VOL.

234, JULY 29, 1994 555

People vs. Simon
*
G.R. No. 93028. July 29, 1994.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

**
plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; To sustain a

conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established.·To sustain a conviction for selling
prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

_______________

* EN BANC.

** This case was initially raffled to the Second Division of the Court but
due to the novelty and importance of the issues raised on the effects of R.A. No.
7659 in amending R.A. No. 6425, the same was referred to and accepted by the
Court en banc pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter No. 209, as
amended.

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

Same; Same; Same; The practice of entrapping drug traffickers

through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse.·We are aware that the practice
of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-
buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. AppellantÊs entrapment and arrest were
not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted
by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill
motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that
they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty.
Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having
been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an
alibi.
Same; Same; Same; The corpus delicti of the crime has been
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.·When the drug
seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at
Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant
were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.
Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with
certainty and conclusiveness.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Minor error or discrepancy
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as
a whole nor reflects on the witnessÊ honesty.·Even, assuming
arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually
seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy
refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
reflects on the witnessesÊ honesty.
Same; Same; Same; No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay
official or any other civilian or be accompanied by the taking of
pictures.·Again, appellant contends that there was neither a
relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the
seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and
after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the
custody of any barangay official or police authorities. These are
absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid,

557
 VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 557

People vs. Simon

be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian,

or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Court finds and
declares the exhibits inadmissible in evidence.·However, we find
and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in
evidence. AppellantÊs conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense,
there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by
counsel. Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was
not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him,
either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction.·Notwithstanding the objectionability of the
aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of
marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction which happens the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In the present
case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Drug-pushing when done on a small scale
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time,
and in any place.·Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable
that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-
pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that
class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.
It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a
total stranger, for what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.
Same; Same; Penalties; Court holds that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 is prision correccional.·For the nonce, we
hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic
Act No. 6425, as

558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be

taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.

DAVIDE, JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; The mere use by

a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no
means make an offense thereunder an offense „punished or
punishable‰ by the Revised Penal Code.·It is thus clear that an
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition
and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is
deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or
borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties
does not make an offense in the special law punished by or
punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and
imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the CodeÊs
nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of
a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make
an offense thereunder an offense „punished or punishable‰ by the
Revised Penal Code. APPEAL from a judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Br. 51.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M. Sampang for accused-appellant.

REGALADO,J.:

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was

charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22,
1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold
four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of
P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory

559

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 559

People vs. Simon

1
examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on
March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from
Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
2
Pampanga where he was
temporarily detained, he pleaded not guilty.
3
He voluntarily
waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial
on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

The evidence on record shows that a confidential

informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative,
informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain „Alyas
Pusa‰ at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco
Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics
Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team
composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz
and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit.
After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team,
together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo
after they had coordinated with the police authorities and
barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the
confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who
consequently approached appellant and asked him if he
had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and
Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and,
upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two
marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money
amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his
head as a pre-arranged signal to his companions who were
stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team
closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head
of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was
then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed
under custodial investigation, with Sgt.

_______________

1 Original Record, 2; Criminal Case No. G-2320, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 51, Guagua, Pampanga.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Ibid., 23.

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon
4
Pejoro as the investigator.
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated LopezÊ testimony, claiming
that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and
the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who
confiscated the5 marijuana and took the marked money
from appellant.
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although
he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest
from the rest of the other members, that is, around two
hundred meters away from his companions. He did not
actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and
appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant
after the latterÊs arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein
the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to
information and to counsel. 6
Appellant, however, orally
waived his right to counsel.
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit „G,‰ the
„Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated‰ which appellant
signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags
of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise
informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on
the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was
confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and
Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put „two,‰
instead of „one‰ and „40,‰ instead of „20‰. He agreed to the
correction since they were the ones who were personally
and directly involved in7 the purchase of the marijuana and
the arrest of appellant.
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 P.M. of the day after the latterÊs
apprehension, and the results were practically normal
except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor
also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person
of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant
due to the latterÊs complaint of gastrointestinal pain. In the
course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that
appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which

_________________

4 TSN, April 6, 1989, 5-32.

5 Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2.
6 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11.
7 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 21-24.

561

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 561

People vs. Simon

causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently

vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the
same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal
8
pain,
his physical condition remained normal.
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of
the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at
around 4:30 P.M., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying
on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant
boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going
to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking
a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was
handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp,
he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused,
he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt.
Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He
admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but
claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After
escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle,
Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the
place at around 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister
to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
9
Pampanga where he was confined for three days.
AppellantÊs brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact
that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca,
Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting
of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been 10
suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latterÊs arrest.
Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a

_________________

8 Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.

