (1993 and 2006b), examining the post-1987
Philippine legislature, observes that the homogeneity of the political
elites has resulted in the persistent conservatism of Congress and in
the neglect of basic issues affecting national development.

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64 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

In addressing the weak state problem in policy-making,

scholars usually offer a standard prescription—the insulation of the
government from the subversion of vested interests. For example,
Manuel Montes (1992) concludes that strengthening the state means
building its capacity to make economic intervention independent of
particularistic interest, where the government is capable of
formulating and implementing economic policy with sufficient
autonomy from these interests. Rivera (1994) argues that only
through a strong, autonomously embedded state can the government
break the continuing power of the elites, lead a social coalition for
industrial growth, and produce economic policies that could
creatively respond to opportunities in the world market. Doronila
(1994) maintains that despite the tensions caused by devolution and
localism, there is a need to build a strong Philippine state to facilitate
and promote reform. Similarly, Almonte (2007) stresses that "our
most urgent need is to raise the political capacity of the Philippine
State—to set it free from the dominance of vested interest groups and
enable it to act unequivocably—on behalf of the common good and
the national interest" (119). Here, political capacity refers to the
legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions, and insuring the
autonomy of the administrative elite, that is insulating it from the
importuning of particularistic groups.

Early on, other scholars such as Constantino (1970), Lichauco

(1973), and Bello and Rivera (1977), focused on another dimension of
the weak state conception vis-à-vis policy-making.4 These scholars
associated state weakness with the susceptibility of government to
interference from external actors, such as foreign governments,
international organizations or transnational businesses, in making
substantive policy decisions. This is similar to the dependency
framework's thesis, wherein their conception associates external
influence in bringing about particularistic policies, as foreign interests
are considered as taking precedence in policy outcomes. Thus, under
this circumstance, the government's capacity to legislate beneficial
public policies is significantly impaired.
In general, the weak state-elitist literature suggests that the
Philippine polity's persistent incapacity in legislating beneficial
public-policy is associated with two conditions of the state: first, an

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 65

elite-captured state where coherent political elites continuously

control policy-making; and second, a foreign-dominated state where
the enduring external influence shapes policy formulation and
decision (see Table 3).

Table 3. The Weak State-Elitist Tradition and Policy-making in the

Philippines.

Scholars Rationalization for Incapacity in

Legislating Public-Regarding Policy

Hutchcroft (1993)
Hutchcroft (1998)
Quirino (1974)
McCoy (1988)
Rivera (1994)
Gutierrez (1994) elite-captured state
De Dios (1990)
Montes (1992)
Doronila (1994)
Almonte (2007)
Caoili (1993 and 2006b) —^
Constantino (1970) "~|
Lichauco(1973) I =— foreign-dominated state
Bello and Rivera (1977) J

The Pluralist Perspective and Philippine Policy-making

In contemporary political thought, there are two dominant
perspectives in interpreting politics [i.e. the process in making
political decisions)—the pluralist and the elitist perspectives. The
earlier elitist perspective views the government as the key entity used
by the dominant group in a stratified society [i.e. the haves and the
have-nots) to advance their interests; hence, policies are deemed as
political decisions intended to serve their vested interest [see Pareto
1935; Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Michels 1962). This perspective
accentuates the collaboration among the elites in controlling the
government and its policy decisions. On the other hand, the pluralist
perspective views the government as an arena among competing
interests in society and that policies are political decisions that reflect

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66 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

the acceptable equilibrium among contending groups (see Truman

1951; Bentley 1967; Dahl 1961,1967 and 1971; Lindblom 1977], This
perspective puts emphasis on diversity and competition among
political actors, as they utilize power and resources (e.g., money,
supporters, expertise, information, or connections] to influence
government's policy decisions.
With the ascendancy of the weak state-elitist framework,
scholars have shown preference for the elitist perspective in
interpreting Philippine politics. Political power in society is presumed
to be skewed and concentrated in a privileged group rather than
spread across groups, and this coherent political elite controls policy
making most of the time. This conventional conception, however,
needs validation, particularly in view of the few empirical studies in
Philippine policy-making showing that instead of tight-knit political
elites conspiring, there is increasing diversity and competition among
political elites.
For instance, Rigoberto Tiglao (1992), in explaining the politics
of policy-making during the Aquino administration, contends that the
elite fragmentation after the democratic restoration has led to intense
competition for political control. As a consequence, this has propelled
the government towards policies that satisfy short-term populist
demands rather than long-term development-oriented policies.
Antonio Pedro (2002], studying the legislation for the liberalization of
foreign banking, focuses on the existing nature of state-society and
business-government relationships. He asserts that Hutchcroft's booty
capitalism framework is incomplete, since it fails to note the changing
dynamics in policy-making. He concludes that the various actors in
government, business, and civil society have acted autonomously in
the legislation of the law. In a similar vein, Eric Batalla (2002],
analyzing the politics of financial liberalization in the Philippines,
offers insights on the nature of state, business-government relations,
and policy-making. He agrees with Pedro's findings that the
characteristics of policy-making as well as the government-business
relations in the Philippines are changing. He further contends that the
fragmentation among the political and business elites has made it
possible for the government to act autonomously and succeed in
making policy change or reform.

