FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149999. August 12, 2005]

THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) OF THE NATIONAL

POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM), petitioner, vs. P/INSP.
JOHN A. MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA
GARCIA and SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 6 September 2001
[1]

Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the 3 July
[2]

1997 Resolution of Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Recaredo

Sarmiento II (PNP Chief Sarmiento), the 3 March 2000 Decision and the 30
June 2000 Resolution, both of the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the
National Police Commission.

The Antecedent Facts

Very early in the morning of 2 March 1995, Nancy Gaspar (Gaspar) and
Proclyn Pacay (Pacay) left the residence of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
(Judge Angeles) in Quezon City. Gaspar and Pacay were both minors and
were later classified as moderate or mild mental retardates by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Agnes Lucero (Lucero) found
Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the Philippine Rabbit bus
terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of
maltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles.
Around 4:00 a.m., Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Baler Police
Station 2, Central Police District Command (CPDC), Quezon City. At the
police station, desk officer SPO1 Jaime Billedo (Billedo) recorded the girls
complaint in the police blotter. On Billedos instruction, SPO1 Roberto C. Cario
(Cario) brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue Medical Center for the
requisite medical examination. Later, the two girls were returned to the police
station where Cario interviewed them. Carios Initial Investigation Report was
reviewed and signed by SPO2 Eugene V. Almario (Almario) and approved by
P/Insp. John A. Mamauag (Mamauag). Later, SPO1 Vivian M. Felipe (Felipe)
and SPO4 Erlinda L. Garcia (Garcia) escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the
DSWD. P/Insp. Roberto V. Ganias (Ganias) signed the Letter of Turnover to
the DSWD.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases.
One was a criminal case for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 against[3]

Judge Angeles. Another was an administrative complaint for Grave

Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias, Mamauag, Almario, Cario,
Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as additional
respondent.
In her administrative complaint, Judge Angeles alleged:

1. On March 2, 1995, respondents Ganias, Almario and Mamauag submitted an

Initial Investigation Report to the District Director, CPDC, and respondent
Ganias turned over a Report to the DSWD merely on the basis of a verbal
report of Agnes Lucero on Judge Reyes alleged maltreatment of Nancy
Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay without getting the required sworn statements of
the two (2) girls and Agnes Lucero;

2. While the two girls were under police custody, respondents found in the
possession of Pacay several items of jewelry and clothing materials belonging
to and stolen from complainant Judge Angeles. Complainants witnesses, Dr.
Sagradia Aldova, Oliva Angeles and Mary Ann Agustin requested the
respondents to register in the police logbook the discovery of the stolen
articles but to no avail;

3. Despite the insistent request of said witnesses and subsequently of the

complainant that a report for qualified theft be entered in the police
blotter, respondents maliciously refused to act upon the incident and conduct
further investigation;

4. Respondents bad faith and highly irregular conduct in handling the

maltreatment charge against complainant was also manifested
when respondents did not give her a chance to explain her side by not
contacting her although her residence is just a few houses away from the
police station;
 5. Even before she was informed of the accusations against her, the police leaked
the baseless maltreatment case against her as shown by the presence of so
many people and members of the media as well as the Human Rights
Commission personnel at the police station;

6. The fact that no case has yet been filed against her shows that the whole event
was maliciously manipulated by her detractors to harass and malign
complainant with the willing assistance of men in uniform. [4]

The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division (ILAD) of the CPDC

investigated the administrative complaint. After its investigation, the ILAD
recommended the dismissal of the charges. In a Resolution dated 10 April [5]

1995, the CPDC District Director approved the recommendation and

dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome of her complaint,
Judge Angeles moved for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief
Sarmiento.

The Ruling of the PNP Chief

In a Decision dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:

[6]

WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondent[s] P/CINSP. ROBERTO

GANIAS, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, and SPO1 Roberto Cario guilty of Serious Neglect of
Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service; P/INSP JOHN MAMAUAG
and SPO2 Eugene Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that
both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety (90) days with forfeiture
of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge
for insufficiency of evidence. [7]

Judge Angeles filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. In a [8]

Resolution dated 3 July 1997, PNP Chief Sarmiento modified his previous
[9]

ruling and ordered the dismissal from the service of Mamauag, Almario,
Garcia and Felipe (Mamauag, et al.).
Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
against PNP Chief Sarmiento, PNP Inspector General Jovencio Sales and
Judge Angeles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101. In
an Order dated 25 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
[10]

petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and for

failure to show that respondents abused their discretion.
 Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chiefs Resolution before the
NAB.

The Ruling of the National Appellate Board

In a Decision, dated 3 March 2000, the NAB dismissed the appeal for
[11]

late filing and lack of merit. The NAB declared:

Appellants Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe, in seeking immediate judicial

remedy by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against appellee and the
PNP dismissal authority even if they have not yet exhausted all administrative
remedies available to them had in fact defaulted in their right to exercise such later
option by omission of their own doing. The right to appeal is provided for by law and
he who seeks to exercise that right must abide with the rules provided therefor.

The substantive rule regarding appeals from a decision of dismissal from the police
service imposed by the Chief, PNP is found in Section 45 of RA 6975, which provides
in part, thus:

Section 45. Finality of Disciplinary Decision - Provided, further, that the disciplinary
action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving dismissal may be appealed to the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

It was on a day certain between July 3 1997 (the date of the Resolution of dismissal)
and July 18, 1997 (date of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition) that Mamauag, et
al. must have received a copy of aforesaid Resolution and from that same day, they
had ten (10) days within which to file their appeal before the NAB had they chosen to
exhaust administrative remedies. But they chose to avail of another remedy thereby
effectively foreclosing their right of appeal to NAB in view of the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of P/Insp. John Mamauag, SPO2

Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. [12]

Mamauag, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the
NAB denied it in the NAB Resolution of 30 June 2000. Thus, Mamauag, et
[13]

al. sought relief from the Court of Appeals.

 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 6 September 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the PNP Chief Recaredo
Sarmiento II dated 3 July 1997, having been rendered in excess of his jurisdiction is
hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void. Accordingly, the DECISION and
RESOLUTION made by the National Appellate Board dated 3 March 2000 and 30
June 2000, respectively, are also SET ASIDE for being null and void.

SO ORDERED. [14]

In finding for Mamauag, et al., the Court of Appeals explained:

First of all, the said provision expressly states that the disciplinary action imposed
upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory. Nowhere does the said
provision grant any party to move for a reconsideration of any disciplinary action
imposed as the remedy provided thereunder is an appeal of either party of the decision
to the National Appellate Board, if such involves a demotion or dismissal of a
member of the PNP. In fact, since the original decision only suspended petitioners
Mamauag and Almario from service and even exonerated Felipe and Garcia, the said
decision is not even subject to any appeal. The said decision clearly does not involve
any demotion nor dismissal which could properly be appealed to the NAB.

Moreover, even under the assumption that a motion for reconsideration is allowed, the
one filed by Judge Angeles should not have merited any consideration from the PNP
Chief. Judge Angeles did not have the personality to make such a motion.
While Sec. 45 of R.A. 6975 does not clearly provide who may appeal (or for that
matter make any motion for reconsideration) from the decision of the PNP Chief, the
last clause mentions eitherparty may appeal with the Secretary and by the doctrine of
necessary implication this extends to said decision of the PNP Chief.

It is elementary that in an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness.

No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense committed
is against the government. As held by the Supreme Court in Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission:

As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not the
party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to
interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness (GONZALO VS. D. RODA, 64 SCRA 120). Even if
she is the Head of Administrative Services Department of the HSRC as a
complainant she is merely a witness for the government in an administrative
case. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is
committed against the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, Judge Angeles has no interest which would be directly and materially
affected by the decision rendered by the PNP Chief. Not being a proper party to the
said case − as she is only a mere witness − then her motion should not have served as
a ground for the re-evaluation of the administrative case against the petitioners which
resulted into a modification of the PNP Chiefs earlier decision.

On this score, We find the latest ruling of the Supreme Court on this matter:

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil service
Commission and held the respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
responden[t] who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the
Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such
ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved
party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

Applying this to the present case by analogy, had the original judgment been rendered
in favor of the petitioners, it would be the Philippine National Police which would be
adversely affected and thus would be the proper party to appeal such a judgment.
Corollary to this, where the original judgment is adverse to the petitioners, it is they
who could properly appeal the same. In either case, the complainant Judge Angeles
certainly has no legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the original
decision handed down by the PNP Chief.

In view of the foregoing, this Court can only rule, as We do now, that the appealed
resolution (dated 3 July 1997) was made in excess of the PNP Chiefs jurisdiction
rendering it null and void. Hence, upon the basic legal precept that a void decision or
resolution can never attain finality, NAB should have ruled accordingly on the matter.
Finding that it did not, the Courts remedial power must perforce be exercised to
rectify the matter before Us.
[15]

Hence, the NABs recourse to this Court.

The Issues
 The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the NAB, raises the
following issues:

1. Whether Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975) allows the filing of
[16]

a motion for reconsideration;

2. Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal

personality to move for reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the
disciplining authority.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition has no merit.

Mamauag and Almario argue that the disciplinary action of 90-day
suspension imposed on them in the 7 June 1996 Decision of PNP Chief
Sarmiento has become final and executory. Mamauag, et al. also argue that
private complainant Judge Angeles has no personality to move for partial
reconsideration of the 7 June 1996 Decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento.
Mamauag, et al. cite Sections 43(e) and 45 of RA 6975 which provide:

SEC. 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). x x x

(e) Decisions. The decision of the PLEB shall become final and
executory: Provided, That a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service
may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the decision.

xxx

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. - The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action
imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal
from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal
may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, The regional or National Appellate Board, as the case
may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the
appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without
prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.

The Court of Appeals sustained Mamauag, et al.

Decisions Appealable Under RA 6975

Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon

a member of the PNP shall be final and executory. Under Section 45, a
disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a demotion or
dismissal from the service. If the disciplinary action is less than a demotion or
dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action shall be final and executory
as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a decision imposing
suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higher authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty. If the [17]

decision exonerates the respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges

against the respondents, there is no disciplinary action since no penalty is
imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from
service is final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or
exoneration because they are not disciplinary actions. This gives rise to two
crucial questions.
First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority
dismissing the charges against a PNP member? Second, if a decision
dismissing the charges against a PNP member is appealable, who can appeal
the PNP or the private complainant, or both?
Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the
[18]

charges or exoneration of the respondents in administrative disciplinary

proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by the government. Thus,
in Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, et al., the Court held:
[19]

Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides:

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office xxx (Italics supplied).

Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez v. CSC that:

xxx xxx xxx

It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. (Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA
318).

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil Service
Law shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges.

Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which
contemplates:

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision xxx (italics supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)

The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal
cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the
administrative case below.

Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city major, as head of
the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser
penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent
to one month against erring employees.

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a

case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges files against him. But
when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion for appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in Dacoycoy, the Court modified the rule in Del Castillo and
earlier cases by allowing the Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of
charges or exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary
proceedings. In Dacoycoy, the Court ruled:
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely
affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an
administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent
Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the
petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service
Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to
enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently,
the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such
ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved
party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the
phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action
which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal
or dismissal from office and not included are cases where the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion
for appeal. In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil
Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone
Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)

Subsequent decisions of the Court affirmed Dacoycoy.

[20]

Dacoycoy allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of

charges or exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary
proceedings. However, Dacoycoy maintained the rule that the private
complainant is a mere government witness without a right to appeal. Thus, [21]

case law holding that the private complainant has no right to appeal the
decision of the disciplining authority remains good law. As explained by
Justice Jose Melo in his concurring opinion in Floralde v. Court of Appeals: [22]
However, in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA 425 [1999]), which
incidentally is another ponencia of Mr. Justice Pardo, the majority, with
undersigned ponente dissenting, modified the above doctrine by allowing the CSC to
appeal in cases where the respondent is exonerated of the charges. Nevertheless, in
both cases, the Court did not deviate from the doctrine that the complainant,
being a mere witness for the government, cannot appeal the decision rendered in
the administrative case. In Paredes, we declared that the complainant is not the party
adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an
appeal to the CSC. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No
private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed
against the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 91 of RA 6975 provides that the Civil Service Law and its rules
and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. Consequently,
case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service
Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP
members. Even without Section 91, case law on the civil service necessarily
applies to PNP members who are embraced in the phrase civil service under [23]

Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a
decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize
either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is
the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the
government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion
but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper
penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty
of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing
must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the
disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial
and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided afterDacoycoy, the
[24]

Court declared:

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought
before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a
nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened
to a judge who should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review.

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices
and agencies, not to litigate.

In any event, a private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of either
party who can appeal under Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private
complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party in
interest. In short, private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under
[25]

Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of
the charges against Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC District Director in the
Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-investigation filed by Judge
Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of the
CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge
Angeles appeal in the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP
Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief pursuant to the
appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the
charges against Mamauag, et al. stands and is now final and executory.
We note that, as found by PNP Chief Sarmiento in his earlier Decision of 7
June 1996, there is no evidence on record to hold Garcia and Felipe liable for
any misconduct. The 3 July 1997 Resolution of PNP Chief Sarmiento stated
that Garcia and Felipe were eye-witnesses to the criminal act of the theft of
Judge Angeles jewelry. The same Resolution also held that Garcia and Felipe
were active participants in the cover-up (of the theft) contrary to the assertion
that they merely brought minors Pacay and Gaspar to the DSWD upon
instructions of their superior.
The theft, however, happened at the house of Judge Angeles. Garcia and
Felipe were indisputably not eyewitnesses to the crime of theft, contrary to the
finding of the PNP Chief. There is also no evidence on record of any act
showing that Garcia and Felipe participated in any cover-up of the theft. We
quote the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997 explaining why there was no cover-
up of the alleged theft:

Appellants argue that after minors Pacay and Gaspar narrated and showed signs of
their harrowing life under Judge Angeles, and pursuant to standard police practice and
the policy of the state to protect children against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination committed by persons having care and custody of them, appellant
Cario decided with the approval of Chief Insp. Ganias to bring said minors to the
hospital for medico-legal examination. Thereafter, the minors were placed under the
protective custody of the DSWD in accordance with Executive Order No. 50, Series
of 1986. For performing their duties pursuant to law and after tending to the needs of
said minors as mandated under Sec. 2 of RA 7610, and for refusing to enter in the
police blotter a fictitious crime of Qualified Theft and to turn over said minors to the
custody of the complainant, appellants were unceremoniously suspended and
subjected to summary dismissal proceedings.

