G.R. No.

191525 I/AME filed with Me TC a "Motion to Lift or Remove Annotations Inscribed in

TCT No. 187565 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City."13 I/AME claimed that
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS it has a separate and distinct personality from Santos; hence, its properties
(I/AME), Petitioner should not be made to answer for the latter's liabilities. The motion was denied
vs. in an Order dated 29 October 2004.
LITTON AND COMPANY, INC., Respondent
Upon motion for reconsideration of I/AME, the Me TC reversed its earlier ruling
DECISION and ordered the cancellation of the annotations of levy as well as the writ of
SERENO, CJ.: execution. Litton then elevated the case to the RTC, which in turn reversed the
Order granting I/AME’s motion for reconsideration and reinstated the original
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Order dated 29 October 2004.
Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107727. I/AME then filed a petition with the CA to contest the judgment of the RTC,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court.
The CA affirmed the Judgment3 and Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila in Special Civil Action No. 06-115547 reinstating the Order5 of the THE CA RULING
Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC) of Manila in favor of Litton and Company, Inc. The CA upheld the Judgment and Order of the RTC and held that no grave
(Litton). abuse of discretion was committed when the trial court pierced the corporate
THE FACTS veil of I/AME.14

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: It took note of how Santos had utilized I/ AME to insulate the Makati real
property covered by TCT No. 187565 from the execution of the judgment
Atty. Emmanuel T. Santos (Santos), a lessee to two (2) buildings owned by rendered against him, for the following reasons:
Litton, owed the latter rental arrears as well as his share of the payment of
realty taxes.6 First, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 August 1979 indicated that Santos,
being the .President, was representing I/AME as the vendee. 15 However,
Consequently, Litton filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Santos records show that it was only in 1985 that I/AME was organized as a juridical
before the MeTC of Manila. The MeTC ruled in Litton’s favor and ordered entity.16 Obviously, Santos could not have been President of a non-existent
Santos to vacate A.I.D. Building and Litton Apartments and to pay various corporation at that time.17
sums of money representing unpaid arrears, realty taxes, penalty,
andattorney’s fees.7 Second, the CA noted that the subject real property was transferred to I/AME
during the pendency of the appeal for the revival of the judgment in the
It appears however that the judgment was not executed. Litton subsequently ejectment case in the CA.18
filed an action for revival of judgment, which was granted by the RTC.8 Santos
then appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which nevertheless affirmed the Finally, the CA observed that the Register of Deeds of Makati City issued TCT
RTC.9 The said CA decision became final and executory on 22 March 1994. 10 No. 187565 only on 17 November 1993, fourteen (14) years after the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale and more than eight (8) years after I/AME was
On l 1 November 1996, the sheriff of the MeTC of Manila levied on a piece of incorporated.19
real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 187565 and
registered in the name of International Academy of Management and Thus, the CA concluded that Santos merely used I/ AME as a shield to protect
Economics Incorporated (I/AME), in order to execute the judgment against his property from the coverage of the writ of execution; therefore, piercing the
Santos.11 The annotations on TCT No. 187565 indicated that such was "only veil of corporate fiction is proper.20
up to the extent of the share of Emmanuel T. Santos."12 THE ISSUES
The issues boil down to the alleged denial of due process when the court vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes,
pierced the corporate veil of I/ AME and its property was made to answer for or to confuse legitimate issues." It is also warranted in alter ego cases "where
the liability of Santos. a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit
of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its
OUR RULING affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency,
We deny the petition. conduit or adjunct of another corporation."

There was no violation of due When [the] corporate veil is pierced, the corporation and persons who are
process against I/AME normally treated as distinct from the corporation are treated as one person,
such that when the corporation is adjudged liable, these persons, too, become
Petitioner avers that its right to due process was violated when it was dragged liable as if they were the corporation.
into the case and its real property made an object of a writ of execution in a
judgment against Santos. It argues that since it was not impleaded in the main The piercing of the corporate veil is premised on the fact that the corporation
case, the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over it. Indeed, compliance concerned must have been properly served with summons or properly
with the recognized modes of acquisition ofjurisdiction cannot be dispensed subjected to the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Corollary thereto, it cannot be
with even in piercing the veil of corporation.21 subjected to a writ of execution meant for another in violation of its right to due
process.26
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law shall
be entertained. This Court considers the determination of the existence of any There exists, however, an exception to this rule: if it is shown "by clear and
of the circumstances that would warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate convincing proof that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation
fiction as a question of fact which ordinarily cannot be the subject of a petition was purposefully employed to evade a legitimate and binding commitment and
for review on certiorariunder Rule 45. We will only take cognizance of factual perpetuate a fraud or like wrongdoings. "27
issues if the findings of the lower court are not supported by the evidence on The resistance of the Court to offend the right to due process of a corporation
record or are based on a misapprehension of facts.22 Once the CA affirms the that is a nonparty in a main case, may disintegrate not only when its director,
factual findings of the trial court, such findings are deemed final and conclusive officer, shareholder, trustee or member is a party to the main case, but when
and thus, may not be reviewed on appeal, unless the judgment of the CA it finds facts which show that piercing of the corporate veil is merited.28
depends on a misapprehension of facts, which if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.23 Such exception however, is not applicable in Thus, as the Court has already ruled, a party whose corporation is vulnerable
this case. to piercing of its corporate veil cannot argue violation of due process. 29

The 29 October 2004 MeTC judgment, the RTC judgment, and the CA decision In this case, the Court confirms the lower courts' findings that Santos had an
are one in accord on the matters presented before this Court. existing obligation based on a court judgment that he owed monthly rentals
and unpaid realty taxes under a lease contract he entered into as lessee with
In general, corporations, whether stock or non-stock, are treated as separate the Littons as lessor. He was not able to comply with this particular obligation,
and distinct legal entities from the natural persons composing them. The and in fact, refused to comply therewith.
privilege of being considered a distinct and separate entity is confined to
legitimate uses, and is subject to equitable limitations to prevent its being This Court agrees with the CA that Santos used I/AME as a means to defeat
exercised for fraudulent, unfair or illegal purposes.24 However, once equitable judicial processes and to evade his obligation to Litton.30 Thus, even while
limitations are breached using the coverture of the corporate veil, courts may I/AME was not imp leaded in the main case and yet was so named in a writ of
step in to pierce the same. execution to satisfy a court judgment against Santos, it is vulnerable to the
piercing of its corporate veil. We will further expound on this matter.
As we held in Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corporation:25
Piercing the Corporate Veil may
Piercing the corporate veil is warranted when "[the separate personality of a Apply to Non-stock Corporations
corporation] is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a
Petitioner I/AME argues that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies As held in Barineau v. Barineau:36
only to stock corporations, and not to non-stock, nonprofit corporations such
as I/AME since there are no stockholders to hold liable in such a situation but [t]he mere fact that the corporation involved is a nonprofit corporation does not
instead only members. Hence, they do not have investments or shares of stock by itself preclude a court from applying the equitable remedy of piercing the
or assets to answer for possible liabilities. corporate veil. The equitable character of the remedy permits a court to look
to the substance of the organization, and its decision is not controlled by the
Thus, no one in a non-stock corporation can be held liable in case the statutory framework under which the corporation was formed and operated.
corporate veil is disregarded or pierced.31 While it may appear to be impossible for a person to exercise ownership
control over a non-stock, not-for-profit corporation, a person can be held
The CA disagreed. It ruled that since the law does not make a distinction personally liable under the alter ego theory if the evidence shows that the
between a stock and non-stock corporation, neither should there be a person controlling the corporation did in fact exercise control, even though
distinction in case the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction has to be there was no stock ownership.
applied. While I/AME is an educational institution, the CA further ruled, it still
is a registered corporation conducting its affairs as such.32 In another U.S. case, Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System,37 the U.S. Court allowed the piercing of the
This Court agrees with the CA. corporate veil of the Foundation headed by the plaintiff, in order to avoid
In determining the propriety of applicability of piercing the veil of corporate inequitable results. Plaintiff was found to be the sole trustee, the sole member
fiction, this Court, in a number of cases, did not put in issue whether a of the board, and the sole financial contributor to the Foundation. In the end,
corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation. In Sula ng Bayan, Inc. v. the Court found that the plaintiff used the Foundation to avoid paying attorneys’
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. ,33 we considered but ultimately refused to pierce the fees.
corporate veil of a non-stock non-profit corporation which sought to institute an The concept of equitable ownership, for stock or non-stock corporations, in
action for reconveyance of real property on behalf of its members. This Court piercing of the corporate veil scenarios, may also be considered. An equitable
held that the non-stock corporation had no personality to institute a class suit owner is an individual who is a non-shareholder defendant, who exercises
on behalf of its members, considering that the non-stock corporation was not sufficient control or considerable authority over the corporation to the point of
an assignee or transferee of the real property in question, and did not have an completely disregarding the corporate form and acting as though its assets are
identity that was one and the same as its members. his or her alone to manage and distribute.38
In another case, this Court did not put in issue whether the corporation is a Given the foregoing, this Court sees no reason why a non-stock corporation
non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental corporation in considering the such as I/AME, may not be scrutinized for purposes of piercing the corporate
application of the doctrine of piercing of corporate veil. In Republic of the veil or fiction.
Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern,34 while we did not allow the piercing
of the corporate veil, this Court affirmed the finding of the CA that the Chairman Piercing the Corporate Veil may
of the Institute for Social Concern cannot be held jointly and severally liable Apply to Natural Persons
with the aforesaid non-governmental organization (NGO) at the time the
Memorandum of Agreement was entered into with the Philippine Government. The petitioner also insists that the piercing of the corporate veil cannot be
We found no fraud in that case committed by the Chairman that would have applied to a natural person - in this case, Santos - simply because as a human
justified the piercing of the corporate veil of the NG0.35 being, he has no corporate veil shrouding or covering his person.39