9 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26.
10 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16.

562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,

declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the
cause for this ailment was appellantÊs peptic ulcer. She did
not see any sign of slight or 11serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body.
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were 12
likewise ordered confiscated
in favor of the Government.
 Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the
aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in
his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not
upholding his defense of „frame-up,‰ (2) not declaring
Exhibit „G‰ (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated)
inadmissible in evidence, and (3) 13convicting him of a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
At the outset, it should be noted that while the PeopleÊs
real theory and evidence is to the effect that appellant
actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves,
while the other two tea bags were 14
merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession, the latter not being in
any way connected with the sale, the information alleges
that he15sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves. In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution
in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags
allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the
disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other
16
two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein.
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
17
the
sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell
means to

_______________

11Ibid., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.

12 Original Record, 174-175; per Judge Arsenio P. Roman.
13 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 3; Rollo, 54.
14 Exhibits F and G, Folder of Exhibits; TSN, July 10, 1989, 53.
15 Original Record, 2.
16 See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20, 1993.
17 People vs. Alilin, G.R. No. 84363, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 772.

563

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 563

People vs. Simon

give, whether 18
for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in
the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was
able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on
October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified
as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of
Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of
appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight
and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is 19
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and
doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. AppellantÊs
entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard
way, for a surveillance was conducted 20
by the team before
the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill motive was or
could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they
are presumed
21
to have regularly performed their official
duty. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated
22
claim of appellant of having been
framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an
alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught red-handed
delivering

_________________

18 See People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 97147, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA
502.
19 People vs. Lati, G.R. No. 70393, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 336.
20 TSN, May 5, 1989, 5.
21 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
22 See People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427, November 20, 1992, 215
SCRA 822.

564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon
prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance
for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have
plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination,
23
P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist
therein, confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88
that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from
appellant were positive
24
for and had a total weight of 3.8
grams of marijuana. Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime 25
had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is
the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags
from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had
nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in
the aforementioned „Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated,‰
26
he signed it as the one who seized the
same.
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro
who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since
such is not an element of the offense with which appellant
is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the
marijuana was confiscated from the possession of
appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution
committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to
a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential
integrity of the prosecution27evidence as a whole nor reflects
on the witnessesÊ honesty. Besides, there was clearly a
mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant
that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug
from the person of appellant, but he participated in the
legal seizure or confiscation

_______________

23 TSN, August 18, 1989, 3.

24 Ibid., id., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits.
25 People vs. Celiz, et al., G.R. No. 92849, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA
755.
26 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4-5; Rollo, 55-56.
27 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 86495, May 13, 1992, 209 SCRA 1.
 565

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 565

People vs. Simon

thereof as the investigator of their unit.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-
peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not
powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary
28
to the
normal procedure in buy-bust operations. This omission
has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in
his testimony, as follows:

„Q Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit

that in conducting such operation you do not anymore
provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine
the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold
of the object?
A We were not able to put powder on these
denominations because we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since that item can be purchased
only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx
Q Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C.
Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we
cannot make a request for that powder because they, 29
themselves, are using that in their own work, sir.‰

The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure

to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can
under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes
„any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, 30
or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.‰ The
dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an
evidentiary technique for identification pur-poses, which
identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative
of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the
seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during
and after his

_______________

28 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6; Rollo, 57.

29 TSN, May 5, 1989, 7.
30 People vs. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 376.

566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the 31

custody of any barangay official or police authorities.
These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence
requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed
by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be
accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the
police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante
delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under
the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellantÊs contention, there was
an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with 32
his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
states, inter alia, that „suspect was arrested for selling two
tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves.‰ Below these remarks was affixed appellantÊs
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged
33
the confiscation of the marked
bills from him.
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned
exhibits inadmissible in evidence. AppellantÊs conformance
to these documents are declarations against interest and
tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained
in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being
nothing 34in the records to show that he was assisted by
counsel. Although appellant manifested during the
custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel,
the waiver
35
was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or
confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in
 36
writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest
report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.

_______________

31 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-7; Rollo, 57-58.

32 Exhibit F, Folder of Exhibits.
33 Exhibit G, ibid.
34 People vs. Mauyao, G.R. No. 84525, April 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 732.
35 TSN, May 5, 1989, 11.
36 Sec. 12(1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.

