RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo

B. Macalintal of our Decision[1]in G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010,
dismissing his petition and declaring the establishment of respondent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional
creation of the PET:

1. He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a concerned

citizen.
2. He is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply by
virtue of his appearance as counsel of former president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo before respondent tribunal.
3. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the PET.
4. The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized

progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling
on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).[2] Petitioner
cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the
PTC is a public office which cannot be created by the President, the power to do
so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the
President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the
Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of
legislature.
 On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Office of the Solicitor General maintains that:

1. Petitioner is without standing to file the petition.

2. Petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET.
3. The constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant
of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all election contests
for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.

Except for the invocation of our decision in Louis ‟Barok C. Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[3]petitioner does not allege new
arguments to warrant reconsideration of our Decision.

We cannot agree with his insistence that the creation of the PET is
unconstitutional. We reiterate that the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting
as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and
tenable. The provision reads:

Sec. 4. x x x.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

We mapped out the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the

foregoing provision and concluded therefrom that:
The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article
on the executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in
the discussions of the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Courts
judicial power as sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we find the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission most instructive:

MR. DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose

to add AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This
refers to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. This is also to confer on
the Supreme Court exclusive authority to enact the necessary rules
while acting as sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

MR. REGALADO. My personal position is that the rule-making power

of the Supreme Court with respect to its internal procedure is
already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering,
however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is
to indicate the sole power of the Supreme Court without
intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on
this particular point, I think I will personally recommend its
acceptance to the Committee.

xxxx

MR. NOLLEDO x x x.

With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the

Committee has also created an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a
Commission on Appointments which may cover membership from
both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee
report does not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that
shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on
Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?

MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and

promulgate its rules because it is a body distinct and independent
already from the House, and so with the Commission on
Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own
rules.
On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally
cogent, we listen to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine

of separation of powers?

MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this

is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.

MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the

judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country,
which to me is a political action.

MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable

under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.

MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome

and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en
bancwould be occupied with it considering that they will be going
over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam
President.

Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the Supreme
Court, Justice Florenz D. Regalado and Fr. Joaquin Bernas both opined:

MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.

I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point.

On page 2, the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President.

May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of

determining the outcome of the contests relating to the election
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President is
purely a political matter and, therefore, should not be left entirely
to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted provision not impinge on the
doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the
judicial departments of the government?

MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem.

 This is a new provision incidentally. It was not in the 1935
Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.

MR. VILLACORTA. That is right.

MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the

separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because this is
strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.

MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee

because this supersedes Republic Act 7950 which provides for the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal?

FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by

their nature, judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts.
If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an
electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the
House, normally, as composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction
over contests.

So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The
Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was declared
winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there
was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question in this case was whether
new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In effect, the
conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two
Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this
did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we
are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by
the Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."

Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest
between two presidential candidates or two vice-presidential
candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary
to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to
constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on
the separation of powers because the power being given to the
Supreme Court is a judicial power.

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power
adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In
fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the
phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its
rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and
then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the
 legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power
to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making
power connected thereto.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of

the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution.
The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.[4]

Stubbornly, despite the explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional

Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution, they constitutionalize[d] what was statutory, petitioner
continues to insist that the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. Petitioner is adamant
that the fact that [the provision] does not expressly prohibit [the] creation [of
the PET] is not an authority for the Supreme Court to create the same.

Petitioner is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the
provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PETs
constitutionality.

We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.

The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing

what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line
or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain
the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the
constitutionality of the PET.
In our Decision, we clarified the structure of the PET:

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme
Court, sitting en banc. The following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
should provide enlightenment:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein
it is provided, and I quote:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President.

Are we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court

especially when it is directed to sit en banc as the sole
judge of all presidential and vice-presidential election
contests?

MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner

Concepcion.

MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme

Court twice and the Supreme Court was able to dispose of each case
in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that was
probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how
the present Supreme Court would react to such circumstances, but
there is also the question of who else would hear the election
protests.

MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23

to 25, there are no rules provided for the hearings and there is not
time limit or duration for the election contest to be decided by the
Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical
background that when R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957, at least three
famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up
in withdrawal by the protestants out of sheer frustration because of
the delay in the resolution of the cases. I am referring to the electoral
protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia against
our "kabalen" former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the
vice-presidential election contest filed by the late Senator Gerardo
Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965.

MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in

mind. But when that protest of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the
results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want to have a
decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and
he did not get what he expected so rather than have a decision
adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection
to vesting in the Supreme Court this matter of resolving presidential
and vice-presidential contests?

MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine

of separation of powers?

MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is

a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.

MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the

judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country,
which to me is a political action.

MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under
the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.

MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome

and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en
bancwould be occupied with it considering that they will be going
over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam
 President.

MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this

contest for President is dependent upon they key number of teams
of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in other offices
are concerned.

MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme

Court is mandated to sit en banc?

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. SUAREZ. I see.

MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the
ballot boxes are opened before teams of three, generally, a
representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the
"protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized.
Of course, that can be expensive, but it would be expensive
whatever court one would choose. There were times that the
Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time
working, would classify the objections, the kind of problems, and
the court would only go over the objected votes on which the
parties could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear
insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the cost of
the revision of the ballots because each party would have to appoint
one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big
amount.

MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioner's experience which

he is sharing with us, what would be the reasonable period for the
election contest to be decided?
MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the
Supreme Court always manages to dispose of the case in one year.

MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.[5]

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is

plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus:

Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme
Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests
involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process
outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the
concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too
burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the
plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of
the PET.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given
our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of

authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules
for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e.,the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous
occasions.[6]

Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus,
its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
We dispose of this argument as we have done in our Decision, viz.:

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the
advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election
contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial
courts, respectively.

At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and
senatorial - exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the
House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET,
and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review
- via a petition for certiorarifiled by the proper party - if there is a showing that the
decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In
the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the
 powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain
the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2
of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority
in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET
and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription
found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to
acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI,
explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof
from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution
itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting
the PET, from the same prohibition.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Marylandproclaimed that
"[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of
this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this
Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not constrict
an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.[7]

Finally, petitioners application of our decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth

Commission[8] to the present case is an unmitigated quantum leap.

The decision therein held that the PTC finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution. A plain reading of the constitutional
provisions,i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on
the Executive Branch, reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with
separate powers of the Executive and the Judicial Branches of government. And
as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET was, in fact,
mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission during the drafting of the present Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Our Decision in G.R.

No. 191618 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice