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Postliminium is a principle in international law which

GOVERNMENT considers valid, except in a very few cases, the acts done
Elements of the State by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within
his competence to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS territory which has been occupied by him comes again in
the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
The last issue was the question of whether or not an
Co Kim Cham has a civil case in CFI Manila instituted enabling law was required. It isn’t. Conquest or colonization
under the Republic of the Philippines during the period of is impotent to amend laws. Laws remain unchanged until
Japanese occupation. Judge Dizon alleges that the case the new sovereign by a legislative act creates such
shouldn’t be continued because: change.

1. The PEC and RP under Japanese In Re: Saturnino Bermudez

military (1986)
occupation were not de facto governments.
2. McArthur’s proclamation invalidated A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986
all Constitution regarding who the provision refers to when it
judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it
under the PEC and the RP. outright for lack of jurisdiction and a cause of action.
3. Lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings with the absence of an Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
enabling law to grant such authority. aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public knowledge that
A writ of mandamus was issued to the judge ordering him the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
to take cognizance and render final judgment of the case. President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
The first issue involved was whether or not the PEC and H. Laurel, and to no other persons
the RP were de facto governments. And the SC held that
they were by expounding on the different kinds of de facto Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
governments (which are listed below) and pointing out that state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
all acts and proceedings of the PEC/RP (which was government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
classified as a de facto government of the second form) are realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
good and valid. are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon
1. Government that USURPS by FORCE or C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
BY so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY the rightful legal and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
government. nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
2. Government of PARAMOUNT FORCE. government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
3. Government established by the native reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
inhabitants who rise in INSURRECTION against the parent the Republic under her government.
state.

The second issue revolved around McArthur’s

proclamation. It did not have the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynate Puno
Philippine Courts under the PEC and the RP by virtue of
the principle of POSTLIMINY in international law. This is an administrative matter in the SC. Puno was
elevated in the seniority rankings of the CA from no. 12 to
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no. 5. This, however, caused Javellana and Campos to file intra-constitutional and thus justiciable). EDSA I overthrew
a motion for reconsideration. Puno countered by saying the whole government. EDSA II sought to petition the
that Aquino had pledged that “no right provided under the government for redress of grievances which only affected
1973 Constitution shall be absent from the Freedom the office of the President.
Constitution” and thus by virtue of Section 2 E.O. 33, Puno
can claim seniority. This was debunked by the SC on the CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS
ground that a revolution changes everything because it
went in defiance of the then existing 1973 Constitution. The ACCFA v. CUGCO
core issue at hand was precisely WON the existing legal
order was overthrown by the revolutionary government. It ACCFA is being sued by CUGCO because of alleged
was. The little resistance met by the new government, violations of a collective bargaining agreement,
control of the state, appointment of key officers in the discrimination against members, and refusal to bargain.
administration, departure of officials of the previous regime, The CIR favored the complainants but ACCFA petitioned to
and the revamp of the military and judiciary signaled the the SC questioning WON the CIR has jurisdiction over the
point where the legal system had ceased to be obeyed by case depending on WON ACCFA exercised governmental
the Filipino people. or proprietary functions. The court ruled that the
implementation of the land reform program of the
Estrada v. Desierto government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most
(2001) certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The
CIR has no jurisdiction but nevertheless the collective
Erap alleges that he is still the President, albeit on-leave, bargaining agreements must be enforced.
where as Arroyo merely claims to be President. He sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in
criminal complaints against his office until after the term of governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions
his presidency was over and only if legally warranted. The may not be strictly what President Wilson described as
first issue raised by the respondents is that the case is a "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as
political question and therefore outside the jurisdiction of those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
the SC. To determine whether or not the question is prevention of crime, those regulating property and property
political, the court looks to the most authoritative guideline rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
in determining such issues: Justice Brennan’s words in the determination of political duties of citizens, and those
1962 case of Baker v. Carr. The Philippines’ leading case is relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under
Tanada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not
refer: merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people — these letter functions being ministrant he
“to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been The growing complexities of modern society, however,
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the have rendered this traditional classification of the functions
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to
The court held that the Arroyo government was not a enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped
revolutionary government as compared to its Aquino to administer for the public welfare than is any private
counterpart. EDSA I involved extra-constitutional exercise individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their
of people power revolution (and is thus a political question well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
and not subject to judicial review) whereas EDSA II activities that the government must undertake in its
provoked the resignation of the sitting president which sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
resulted in the succession of the vice president (which is challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
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the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization The prohibition of the article in the first issue has already
of economic forces. Here of course this development was been decided in recent cases by reasoning of: ". . . for the
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning property must take place during the pendency of the
the promotion of social justice. litigation involving the property"1 Thus, no violation of said
provision took place. As for the second regarding the
PARENS PATRIAE violation of the Code of Commerce provision:

