Labstan Digest PDF
Labstan Digest PDF
No.
184058:
March
10,
2010
anexpiredlicense,shall
be
deemedillegal
and
punishable
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
v.
MELISSA
CHUA,
under
Article
39
of
the
Labor
Code
of
the
Philippines.And
Appellant.
illegal
recruitment
is
deemed
committed
inlarge
scale
if
CARPIO
MORALES,
J.:
committed
against
three
or
more
persons
individually
or
as
a
group.
FACTS:
Thus
forillegal
recruitment
in
large
scale
to
prosper,
the
Appellant
was
indicted
for
Illegal
Recruitment
(Large
Scale)
prosecution
has
to
prove
three
essential
elements,
to
wit:
(1)
and
for
five
counts
of
Estafa
in
violation
of
Article
38
(a)
of
the
accused
undertook
arecruitment
activity
under
Article
the
the
New
Labor
Code
of
the
Philippines,
in
relation
to
Art.
13(b)
or
any
prohibited
practice
under
Article
34
of
the
13
(b)
and
(c
)
thereof,
as
further
amended
by
Sec.
6
(a),
(1)
Labor
Code;
(2)
the
accused
did
not
have
the
license
or
the
and
(m)
of
RA
8042.
authority
to
lawfully
engage
in
therecruitment
and
placement
of
workers;
and
(3)
the
accused
committed
such
illegal
Appellant
denied
the
charges.Claiming
having
worked
as
a
activity
against
three
or
more
persons
individually
or
as
a
temporary
cashier
from
January
to
October,
2002
at
the
office
group.
of
Golden
Gate,
owned
by
one
Marilyn
Calueng,
she
maintained
that
Golden
Gate
was
a
licensed
recruitment
In
the
present
case,
Golden
Gate,
of
which
appellant
admitted
agency
and
that
Josie,
who
is
her
godmother,
was
an
agent.
being
a
cashier
from
January
to
October
2002,
was
initially
authorized
to
recruit
workers
for
deployment
abroad.Per
the
Admitting
having
receivedP80,000
each
from
Marilyn
and
certification
from
the
POEA,Golden
Gates
license
only
expired
Tan,
receipt
of
which
she
issued
but
denying
receiving
any
on
February
23,
2002
and
it
was
delisted
from
the
roster
of
amount
from
King,
she
claimed
that
she
turned
over
the
licensed
agencies
on
April
2,
2002.
money
to
the
documentation
officer,
one
Arlene
Vega,
who
in
turn
remitted
the
money
to
Marilyn
Calueng
whose
present
Appellant
was
positively
pointed
to
as
one
of
the
persons
whereabouts
she
did
not
know.
who
enticed
the
complainants
to
part
with
their
money
upon
the
fraudulent
representation
that
they
would
be
able
to
The
RTC
convicted
appellant
of
Illegal
Recruitment
(Large
secure
for
them
employment
abroad.In
the
absence
of
any
Scale)
and
three
counts
of
Estafa.
On
appeal,
the
CA
affirmed
evidence
that
the
complainants
were
motivated
by
improper
the
RTCs
decision
holding
that
appellants
defense
that,
as
motives,
the
trial
courts
assessment
of
their
credibility
shall
temporary
cashier
of
Golden
Gate,
she
received
the
money
not
be
interfered
with
by
the
Court.
which
was
ultimately
remitted
to
Marilyn
Calueng
is
immaterial,
she
having
failed
to
prove
the
existence
of
an
Even
if
appellant
were
a
mere
temporary
cashier
of
Golden
employment
relationship
between
her
and
Marilyn,
as
well
as
Gate,
that
did
not
make
her
any
less
an
employee
to
beheld
the
legitimacy
of
the
operations
of
Golden
Gate
and
the
extent
liable
for
illegal
recruitment
as
principal
by
direct
of
her
involvement
therein.
participation,
together
with
the
employer,
as
it
was
shown
that
she
actively
and
consciously
participated
in
the
Hence,
this
appeal.
recruitment
process.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
appellant
is
guilty
of
illegal
Assuming
arguendo
that
appellant
was
unaware
of
the
illegal
recrtuitment?
nature
of
the
recruitment
business
of
Golden
Gate
that
does
not
free
her
of
liability
either.Illegal
Recruitment
in
Large
HELD:
The
appeal
is
denied.
Scale
penalized
under
Republic
Act
No.
8042,
or
The
Migrant
Workers
and
Overseas
Filipinos
Act
of
1995,
is
a
special
law,
LABOR
LAW
a
violation
of
which
is
malum
prohibitum,not
malum
in
se.
Intent
is
thus
immaterial.
And
that
explains
why
appellant
The
term
recruitment
and
placement
is
defined
under
Article
was,
aside
from
Estafa,
convicted
of
such
offense.
13(b)
of
the
Labor
Code
of
the
Philippinesas
any
act
of
canvassing,
enlisting,
contracting,
transporting,
utilizing,
DENIED
hiring,
or
procuring
workers,
and
includes
referrals,
contract
services,
promising
or
advertising
for
employment,
locally
or
G.R.
No.
187730:
June
29,
2010
abroad,
whether
for
profit
or
not.Provided,
That
any
person
or
entity
which,
in
any
manner,
offers
or
promises
for
a
fee
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
v.
RODOLFO
employment
to
two
or
more
persons
shall
be
deemed
GALLO
y
GADOT,
Accused-‐Appellant.
engaged
inrecruitment
and
placement.
On
the
other
hand,
illegal
recruitment
is
defined
under
Article
38,
paragraph
(a)
VELASCO,
JR.,
J.:
of
the
Labor
Code,
as
amended.
FACTS:
From
the
foregoing
provisions,
it
is
clear
that
anyrecruitment
activities
to
be
undertaken
by
non-‐licensee
or
non-‐holder
of
Accused-‐appellant
Gallo
and
accused
Pacardo
and
Manta
contracts,
or
as
in
the
present
case,
an
agency
with
together
with
Mardeolyn
and
9
others,
were
charged
with
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
1
syndicated
illegal
recruitment
and
18
counts
of
or
advertising
for
employment,
locally
or
abroad,
whether
for
estafacommitted
against
eighteen
complainants,
including
profit
or
not.
SC
believes
that
the
prosecution
was
able
to
Dela
Caza,
Guantero
and
Sare.
The
present
appeal
concerns
establish
the
elements
of
the
offense
sufficiently.
The
solely
accused-‐appellants
conviction
for
syndicated
illegal
evidence
readily
reveals
that
MPM
Agency
was
never
recruitment
in
Criminal
Case
No.
02-‐206293
and
for
estafain
licensed
by
the
POEA
to
recruit
workers
for
overseas
Criminal
Case
No.
02-‐206297.
According
to
the
prosecution,
employment.
In
the
instant
case,
accused-‐appellant
Dela
Caza
was
introduced
by
Panuncio
to
accused-‐appellant
committed
the
acts
enumerated
in
Sec.
6
of
R.A.
8042.
Gallo,
Pacardo,
Manta,
Mardeolyn,
Lulu
Mendanes,
Yeo
Sin
Testimonial
evidence
presented
by
the
prosecution
clearly
Ung
and
another
Korean
national
at
the
office
of
MPM
Agency
shows
that,
in
consideration
of
a
promise
of
foreign
located
in
Malate,
Manila.
Accused-‐appellant
Gallo
then
employment,
accused-‐appellant
received
the
amount
of
Php
introduced
himself
as
a
relative
of
Mardeolyn
and
informed
45,000.00
from
Dela
Caza.
When
accused-‐appellant
made
Dela
Caza
that
the
agency
was
able
to
send
many
workers
misrepresentations
concerning
the
agencys
purported
power
abroad.
Together
with
Pacardo
and
Manta,
he
also
told
Dela
and
authority
to
recruit
for
overseas
employment,
and
in
the
Caza
about
the
placement
fee
of
PhP150,000
with
a
down
process,
collected
money
in
the
guise
of
placement
fees,
the
payment
of
PhP45,000
and
the
balance
to
be
paid
through
former
clearly
committed
acts
constitutive
of
illegal
salary
deduction.
With
accused-‐appellants
assurance
that
recruitment.
many
workers
have
been
sent
abroad,
as
well
as
the
presence
of
the
2
Korean
nationals
and
upon
being
shown
the
visas
procured
for
the
deployed
workers,
Dela
Caza
was
convinced
G.R.
No.
179532:
May
30,
2011
to
part
with
his
money
and
paid
the
agency.
