F.C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co.

FACTS:
Fisher is a stockholder in the Yangco Steamship Company. The directors of the company adopted a
resolution which was thereafter ratified and affirmed by the shareholders of the company, expressly
declaring and providing that the classes of merchandise to be carried by the company in its business as a
common carrier do not include dynamite, powder or other explosives, and expressly prohibiting the
officers, agents and servants of the company from offering to carry, accepting for carriage said
dynamite, powder or other explosives.

Then Acting Collector of Customs demanded and required of the company the acceptance and carriage
of such explosives. He has refused and suspended the issuance of the necessary clearance documents of
the vessels of the company unless and until the company consents to accept such explosives for
carriage. Fisher was advised that should the company decline to accept such explosives for carriage, the
respondent Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands and the respondent prosecuting attorney of the
city of Manila intend to institute proceedings under the penal provisions of sections 4, 5,and 6 of Act No.
98 of the Philippine Commission against the company, its managers, agents and servants.

Notwithstanding the demands of Fisher, the manager, agents and servants of the company decline and
refuse the carriage of such explosives.

ISSUE:
WON the acts complained of had the effect of making or giving an unreasonable or unnecessary
preference or advantage to any person, locality or particular kind of traffic, or of subjecting any person,
locality, or particular kind of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or discrimination

HELD:
No.

There may be some vessels engaged in business as common carriers of merchandise, which for lack of
suitable deck space or storage rooms might be justified in declining to carry kerosene oil, gasoline, and
similar products, even when offered for carriage securely packed in cases; and few vessels are equipped
to transport those products in bulk. But in any case of a refusal to carry such products which would
subject any person, locality or the traffic in such products would be necessary to hear evidence before
making an affirmative finding that such prejudice or discrimination was or was not unnecessary, undue
or unreasonable. The making of such a finding would involve a consideration of the suitability of the
vessel for the transportation of such products; the reasonable possibility of danger or disaster resulting
from their transportation in the form and under the conditions in which they are offered for carriage;
the general nature of the business done by the carrier and, in a word, all the attendant circumstances
which might affect the question of the reasonable necessity for the refusal by the carrier to undertake
the transportation of this class of merchandise.

VDA. DE NUECA v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958, Fermin Nueca brought7 sacks of palay to Manila Railroad Co. (MRC) atits
station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, tobe shipped to the municipality of Libmanan of thesame
province.-He paid P 0.70 as freight charge and was issuedWay Bill No. 56515.-The cargo was loaded on
the freight wagon of Train 537. Passengers boarded the train andshunting operations started to hook a
wagonthereto.-Before the train reached the turnoff switch, itspassenger coach fell on its side some 40 m
fromthe station. The wagon pinned Nueca, killing himinstantly.-Nueca’s widow and children bring this
claim fordamages, alleging that the Nueca was apassenger and his death was caused by
MRC’snegligence.-MRC disclaimed liability stating: (1) it exerciseddue care in safeguarding the
passengers duringthe shunting operation, (2) Nueca was not a passenger but a trespasser, (3) even if
Nuecawere a passenger, he illegally boarded the trainwithout permission by not paying the fare, (4)
themishap was not attributable to any defect in MRCequipment, (5) that the accident happened due
toforce majeur.-MRC presented evidence showing there was nomechanical defect, but it did not explain
why theaccident occurred or show that force majeurcaused the mishap.-The lower court absolved MRC
of liability and heldthat Nueca was a trespasser since he did not buyany ticket, and in any case, was not
in a properplace for passengers.

Issue:

1.W/N Nueca was a passenger?2.W/N MRC is liable?[Link] the accident due to MRC’s negligence
orforce majeur?[Link] Nueca liable for contributory negligence?Held:[Link], Nueca was not a passenger
thus, MRC did notowe him extraordinary diligence.A passenger is one who travels in a public
conveyanceby virtue of a contract, express or implied, with thecarrier as to the payment of the fare, or
that which isaccepted as an equivalent. The relation of passenger and carrier commences whenone puts
himself in the care of the carrier, or directlyunder its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a
passenger, and is accepted as such by thecarrier – as where he makes a contract for trasportationand
presents himself at the proper place and in a propermanner to be transported.

KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO

(G.R. No. 85331; August 25, 1989)

Legal Issue:

Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LINE

(
KBL) is liable for damagesfrom the [Link] of the Case:The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was
then coming from Pila, Laguna andtraversing the an old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL
bus driven by itsregular driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who
wasdriving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards thedirection of
Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven byGrajera. The sketch marked
very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed theintersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It
is also obvious that the point of impactwas on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly
belonging to the [Link] from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch
(Exhibit 'E'), thesequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the
jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to
move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersectionto give way to the
jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop withoutslamming into the rear of the
vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way,
unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera,which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center
of the highway and was directlyon the path of the KBL bus. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was
travelling at afast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another
50meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.

Ruling of the Court:YES

. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision.

Reason behind the Ruling:

The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal
presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the
supervision of its bus driver, where the employer is held liablefor damages; it has of course a right of
recourse against its own negligent employee. Theliability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is direct and immediate; itis not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner
Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The awardof moral
damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quitemodest consideirng
Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a deathhastened by, if not directly due to,
the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. [Link] OF APPEALS, all Heirs of the late Pedrito
Cudiamat – Contributory Negligence – Arts. 1761-1762 – Ces
October 7, 1991
FACTS:
Pedrito Cudiamat tried to board the bus of Dangwa while it was slowly moving. When Pedrito stepped
on the platform in an attempt to enter therein, the bus suddenly accelerated forward. Pedrito fell from
the platform and was ran over by the bus. Subsequently, he died.
The heirs of Pedrito filed an action for damages against Dangwa based on the latter’s negligence.
Dangwa said that it was not liable because the proximate cause of Pedrito’s death was his own
negligence in trying to board a moving vehicle.

ISSUE: WON Pedrito is guilty of contributory negligence.

NO.
The act of Pedrito in attempting to board a slowly moving vehicle was not negligence per se. The fact
that passengers board and alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience and
both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
Pedrito, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is
entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held
that the duty, which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons, extends to persons boarding the cars
as well as to those alighting therefrom.

ARTICLE 1762 provides that the contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of
damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common
carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
The aforesaid provision applies only where both parties are guilty of negligence and not, as in this case,
where only the negligence of the CC was the proximate cause of Pedrito’s death.
The SC said that only Dangwa was negligent. Thus, it was solely answerable for Pedrito’s death.