Reg vs Govinda

. For convenience of comparison, the provisions of Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal
Code may be stated thus:

Section 299.

A person commits culpable homicide, if the act by which the death is caused is done

(a) With the intention of causing death;

(b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death:

(c) With the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

Section 300.

Subject to certain exceptions, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is
caused is done (1) With the intention of causing death;

(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;

(3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to
be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;

(4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

3. I have underlined the words which appear to me to mark the differences between the two
offences.

4. (a) and (1) show that where there is an intention to kill, the offence is always murder.

5. (c) and (4) appear to me intended to apply (I do not say that they are necessarily limited) to
cases in which there is no intention to cause death or bodily injury. Furious driving, firing at a
mark near a public road, would be cases of this description. Whether the offence is culpable
homicide or murder, depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result,
it is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder.

6. The essence of (2) appears to me to be found in the words which I have underlined. The
offence is murder, if the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from
peculiarity of constitution, or immature age, or other special circumstance, to be killed by an
injury which would not ordinarily cause death. The illustration given in the section is the
following:

A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death,
strikes him with intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is
guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.

7. There remain to be considered (b) and (3), and it is on a comparison of these two clauses
that the decision of doubtful cases like the present must generally depend. The offence is
culpable homicide, if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death; it is
murder, if such injury is sufficient in the, ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
distinction is fine, but appreciable. It is much the same distinction as that between (c) and (4),
already noticed. It is a question of degree of probability. Practically, I think, it will generally
resolve itself into a consideration of the nature of the weapon used. A blow from the fist or a
stick on a vital part may be likely to cause death; a wound from a sword in a vital part is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The distinction between sections 299 and 300 was made clear by Melvil J. in Reg. vs
Govinda [1876 ILR Bom 342]. In this case the accused had knocked his wife down, put one knee on
her chest, and struck her two or three violent blows on the face with the closed fist, producing
extraversion of blood on the brain and she died in consequence, either on the spot, or very shortly
afterwards, there being no intention to cause death and the bodily injury not being sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. The accused was liable for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.

Kalarimadathil Unni vs State Of Kerala

they had laid their
victim in a drain after closing his mouth with adhesive tape
and plugging his nose with cotton wool soaked in chloroform,
as a result of which death was caused. They appealed to
this Court by special leave. It was contended on their
behalf: (i) that their offence did not amount to murder but
only to culpable homicide
The first clause says that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death. An intention to kill a person brings the matter so
clearly within the general principle of mens rea as to cause no difficulty. Once the intention
to kill is proved, the offence is murder unless one of the exceptions applies in which case
the offence is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As there is no
question of any of the exceptions they need not be mentioned. But it is plain that the
appellants did not contemplate killing the Lt. Commander. No part of their preparations
shows an intention to kill. Had they so desired, they had ample time and opportunity to
effectuate that purpose without going to the trouble of using cotton soaked in chloroform
to stuff the nostrils. They had only to hold his nose closed for a few minutes. The confession
to which we have referred also shows that the news of the death of the Lt. Commander
came to them with as much surprise as shock. In these circumstances, the first clause of s.
300 cannot apply.

The second clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom harm is caused.
The mental attitude here is two-fold. There is first the intention to cause bodily harm and
next there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the
intended injury. English Common Law made no clear distinction between intention and
recklessness but in our law the foresight of the death must be present. The mental attitude
is thus made of two elements-(a) causing an intentional injury and (b) which injury the
offender has the foresight to know would cause death. Here the injury or harm was
intended. The appellants intended tying up the victim, closing his mouth by sticking
adhesive plaster and plugging his nose with cotton wool soaked in chloroform. They
intended that the Lt. Commander should be rendered unconscious for some time but they
did not intend to do more harm than this. Can it be said that they had the subjective
knowledge of the fatal consequences of the bodily harm they were causing? We think that
on the facts the answer cannot be in the affirmative. To say that the act satisfied the test of
subjective knowledge would be really tantamount to saying that the appellants intended to
commit the murder of the Lt. Commander which, as said already, was not the case.

The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the
intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this clause the result of the
intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender
intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary way of nature
the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether
the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences or not. As was laid down
in Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab(1) for the application of this clause it must be first
established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the
nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be
sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not
accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is
established.

Applying these tests to the acts of the appellants we have to see first what bodily injury has
been established. The bodily injury consisted of tying up the hands and feet of the victim,
closing the mouth with adhesive plaster and plugging the nostrils with cotton soaked in
chloroform. All these acts were deliberate acts which had been preplanned and they,
therefore, satisfy the subjective test involved in the clause. The next question is whether
these acts considered objectively were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. In our judgment they were. The victim could only possibly breathe through the
nostrils but they were also closed with cotton wool and in addition an asphyxiating agent
was infused in the cotton. All in all it would have been a miracle if the victim had escaped.
Death of the victim took place as a direct result of the acts of his assailants.

