PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN II G.R. No.
152662
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against
the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis
the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved
the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999,
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November
18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable
to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
Luis Panaguiton Jr., petitioner
vs DOJ, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo Cawili, Respondents
Ponente: Tinga
Facts:
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for certiorari and
motion for reconsideration
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment both signed by
Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for insufficiency of funds
or closure of account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC
Prosecutor's Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included as party-
respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He averred that he was
not Cawili's business associate and claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson
also denied that he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been falsified.
As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which was the same as the
signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson
claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson.
Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed before the proper
court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced checks and had altered
his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC
to conduct reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring to the
NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4
year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in QC
prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial
and not administrative proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was filed against
Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of rules of criminal procedure because the initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not
from the investigating prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared
that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled the
subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP
Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not
provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august resolution of the DOJ, but
was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on dismissing his
petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was without merit and questions are
too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in dismissing the petition
for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long
delay, attributable to petitioner and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases. The petition is meritorious.
Issues: (1) Technical Issues, (2) Substantive Aspects
Ruling: (1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are true and correct-the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on them and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice may be served. We find that by attaching
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.We also agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to
attach a certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI suspends the running of
the prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping
resolutions and misapplications.
Petition is granted.
