Research Proposal

“Iran-Saudia Relations:Implication For

Submitted by:
Muhammad Yousaf Khan
Registration No:1427-116209
BS-IR (7th semester)
 Supervised by:
Mr. Akhlaq Khan
Professor, Department of IR

Preston University,Islamabad Campus

Chapter 1:
Introduction

Pakistan shares deep socio-religious linkages and has common security and economic interests

with both, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ideally, Pakistan aspires to remain neutral in the Iran-Saudi

rivalry, while continuing to deepen ties with both nations. However, Pakistan’s stance is prone

to several vulnerabilities, thus to manage this balance Pakistan would have to work on certain

internal policies and correctly respond to regional developments.

For decades, Pakistan has hewed closer to Saudi Arabia than to Iran, but successive Pakistani

civilian and military leaders have pursued a more couraging foreign policy to avoid being

perceived as pro-Saudi and anti-Iranian. Following the worsening in Saudi-Iranian relations in

January 2016 after Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shia sheikh, Pakistan’s attempts at

shuttle diplomacy and mediation were clear evidence of its interest in avoiding a regional cold

war in the Middle East. Since 2015, however, the deteriorating Saudi-Iranian relationship has
brought forth a new cold war in the Middle East. These complications have affected Pakistan’s

broader approach to the region, as Riyadh’s and Tehran’s divergent interests make it increasingly

difficult to avoid choosing sides. Pakistan’s significant economic ties with both countries also

make it vulnerable to any further hostilities.

Pakistan was one of the three countries (the others were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates) that recognized the Taliban regime in Kabul after 1996, the regime’s attacks against

Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in 1998 further soured relations between Iran and

[Link] its interests clashed with Iran to a strong degree throughout the 1990s, Pakistan

still did not take an anti-Iranian stance after the 9/11 attacks, which put enormous pressure on

Iran. As Iran was put under sanctions due to its nuclear program and a war seemed imminent,

Pakistan took a firm stance against any attack on Iranian soil for fear of a backlash from its Shia

citizens.

In the 2010s, two events have had particular relevance to Pakistan’s approach to both

[Link], following the start of a Saudi-led coalition’s campaign against Houthi rebels in

Yemen in early 2015, Pakistan’s civilian leadership with legislative assent elected to remain

neutral. Since then,however, Pakistan’s approach to the Yemen conflict has evolved, and it now

participates in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. Second, in early

2016, the Saudis executed the prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Saudi citizen, an act

that sparked a diplomatic firestorm between Iran and Saudi Arabia and forced Pakistan to do

what it could to mitigate the fallout. Both events illustrate the many considerations that Pakistani

decision makers face in their approach to the Middle East today. External factors, including US

policy shifts toward Iran,Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan alike under the administration of President
Donald J. Trump, also have affected Islamabad’s diplomatic calculations and prompted it to

remain cautious.

Currently, Saudi Arabia and Iran stand on opposite sides, to safeguard their interests in the

landmasses between and around their territories. As part of its official policy on Iran, the

Kingdom has mentioned the possibility of ‘fighting the battle inside Iran’. Pakistan, which shares

a direct border with Iran thus becomes an integral part of the Iran-Saudi equation. Pakistan

cannot ever allow Baluchistan to be used as a launch pad against Saudi Arabia.

• Research Questions:

• Central Question:

• What are the major implications for Pakistan in an on going Saudi-Iran rivalry in the

middle East region?

• Sub Questions:

• How Pakistan is choosing to remain neutral in this three way matrix to defend itself

from Saudi-Iran rivalry?

• How has Pakistan managed its relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran?

• What steps have been taken by Pakistan to reduce the tensions between Iran-Saudi

relations?

• Hypothesis:
The rising tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia has opened the economic,diplomatic and

other trade options for Pakistan with both nations of Gulf rgion.

• Problem Statement:

This study will provide various aspects of balancing moves taken by Pakistan in the Saudi-Iran

rivalry and explore the current developments in Pakistan’s bilateral ties with Iran and Saudi

[Link] also address the impacts of ideologically driven proxies and look at the current

regional developments in order to assess Pakistan’s options in dealing with Saudi-Arabia and

Iran.

• Objectives of study:

• To analyze the neutral role of Pakistan in the Pak-Saudi rivalry due to changing regional

dynamics and Pakistan’s internal weaknesses.

• To critically asses the historic ties between the three way matrix between Pakistan,Iran

and Saudi Arabia

• To evaluate the implications and options that Pakistan can avail through this scenerio.

• Significance of Study:

This paper aims to study and identify Pakistan’s role and potential to decrease intra-Gulf

contentions spcifically in Iran-Saudi relations or transform their conflict for mutual economic

and strategic benefits. The study argues that in the changing world order, Pakistan and Gulf

region need to come out of their recent past and dependency upon super-powers.
• Literature Review:

Pakistan is the sole nuclear-armed Muslim majority country. It was established as a democratic

home for the Muslims of the subcontinent but has witnessed four military coups d’état and is

subject to military tutelage to this day. It is these contradictions that have shaped the

direction,content, and approach of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Leaving aside its devoted pro-

Western foreign policy of the 1950s, Pakistani policy makers, military and civilian alike, have

acted pragmatically both in relation to current and to former global powers, including the

Soviet Union, the U.S. and China. This is perhaps best evidenced in Pakistan’s historical

balancing act between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In other words, Pakistani foreign policy makers

have diligently followed a neutral approach between the dictates of geography that draw it to

neighboring Iran and a sentimental appeal in its relations with Saudi Arabia.

In the early 1950s as a fledgling state, Pakistan did not hesitate to ally with the United States.

Pakistan became a member of Baghdad Pact, later branded the Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO), in 1955, as well as South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and hence

was deservedly called ‘the most allied ally’ of the U.S. Pakistani political elites sought all kinds of

assistance (economic, political/diplomatic and military) from the United States primarily with

the aim of countering the perceived existential threat from India. However, all that abruptly

changed in the mid 1960s when the U.S., which had earlier helped India in its war against

China, declined to help Pakistan in the 1965 India-Pakistan war. This was the turning point for

Pakistani rulers.
Pakistan and Iran were both members of CENTO and in the following years also became

members of the Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD) organization with Turkey as the

other member. Ayub Khan, as a ‘modernizer’ and defender of enlightened Islam,helped the

case of Pakistan-Iran relations to a great extent, given that the Shah himself was a secular

modernizer. In fact, in the 1950s, when a number of Shia officials including Governor-General

Iskandar Mirza, occupied positions of power in Pakistan, there was even a movement in

Pakistan that defended the idea of a union between Sunni Pakistan and Shia Iran, in which the

Shah would be the head of state. The fact that the Shah did not make any attempt to play the

Shia card in its relations with Pakistan removed a possible irritant in bilateral relations. In the

1960s the Shah helped Pakistan modernize its army by buying weapon from Western countries

on behalf of Pakistan. Iran’s help was critical, especially after the U.S. embargo following the

India–Pakistan war of 1965, a move that hit Pakistan especially hard due to Pakistan’s

dependence on American arms.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was foreign minister in Ayub Khan’s later years, carried th pragmatic

tone of Pakistan foreign policy to new heights in both regional and global affairs. It was from

the early 1970s onwards, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, that Saudi Arabia came more

forcefully into the Pakistani foreign policy picture. As Bhutto already aimed at raising Pakistan’s

stature in the Islamic world and bartering for Pakistan’s share of the wealth accumulating in the

Gulf, one clever means to these ends was the hosting of an Islamic conference summit in

Pakistan.

The Shah was concerned that if Pakistan fell, Iran would be next, so he continued to appeal to

the Americans to keep Pakistan strong enough. It is nevertheless true tha Bhutto tried to
extract as much economic benefit from both Saudi Arabia and Iran as possible. One significant

asset that Pakistan had and still has in its relations with Iran and the Gulf countries has been the

trust it enjoys with all sides. This is owing to the fact that as a non-Arab Muslim-majority

country, Pakistan does not have any political claim on either Iran or the Gulf nations. When the

security situation in the Persian Gulf was fast deteriorating, with convulsions in Iran and a

perception of Soviet expansion, the Saudis specifically asked for “a non-Arab state like Pakistan”

to replace Iranian troops in Oman should the latter be withdrawn. After deciding in April 2015

against contributing Pakistani troops to the Saudi assault on Yemen, Pakistan this time quietly

joined the alliance.

