CAYETANO v.

MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991
PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the said nomination. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the Constitutional qualification requirement.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:

(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the bar, worked in his
father’s law office. After then, he worked as operations officer in the World Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon
returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently rendered services to
various companies either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide
Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

2. WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on Appointments regarding the
confirmation of nomination of Monsod.

RULING:

1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2. NO. The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of the COMELEC Chairman by the president is
mandated by the Constitution. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since
no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion for has been clearly shown.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

FACTS: COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the losing bidder,
petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the
writ prayed for.

Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case which the court
granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an
award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the
winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.
RULING: It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be
imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

ELPIDIO M. SALVA v. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of
Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. On the other hand, Resolution No. 345
affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05
was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under
Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the attestations or certifications of the Department of
Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. Petitioners filed an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the
COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

"SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty
of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear
and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and
the enforcement of the election laws.

The issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of
the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable
by certiorari by Supreme Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.

Brillantes vs. Comelec

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which
provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow
the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would
likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as
provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond
judicial determination.

Issue: Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712.
The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited
citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an
“unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision
that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any
disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003
General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain
conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and
available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been
substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

Gallardo vs. Tabamo

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners would have us
prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit, docketed therein as Special Civil Action No.
465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement
of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted
whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order because the case
principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively
vested in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the private
respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias
in favor of the private respondent in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465

RULING:
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power
to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage -- the
citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

1. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members
of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its
deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his
duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions
or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall
suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of
such violation or failure.

2. To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.”
The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections
broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its
rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time.

Libardos v. Casar
J. Padilla (1994)

Doctrine: A judge has jurisdiction to issue a suspension of the canvassing of election returns, even if done to prevent bloodshed.

Facts:

Mayor Perlita Libardos was an official mayoralty candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Maigo, Lanao
del Norte. Wilfredo Randa, the candidate of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), during the canvassing, filed a complaint for
Preliminary Injunction with the MCTC of Kolambugan-Maigo, Lanao del Norte, presided over by judge Abdullah Casar.

Judge ordered the Board of Canvassers to suspend the canvassing of the election returns of Precinct No. 10-A until either
the COMELEC, or Iligan RTC could act on the complaint of Randa.

The order caused the delay in the canvassing of the election returns which was resumedonly after the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Lanao del Norte sent a message to the COMELEC requesting that an order be issued ordering the Board of
Canvassers to disregard the restraining order of the judge.

The judge admitted having issued without jurisdiction the questioned order. He justified its issuance as an immediate
remedy and arrangement to prevent bloodshed between the contending parties. Office of Court Administrator admonished the
judge.

Issue:

W/N Judge Casar grossly ignorant of the law.

Held:

YES. Findings of the OCA adopted. In its report, OCA stated that the Order was issued without jurisdiction, the acts
complained of should be met with a corresponding sanction. Formal investigation of the charge against the judge for issuing the
order without jurisdiction is no longer necessary in view of his admission. The defense interposed by the judge is unavailing. As a
judicial officer, he is expected to know and keep abreast with the latest law and jurisprudence. His feeling of sympathy and fairness
cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress or dispense with the existing laws involving the controversy.

To hold him administratively liable for ignorance of the law, there must be reliable evidence to show the judicial acts
complained of were ill-motivated and corrupt. The documents on file in the case do not show that questioned order was ill-motivated
or corrupt. He acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his Order knowing full well that he does not have jurisdiction to act on
the petition.

While his reasons for issuing the assailed order are perhaps commendable and demonstrative of his concern for peace and order
during the election period in the given community, he lost sight of his bounden duty, as a Judge, to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1). A Judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2).

Guieb vs. Fontanilla, 247 SCRA 348, Aug. 14, 1995

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent Manuel Asuncion, were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of May 9, 1994. The former was proclaimed as the winning
candidate then the latter filed an election protest with the MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. On May 27, 1994, the MTC confirmed
the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissed the protest of the private respondent. The private respondent then appealed the
decision to the RTC of Dagupan City. In its decision of August 31, 1994, RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. On November 25,
1994, the private respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. RTC declared that the motion should
be properly filed with the court of origin and that the decision of 3August 31, 1994 had already become final. On December 12,
1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari which was denied
because of his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that motion. On February 8, 1995, he filed a motion for reconsideration of
the denial. Meanwhile, on December 20, 1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. MTC deferred action on the said motion and required the petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the status of his
petition with this Court but the latter failed to comply with the said order, so the court issued an order on granting the issuance of a
writ of execution. However, the court received the said counsel's Compliance later on, wherein he informed the court of the
petitioner's motion to reconsider this Court's resolution denying the motion for extension of time to file his petition. In a resolution the
Court required the respondent to comment on the petition. The petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or
Suspend Execution which was denied on the ground that the writ must have already been implemented and, therefore, the motion to
stay or suspend the same has become moot and academic. The sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that he
enforced the writ and proclaimed the private respondent as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has a jurisdiction over this case.

Held:

No. Under Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph 2-C of the Constitution, it is the COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial Courts,
that has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction, which
are the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.