In the United States, from which we have adopted our law on corporations, a) When the Corporation is the Alter Ego of a Natural Person
non-profit corporations are not immune from the doctrine of piercing the As cited in Sula ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc. ,40 "[t]he doctrine of alter ego is
corporate veil.1âwphi1 Their courts view piercing of the corporation asan based upon the misuse of a corporation by an individual for wrongful or
equitable remedy, which justifies said courts to scrutm1ze any organization inequitable purposes, and in such case the court merely disregards the
however organized and in whatever manner it operates. Moreover, control of corporate entity and holds the individual responsible for acts knowingly and
ownership does not hinge on stock ownership. intentionally done in the name of the corporation." This, Santos has done in
this case. Santos formed I/AME, using the non-stock corporation, to evade This Court agrees with the CA that I/AME is the alter ego of Santos and Santos
paying his judgment creditor, Litton. - the natural person - is the alter ego of I/AME. Santos falsely represented
himself as President of I/AME in the Deed of Absolute Sale when he bought
The piercing of the corporate veil may apply to corporations as well as natural the Makati real property, at a time when I/ AME had not yet existed.
persons involved with corporations. This Court has held that the "corporate Uncontroverted facts in this case also reveal the findings of Me TC showing
mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation Santos and I/ AME as being one and the same person:
is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation."41
(1) Santos is the conceptualizer and implementor of I/AME;
We have considered a deceased natural person as one and the same with his
corporaticc to protect the succession rights of his legal heirs to his estate. (2) Santos’ contribution is ₱1,200,000.00 (One Million Two Hundred Thousand
In Cease v. Court of Appeals, 42 the predecessor-in-interest organized a close Pesos) out of the ₱1,500,000.00 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos),
corporation which acquired properties during its existence. When he died making him the majority contributor of I/AME; and,
intestate, trouble ensued amongst his children on whether or not to consider
his company one and the same with his person. The Court agreed with the trial (3) The building being occupied by I/AME is named after Santos using his
court when it pierced the corporate veil of the decedent's corporation. It found known nickname (to date it is called, the "Noli Santos Inte1national Tower").48
that said corporation was his business conduit and alter ego. Thus, the This Court deems I/AME and Santos as alter egos of each other based on the
acquired properties were actually properties of the decedent and as such, former’s own admission in its pleadings before the trial court. In its Answer (to
should be divided among the decedent's legitimate children in the partition of Amended Petition) with the RTC entitled Litton and Company, Inc. v. Hon.
his estate.43 Hernandez-Calledo, Civil Case No. 06-115547, I/AME admitted the allegations
In another instance, this Court allowed the piercing of the corporate veil against found in paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of the amended petition of Litton, particularly
another natural person, in Arcilla v. Court of Appeals. 44 The case stemmed paragraph number 4 which states:
from a complaint for sum of money against Arcilla for his failure to pay his loan 4. Respondent, International Academy of Management and Economics
from the private respondent. Arcilla, in his defense, alleged that the loan was Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Respondent I/ AME), is a corporation organized
in the name of his family corporation, CSAR Marine Resources, Inc. He further and existing under Philippine laws with address at 1061 Metropolitan Avenue,
argued that the CA erred in holding CSAR Marine Resources liable to the San Antonie Village, Makati City, where it may be served with summons and
private respondent since the latter was not impleaded as a party in the case. other judicial processes. It is the corporate entity used by Respondent
This Court allowed the piercing of the corporate veil and held that Arcilla used Santos as his alter ego for the purpose of shielding his assets from the
"his capacity as President, x x x [as] a sanctuary for a defense x x x to avoid reach of his creditors, one of which is herein Petitioner.49 (Emphases ours)
complying with the liability adjudged against him x x x. "45 We held that his
liability remained attached even if he was impleaded as a party, and not the Hence, I/AME is the alter ego of the natural person, Santos, which the latter
corporation, to thecollection case and even if he ceased to be corporate used to evade the execution on the Makati property, thus frustrating the
president.46 Indeed, even if Arcilla had ceased to be corporate president, he satisfaction of the judgment won by Litton.
remained personally liable for the judgment debt to pay his personal loan, for
b) Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil
we treated him and the corporation as one and the same. CSAR Marine was
deemed his alter ego. This Court in Arcilla pierced the corporate veil of CSAR Marine Resources to
satisfy a money judgment against its erstwhile President, Arcilla.
We find similarities with Arcilla and the instant case. Like Arcilla, Santos: (1)
was adjudged liable to pay on a judgment against him; (2) he became We borrow from American parlance what is called reverse piercing or reverse
President of a corporation; (3) he formed a corporation to conceal assets which corporate piercing or piercing the corporate veil "in reverse."
were supposed to pay for the judgment against his favor; (4) the corporation
which has Santos as its President, is being asked by the court to pay on the As held in the U.S. Case, C.F. Trust, Inc., v. First Flight Limited
judgment; and (5) he may not use as a defense that he is no longer President Partnership, 50 "in a traditional veil-piercing action, a court disregards the
of I/AME (although a visit to the website of the school shows he is the current existence of the corporate entity so a claimant can reach the assets of a
President).47
corporate insider. In a reverse piercing action, however, the plaintiff seeks to such remedies that could have otherwise been available, to the detriment of
reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy claims against a corporate insider." other creditors.56

"Reverse-piercing flows in the opposite direction (of traditional corporate veil- Reverse corporate piercing is an equitable remedy which if utilized cavalierly,
piercing) and makes the corporation liable for the debt of the shareholders." 51 may lead to disastrous consequences for both stock and non-stock
corporations. We are aware that ordinary judgment collection procedures or
It has two (2) types: outsider reverse piercing and insider reverse piercing. other legal remedies are preferred over that which would risk damage to third
Outsider reverse piercing occurs when a party with a claim against an parties (for instance, innocent stockholders or voluntary creditors) with
individual or corporation attempts to be repaid with assets of a corporation unprotected interests in the assets of the beleaguered corporation.57
owned or substantially controlled by the defendant. 52 In contrast, in insider
reverse piercing, the controlling members will attempt to ignore the corporate Thus, this Court would recommend the application of the current 1997 Rules
fiction in order to take advantage of a benefit available to the corporation, such on Civil Procedure on Enforcement of Judgments. Under the current Rules of
as an interest in a lawsuit or protection of personal assets. 53 Court on Civil Procedure, when it comes to satisfaction by levy, a judgment
obligor is given the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof
Outsider reverse veil-piercing is applicable in the instant case. Litton, as may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. If the judgmentobligor does not
judgment creditor, seeks the Court's intervention to pierce the corporate veil exercise the option, personal properties, if any, shall be first levied and then
of I/AME in order to make its Makati real property answer for a judgment on real properties if the personal properties are deemed insufficient to answer
against Santos, who formerly owned and still substantially controls I/AME. for the judgment.58
In the U.S. case Acree v. McMahan, 54 the American court held that In the instant case, it may be possible for this Court to recommend that Litton
"[ o ]utsider reverse veil-piercing extends the traditional veil-piercing doctrine run after the other properties of Santos that could satisfy the money judgment
to permit a third-party creditor to pierce the veil to satisfy the debts of an - first personal, then other real properties other than that of the school.
individual out of the corporation's assets." However, if we allow this, we frustrate the decades-old yet valid MeTC
The Court has pierced the corporate veil in a reverse manner in the instances judgment which levied on the real property now titled under the name of the
when the scheme was to avoid corporate assets to be included in the estate school. Moreover, this Court will unwittingly condone the action of Santos in
of a decedent as in the Cease case and when the corporation was used to hiding all these years behind the corporate form to evade paying his obligation
escape a judgment to pay a debt as in the Arcilla case. under the judgment in the court a quo. This we cannot countenance without
being a party to the injustice.
In a 1962 Philippine case, this Court also employed what we now call reverse-
piercing of the corporate veil. In Palacio v. Fely Transportation Co., 55 we Thus, the reverse piercing of the corporate veil of I/AME to enforce the levy on
found that the president and general manager of the private respondent execution of the Makati real property where the school now stands is applied.
company formed the corporation to evade his subsidiary civil liability resulting WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The
from the conviction of his driver who ran over the child of the petitioner, causing CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 107727 dated 30 October 2009 and its
injuries and medical expenses. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the Resolution on 12 March 2010 are hereby AFFIRMED. The MeTC Order dated
president and general manager, and Fely Transportation, may be regarded as 29 October 2004 is hereby REINSTATED.
one and the same person. Thus, even if the president and general manager
was not a party to the case, we reversed the lower court and declared both Accordingly, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 2, is hereby DIRECTED to execute
him and the private respondent company, jointly and severally liable to the with dispatch the MeTC Order dated 29 October 2004 against Santos.
plaintiffs. Thus, this Court allowed the outsider-plaintiffs to pierce the corporate
veil of Fely Transportation to run after its corporate assets and pay the SO ORDERED.
subsidiary civil liability of the company's president and general manager.
G.R. No. 124043 October 14, 1998
This notwithstanding, the equitable remedy of reverse corporate piercing or
reverse piercing was not meant to encourage a creditor’s failure to undertake
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs. including surcharge and interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency
expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MEN'S withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally protested the
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. assessment and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated
October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