Gov. of Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law
(1916) which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations
Contributions were collected during the Spanish Regime of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Part of the Perfecto). It may be recalled that political law embraces
money was never distributed and was instead deposited constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative
with the defendant bank. In an action for its recovery later law including the law on public officers and elections.
filed by the government, the defendant questioned the Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
competence of the plaintiff (PI government), contending more of the nature of an administrative law because it
that the suit could be instituted only by the intended regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
beneficiaries themselves or by the heirs of the victims. The employees with respect to engaging in business; hence,
issue of concern here is WON the PI has the right to file a political in essence.
case in behalf of its citizens. It does in its capacity as the
guardian or parens patriae of the people. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of the Spanish Code of
SOVEREIGNTY Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
Elements of the State because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945) with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
There was no change of sovereignty during the period of affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Japanese occupation. Possession of sovereignty remained Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs that:
with the Americans while the exercise of the acts of
sovereignty belonged to the belligerent invaders. "'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by
one nation to another, either following a conquest or
Macariola v. Asuncion otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their nature
(1992) and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.' 2
In a civil case of the CFI Leyte, Judge Asuncion ruled a
partition of lots of one deceased Francisco Reyes among "While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in
Macariola (sole child of Francisco’s first wife) and the conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force
children from his second marriage. A year later, the judge without the express assent or affirmative act of the
bought one of the lots he settled from a certain Galapon. conqueror, the political laws do not. 3
Macariola charges Asuncion with a complaint of committing
“acts unbecoming a judge.” The main issues are twofold: 1
the first is WON he violated Article 1491 (5) of the CC; and The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., [1979]; Rosario
vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, [1978]
second is WON he violated Article 14 (1) & (5) of the Code
of Commerce. 2
Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899

3
Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14
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Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto, this Court stated that: "It ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties
is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region is of the opinion that the petition should be granted
are totally abrogated." because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court is
“tinged with political complexion”, that the procedure does
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued not afford a fair trial and violates constitutional right of
the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to is of the opinion that:
the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First only factor to be considered is the authority of the
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance.
It is well established in International Law that "The criminal
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied
(1946) territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely from
Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The
Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the Japanese authority thus derived can be asserted either through
forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined
and led a guerilla unit. Lieut. Col. Jurado, recognized by in the military code of the conquering state, or through the
the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district."
but was slain by the latter and his companions. The same (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.)
people who killed the replacing officer claim that they were
not subject to military law at the time when the offense was The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
committed. But the rule suspending political laws only governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
affects the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and had therefore the power or was competent to create the
is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus, Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No
members of the armed forces continued to be covered by question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a
the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency
laws relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling
occupation. By the acceptance of the petitioners’ within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be
appointments as officers in the Philippine Army they of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature
became amenable to the Articles of War. or character of the law so applied. There is no room for
doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the
Peralta v. Director of Prisons court in question.
(1945)
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of
Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes
prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to
Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which
time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal said petitioner was convicted.
Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7
promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition It appears clear that it was within the power and
for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court’s competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
existence was void ab initio because it was created as a through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
political instrumentality under the command of the the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which
Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
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imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. offenses committed against the belligerent occupant,
Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of
Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than
offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid
of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare,
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As
of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of examples, the crimes against national security, such as
its operations. treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the
The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of Commonwealth or United States Government under the
the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the
Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of belligerent occupant.
postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now
serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.
STATE IMMUNITY
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all CHARACTERIZATION OF SUIT
judgment of political complexion of the courts during the
Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of Begosa v. Chairman, Phil. Vet. Assoc.
the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. (1970)
Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence
which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political A veteran, Begosa, suffering from permanent disability was
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be being denied what has been granted him specifically by
valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the legislative enactment (which certainly is superior to any
Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine
Veterans Administration). Although the respondent
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons relented, the amount released was far less than what the
veteran was legally entitled to. He appealed. The doctrine
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of of state immunity cannot be invoked by the PVA.
firearms. The CA modified the sentence from arresto mayor
to prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of Where litigation may have adverse consequences on the
the CA on the sole ground that the court was a creation of public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or
the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the loss of property, the public official being tried cannot be
Japanese military occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez held liable by virtue of state immunity. However, where the
Tan Keh and Dizon, the court ruled that the RP and the suit against such a government official had to be instituted
PEC were governments de facto and that judicial acts were because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by
good and valid and remained good and valid after the statute appropriating funds for the benefit of the plaintiff,
restoration of the Commonwealth Government. The CA that then the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied.
existing during Japanese occupation was the CA after the
restoration. And even if the CA was a new court, its Republic v. Feliciano
judgments would still remain good and valid provided that (1987)
they do not have a political complexion.
Feliciano allegedly owns a parcel of land through his
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political possession of informacion possesoria. But this same land,
complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined by virtue of Proclamation No. 90 of President Ramon
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Magsaysay, became reserved for settlement purposes. The doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our
Feliciano seeks to prove that his ownership of the land as own government but also to foreign states who are subject
evidenced by his informacion is valid and makes a claim to to the jurisdiction of our courts.
recover said property. However, the court ruled that the
state did not give its consent to be sued and thus immune The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it,
from the complaint. Although the proclamation stated that it is that "there can be no legal right against the authority
shall be “subject to private rights if any there be”, this which makes the law on which the right depends." In the
cannot be construed as an express waiver of immunity. case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium5 and
not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
juris4. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where
statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines
made by an act of the legislative body. "adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land."

The acts of petitioners are protected by the presumption of

good faith, which has not been overturned by the private
respondents. Mistakes concededly committed by such
public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
RATIONALE FOR IMMUNITY that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. Exceptions to the doctrine of state
Sanders v. Veridiano immunity as enumerated in the case are:
(1988)
Officer is sued to compel him to do an act required by law
Rossi and Wyer, gameroom attendards, are suing Sanders [such as restraining a Cabinet member from enforcing a
and Moreau (superiors of the attendants) for libelous law claimed to be unconstitutional].
imputations committed by the latter which eventually cost
them their jobs. However, the court ruled that the alluded When the government violated its own laws.
acts were official and not personal and that the acts
petitioners are called to account were performed in the When an officer acted without or in excess of authority in
discharge of their official duties. forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation thereof, though the property was converted
Given the official character of the above-described letters, for the public good.
we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States United States v. Guinto
government. As they have acted on behalf of that (1990)
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is Three main cases dealing with the doctrine of state
responsible for their acts. immunity are consolidated in this case with the fourth being
remanded due to a lack of information.