567

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 567

People vs. Simon

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid

exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal
sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
requires merely
37
the consummation of the selling
transaction which happens the 38
moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and
in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable
39
that he
would sell marijuana to a total stranger. We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case,
belongs to that class of crimes
40
that may be committed at
any time and in any place. It is not contrary to human 41
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, for
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts 42
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.
While there may be instances where such sale could be
improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional
particulars are not present in this case.
 Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which
caused him to escape from
43
Camp Olivas the night he was
placed under custody. This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents
earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by

_______________

37 People vs. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194.
38 People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, 1994.
39 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 11; Rollo, 62.
40 People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 28.
41 Cf. People vs. Cina, G.R. No. 88220, October 1, 1990, 190 SCRA 199.
42 People vs. Consuelo, G.R. No. 77755, April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 402.
43 TSN, July 10, 1989, 12-13.

568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

force and coercion.

The doctrine is now too well embedded in our
jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of 44
mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellantÊs allegation 45
of maltreatment. Two
doctors, 46one for the prosecution and the other for the
defense, testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or
indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the
person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his
abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from 47
which he had
been suffering even before his arrest. His own brother
even corroborated that fact, saying 48
that appellant has had
a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated
at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not
divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at 49
the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.
Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the
authorities nor file appropriate charges against50
the alleged
malefactors despite the opportunity to do so and with the
legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellantÊs
story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute
his allegations that his arrest was baseless and
premeditated for the NARCOM
51
agents were determined to
arrest him at all costs. Premeditated or not, appellantÊs
arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his
isolation from society and it was providential that it came
about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of
prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion

___________________

44 People vs. Eslaban, G.R. Nos. 101211-12, February 8, 1993, 218

SCRA 534.
45 TSN, June 14, 1989, 22.
46 Ibid., August 18, 1989, 48.
47 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 15-16.
48 Ibid., October 23, 1988, 15-16.
49 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15.
50 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 26-27.
51 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4; Rollo, 55.

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People vs. Simon

could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the

judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic 52
Act
No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993, which
supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of
this case and entails additional questions of law which we
shall now resolve.

II

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent

to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

„[Link] 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No.

6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx
Â[Link], Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.·The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.Ê
xxx

„[Link] 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

Â[Link] of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime.·The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is
in any of the following quantities:
xxx
5.750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx

_________________

52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it „shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation,‰ and it was so published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal.

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

ÂOtherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing

quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.ʉ

[Link] that herein appellant is being prosecuted for

the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of
only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the
sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would
be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle
him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special
law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of 53the
previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it
has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code
the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to
and shall be given54
retrospective effect to crimes punished
by special laws. The exception in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more
of the crimes of serious or less 55 serious physical
injuries,robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be
whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte
apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty
to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been
resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante.,
thus:

„x x x. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code,

declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are
favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and
nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill
such duty, irrespective

_______________

53 Title Five, Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs.

54 U.S. vs. Hocbo, 12 Phil. 304 (1908); U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil. 29 (1913);
U.S. vs. Almencion, 25 Phil. 648 (1913); People vs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387
(1923); People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225
(1935).
55 Article 62(5), Revised Penal Code.

571

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People vs. Simon

of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also
all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the
penalty.‰

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by

the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659
has already become final and executory or the accused is
serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and
pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate
the matter being brought to the 56 judicial authorities for
relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
[Link] through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the
law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the
quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
fromprision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of
its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty
where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as
the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved
is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed
with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
57
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, we
hereby sold that the penalty to be imposed

_________________

56See Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Gumabon, et

al. vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 420.
57Lopez and Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 100 Phil. 850
(1957).

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572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon
where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from
prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental
rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in
a manner favorable to the accused.
[Link], as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous
drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable
range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section
20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall
be taken from said range „depending upon the quantity‰ of
the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second
paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the
lightest of them being the minimum, the next as58 the
medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on the
accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section
20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the
penalty shall instead depend upon the 59
quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transactions. Accordingly, by way
of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the
purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the
aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of
the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances
will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be
imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the
drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be
used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as
shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of
Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition
thereon that, unless

________________

58 Article 77, Revised Penal Code.

59 Thisgraduated scheme of penalties is not stated with regard and
does not apply to the quantities and their penalties provided in the first
paragraph, the penalties therein being the same regardless of whether
the quantities exceed those specified therein.

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VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 573

People vs. Simon

there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities

of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided
into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble
the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the
penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods
according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams,
prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.
Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive 60
penalty
only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana
subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional
is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary
and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
[Link] correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1
day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of
three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in
the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question
is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed,
which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal
liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was
held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under
special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied
in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was
because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to
those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then
provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for
the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the
rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous
cases that

________________

60 Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 20, R.A. No. 7659.

