FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO

and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress
to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the
National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive
with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform
the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of
a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of
the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing
principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look
into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of
the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what
may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call
of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government
and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(
1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.