Lavazza's Brand Strategy in India
Lavazza's Brand Strategy in India
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a service. At the same time, the success of a brand is determined by consumers who buy a
product or a service because that brand offers them high quality, transmits particular
emotions, gives a sense of safety, etc.
Data collection
The authors had the opportunity to follow the operation conducted by the Lavazza Company
in India for three years (2007-2010), although the majority of the interviews were done in the
first two years of the research. The research focused on the brand strategy using a
qualitative approach based on interviews with Lavazza management. The interviews were
organized in two sessions. The first session of interviews was carried out during 2007-2008
with two objectives: to understand Lavazza’s values and strategies, the Indian culture and
the opportunities that this country could offer the Italian company. The second objective was
to follow the strategy Lavazza used to manage the transition after the acquisition of the two
Indian companies.
The second session of interviews was carried out during 2009-2010 to verify the current
situation and to finalize the framework developed. Interviews lasted two and one half hours
on average and when possible were supported by documentation referring to the strategies
adopted in India by Lavazza, and to research and studies either conducted or
commissioned by the Lavazza Company (n.d.).
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‘‘ Lavazza is present in 80 countries through its distributors and
agents. This was the traditional method adopted to go
international in the late 1970s and was the easiest way to sell
products in foreign countries. ’’
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Figure 1 Lavazza’s internationalization model
positioning of the brands acquired were both studied in depth. In particular, the economy of
India has grown at an average rate of nearly eight percent per year since the beginning of
2003. The overall growth of GDP during 2006-2007 has been placed at 9.2 percent. At a
disaggregated level the growth during 2006-2007 was 2.7 per cent in agriculture, 10.0 per
cent in industry and 11.2 per cent in services as compared to 6.0 percent, 9.6 percent and
9.8 percent respectively during 2005-2006.
Indian coffee cultivations are largely confined to the hilly regions of the southern states. They
account for 53 percent of the planted area (59 percent planted with rabica, 41 percent with
robusta). Most coffee holdings are small. India produces around 260 mn kgs of coffee per
year. Indian coffee production has a yield of 800-900 kgs per hectare, which is quite low,
compared to the world average of 1,100 kg per hectare. Domestic demand for coffee has
grown quickly and steadily over the last decade. An increasing number of companies have
discovered the opportunity that lies in the Indian market, with high Consumer demand, a fast
growing population, and high purchasing power.
The Indian hot drinks market generated total revenues of $2,369.2 million in 2006. Between
2002 and 2006, it presented a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.5 percent. The
disaggregation of Indian hot drinks sales is at odds with the corresponding Italian market.
Indeed, tea is the main segment of the consumption of hot drinks in India, whilst coffee is the
second hot drink (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Coffee in India is the second hot drink after tea (% Share, by value)
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In India, tea proved to be the most lucrative hot drinks market in 2006, generating total
revenues of $1,245.4 million, equivalent to 52.6 percent of the market’s overall value. Coffee
sales generated revenues of $735.5 million in 2006, representing 31 percent of the market’s
aggregate revenues. These and other factors persuaded the Lavazza Company to invest in
India.
The case
The acquisition of two Indian companies
On 9 March 2007 in Mumbai, India, the Lavazza Group signed an agreement with the
Sterling Infotech Group to acquire Barista Coffee Company Limited and Fresh & Honest
Café Limited, two major local distributors. Barista was the second-largest Indian coffee shop
chain in terms of outlets, with 150 coffee shops of which 132 were in India, mainly in New
Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore.
The acquisition was carried out based on a precise development strategy that would lead to
the opening of 400 outlets by 2010 in India. This target would be achieved by leveraging the
excellent premium positioning and importance reached by Barista on the Indian market at
that time.
Fresh & Honest Café (FHC) focused on the vending machine business, specifically on office
coffee services, and was the leading company in the bean-to-cup segment (high quality
bean product). In over 22 Indian cities, FHC supplied an average of 300,000 cups of coffee
per day, equal to about 800 tons of coffee per year. The company was expanding rapidly and
had a production site in the southern region of India. Among its customers, were some of the
most prestigious hotel chains in India.
‘‘Acquisition is part of our strategy and aims at expanding our operations in markets with a
high development rate and a high growth potential’’ stated Alberto Lavazza, Chairman of the
Group. ‘‘This ambitious policy has a strong economic impact due to the importance of this
transaction, but it also has a significant impact in terms of international expansion and
development of our brand’’.
