III.

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

A. Definition
● What is human rights law?

Simon, Jr. v. FACTS:

Commission on Human ● The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo
Rights, 229 SCRA 117 (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the QC
, January 05, 1994 Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
PINEDA officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated).
● Respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to July 12, 1990) to
vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.
● Prior to their receipt of the notice, the respondents were informed by
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's
Park".
● On July 12, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon, Jr., of
QC to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA.
● The CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering
petitioners to appear before the CHR
● The petitioners carried out the demolition.
● The CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance
of not more than P200,000 in favor of the private respondents to purchase
light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the
warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt
and arrest."
● A motion to dismiss was issued by petitioners questioning CHR's
jurisdiction.
● a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that
the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the
rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business.
● In an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition despite the "order to desist". CHR also denied their MD, stating
that:
○ "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and
political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body
with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . .
.“
○ “The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity…”
● Petitioner’s MR was also denied. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the CHR has jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished
by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of QC?
--- NO

RULING:
● NO, CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights. The order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents cannot fall
within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

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● The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted
by then President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative power
at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.
● Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights
○ . . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
○ The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
● In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, one of the questions
that has been propounded is "what do you understand by "human rights?"
The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given
the following varied answers:
○ Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of
his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world. . . .
○ Include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom,
and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights,
such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in politics;
and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment,
and social services.
○ The entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer
fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights
are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and
protected by it.
○ (Include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
○ Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable.
● The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggests that the scope of
human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an
individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations.
● Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering
the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
● "Civil rights," has been defined as referring —
○ (t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the
government. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to
rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
● Political rights are said to refer to the right
○ to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government

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 ● In the case at bar, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished
are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed
into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway.
● The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess.
● The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00
by way of financial aid is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not
only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question
the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
● The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding in the investigation
and from implementing the fine for contempt.

Risos-Vidal v. FACTS:
Commission on ● On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Elections, 747 SCRA Estrada, for the crime of plunder in a Criminal Case
210 , January 21, 2015 ● On October 25, 2007, however, former President Arroyo extended
(include J. Leonen executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.
dissent) ● The next day, Former President Estrada "received and accepted” the
pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
PINEDA ● On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a COC, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
*Sorry Patrick. I need to ● Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
assign you another one COMELEC.
since you weren’t ● Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President
included in the first set. :( Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction
for Plunder Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. She relied on Section 40
of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
● Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
○ SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
○ (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath
of allegiance to the Republic; ...x
● Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
○ Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who ... has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
● The COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification; The subsequent MR filed by petitioner was denied.
● On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the
present petition. While this case was pending before the Court, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and Estrada was voted into office.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified
to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo? --- NO

RULING:

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 ● Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
● The wording of the pardon is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

● Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C of the 1987
constitution, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the
power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency
● It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC.
● Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC

● Articles 36 and 41 cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons
convicted of violating penal statutes.
● All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty
does not carry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless the
President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still
recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and,
specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its
accessory penalties or to pardon both.
● A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon.
● The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder
and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
● The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
● Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is indubitable
from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together
with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of Estrada under Sec. 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12

of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him.
● Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court
reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted admits no other
interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon
granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including
the right to seek elective office.
● While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC
is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
● The third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the

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 conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
● If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought
to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to
former President Estrada
● Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon
granted was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete
factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to
grant a limited pardon. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions.

J. Leonen, dissent:
● The Dissent of Justice. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there was no
express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold
public office in the pardon granted to Estrada, as required by Articles 36
and 41 of the RPC.
● Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or
diminish the President’s power to extend clemency.
● Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They
only provide a procedural prescription. They are only concerned with how
he or she is to exercise such power so that no other governmental
instrumentality needs to intervene to give it full effect.
● All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to
include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold
public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification,he or she should do so expressly.
● Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution
actually concerns the coverage of the pardon – whether the pardon granted
to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have restored all his
political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
● Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute
nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former President Estrada
is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing
statement restored to former President Estrada all his civil and political
rights except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage
and to hold public office. He adds that had the President chosen to be so
expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, she
should have been more clear on her intentions.