It would defy both logic and human nature that a mere SPO1 such as appellant Cario
would refuse the rightful demands of respectable emissaries of a well-known and
feared RTC Judge whose reputation precedes her. There is no plausible reason,
therefore, for appellant to refuse entry of the alleged stolen jewelry in the blotter.
They are more than aware that they are facing a lawyer and judge who can make life
miserable for them if they refuse to perform their duties enjoined by law. The truth of
the matter is that what was discovered was a coin purse/wallet of Nancy Gaspar
placed inside the paper bag of Proclyn Pacay and which yielded fancy jewelry items, a
P20-peso bill and a wristwatch that according to Gaspar was given her by the private
complainant. It was Oliva Angeles and Dra. Sagrada who took with them the coin
purse of Pacay. How the private complainant produced the alleged stolen jewelry
worth P26,820.25 is a matter which only they can explain. [26]

PNP Chief Sarmientos Decision of 7 June 1996 dismissed from the

service Ganias, Billedo, and Cario, suspended for 90 days Mamauag and
Almario, and exonerated Garcia and Felipe. All the respondents initially
appealed the Decision to the NAB. The NAB exonerated Ganias, Billedo and
Cario and advised the PNP Chief to take note of our findings in the instant
case and to act thereon accordingly with respect to Judge Angeles pending
motion for partial reconsideration involving Mamauag, et al. The PNP Chief,
however, issued his Resolution on 3 July 1997 dismissing from the service
Mamauag, et al., twenty-six days before the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997.
The NAB, which is a higher disciplining authority than the PNP Chief,
found that the same grave misconduct charged against all the respondents
never happened. Thus, the NAB exonerated and reinstated Ganias, Billedo
and Cario, whom the PNP Chief dismissed from the service in his original
Decision of 7 June 1996. The NAB decision became final and executory on 28
February 1998. Ironically, Mamauag and Almario, whom the PNP Chief
originally meted out a lesser penalty of 90-day suspension but subsequently
dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have not been reinstated to
their positions up to now. Garcia and Felipe, whom the PNP Chief originally
exonerated but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration,
have also not been reinstated to their positions. And yet, as found by the NAB,
the appellate disciplining authority superior to the PNP Chief, the same
offense of grave misconduct charged against all respondents, including
Mamauag, et al., never happened.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 06 September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No.
61711 with MODIFICATION. We REVERSE the 3 July 1997 Resolution of
PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II and REINSTATE the Resolution of 10 April
1995 of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against P/Insp.
John A. Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia, and SPO1
Vivian Felipe, who are all entitled to back salaries and other benefits as
provided under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 6975.
[27]

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154083 February 27, 2013

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SAMSON DE LEON, Respondent.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A public official is guilty of grave misconduct when he neglects to act upon a complaint about a
violation of the law he is enforcing. He may be suspended or dismissed from office for his first
offense.

The Office of the Ombudsman seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
January 30, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reduced to suspension for three months
without pay for simple neglect of duty the penalty of suspension for one yt:!ar without pay the Office
of the Ombudsman had imposed on respondent Samson De Leon (De Leon) upon finding him guilty
of neglect of duty. 1

Antecedents

Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras, Rizal, Graft
Investigation Officer Dante D. Tomilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission order dated April 17, 1998.

On June 8, 1998, Tornilla filed his report to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, through Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and Director Agapito B. Rosales,2 confirming the illegal
quarrying, to wit:

From the Municipal Hall, we proceeded to the quarrying area. Along our way, we have noticed a
dump truck loaded with quarrying materials coming from the quarrying site. At this juncture, we
signaled the truck driver to stop and then checked the driver’s license, the truck registration while my
other companions took pictures of the truck.

Verification of the above hauler truck with Plate No. TKU-121 (Isuzu) is owned and operated by
Mayor Lito Tanjuatco of Tanay, Rizal. The truck driver, a certain Alfredo Casamayor Payot informed
this Investigator that he is paying One hundred (P100.00) Pesos per truckload of quarrying materials
to the quarry operator, a certain Mr. Javier.

xxxx

Jonathan Llagas, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator denied knowing Mr. Javier nor
any quarrying activities going on in Baras, Rizal. When we informed him of our findings, he insisted
that the quarrying operations is within the jurisdictional area of Tanay, Rizal. To cut short our
discussion, we requested him to look and see the quarrying operations to determine the territorial
boundaries, whether it is a part of Baras or Tanay and to submit his findings and action taken on our
request. However, up to this writing, Jonathan Llagas failed to comply.

