Maddie

 Bautista  

US. GUINTO - G.R.  No.  76607  

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on
the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting
the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.c

1. In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barbering services in the said base.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed
that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not
included in the invitation to bid. The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions. Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court
issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo. On July 22,
1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America,
which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as officials / employees of the
U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

2. In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S.
Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City for pouring urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables. On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the
United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer
of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done
by him in his official capacity. But the motion was denied by the respondent judge on the ground
that that although defendants acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what
their functions called for brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they
may have had in the beginning.

3. In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners herein. The officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing
of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages
against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed. During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro, a special counsel
assigned to the International Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base,
alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the
laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP- US Military Bases
Agreement. The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11,
1987, which held that the claimed immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only
criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court
when they submitted their answer.
Maddie  Bautista  

4. In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
herein petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the
plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendant. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat
them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs
were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting
arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken
to the medical center for treatment of their wounds. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the
United States of America and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect
a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. But it was denied by
the trial court. The complaint alleged criminal acts against the individually-named defendants and
from the nature of said acts it could not be said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity
should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves are duty bound to respect, obey and submit
themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the members of the United States Armed
Forces who are being treated as guests of this country should respect, obey and submit themselves
to its laws

ISSUE: Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without
its consent

In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official
functions.

HELD:

1st suit: No. the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied. because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. The barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States
Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. DISMISSED

2nd suit the Court assumes that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake
of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of
membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are
exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available
to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point
to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the
privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. The consequence of this finding is that
Maddie  Bautista  

the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage
suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were
acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that
by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions,
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. dismissed

3rd suit the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It
cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their
duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. dismissed

4th suit The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what
actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident
in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The
needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after
it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in
question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
Dismissed

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

JURE IMPERII – sovereign and governmental acts.

JURE GETIONIS – commercial, private, and proprietary acts.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.

Express consent - may be embodied in a general law or a special law; effected only by the will of
the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute.

Implied consent - when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which
the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
Maddie  Bautista  

doctrine of state immunity - "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law
on which the right depends." While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

Suability - depends on the consent of the state to be sued,

The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable

Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent.
The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated
"special agents," this article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms
of consent. The said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its
inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.