The ordinary course of nature was neither interrupted nor interfered with by any intervening
act of another and whatever happened was the result of the acts of the assailants, and their acts
alone.

There was no interference by anyone else. Death was due to asphyxiation whether caused
by the mechanical obstruction of the nostrils or by chloroform as an asphyxiating agent, or
both. Whichever way one looks at it, the injury which caused the death was the one
inflicted by the assailants.

State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Rayavarapu Punnayya

Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with cls. (2) and (3) of s. 300. The distinguishing feature of
the mens rea requi- site under cl. (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offend- er
regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the
intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that' such harm
would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal
health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential
requirement of el. (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the
offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury caus- ing the death of the particular
victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause.

If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim,
nor an inten- tion to. cause death or bodily injury sufficient 'in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the
death, was intentionally given.

In clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the
corresponding el. (b) of s. 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have
been used.
The differ- ence between cl. (b) of s. 299 and cl. (3) of s. 300 is one of the degree of
probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. The word "likely" in cl. (b)
of s. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibili- ty. The
words "bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean
that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to the ordinary
course of nature. For cases to fall within cl. (3), it is not necessary that the offender
intended to cause death, So long as death ensues from the intentional. bodily injury or
injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and anr. v. State
of Kerala(2) is an apt illustra- tion of this point.

In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, (2) Vivian Bose j. speaking for this Court,
explained the meaning' and scope of Clause (3), thus (at p. 1500):

"The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s.
300, 3rdly'. First, it must establish, quite objective- ly, that a bodily injury is present;.
secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective
investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
injury, that is to say,. that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind
of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further, and, fourthly it must be ,proved that the injury of the type just
described made up of the three elements set out above was suffi- cient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objec- tive and
inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) even if the intention of
accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be
murder. Illustration (c) appended to s. 300 clearly brings out this point.

be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at
the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused
the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the
death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to
"culpable homicide" as defined in s. 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in
the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of s. 300, Penal Code is reached. This
is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution
bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of murder' contained
in s. 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be 'culpable
homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of s. 304,
depending. respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of s. 299 is applicable. If
this question is found in the positive, but the case comes, within any of the Exceptions
enumerated in s. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'
punishable under the First Part of s. 304, Penal Code.

The crux of the matter is, whether the facts established bring the case within Clause Thirdly
of s. 300. This question further narrows down into a consideration of the two-fold issue :.

(i) Whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the
accused ?

(ii) If so, were they sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature ? If both these
elements are satisfactorily established, the offence will be 'murder', irrespective of the fact
whether an intention on the part of the accused to cause death, had or had not been proved

The ratio of Anda v. State of Rajasthan (supra) applies in full force to the facts of the
present case. Here, a direct causal connection between the act of the accused and the
death was established. The injuries were the direct cause of the death. No secondary
factor such as gangrene, tetanus etc., supervened. There was no doubt whatever that the
beating was premeditated and calculated. Just as in Anda's case, here also, the aim of the
asailants was to smash the arms and legs of the deceased, and they succeeded in that
design. causing no less than 19 injuries, including fractures of most of the bones of the
legs and the arms. While in Anda's case, the sticks used by the assailants were not
specially dangerous, in the instant case they were unusually heavy, lethal weapons. All
these acts of the accused were pre-planned and intentional, which, considered objectively
in the light of the medical evidence. were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The mere fact that the beating was designedly con- fined by the assailants
to the legs and arms, or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was individually suffi-
cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, will not exclude the application of
Clause 3rdly of s. 300. The expression "bodily injury" in Clause 3rdly includes also its
plural, so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally, caused
by the accused are cumula- tively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of
nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency. The
sufficiency spoken of in this clause. as a|ready noticed, is the high probability of death in
the ordinary course of nature, and if such suffi- ciency exists and death is caused and the
injury causing it is intentional, the case would fail under Clause 3rdly of s.

300. All the conditions which are a pre-requisite for the applicability of this clause have been
established and the offence committed by the accused in the instant case was 'murder'. with a
sentence of imprisonment for life.

Virsa Singh vs The State Of Punjab

All it means is that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that the injury
is of the kind that falls within the earlier clause, namely, that the injury found to be present
was the injury that was intended to be inflicted
Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of
inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing
to do with the question of intention.

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case
under s. 300, 3rdly " ; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present
;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury,
that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly,
it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set
out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry
is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on
the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly.