Per report received by the Office of the Assistant Ombudsman, EIO, stated that the quarrying
activities in Baras, Rizal is still going on the following day, Saturday, April 18, 1998, after our visit on
Friday, April 17, 1998, (p. 21, Records). With this information, this investigator proceeded back to the
Baras, Rizal and conducted ocular inspection on May 8, 1998, before proceeding to the Laguna
Lake Development Authority in Calauan, Laguna, in compliance with a Mission Order.
True enough, we were able to see for ourselves the continuing quarry operations and the quarried
stones, soil and materials were dumped to a portion of the Laguna de Bay thereby reclaiming said
portion allegedly to be developed as Resort and restaurant establishments.3

Tornilla recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against Baras Municipal Mayor
Roberto Ferrera, Baras Municipal Planning and Coordinator Jonathan Llagas, and property owner
Venancio Javier for the probable violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act); and that administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil Service Rules
be also undertaken.

In his report and recommendation dated July 13, 1998,4 DILG Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G.
Falcis II sought the inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) of Rizal.

After the preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Edgardo V. Geraldez of the FFIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, issued a decision dated April 29, 1999,5 dismissing the complaint against
all the respondents for lack of substantial evidence. However, Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr.
recommended the disapproval of the said decision. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr.

The case was then referred to Atty. Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a memorandum on October
20, 19996, duly approved by the Ombudsman, finding De Leon liable for gross neglect of duty, as
follows:

WHEREFORE , it is respectfully recommended that:

xxxx

3) Respondent SAMSON G. DE LEON, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, be

penalized with one (1) year suspension without pay, for Gross Neglect of Duty.7

xxxx

On December 2, 1999, De Leon moved for Reconsideration,8 praying that the memorandum dated
October 20, 1999 be set aside.

On January 31, 2000, the Ombudsman denied De Leon’s motion for reconsideration.9

On November 17, 1999, the DENR directed the Regional Executive Director of Region IV to effect
De Leon’s suspension. 10

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, De Leon appealed to the CA via a petition for review,11 seeking the reversal of the
memorandum dated October 20, 1999 and the order dated January 31, 2000 of the Ombudsman.
He averred as grounds of his appeal the following, namely:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
 DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMBODIED IN THE DECISION
DATED 29 APRIL 1999.

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
FINDING THE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY.

III. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN EFFECTING THE
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF ONE
YEAR, ON THE PETITIONER.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Office of the Ombudsman, submitted its
comment on July 14, 2000,13 praying that De Leon’s petition for review be dismissed for its lack of
merit.

On January 30, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Memorandum dated October 20, 1999 issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-98-0414 is hereby MODIFIED in that petitioner SAMSON DE
LEON is hereby penalized with THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION without pay for SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTY. Furthermore, it appearing that he has already served such penalty, petitioner
is hereby ordered REINSTATED to his former position.

SO ORDERED.14

The Office of the Ombudsman sought reconsideration,15 but the CA denied its motion on June 21,
2002.

Issues

Dissatisfied, the Office of the Ombudsman appeals, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

IT DECREED PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIABLE FOR SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY

NOTWITHSTANDING THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT HE FAILED TO PERFORM A TASK
WHICH IS CLEARLY REPOSED ON HIM ON A REGULAR BASIS AND WHICH BREACH
OF DUTY APPEARS FLAGRANT AND PALPABLE.

II.

IT SUBSTITUTED ITS FINDING TO THAT OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHEN NO COGENT

REASON EXISTS THEREFOR.

III.
 IT HELD THAT THE DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.16

The pivotal issue is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in modifying the findings and
reducing the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling

The petition for review on certiorari is meritorious.

In its assailed decision, the CA justified its modification of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the following manner, to wit:

In the case at bench, petitioner, although guilty of neglect in the performance of his official duties,
may only be held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Petitioner’s offense is not of such nature to be
considered brazen, flagrant and palpable as would amount to a Gross Neglect of Duty. As pointed
out by petitioner, as early as May 1997, upon the complaint of one Teresita G. Fabian, he ordered
the inspection of the subject property located in Baras, Rizal. Relying on the report of Forrester
Ferrer and Engineer Aide Velasquez, petitioner indorsed to the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
the former’s findings that there were "extraction" in the area. The same findings were likewise
forwarded to the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. A reinvestigation of the area was again
conducted in July 1997 upon petitioner’s instruction with the findings that there were no illegal
quarrying activities being undertaken in the premises although a payloader and a back hoe can be
seen in the area. Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead
confirmed such findings by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings,
specially since the report cited the presence of large machineries, and that there was visible
extraction in the area. While the Court is not inclined to conclude that there were indeed illegal
quarrying activities in the area, nevertheless, prudence dictates that petitioner should have brought it
upon himself to confirm the findings of the investigation. Moreover, in this day and age where
environmental concerns are not to be trifled with, it devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resource Officer, to oversee the protection and preservation of the
environment within his province. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s passing the buck, so to speak,
to the Regional Director of the DENR for to do so would be tolerating bureaucracy and inefficiency in
government service.