After
2
weeks,
the
said
agency
moved
and
changed
their
name.
After
2
more
CLAUDIA
S.
YAP,
Petitioner,
v.
THENAMARIS
SHIPS
months
of
waiting
in
vain
to
be
deployed,
Dela
Caza
and
the
MANAGEMENT
and
INTERMARE
MARITIME
AGENCIES,
other
applicants
decided
to
take
action.
The
first
attempt
was
INC.,Respondents.
unsuccessful
because
the
agency
again
moved
to
another
place.
However,
with
the
help
of
the
Office
of
Ambassador
NACHURA,
J.:
Seres
and
the
Western
Police
District,
they
were
able
to
locate
the
new
address
at
Carriedo,
Manila.
The
agency
FACTS:
explained
that
it
had
to
move
in
order
to
separate
those
who
are
applying
as
entertainers
from
those
applying
as
factory
Petitioner
was
employed
as
an
electrician
of
the
vessel,
M/T
workers.
Accused-‐appellant
Gallo,
together
with
Pacardo
and
SEASCOUT
by
Intermare
Maritime
Agencies,
Inc.
in
behalf
of
Manta,
were
then
arrested.
For
his
defense,
accused-‐ its
principal,
Vulture
Shipping
Limited.The
contract
was
for
appellant
denied
having
any
part
in
the
recruitment
of
Dela
12
months.On
23
August
2001,Yapboarded
M/T
SEASCOUT
Caza.
In
fact,
he
testified
that
he
also
applied
with
MPM
and
commenced
his
job
as
electrician.
However,
on
or
about
Agency
for
deployment
to
Koreaas
a
factory
worker.
RTC
and
08
November
2001,
the
vessel
was
sold.
CA
convicted
the
appellants.
Yap
received
his
seniority
bonus,
vacation
bonus,
extra
bonus
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
accused-‐appellant
is
guilty
of
illegal
along
with
the
scrapping
bonus.However,
he
insisted
that
he
was
entitled
to
the
payment
of
the
unexpired
portion
of
his
recruitment
committed
by
a
syndicate.
contract
since
he
was
illegally
dismissed
from
HELD:
Yes.
employment.He
alleged
that
he
opted
for
immediate
transfer
but
none
was
made.
LABOR
LAW
Respondents
contended
that
Yap
was
not
illegally
To
commit
syndicated
illegal
recruitment,
three
elements
dismissed.They
further
alleged
that
Yaps
contract
was
validly
must
be
established:
(1)
the
offender
undertakes
either
any
terminated
due
to
the
sale
of
the
vessel
and
no
arrangement
activity
within
the
meaning
of
recruitment
and
placement
was
made
for
Yaps
transfer
to
Thenamaris
other
vessels.
defined
under
Article
13(b),
or
any
of
the
prohibited
practices
enumerated
under
Art.
34
of
the
Labor
Code;
(2)
he
Thus,
Yap
brought
the
issue
before
the
Labor
Arbiter
(LA)
has
no
valid
license
or
authority
required
by
law
to
enable
which
ruled
that
petitioner
was
illegally
dismissed;
that
one
to
lawfully
engage
in
recruitment
and
placement
of
respondents
acted
in
bad
faith
when
they
assured
petitioner
workers;
and
(3)
the
illegal
recruitment
is
committed
by
a
of
re-‐embarkation
but
he
was
not
able
to
board;
and
that
group
of
three
(3)
or
more
persons
conspiring
or
petitioner
was
entitled
to
his
salaries
for
the
unexpired
confederating
with
one
another.
When
illegal
recruitment
is
portion
of
his
contract
for
a
period
of
nine
months
committed
by
a
syndicate
or
in
large
scale,
i.e.,
if
it
is
(US$12,870.00),
P100,000
for
moral
damages,
and
P50,000
committed
against
three
(3)
or
more
persons
individually
or
for
exemplary
damages
with
10%
of
the
same
for
Attys
fees.
as
a
group,
it
is
considered
an
offense
involving
economic
sabotage.Under
Art.
13(b)
of
the
Labor
Code,
recruitment
and
Respondents
sought
recourse
from
the
NLRC
which
modified
placement
refers
to
any
act
of
canvassing,
enlisting,
the
award
of
salaries
from
that
corresponding
to
nine
months
contracting,
transporting,
utilizing,
hiring
or
procuring
to
only
three
months
(US$4,290.00)
pursuant
to
Section
10
workers,
and
includes
referrals,
contract
services,
promising
R.A.
No.
8042.
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
2
burden
on
those
who
have
relied
on
the
invalid
law.
This
case
Respondents
and
petitioner
both
filed
a
Motion
for
Partial
Reconsideration.
should
not
be
included
in
the
exception.
It
was
not
the
fault
of
petitioner
that
he
lost
his
job
due
to
an
act
of
illegal
dismissal
NLRC
affirmed
the
finding
of
Illegal
Dismissal
and
Bad
Faith
committed
by
respondents.
on
the
part
of
respondent.
However,
the
NLRC
reversed
its
earlier
Decision,
holding
that
"there
can
be
no
choice
to
grant
only
3
months
salary
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term
Also,
we
cannot
subscribe
to
respondents
postulation
that
because
there
is
no
full
year
of
unexpired
term
which
this
can
be
applied."
the
tanker
allowance
of
US$130.00
should
not
be
included
in
the
computation
of
the
lump-‐sum
salary.
First,
fair
play,
Respondents
filed
an
MR,
which
the
NLRC
denied.
justice,
and
due
process
dictate
that
this
Court
cannot
now,
Undaunted,
respondents
filed
a
petition
forcertiorariunder
Rule
65
before
the
CA.
for
the
first
time
on
appeal,
pass
upon
this
question.
Second,
the
allowance
was
encapsulated
in
the
basic
salary
clause.
The
CA
affirmed
the
findings
and
ruling
of
the
LA
and
the
NLRC.
However,
the
CA
ruled
that
the
NLRC
erred
in
sustaining
the
LAs
interpretation
of
Section
10
of
R.A.
No.
People
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Domingo
Panis
8042.
The
CA
relied
on
the
clause
"or
for
three
months
for
GR
No.
L–58674–77,
July
11,
1990
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
less"
provided
in
the
5th
paragraph
of
Section
10
of
R.A.
No.
8042.
FACTS:
Both
parties
filed
their
respective
MRs
which
the
CA
denied.
On
January
9,
1981,
four
information
were
filed
in
the
in
the
Thus,
this
petition.
Court
of
First
Instance
(CFI)
of
Zambales
and
Olongapo
City
alleging
that
herein
private
respondent
Serapio
Abug,
ISSUE:
"without
first
securing
a
license
from
the
Ministry
of
Labor
as
a
holder
of
authority
to
operate
a
fee-‐charging
employment
agency,
did
then
and
there
wilfully,
unlawfully
and
criminally
[1]
Whether
Section
10
of
R.A.
8042,
to
the
extent
that
it
operate
a
private
fee
charging
employment
agency
by
affords
an
illegally
dismissed
migrant
worker
the
lesser
benefit
charging
fees
and
expenses
(from)
and
promising
of
"salaries
for
[the]
unexpired
portion
of
his
employment
employment
in
Saudi
Arabia"
to
four
separate
individuals.
Abug
filed
a
motion
to
quash
contending
that
he
cannot
be
contract
for
three
(3)
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
charged
for
illegal
recruitment
because
according
to
him,
term,whichever
is
less"
is
constitutional;
Article
13(b)
of
the
Labor
Code
says
there
would
be
illegal
recruitment
only
"whenever
two
or
more
persons
are
in
any
manner
promised
or
offered
any
employment
for
a
fee.”
[2]
Assuming
that
it
is,
whether
the
CA
gravely
erred
in
granting
petitioner
only
three
(3)
months
backwages
when
his
Denied
at
first,
the
motion
to
quash
was
reconsidered
and
granted
by
the
Trial
Court
in
its
Orders
dated
June
24,
1981,
unexpired
term
of
9
months
is
far
short
of
the
"every
year
of
the
and
September
17,
1981.
In
the
instant
case,
the
view
of
the
unexpired
term"
threshold.
private
respondents
is
that
to
constitute
recruitment
and
placement,
all
the
acts
mentioned
in
this
article
should
involve
dealings
with
two
or
more
persons
as
an
HELD:
The
petition
is
impressed
with
merit.
indispensable
requirement.