(1) Respondents file for a case of cancellation of a

4
STRICTISSIMI JURIS. The most strict right or law. In barbershop concessionaire. The State herein can be sued
general, when a person receives an advantage, as the grant
of a license, he is bound to conform receives an advantage,
5
as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform strictly to All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a jurisdiction over one another.
strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in
case of a dispute, it will be strictly construed.
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because barbershop concessionaires are commercial in The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested
nature and the state entering into such a proprietary expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied
contract implicitly gave its consent to be sued. in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when
the state enters into a contract or it itself commences
(2) A cook was found guilty of pouring urine in soup and litigation.
was subsequently relieved from duty. He files a complaint
against the club manager who invokes state immunity. The The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
State can be sued since restaurant operation is a is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine
commercial affair, however, it does not necessarily mean government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
that the state is liable. moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
(3) Luis Bautista was caught in a buy-bust operation; he action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of
was then subsequently relieved from duty. He now sues the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable
with the complaint of illegal dismissal. The respondent a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When
State cannot be sued because it performed acts within its the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
official capacity. descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
There is no question that the United States of America, like consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract The above rules are subject to qualification. Express
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no consent is effected only by the will of the legislature
such waiver may be implied. through the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government
Even without such affirmation [in Art. 16, Sec. 3 of 1987 will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
Constitution], we would still be bound by the generally be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will
of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the result only where the government is claiming affirmative
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated relief from the defendant.
in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in
its relations with other states.
The Holy See v. Rosario
XXX (1994)

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal The Holy See, represented by the Papal Nuncio, sold
prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants certain parcels of land to two buyers. However, because
the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply the petitioners were unable to evict the squatters, a dispute
invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in arose as to who held the responsibility of clearing the said
democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant parcels of land of squatters. Respondents filed a complaint
unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the for the annulment of the sale of the land but the DFA filed a
doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not motion to intervene claiming that it had a legal interest in
be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic
says that the state may not be sued without its consent, immunity of petitioner.
which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has
no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying
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sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made
insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the
absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the
Philippines. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

Private respondent’s opinion is untenable. Aside from the Sayson v. Singson

privilege of sovereign immunity established by the DFA, the (1973)
Holy See is nonetheless immune from suit because the
transaction entered into was not for profit or for gain. It Singson filed a money claim against the Highways Auditor
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the General petitioning the latter to be compelled to pay the
squatters living there made it almost impossible for balance due to Singson. Sayson failed to pay the
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation corresponding balance to Singson after discovering that
(construction of Papal Nuncio’s residence). The fact that the equipment being sold by Singson was overpriced.
squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and
that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand
admitted by private respondent in its complaint. taken by the Republic. The lower court was unmindful of
the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General
each widely held and firmly established. According to the Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its cause of action is a money claim against the government,
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy,
of America v. Ruiz) mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of
such claim against the State..., but an ordinary action for
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and specific performance... Actually, the suit disguised as one
transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which
our own guidelines, tentative they may be. cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with
the consent of the State
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such Republic v. Purisima
an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical (1977)
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign Yellow Bell Freight Lines brought a suit against the Rice
state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the and Corn Administration for an alleged breach of contract.
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its Rice and Corn moved to dismiss the suit by using the
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an doctrine of state immunity. Respondent judge dismissed
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially the motion to dismiss. The SC held that the courts do not
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the claims
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold of the national government.
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the counsel of the government but must be effected through a
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duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed. norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
Amigable v. Cuenca government takes any property for public use, which is
(1972) conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
The government used a portion of the land owned by the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
Amigable for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
Avenues without prior negotiation/expropriation. Amigable invoked."
sues Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways seeking payment for the appropriated land. The Santiago v. Republic
court ruled in favor of the state by virtue of applying state (1978)
immunity. However, the SC set aside the lower courts
decision on the basis that “immunity from suit cannot serve Santiago filed an action in the CFI naming as defendant the
as an instrument for penetrating an injustice on a citizen.” Government of the Republic of the Philippines represented
by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). His
Ministerio v. City of Cebu plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed
(1971) by him and his spouse in 1971, with the BPI as the donee.
Petitioner alleges that the donee failed to comply the terms
Petitioners seek just compensation for a registered lot of the donation. Petitioner then is led to conclude that he
alleging that the government took physical and material was exempt from compliance with such an explicit
possession of it and used it for the widening of Gorodo Ave. constitutional command, which prohibits a suit against the
in Cebu City. CFI dismissed the case on the ground of Republic without its consent. The issue is WON the RP
immunity of the state to be sued without its consent. gave its consent when it accepted the terms of donation
The SC held that: where the government takes away given by Santiago, thereby allowing itself to be sued based
property from a private landowner for public use without on the high dictates of equity and justice.
going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain In the case at bar, the Republic, as donee, gave its implied
a suit against the government without thereby violating the consent to perform the conditions of the donation. In such a
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its case as this, the court held that the donor, with the
consent. The SC there said: Republic as donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He (the
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be donor) has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances,
compensated for property taken for public use were to be the fundamental postulate of non-suitability cannot stand in
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should the way. The government being the beneficiary manifests
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government people.
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at
the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only Lim v. Brownell
upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, (1960)
or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the Lim is claiming ownership over certain lots of land that
land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public were reclaimed by the US government and subsequently,
use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance turned over to the RP. Lim claims these lands originally
of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad belong to his deceased mother but were illegally
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely possessed by Japanese troops. The US was able to take
because there was a failure to abide by what the law possession of said lands after the war by virtue of the
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just Trading with the Enemy Act.
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.10