Be that as it may, as the Court previously stated, petitioner’s negligence does not amount to a gross
neglect of duty. Given that his neglect is not that odious, petitioner should only be liable for Simple
Neglect of Duty and should accordingly be meted out the penalty of three (3) months suspension
without pay.17

We disagree with the CA that De Leon was liable only for simple misconduct. An examination of the
records persuasively shows that the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held De Leon guilty of gross
neglect of duty, a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.18

A PENRO, who is appointed by the Secretary of the DENR, has the responsibility to implement
DENR policies, programs and projects in the province of his assignment. De Leon was appointed as
the PENRO of Rizal and concurrently the Chairman of the PMRB of Rizal. As such, his duties and
responsibilities included the following:

1. Plans, organizes, directs and coordinates the overall office and field activities and
operation of the province concerning environmental and natural resources
programs/projects;
 2. Supervises and enforces discipline to personnel pertaining to norm and conduct in the
effective performance of tasks pursuant to manual operation guidelines and establish[ed]
practices;

3. Makes final review and correction of administrative and technical report submitted by
subordinates;

4. Coordinates with local government units, national office officials and other concern (sic)
parties related to the conduct and operation of the office;

5. Execute[s] and implement[s] policy, rules and regulations work programs and plans laid
down by the Regional Office;

6. Approves routine and non-policy determining papers and renders administrative and
technical decision(s) within the limit(s) of delegated authorities;

7. Occasionally conduct[s] field inspection to obtain on the spot information about the needs
and problems of the provincial office; and

8. Perform[s] such other duties as maybe (sic) assigned.19

Based on the Civil Service Position Description Form,20 De Leon as the PENRO of Rizal was the
highest executive officer of the DENR at the provincial level. He had the authority to coordinate all
the DENR agencies within his jurisdiction, including the PMRB. In his concurrent positions as the
PENRO and Chairman of the PMRB, therefore, his paramount function was to ensure that the laws
enforced by the DENR as well as the rules and regulations promulgated by the DENR in
implementation of such laws were complied with and effectively implemented and enforced. Verily,
he was the primary implementor and enforcer within his area of responsibility of all the laws and
administrative orders concerning the environment, and because of such character of his concurrent
offices should have made sure that he efficiently and effectively discharged his functions and
responsibilities.

In the matter that is now before us, De Leon evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively
discharge his functions and responsibilities. Except for issuing the investigation order and for
denying having granted any permit to quarry, he did nothing affirmative to put a stop to the illegal
quarrying complained of, or to do any other action that was entirely within his power to do as the
PENRO that the complaint demanded to be done.

Relevantly, the CA itself also observed in its decision under review that De Leon had not done
enough as the circumstances obtaining in the case properly called for, to wit:

x x x Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead confirmed
such findings by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings, specially since the
report cited the presence of large machineries, and that there was visible extraction in the area.
While the court is not inclined to conclude that there were indeed illegal quarrying activities in the
area, nevertheless, prudence dictates that petitioner should have brought it upon himself to confirm
the findings of the investigation. Moreover, in this day and age where environmental concerns are
not to be trifled with, it devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resource Officer to oversee the protection and preservation of the environment with his province.
The Court cannot accept petitioner’s passing the buck so to speak. x x x.21
Its foregoing observations notwithstanding, the CA still held De Leon guilty only of simple neglect of
duty.

The CA thereby erred.

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to give to their own property."22 It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness
of a person to perform a duty.23 In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.24

In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference."25

Conformably with these concepts, De Leon, given his rank and level of responsibility, was guilty of
gross neglect in not performing the act expected of him as the PENRO under the circumstances
obtaining. He was precisely assigned to perform tasks that imposed on him the obligation to do
everything reasonably necessarily and permissible under the law in order to achieve the objectives
of environmental protection. He could not feign ignorance of the Government’s current efforts to
control or prevent environmental deterioration from all hazards, including uncontrolled mining and
unregulated illegal quarrying, but he chose to be passive despite clear indications of the illegal
quarrying activities that had been first brought to his official attention as early as in 1997 by Teresita
Fabian of the Provincial Tourism Office of Rizal. The most that he did on the complaint was to
dispatch two of his subordinates to verify the report of quarrying. After the subordinates returned with
the information that there were no quarrying activities at the site, he was apparently content with
their report. He was not even spurred into further action by the subordinates’ simultaneous report on
having observed at the site the presence of earthmoving equipment (specifically, a backhoe and a
payloader). Had he been conscientious, the presence of the earthmoving equipment would have
quickly alerted him to the high probability of their being used in quarrying activities at the site. We
presume that he was not too obtuse to sense such high probability. The seriousness of the matter
should have prodded him to take further actions, including personally inspecting the site himself
either to confirm the findings of the subordinates or to satisfy himself that the earthmoving equipment
was not being used for quarrying. By merely denying having granted any permit or unwarranted
benefit to any quarry operator, he seemingly considered the report of his subordinates satisfactory.