It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real
distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an
act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury
actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the
only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Dhupa Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar

He, however, submitted that conviction of appellant No.1-Dhupa Chamar under Section
302 of the Penal Code was unwarranted and as he is said to have inflicted a single blow to
deceased Ram Patia Devi, Clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the Penal Code would not be
attracted and, accordingly, the act of appellant-Dhupa Chamar would not amount to
murder. Thus, a question arises as to when death is caused by a single blow, whether Clause
Thirdly of Section 300 of the Penal Code is attracted. The ingredient 'intention' in that
Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a given case whether offence involved is
murder or not.
Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden
is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Section 300,

In the case of Gudar Dusadh v. State of Bihar,….."The fact that the appellant gave only one
blow on the head would not mitigate the offence of the appellant and make him guilty of the
offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The blow on the head of Ramlal with
lathi was plainly given with some force and resulted in a 3" long fracture of the left parietal
bone. Ramlal deceased died instantaneously and as such, there arose no occasion for giving a
second blow to him. As the injury on the head was deliberate and not accidental and as the
injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the case against the
appellant would fall squarely within the ambit of clause "3rdly" of Section 300, Indian Penal
Code."

Munna v. State of M.P…..."Adverting to the contention of a single blow, it may be pointed out
that there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A
single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some cases
under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with
regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of
each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the
weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the
injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or
knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him."

Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, if we examine facts of the present case, Clause
Thirdly of Section 300 is fully attracted. It appears that the accused persons came armed
with deadly weapons and there was an altercation and exchange of hot words whereafter
appellant No. 1 assaulted victim Ram Patia Devi with a bhala causing injury on the chest
rupturing important blood vessels and cutting of aorta and other artery resulting in her
instantaneous death
The above circumstance would show that accused intentionally inflicted the injury and the
same would indicate such a state of mind of the appellant- Dhupa Chamar that he aimed
and inflicted the injury with deadly weapon. herefore, inevitable conclusion would be that
appellant No. 1- Dhupa Chamar has committed the offence of murder
Rajan vs State Rep.

11. Having come to the said conclusion, now we have to examine, as to "what was the offence
that was committed by the accused by the said act". What actually transpired inside the house
could be gathered only from the extra judicial confession. In Ex.P10-extra judicial confession,
the accused had stated that when he asked his wife to give money, she refused, which resulted
in a wordy quarrel inside the house. Since the deceased shouted at him in a loud voice, he
slapped her. The confession would further reveal that on receiving the said slap, she fell down.
Thereafter, the accused tried to wake her up. But, there was no response from her. The
confession would further state that the accused believed that the deceased had already passed
away. Only under that belief, according to the confession, in order to escape from the clutches
of law, he set fire to the deceased. The medical evidence, however, states that the death was
only due to burn injuries and not due to smothering or strangulation or due to any other physical
violence. Thus, according to the accused, at the time when he poured kerosene and set fire, he
was under the mistaken impression that the deceased had already died whereas, in fact, she
was alive.

15. As we have already concluded , the appellant had committed two acts. One was slapping
the deceased and making her motionless/unconscious and the second was pouring kerosene
and setting fire to her. Whether two or more acts of an accused would constitute a single act
or not depends upon the fact whether there was continuity of action. As defined in Section
33 of IPC, a series of acts may constitute a single act. But, if more than one act are committed,
not in series, it would not constitute a single act. In the instant case, going by the evidences
available on record, we are of the view that these two acts were committed in a series and,
therefore, they constitute a single act as defined in Section 33of IPC.

16. So far as the first act is concerned, undoubtedly, it will not fall within the ambit of Section
299 of IPC inasmuch as by the said act, the appellant did not cause the death of the deceased
though he believed that he had caused death by the first act. Further, the first act of slapping
was done not with either intention to cause death or intention to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death or with the knowledge as defined in Section 299 of IPC.

Therefore, when he committed the second act also the appellant had no intention to cause
death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Since the
appellant was under the belief that the deceased was already dead, it cannot be said that
the appellant, had intended to cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death. Thus, the second act of the appellant, causing the death of the deceased by pouring
kerosene and setting fire to the deceased also, would not fall within the first or second limb
of Section 299 of IPC at all.
Now, turning to the third limb of Section 299 of IPC, it speaks of knowledge that he is likely
by such act to cause death. Here again, it can be argued that since the appellant was under
the belief that the deceased was no more, knowledge on his part that by his act he was
likely to cause death cannot be imputed. But, such argument cannot be countenanced for,
such belief can not be farcical or illogical. It should be examined whether the belief of the
accused in this case, that the deceased was no more was based on logic and on good faith.
If the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead is based on due care and
attention, then, the knowledge as dealt with in the third limb of section 299 of IPC cannot
be imputed to him. But, if the belief that the deceased was dead was not based on due care
and attention and such belief was recklessly held, then, certainly, knowledge as defined
in Section 299of IPC can be imputed to the accused. In other words, the belief of the
appellant that the deceased was dead must be out of good faith.

The term Good faithis defined in Section 52 of IPC which reads as follows:-

52. Good faith.Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed
without due care and attention.

19. In the instant case, the appellant, without taking due care and attention, that is, without
fully ascertaining whether the deceased was already dead or not, in haste, had poured kerosene
and set fire to the deceased. There was total lack of due care and attention on the part of the
appellant. Thus, the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead was not based
on due care and attention and so, he cannot escape by taking recourse to the plea of good faith
as defined in Section 52 of IPC. In such view of the matter, we have to hold that the second
act of the appellant in the instant case would squarely fall within the third limb of section
299 of IPC.