PANGANIBAN, J.: Contesting the denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for review at the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due course, the CTA issued
this ruling in favor of the YMCA:
Is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the Young Men's
Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) — established as "a
welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation" — subject to . . . [T]he leasing of [private respondent's] facilities to small shop owners, to
income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and the restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are
Constitution? reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the objectives of the [private respondents]. It appears from the testimonies of
the witnesses for the [private respondent] particularly Mr. James C. Delote,
former accountant of YMCA, that these facilities were leased to members and
The Case
that they have to service the needs of its members and their guests. The
rentals were minimal as for example, the barbershop was only charged P300
per month. He also testified that there was actually no lot devoted for parking
This is the main question raised before us in this petition for review on certiorari space but the parking was done at the sides of the building. The parking was
challenging two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals1 on September primarily for members with stickers on the windshields of their cars and they
28, 19952 and February 29, 19963 in CA-GR SP No. 32007. Both Resolutions charged P.50 for non-members. The rentals and parking fees were just
affirmed the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA enough to cover the costs of operation and maintenance only. The earning[s]
to claim tax exemption on the latter's income from the lease of its real property. from these rentals and parking charges including those from lodging and other
charges for the use of the recreational facilities constitute [the] bulk of its
income which [is] channeled to support its many activities and attainment of its
The Facts objectives. As pointed out earlier, the membership dues are very insufficient
to support its program. We find it reasonably necessary therefore for [private
respondent] to make [the] most out [of] its existing facilities to earn some
income. It would have been different if under the circumstances, [private
The facts are undisputed.4 Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-
respondent] will purchase a lot and convert it to a parking lot to cater to the
profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are
needs of the general public for a fee, or construct a building and lease it out to
beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious,
the highest bidder or at the market rate for commercial purposes, or should it
educational and charitable objectives.
invest its funds in the buy and sell of properties, real or personal. Under these
circumstances, we could conclude that the activities are already profit oriented,
not incidental and reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives of the
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 association and therefore, will fall under the last paragraph of Section 27 of
from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants the Tax Code and any income derived therefrom shall be taxable.
and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-
members. On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued
an assessment to private respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01
Considering our findings that [private respondent] was not engaged in the Following the ruling in the afore-cited cases of Province of Abra vs. Hernando
business of operating or contracting [a] parking lot, we find no legal basis also and Abra Valley College Inc. vs. Aquino, the ruling of the respondent Court of
for the imposition of [a] deficiency fixed tax and [a] contractor's tax in the Tax Appeals that "the leasing of petitioner's (herein respondent's) facilities to
amount[s] of P353.15 and P3,129.73, respectively. small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of
the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the objectives of the petitioners, and the income derived
xxx xxx xxx therefrom are tax exempt, must be reversed.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the following assessments are WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED in so far as it
hereby dismissed for lack of merit: dismissed the assessment for:

1980 Deficiency Fixed Tax — P353,15; 1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 353.15

1980 Deficiency Contractor's Tax — P3,129.23; 1980 Deficiency Contractor's Tax P 3,129.23, &

1980 Deficiency Income Tax — P372,578.20. 1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 372,578.20

While the following assessments are hereby sustained: but the same is AFFIRMED in all other respect. 7

1980 Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax — P1,798.93; Aggrieved, the YMCA asked for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:

1980 Deficiency Withholding Tax on Wages — P33,058.82

I

plus 10% surcharge and 20% interest per annum from July 2, 1984 until fully
paid but not to exceed three (3) years pursuant to Section 51(e)(2) & (3) of the The findings of facts of the Public Respondent Court of Tax Appeals being
National Internal Revenue Code effective as of 1984. 5 supported by substantial evidence [are] final and conclusive.

Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the Court of II
Appeals (CA). In its Decision of February 16, 1994, the CA6 initially decided
in favor of the CIR and disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
The conclusions of law of [p]ublic [r]espondent exempting [p]rivate Before us, petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
[r]espondent from the income on rentals of small shops and parking fees [are]
in accord with the applicable law and jurisprudence. 8
I

Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA, the CA
reversed itself and promulgated on September 28, 1995 its first assailed In holding that it had departed from the findings of fact of Respondent Court of
Resolution which, in part, reads: Tax Appeals when it rendered its Decision dated February 16, 1994; and

The Court cannot depart from the CTA's findings of fact, as they are supported II
by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial.

In affirming the conclusion of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the

xxx xxx xxx income of private respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees [is]
exempt from taxation. 11

The second ground raised is that the respondent CTA did not err in saying that
the rental from small shops and parking fees do not result in the loss of the This Court's Ruling
exemption. Not even the petitioner would hazard the suggestion that YMCA is
designed for profit. Consequently, the little income from small shops and
parking fees help[s] to keep its head above the water, so to speak, and allow
The petition is meritorious.
it to continue with its laudable work.

First Issue:
The Court, therefore, finds the second ground of the motion to be meritorious
and in accord with law and jurisprudence. Factual Findings of the CTA

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED; the respondent Private respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA Decision reversed
CTA's decision is AFFIRMED in toto.9 the factual findings of the CTA. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the
CA merely reversed the "ruling of the CTA that the leasing of private
respondent's facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen
The internal revenue commissioner's own Motion for Reconsideration was operators and the operation of parking lots are reasonably incidental to and
denied by Respondent Court in its second assailed Resolution of February 29, reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the private
1996. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 10 respondent and that the income derived therefrom are tax exempt." 12
Petitioner insists that what the appellate court reversed was the legal
conclusion, not the factual finding, of the CTA. 13 The commissioner has a
The Issues point.
Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when
supported by substantial evidence, will be disturbed on appeal unless it is
shown that the said court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. xxx xxx xxx
14 In the present case, this Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of
the CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter merely applied the law to the
facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR: "Whether (g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated
or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of certain exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;
premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last
paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended." 15 (h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and
other non-profitable purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or member;
Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the
aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner
different from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual xxx xxx xxx
findings.

Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It whatever kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of their
has been held that "[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit,
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood imposed under this Code. (as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1457)
of alleged facts." 16 In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less
change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts.
That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not
Petitioner argues that while the income received by the organizations
irregular or abnormal.
enumerated in Section 27 (now Section 26) of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted
from the payment of tax "in respect to income received by them as such," the
exemption does not apply to income derived ". . . from any of their properties,
Second Issue: real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless
of the disposition made of such income . . . ."
Is the Rental Income of the YMCA Taxable?

Petitioner adds that "rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from

We now come to the crucial issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA from its
the lease of its properties, real or personal, [is] not, therefore, exempt from
real estate subject to tax? At the outset, we set forth the relevant provision of
income taxation, even if such income [is] exclusively used for the
the NIRC:
accomplishment of its objectives." 17 We agree with the commissioner.

Sec. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. — The following

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied
organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received
the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions. 18
by them as such —
Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest.
and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the
claimed exemption "must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a
language too clear to be mistaken." 19 Constitutional Provisions

In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly On Taxation
disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the
NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the
YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax Invoking not only the NIRC but also the fundamental law, private respondent
imposed by the same Code. Because the last paragraph of said section submits that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, 24
unequivocally subjects to tax the rent income of the YMCA from its real exempts "charitable institutions" from the payment not only of property taxes
property, 20 the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and but also of income tax from any source. 25 In support of its novel theory, it
to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction. compares the use of the words "charitable institutions," "actually" and "directly"
in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, on the one hand; and in Article VI,
Section 22, par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand. 26
It is axiomatic that where the language of the law is clear and unambiguous,
its express terms must be applied. 21 Parenthetically, a consideration of the
question of construction must not even begin, particularly when such question Private respondent enunciates three points. First, the present provision is
is on whether to apply a strict construction or a liberal one on statutes that divisible into two categories: (1) "[c]haritable institutions, churches and
grant tax exemptions to "religious, charitable and educational propert[ies] or parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-profit
institutions." 22 cemeteries," the incomes of which are, from whatever source, all tax-exempt;
27 and (2) "[a]ll lands, buildings and improvements actually and directly used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes," which are exempt only from
The last paragraph of Section 27, the YMCA argues, should be "subject to the property taxes. 28 Second, Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29
qualification that the income from the properties must arise from activities which limited the exemption only to the payment of property taxes, referred to
'conducted for profit' before it may be considered taxable." 23 This argument the provision of the 1935 Constitution and not to its counterparts in the 1973
is erroneous. As previously stated, a reading of said paragraph ineludibly and the 1987 Constitutions. 30 Third, the phrase "actually, directly and
shows that the income from any property of exempt organizations, as well as exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes" refers not
that arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase "any only to "all lands, buildings and improvements," but also to the above-quoted
of their activities conducted for profit" does not qualify the word "properties." first category which includes charitable institutions like the private respondent.
This makes from the property of the organization taxable, regardless of how 31
that income is used — whether for profit or for lofty non-profit purposes.

The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of

Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent which, in turn, may
committed reversible error when it allowed, on reconsideration, the tax have guided the people in ratifying the Charter. 32 Such intent must be
exemption claimed by YMCA on income it derived from renting out its real effectuated.
property, on the solitary but unconvincing ground that the said income is not
collected for profit but is merely incidental to its operation. The law does not
make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a former constitutional
income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not commissioner, who is now a member of this Court, stressed during the
distinguish, neither should we. Concom debates that ". . . what is exempted is not the institution itself . . .;
those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements certification is required in order for the learner to progress through the grades
actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational or move to the higher levels." 41 The Court has examined the "Amended
Articles of Incorporation" and "By-Laws"43 of the YMCA, but found nothing in
purposes." 33 Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent authority on the them that even hints that it is a school or an educational institution. 44
Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that
the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes. 34

Furthermore, under the Education Act of 1982, even non-formal education is

understood to be school-based and "private auspices such as foundations and
In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that "[t]he civic-spirited organizations" are ruled out. 45 It is settled that the term
tax exemption covers property taxes only." 35 Indeed, the income tax "educational institution," when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to
exemption claimed by private respondent finds no basis in Article VI, Section a ". . . school seminary, college or educational establishment . . . ." 46
26, par. 3 of the Constitution. Therefore, the private respondent cannot be deemed one of the educational
institutions covered by the constitutional provision under consideration.

Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Character,
36 claiming that the YMCA "is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution . . . Words used in the Constitution are to be taken in their ordinary acceptation.
whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for While in its broadest and best sense education embraces all forms and phases
educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income." of instruction, improvement and development of mind and body, and as well of
37 We reiterate that private respondent is exempt from the payment of property religious and moral sentiments, yet in the common understanding and
tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation application it means a place where systematic instruction in any or all of the
alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to useful branches of learning is given by methods common to schools and
justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. institutions of learning. That we conceive to be the true intent and scope of the
term [educational institutions,] as used in the

As previously discussed, laws allowing tax exemption are construed Constitution. 47

strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims
under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1)
it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and Moreover, without conceding that Private Respondent YMCA is an educational
(2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, institution, the Court also notes that the former did not submit proof of the
and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and
scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it met exclusively used for educational purposes. Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA
the said requisites. by-laws, which formed part of the evidence submitted, is patently insufficient,
since the same merely signified that "[t]he net income derived from the rentals
of the commercial buildings shall be apportioned to the Federation and
Is the YMCA an educational institution within the purview of Article XIV, Member Associations as the National Board may decide." 48 In sum, we find
Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution? We rule that it is not. The term no basis for granting the YMCA exemption from income tax under the
"educational institution" or "institution of learning" has acquired a well-known constitutional provision invoked.
technical meaning, of which the members of the Constitutional Commission
are deemed cognizant. 38 Under the Education Act of 1982, such term refers
to schools. 39 The school system is synonymous with formal education, 40 Cases Cited by Private
which "refers to the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded
learnings organized and provided by the formal school system and for which
Respondent Inapplicable WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
The cases 49 relied on by private respondent do not support its cause. YMCA February 16, 1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that the income derived
of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue 50 and Abra Valley College, Inc. v. by petitioner from rentals of its real property is subject to income tax. No
Aquino 51 are not applicable, because the controversy in both cases involved pronouncement as to costs.
exemption from the payment of property tax, not income tax. Hospital de San
Juan de Dios, Inc. v. Pasay City 52 is not in point either, because it involves a
claim for exemption from the payment of regulatory fees, specifically electrical SO ORDERED.
inspection fees, imposed by an ordinance of Pasay City — an issue not at all
related to that involved in a claimed exemption from the payment of income
taxes imposed on property leases. In Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Com. of Davide, Jr., Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Internal Revenue, 53 the party therein, which claimed an exemption from the
payment of income tax, was an educational institution which submitted
substantial evidence that the income subject of the controversy had been
Bellosillo, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
devoted or used solely for educational purposes. On the other hand, the
private respondent in the present case has not given any proof that it is an
educational institution, or that part of its rent income is actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.

Epilogue
Separate Opinions

In deliberating on this petition, the Court expresses its sympathy with private
respondent. It appreciates the nobility of its cause. However, the Court's power
and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It
cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting;
Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation.

I vote to deny the petition. The basic rule is that the factual findings of the Court
We concede that private respondent deserves the help and the of Tax Appeals when supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed
encouragement of the government. It needs laws that can facilitate, and not on appeal unless it is shown that the court committed grave error in the
frustrate, its humanitarian tasks. But the Court regrets that, given its limited appreciation of facts.1 In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the validity
constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. of the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that private respondent Young
That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. Indeed, Men's Christian Association (YMCA) is an association organized and operated
some of the members of the Court may even believe in the wisdom and exclusively for the promotion of social welfare and other non-profitable
prudence of granting more tax exemptions to private respondent. But such purposes, particularly the physical and character development of the youth.2
belief, however well-meaning and sincere, cannot bestow upon the Court the The enduring objectives of respondent YMCA as reflected in its Constitution
power to change or amend the law. and By-laws are:
(a) To develop well-balanced Christian personality, mission in life, multifarious projects and attain the laudable objectives of YMCA, fund raising
usefulness of individuals, and the promotion of unity among Christians and has become an indispensable and integral part of the activities of the
understanding among peoples of all faiths, to the end that the Brotherhood of Association. YMCA derives its funds from various sources such as
Man under the Fatherhood of God may be fostered in an atmosphere of mutual membership dues, charges on the use of facilities like bowling and billiards,
respect and understanding; lodging, interest income, parking fees, restaurant and canteen. Since the
membership dues are very minimal, the Association derives funds from rentals
of small shops, restaurant, canteen and parking fees. For the taxable year
(b) To promote on equal basis the physical, mental, and spiritual welfare ending December 1980, YMCA earned gross rental income of P676,829.00
of the youth, with emphasis on reverence for God, social discipline, and P44,259.00 from parking fees which became the subject of the questioned
responsibility for the common good, respect for human dignity, and the assessment by petitioner.
observance of the Golden Rule;

The majority of this Court upheld the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that
(c) To encourage members of the Young Men's Christian Associations in the leasing of petitioner's facilities to small shop owners and to restaurant and
the Philippines to participate loyally in the life of their respective churches; to canteen operators in addition to the operation of a parking lot are reasonably
bring these churches closer together; and to participate in the effort to realize necessary for and incidental to the accomplishment of the objectives of YMCA.
the church Universal; 4 In fact, these facilities are leased to members in order to service their needs
and those of their guests. The rentals are minimal, such as, the rent of P300.00
for the barbershop. With regard to parking space, there is no lot actually
devoted therefor and the parking is done only along the sides of the building.
(d) To strengthen and coordinate the work of the Young Men's Christian
The parking is primarily for members with car stickers but to non-members,
Associations in the Philippines and to foster the extension of the Youth Men's
parking fee is P0.50 only. The rentals and parking fees are just enough to
Christian Associations to new areas;
cover the operation and maintenance costs of these facilities. The earnings
which YMCA derives from these rentals and parking fees, together with the
charges for lodging and use of recreational facilities, constitute the bulk or
(e) To help its Member Associations develop and adopt their programs to majority of its income used to support its programs and activities.
the needs of the youth;