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 67

More recently, Brillo (2010), analyzing the legislation and re

legislation of the anti-dumping law, touches on the interagency
competition among the governmental actors. He observes that
executive agencies see the repeal process as an opportunity to expand
their domain and scope of authority. The issue of jurisdiction in R.A.
7843 has led to a bureaucratic battle between government agencies
(i.e. Department of Finance [DOF] vs. Department of Trade and
Industry [DTI]) that spilled over to Congress, with the House of
Representatives backing DOF and the Senate supporting DTI. In
another study, Brillo (2012a), examining the legislation of the foreign
investment law, analyzes the bureaucrat-politician's dynamics in its
policy-making. He argues that contrary to the weak state thesis, a
different set of dynamics exists between the bureaucrats and
politicians. He notes that the bureaucrats are active, autonomous, and
dominant in policy-making, as they basically determine the inputs of
the discussions, the critical content of the proposal, and most
importantly, the policy outcome. On the other hand, the politicians are
passive and reactive in the lawmaking process, as they defer to the
wisdom of bureaucrats and their participation is largely confined to
fine tuning—adjustments or refinements in the form of stipulations or
exceptions to suit and placate supporters, constituents, allies or
favored interests. In the same light, Brillo (2012b), re-examining the
politics of the policy-making of the foreign bank liberalization law in
the Philippines, makes a fine-grained assessment of the quality of
pluralism that exists among actors in the legislation of the banking
policy. He contends that the law has taken a conservative form since
the Senate has a formidable alliance with the bureaucracy and interest
groups (viz., the Senate-Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [BSP], Bankers
Association of the Philippines [BAP], resident foreign banks bloc), as
compared to the House of Representatives; and that the internal
dynamics between the Senate and the House of Representatives have
made it difficult for the former to make concessions while easier for
the latter to make compromises. Summing up, these studies suggest
that contemporary policy-making is better viewed from the
standpoint of pluralism—a political process where a range of
autonomous actors compete in influencing and defining the policy
outcome (Self 1985; Smith 1990; Howlett and Ramesh 1995).

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68 Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society

Concluding Remarks
In the literature, the dynamics in Philippine polity, specifically
the government's capacity in legislating policies has been, time and
again, interpreted by scholars using the dominant weak state-elitist
framework. In general, the weak state-elitist framework presupposes
that the Philippine polity's chronic incapacity of producing public
regarding policies is deemed the consequence of two conditions of the
state. First is the elite-captured state which refers to the enduring
control of powerful, homogenous political elites over the
government's policy-making mechanism. Second is the foreign
dominated state which refers to the vulnerability of the government's
policy decisions to external influences or interferences. In both
cases—whether by virtue of the elite-captured state or the foreign
dominated state—there is an adverse effect since the governmental
capacity in legislating beneficial public policies is considerably
compromised.
A small group of scholars have questioned the soundness and
adequacy of the weak state-elitist framework. They have pointed out
that its clichéd explanation is out-of-synch with the contemporary
policy-making experiences. By implication, the weak state-elitist view
is overused and, by taking a broad perspective, is too general to be of
much analytical use in policy-making analysis (Atkinson and Coleman
1989; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Mikamo 1997], These scholars
suggest that pluralism better characterizes present-day Philippine
policy-making since there is increasing fragmentation among political
actors in legislating policies. Here, the actors are seen as autonomous
with distinct interests, resources, and power, giving rise to divergent
positions across policy issues over time. Thus, in the light of the
changing nature of policy-making in the Philippines, these studies
imply the need to reassess the dominant weak state-elitist framework.

ENDNOTES

lrThe author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers, but assumes

responsibility for the final manuscript.

2The ascendancy of this neocolonial interpretation of Philippine politic

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 Philippine Policy-making: Perspectives 69

aided by the global rediscovery of imperialism and the rise of dependency school, as
well as the heavy reliance of the Marcos government on economic and militaiy
assistance from the United States (Quimpo 2005).

3For instance, scholars began to question and criticize the dependency

framework, particularly its seeming oversimplification—the absence of autonomy of
the Philippine government and the overwhelming American influence over it

4See discussion on the dependency framework.

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