The above said judgement in Palani Goundan's case came up for consideration in Kaliappa
Goundan v. Emperor, 145 Ind Cas 953 . In that case, factually, there was a scuffle between the
deceased and the accused. The deceased fell unconscious. The accused dragged her to the
railway line and laid the body across the rails to make it appear that she died of a train accident.
Subsequently, the train hit her and according to the medical evidence, the death was due to
hitting by train. Though it was not specifically pleaded by the accused that they believed that
the deceased was dead and under the said belief they dragged the body and laid it across the
railway line, the trial court made an inference that the accused would have believed that the
deceased was already dead and on that belief, laid it across the railway line to make it appear
as though she died of the accident. On this inference, the trial court acquitted the accused
holding that the act of the accused would not amount to culpable homicide. But, the High Court
found that in the absence of any evidence or even a plea that the accused believed that the
deceased was already dead and under that belief the body was dragged and laid across the
railway line, the finding of the trial court cannot be sustained as it is based only on mere
surmise. The High Court, therefore, set aside the acquittal and convicted the accused for
murder. While doing so, the High Court has held in paragraph 12 as follows:-

12. To sum up this case: (1) an intention to kill Muthayee was clearly proved; (2) that it was
in pursuance of a deliberate plan; (3) that the appellants placed Muthayee's body across the
Railway line; (4) that it was that act which caused her death; (5) the appellants have not put
forward the case that they believed Muthayee to be dead when they put her body across the
line; (6) the marks of a struggle and the body being dragged and the discovery of the woman's
that at that, spot prove nothing more than a struggle and (7) there is some slight medical
evidence regarding marks of strangulation. This, however, was not the cause of Muthayee's
death. The conclusions I arrive at from the before mentioned facts are that the appellants had
a struggle with the deceased woman during which her that fell off of was removed, that an
attempt may have been made to strangle her, that she was immediately dragged either in an
unconscious or semi-conscious condition on to the Railway line and placed in front of the train,
the intention throughout being to kill Muthayee, that the intention with which the accused
struggled with Muthayee cannot be separated from the intention with which they put her body
across the line, that the two acts were intimately connected with each other and the latter act
followed immediately upon the former, that both the acts of the appellants must be treated as
being only one transaction, the transaction being to kill Muthayee, and that the most favourable
inference that could possibly be drawn in favour of the appellants is that they acted with a
reckless indifference and ignorance as to whether Muthayee was alive or dead. Even this
inference, in my view, is not such a reasonable one as the former but it is the most favourable
one which could be drawn. All this leads me to one conclusion and one conclusion only,
namely, that the appellants were guilty of the offence of murder.(Emphasis added)

26. In Re: Thavamani v.Unknown, (1943) 2 MLJ 13, Palani Goundan and Kaliappa
Goundan cases cited supra, came up for consideration. In that case, the deceased was
held by the accused and attacked. Believing that she died, with a view to erase the
evidence, threw the body into the well. But, the deceased died only due to drowning .
Seeking help from Palani Goundan case, it was argued before this court that since the
accused believed that the deceased was already dead, he threw the body into the well and
as such the act of the accused would not amount to either culpable homicide or murder.
But, the court held that the initial intention of the accused itself was to commit murder
and the first act of attacking the deceased was with the intention to kill her and the second
act of throwing the body into well was in continuation of the first act and thus, both the
acts constitute a single act which was done with the intention to kill the deceased. Thus,
in that case, this court followed the distinction made in Kaliappa Goundan case
distinguishing the Palani Gounden case and held that the accused was liable to be
punished for murder.
28. In the instant case, as we have already pointed out, when the accused committed the first
act of slapping the deceased, he had no intention at all, either to cause the death or to cause
such bodily injury which is likely to cause death. Similarly, when he committed the second act
of pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased also, he had no intention to cause the death
of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. As we have already
concluded, these two acts constitute one single act. Had it been the case that the first act was
done with the intention to cause death and believing that out of the first act, the deceased died,
the second act is done, though factually, the death was caused only by the second act, since
both the acts constitute one single act and since there was initial intention for the accused to
cause the death of the deceased, the act of the accused would fall within the first limb of section
299 of IPC and section 300 of IPC and, therefore, he would be liable for punishment
under Section 302 of IPC. But, obviously, the accused never had such intention to cause the
death of the deceased nor did he have intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death. But, at the same time, as we have already concluded, since the accused had committed,
the said second act of pouring kerosene and setting fire without taking adequate care and
attention, in a reckless manner, and without making due verification as to whether the deceased
was dead or not, he had in haste poured kerosene and set fire and killed the deceased.
Therefore, the belief as claimed by the accused that the deceased was dead is not out of good
faith. So, he can be imputed with knowledge as required under third limb of Section 299 of
IPC when he did the second act of pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased. At this
juncture, it needs to be mentioned that clause (iv) of Section 300 of IPC and the third limb
of section 299 of IPC have presented considerable difficulty to courts in their practical
application to concrete cases. The range of probability in the two clauses relates to causing of
death but in one it is comparatively not so strong as in the other. Although one may know that
the act or illegal omission is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death still, it is not murder,
even if death was caused thereby, if the doer had no knowledge that in all probabilities it would
cause death [vide State of Kerala v. Mani @ Chandran, 1992 Crl.L.J.1682]. In the instant case,
we are of the view that so much of knowledge as is required under the fourth limb of section
300 of IPC cannot be imputed to the accused and, therefore, he cannot be punished for offence
under Section 302 of IPC and thus, he is liable to be punished only under Section 304(ii) of
IPC.