At that point Lavazza had to deal with managing the brand transfer to the acquired local
distributors, Barista and FHC. Lavazza used tactics commonly adopted by food companies
when trying to access a foreign market. In 2011 Starbucks entered India with a joint venture
with Pantaloon Retail, which that owned the largest local coffee shop.
These brand transfers are facilitated by the tendency of international markets to become
more homogeneous than ever before. As a result, companies that favor global brands have
to decide whether it is advisable to replace all their local brands with global ones or not.
Branding globally, while marketing locally (Barron and Hollingshead, 2004), assumes that
global branding must be driven by collaboration among local markets, both with each other
and with central marketing.
In the Indian coffee industry Barista and FHC had many opportunities for growth due to the
lack of power of suppliers and buyers and the increasing market volume. However, a
moderate threat lay in the internal competition that could have been harsh in the future,
particularly for Barista due to potential new entrants like Starbucks or other multinational
giants.
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‘‘ Lavazza had the chance to exploit the period before the boom
of retail infrastructures, when multinational companies would
massively enter the market. ’’
Lavazza had the chance to exploit the period before the boom of mass retail infrastructures,
when multinational companies would enter the market massively, to build strong corporate
brand awareness and train the Indian taste to a high quality espresso in order to position
itself as an interesting niche segment.
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‘‘ The local culture is the first guide for the company: without a
good understanding, all changes can fail and can destroy the
value of the acquired brand/brands. ’’
As far as the coffee shop segment was concerned, Starbucks was the most likely to enter the
Indian market. But even with strong brand recognition in Western Countries, success in India
was not a foregone conclusion. In fact, one could argue that Starbucks could hurt Indian
pride and culture, being too Western. Others might count on this, considering the ‘‘Western
taste’’ of Starbucks a strength that would attract the Indian middle and upper classes who
could afford expensive lifestyles. They often want to distinguish themselves from other
poorer Indian classes, by showing off their new richer status compared to the past.
A particular threat for Lavazza could be the entrance of very strong multinational companies
into the retail market once large distribution infrastructures were developed in India. In fact, if
Lavazza did not build a well-recognized brand, it would be overtaken by bigger multinational
companies like Nestlé that are stronger when competition is led by cost cutting and lower
prices.
By exploiting the late boom of mass retail distribution infrastructures, Lavazza could have
enough time to make its brand well known and spread its knowledge of espresso throughout
the Indian market. In fact, another way to defend minor companies like Lavazza against the
entrance of multinational giants would also have been to train the Indian consumer taste to
prefer high quality espresso. This in turn would have reduced consumer price sensitivity in
favor of a high quality espresso like Lavazza, rather than a filter product like Nescafè. Thus,
the risk of new entrants was medium-high for Barista.
As for Fresh & Honest, the risk was lower than for Barista because it had already gained the
leadership of the B2B market and that was more difficult to jeopardize. Above all, there was a
market entrance barrier created by high fixed costs, but it is also true that several big players
capable of affording high investments could be listed, so several incumbents could be found
even if some entry barriers did exist (e.g. regulation, high investments required to start up a
company, etc).
Substitutes. The main hot drink in India is tea, which represents an ancient tradition although
espresso and coffee consumption are increasing. For FHC the risk of substitute products
was lower than for Barista because companies, many of which as multinational foreign
companies, want to provide their employees with both tea and coffee. On the other hand, in
the B2C channel, drinking an espresso is perceived as a moment to relax with friends,
without the practical use it has in Italy (e.g. people have espresso at breakfast to wake up).
So consumers may choose among a wider range of products when they are out and want to
spend some time with friends. For instance, they can have ice-cream, soft drinks or other hot
drinks. Hence Barista may have had to deal with a higher risk of substitute products than
FHC, because end users (employees of a company or guests in an hotel, etc) cannot choose
among a wide range of products but just between two or three drinks that their company has
chosen to provide by partnering with a particular supplier (e.g. Fresh & Honest with Lavazza
coffee blends).