On
the
other
hand,
the
petitioner
argues
that
the
requirement
of
two
or
more
persons
is
imposed
only
where
the
recruitment
and
placement
consists
We
have
previously
declared
that
the
clause
"or
for
three
of
an
offer
or
promise
of
employment
to
such
persons
and
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
always
in
consideration
of
a
fee.
less"
is
unconstitutional
for
being
violative
of
the
rights
of
ISSUE:
(OFWs)
to
equal
protection.
Moreover,
the
subject
clause
does
not
state
any
definitive
governmental
purpose,
hence,
it
Whether
or
not
Article
13(b)
of
the
Labor
Code
provides
for
also
violates
petitioner's
right
to
substantive
due
process.
the
innocence
or
guilt
of
the
private
respondent
of
the
crime
of
illegal
recruitment
Generally,
an
unconstitutional
act
is
not
a
law.
An
exception
COURT
RULING:
to
this
is
the
doctrine
of
operative
fact
applied
when
a
The
Supreme
Court
reversed
the
CFI’s
Orders
and
reinstated
declaration
of
unconstitutionality
will
impose
an
undue
all
four
information
filed
against
private
respondent.
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
3
of
license
or
authority
are
prescribed
for
violations
of
the
The
Article
13(b)
of
the
Labor
Code
was
merely
intended
to
abovequoted
provisions,
among
others.
And
the
Secretary
of
create
a
presumption,
and
not
to
impose
a
condition
on
the
Labor
has
the
power
under
Section
35
of
the
law
to
apply
these
basic
rule
nor
to
provide
an
exception
thereto.
sanctions,
as
well
as
the
authority,
conferred
by
Section
36,
not
only
to
'restrict
and
regulate
the
recruitment
and
Where
a
fee
is
collected
in
consideration
of
a
promise
or
offer
placement
activities
of
all
agencies,'
but
also
to
'promulgate
of
employment
to
two
or
more
prospective
workers,
the
rules
and
regulations
to
carry
out
the
objectives
and
individual
or
entity
dealing
with
them
shall
be
deemed
to
be
implement
the
provisions
governing
said
activities.
Pursuant
engaged
in
the
act
of
recruitment
and
placement.
The
words
to
this
rule-‐making
power
thus
granted,
the
Secretary
of
"shall
be
deemed"
create
the
said
presumption.
Labor
gave
the
POEA,
'on
its
own
initiative
or
upon
filing
of
a
complaint
or
report
or
upon
request
for
investigation
by
any
[G.R.
No.
109583.
September
5,
1997.]
aggrieved
person,
.
.
.
(authority
to)
conduct
the
necessary
TRANS
ACTION
OVERSEAS
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
proceedings
for
the
suspension
or
cancellation
of
the
license
THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY
OF
LABOR
or
authority
of
any
agency
or
entity'
for
certain
enumerated
offenses
including
—
1)
the
imposition
or
acceptance,
FACTS:
directly
or
indirectly,
of
any
amount
of
money,
goods
or
services,
or
any
fee
or
bond
in
excess
of
what
is
prescribed
by
Private
respondents
sought
employment
as
domestic
helpers
the
Administration,
and
2)
any
other
violation
of
pertinent
through
petitioner's
employees.
The
applicants
paid
provisions
of
the
Labor
Code
and
other
relevant
laws,
rules
placement
fees
ranging
from
P1,000.00
to
P14,000.00,
but
and
regulations.
The
Administrator
was
also
given
the
power
petitioner
failed
to
deploy
them.
Their
demand
for
refund
to
'order
the
dismissal
of
the
case
or
the
suspension
of
the
proved
unavailing;
thus,
they
were
constrained
to
institute
license
or
authority
of
the
respondent
agency
or
contractor
complaints
against
petitioner
for
violation
of
Articles
32
and
or
recommend
to
the
Minister
the
cancellation
thereof."
This
34(a)
of
the
Labor
Code,
as
amended.
The
Undersecretary
of
power
conferred
upon
the
Secretary
of
Labor
and
Labor
found
that
the
petitioner
is
liable
for
28
counts
of
Employment
was
echoed
in
People
vs.
Diaz,
259
SCRA
441
violation
of
Article
32
and
5
counts
of
Art.
34(a)
and
ordered
(1996),
viz.:
"A
non-‐licensee
or
non-‐holder
of
authority
the
cancellation
of
its
license
to
participate
in
means
any
person,
corporation
or
entity
which
has
not
been
the
overseas
placement
and
recruitment
of
workers.
The
issued
a
valid
license
or
authority
to
engage
in
recruitment
cancellation
of
petitioner's
license
was
temporarily
lifted
but
and
placement
by
the
Secretary
of
Labor,
or
whose
license
or
the
order
revoking
its
license
was
reinstated
when
the
authority
has
been
suspended,
revoked
or
cancelled
by
the
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration
was
eventually
POEA
or
the
Secretary."
In
view
of
the
Court's
disposition
on
denied
for
lack
of
merit.
The
issue
presented
in
the
case
at
the
matter,
we
rule
that
the
power
to
suspend
or
cancel
any
bar
is
whether
or
not
the
Secretary
of
Labor
and
Employment
license
or
authority
to
recruit
employees
has
jurisdiction
to
cancel
or
revoke
the
license
of
a
private
fee
foroverseas
employment
is
concurrently
vested
with
the
charging
employment
agency.
LibLex
POEA
and
the
Secretary
of
Labor.
prLL
The
Supreme
Court
ruled
that
the
power
to
suspend
or
cancel
any
license
or
authority
to
recruit
employees
for
overseas
employment
is
concurrently
vested
with
the
[G.R.
No.
167639.
April
19,
2006.]
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Authority
(POEA)
and
the
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
represented
by
the
Secretary
of
Labor.
ADMINISTRATOR
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION
ISSUE:
whether
or
not
the
Secretary
of
Labor
and
(POEA),
petitioner,
vs.
PRINCIPALIA
MANAGEMENT
AND
Employment
has
jurisdiction
to
cancel
or
revoke
the
license
PERSONNEL
CONSULTANTS,
INCORPORATED,
of
a
private
fee-‐charging
employment
agency.
YNARES-‐SANTIAGO,
J
p:
HELD:
FACTS:
Two
separate
complaints
filed
before
the
Philippine
Overseas
LABOR
AND
SOCIAL
LEGISLATION;
LABOR
CODE;
ILLEGAL
Employment
Administration
(POEA)
RECRUITMENT;
POWER
TO
SUSPEND
OR
CANCEL
ANY
against
Principalia
Management
and
Personnel
Consultants,
LICENSE
OR
AUTHORITY
TO
RECRUIT
Incorporated
(Principalia)
for
violation
of
the
2002
POEA
FOR
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT;
CONCURRENTLY
VESTED
Rules
and
Regulations.
WITH
THE
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
Concha
alleged
that
in
August
2002,
she
applied
ADMINISTRATION
(POEA)
AND
THE
SECRETARY
OF
LABOR.
with
Principalia
for
placement
and
employment
as
caregiver
—
The
power
to
suspend
or
cancel
any
license
or
authority
to
or
physical
therapist
in
the
USA
or
Canada.
Despite
paying
recruit
employees
for
overseas
employment
is
vested
upon
P20,000.00
out
of
the
P150,000.00
fee
required
the
Secretary
of
Labor
and
Employment
under
Article
35
of
by
Principalia
which
was
not
properly
the
Labor
Code,
as
amended.
In
the
case
of
Eastern
Assurance
receipted,
Principalia
failed
to
deploy
Concha
for
and
Surety
Corp.
vs.
Secretary
of
Labor,
181
SCRA
110
(1990),
employment
abroad.
In
its
March
15,
2004
Order,
4
the
we
held
that:
"The
penalties
.of
suspension
and
cancellation
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
4
Adjudication
Office
of
the
POEA
found
Principalia
liable
for
computation,
as
alleged
by
POEA.
Moreover,
POEA
would
violations
of
the
2002
POEA
Rules
and
Regulations
have
no
authority
to
exercise
its
regulatory
functions
Principalia
moved
for
reconsideration
which
the
POEA
over
Principalia
because
the
matter
had
already
been
granted
on
June
25,
2004.
7
The
latter
lifted
its
order
brought
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
DOLE.
Principalia
has
been
suspending
the
documentary
processing
byPrincipalia
after
granted
the
license
to
recruit
and
process
documents
for
noting
that
it
exerted
efforts
to
obtain
overseas
employment
Filipinos
interested
to
work
abroad.