B. Sources
● Law
● Philosophy
● Religion

IV. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

UDHR Preamble Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
*Anyone can copy-paste of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in this part in the world,

SOURCE: Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
https://www.un.org/en/un which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which
iversal-declaration- human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
human-rights/ want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last

resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be

5
 protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between

nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in
the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with

the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest

importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education
to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Government of Hong FACTS:

Kong Special
Administrative Region v. 1. In 1995, The RP and HK, then under the British Crown signed an
Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons” Which
470 , April 19, 2007 took effect on June 20, 1997, days before HK was handed back over to the
PRC as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
RIGOR
2. 1999 - The HK DOJ sent the DOJ of the Philippines a request for
On Extradition- It is the provisional arrest of private respondent, Munoz who was charged in HK
right of a foreign power with offenses against their “Prevention of Bribery Ordinance” and the
created by treaty, to common law of Hong Kong.
demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted 3. The DOJ forwarded the request to the NBI who then turned it over to the
of a crime within its RTC which issued an Order of Arrest against Munoz.
territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the 4. Munoz was arrested but then filed a petition for certiorari. Prohibition, and
state to surrender him to mandamus assailing the validity of the order of the arrest. CA rendered it
the demanding state. void but the SC sustained its validity.

NOT a criminal 5. HK SAR filed a petition for the extradition of private respondent at the RTC
proceeding. It is not a of Manila. Munoz meanwhile filed petition for bail in the same case. Petition
trial. It is merely for bail was initially denied in the RTC, and then granted on appeal. Thus,
administrative in HK SAR filed an urgent motion to vacate the order granting bail.
character but it does
involve the deprivation of 6. Petitioner’s argument: The trial court committed a grave abuse of
liberty on the part of the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the private
extraditee, and the respondent to bail because there is no law in the Philippines that provides
means employed to that a potential extraditee has a right to bail. The right being limited solely
attain its purposes are to criminal proceedings.
the machinery of criminal
law. (arrests) 7. Respondent’s argument: The right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee. Extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the right to bail may be extended to potential

extradites. (Yes. it does)

HELD:

6
 1. The Bill of Rights, specifically Sec 13, Art. III of the Constitution provides
that the right to bail shall not be imapired.

2. Modern trends in public international law primarily placed primacy on the

worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed the right to life, liberty, and all the
other fundamental rights of every person. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community.

3. The State’s power to deprive a person’s liberty is not necessarily limited to

criminal proceedings. Furthermore, bail is not limited to criminal
proceedings. Bail has been allowed in the jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international obligations.

4. The Philippines has granted bail on deportation cases such as US v. Go-

Sioco and Mejoff v. Director of Prisons. If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, there is no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases.

5. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to extraditee,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion of bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.

6. Under pacta sunt servanda, the Philippines should honor its obligations
under the extradition treaty. HOWEVER, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by the Constitutions but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is party to.

The SC dismissed HK SAR’s petition and remanded the case to the TC to determine
if Munoz was entitled to bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence”. If not,
he shall be extradited.

B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

ICCPR Preamble The States Parties to the present Protocol,

*Anyone can copy-paste Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
in this part United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,

Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenants on Human Rights recognize that the ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights,

Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of

all human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Recalling that each State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Covenant) undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially

7
 economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures,

Considering that, in order further to achieve the purposes of the Covenant and the
implementation of its provisions, it would be appropriate to enable the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) to
carry out the functions provided for in the present Protocol,

In the Matter of the FACTS: This is a very long case. I’m so sorry. :(
Allegations Contained in :<
the Columns of Mr. ● Case of Indirect Contempt against Amado Macasaet:
Amado P. Macasaet
Published in Malaya ● The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the "Business
Dated September 18, Circuit" column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of
19, 20 and 21, 2007, general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles, containing
561 SCRA 395 , statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the
August 08, 2008 Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper on
September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007.
TAONGAN
● In the 18-21 September 2007 issues of Malaya, Macasaet ran a story,
RELEVANT!!!: based on information obtained from confidential sources, of an alleged
bribery in the Court committed as follows:
Even the major ● On separate occasions in the second week of September 2007,
international and regional five "milk" boxes containing cash worth P10 million were delivered
human rights instruments to the Court and received by a certain "Cecilia," a staff of an
of civil and political rights unnamed lady Justice who was absent that day so her staff Cecilia
- the International opened one of the boxes and saw its contents.
Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), ● Cecilia wasn't named at first but the clue given was that "the Court
the European employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another
Convention on Human lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the
Rights (ECHR), the incumbent lady justice." Macasaet later said in another article, " I
American Convention on have established the lady justice's secretary who opened one of
Human Rights (ACHR), the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late,
and the African Charter respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma
on Human and People's from Batangas." *The name of the secretary is Cecilia Muñoz-
Rights (ACHPR) - protect Delis.
both freedom of
expression and the ● Forthwith, the Justice terminated "Cecilia’s" employment. The
administration of justice. payoff was made allegedly in connection with a decision rendered
Freedom of expression is by the Justice "acquitting" a Filipino-Chinese businessman.
protected under Article
19 of the ICCPR ' ● Macasaet’s story, which carried commentaries on the state of the judiciary
and reputation of judges, exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she
(1) Everyone shall have knows about the alleged bribery and the Court to investigate the matter.
the right to hold opinions
without interference. ● Newsbreak, an online magazine, posted on its website a news report that
(2) Everyone shall have the Court is investigating a bribery incident based on facts substantially
the right to freedom of similar to what Macasaet wrote. The news report named Justice Consuelo
expression; this right Ynares-Santiago as the member of the Court involved in the alleged bribery
shall include freedom to and one Cecilia Delis (Delis) as her staff whose employment she
seek, receive and impart terminated.
information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of ● On September 24 2007, Justice Santiago issued a statement denying the
frontiers, either orally, in "accusations and insinuations" published in Malaya and Newsbreak.
writing or in print, in the Justice Santiago also asked the Court to investigate the matter.
form of art, or through
any other media of his ● In a Resolution, the Court en banc required Macasaet to explain "why no
choice. sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court". After
Macasaet complied and Delis provided her affidavit, the Court created a
However, Article 19 of Committee, composed of former members of the Court, to "receive
the ICCPR is made evidence from all parties concerned" and submit its report and
subject to Article 14(1), recommendation.
which guarantees the
right of individuals to "be ● Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo (Newsbreak employees) uniformly testified that

8
equal before the courts they obtained the information on the alleged bribery from their respective
and tribunals" and "be confidential sources.
entitled to a fair x x x
hearing by a competent, ● Cecilia Delis denied having opened any box containing cash intended for
independent and Justice Santiago. While admitting that she was a staff of Justice Santiago,
impartial tribunal," where Delis denied having been fired from service and claimed that she resigned,
"[t]he press and the that she was not the secretary but was a Judicial Staff Officer, that as a
public may be excluded matter of procedure, she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as
from all or part of a trial such was a duty assigned to their utility personnel; that it was "highly
for reasons of morals, unlikely for something as blatant as [a] bribery attempt to have been done
public order (order right in the doors of the Court.
public) or national
security in a democratic ● It was determined during the hearings conducted by the Committee that
society, or when the the case referred to in Macasaet and Newsbreak’s publications is the case
interest of the private of Henry T. Go v. Sandiganbayan. The petition in that case sought the
lives of the Parties so nullification of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling denying quashal of the
requires, or to the extent Information filed against petitioner Henry Go for violation of Section 3(g)
strictly necessary in the of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). In a Decision
opinion of the court in penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Third Division, by a divided
special circumstances vote, dismissed the petition. Go sought reconsideration and while his
where publicity would motion was pending, Justice Callejo retired from the Court. In the
prejudice the interests of Resolution penned by Justice Santiago, Go’s motion was granted, the
justice x x x." earlier decision reversed, and the Information filed against Go was
dismissed. The respondent sought reconsideration which awaits
Article 10(2) of the ECHR resolution.
goes further by explicitly
mentioning the ● In its Report and Recommendation, the Committee found that "there exist
maintenance of the valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet for indirect contempt x x x."
authority and impartiality
of the judiciary ' ● The Committee also found:
○ As Justice Vitug has observed during the last hearing before the
“The exercise of these Committee, everything that has been heard thus far would appear
freedoms, since it carries to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted "there is no paper trail" to
with it duties and support the charge of bribery against Justice Santiago. None of
responsibilities, may be her sources had talked with Delis herself.
subject to such
formalities, conditions, ○ That Macasaet's story about the bribery and of Cecilia's role in
restrictions or penalties supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and
as are prescribed by law contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due diligence,
and necessary in a patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed
democratic society..., for to him, before giving it publicity in his columns. His article and that
preventing disclosure of of Newsbreak made a lot of assumptions such as: "That the five
information received in (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another
confidence, or for assumption of Macasaet's. "It is a calculation based on estimates
maintaining the authority obtained from friends and how much five boxes can hold in one
and impartiality of the thousand peso bills, more or less ten million," he explained.
judiciary.”
● Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt
of court, the Committee recommended to cite Amado P. Macasaet for
indirect contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macasaet was merely exercising his right to press freedom
and should therefore, not be guilty of contempt. - NO.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY

of indirect contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, in
accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

*SC had a very long discussion on the principle of press freedom.