Consumers may limit their caffeine intake and therefore coffee consumption due to health
concerns, with other soft or hot drink categories forming potential substitutes. However,
considering that the proportion of the population consuming coffee is increasing, it was
unlikely that such substitution would substantially impact coffee sales. Moreover, Barista
overcame this threat by offering a wide range of products. Indeed, Barista provided their
clients not only with coffee but also with tasty specialties like ice-cream, chocolates, cakes,
soft drinks and sandwiches.
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Internal rivalry. There were a few major players in the coffee shop chain sector: the Café
Coffee Day, Costa Coffee, Café Mocha, Java Green and Nescafé outlets. Players attempt to
distinguish themselves from competitors by offering gourmet variations on essentially the
same products, and propose a wide menu and a pleasant atmosphere with soft lights, colors
and music, merchandizing, and Internet connections. Usually the products become more
differentiated with the addition of various ingredients and flavors.
Although for Fresh & Honest Café the product differentiation was lower and consisted more
of variations in the production process of the coffee blends, overall the internal rivalry for
Barista was moderate and for FHC it was quite low.
Finally, in the Indian coffee industry Barista and FHC had many opportunities for growth due
to the lack of supplier and buyer power and the increasing market volume. Nevertheless, a
moderate threat lay in the internal competition that could have been quite harsh in the future,
particularly for Barista, due to potential new entrants like Starbucks or other multinational
giants already active in the consumer goods or food service.
Lavazza had the chance to exploit the period before the boom of retail infrastructures, when
multinational companies would massively enter the market, build strong corporate brand
awareness and train the Indian taste to appreciate a high quality espresso in order to
position itself as an interesting niche segment.
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VOL. 33 NO. 5 2012 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STRATEGY PAGE 39
reach this objective is not simple and, above all, requires a long time. In designing the path
the Lavazza management started with identifying medium-short term objectives to leverage
the two companies acquired and increase awareness and respect for the Italian brand.
Lavazza adopted a cautionary approach in managing the transition period because it knew
that an error could have been fatal and management was not in a hurry to reach its
objectives.
Three years after the arrival of Lavazza in India, the company’s brand awareness and
presence is still increasing. The objectives and the strategy chosen by the Italian company in
2007 are the same today although the economic scenario and the development of the
country have caused a slowing down in the penetration of the market. Lavazza did not retain
the entire initial plan because the reaction of the local population and the market itself were
not quite as expected but all the goals were achieved because the strategy adopted allowed
Lavazza flexibility.
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‘‘ The final objective of Lavazza Company is, even today, to be
present in all the channels and to penetrate the Indian market
with the Lavazza brand in the retail segment. ’’
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Figure 4 Focus on the second step ‘‘adaptive brand strategy building’’
important to consider how consumers perceive such aspects as the quality of service, the
uniforms and employee preparedness. But in order to do this it is necessary to get into
people’s minds, understand their culture, their habits and their needs. The local culture is the
first guide for the company: without a good understanding, all changes can fail and can
destroy the value of the acquired brand/brands.
Second, there is ‘‘audit the brand sphere’’. This step differs from De Chernatony’s (2001)
because we must consider that when a company decides to enter an emerging market
through acquisitions, the companies are already structured and inserted into the market. The
‘‘audit the brandsphere’’ phase, in the case analyzed, means to apply the five forces
analysis of Porter (1985) to the brand/brands acquired. The objective is to understand how
strong the brand/brands are on the market and which are the weaker areas. This can help
when the company has to define the strategy and future actions.
Third, the company has to set the ‘‘KPIs brand building’’ in order to monitor the performance
of the brand. In particular, for the first phase the KPIs will be mostly qualitative; for the
company it is essential to have an awareness of how the brand is perceived by the local
population, what the reactions to the changes made are and to identify the opportunities as
soon as possible.
Finally, the company has to find a ‘‘brand essence’’ for the target market that is the core of
the brand, a promise.
The third step is the implementation or the ability of the company to transform the strategy
Keywords:
into reality.
Brand,
Emerging markets, Finally, the company has to monitor the results achieved and, if necessary, intervene on the
Strategy, brand building strategy in order to correct it and adapt it to the new needs.
Coffee market,
Indian market,
Multinational companies,
Conclusion
International business,
Food and drink products, This case study offers recommendations on how firms in the food and beverage industry can
India, be most effective in managing their brands abroad and illustrates the required steps and
Cross-cultural studies strategic choices that companies need when deciding to go international.
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Corresponding author
Chiara Giachino can be contacted at: [email protected]
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