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574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by

degrees could not be given supplementary application to
special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect
of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a
legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the
special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a
special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects
under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as
in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional,
in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional,
to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
[Link] this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for
offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the
conventional practice in the United States but differently
from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and
its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a
range of penalties with definitive durations, such as
imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but
without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and
referred to at
61
the time laws like the Indeterminate
Sentence Law were passed during the American regime.

________________

61 Act No. 4103, effective on December 5, 1933.

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VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 575

People vs. Simon

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a

special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be
punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same
manner provided therein. 62 Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 303 penalizing non-payment of
salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein,
provided:

„[Link] of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as

required by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a
fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer
by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article
three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of
the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner
63
as therein provided.‰

Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses

defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties
as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal
Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700
(Anti-Subversion Act) where
64
the penalties ranged from
arresto mayor to death; Presidential Decree No. 1612
(Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto
mayor to prision mayor; and Presi-dential Decree No. 1866
(illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision
mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
 Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No.
6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and
not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon
things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon

________________

62 Effective on June 9, 1938.

63 See a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which penalizes the illegal
taking of timber and forest products under Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code by reference.
64 In fact, the penalty for officers or ranking leaders was prision mayor
to death, just like the penalty for treason by a resident alien under
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner,

driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties
under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal
Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to
said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of
special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last
given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that
the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4
months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term
under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty
for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping
attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law
do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply
to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of
penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the
Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments
founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code,
have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former
Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are
special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal
Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related
provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these
special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an
indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of
penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which
could never have been the intendment
65
of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, a prosecution under a special
law

________________

65 G.R. No. 51368, November 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 35.

577

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 577

People vs. Simon

(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-

Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said
therein that·

„We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall
be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with
respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise
to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code x x x. Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, x x x.‰ (Italics supplied.)

More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of

the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2)
of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:

„x x x. Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of

the Revised Penal Code shall be ÂsupplementaryÊ to special laws,
this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the
court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense,
there is no roomfor the application of the provisions of the Code. x x
x
„The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the
application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the
court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the Âdeep
legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of
66
criminal laws.ʉ (Emphasis ours.)

________________

66 People vs. Tsang Hin Wai, et al., G.R. No. 66389, September 8, 1986,
144 SCRA 22. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 891 as
Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, Senator
Arturo M. Tolentino made this enlightening explanation as reported in
the records of the Senate and which is pertinent to our present
discussion: „x x x Article 190, referring to prohibited drugs, actually was
repealed by the enactment of a special law referring to drugs. But since
we were only amending the Revised Penal Code in this proposed bill or

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the

Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral
67
parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, with
much more reason should the provisions of said Code on
the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules
for graduating such penalties by degrees should have
supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if
they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat
that mitigating circumstances should be considered and
applied only if they affect theperiods and the degrees of the
penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the
graduation and consequently determine the degree of the
penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the
Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are
the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5
of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree.
Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances,
as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by
one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of
Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the
determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated
second paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to
avoid anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.

________________

draft, we reincorporated Article 190 in an amended form. x x x It

reincorporates and amends Article 190 on the importation, manufacture,
sale, administration upon another, or distribution of prohibited drugs,
planting or cultivation of any plant, which is a source of prohibited
drugs, maintenance of a den, dive or similar place, as defined in the
Dangerous Drugs Law‰ (9th CRP, 1st Regular Session, Vol. 1, No. 71, 12).
67 See Articles 25, 70 and 71, Revised Penal Code.

579

VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 579

People vs. Simon

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law

prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided
for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the
penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty
next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71.
If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex
penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in
their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor
and reclu-sion temporal, then one degree lower would be
arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods
of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each
be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that
the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A
perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect
law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
[Link] final query is whether or not the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us.
Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in
nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be
imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death,
provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately
68
resolved
will exceed one year of imprisonment. The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sen-

_______________

68 Section 2, Act No. 4103, as amended.

 580

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

tence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised
Penal Code, states that „if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.‰ We hold that this quoted portion
of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a
special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken
from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as
discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the „offense is punished‰ under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted
rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special
laws was necessary because of the nature of the former
type of penalties under said laws which were not included
or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the
Code, hence there could be no minimum „within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense,‰ as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws
hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still
apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore,
considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted,
this holding is but an application69
and is justified under the
rule of contemporanea expositio.
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects.
In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended
Section 20 of said law to arrive atprision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law,
is now in effect punished by and under the
________________

69 Contemporaneous exposition, or construction; a construction drawn

from the time when, and the circumstances under which, the subject-
matter to be construed, such as a custom or statute, originated (BlackÊs
Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 390).