Nature and History of Press Freedom

● Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the

press, is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. The history of press
freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in 1215,

9
 which established the principle that not even the lawmaker should be above
the law.

● In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical

defense of the right to free speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order
of June 14, 1643, which declared that no "book, pamphlet, paper, nor part
of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed,
bound, stitched or put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless
the same be first approved of and licensed under the hands of such person
or persons as both, or either of the said Houses shall appoint for the
licensing of the same."

● Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist - Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to
forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what
is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his
own temerity.

● In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the
First Amendment to its Constitution, declaring that "Congress shall make
no law x x x abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."

● Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III,

1987 Constitution, which in part provides that "[n]o law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press x x x x," is
a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.

Media and Its Multiplying Roles in Democracy

● The use of information technology has firmed up the media networks' hold
on power. Traditional media for mass communication - newspapers,
magazines, radio, and standard television - have been joined by satellite
and cable television, electronic mail, short messaging and multi-media
service, and the internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic
news and information companies to even intensify their influence over the
general public.

● The media exert a strong influence on what people think and feel. Certainly,
the power of Philippine media is of no small measure. The reach of
Philippine media is quite extensive '

● The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They
provide citizens with relevant information to help them make informed
decisions about public issues affecting their lives. As the Fourth Estate in
our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and
vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the years, the Philippine
media have earned the reputation of being the "freest and liveliest" in Asia.

Open Justice and Judicial Independence

● Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the
public right to scrutinize and criticize government. There is no doubt that
the fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily includes the
right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions.

● This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic

society as freedom of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in
several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the
determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will
provide:
○ (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy,
and
○ (2) the maintenance of the public's confidence in the
administration of justice.

● Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure

10
 that the rule of law shall rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-
tiered system of government, so structured that no branch holds limitless
power.

● The judicial branch is described as the "least dangerous" branch of

government. But it holds a special place in the tripartite system, as it is
primarily responsible for protecting basic human liberties from government
encroachment. It completes the nation's system of checks and balances. It
serves as an arbiter of disputes between factions and instruments of
government.

● The present judicial system allows the people to rely upon our courts with
substantial certainty; it encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms
rather than on the streets. To accomplish these tasks, an independent
judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy.
It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of
government as well.

● One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each

particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with
autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear - or at least
without having to take it seriously if he does hear - criticisms of his personal
morality and fitness for judicial office.

● The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on

the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects
judges as a class.

● A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of

independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence
threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate.

● But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and

illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the
court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they
conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional
responsibilities; they also undermine the people's confidence in the
courts.

● Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct - yet related -
undesirable consequences.
○ First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated
from the personal and political consequences of making an
unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk.
○ Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the public's trust
and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial
independence and the public's trust and confidence in the
judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a
healthy democracy.

● Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of

expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not
absolute.

● The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary

through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of
the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.

RELEVANT (based on topic this case is under)

● Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil
and political rights - the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),

11
 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) - protect both freedom
of expression and the administration of justice. Freedom of expression is
protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR '

○ (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without

interference.
○ (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.

● However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which

guarantees the right of individuals to "be equal before the courts and
tribunals" and "be entitled to a fair x x x hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal," where "[t]he press and the public may
be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order
(order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the
interest of the private lives of the Parties so requires, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x."

● Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the

maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary '

● “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and

responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society..., for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

A Survey of Philippine Jurisprudence

● In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of

the Court of First Instance of Pampanga - the very first case decided by the
Supreme Court was a contempt proceeding.

● Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of
offenses that have attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the
administration of justice. Cases of Amzi B. Kelly was held guilty of
contempt. She was the editor of The Independent criticizing the Court for
its decision to hold him in contempt for having published a book stating that
various government officials, including the members of the Supreme Court,
were guilty of politically assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was
executed for the killing of a political rival in 1915.Atty. Vicente Sotto was
fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in the Manila Times objecting to
one of the High Court's decisions, citing that such decision by the majority
was but another evidence of "the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of
the majority of its members". Eva Maravilla-Ilustre where she assailed the
SC minutes resolutions and said in her letter, that the "unjust resolutions
railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of
the SC under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics." The Court fined her for contempt and held "Letters
addressed to individual Justices in connection with the performance of their
judicial functions become part of the judicial records and are a matter of
public concern for the entire Court."