• Pakistan relationship with Saudi Arabia:

Substantive and serious bilateral relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia date back to the

1960s, when the two countries established formal diplomatic ties and began cooperating on

matters of mutual strategic interest. In 1947, British rule in India came to an end, creating the

independent dominions of India and Pakistan. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic

relations. In 1969, for instance, Pakistani pilots flew Royal Saudi Air Force fighters to repel a

South Yemeni i During the late Cold War, as many as fifteen thousand Pakistani troops were

stationed in Saudi Arabia. ncursion of the southern Saudi border. hese military-to-military ties

flourished under the regime of Pakistan’s General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978–88).Following

the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979,Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

partnered extensively with its Saudi counterpart to counter and manage the Soviet threat in

Afghanistan.
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979,Pakistan’s Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) partnered extensively with its Saudi counterpart to counter and manage the

Soviet threat in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, however, this economic relationship is integral to its

energy security. Riyadh has consistently accounted for an overwhelming portion of Islamabad’s

crude oil imports. Beyond the critical importance of oil, Pakistan relies heavily on remittance

payments from Pakistani citizens employed in Saudi Arabia; however, this long-term trend may

be shifting.

• Pakistan relationship with Iran:

From geographic necessity, Pakistan and successive Iranian regimes have maintained diplomatic

ties with varying degrees of cordiality over the years. Tehran’s leaders and the various civilian

and military governments in Islamabad have seen differing challenges and opportunities in their

relationship. The two countries share a particularly restive border: Iran’s Sistan-va-Baluchestan

Province and Pakistan’s neighboring (and even more volatile) Balochistan Province are both

home to militant groups of ethnic Baloch that have long pursued [Link] these

concerns, the bilateral relationship is robust, and the two countries have cooperated on several

economic projects.

The first period, which spans Pakistan’s independence in 1947 to the Iranian Islamic Revolution

of 1979, had relatively convivial bilateral ties and neighborly relations. The shah of Iran also was

the first foreign head of state to visit the newly independent Pakistan. Pakistan similarly sold

arms to Iran during the IranIraq War in the 1980s even as it also armed [Link] Iran, Pakistan

was a key source of the man-portable, shoulder-launched Stinger missiles used in the 1986–88 oil

tanker [Link] relationship between the two countries became considerably more complicated
following Iran’s 1979 revolution. The Saudis made additional efforts to influence Pakistan

through Sunni clients such as the Deobandi movement and, in more recent times, the Ahl-e

Hadith religious movement, mainly to minimize possible Iranian gains.

Iran and Pakistan maintain close but underdeveloped economic ties. Even though they share a

land border, their total trade volumes are a fraction of that between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan’s top imports from Iran included mineral fuels, ships, iron and steel, vegetables, and

raw hides. In 2015, some Pakistani analysts pointed to an opportunity for Pakistan and Iran to

develop their economic relationship after the completion of the JCPOA lifted US and EU nuclear

sanctions on Iran and the creation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) funneled

major Chinese investment flows into [Link] of these opportunities, the two countries

also have a joint, cross-border gas pipeline project known as the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.

• Bibliography:

Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s foreign policy: 1947-2012: A concise history (3rd ed.). Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 2013, p. 15.

Gohar Ayub Khan, Testing Times as Foreign Minister (Islamabad, Lahore & Karachi: Dost

Publications, 2009), p.74.

Harsh V. Pant, “Pakistan and Iran: A Relationship in Search of Meaning” Is Osama Butt ed. U.

Butt, & J. Schofield (Eds.), Pakistan: The US, geopolitics and grand strategies, pp. 206-224,

London: Pluto Press, 2012, p. 207.

Horizon, Vol. 34, No. 1, The Inter-Relation of Muslim States and Pakistan (First Quarter 1981),

pp. 81-92, p.83.

‘Zia Further Consolidates Power’, US Embassy Cable from Islamabad to Secretary of State

Washington, 7 July 1977, [Link]

?rid=154417&dt=2532&dl=1629

National Foreign Assessment Center, Top Secret, Central Intelligence Agency “Key Issues in

Saudi Foreign Policy”, March 1981, [Link]

rdp06t00412r000200160001-1.

Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, reprint ed.

(London: I. B. Tauris, 2017).

Zafar Bhutta, “In a Bid to Diversify, Pakistan Plans Oil Imports from Russia,” Express Tribune,

December 31, 2017, [Link]/story/1597181/2-bid-diversify-pakistan-plans-oil-imports-

russia/.

“Saudi and Arab Allies Bomb Houthi Positions in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, March 26, 2015,

[Link]/news/middleeast

/2015/03/[Link].

Saim Saeed, “Pakistan’s Yemen Dilemma,” The American Interest (blog), April 17, 2015,

[Link]/2015/04/17/pakistans-yemen-dilemma/.
“Saudi Cuts Ties with Iran, Expels Tehran Envoys,” Al Arabiya English, January 4, 2016,

[Link]/en/News/middle

-east/2016/01/04/[Link].

William Branigin, ‘Zia Visits Tehran on ‘Peace Mission’, The Washington Post, 28 September

1980, [Link]