Thus,
POEA's
action
of
for
Baldoza
within
the
period
stipulated
in
the
settlement
suspending
Principalia's
license
before
final
adjudication
by
agreement
but
due
to
Baldoza's
lack
of
qualification,
his
the
DOLE
would
be
premature
and
would
amount
to
a
application
was
declined
by
its
foreign
principal.
violation
of
the
latter's
right
to
recruit
and
deploy
workers.
Meanwhile,
on
June
14,
2004,
or
before
the
promulgation
of
Finally,
the
presumption
of
regular
performance
of
duty
by
POEA's
order
lifting
the
suspension,
Principalia
filed
a
the
POEA
under
Section
3
(m),
Rule
131
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
Complaint
8
(Complaint)
against
Rosalinda
D.
Baldoz
in
her
finds
no
application
in
the
case
at
bar,
as
it
applies
only
capacity
as
Administrator
of
POEA
and
Atty.
Jovencio
R.
where
a
duty
is
imposed
on
an
official
to
act
in
a
certain
way,
Abara
in
his
capacity
as
POEA
Conciliator,
before
the
and
assumes
that
the
law
tells
him
what
his
duties
are.
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
Mandaluyong
City
for
The
issue
threshed
out
before
the
trial
court
was
whether
the
"Annulment
of
Order
for
Suspension
of
Documentation
order
of
suspension
should
be
implemented
pending
appeal.
Processing
with
Damages
and
Application
for
Issuance
of
a
It
did
not
correct
a
ministerial
duty
of
the
POEA.
As
such,
the
Temporary
Restraining
Order
and/or
Writ
of
Preliminary
presumption
on
the
regularity
of
performance
of
duty
does
Injunction,
and
a
Writ
of
Preliminary
Mandatory
not
apply.
Injunction."
Principalia
claimed
that
the
suspension
of
its
documentary
processing
would
ruin
its
reputation
and
WHEREFORE,
in
light
of
the
foregoing,
the
petition
is
DENIED
goodwill
and
would
cause
the
loss
of
its
applicants,
for
lack
of
merit.
employers
and
principals.
Judge
Paulita
B.
Acosta-‐Villarante
of
the
RTC
of
Mandaluyong
City,
Branch
211,
granted
a
72-‐ [G.R.
No.
156029.
November
14,
2008.]
hour
restraining
order
enjoining
Administrator
Baldoz
and
SANTOSA
Atty.
Abara
to
refrain
from
imposing
the
suspension
orders
B.
DATUMAN,
petitioner,
vs.
FIRST
COSMOPOLITAN
MANPO
before
the
matter
can
be
heard
in
full
WER
AND
PROMOTION
SERVICES,
INC.,
Petitioner
assails
the
September
20,
2004
Resolution
1
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-‐G.R.
SP
No.
86170,
dismissing
outright
LEONARDO-‐DE
CASTRO,
J
p:
the
petition
for
certiorari
for
failure
to
attach
copies
of
all
relevant
pleadings
and
transcripts
of
the
hearings,
as
well
as
FACTS:
the
March
29,
2005
Resolution
2
denying
the
motion
for
Sometime
in
1989,
reconsideration.
respondent
First
Cosmopolitan
Manpower
&
Promotion
Services,
Inc.
recruited
petitioner
Santosa
B.
Datuman
to
ISSUES
work
abroad
as
a
Saleslady
in
Bahrain
with
a
salary
of
core
issues
for
resolution
are
as
follows:
(1)
whether
the
$370.00
for
a
period
of
1
year
as
stipulated
in
the
contract.
Court
of
Appeals
erred
in
dismissing
the
Petition
However,
her
employer
Mohammed
Hussain
took
her
for
Certiorari
based
on
purely
technical
grounds;
and
(2)
passport
when
she
arrived
there;
and
instead
of
working
as
a
whether
the
trial
court
erred
in
issuing
the
writ
of
saleslady,
she
was
forced
to
work
as
a
domestic
helper
with
a
preliminary
injunction
salary
of
Forty
Bahrain
Dinar
(BD40.00),
equivalent
only
to
One
Hundred
US
Dollars
(US$100.00).
This
was
contrary
to
HELD:
the
agreed
salary
of
US$370.00
indicated
in
her
Contract
of
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
Court
of
Appeals
dismissed
the
petition
Employment
signed
in
the
Philippines
and
approved
by
the
for
certiorari
due
to
POEA's
failure
to
attach
the
following
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA).
relevant
documents.
The
trial
court
did
not
decree
that
the
On
September
1,
1989,
her
employer
compelled
her
to
sign
POEA,
as
the
granting
authority
of
Principalia's
license
to
another
contract,
transferring
her
to
another
employer
as
recruit,
is
not
allowed
to
determine
Principalia's
compliance
housemaid
with
a
salary
of
BD40.00
for
the
duration
of
two
with
the
conditions
for
the
grant,
as
POEA
would
have
us
(2)
years.
4
She
pleaded
with
him
to
give
her
a
release
paper
believe.
For
all
intents
and
purposes,
POEA
can
determine
and
to
return
her
passport
but
her
pleas
were
unheeded.
Left
whether
the
licensee
has
complied
with
the
requirements.
In
with
no
choice,
she
continued
working
against
her
will.
this
instance,
the
trial
court
observed
that
the
Order
of
Worse,
she
even
worked
without
compensation
from
Suspension
dated
March
15,
2004
was
pending
appeal
with
September
1991
to
April
1993
because
of
her
employer's
the
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Labor
and
Employment
continued
failure
and
refusal
to
pay
her
salary
despite
(DOLE).
Thus,
until
such
time
that
the
appeal
is
resolved
with
demand.
In
May
1993,
she
was
able
to
finally
return
to
the
finality
by
the
DOLE,
Principalia
has
a
clear
and
convincing
Philippines
through
the
help
of
the
Bahrain
Passport
and
right
to
operate
as
a
recruitment
agency.
Immigration
Department.
5
Furthermore,
irreparable
damage
was
duly
proven
by
Principalia.
Suspension
of
its
license
is
not
easily
In
May
1995,
petitioner
filed
a
complaint
before
the
POEA
quantifiable
nor
is
it
susceptible
to
simple
mathematical
Adjudication
Office
against
respondent
for
underpayment
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
5
and
nonpayment
of
salary,
vacation
leave
pay
and
refund
of
of
until
April
1990).
The
signing
of
the
"substitute"
contracts
her
plane
fare.
While
the
case
was
pending,
she
filed
the
with
the
foreign
employer/principal
before
the
expiration
of
instant
case
before
the
NLRC
for
underpayment
of
salary
for
the
POEA-‐approved
contract
and
any
continuation
of
a
period
of
one
year
and
six
months,
nonpayment
of
vacation
petitioner's
employment
beyond
the
original
one-‐year
term,
pay
and
reimbursement
of
return
airfare.
EHSITc
against
the
will
of
petitioner,
are
continuing
breaches
of
the
respondent
countered
that
petitioner
actually
agreed
to
work
original
POEA-‐approved
contract.
To
accept
the
CA's
in
Bahrain
as
a
housemaid
for
one
(1)
year
because
it
was
the
reasoning
will
open
the
floodgates
to
even
more
abuse
of
our
only
position
available
then.
However,
since
such
position
overseas
workers
at
the
hands
of
their
foreign
employers
and
was
not
yet
allowed
by
the
POEA
at
that
time,
they
mutually
local
recruiters,
since
the
recruitment
agency
could
easily
agreed
to
submit
the
contract
to
the
POEA
indicating
escape
its
mandated
solidary
liability
for
breaches
of
the
petitioner's
position
as
saleslady.
Respondent
added
that
it
POEA-‐approved
contract
by
colluding
with
their
foreign
was
actually
petitioner
herself
who
violated
the
terms
of
principals
in
substituting
the
approved
contract
with
another
their
contract
when
she
allegedly
transferred
to
another
upon
the
worker's
arrival
in
the
country
of
employment.
Such
employer
without
respondent's
knowledge
and
approval.
outcome
is
certainly
contrary
to
the
State's
policy
of
Lastly,
respondent
raised
the
defense
of
prescription
of
cause
extending
protection
and
support
to
our
overseas
workers.
of
action
since
the
claim
was
filed
beyond
the
three
(3)-‐year
To
be
sure,
Republic
Act
No.