Application of Existing Jurisprudence to the Case at Bar

● In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding,

the Court weighs the conflicting constitutional considerations -
respondent's claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and,
on the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding
public interest in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the
orderly administration of justice - both indispensable to the preservation

12
 of democracy and the maintenance of a just society.

● The Court has no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in
our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or
public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way
for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.

● Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this

genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless
scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press
freedom.

● The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found
respondent feigning his "highest respect for this Court".

● Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of

"thieves" and a "basket of rotten apples." These publications directly
undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme
Court as an institution.

● Aggravating respondent's affront to the dignity of the Court is his

unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous
acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before the Investigating
Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published
the instant articles, he replied that he was "happy in the sense that [he] did
a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the
investigating panel].

● Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which partly states that "x x x members of the Supreme Court
x x x may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x
x x bribery x x x" and Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that "[t]he
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case
of impeachment."

● The Court cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no

impeachment complaint has been filed against Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago. Thus, his cited constitutional provisions do not come into play.

● Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From
the time his articles were published, no formal charge has been filed
against him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the
same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio
by the court against which the contempt was committed, by an order or any
other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be
punished for contempt.

● In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee

proceedings as "fatally defective for patent denial of due process"89
because "when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses,
denying to Macasaet such right."

● The Court disagrees on triple grounds:

○ (1) The proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be
regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests on
Macasaet, not on the Committee. "Strictly speaking however, they
are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the
contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has
been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the
elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really
constituting neither. "

○ (2) Assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-

13
 examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his
right to due process of law was violated. The right of an accused
to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct
of the Constitutional right "to meet the witnesses face to face," can
be waived when not timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet,
never did he assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him despite the opportunity to do so.

○ (3) The Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against respondent, for and in his behalf.
Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel, which is
absurd.

● The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This
can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press
and through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt
of court rulings.

● As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:

○ Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect
critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and
the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizen whom it is expected to serve.
○ x x x
○ But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. x x x

● As the golden rule goes - let us not do to others what we do not want others
to do to us. Igalang natin ang isa't -isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang
ayaw nating gawin nila sa atin.

Reyes v. Court of FACTS:

Appeals, 606 SCRA ● Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege
580 , December 03, on November 30, 2007.
2009 ● On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45
VILLAVIRAY ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold
Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the
name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the
interest of national security and public safety.
● OnDecember13,2007,the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for
Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.
● On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez
wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.
● On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite
the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still
subsists; that every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for
his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers
because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List;
and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting
of HDO No. 45.
● Petitioner filed for petition for a writ of amparo on the ground that
respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner
argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure
Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal
Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
● Respondents raised the following defences: 1) that the Secretary of Justice
is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No.
17, Series of 1998 and No. 18 Series of 2007 pursuant to his mandate

14
 under the Administrative Code of 1987 as a head of the principal law
agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007
was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary
investigation of the case against petitioner upon the request of the DILG;
3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent's
pending Motion for Reconsideration; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the
DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be
attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
● The CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying
the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?
NO
2. Whether petitioner's right to liberty has been violated by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo?
NO

HELD:
1st Issue:
● Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: The petition for a writ
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
● Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.: The Amparo Rule in
its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances", or to threats thereof
● Tapuz v. Del Rosario: The writ is intended to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
● The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security.
● The right to life is defined as “… not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a
life lived with the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property”.
● The right to liberty is "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare."
● The right to security includes "freedom from fear” or the right from any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. It may
also be said that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat”.
It is also a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security and a
guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government.
● The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. A
person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court's sound discretion.

2nd Issue:
● The restriction on petitioner's right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner
has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal

15
 recourse or remedy.
● Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be led. The reliefs
under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
● Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed
with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-
3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the
DOJ's HDO, as his co- accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner
argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said
HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the
HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power
of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.
● Once a complaint or information is led in court, any disposition of the case
such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the
court. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority
to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court.
The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is
available by motion in the criminal case. Even in civil cases pending before
the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly
intervene through the writ of amparo,
● Petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.Petitioner's
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show
any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it
unnecessary for the Court on this occasion to pass upon the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 and Circular No.
18, Series of 2007

WHEREFORE, the petition isDISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated

February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Disini, Jr. v. Secretary FACTS:

of Justice, 716 SCRA ● These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic
237 , February 18, Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional
2014 and void.
● The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
ZUÑO Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a
system that links him to other computers.
Note: For this, I’ve only ● The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
included the court’s ratio information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system
on why it deemed certain since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to
provisions of the act as use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes.
unconstitutional. To ● And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications
include its reasons for from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft
declaring those that it by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card
deemed as constitutional or defrauding him through false representations.
would take up so many ● The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
pages of this digest. exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the
internet.
● For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use
of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings, and it has the duty
and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
● Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not the challenged provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012 are constitutional. - See the enumeration below.

