INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA.
DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX
CARUNGCONG as ADMINISTRATRIX
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO
G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010
Corona, J.
FACTS:
Mediatrix Carungcong (Mediatrix), the administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased mother, Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong (Manolita), filed an estafa
case against her brother-in-law, the husband of her deceased sister Zenaida, William
Sato (Sato).
Sato sold four (4) parcels of land in Tagaytay City belonging to Manolita, his mother-in-
law, from whom he acquired Special Power of Attorney to sell the said parcels of land
through fraudulent acts by taking advantage of Manolita’s blindness to secure her
signature and thumb mark, making her believe that said documents involved only her
taxes.
Sato moved to quash the Information of the Estafa case filed against him claiming that
his relationship to Manolita as in-laws exempts him from criminal liability under Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the death of Sato’s wife extinguished the relationship by affinity
between Sato and Manolita.
2. Whether or not Sato should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship with Manolita.
RULING:
1. No, Zenaida’s death did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between Sato and
Manolita. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the relatives of
the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless whether the marriage produced children or not.
2. No, the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies
to felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases aforementioned.
As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said
crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender
civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorically and unmistakable language of the provision shows
that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. In the instant case, estafa through falsification clearly does not fall under
the said provision.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
TEODORO SABIO
G.R. No. L-23734
April 27, 1967
Bengzon, JP.
FACTS:
On April 12, 1963, the defendant-appellant Teodoro Sabio (Sabio) and his friend were
sitting in the plaza of Central Manapla in Negros Occidental where they were
approached by their old friend Romeo Bacobo (Bacobo) together with two other
friends. Bacobo approached them by starting a conversation with Sabio and at the same
time, giving Sabio a “foot-kick greeting” by touching Sabio’s foot with his own foot.
Sabio thereupon stood up and dealt with Bacobo a fist blow, inflicting upon him a
lacerated wound of ¾ inches long at the upper lid of his left eye.
Sabio thereafter was prosecuted for less serious physical injuries. The municipal trial
Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 5 months and 10 days of imprisonment
plus costs. They appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance and he was likewise
found guilty but with mitigating circumstance of provocation lessening the
imprisonment sentence to 1 month and 5 days plus indemnity of P100.00 and costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a fist blow delivered in retaliation to a “foot-kick greeting” is an act of
self-defense and be considered a justifying circumstance.
RULING:
No, a fist blow delivered in retaliation to a “foot-kick greeting” is not an act of self-
defense and cannot be considered as a justifying circumstance. A primordial requisite
for self-defense is unlawful aggression, and for it to be present, there must be a real
danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case, the foot-kick between friends
maybe a practical joke, and may even hurt, but it is not serious or real attack on a
person’s safety. Thus, the act does not sufficiently constitute an unlawful aggression.
Such kick was only a mere slight provocation.
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125059
March 17, 2000
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Francisco Sycip (Sycip) agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation
(FRC), a townhouse unit in FRC’s project in Bacoor, Cavite. Upon execution of the
contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks
covering 49 monthly installments. After moving in his unit, Sycip complaied to FRC
regarding the defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project.
FRC sent “stop payment orders” to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other
postdated checks to the bank as due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his
checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made such orders on the
forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner’s checking account, the drawee
bank dishonored six (6) posted checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for
violations of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 22 involving such checks.
The trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sycip is guilty for violation of Bouncing Checks Law.
RULING:
No, Sycip is not guilty for violation of Bouncing Checks Law.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law, an offense is committed when the
following elements are present:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
2. the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3. the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that although the first element of the
offense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
NOE TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158057
September 24, 2004
Callejo, Sr. J.
FACTS:
On September 16, 1995, petitioner Noe Toledo (Noe) was on his way home at Tuburan,
Odiongan, Romblon when he saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte (Ricky) having a drinking
spree with his friends five meters away from his house. Noe ordered them to not make
loud noises, and they obliged. He then proceeded to his house and went to sleep. On
the other side, Ricky together with his friends went to sleep at the Guarte’s house. They
had not laid down long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house
three times. Ricky rose from the bed and peeped through a window and saw Noe
stoning their house. Ricky asked Noe why he was stoning their house but Noe did not
answer and instead, he met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and without any warning,
stabbed Ricky in the abdomen with a bolo. Ricky was taken to the Romblon Provincial
Hospital thereafter where he was immediately operated on by Dr. Fetalvero, but Ricky
later on died while being operated on because of massive blood loss.
On the Evidence of the Petitioner, Noe alleged that when Ricky went out the house that
night, he proceeded to Noe’s house inebriated and incensed, pulled out a balisong,
pushed the door and threatened to stab Noe. Trying too hard to block Ricky from
entering the house, Noe pushed their sala set against the door as he hurriedly ran
upstairs to get his bolo. He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using
his left hand. He pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky. The bolo
accidentally hit Ricky in the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and fell to the floor.
Noe, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain the next day.
The RTC rendered judgment finding Noe guilty as charged, and not giving credence and
probative weight to the testimony of Noe that his bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the
stomach. Noe thereafter appealed to CA raising the issue whether or not he can be held
criminally liable for the accidental death of Ricky. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision
with modifications, ruling that Noe failed to prove that he acted on self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Noe is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the
evidence on record.
RULING:
Yes, Noe is guilty of homicide.
The herein accused Noe asserts two provisions in the Revised Penal Code that would
theoretically exempt him from criminal liability, which are –
1. Article 12, paragraph 4 of the RPC which reads:
“Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it; and
2. Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC which reads:
“Article 11. Justifying circumstances – The following do not incur criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Noe invoking the above-mentioned provisions of the RPC at the same is extremely
deviating to the law itself because the said defences are directly opposites. There is no
such defense as “accidental self-defense” in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph
4 of the RPC, are affirmative defences which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence. Noe failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident,
without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The Supreme Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that Noe failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.