G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES,

FACTS:

 a "Demolition Notice signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated).
 In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA.
 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".
 the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with
the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.
 the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
 On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents as well as CHR's own ocular
inspection, and convinced thatthe petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more
than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning
that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.
 A motion to dismiss, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in
Metro-Manila;

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in
the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue,
Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.

 The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business.
  CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss , stating the Commission on Human Rights under its
constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the
gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the
(Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but
it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added: The right to earn a living is a right
essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and
trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and
their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who
were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

ISSUE: WNOT CHR HAS JURISDICTION to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;

RULING:

NONE.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President
Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.

The powers and functions of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
(T)he Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to
determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a
few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the
Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given
the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the
world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights,
such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity Because they
are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights
can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It
thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting
the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of
value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the
inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly
represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and
an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in
the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September
1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and
were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and
security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were
dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies
like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of
political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay.
And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture,
salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in
power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable
of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.

Political rights,on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings
and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant
to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone
it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of
the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide
for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account
its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into
a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be
invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino,
explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the
victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic
since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final
resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also
prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December
1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,

et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and
desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that
such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the
CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as
the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because
it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the
majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive
action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional
agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures
but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations
which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.