Abdul Waheed Khan and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

Criminal trial--Necessity of holding identification parade when arises?--
Identification parade of accused persons cannot be faulted with.
The necessity for holding an identification parade can arise only when the accused
are not previously known to the witnesses. The whole idea of a test identification
parade is that witnesses who claim to have seen the culprits at the time of
occurrence are to identify them from the midst of other persons without any aid
or any other source. The test is done to check upon their veracity. In other words,
the main object of holding an identification parade, during the investigation stage,
is to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and also to
enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could be cited as eye-
witness of the crime.
In the instant case, the factual scenario noted by the trial court reveals that all possible
efforts were made to have test identification parade immediately after the arrest of the
accused persons.

8. Coming to the applicability of Section 302 IPC, it is submitted that though the intention
was to rob the deceased, when the deceased resisted, in order to achieve the intended
object, he was indiscriminately stabbed till he succumbed to death and the cash and the
drafts were snatched away. The High Court was justified in its conclusion about the
applicability of Section 302 IPC.

In case of Abdul Waheed Khan and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, three accused rushed to
the deceased and began stabbing him indiscriminately with their three knives, while another accused
tried to snatch the bag containing the cash. Further knife blows were given by the three accused
persons till the deceased collapsed. They away the cash bag and all of them fled. the three
appellants had indiscriminately stabbed the deceased, though their object was to rob him. the doctor
said that the stab wounds as well as the head injury are individually sufficient to cause death". The
stab wounds came first and then the possible fall. Taking into account the totality of the
circumstances the accused was held guilty for murder.

R v Ahluwalia

The appellant, Ahluwalia, suffered abuse and violence from her husband for years. After
one violent evening, she went to bed thinking about her husband’s behaviour and could
not sleep. She finally went downstairs, poured petrol into a bucket, lit a candle, went to
her husband’s bedroom and set it on fire. Her husband died from his injuries. Ahluwalia
pleaded manslaughter on grounds that she did not intend to kill him, only to inflict
pain. She also pleaded the defence of provocation on grounds of her treatment during
the marriage. To support it, reliance was placed upon the whole history of ill-treatment
throughout the marriage, culminating on the night in the deceased's refusal to speak to
her, his threat to use the hot iron upon her, his threat to beat her the next morning if
she did not provide him with money and his clear indication that he wished the
marriage to end.

In the present case the learned judge followed that direction faithfully. He repeated it
almost verbatim when he first directed the jury on provocation. Later he said:

"Bear in mind it is a sudden and temporary loss of self-control for which you are
looking, not a thought-out plan how to punish him for his wickedness."
Nevertheless, it is open to the judge, when deciding whether there is any evidence of
provocation to be left to the jury and open to the jury when considering such evidence, to
take account of the interval between the provocative conduct and the reaction of the
defendant to it. Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct made its
impact on the mind of the defendant he or she kept or regained self-control. The passage
of time following the provocation may also show that the subsequent attack was planned
or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self-
control and therefore with the defence of provocation. In some cases, such an interval may
wholly undermine the defence of provocation; that, however, depends entirely on the facts
of the individual case and is not a principle of law.

Mr. Robertson referred to the phrase "cooling off period" which has sometimes been
applied to an interval of time between the provocation relied upon and the fatal act. He
suggests that although in many cases such an interval may indeed be a time for cooling
and regaining self-control so as to forfeit the protection of the defence, in others the time
lapse has an opposite effect. He submits, relying on expert evidence not before the trial
judge, that women who have been subjected frequently over a period to violent treatment
may react to the final act or words by what he calls a "slow-burn" reaction rather than by
an immediate loss of self-control.