8042
explicitly
prohibits
the
period
from
the
time
the
right
accrued,
reckoned
from
either
substitution
or
alteration
to
the
prejudice
of
the
worker
of
1990
or
1991.
employment
contracts
already
approved
and
verified
by
the
Department
of
Labor
and
Employment
(DOLE)
from
the
time
On
April
29,
1998,
Labor
Arbiter
Jovencio
Mayor,
Jr.
rendered
of
actual
signing
thereof
by
the
parties
up
to
and
including
a
Decision
finding
respondent
liable
for
violating
the
terms
of
the
period
of
the
expiration
of
the
same
without
the
approval
the
Employment
Contract
and
ordering
it
to
pay
petitioner.
of
the
DOLE.
On
appeal,
the
NLRC,
Second
Division,
issued
a
Hence,
in
the
present
case,
the
diminution
in
the
salary
of
Decision
10
affirming
with
modification
the
Decision
of
petitioner
from
US$370.00
to
US$100
(BD40.00)
per
month
Labor
Arbiter
Mayor,
Jr.,
by
reducing
the
award
of
salary
is
void
for
violating
the
POEA-‐approved
contract
which
set
differentials
from
US$4,050.00
to
US$2,970.00.
On
August
7,
the
minimum
standards,
terms,
and
conditions
of
her
2002,
the
CA
issued
the
assailed
Decision
15
granting
the
employment.
Consequently,
the
solidary
liability
of
petition
and
reversing
the
NLRC
and
the
Labor
Arbiter.
respondent
with
petitioner's
foreign
employer
for
petitioner's
money
claims
continues
although
she
was
forced
ISSUE:
to
whether
the
CA
erred
in
not
holding
respondent
to
sign
another
contract
in
Bahrain.
It
is
the
terms
of
the
liable
for
petitioner's
money
claims
pursuant
to
their
original
POEA-‐approved
employment
contract
that
shall
Contract
of
Employment.
govern
the
relationship
of
petitioner
with
the
respondent
recruitment
agency
and
the
foreign
employer.
We
agree
with
HELD:
the
Labor
Arbiter
and
the
NLRC
that
the
precepts
of
justice
and
fairness
dictate
that
petitioner
must
be
compensated
Section
1
of
Rule
II
of
the
POEA
Rules
and
Regulations
is
clear
for
allmonths
worked
regardless
of
the
supposed
termination
that
the
private
employment
agency
shall
assume
joint
and
of
the
original
contract
in
April
1990.
It
is
undisputed
that
solidary
liability
with
the
employer.
19
This
Court
has,
time
petitioner
was
compelled
to
render
service
until
April
1993
and
again,
ruled
that
private
employment
agencies
are
held
and
for
the
entire
period
that
she
worked
for
the
foreign
jointly
and
severally
liable
with
the
foreign-‐based
employer
or
his
unilaterally
appointed
successor,
she
should
employer
for
any
violation
of
the
recruitment
agreement
or
have
been
paid
US$370/month
for
every
month
worked
in
contract
of
employment.
20
This
joint
and
solidary
liability
accordance
with
her
original
contract.
HTSIEa
imposed
by
law
against
recruitment
agencies
and
foreign
This
Court
reminds
local
recruitment
agencies
that
it
is
their
employers
is
meant
to
assure
the
aggrieved
worker
bounden
duty
to
guarantee
our
overseas
workers
that
they
of
immediate
and
sufficient
payment
of
what
is
due
are
being
recruited
for
bona
fidejobs
with
bona
him.
21
This
is
in
line
with
the
policy
of
the
state
to
protect
fide
employers.
Local
agencies
should
never
allow
themselves
and
alleviate
the
plight
of
the
working
class.
to
be
instruments
of
exploitation
or
oppression
of
their
In
the
assailed
Decision,
the
CA
disregarded
the
aforecited
compatriots
at
the
hands
of
foreign
employers.
Indeed,
being
provision
of
the
law
and
the
policy
of
the
state
when
it
the
ones
who
profit
most
from
the
exodus
of
Filipino
workers
reversed
the
findings
of
the
NLRC
and
the
Labor
Arbiter.
As
to
find
greener
pastures
abroad,
recruiters
should
be
first
to
the
agency
which
recruited
petitioner,
respondent
is
jointly
ensure
the
welfare
of
the
very
people
that
keep
their
industry
and
solidarily
liable
with
the
latter's
principal
employer
alive.
CAaSHI
abroad
for
her
(petitioner's)
money
claims.
Respondent
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED.
The
assailed
Decision
cannot,
therefore,
exempt
itself
from
all
the
claims
and
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
dated
August
7,
2002
and
Resolution
liabilities
arising
from
the
implementation
of
their
POEA-‐
dated
November
14,
2002
in
CA-‐G.R.
SP
No.
59825
are
approved
Contract
of
Employment.
REVERSED
AND
SET
ASIDE.
The
Decision
of
the
National
We
cannot
agree
with
the
view
of
the
CA
that
the
solidary
Labor
Relations
Commission
dated
February
24,
2000
is
liability
of
respondent
extends
only
to
the
first
contract
REINSTATED
with
a
qualification
with
respect
to
the
award
(i.e.
the
original,
POEA-‐approved
contract
which
had
a
term
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
6
of
salary
differentials,
which
should
be
granted
for
the
period
[G.R.
No.
121777.
January
24,
2001.]
May
31,
1992
to
April
1993
and
not
May
1993
to
April
1994.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-‐appellee,
vs.
CAROL
M.
DELA
PIEDRA
[G.R.
No.
177498.
January
18,
2012.]
FACTS:
STOLT-‐NIELSEN
TRANSPORTATION
Erlie
Ramos,
an
attorney
of
the
POEA,
received
a
call
from
an
GROUP,
INC.
AND
CHUNG
GAI
SHIP
unidentified
woman
inquiring
about
the
legitimacy
of
the
MANAGEMENT,
petitioners,vs.
SULPECIO
recruitment
conducted
by
Mrs.
Carol
Figueroa.
Ramos
MEDEQUILLO,
JR.,
respondent.
conferred
with
the
CIS
to
organize
the
arrest
of
the
alleged
illegal
recruiter.
The
group
planned
the
entrapment
the
next
The
most
recent
case
of
Stolt-‐Nielsen
Transportation
Group,
day
with
Eileen
Fermindoza
to
pose
as
an
applicant.
The
plan
Inc.
and
Chung
Gai
Ship
Management
vs.
Sulpecio
Medequillo,
materialized
the
next
day,
which
caused
the
CIS
team
to
bring
Jr.
(G.R.
No.
177498,
January
18,
2012)
confirms
the
standing
Figueroa,
a
certain
Jasmine
Alejandro,
and
three
women
rule
that
a
seafarer
must
indeed
be
compensated
as
a
result
applicants
to
the
office
for
investigation.
In
the
course
of
the
of
the
unreasonable
failure
of
his
employer
to
deploy
him
investigation,
it
turned
out
that
Figueroa
had
many
aliases,
notwithstanding
his
execution
of
an
employment
contract
among
them
Carol
Llena
and
Carol
de
la
Piedra.
A
check
by
duly
approved
by
the
POEA.
Ramos
with
the
POEA
revealed
that
she
was
not
licensed
nor
authorized
to
conduct
recruitment.
Figueroa
was
charged
In
the
above-‐cited
case,
the
seafarer
was
initially
hired
by
his
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
illegal
recruitment
in
Large
employers
as
Third
Assistant
Engineer
on
board
an
ocean-‐ Scale.
Denial
comprised
the
accuseds'
defense.
The
trial
court
going
vessel
for
nine
(9)
months.
After
barely
three
(3)
convicted
the
accused
and
sentenced
her
to
life
months
of
service,
he
was
ordered
to
be
repatriated
by
the
imprisonment.
Accused-‐appellant
questioned
her
conviction
ship
master.
Upon
his
return
to
Manila,
he
was
transferred
for
illegal
recruitment
in
large
scale
and
assailed
the
employment
by
his
employers
with
another
vessel
for
the
constitutionality
of
the
law.
same
period
of
nine
(9)
months
under
the
first
contract.
His
The
Supreme
Court
affirmed
the
constitutionality
of
the
law
second
contract
was
approved
by
the
POEA.
Despite
the
and
the
conviction
of
the
accused,
but
reduced
the
penalty
commencement
of
his
second
contract
however,
his
imposed
upon
her.
According
to
the
Court,
considering
that
employers
refused
to
deploy
him
for
no
apparent
reason.
Left
the
two
elements
of
lack
of
license
or
authority
and
the
with
no
other
choice,
the
seafarer
filed
a
case
for
illegal
undertaking
of
the
activity
constituting
recruitment
and
dismissal
for
the
first
contract
and
for
failure
to
deploy
under
placement
are
present,
appellant,
at
the
very
least,
was
liable
the
second
contract.