HELD:
● 1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
A. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting
of unsolicited commercial communications;

16
The government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce
the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have
never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail
ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not
to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

B. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of

traffic data in real-time;

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or

record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. The cybercrime law
fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." It just says, "with
due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a
general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and
lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities
or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Nothing can prevent law
enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity
of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad
elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

C. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of

Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in
one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under
its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot
substitute for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section
19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly
not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds,
declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize
content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for
him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make
him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.

● 2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

A. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system
without right;
B. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including
transmission of viruses;

17
 C. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring
domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of
others;
D. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or
misuse of identifying information belonging to another;
E. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;
F. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child
pornography;
G. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when
crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed
with the use of information and communications
technologies;
H. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
I. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to
require service providers to preserve traffic data and
subscriber information as well as specified content data for
six months;
J. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;
K. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and
examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
L. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously
preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;
M. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to
cybercrime investigations;
N. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
O. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions;
and
P. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.

● Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and

CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it;

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code,
already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the
author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print. Whether these reactions
to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel,
acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the Court
will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.

● Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the

commission of cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in
relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System

In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider
like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the
computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment
on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site.

18
 The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory
statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding
or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board
a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with
libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since
he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on
it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the
statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or
abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed
Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may
think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting.

The cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is

inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the
medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of
expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web
of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that
they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

However, no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as

the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith
to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to
be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.

● The crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under

Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5)
on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section
4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-
related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the
exercise of the freedom of expression.

● Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on

Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online.

● Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the

correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175
to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both

Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging

the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175
and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription,
and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

C. International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

ICESCR Preamble Preamble

19
*Anyone can copy-paste The States Parties to the present Covenant,
in this part
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
*The Preamble extends United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
to all of the articles. rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,
Source:
https://www.ohchr.org/en Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
/professionalinterest/pag
es/cescr.aspx Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social
and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights,

Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,

Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community
to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,

Agree upon the following articles:

Central Bank Employees FACTS:

Association, Inc. v. ● On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It
Bangko Sentral ng abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
Pilipinas, 446 SCRA ● 8 years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now
299 , December 15, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association filed a petition for
2004 prohibition against BSP and the Exec. Sec. of the Office of the President,
to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Sec.
ALMADRO 15(c) Article 2 of R.A. 7653 because it is unconstitutional.
● Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
This case is mainly about
equal protection clause Section 15. Exercise of Authority. — In the exercise of its authority, the
and that it was violated Monetary Board shall:
because the rank-and-file xxx xxx xxx
of seven other GFIs were o (c) establish a human resource management system which
granted the exemption shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer,
from the salary promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall
standardization law aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels
(SSL) that was of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
specifically denied to the management.
rank-and-file of the BSP. o A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and
The main topic according wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be
to the Syllabus is about instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's
the ICESCR which is in human resource development program: Provided, That the
bold letters under letter Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as
“C.” You can choose to closely as possible with the principles provided for under
not read the rest of the Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].
topics and go straight to Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure
that but it’s risky. The of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and
case is very very long by below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under
the way. Republic Act No. 6758.
● Petitioners assail the above proviso because it makes an unconstitutional
cut between 2 classes of employees in the BSP – (1) the BSP officers of
those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and
below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt
class).
● It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation,"
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences,
but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims
that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.

20
 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP
● In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but
arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a
separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other
provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994
BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the
proviso was implemented.
● Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test,
provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law.
● The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also
defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the
classification is based on actual and real differentiation.

ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Sec. 15(c), Art. 2 of R.A. 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws?”
No at the start then it became a Yes.

HELD:

A.UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c),

ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection show that the classification created by
the proviso, on its face, bears no constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the “equal protection” clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As
held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, and reiterated in a long line of
cases:
“The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them.. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.”

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was
not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact
lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms
of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is
not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.