This ground of appeal therefore turns upon the one characteristic which it is complained the
learned judge ignored. Mr. Robertson submits that this appellant was suffering from a
"battered woman syndrome", such that it had become a characteristic within the
meaning of Lord Diplock's formulation. He says that not only had the appellant suffered
violence, abuse and humiliation over some ten years and thereby undergone a dreadful
ordeal. That course of ill-treatment had affected her personality so as to produce a state of
"learnt helplessness" -- a phrase used by experts who have identified this condition.
We have been shown a report which was available before the trial from a recognised
medical practitioner for the purposes of the Mental Health Act. That doctor expressed the
opinion that the appellant was suffering from endogenous depression at the material time, a
condition which, in the opinion of some experts, would be termed "a major depressive
disorder".

R v Ahluwalia (1993) 96 Cr App R 133 Court of Appeal

The appellant poured petrol and caustic soda on to her sleeping

husband and then set fire to him. He died six days later from his
injuries. The couple had an arranged marriage and the husband had
been violent and abusive throughout the marriage. He was also
having an affair. On the night of the killing he had threatened to hit
her with an iron and told her that he would beat her the next day if
she did not provide him with money. At her trial she admitted killing
her husband but raised the defence of provocation however, the
jury convicted her of murder. She appealed on the grounds that the
judge's direction to the jury relating to provocation was wrong and
she also raised the defence of diminished responsibility.

Held:

The judge's direction on provocation was correct. The Duffy

direction was good law and the judge had directed the jury on the
issue of the abuse suffered by the appellant and thus the jury would
have considered the affect of this in reaching their verdict. The
appeal on the grounds of provocation was therefore unsuccessful.

However, the appeal was allowed on the grounds of diminished

responsibility. The Court did, however, stress that it was exceptional
that fresh evidence would be allowed.
Exceptions

Km nanavati v
Even so, it is contended by Mr. Pathak that the accused shot the deceased while deprived of
the power of self-control by sudden and grave provocation and, therefore, the offence would
fall under Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The said Exception reads:

"Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control
by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or
causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident".

Homicide is the killing of a human being by another. Under this exception, culpable homicide
is not murder if the following conditions are complied with : (1) The deceased must have given
provocation to the accused. (2) The provocation must be grave. (3) The provocation must be
sudden. (4) The offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his
power of self-control. (5) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the
deprivation of the power of self-control. (6) The offender must have caused the death of the
person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

The first question raised is whether Ahuja gave provocation to Nanawati within the meaning
of the exception and whether the provocation, if given by him, was grave and sudden.

Learned Attorney-General argues, that though a confession of adultery by a wife may in certain
circumstances be provocation by the paramour himself, under different circumstances it has to
be considered from the standpoint of the person who conveys it rather than from the standpoint
of the person who gives it. He further contends that even if the provocation was deemed to
have been given by Ahuja, and though the said provocation might have been grave, it could
not be sudden, for the provocation given by Ahuja was only in the past.

On the other hand, Mr. Pathak contends that the act of Ahuja, namely, the seduction of Sylvia,
gave provocation though the fact of seduction was communicated to the accused by Sylvia and
that for the ascertainment of the suddenness of the provocation it is not the mind of the person
who provokes that matters but that of the person provoked that is decisive. It is not necessary
to express our opinion on the said question, for we are satisfied that, for other reasons, the case
is not covered by Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

The question that the Court has to consider is whether a reasonable person placed in the same
position as the accused was, would have reacted to the confession of adultery by his wife in
the manner in which the accused did.

It will be seen in this case that abusive language of the foulest kind was held to be sufficient
in the case of man who was already enraged by the conduct of deceased's son. The same learned
Judge in a later decision in Boya Munigadu v. The Queen upheld plea of grave and sudden
provocation in the following circumstances: The accused saw the deceased when she had
cohabitation with his bitter enemy; that night he had no meals; next morning he went to the
ryots to get his wages from them, and at that time he saw his wife eating food along with her
paramour; he killed the paramour with a bill-hook. The learned Judges held that the accused
had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the first exception to s. 300 of the Indian
Penal Code. The learned Judges observed :

Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of "grave and
sudden" provocation ? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a
reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way
of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the
society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging
from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any standard with precision : it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard
to the relevant circumstances.

The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of "grave and
sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as
the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as
to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances,
cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first
Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the
previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the
subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal
blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not
after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for
premeditation and calculation.

Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed
to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the latter was not present. We will
assume that he had momentarily lost his self-control. But if his version is true-for the purpose
of this argument we shall accept that what he has said is true-it shows that he was only thinking
of the future of his wife and children and also of asking for an explanation from Ahuja for his
conduct. This attitude of the accused clearly indicates that he had not only regained his self-
control, but on the other hand, was planning for the future. Then he drove his wife and children
to a cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a revolver on a false pretext, loaded it with
six rounds, did some official business there, and drove his car to the office of Ahuja and then
to his flat, went straight to the bed-room of Ahuja and shot him dead. Between 1-30 P.M.,
when he left his house, and 4-20 P.M., when the murder took place, three hours had elapsed,
and therefore there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control, even if he had not
regained it earlier. On the other hand, his conduct clearly shows that the murder was a
deliberate and calculated one. Even if any conversation took place between the accused and
the deceased in the manner described by the accused-though we do not believe that-it does not
affect the question, for the accused entered the bed-room of the deceased to shoot him. The
mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the abuse provoked an
equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore,
hold that the facts of the case do not attract the provisions of Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian
Penal Code.