The
arbiter,
the
NLRC,
and
the
Court
of
for
simple
illegal
recruitment.
A
conviction
for
large-‐scale
Appeals
all
ruled
for
the
seafarer,
agreeing
that
while
the
illegal
recruitment
must
be
based
on
a
finding
in
each
case
of
employers
cannot
be
held
liable
under
the
first
contract
since
illegal
recruitment
of
three
or
more
persons
whether
the
second
contract
novated
it,
the
employers
are
liable
for
individually
or
as
a
group.
In
this
case,
only
two
persons
were
breach
of
the
second
contract.
proven
to
have
been
recruited
by
the
appellant.
Hence,
the
The
Supreme
Court
likewise
sided
with
the
seafarer,
finding
decision
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
was
modified.
Appellant
that
there
was
a
novation
of
the
first
contract.
On
the
matter
was
found
guilty
of
illegal
recruitment
on
two
counts
and
was
of
the
non-‐deployment
of
the
seafarer
without
any
valid
sentenced
to
4
years
to
6
years
imprisonment
on
each
count.
reason,
the
High
Court
explained
that
the
seafarer
has
a
remedy
in
such
a
case
even
if
the
employment
contract
has
w/n
there
was
illegal
recruitment
not
yet
commenced
and
he
has
yet
to
actually
depart
from
the
airport
or
seaport
in
the
port
of
hire.
For
clarity,
the
Court
HELD:
distinguished
between
the
‘perfection
of
contract’
on
the
one
In
this
case,
the
first
element
is
present.
The
certification
of
hand,
which
took
place
when
the
parties
agreed
on
the
object
POEA
Officer-‐in-‐Charge
Macarulay
states
that
appellant
is
not
and
the
cause
as
well
as
the
terms
of
the
contract,
and
licensed
or
authorized
to
engage
in
recruitment
and
‘commencement
of
the
employer-‐employee
relationship’
on
placement.
The
second
element
is
also
present.
Appellant
is
the
other
hand,
when
the
seafarer
would
have
been
actually
presumed
engaged
in
recruitment
and
placement
under
deployed.
The
‘perfection
of
contract’
brings
about
certain
Article
13
(b)
of
the
Labor
Code.
Both
Nancy
Araneta
and
rights,
the
breach
of
which
may
give
rise
to
a
cause
of
action.
Lourdes
Modesto
testified
that
appellant
promised
them
Ta-‐king
note
of
the
case
of
Santiago
v.
CF
Sharp
Crew
employment
for
a
fee.
Their
testimonies
corroborate
each
Management,
Inc.
(G.R.
No.
162419,
July
10,
2007),
the
Court
other
on
material
points:
the
briefing
conducted
by
appellant,
observed
that
since
there
was
non-‐deployment
of
the
the
time
and
place
thereof,
the
fees
involved.
Appellant
has
seafarer
herein
which
constituted
as
a
breach
by
the
not
shown
that
these
witnesses
were
incited
by
any
motive
to
employers
of
the
parties’
agreement,
the
employers
are
liable
testify
falsely
against
her.
The
absence
of
evidence
as
to
an
to
pay
the
seafarer
actual
damages
in
the
form
of
the
loss
of
improper
motive
actuating
the
principal
witnesses
of
the
nine
(9)
months’
worth
of
salary
as
stated
in
the
employment
prosecution
strongly
tends
to
sustain
that
no
improper
contract.
motive
existed
and
that
their
testimony
is
worthy
of
full
faith
and
credence.
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
7
Appellant's
denials
cannot
prevail
over
the
positive
On
appeal,
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
reversed
the
decision
of
declaration
of
the
prosecution
witnesses.
Affirmative
the
NLRC
and
referred
the
claim
to
the
National
Conciliation
testimony
of
persons
who
are
eyewitnesses
of
the
fact
and
Mediation
Board
(NCMB)
for
the
designation
of
the
asserted
easily
overrides
negative
testimony.
That
appellant
voluntary
arbitrator
or
constitution
of
a
panel
of
voluntary
did
not
receive
any
payment
for
the
promised
or
offered
arbitrators
for
appropriate
resolution
on
the
applicable
CBA
employment
is
of
no
moment.
From
the
language
of
the
provision
to
be
applied
insofar
as
death
benefits
due
to
the
statute,
the
act
of
recruitment
may
be
"for
profit
or
not";
it
heirs
of
the
seafarer
are
concerned.
suffices
that
the
accused
"promises
or
offers
for
a
fee
employment"
to
warrant
conviction
for
illegal
recruitment.
.
.
The
Supreme
Court
affirmed
the
CA
ruling,
finding
that
The
claim
of
"frameup,"
like
alibi,
is
a
defense
that
has
been
Republic
Act
(RA)
No.
8042,
the
special
law
governing
invariably
viewed
by
the
Court
with
disfavor
for
it
can
easily
overseas
Filipino
workers,
does
not
provide
for
any
provision
be
concocted
but
difficult
to
prove.
Apart
from
her
self-‐ regarding
jurisdiction
over
disputes
or
unresolved
serving
testimony,
appellant
has
not
offered
any
evidence
grievances
on
the
interpretation
or
implementation
of
a
CBA.
that
she
was
indeed
framed
by
Ramos.
She
has
not
even
Section
10
of
R.A.
8042
simply
speaks
in
general
of
law
or
hinted
at
any
motive
for
Ramos
to
frame
her.
Law
enforcers
contract
involving
Filipino
workers
for
overseas
deployment
are
presumed
to
have
performed
their
duties
regularly
in
the
including
claims
for
actual,
moral,
exemplary
and
other
forms
of
damages.
On
the
other
hand,
Articles
217
(c)
and
261
of
absence
of
evidence
to
the
contrary.
the
Labor
Code,
a
general
statute,
are
clear
and
particular
in
expressing
that
voluntary
arbitrators
have
jurisdiction
over
[G.R.
No.
172642.
June
13,
2012.]
case
arising
from
the
interpretation
or
implementation
of
ESTATE
OF
NELSON
R.
DULAY,
represented
by
his
wife
CBA’s..
As
such,
the
specific
or
special
provisions
of
the
Labor
MERRIDY
JANE
P.
DULAY,
petitioner,
vs.
ABOITIZ
JEBSEN
Code
govern
and
not
those
of
R.A.
8042.
MARITIME,
INC.
and
GENERAL
CHARTERERS,
INC
The
High
Court,
upon
review
of
the
CBA
which
the
seafarer’s
Who
has
jurisdiction
over
a
case
involving
the
interpretation
widow
considers
to
be
the
law
between
the
parties,
likewise
or
implementation
of
the
collective
bargaining
agreement:
concluded
that
the
parties
really
intended
to
bring
to
the
labor
arbiter
or
the
voluntary
arbitrator?
conciliation
or
voluntary
arbitration
any
dispute
or
conflict
in
the
interpretation
or
application
of
the
provisions
of
their
The
recent
case
of
“Estate
of
Nelson
R.
Dulay
represented
by
CBA.
his
wife
Merridy
Jane
P.
Dulay
vs.
Aboitiz
Jebsen
Maritime,
Inc.
&
General
Charterers,
Inc.”
(G.R.
No.
172642)
decided
by
It
noted
that
Section
7
of
the
Omnibus
Rules
and
Regulations,
the
Supreme
Court
on
June
13,
2012
answered
the
above
as
amended
by
R.S.
10022,
promulgated
by
the
Department
question
by
holding
that
the
voluntary
arbitrator
should
take
of
Labor
and
Employment
and
the
Department
of
Foreign
cognizance
of
such
an
issue.
Affairs,
which
implement
R.A.
8042,
so
provides
that
for
Overseas
Filipino
Workers
with
CBA’s
the
case
shall
be
In
the
said
Dulay
case,
a
veteran
seafarer,
after
completion
of
submitted
for
voluntary
arbitration
following
Articles
261
his
employment
contract,
and
while
still
a
bona
fide
member
and
262
of
the
Labor
Code.
Such
is
the
same
idea
invoked
in
of
a
union
which
was
the
collective
bargaining
agent
of
his
Section
29
of
the
POEA
Standard
Employment
contract.
employer,
died
of
acute
renal
failure
secondary
to
septicemia.
