ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ G.R. No.
L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be
in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no
conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its
findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned
“Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry,
and land titles.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No.
1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress of
Ramas, as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking
undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.” The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds
and equipment in favor of the State.
Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an
illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on
March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts
that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed
private respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill
of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the
time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Issue:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal
Held:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution.“ The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would
render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”)
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even
the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due
process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the
UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”
The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the UDHR.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid
down in the ICCPR. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could
not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international
law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid
abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In
this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to
be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the
warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did
not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding
team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are
not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that
such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used
as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be
returned immediately to Dimaano.
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA vs. SABBATINO 379 U.S. 398; March 23, 1964
U.S. SUPREME COURT
FACTS:
The Cuban government retaliated against the United States for various measures imposed against the Castro
government by expropriating property held by U.S. citizens in Cuba. This included the seizure of sugar owned
by a company called C.A.V. A different American company, Farr, Whitlock & Co. had contracted to buy this
sugar from C.A.V., but after it was seized, they bought it directly from the Cuban government. After receiving
the sugar, however, Farr, Whitlock & Co. did not pay the Cuban government; instead, they paid C.A.V.'s legal
representative, Sabbatino. The plaintiff, the National Bank of Cuba (acting on behalf of the Cuban government)
filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendant,
Sabbatino, to recover the money paid for the sugar. The District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the defendant, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.
The issue taken by the Supreme Court was whether to apply the Act of State doctrine, which would uphold the
legality of the expropriation because it was an official act of another country, not subject to question in US
courts.
The defendant contended that the doctrine was inapplicable for three reasons: (1) Because the act in question
was a violation of international law; (2) Because the doctrine should not be applied unless the Executive
branch asks the court to do so; (3) Because Cuba had brought the suit as a plaintiff and had given up its
sovereign immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of state doctrine did apply in the case
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that the act of state doctrine did apply in the case. The Court refused to hold that the
expropriation violated international law, because there was no clear unity of international opinion disapproving
the seizure of land or property in a country by the government of that country. It noted also that interposition of
the Executive was unnecessary to prevent the courts from interfering in affairs of state, as a single court could
upset delicate international negotiations through the assertion of U.S. law in another country. Finally, the Court
found no bar to application of the doctrine should be imposed by the fact that Cuba had brought the suit,
comparing this to the sovereign immunity enjoyed by U.S. States which can sue, but cannot be sued.
THE HOLY SEE vs. ROSARIO G.R. No. 101949; December 1, 1994 QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in
the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business. The three lots owned by the petitioner were sold to Ramon
Licup. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. A dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner off to Tropicana.
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, annulment of the sale of the three parcels of
land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner and Tropicana. Petitioner separately moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. The RTC issued an order
denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a subject of Public International Law
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioner is a subject of public international law. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis If
the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it
is not undertaken for gain or profit. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose
off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a
foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private
respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the
Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See Once the Philippine government decides to
espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
DALE SANDERS and A.S. MOREAU, JR. vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II G.R. No. L-46930; June 10,
1988 CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City
while petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base in the same station. Private
respondent Rossi, and Wyer (who died 2 years ago) are American citizens with permanent residence in the
Philippines, and who were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA. When they were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time, private respondents intended to contest the same. Nonetheless, proceedings were held
and the private respondents were ordered reinstated to their permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Sanders and Moreau opposed this. Sander sent a letter addressed to Moreau, asking for the rejection of the
report of the hearing. Moreau for his part, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of
status and asking for the latter’s concurrence. Hence, the private respondents filed in the CFI of Olongapo City
a complaint for damages against herein petitioners, claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations that
had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
arguing the lack of the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of their state immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that petitioners are immune
from suit
RULING:
YES. It is clear that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters questioned, it is concluded that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the US government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally that is responsible for their acts. If ever the payment of damages was awarded, this will require the
US government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, thus making the action a suit against the
government without its consent, warranting the case’s dismissal.
The doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought
to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of states. Our adherence to this precept is expressed in Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution.
THE LOTUS CASE (FRANCE vs. TURKEY) 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 10 PCIJ
FACTS:
A collision occurred on the high seas between a French vessel – Lotus and a Turkish vessel – Boz-Kourt. The
Boz-Kourt sank and killed eight Turkish nationals on board the Turkish vessel. The 10 survivors of the Boz-
Kourt (including its captain) were taken to Turkey on board the Lotus. In Turkey, the officer on watch of the
Lotus (Demons), and the captain of the Turkish ship were charged with manslaughter. Demons, a French
national, was sentenced to 80 days of imprisonment and a fine. The French government protested, demanding
the release of Demons or the transfer of his case to the French Courts. Turkey and France agreed to refer this
dispute on the jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The French Government
contends that the Turkish Court, in order to have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title to jurisdiction
recognized by international law in favor of Turkey. While the Turkish Government believes that it has
jurisdiction as long as it does not conflict with international law.
ISSUE:
Whether Turkey has jurisdiction over the alleged offense committed on the high seas between two vessels
flying different flags
RULING:
A State cannot exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory unless an international treaty or customary law
permits it to do so. This is what we called the first Lotus Principle. The second principle of the Lotus case:
within its territory, a State may exercise its jurisdiction, on any matter, even if there is no specific rule of
international law permitting it to do so. In these instances, States have a wide measure of discretion, which is
only limited by the prohibitive rules of international law. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas,
the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction
over foreign vessels upon them. But it by no means, follows that a State can never in its own territory exercise
jurisdiction over acts, which have occurred on board a foreign ship on high seas. All that can be said is that, by
virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, a ship is placed in the same position as national territory. It
follows that what occurs on board a vessel upon high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the territory of
the State whose flag the ship flies. If therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on
a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied and the conclusion must
therefore be drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the
effects of the offense have taken place belongs, from regarding the offense as having been committed in its
territory and prosecuting the delinquent.