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VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 581

People vs. Simon

Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the

minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that „in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.‰ (Italics ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that
qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court
has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act No.
4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus,
with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting
from its coverage „persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life imprisonment,‰ we have held that
what is considered is the penalty actually70
imposed and not
the penalty imposable under the law, and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the
law states is „life imprisonment.‰
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding
disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the
principles of literal interpretation, which have been
rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of
historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents
of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of
structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of
the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103
in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall
be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense.
Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity
in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize71
laws with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.

________________

70 People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951); People vs. Dimalanta,
92 Phil. 239 (1952); People vs. Moises, et al., G.R. L-32495, August 13,
1975, 66 SCRA 151.
71Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus (BlackÊs Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953).

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582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social

measure of compassion, and 72
should be liberally interpreted
in favor of the accused. The „minimum‰ sentence is
merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of
grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed
to serve the 73
balance of his sentence outside of his
confinement. It does not constitute the totality of the
penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the
rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is
only the period when the convictÊs eligibility for parole may
be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be
denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he
has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at
bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the
penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range we have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with
fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence
at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby
even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of
an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED,
but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he
hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo,

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I join Davide, Jr., J. in his concurring
and dissenting opinion.

________________

72 People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).

73 24 C.J.S., Indeterminate Sentence, Sec. 1993, 1217-1218.

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VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 583

People vs. Simon

Davide, Jr., J., Please see Concurring/Dissenting

opinion.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Quiason, J., I join Justice Davide in his dissenting
opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:

I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in

appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would
be prision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended),
should be that whose minimum is within the range of the
penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence
of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any
mitigating circumstances or of a privileged mitigating
circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two
degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account
the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be
prision correccional.

I.
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A.
No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also
their technical signification and effects, then what should
govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which directs that:

„in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the

Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.‰

Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided

for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized
under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended, the latter

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584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon

offenses would now be considered as punished under the

Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No.
4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also
provides that:

„if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
same.‰ (Emphasis supplied).

There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which

should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other
laws (or special laws). The offenses punished by the Revised
Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II
thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed
punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it,
and none other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty
which is included in the classification of Penalties in
Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished
under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the
Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the special law. That the latter
imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its
nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the
special law punished by or punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the
special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty
therefor, although it adopts the CodeÊs nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means
make an offense thereunder an offense „punished or
punishable‰ by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No.
7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should
now be considered aspunished under the Revised Penal
Code. If that were so, then

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VOL. 234, JULY 29, 1994 585

People vs. Simon

we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses

are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the
nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties
(Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex
crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61),
among others. We cannot do otherwise without being
drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard
to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal
Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs
Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed
under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is prision
correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the
accused should be that whose minimum should not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional.

II.
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty
provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz.,
prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal,
and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code,
each should form a period, with the lightest of them being
the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said
second paragraph of Section 20 the penaltydepends on the
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction,
then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal
Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as
amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall
be considered as a principal penalty depending on the
quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the
modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component
penalty shall then be fixed. To illustrate, if by the quantity
of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the
proper principal penalty should be prision

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586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Simon
correccional, but there is one mitigating and no
aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed
should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet,
the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:

„The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances

may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond
or lower thanprision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that
the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the sriousness of drug offenses.‰

Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from

reclusion temporal·if it is the penalty to be imposed on the
basis of the quantity of the drugs involved·by two degrees,
or to prision correccional, if there are two or more
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or
if there is a privileged mitigating circumstance of, say,
minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under
circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision
mayor, regardless of the fact that a reduction by two
degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree
because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision
correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is
prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed. I
find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair.
It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph
involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and
disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the
disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact „depreciated‰ the serious-ness of drug
offenses by providing quantity as basis for the
determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only
to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is
unfair because an accused who is found guilty of possessing
MORE dangerous drugs·say 500 to

587
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People vs. Simon

749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be

imposed would be reclusion temporal·may only be
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating
circum-stances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of
possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana·in which
case the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional
·would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he
has the same number of privileged mitigating
circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens
to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the
reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

„[Link] to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years

of age.·When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his
case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the
last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who
is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees
at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.‰

I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20

of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised
Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Appealed judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.·In prosecutions for illegal sale of marijuana

what is material is the proof that the selling transaction
transpired coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence (People vs. Mariano, 191 SCRA
136).

···o0o···
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