Muthu vs State By Inspector Of Police

the deceased Siva who used to collect waste papers from the roadside, collected the waste-
papers and cardboard boxes and threw them inside the shop of the accused. On seeing this
the accused got angry and shouted at Siva "why do you do this everyday?" and pulled his
hair. The deceased thereupon pushed the accused. Then the accused took a knife from the
top of a table in the shop and stabbed Siva in the chest. Siva fell down due to this injury and
died.

6. We are satisfied that the accused was deprived of the power of self- control by grave and
sudden provocation which led him to commit the offence. If rubbish is thrown into one's house
or shop one would naturally get very upset. It is evident that the accused had no motive or
intention to cause the death of the deceased since the accused was not carrying the knife from
before, and only picked it up during the scuffle with the deceased. 8. The position may have
been different if right from the beginning the appellant accused had been carrying a knife with
the intention to attack the deceased. But that is not the case here.
. Learned counsel for the State relied on the decision in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P.
2006 (11) SCC 444. In that decision itself it has been mentioned in paragraph 29 that whether
there was an intention to cause death is to be gathered from several circumstances, and one of
the circumstances mentioned in the said paragraph is whether the weapon was carried by the
accused or was picked up from the spot. If it was carried by the accused right from the
beginning that may be a circumstance to indicate that there was an intention to cause death if
it was used for attacking the deceased on a vital part of the body. However, when the weapon
was not initially in the hand of the accused, but was picked up from the spot during the
altercation, then it cannot be said that it is a case under Section 302IPC, rather it is only a case
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder which comes under Section 304 IPC and not
under Section 302 IPC.

No doubt, even in the heat of the moment or fit of anger one should not attack somebody since
human beings are different from animals inasmuch as they have the power of self-control.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the heat of the moment and in a fit of anger people some
times do acts which may not have been done after premeditation.

14. In our opinion, throwing waste and rubbish inside the house or shop of somebody is
certainly a grave and sudden provocation. Everyone wishes to keep his premises neat and
clean, and is likely to loose his self-control in such a situation. The incident in question
occurred in a sudden fight and a heat of passion by a sudden quarrel without the appellant
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Hence the appellant is
entitled to the benefit of Exceptions I and 4 and the case comes under Section 304 IPC.

B.D.Khunte vs Union Of India & Ors on 30 October, 2014

The above factual backdrop, argued Mr. Sisodia, was to bring the appellant’s case within
Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It was contended that the day time
incident in the store room had so deeply shaken the appellant that he was gravely and
suddenly provoked when the appellant saw the deceased approaching the picket in the
evening. Mr. Sisodia argued that although there was a time gap of several hours between
the attempted commission of an unnatural offence upon the appellant and the time when
he was gunned down by the appellant, yet keeping in view the nature of the incident and
the effect the same had upon the appellant the interval was not of much consequence in
the matter of restoring the appellant’s equilibrium. The appellant was, according to the
learned Counsel, so deeply disturbed and provoked into a state of complete loss of self-
control that he had taken the extreme step of putting the deceased to death no sooner the
latter came before him while the appellant was on guard duty armed with his service
weapon. Mr. Sisodia contended that the question: whether an incident was sufficient to
result in a provocation so grave and sudden as would deprive the person so provoked of the
power of self-control will have to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.

It was contended that even if the appellant’s version about the day time incident was
accepted, a long interval between the alleged provocation by the deceased and the
murderous assault by the appellant clearly denuded the provocation of its gravity and
spontaneity. A provocation like the one allegedly given by the deceased at 1 p.m. would
have sufficiently cooled down after long hours especially when even according to the
appellant he had attended to other duties in the intervening period. The fact that the
appellant and his colleagues had decided that they will in the evening give a beating to the
deceased when they assembled at the water heating point also showed that the
provocation was far from being sudden and grave enough for the appellant to shoot the
deceased down when he saw him in the evening

What is critical for a case to fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC is that the provocation
must not only be grave but sudden as well. It is only where the following ingredients of
Exception 1 are satisfied that an accused can claim mitigation of the offence committed by him
from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder:

(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

(2) The provocation so given must have been grave.

(3) The provocation given by the deceased must have been sudden.

(4) The offender by reason of such grave and sudden provocation must have been deprived of
his power of self-control; and (5) The offender must have killed the deceased or any other
person by mistake or accident during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-
control.