B.THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS — EXEMPTING ALL

OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(GFIs) FROM THE SSL — RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere

comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since
the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in
its application to another.

21
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid
law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances.

2.Applicability of the equal protection clause.

Courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in
determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though
the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.

3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 =
consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso. (The time when the the last
proviso of RA 7653 became unconstitutional)

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653
is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of
the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the
class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated
upon.

Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004.

Eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven
other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-
file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the
SSL in 2000.

The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when
we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the
sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the
exclusion of the BSP rank-and- file employees would have been devoid of any
substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per
alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what
he is prohibited to do directly.

IV. Equal Protection Under International Lens (Pertinent)

In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the
main have followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

A.Equal Protection in the United States

In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test.
Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential
analysis, to wit:
“Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention
in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only
that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon

22
 some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation."
The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means
used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive
due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with
identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And
usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the
courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose;
perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.”

B.Equal Protection in Europe

TheUnited Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone
forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom
domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination
on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of
race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further
indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect
under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to
derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour,
language, religion or social origin."

Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification
which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case the
European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would
contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised. But over the years, the European Court has developed a
hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of
justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race,
nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others.

C.Equality under International Law (ICESCR is found here)

The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality
before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination,
constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights.

Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality. The general international
provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC).

In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional

instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights; the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights; the European Convention on Human
Rights;the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and
the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states).
Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on
Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the
League.

The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional

23
"first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining
rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of
"equal and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the
American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure . . . the full and
free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination" and to "secure
without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. These provisions
impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate
discrimination.

In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and
prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR and in a very large number
of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United
Nations body. Additionally, many of the other international and regional human
rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier
tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to
the ICCPR rights. In Broeks and Zwaan-de-Vries, the issue before the Committee
was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act
(WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that
discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article
26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that
Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and
political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that
Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in
ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to
rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such
as the right to social security found in ICESCR:

Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does

not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided
for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation
to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the
exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article
26 of the Covenant.

Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification

may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal
protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as
the Human Rights Committee took into account the definitions of discrimination
adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:

. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms.

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and
its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international
law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society.
Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special
status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils.

24
 The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise

proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test
of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often
skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane

conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment

opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would
be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.

xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which
ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work
of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work
not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for
equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long

honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special

25
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require
a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or
English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not
per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been
used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning
reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without
which we cannot come to our own decisions through the

In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated
that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. . . . [I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged.

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social
justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working
class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have
more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only
on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this
pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

V. A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the
challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with
this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity
perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-
and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational
basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right,
or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down
any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether
the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless
of the character or nature of the actor.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from
the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages
that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are
limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-􏰁le employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better education and

26
 opportunities for career advancement — are given higher compensation packages
to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited,
especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the officers — who have
the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life
for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court.
They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor
the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they
impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A.
No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank- and-file in compensation.
These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they
should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They
cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting
time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is
the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

D. Convention on Rights of the Child

CRC Preamble Preamble

*Anyone can copy-paste The States Parties to the present Convention,

in this part
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
*The Preamble extends United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
to all the articles in CRC. rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
Source: peace in the world,
https://www.ohchr.org/en
/professionalinterest/pag Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter,
es/crc.aspx reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the
human person, and have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can
fully assume its responsibilities within the community,

Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness,
love and understanding,

Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society,

27
 and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality
and solidarity,

Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated
in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration
of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959
and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in
article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and
international organizations concerned with the welfare of children,

Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, "the
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards
and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth",

Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement
and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules); and the
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict, Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in
exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration,

Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each
people for the protection and harmonious development of the child, Recognizing the
importance of international co-operation for improving the living conditions of
children in every country, in particular in the developing countries,

Have agreed as follows:

Pharmaceutical and NOTE: From what I understand, the respondents were invoking international law
Health Care Association to justify the RIRR, but they failed. HOWEVER the RIRR was still held valid. The
of the Philippines v. provision regarding prohibiting advertisements was not covered by the international
Duque III, 535 SCRA 265 law that was “transformed” into domestic law. However DOH still had the authority
, October 09, 2007 via police power to prohibit them. (Police power was not discussed pero it alluded
to that)
BERNARDO
FACTS
I’ll focus on the ● Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
international law part and Court, seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012
not the milk part since entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order
we’re not studying the No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International
milk code. Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes
(RIRR).
● Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are
not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
● Respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH).
● Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
the president under the Freedom Constitution.
● One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
● From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. (Not claims as in damages, but claims as in “This
milk is good for your baby’s health)
● In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and

28
 ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
● On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006.