Curiously, De Leon contended that the responsibility to monitor any reported mining and quarrying
activities belonged to the Regional Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. His contention
was insincere, if not also ridiculous, however, considering that he was then the concurrent Chairman
of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, the office directly tasked with the implementation of all
environmental laws, rules and regulations.

The flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of De Leon to perform his official duties denoted
gross neglect of duty also because the illegal quarrying had been going for a period of time. The
actions he took were inadequate, and could even be probably seen as a conscious way to mask a
deliberate and intentional refusal to perform the duties that his position required. He had no
justification for accepting the reports of his subordinates at face value despite indications to the
contrary. Making it worse for him was that the place where the quarrying was then taking place was
a mere stone’s throw away from the main road, being only about 400 meters away from the main
road.
In this connection, the Court observes that gross neglect of duty includes want of even slight care.
De Leon’s omission and indifference were definitely more than want of slight care, but were
tantamount to a wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard the established rules, which only
strengthened and confirmed his guilt of gross negligence.

The remaining question is whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was
immediately executory. The question crops up from the insistence by De Leon that his penalty of
suspension for one year was not immediately executory.

The CA held that the one-year suspension meted on De Leon was not immediately executory, viz:

x x x. Book 5, Title 1, Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cited by the OSG is not
applicable as said rule governs administrative cases decided by the Civil Service Commission. In
this case, petitioner was adjudged liable by the Office of the Ombudsman, hence RA 6670 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 shall govern. In this regard, Section 27 of RA 6670 provides that ‘(A)ny
order, directive, or decision, imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, a suspension of
not more than a month’s salary shall be final and unappealable." Logically, therefore, suspension of
more than one (1) month is not deemed final and executory. (Underscoring in the original)

There is no issue about the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. The only officials not under its disciplinary authority are those who may be
removed only by impeachment, the Members of Congress, and the Justices and Judges of the
Judiciary. As to this, Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) clearly provides, viz:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

De Leon was subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman because he was
an appointive public official.26 Indeed, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate
extends to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed
during his tenure of office by any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.27 The
Office of the Ombudsman also has the power to act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts
or omissions that (1) are contrary to law or regulation; (2) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory; (3) are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law; (4) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) are
in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) are otherwise irregular,
immoral or devoid of justification.28 At the same time, the Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority, can impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The exercise of all
such powers is well founded on the Constitution and on Republic Act No. 6770.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, and related cases,29 the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Puno, has definitively recognized the full administrative disciplinary authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman, declaring that its authority does not end with a recommendation to punish, but
goes farther as to directly impose the appropriate sanctions on the erring public officials and
employees, like removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or criminal prosecution; and
characterizing such imposition of sanctions to be not merely advisory or recommendatory but
actually mandatory, to wit:

In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the
Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings
of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who
may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees
only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist
watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement
his own actions.30

To resolve whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory,
we hereby hold that the decision is immediately executory, and that an appeal does not stop the
decision from being executory. This was clearly pronounced by the Court in Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals,31 to wit:

The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not
immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all
other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of
RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory.

In Lapid v. Court of Appeals, the Court anchored its ruling mainly on Section 27 of RA 6770 , as
supported by Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
pertinent provisions read:

Section 27 of RA 6770

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest
of justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (AO 07):

Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA
6770. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman "mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is
other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory."

Subsequently, on 17 August 2000, the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 14-A (AO 14-
A), amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
amendment aims to provide uniformity with other disciplining authorities in the execution or
implementation of judgments and penalties in administrative disciplinary cases involving public
officials and employees. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by AO 14-A, reads:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
1âw phi1

or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.(Emphasis supplied)

On 15 September 2003, AO 17 was issued, amending Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was further amended and now reads:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he
did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a

matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply
with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be
ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of AO 17 provides for
execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether
the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay
was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the
pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appealshas already been superseded by the case of In the
Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which
clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending
appea1."32 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 30,
2002; HOLDS respondent SAMSON DE LEON guilty of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, and
IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY;
and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Abstract
In this paper we present a "routine activity approach" for analyzing crime rate trends and cycles. Rather
than emphasizing the characteristics of offenders, with this approach we concentrate upon the
circumstances in which they carry out predatory criminal acts. Most criminal acts require convergence in
space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians against crime.
Human ecological theory facilitates an investigation into the way in which social structure produces this
convergence, hence allowing illegal activities to feed upon the legal activities of everyday life. In
particular, we hypothesize that the dispersion of activities away from households and families increases
the opportunity for crime and thus generates higher crime rates. A variety of data is presented in support
of the hypothesis, which helps explain crime rate trends in the United States 1947-1974 as a byproduct of
changes in such variables as labor force participation and single-adult households.

Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach

Lawrence E. Cohen and Marcus Felson

American Sociological Review

Vol. 44, No. 4 (Aug., 1979), pp. 588-608

Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: [Link]

Page Count: 21

The specific deterrence of administrative per se laws in

reducing drunk driving recidivism
 David L. McArthur, PhD, MPHa, ,
 Jess F. Kraus, MPH, PhDa
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Abstract
Objective: To determine if administrative per se laws are more effective than other
forms of sanction against drunk drivers.

Search Strategies: The overall goal of the search strategy was to identify all relevant
research concerning the specific effects of administrative per se laws in reducing drunk
driving recidivism, traffic crashes, and other alcohol-related driving offenses by those
drivers with suspended licenses. Known review articles and MEDLINE reviews formed
the reference bibliography; numerous databases were searched from 1966 to the
present, using such terms as alcohol, driver’s license, recidivism, deterrence, and
legislation.

Selection Criteria: To be selected the study had to be designed to test the presence of
an administrative per se license revocation or restriction in a defined cohort, have a
suitable comparison cohort whose sanctions for drunk driving were not administrative
per se, and provide relevant data that lead to an objective assessment of recidivism.
Types of studies included were randomized controlled trials, nonrandomized controlled
trials, other specialized cohort studies, and case-control studies. Three studies were
identified; all met inclusion criteria.

Data Collection and Analysis: One of the studies provided Kaplan-Meier survival curves
for failure times defined as days to new conviction following the initial arrest. Odds ratios
and 99% confidence intervals were extracted from two of the studies and additional
information was supplied by the author of one of the studies.

Main Results: One study found that one state in the United States experienced a
reduction of about one third in repeat arrests for drunk driving over a 3-year period
among those who were arrested under administrative per se, relative to recidivism seen
in a comparison cohort of drivers prior to administrative per se. Two other states did not
experience any change in recidivism. The second study found that drivers whose
licenses were suspended under administrative per se were 39% less likely during the
first year following suspension to be rearrested on the charge of driving while
intoxicated compared with a comparison cohort. This differential persisted into the
second year of follow-up, but disappeared by the third year. The third study found both
first offenders and repeat offenders arrested under administrative per se were 34% less
likely to be involved during the year following their arrest in a subsequent motor vehicle
crash compared with those in the comparison cohort. Drivers with administrative per se
suspensions were 21% less likely to be involved in additional drunk driving offenses,
and 27% less likely to be involved in reckless driving offenses related to alcohol.

Conclusions: Administrative per se laws governing license restriction for drivers have
been shown to be effective in some states but not others in decreasing the rates at
which these same drivers are subsequently involved in a motor vehicle crash or in
another alcohol-related offense, compared with drivers who were sanctioned through
other conventional judicial processes. Replications are needed in other states or large
driver populations using improved methodology.
 Keywords
 alcohol drinking;
 automobile driving;
 prevention;
 accident prevention;
 alcohol deterrents;
 laws;
 legislation
The Accuracy of Five Risk Appraisal Instruments in Predicting
Institutional Misconduct and New Convictions
Daryl G. Kroner Jeremy F. Mills

First Published August 1, 2001 research-article

Abstract

The predictive accuracy of the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised, Level of Service

Inventory– Revised, HCR-20, Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, and the Lifestyle
Criminality Screening Form were compared in a sample of male offenders. Both
correlations and receiver operating characteristics measured the relationship
between the instruments and the predictive outcome criteria of institutional
misconduct and release failure. Although some instruments performed better across
the outcome measures, there were no statistical differences in predictive accuracy
among the instruments.

Administrative Discipline Contacts: A Review of the Literature

J. Ron Nelson, Jorge E. Gonzalez, Michael H. Epstein and Gregory J. Benner

Behavioral Disorders

Vol. 28, No. 3 (May 2003), pp. 249-281

Published by: Council for Exceptional Children

Stable URL: [Link]

Page Count: 33
Abstract
The authors systematically review the available research on administrative discipline contacts to (a)
identify the domain variables (e.g., gender, ethnicity) that influence the use of administrative discipline
contacts, (b) identify participant classification variables (e.g., antisocial) related to administrative discipline
contacts, and (c) determine the validity of administrative discipline contacts. They drew from 20
independent samples published in 23 articles. A wide range of school (e.g., grade level, size) and student
(e.g., achievement, abilities, socioeconomic status, ethnicity) domain variables appear to influence the
use of administrative discipline contacts, whereas administrator/teacher (e.g., ethnicity, gender) and
family (e.g., parenting style, education levels of parents) variables have less influence. Four participant
classification variables appear to be related to administrative discipline contacts: participation in athletics;
child neglect; antisocial behavior; and anecdotal suspension report. The concurrent and predictive validity
of administrative discipline contacts appears to be relatively limited. The findings and future research
needs are discussed.