The very act of appearance of the deceased near the picket/post where the appellant was
on duty could not, therefore, constitute a provocation within the meaning of Exception 1
to Section 300 IPC.
Nawaz vs The State Rep.
4. On the date of the incident at about 9.00 a.m., the deceased quarrelled with Accused No.1
and called her a ‘prostitute’. He also told her that Accused No. 1 has converted the daughter
into a prostitute as well. At that point of time, Accused No. 2 came from the first floor and
asked the deceased not to quarrel with Accused No. 1 and her daughters. Since the deceased
did not stop, Accused No. 2 slapped the face of the deceased. Immediately, thereafter, both the
accused throttled the deceased with the help of a towel and burnt the dead body to try to conceal
the offence. Subsequently, they transported the dead body in a Maruti Car owned by PW 15
and abandoned the body elsewhere.

Immediately, after hearing the deceased calling the Accused No. 1 and her daughter as
prostitutes, the Accused No. 2 suddenly slapped the cheek of the deceased. Immediately,
after receipt of said assault, the deceased fell down unconscious and thereafter he was
throttled to death. Everything has occurred in the fraction of a minute. Since the accused,
because of the aforesaid conduct of the deceased calling accused No. 1 and her daughter as
prostitute, was deprived of the power of selfcontrol.

13. The deceased provoked the accused No.1 by uttering the word ‘prostitute’. In our society,
no lady would like to hear such a word from her husband. Most importantly, she would not be
ready to hear such a word against her daughters. The incident is a result of a sudden and grave
provocation by the deceased. Since the body came to be transported by the accused to a
different place in order to hide the offence, the accused are rightly convicted for offence
under Section 201 of IPC.

Dakhi Singh vs The State

The question then would be what offence is made out. We have given our anxious thought to
this question and we are of opinion that the case would be covered by Exception 3 to Section
300 of the Indian Penal Code. That Exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder
if the offender, being a public servant, or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement
of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him. by law, and causes death by doing an act
which he, in good faith, thinks to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as
a public servant without ill-will towards the person whose death he has caused. In the present
case there was no ill-will between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant was a public
servant and his object was the advancement of public justice. He no doubt exceeded the powers
given to him by law, and he caused the death of the fireman by doing an act which he, in good
faith, believed to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty. In such
circumstances the offence that was committed was culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under Section 304, Part II, Penal Code. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the
appellant should have been convicted under Section 304, Part II, instead of under Section 302,
I. P. C.

Ghapoo Yadav & Ors vs State Of M.P

the question is about applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC. For bringing in its
operation it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden
fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue
advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said
exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its
place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle,
for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is
total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which
clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There
is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct
consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding
that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in
whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts
them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and
blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral
provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so,
the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception

1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for
which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the
other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did.
There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of
blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused
(a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the
person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be
found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not
defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no
time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a
fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and
more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule
as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel
is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the
application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there
was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage
or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision
means 'unfair advantage'.

The infliction of the injuries, and their nature proves the intention of the accused appellants,
but causing of such injuries cannot be termed to be either in a cruel or unusual manner for not
availing the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. After the injuries were inflicted the
injured has fallen down, but there is no material to show that thereafter any injury was inflicted
when he was in helpless condition. The assaults were made at random. Even the previous
altercations were verbal and not physicals. It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused
appellants had come prepared and armed for attacking the deceased. The previous disputes
over land do not appear to have assumed characteristics of physical combat. This goes to show
that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight the accused persons had
caused injuries on the deceased, but had not acted in cruel or unusual manner. That being so,
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable.

K. Ravi Kumar vs State Of Karnataka

The appellant asked Padma to accompany him to leave for Mandya immediately to see his
father's condition. However, Padma did not agree to leave immediately but said that they can
go the next day. This issue led to heated exchange between them and eventually resulted in
appellant loosing his mental balance to the extent that he first alleged to have stabbed Padma
with knife and then poured Kerosene and set her on fire.

Learned Counsel submitted that the incident in question, which eventually led to Padma's
death, took place due to sudden fight ensued between the couple without any premeditation
and the act of the appellant in allegedly stabbing and pouring kerosene on Padma was an
outcome of the heat of passion upon such sudden quarrel. Learned counsel referred to the
evidence while supporting his submission and contended that no evidence was adduced by the
prosecution to show that either relation between the appellant and his wife was not cordial
or/and that they were fighting intermittently on issues or that some violence or overt act was
shown by the appellant towards Padma or any threat was given by the appellant to her or that
there was any pre- determined motive in the appellant's mind to kill her. Learned counsel
pointed out that during the 9 years of their marriage, the couple was blessed with two children
and the appellant never made any demand of dowry from the deceased or her parents

(i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of
passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started
the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but
what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the
offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any
undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat
of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves
fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted
cruelly......." (Emphasis supplied)

we are of the considered view that these reasons are sufficient to give benefit of Exception 4
toSection 300 IPC to the appellant

One important aspect to be considered is whether appellant is entitled to Fifth exception

of Section 300 of IPC. Fifth exception reads as follows:

Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age
of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
provocation by the deceased has resulted in the incident in question.