In its decision of 16 February 1994, the Court of Appeals thus committed grave
(f) To assist the Member Associations in developing and maintaining a error in departing from the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals by declaring
high standard of management, operation and practice; and that the leasing of YMCA's facilities to shop owners and restaurant operators
and the operation of a parking lot are used for commercial purposes or for
profit, which fact takes YMCA outside the coverage of tax exemption. In later
(g) To undertake and sponsor national and international programs and granting the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent YMCA, the Court
activities in pursuance of its purposes and objectives. 3 of Appeals correctly reversed its earlier decision and upheld the findings of the
Court of Tax Appeals by ruling that YMCA is not designed for profit and the
little income it derives from rentals and parking fees helps maintain its noble
existence for the fulfillment of its goals for the Christian development of the
Pursuant to these objectives, YMCA has continuously organized and
youth.
undertaken throughout the country various programs for the youth through
actual workshops, seminars, training, sports and summer camps, conferences
on the cultivation of Christian moral values, drug addiction, out-of-school youth,
those with handicap and physical defects and youth alcoholism. To fulfill these
Respondent YMCA is undoubtedly exempt from corporate income tax under describes "the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing
the provisions of Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), of the National Internal Revenue organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their
Code, to wit: activities" in order to make such income taxable. It is the exception to Sec. 27
pars. (g) and (h) providing for the tax exemptions of the income of said
organizations. Hence, if such income from property or any other property is
Sec. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. — The following not conducted for profit, then it is not taxable.
organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received
by them as such — . . . (g) civic league or organization not organized for profit
but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare; (h) club organized Even taken alone and understood according to its plain, simple and literal
and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable meaning, the word "income" which is derived from property, real or personal,
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 27 means the amount of money coming
stockholder or member . . . . Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding to a person or corporation within a specified time as profit from investment; the
paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing return in money from one's business or capital invested.7 Income from
organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their property also means gains and profits derived from the sale or other disposition
activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such of capital assets; the money which any person or corporation periodically
income, shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code. receives either as profits from business, or as returns from investments 8 The
word "income" as used in tax statutes is to be taken in its ordinary sense as
gain or profit.9
The majority of the Court accepted petitioner's view that while the income of
organizations enumerated in Sec. 27 are exempt from income tax, such
exemption does not however extend to their income of whatever kind or Clearly, therefore, income derived from property whether real or personal
character from any of their properties real or personal regardless of the connotes profit from business or from investment of the same. If we are to
disposition made of such income; that based on the wording of the law which apply the ordinary meaning of income from property as profit to the language
is plain and simple and does not need any interpretation, any income of a tax of the last paragraph of Sec. 27 of the NIRC, then only those profits arising
exempt entity from any of its properties is a taxable income; hence, the rental from business and investment involving property are taxable. In the instant
income derived by a tax exempt organization from the lease of its properties case, there is no question that in leasing its facilities to small shop owners and
is not therefore exempt from income taxation even if such income is exclusively in operating parking spaces, YMCA does not engage in any profit-making
used for the accomplishment of its objectives. business. Both the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 25 September 1995, categorically found that these activities
conducted on YMCA's property were aimed not only at fulfilling the needs and
Income derived from its property by a tax exempt organization is not absolutely requirements of its members as part of YMCA's youth program but, more
taxable. Taken in solitude, a word or phrase such as, in this case, "the income importantly, at raising funds to finance the multifarious projects of the
of whatever kind and character . . . from any of their properties" might easily Association.
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. 5
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be As the Court has ruled in one case, the fact that an educational institution
interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be charges tuition fees and other fees for the different services it renders to the
considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general students does not in itself make the school a profit-making enterprise that
intent of the whole enactment.6 A close reading of the last paragraph of Sec. would place it beyond the purview of the law exempting it from taxation. The
27 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to the whole section on mere realization of profits out of its operation does not automatically result in
tax exemption of the organizations enumerated therein, shows that the phrase the loss of an educational institution's exemption from income tax as long as
"conducted for profit" in the last paragraph of Sec. 27 qualifies, limits and no part of its profits inures to the benefit of any stockholder or individual.10 In
order to claim exemption from income tax, a corporation or association must
show that it is organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, athletic, cultural or educational purposes or for the rehabilitation of It is claimed however that the institution is run as a business in that it keeps a
veterans, and that no part of its income inures to the benefit of any private lodging and boarding house. It may be admitted that there are 64 persons
stockholder or individual. 11 The main evidence of the purpose of a corporation occupying rooms in the main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take
should be its articles of incorporation and by-laws, for such purpose is required their meals at the restaurant below. These facts however are far from
by statute to be stated in the articles of incorporation, and the by-laws outline constituting a business in the ordinary acceptation of the word. In the first place,
the administrative organization of the corporation which, in turn, is supposed no profit is realized by the association in any sense. In the second place it is
to insure or facilitate the accomplishment of said purpose. 12 undoubted, as it is undisputed, that the purpose of the association is not
primarily to obtain the money which comes from the lodgers and boarders. The
real purpose is to keep the membership continually within the sphere of
influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, the
The foregoing principle applies to income derived by tax exempt corporations opportunities which vice presents to young men in foreign countries who lack
from their property. The criterion or test in order to make such income taxable home or other similar influences.
is when it arises from purely profit-making business. Otherwise, when the
income derived from use of property is reasonable and incidental to the
charitable, benevolent, educational or religious purpose for which the
corporation or association is created, such income should be tax-exempt. The majority, if not all, of the income of the organizations covered by the
exemption provided in Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), of the NIRC are derived from
their properties, real or personal. If we are to interpret the last paragraph of
Sec. 27 to the effect that all income of whatever kind from the properties of
In Hospital de San Juan de Dios, Inc. v. Pasay City 13 we held — said organization, real or personal, are taxable, even if not conducted for profit,
then Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), would be rendered ineffective and nugatory.
As this Court elucidated in Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Collector of Internal
In this connection, it should be noted that respondent therein is a corporation Revenue, 15 every responsible organization must be so run as to at least
organized for "charitable, educational and religious purposes"; that no part of insure its existence by operating within the limits of its own resources,
its net income inures to the benefit of any private individual; that it is exempt especially its regular income. It should always strive whenever possible to
from paying income tax; that it operates a hospital in which MEDICAL have a surplus. If the benefits of the exemption would be limited to institutions
assistance is given to destitute persons free of charge; that it maintains a which do not hope or propose to have such surplus, then the exemption would
pharmacy department within the premises of said hospital, to supply drugs and apply only to schools which are on the verge of bankruptcy. Unlike the United
medicines only to charity and paying patients confined therein; and that only States where a substantial number of institutions of learning are dependent
the paying patients are required to pay the medicines supplied to them, for upon voluntary contributions and still enjoy economic stability, such as Harvard,
which they are charged the cost of the medicines, plus an additional 10% the trust fund of which has been steadily increasing with the years, there are
thereof, to partly offset the cost of medicines supplied free of charge to charity and there have always been very few educational enterprises in the
patients. Under these facts we are of the opinion and so hold that the Hospital Philippines which are supported by donations, and these organizations usually
may not be regarded as engaged in "business" by reason of said sale of have a very precarious existence. 16
medicines to its paying patients . . . (W)e held that the UST Hospital was not
established for profit-making purposes, despite the fact that it had 140 paying
beds, because the same were maintained only to partly finance the expenses Finally, the non-taxability of all income and properties of educational
of the free wards containing 203 beds for charity patients. institutions finds enduring support in Art. XIV, Sec. 4, par. 3, of the 1987
Constitution —

In YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 14 this Court explained

—
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational The enduring objectives of respondent YMCA as reflected in its Constitution
institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes and By-laws are:
shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of
the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law. (a) To develop well-balanced Christian personality, mission in life,
usefulness of individuals, and the promotion of unity among Christians and
understanding among peoples of all faiths, to the end that the Brotherhood of
In YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue 17 this Court categorically Man under the Fatherhood of God may be fostered in an atmosphere of mutual
held and found YMCA to be an educational institution exclusively devoted to respect and understanding;
educational and charitable purposes and not operated for profit. The purposes
of the Association as set forth in its charter and constitution are "to develop the
Christian character and usefulness of its members, to improve the spiritual, (b) To promote on equal basis the physical, mental, and spiritual welfare
intellectual, social and physical condition of young men and to acquire, hold, of the youth, with emphasis on reverence for God, social discipline,
mortgage and dispose of the necessary lands, buildings and personal property responsibility for the common good, respect for human dignity, and the
for the use of said corporation exclusively for religious, charitable and observance of the Golden Rule;
educational purposes, and not for investment or profit." YMCA has an
educational department, the aim of which is to furnish, at much less than cost,
instructions on subjects that will greatly increase the mental efficiency and
(c) To encourage members of the Young Men's Christian Associations in
wage-earning capacity of young men, prepare them in special lines of
the Philippines to participate loyally in the life of their respective churches; to
business and offer them special lines of study. We ruled therein that YMCA
bring these churches closer together; and to participate in the effort to realize
cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for religious purposes or
the church Universal;
an institution devoted exclusively for charitable purposes or an institution
devoted exclusively to educational purposes, but it can be truthfully said that it
is an institution used exclusively for all three purposes and that, as such, it is
entitled to be exempted from taxation. (d) To strengthen and coordinate the work of the Young Men's Christian
Associations in the Philippines and to foster the extension of the Youth Men's
Christian Associations to new areas;
Separate Opinions

(e) To help its Member Associations develop and adopt their programs to
the needs of the youth;
BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting;

(f) To assist the Member Associations in developing and maintaining a

I vote to deny the petition. The basic rule is that the factual findings of the Court
high standard of management, operation and practice; and
of Tax Appeals when supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is shown that the court committed grave error in the
appreciation of facts.1 In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the validity
of the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that private respondent Young (g) To undertake and sponsor national and international programs and
Men's Christian Association (YMCA) is an association organized and operated activities in pursuance of its purposes and objectives. 3
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare and other non-profitable
purposes, particularly the physical and character development of the youth.2
Pursuant to these objectives, YMCA has continuously organized and existence for the fulfillment of its goals for the Christian development of the
undertaken throughout the country various programs for the youth through youth.
actual workshops, seminars, training, sports and summer camps, conferences
on the cultivation of Christian moral values, drug addiction, out-of-school youth,
those with handicap and physical defects and youth alcoholism. To fulfill these Respondent YMCA is undoubtedly exempt from corporate income tax under
multifarious projects and attain the laudable objectives of YMCA, fund raising the provisions of Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), of the National Internal Revenue
has become an indispensable and integral part of the activities of the Code, to wit:
Association. YMCA derives its funds from various sources such as
membership dues, charges on the use of facilities like bowling and billiards,
lodging, interest income, parking fees, restaurant and canteen. Since the
Sec. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. — The following
membership dues are very minimal, the Association derives funds from rentals
organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received
of small shops, restaurant, canteen and parking fees. For the taxable year
by them as such — . . . (g) civic league or organization not organized for profit
ending December 1980, YMCA earned gross rental income of P676,829.00
but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare; (h) club organized
and P44,259.00 from parking fees which became the subject of the questioned
and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable
assessment by petitioner.
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or member . . . . Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding
paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing
The majority of this Court upheld the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals that organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their
the leasing of petitioner's facilities to small shop owners and to restaurant and activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such
canteen operators in addition to the operation of a parking lot are reasonably income, shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code.
necessary for and incidental to the accomplishment of the objectives of YMCA.
4 In fact, these facilities are leased to members in order to service their needs
and those of their guests. The rentals are minimal, such as, the rent of P300.00
The majority of the Court accepted petitioner's view that while the income of
for the barbershop. With regard to parking space, there is no lot actually
organizations enumerated in Sec. 27 are exempt from income tax, such
devoted therefor and the parking is done only along the sides of the building.
exemption does not however extend to their income of whatever kind or
The parking is primarily for members with car stickers but to non-members,
character from any of their properties real or personal regardless of the
parking fee is P0.50 only. The rentals and parking fees are just enough to
disposition made of such income; that based on the wording of the law which
cover the operation and maintenance costs of these facilities. The earnings
is plain and simple and does not need any interpretation, any income of a tax
which YMCA derives from these rentals and parking fees, together with the
exempt entity from any of its properties is a taxable income; hence, the rental
charges for lodging and use of recreational facilities, constitute the bulk or
income derived by a tax exempt organization from the lease of its properties
majority of its income used to support its programs and activities.
is not therefore exempt from income taxation even if such income is exclusively
used for the accomplishment of its objectives.