The
widow
claimed
for
death
benefits
through
the
grievance
The
Court
made
it
clear
that
with
respect
to
disputes
procedure
of
the
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(CBA)
involving
claims
of
Filipino
seafarers
where
the
parties
are
between
the
seafarer’s
union
and
his
employer
but
the
covered
by
a
CBA,
the
dispute
or
claim
should
be
submitted
procedure
was
declared
deadlocked.
Pursuant
to
a
provision
to
the
jurisdiction
of
a
voluntary
arbitrator
or
panel
of
in
the
CBA,
the
widow
then
filed
a
claim
against
the
employer
arbitrators.
In
the
absence
of
a
CBA,
the
parties
may
opt
to
for
death
and
medical
benefits
and
damages
amounting
to
US
submit
the
dispute
to
either
to
the
NLRC
or
to
voluntary
90,000
dollars
before
the
National
Labor
Relations
arbitration.
Commission
(NLRC)
–
Arbitration
Board.
This
position
is
consistent
with
the
policy
of
the
state
and
A
few
days
later,
the
deceased
seafarer’s
brother
received
Section
3,
Article
13
of
the
Constitution
to
promote
voluntary
20,000
Pesos
from
the
employer
pursuant
to
a
different
and
arbitration
as
a
mode
of
settling
labor
disputes.
separate
provision
of
the
same
CBA
and
released
the
union
from
further
liability.
The
employer
insisted
that
the
NLRC
PAUL
V.
SANTIAGO,
petitioner,
vs.
CF
SHARP
CREW
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
wido’s
claim
due
to
the
absence
MANAGEMENT,
INC.,
respondent.
of
an
employer-‐employee
relationship
at
the
time
of
the
G.R.
No.
162419
seafarer’s
death
and
the
fact
that
the
seafarer’s
contract
was
July
10,
2007
already
completed
prior
to
his
demise.
The
labor
arbiter
and
the
NLRC
both
recognized
the
claim
and
ruled
in
favor
of
the
TINGA,
J.:
widow,
ordering
the
claims
arising
out
of
an
employer-‐
employee
relationship
or
by
virtue
of
any
employer
to
pay.
FACTS:
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
8
Petitioner
had
been
working
as
a
seafarer
for
Smith
Bell
Management,
Inc.
(respondent)
for
about
five
(5)
years.
He
In
G.R.
No.
152642,
in
2002,
Rey
Salac
et
al,
who
are
signed
a
new
contract
of
employment
with
the
duration
of
9
recruiters
deploying
workers
abroad,
sought
to
enjoin
the
months
on
Feb
3
1998
and
he
was
to
be
deployed
10
days
Secretary
of
Labor,
Patricia
Sto.
Tomas,
the
POEA,
and
after.
This
contract
was
approved
by
POEA.
A
week
before
TESDA,
from
regulating
the
activities
of
private
recruiters.
the
date
of
departure,
the
respondent
received
a
phone
call
Salac
et
al
invoked
Sections
29
and
30
of
the
Republic
Act
from
petitioner’s
wife
and
some
unknown
callers
asking
not
8042
or
the
Migrant
Workers
Act
which
provides
that
to
send
the
latter
off
because
if
allowed,
he
will
jump
ship
in
recruitment
agency
in
the
Philippines
shall
be
deregulated
Canada.
one
year
from
the
passage
of
the
said
law;
that
5
years
thereafter,
recruitment
should
be
fully
deregulated.
RA
8042
Because
of
the
said
information,
petitioner
was
told
that
he
was
passed
in
1995,
hence,
Salac
et
al
insisted
that
as
early
as
would
not
be
leaving
for
Canada
anymore.
This
prompted
2000,
the
aforementioned
government
agencies
should
have
him
to
file
a
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal
against
the
stopped
issuing
memorandums
and
circulars
regulating
the
respondent.
The
LA
held
the
latter
responsible.
On
appeal,
recruitment
of
workers
abroad.
the
NLRC
ruled
that
there
is
no
employer-‐employee
relationship
between
petitioner
and
respondent,
hence,
the
Sto.
Tomas
then
questioned
the
validity
of
Sections
29
and
claims
should
be
dismissed.
The
CA
agreed
with
the
NLRC’s
30.
finding
that
since
petitioner
had
not
departed
from
the
Port
of
Manila,
no
employer-‐employee
relationship
between
the
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Sections
29
and
30
are
valid.
parties
arose
and
any
claim
for
damages
against
the
so-‐called
employer
could
have
no
leg
to
stand
on.
HELD:
The
issue
became
moot
and
academic.
It
appears
that
during
the
pendency
of
this
case
in
2007,
RA
9422
(An
Act
to
ISSUE:
When
does
the
employer-‐employee
relationship
Strengthen
the
Regulatory
Functions
of
the
POEA)
was
involving
seafarers
commence?
passed
which
repealed
Sections
29
and
30
of
RA
8042.
RULING:
G.R.
167590
A
distinction
must
be
made
between
the
perfection
of
the
In
this
case,
the
Philippine
Association
of
Service
Exporters,
employment
contract
and
the
commencement
of
the
Inc.
(PASEI)
questioned
the
validity
of
the
following
employer-‐employee
relationship.
The
perfection
of
the
provisions
of
RA
8042:
contract,
which
in
this
case
coincided
with
the
date
of
execution
thereof,
occurred
when
petitioner
and
respondent
a.
Section
6,
which
defines
the
term
“illegal
recruitment”.
agreed
on
the
object
and
the
cause,
as
well
as
the
rest
of
the
PASEI
claims
that
the
definition
by
the
law
is
vague
as
it
fails
terms
and
conditions
therein.
The
commencement
of
the
to
distinguish
between
licensed
and
non-‐licensed
recruiters;
employer-‐employee
relationship,
as
earlier
discussed,
would
have
taken
place
had
petitioner
been
actually
deployed
from
b.
Section
7,
which
penalizes
violations
against
RA
8042.
the
point
of
hire.
Thus,
even
before
the
start
of
any
employer-‐ PASEI
argues
that
the
penalties
for
simple
violations
against
employee
relationship,
contemporaneous
with
the
perfection
RA
8042,
i.e.,
mere
failure
to
render
report
or
obstructing
of
the
employment
contract
was
the
birth
of
certain
rights
inspection
are
already
punishable
for
at
least
6
years
and
1
and
obligations,
the
breach
of
which
may
give
rise
to
a
cause
day
imprisonment
an
a
fine
of
at
least
P200k.
PASEI
argues
of
action
against
the
erring
party.
Thus,
if
the
reverse
had
that
such
is
unreasonable;
happened,
that
is
the
seafarer
failed
or
refused
to
be
deployed
as
agreed
upon,
he
would
be
liable
for
damages.
c.
Section
9,
which
allows
the
victims
of
illegal
recruitment
to
have
the
option
to
either
file
the
criminal
case
where
he
or
Respondent’s
act
of
preventing
petitioner
from
departing
the
she
resides
or
at
the
place
where
the
crime
was
committed.
port
of
Manila
and
boarding
"MSV
Seaspread"
constitutes
a
PASEI
argues
that
this
provision
is
void
for
being
contrary
to
breach
of
contract,
giving
rise
to
petitioner’s
cause
of
action.
the
Rules
of
Court
which
provides
that
criminal
cases
must
be
Respondent
unilaterally
and
unreasonably
reneged
on
its
prosecuted
in
the
place
where
the
crime
or
any
of
its
obligation
to
deploy
petitioner
and
must
therefore
answer
essential
elements
were
committed;
for
the
actual
damages
he
suffered.
d.
Section
10,
which
provides
that
corporate
officers
and
685
SCRA
245
–
Labor
Law
–
Labor
Standards
–
directors
of
a
company
found
to
be
in
violation
of
RA
8042
Constitutionality
of
Sections
6,
7,
9,
10,
29,
and
30
of
the
shall
be
themselves
be
jointly
and
solidarily
liable
with
the
Migrant
Workers
Act
or
R.A.
No.
8042
corporation
or
partnership
for
the
aforesaid
claims
and
damages.
PASEI
claims
that
this
automatic
liability
imposed
This
case
is
a
consolidation
of
the
following
cases:
G.R.
No.
upon
corporate
officers
and
directors
is
void
for
being
152642,
G.R.
No.
152710,
G.R.
No.
167590,
G.R.
Nos.
182978-‐ violative
of
due
process.
79,
and
G.R.
Nos.
184298-‐99.
RTC
Judge
Jose
Paneda
of
Quezon
City
agreed
with
PASEI
and
G.R.
No.
152642
and
G.R.
No.