Filed Case
● However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
● The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the
DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
● On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO
enjoining respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.

Arguments:

ISSUE:
#1 Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest [Y]

#2 Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are

part of the law of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR
[Yes, but the provision being assailed was not covered by the international law.]

#3 Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules

and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is constitutional
[Yes, only certain provisions were struck down]

HELD:
#1
● The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries
to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that
of its members.
● An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of
direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

#2
● The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by
respondents, namely:
(1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child;
(2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and
(3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
● ...only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties
to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages
of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure
that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with
pregnancy and lactation.
● Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use
or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.

International Law
● Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.

Transformation
● The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation.
● The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been

29
 concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required
under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
● However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
● The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is
well to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision
in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of
promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the
ICMBS.
● Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising,
promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC).

Incorporation
● The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)
● "Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of
general or customary international law which are binding on all states, i.e.,
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of
sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and
pacta sunt servanda,among others.

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:

● Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio
juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements
of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the
psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way
they do.

World Health Assembly / World Health Organization

● WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have
they attained the status of customary law and should they then be deemed
incorporated as part of the law of the land?

● Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted

by the WHA bind member states thus: On the other hand, under Article
23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article
19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:

● The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA
recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and
political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest international body in the field of
health."
● Even the ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation.
● Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature
enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the
subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months,
and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk
substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
● "Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law
set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-
binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state

30
 behavior.
● WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu
outbreaks

Example of Soft Law being adopted through Transformation

● In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain
measures recommended by WHO to address the outbreaks of SARS and
Avian flu by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and
E.O. No. 280 on February 2, 2004, delegating to various departments
broad powers to close down schools/establishments, conduct health
surveillance and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and agricultural
products.
● It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency,
the duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not
binding or enforceable, although said resolutions had great political
influence.

Respondents’ failure to show that the Recommendation was binding

● As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by
states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio
juris).
● Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither
have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said
WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
● Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA
Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of
the law of the land.
● Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that
can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature.
● Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject
RIRR.

#3
Allegations of Petitioner against the RIRR
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR
extended its coverage to "young children" or those from ages two years old
and beyond.
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides
"exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares that
"there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable
requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute
ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-
24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional
claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in the
promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague: The RIRR
imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:
4. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to
health professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity:
5. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend
assistance in research and continuing education of health professionals;
RIRR absolutely forbids the same.
6. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits
it.
7. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk
Code.
8. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.

31
SC Ruling on Each One
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited
only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states: The
coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on
the kind of product being marketed to the public.

2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code,
does not recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and
possible substitute for breastmilk.

● The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be
considered and construed together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he
particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole."

● Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only
when necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on
complete and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that
information and educational materials should include information on the
proper use of infant formula when the use thereof is needed.

● Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain
cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper.

3. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain
other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it.
The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to
further discuss it. However, health information, particularly advertising
materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and
supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH.
● DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any
information on breastmilk vis-à-visbreastmilk substitutes, supplement and
related products, in the following manner:
● DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to
whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9
of the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant
women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the
health care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall
not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding.
● The DOH exercises control over the information content of advertising,
promotional and marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and other related products. It also sets a viable
standard against which the IAC may screen such materials before they are
made public.
● In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,64 the Court
held:
● x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
● In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused
with public interest and welfare.

4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health

professionals, the Court also finds that there is no inconsistency between
the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR

5. The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such
research or educational assistance may be given by milk companies or
under what conditions health workers may accept the assistance. Thus,
Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research
done or extent of assistance given by milk companies are completely in
accord with the Milk Code.

32
 6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also
consistent with the Milk Code. Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that
donations may be made by manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk
substitutes upon the request or with the approval of the DOH.

● The law does not proscribe the refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves
it purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request or accept such
donations.

● The DOH then appropriately exercised its discretion through Section 5175
of the RIRR which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations
from manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes.

7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative

sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's
objection thereto.

● The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations.
Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the
prosecution of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on
products covered by this Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for
the penalties to be imposed on violators of the provision of the Milk Code
or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:

8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are
contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.

● An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or

rule-making power or the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.

In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH
to promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void.
The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of

Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.

33