In its decision of 16 February 1994, the Court of Appeals thus committed grave
error in departing from the findings of the Court of Tax Appeals by declaring
Income derived from its property by a tax exempt organization is not absolutely
that the leasing of YMCA's facilities to shop owners and restaurant operators
taxable. Taken in solitude, a word or phrase such as, in this case, "the income
and the operation of a parking lot are used for commercial purposes or for
of whatever kind and character . . . from any of their properties" might easily
profit, which fact takes YMCA outside the coverage of tax exemption. In later
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
granting the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent YMCA, the Court
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. 5
of Appeals correctly reversed its earlier decision and upheld the findings of the
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
Court of Tax Appeals by ruling that YMCA is not designed for profit and the
interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be
little income it derives from rentals and parking fees helps maintain its noble
considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.6 A close reading of the last paragraph of Sec. would place it beyond the purview of the law exempting it from taxation. The
27 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to the whole section on mere realization of profits out of its operation does not automatically result in
tax exemption of the organizations enumerated therein, shows that the phrase the loss of an educational institution's exemption from income tax as long as
"conducted for profit" in the last paragraph of Sec. 27 qualifies, limits and no part of its profits inures to the benefit of any stockholder or individual.10 In
describes "the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing order to claim exemption from income tax, a corporation or association must
organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their show that it is organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
activities" in order to make such income taxable. It is the exception to Sec. 27 scientific, athletic, cultural or educational purposes or for the rehabilitation of
pars. (g) and (h) providing for the tax exemptions of the income of said veterans, and that no part of its income inures to the benefit of any private
organizations. Hence, if such income from property or any other property is stockholder or individual. 11 The main evidence of the purpose of a corporation
not conducted for profit, then it is not taxable. should be its articles of incorporation and by-laws, for such purpose is required
by statute to be stated in the articles of incorporation, and the by-laws outline
the administrative organization of the corporation which, in turn, is supposed
Even taken alone and understood according to its plain, simple and literal to insure or facilitate the accomplishment of said purpose. 12
meaning, the word "income" which is derived from property, real or personal,
provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 27 means the amount of money coming
to a person or corporation within a specified time as profit from investment; the The foregoing principle applies to income derived by tax exempt corporations
return in money from one's business or capital invested.7 Income from from their property. The criterion or test in order to make such income taxable
property also means gains and profits derived from the sale or other disposition is when it arises from purely profit-making business. Otherwise, when the
of capital assets; the money which any person or corporation periodically income derived from use of property is reasonable and incidental to the
receives either as profits from business, or as returns from investments 8 The charitable, benevolent, educational or religious purpose for which the
word "income" as used in tax statutes is to be taken in its ordinary sense as corporation or association is created, such income should be tax-exempt.
gain or profit.9

In Hospital de San Juan de Dios, Inc. v. Pasay City 13 we held —

Clearly, therefore, income derived from property whether real or personal
connotes profit from business or from investment of the same. If we are to
apply the ordinary meaning of income from property as profit to the language In this connection, it should be noted that respondent therein is a corporation
of the last paragraph of Sec. 27 of the NIRC, then only those profits arising organized for "charitable, educational and religious purposes"; that no part of
from business and investment involving property are taxable. In the instant its net income inures to the benefit of any private individual; that it is exempt
case, there is no question that in leasing its facilities to small shop owners and from paying income tax; that it operates a hospital in which MEDICAL
in operating parking spaces, YMCA does not engage in any profit-making assistance is given to destitute persons free of charge; that it maintains a
business. Both the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Court of Appeals in its pharmacy department within the premises of said hospital, to supply drugs and
resolution of 25 September 1995, categorically found that these activities medicines only to charity and paying patients confined therein; and that only
conducted on YMCA's property were aimed not only at fulfilling the needs and the paying patients are required to pay the medicines supplied to them, for
requirements of its members as part of YMCA's youth program but, more which they are charged the cost of the medicines, plus an additional 10%
importantly, at raising funds to finance the multifarious projects of the thereof, to partly offset the cost of medicines supplied free of charge to charity
Association. patients. Under these facts we are of the opinion and so hold that the Hospital
may not be regarded as engaged in "business" by reason of said sale of
medicines to its paying patients . . . (W)e held that the UST Hospital was not
As the Court has ruled in one case, the fact that an educational institution established for profit-making purposes, despite the fact that it had 140 paying
charges tuition fees and other fees for the different services it renders to the beds, because the same were maintained only to partly finance the expenses
students does not in itself make the school a profit-making enterprise that of the free wards containing 203 beds for charity patients.
 Finally, the non-taxability of all income and properties of educational
institutions finds enduring support in Art. XIV, Sec. 4, par. 3, of the 1987
In YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 14 this Court explained Constitution —
—

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

It is claimed however that the institution is run as a business in that it keeps a institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes
lodging and boarding house. It may be admitted that there are 64 persons shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of
occupying rooms in the main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
their meals at the restaurant below. These facts however are far from in the manner provided by law.
constituting a business in the ordinary acceptation of the word. In the first place,
no profit is realized by the association in any sense. In the second place it is
undoubted, as it is undisputed, that the purpose of the association is not
primarily to obtain the money which comes from the lodgers and boarders. The In YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue 17 this Court categorically
real purpose is to keep the membership continually within the sphere of held and found YMCA to be an educational institution exclusively devoted to
influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, the educational and charitable purposes and not operated for profit. The purposes
opportunities which vice presents to young men in foreign countries who lack of the Association as set forth in its charter and constitution are "to develop the
home or other similar influences. Christian character and usefulness of its members, to improve the spiritual,
intellectual, social and physical condition of young men and to acquire, hold,
mortgage and dispose of the necessary lands, buildings and personal property
for the use of said corporation exclusively for religious, charitable and
The majority, if not all, of the income of the organizations covered by the educational purposes, and not for investment or profit." YMCA has an
exemption provided in Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), of the NIRC are derived from educational department, the aim of which is to furnish, at much less than cost,
their properties, real or personal. If we are to interpret the last paragraph of instructions on subjects that will greatly increase the mental efficiency and
Sec. 27 to the effect that all income of whatever kind from the properties of wage-earning capacity of young men, prepare them in special lines of
said organization, real or personal, are taxable, even if not conducted for profit, business and offer them special lines of study. We ruled therein that YMCA
then Sec. 27, pars. (g) and (h), would be rendered ineffective and nugatory. cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for religious purposes or
As this Court elucidated in Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Collector of Internal an institution devoted exclusively for charitable purposes or an institution
Revenue, 15 every responsible organization must be so run as to at least devoted exclusively to educational purposes, but it can be truthfully said that it
insure its existence by operating within the limits of its own resources, is an institution used exclusively for all three purposes and that, as such, it is
especially its regular income. It should always strive whenever possible to entitled to be exempted from taxation.
have a surplus. If the benefits of the exemption would be limited to institutions
which do not hope or propose to have such surplus, then the exemption would G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
apply only to schools which are on the verge of bankruptcy. Unlike the United
States where a substantial number of institutions of learning are dependent ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
upon voluntary contributions and still enjoy economic stability, such as Harvard, vs.
the trust fund of which has been steadily increasing with the years, there are PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
and there have always been very few educational enterprises in the
DECISION
Philippines which are supported by donations, and these organizations usually
have a very precarious existence. 16 REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter
he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full,
dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing reads:
adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other Dear Sir:
overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until
the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because such time that my ideal weight is achieved.
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character. Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time
schedule you will set for my weight check.
The Facts
Respectfully Yours,
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, weeks for weight checks.
1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one
company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March
more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to
5, 1985 to November 1985.
report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards. 5
petitioner’s weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another
May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his
set of weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not
ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told
report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain
that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to
his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989. 2
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds.
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered
Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds,
which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case
retained. requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219
pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was
given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 19
and submit controverting evidence.8
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. 9 Notably, he did not reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. 20
deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any,
had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of
company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL Execution22 of PAL.
discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the
the cabin crew members who are similarly situated." NLRC.23
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least
two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10 WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18
November 1998 as modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainant’s
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant’s
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other
years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11 benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, 12 petitioner filed a of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is
complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of
complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant’s reinstatement
through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for
was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows: utter lack of merit.25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
declaring the complainant’s dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a
reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by
him: petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be
until reinstated, which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
up to August 15, 1998 at ₱651,000.00; petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
b. Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total award. despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his
SO ORDERED.14 ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to
of the nature of the job of petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the Rules of Civil Procedure.30
performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:
factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and
Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The III.
assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE.
The private respondent’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED
SO ORDERED.32 AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT
CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the PROMOTED;
NLRC because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations" 33 in
evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight IV.
standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s
position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND]
in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring
to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision supplied)
cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the Our Ruling
dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the relevant question to ask is
not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article
or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion
standards of PAL are reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. 39 It is keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40 The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code. As explained by the CA:
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the
standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew
violation, "justifies an employee’s separation from the service."42 must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
Issues qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution: these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require
the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to
I. meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not
squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN Article 282(e) – the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these
are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They
II. apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed
PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed
(BFOQ) DEFENSE";
simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of
not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x 45 PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report
when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation.
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an
obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. illness.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely within Health, Retardation and Hospitals,52decided by the United States Court of
the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from
the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura’s illness – occasional 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd
attacks of asthma – is a cause analogous to them. Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance
to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as met the Center’s legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar
an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination." position. At that time, "she stood 5’2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds."
Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater
others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful risk of serious diseases.
act of the employee. How Nadura’s illness could be considered as "analogous"
to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on
that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.48 the basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that
substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the
under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was
laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability
dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the
issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to metabolic system and the neurological appetite – suppressing signal system,
meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal,
accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL. "mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation
flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to alteration."
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978
could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is "at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her
yes. I can do it now."49 height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in
1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of perform the duties of the job.67
the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it
"[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."69
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It
intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54 was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational the protection of the interests of the company against possible competitor
qualification defense. infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 55 In the United States, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it
exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care
prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
the normal operation of a business or enterprise.56 with due regard for all the circumstances.75