152710
he
declared
the
said
provisions
of
RA
8042
as
void.
Secretary
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
9
Sto.
Tomas
petitioned
for
the
annulment
of
the
RTC
Eufrocina
Gumabay
and
the
other
officers
of
Becmen
filed
a
judgment.
motion
for
leave
to
intervene.
They
aver
that
Section
10
is
invalid.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Sections
6,
7,
9,
and
10
of
RA
8042
are
void.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Section
is
invalid.
HELD:
No,
they
are
valid
provisions.
HELD:
No.
As
earlier
discussed,
Section
10
is
valid.
The
liability
of
Gumabay
et
al
is
not
automatic.
However,
the
SC
a.
Section
6:
The
law
clearly
and
unambiguously
reconsidered
its
earlier
ruling
that
Gumabay
et
al
are
distinguished
between
licensed
and
non-‐licensed
recruiters.
solidarily
and
jointly
liable
with
Becmen
there
being
no
By
its
terms,
persons
who
engage
in
“canvassing,
enlisting,
evidence
on
record
which
shows
that
they
were
personally
contracting,
transporting,
utilizing,
hiring,
or
procuring
involved
in
their
company’s
particular
actions
or
omissions
workers”
without
the
appropriate
government
license
or
in
Jasmin’s
case.
authority
are
guilty
of
illegal
recruitment
whether
or
not
they
commit
the
wrongful
acts
enumerated
in
that
section.
On
the
other
hand,
recruiters
who
engage
in
the
canvassing,
[G.R.
No.
170139.
August
5,
2014.]
enlisting,
etc.
of
OFWs,
although
with
the
appropriate
SAMEER
OVERSEAS
PLACEMENT
AGENCY,
government
license
or
authority,
are
guilty
of
illegal
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
JOY
C.
CABILES,
respondent.
recruitment
only
if
they
commit
any
of
the
wrongful
acts
J.
LEONEN
enumerated
in
Section
6.
Petitioner,
Sameer
Overseas
Placement
Agency,
Inc.,
is
a
b.
Section
7:
The
penalties
are
valid.
Congress
is
well
within
recruitment
and
placement
agency.
its
right
to
prescribed
the
said
penalties.
Besides,
it
is
not
the
duty
of
the
courts
to
inquire
into
the
wisdom
behind
the
law.
Respondent
Joy
Cabiles
was
hired
thus
signed
a
one-‐
year
employment
contract
for
a
monthly
salary
of
c.
Section
9:
The
Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure,
particularly
NT$15,360.00.
Joy
was
deployed
to
work
for
Taiwan
Wacoal,
Section
15(a)
of
Rule
110,
itself,
provides
that
the
rule
on
Co.
Ltd.
(Wacoal)
on
June
26,
1997.
She
alleged
that
in
her
venue
when
it
comes
to
criminal
cases
is
subject
to
existing
employment
contract,
she
agreed
to
work
as
quality
control
laws.
Therefore,
there
is
nothing
arbitrary
when
Congress
for
one
year.
In
Taiwan,
she
was
asked
to
work
as
a
cutter.
provided
an
alternative
venue
for
violations
of
a
special
penal
law
like
RA
8042.
Sameer
claims
that
on
July
14,
1997,
a
certain
Mr.
Huwang
from
Wacoal
informed
Joy,
without
prior
notice,
that
d.
Section
10:
The
liability
of
corporate
officers
and
directors
she
was
terminated
and
that
“she
should
immediately
report
is
not
automatic.
To
make
them
jointly
and
solidarily
liable
to
their
office
to
get
her
salary
and
passport.”
She
was
asked
with
their
company,
there
must
be
a
finding
that
they
were
to
“prepare
for
immediate
repatriation.”
Joy
claims
that
she
remiss
in
directing
the
affairs
of
that
company,
such
as
was
told
that
from
June
26
to
July
14,
1997,
she
only
earned
a
sponsoring
or
tolerating
the
conduct
of
illegal
activities.
total
of
NT$9,000.15
According
to
her,
Wacoal
deducted
NT$3,000
to
cover
her
plane
ticket
to
Manila.
G.R.
182978-‐79,
and
G.R.
184298-‐99
On
October
15,
1997,
Joy
filed
a
complaint
for
illegal
In
this
case,
Jasmin
Cuaresma,
a
nurse
working
in
Saudi
dismissal
with
the
NLRC
against
petitioner
and
Wacoal.
LA
Arabia
was
found
dead.
Her
parents
received
insurance
dismissed
the
complaint.
NLRC
reversed
LA’s
decision.
CA
benefits
from
the
OWWA
(Overseas
Workers
Welfare
affirmed
the
ruling
of
the
National
Labor
Relations
Administration).
But
when
they
found
out
based
on
an
Commission
finding
respondent
illegally
dismissed
and
autopsy
conducted
in
the
Philippines
that
Jasmin
was
raped
awarding
her
three
months’
worth
of
salary,
the
and
thereafter
killed,
her
parents
(Simplicio
and
Mila
reimbursement
of
the
cost
of
her
repatriation,
and
attorney’s
Cuaresma)
filed
for
death
and
insurance
benefits
with
fees
damages
from
the
recruitment
and
placement
agency
which
handled
Jasmin
(Becmen
Service
Exporter
and
Promotion,
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Cabiles
was
entitled
to
the
unexpired
Inc.).
portion
of
her
salary
due
to
illegal
dismissal.
The
case
reached
the
Supreme
Court
where
the
Supreme
HELD:
Court
ruled
that
since
Becmen
was
negligent
in
investigating
YES.
The
Court
held
that
the
award
of
the
three-‐month
the
true
cause
of
death
of
Jasmin
(
a
violation
of
RA
8042),
it
equivalent
of
respondent’s
salary
should
be
increased
to
the
shall
be
liable
for
damages.
The
Supreme
Court
also
ruled
amount
equivalent
to
the
unexpired
term
of
the
employment
that
pursuant
to
Section
10
of
RA
8042,
the
directors
and
contract.
officers
of
Becmen
are
themselves
jointly
and
solidarily
liable
with
Becmen.
In
Serrano
v.
Gallant
Maritime
Services,
Inc.
and
Marlow
Navigation
Co.,
Inc.,
this
court
ruled
that
the
clause
“or
for
three
(3)
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
10
whichever
is
less”
is
unconstitutional
for
violating
the
equal
protection
clause
and
substantive
due
process.
A
statute
or
provision
which
was
declared
unconstitutional
is
not
a
law.
It
“confers
no
rights;
it
imposes
no
duties;
it
affords
no
protection;
it
creates
no
office;
it
is
inoperative
as
if
it
has
not
been
passed
at
all.”
The
Court
said
that
they
are
aware
that
the
clause
“or
for
three
(3)
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
less”
was
reinstated
in
Republic
Act
No.
8042
upon
promulgation
of
Republic
Act
No.
10022
in
2010.
Ruling
on
the
constitutional
issue
In
the
hierarchy
of
laws,
the
Constitution
is
supreme.
No
branch
or
office
of
the
government
may
exercise
its
powers
in
any
manner
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution,
regardless
of
the
existence
of
any
law
that
supports
such
exercise.
The
Constitution
cannot
be
trumped
by
any
other
law.
All
laws
must
be
read
in
light
of
the
Constitution.
Any
law
that
is
inconsistent
with
it
is
a
nullity.
Thus,
when
a
law
or
a
provision
of
law
is
null
because
it
is
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution,
the
nullity
cannot
be
cured
by
reincorporation
or
reenactment
of
the
same
or
a
similar
law
or
provision.
A
law
or
provision
of
law
that
was
already
declared
unconstitutional
remains
as
such
unless
circumstances
have
so
changed
as
to
warrant
a
reverse
conclusion.
The
Court
observed
that
the
reinstated
clause,
this
time
as
provided
in
Republic
Act.
No.
10022,
violates
the
constitutional
rights
to
equal
protection
and
due
process.96
Petitioner
as
well
as
the
Solicitor
General
have
failed
to
show
any
compelling
change
in
the
circumstances
that
would
warrant
us
to
revisit
the
precedent.
The
Court
declared,
once
again,
the
clause,
“or
for
three
(3)
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
less”
in
Section
7
of
Republic
Act
No.
10022
amending
Section
10
of
Republic
Act
No.
8042
is
declared
unconstitutional
and,
therefore,
null
and
void.
SBCA
2nd
Sem
SY
15-‐16
LABSTAN
–
ATTY
RESURRECION
AKD
Digests
11