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common
is no statute providing for it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show
could justify his dismissal.58 its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by
virtue of being a common carrier.
Both arguments must fail.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily
Carta for Disabled Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ. rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employee’s
Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
"Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
rationally connected to the performance of the job; 64 (2) the employer must confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People,
standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work- especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies
related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly.
held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the A lesser performance is unacceptable.
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or
attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important
activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what
to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang
who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to napagkasunduan.
attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to
withstand grueling flight schedules. Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based
on height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules
cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
respondent that "[w]hether the airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not part of PAL.
has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their
destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated
airworthiness of respondent’s airlines," must fail. against by PAL.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient
apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were excuse to discriminate against him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold
denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came
flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in
company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of
overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the
another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and private respondent’s failure to comply."80It is a basic rule in evidence that each
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is
task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the
introduction of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline companies supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him.
to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner. and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of
his situation with other employees.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of
impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin
it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights;
passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could
three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the
attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote. words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to
meet."82
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of
PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the
know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason
is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun"
and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It to frustrate his "immediate return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence
only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position
If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly
of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his
facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies signature.96
do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.85 Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a
case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
We thus annul their findings. employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution"98 and ""even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and
clause guaranty86 of the Constitution. However, in the absence of pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot the higher court."99 He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work
be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered
against acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the
in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal payment of his full backwages.
protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects
no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight,
wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He
protection guarantee.91 asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that
the law does not exact compliance with the impossible. 100
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and
wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.92 Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This
may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance: employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to ironclad rule.
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated
in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as
execution for reinstatement provided herein. an act "social justice,"101 or based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is
required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self- not reflect on the moral character of the employee.103
executory and does not require a writ of execution,93 the option to exercise
actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s
not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts. pay for every year of service.104 It should include regular allowances which he
might have been receiving.105 We are not blind to the fact that he was not
dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his
moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
more or less a decade. registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is
entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley
pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances. Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces)
filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
SO ORDERED. Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered
that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
G.R. No. 221697
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
vs. court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents. sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
x-----------------------x indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
G.R. No. 221698-700 parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to
the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
vs. Natividad Sonora Poe.4
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents. Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered
as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December
DECISION 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No.
196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
PEREZ, J.:
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies
23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 at the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies
(DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15- graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de
The Facts San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise
June 2004, respectively. 13 the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She
14
travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She
obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15 In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July
Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16 2006.33
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home 34 and to this
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The day, is where the couple and their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
estate.18
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with
the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her
bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early as 2004, the petitioner three (3) children. 39
already quit her job in the U.S.23
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed 25 while her husband was March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange DFA.42
the sale of their family home there.26
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
began attending Philippine private schools. affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. 63 Following this line of
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
present.51 American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate
of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. 52 On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner
was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54 of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also
DE0004530. 55 on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May in the Philippines.67
2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 (1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58 primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered (2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement
these consolidated cases. in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697 allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo)
filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as (3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is citizenship and residency qualifications for:
convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. 60 Essentially, a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were
Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation considered citizens;
when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61 citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S.
of R.A. No. 9225; Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the raffled to its First Division.
filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same
is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted; In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural- lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
born status;
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005; considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225; construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore,
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
true date of reacquisition of domicile;
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad,
Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
as the country's next leader.68 legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed
by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
deemed submitted for resolution.
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a
the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it
Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the
only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and
a foundling.79
Local Elections, contained material representations which are false.
The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads: Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon
the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and
filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
her frequent trips to the U.S.82
hereby CANCELLED.69
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner,
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by
docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under
petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
Resolution by denying the same.70
citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700 repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and
will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the
domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She believed that
requirement for President. all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) in Corinthian Hills.99
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice
be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine in the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100She
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her
laws.88 COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments: In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90 Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo reads:
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A
petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92 hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and
she is a natural-born citizen of this country. National Elections.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
the Philippines.95 reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its
present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from and functions:
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases. (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the: officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares. involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in not appealable.
the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No.
15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad (4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent. and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding peaceful, and credible elections.
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division. or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
May 2016 National Elections. any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate. cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies. may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall. COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that: residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law.
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the
lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that: for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
provision for candidates for these positions.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
of the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-
Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation Marcos that:
in Fermin reads:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a Constitution.
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to
provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending Constitution."
in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23
the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are
is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is
suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
President, as the case may be.106 anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as representation can be determined.
reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under
9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding
of Rule 25, which states that: the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107 foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance,
the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to: blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the
burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent." fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
DEMONSTRABLE.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as
her parents are Filipinos. the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128: the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
issue. Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino
in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents.
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners
in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278.
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the
female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would
there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers
1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or
at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have
was Filipino.112 a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners President:
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment.
have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left Sr. Rafols:
behind. To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of Sr. Montinola:
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional need ...
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines. Sr. Rafols:
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no be Filipino.
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because Sr. Montinola:
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of amendment.
Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
Sr. Rafols:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental The amendment should read thus:
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary one, or the children of unknown parentage."
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of Sr. Briones:
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115 parentage.

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations Sr. Rafols:
of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is the child, is not unknown.
recorded:
President:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
Sr. Rafols:
recognized by the father.
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
xxxx children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their
parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally
Filipinos. correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn
President: existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones. need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
Sr. Busion: impliedly so recognized.
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
hands of the Legislature? efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to
Sr. Roxas: recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a is silently vocal. 118
provision on the subject exhaustively.116 The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and
was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said: the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny
foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; marginalization."
but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed
that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings.
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
amendment. mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
16 February 2016 Oral Arguments: requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
Court said: law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied) consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known
as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted. Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process 1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. change his nationality.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our
favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved country:
Article 7 The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. Article 2

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be parents possessing the nationality of that State.
stateless.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
"to acquire a nationality:" Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Article 24 Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
his family, society and the State. from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is
likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be was content with the practice of international and regional state organs,
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative
require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention.
of the country of birth," to wit: The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
Article 14 yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. "generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of
territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
"basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
under the incorporation clause. the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as plain "Philippine citizenship."
its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of
the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as
out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as follows:
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
the country in which the foundling is found. prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of
Philippine citizens. the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with natural-born citizenship."
the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty. remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself
civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
warning in his opening statement is relevant: continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship.
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
that there is no third category for repatriated citizens: participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for
the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for On Residence
the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her COC
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146 ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to
the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according
law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May
should be respected."148 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain
parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect
It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
parents which are precisely unknown. change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of be actual.153
the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different
May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e- from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented
mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v.
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not
items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced
confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such
where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on
24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
the family home). petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that
she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
cases. donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In
this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No.
private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the
until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted. become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164in line with the government's "reintegration That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients. of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence
that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help her passport and the school records of her children.
him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in
absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made
petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
repatriation shortly thereafter. residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if
precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC
respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been
decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis. The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner
actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false,
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months,
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In she could do so in good faith.
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the
2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false. For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything.
As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April- under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her senatorial candidacy.
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in
the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague. statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It
she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the
and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention
case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made
her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer. senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was
mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband
pronouncement that: however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of
their family home.
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to
evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would school.
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168 In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to completed.
the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her
as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from
declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe"
only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise
This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of
residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal
cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what
we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner company in July 2006.
made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE
Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170 NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to
be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to
let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider SO ORDERED.
no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for
her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with vs.
grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit: Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division,
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary CARSON, J.:
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these
in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED. proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to
the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details
in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. substantially correct:
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No.
15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that: 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building,
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections. porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had
with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no
AFFIRMED. other openings of any kind in the room.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division. received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to
dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door following day.
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found
is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances,
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder prescribed by law.
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out
upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
Pascual's wounds.
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date
of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the xxx xxx xxx
defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the
protection. following attendant circumstances:

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have (1) Illegal aggression.
on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant
his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant
hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him
cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced
to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist,
the aid of the wounded man. and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will
not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to
he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings. defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting
for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
property under his charge. modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from
acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from
be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the
the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be
was not due to negligence or bad faith. looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature
works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to
cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act another.
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim.
Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.) Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
unless the contrary shall appear.
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the he had intended to commit.
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted
liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule
code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
(Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.) malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was
actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without medium and maximum degrees.
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real. In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph
there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which they may consider proper.
which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2,
the Criminal Law, folio 169.) The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
following language: liability on the actor.

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
injury which may be the object of the crime. statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the
that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute
no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily
guilty of criminal negligence." in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
the following language: "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
judgment and decision of the trial court. Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully,"
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
are as follows: generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the
decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine: Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"),
rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power
crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that — of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts,
and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of
any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure
it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by — from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices
distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
"an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict
In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also — accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided
doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal..,
differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And — 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P.,
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he
upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time
placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming
what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more
the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault
or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A.
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds
though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
cases there cited.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the
leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he
of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had
real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown
or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he
of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts,
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily." had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited
during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said: be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense,
with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code?
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal
had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational
although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles
be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused,
to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
the case, p.7.) "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows: the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife
who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent,
with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering
against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they
might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The
did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor
rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed,
death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was
lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain,
February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) . A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us
that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room
in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and
heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all
hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant
fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-
killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged
employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the ordered.
accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness,
etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at Separate Opinions
night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head
TORRES, J., dissenting:
out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery
of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes
and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless
addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-
while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, 1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could
not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-
defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person 213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive. 273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327,
343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600,
undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-
one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in 879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with
the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from. c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. 1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
[MABINI], petitioners, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
vs. 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849,
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145,
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492,
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553,
560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-
703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
ESCOLIN, J.:
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
implementation and administrative orders.
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,
361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or
528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of represent the people in cases of this character.
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant. The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
course. of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. the date when it goes into effect.
Justice Grant T. Trent said: Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error' Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents concerned. 6
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
or which he may authorize so to be published. ... of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions
constructive one. so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for
potestad.5 the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
excluded from such publication. official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
this Court. There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and
erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a effect.
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." I shall explain why.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process
the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage
are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
provide that they shall take effect immediately. misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official impressed with binding force or effectivity.
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
effect. doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not
SO ORDERED. require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
Relova, J., concurs. process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
Aquino, J., took no part. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent
that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2
Separate Opinions
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and
of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed
out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine
that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion
presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it
of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws
could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and
on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
its penalties.
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than
to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code
executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published
such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
provide for a different rule. that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To
sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
such a pronouncement.
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative
for its proper dissemination. orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when
in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have assume that role.
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There
should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
rights or shall destroy vested rights. before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification): Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may
be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said
laws already provide for their effectivity date.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take publication thereof.
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in
the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition
Separate Opinions
that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The
said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the
sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it
effect. could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences
I shall explain why. could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that
impressed with binding force or effectivity. such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil
require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. provide for a different rule.
The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice
its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously
that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to
Official Gazette. 2 such a pronouncement.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and
of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed
out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine
that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned
of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional
of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be rights or shall destroy vested rights.
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
its penalties. prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may
be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of laws already provide for their effectivity date.
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published the Official Gazette.
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The
sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official
or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative
for its proper dissemination. orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade
and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to
assume that role. extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such
instructions in school by petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it Iloilo.2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Mrs. Concepcion Ong.3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites
of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod
City on January 10, 1976. 4
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of
the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the
terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive
necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her
continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade
the high moral values, of the school." 5
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12,
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor
issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for
publication thereof. resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting
evidence. Affidavits 7 were submitted by private respondent to bolster its
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990 contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took
EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner, advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her
vs. advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed
Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents. alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody
had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without
Laogan Law Offices for private respondent. conducting any formal hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956
in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioner. It was held therein that —
REGALADO, J.:
The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the respondent pointed out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua,
controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an
a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the
was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly
services. picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship was
manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within
Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced
Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however
enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the
and took place during these times. . . . 9 President of the Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on
September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision.
to. 10 Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position
On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages
Commission claiming denial of due process for not having been furnished from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further reinstatement. 15
contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating
conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into reversals, one would think that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to
lawful wedlock with her student.11 petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public
On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private
unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the
reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings: aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung
High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher
Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18
the student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants
Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in
by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts. his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present
case:
xxx xxx xxx
That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but
Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the went further to view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the
conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be held
about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it
with the door open. wise to uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating
the services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the
xxx xxx xxx
school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on
Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was her integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a
precipitated by immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act with
appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above
herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by suspicion; 19
petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the sequence of events from the
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the
beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua
reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent, viz.:
up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of
evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the 1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's
school but none has come to our attention. . . . 12 claim to the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and
is, therefore, illegal.
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on
March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations 2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when
Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as the hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and
financial assistance. 13 Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without presenting
the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
cross-examine them. demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?22

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that
misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether
committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20 culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the
We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and
We do not agree. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law.
an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before
resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained
not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify
question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by
in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor. absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of
fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not
Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the bound thereby.23
community toward the teachers and to strengthen the educational system,
private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly
serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence and forcefully observed by him in his original decision:
reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services.
It argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the
over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy records referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the
over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration
extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit,
violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states leaving many question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the
that a "school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school hours when
position to court a pupil or student." 21 appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the
school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most
her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the
pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant
that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This and her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts
contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but
Relations Commission thus: the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February,
1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and
. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits
for clearance was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . .
of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after
clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier,
The alleged immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The
alleged undignified conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more
inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her
motives known only to itself. 24 dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably
As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the
was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed. parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her
Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is reinstatement.
however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of
Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay
claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared. petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year
We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte- of service.
face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior
trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is SO ORDERED.
that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on
unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
assailed resolution in this wise:
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing vs.
immoral acts inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . . . 27
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral
acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school
teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that
petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, PARAS, J.:
this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern existence.
cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and
educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association [Link], (105 Phil.
1973 Constitution which similarly provides: 173,176-177) stated:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied) with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
Black defines "practice of law" as: estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) the Commission on Audit?

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has to the practice of law.
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. MR. OPLE. Thank you.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? ... ( Emphasis supplied)
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
The Commissioner will please proceed. that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from
the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
years". synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
Commission on Audit. may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from
A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles,
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer
is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much concept of practice of law.
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. decisional contexts.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). therefrom.

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice- advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients
and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi- multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
of complex decision-making. younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
industry. confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal problems in-house. legal function itself.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other learning.
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
management. ( Emphasis supplied.) as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of other arenas.
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis cases. (Emphasis supplied)
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
(Emphasis supplied) comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group- Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
of team performance than internal group processes. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
considerations. (Emphasis supplied) of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
are apropos: employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an make or by decisions.
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
(Emphasis supplied) of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not supplied)
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and supplied)
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
supplied) be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
265). mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
for at least ten years. appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
327, the Court said: definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of No blade shall touch his skin;
the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers. No blood shall flow from his veins.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
incumbent President? replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
We now proceed:
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings
on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the SO ORDERED.
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

Separate Opinions
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
NARVASA, J., concurring:
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate. Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and
after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine."
A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
PADILLA, J., dissenting: his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
appointment as COMELEC Chairman. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
(10) years" has not been met. whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries." Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with. 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service
to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
1
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice" law, or any involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of
law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives in People vs. Villanueva:4
pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
(Martin supra) Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the appointment to such position.
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client CRUZ, J., dissenting:
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3 while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
COMELEC Chairman. we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is
The following relevant questions may be asked: made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the review.
practice of law?
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office
who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so that we said could not be reviewed.
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman? If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this
Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which Appointments.
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court
in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such was qualified to be elected in the first place.
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors
as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended
of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but
give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of
that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in
must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a
practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind
of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and
2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
workable." grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as rational limits.
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in
he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law in the practice of law.
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement
in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations? Attempt — Member

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned following companies:
is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of b. Dataprep, Philippines
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
during the ten-year period.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod Member of the Board of the Following:
has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
member of the Bar there?
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
The professional life of the respondent follows:
e. Graphic Atelier
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following: f. Manila Electric Company

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
Pennsylvania h. Philippine Electric Corporation
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
Corporation and affiliated companies respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
executive but not as a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very
seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said:
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances,
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is
not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real
bar for at least ten years." estate is concerned."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: xxx xxx xxx
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. xxx xxx xxx

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
(4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied) the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or
a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
SCRA 109 [1965]): Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-
xxx xxx xxx President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself Chairman of the COMELEC.
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of I vote to GRANT the petition.
law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
Bidin, J., dissent
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice Separate Opinions
of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office NARVASA, J., concurring:
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115) as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification
xxx xxx xxx by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited
from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of PADILLA, J., dissenting:
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
(10) years" has not been met.
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
constitutional boundaries." customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
that such standard is met and complied with. to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur
as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
(Martin supra) engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an CRUZ, J., dissenting:
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3 while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
COMELEC Chairman. we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is
made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
The following relevant questions may be asked: Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law? In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion
of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so that we said could not be reviewed.
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this
COMELEC Chairman? Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which Appointments.
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such was qualified to be elected in the first place.
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the
in People vs. Villanueva:4 numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or
services. give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of
that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in
must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a
practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind
of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because
practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board. official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and
2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
global to be workable." grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as rational limits.
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in
he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law in the practice of law.
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement
over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned following companies:
is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of b. Dataprep, Philippines
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
during the ten-year period.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod Member of the Board of the Following:
has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
member of the Bar there?
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
The professional life of the respondent follows:
e. Graphic Atelier
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following: f. Manila Electric Company

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
Pennsylvania
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
Corporation and affiliated companies respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member executive but not as a lawyer.

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
Attempt — Member equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said:
"I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances,
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages
Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real
least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine estate is concerned."
bar for at least ten years." xxx xxx xxx
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d xxx xxx xxx
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited. ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business;
only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
xxx xxx xxx customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence,
SCRA 109 [1965]): integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-
President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
xxx xxx xxx prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112) Chairman of the COMELEC.
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself I vote to GRANT the petition.
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of
law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding

one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner,
1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited

from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and
consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for
membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may
have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize
the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice
of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).