its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so.

The immunity of the state from suit, however, cannot be In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is
invoked where the action, as in the present case, is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or there can be no legal right as against the authority that
interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership makes the law on which the right depends."
and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has
expressly been given by the United States. Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
United States v. Ruiz Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
(1985) Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
Respondent was able to win a bid for a project for the deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
repair of the wharves/shoreline of the Subic Bay Area. caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency
Petitioner asked for a quotation but later on denied the and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
respondent the project stating that the respondent was not functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle
qualified. The latter files suit for awarding the project to him were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy
and for damages as well. were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on
the part of our people to go to court, at the least
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to be imagined."
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only Justice Malcolm: "A rule, which has never been seriously
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign although it may be due government employees, is not
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to
Republic v. Villasor be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
(1973) disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
Respondent Judge Villasor is alleged to have acted in specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of public policy forbids it."
an alias writ of execution against the properties of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and thus, the Alias Writ of SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant
thereto are null and void. What was done by respondent Phil. National Railways v. IAC
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the (1993)
Constitution.
Baliwag Bus and an express train collided resulting to
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing death and damages. Baliwag sues PNR; but PNR raises
from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as the defense that it was the bus driver who was negligent
well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.11

and the doctrine of state immunity exempts them from suit. performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
IAC ruled in favor of Baliwag, hence this appeal. article shall be applicable." It is, therefore, evident that the
State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
Although PNR is a government formed department, PNR liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
engages in a purely commercial action. PNR was created Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers
not to discharge a governmental function but to operate a and employees when they act as special agents within the
transport service which is essentially a business concern. meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the
When the government enters in a commercial business, it chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like such an agent.
any other private corporation.

National Irrigation Administration v. Fontanilla

(1991)

The NIA group was on its way to a campsite. In a hurry to

reach their destination, they ran over someone and did not
even stop to check what happened. It turned out to be the
son of herein respondents who subsequently filed suit. NIA
avers that they were an agency of the government and
therefore not liable for the acts of the driver who was a
special agent. The SC ruled, however, that the NIA is a
government agency with juridical personality that is
separate and distinct from the government. Therefore it is
not immune from suit. Besides, the NIA’s charter
specifically allows the NIA to sue and be sued.

SUITABILITY V. LIABILITY

Merritt v. Gov. of the Phil Islands

(1916)

Plaintiff Merritt on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance

which did not warn of its impending approach. As the
negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed
by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at
once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the
damages resulting therefrom. The government, by no less
than an Act, authorized Merritt to bring suit in the CFI
Manila in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital.

Did the government simply waive its immunity from suit or

did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “The

state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused
by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.12

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE the national and local governments — such as the

elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 —
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS 6 will be chosen; and

Gonzales v. COMELEC 4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election,
November 9, 1967, Concepcion, C.J. in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to
the people for ratification, must be held under such
Facts: conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the
The House of Representatives passed a bill which allowed people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the
for proposals in Resolution 1 (increasing max number of nature and implications of said amendments.
representatives from 120-180) and Resolution 3
( authorizing Senators and Representatives to be Senator Arturo Tolentino objected to the PHILCONSA
delegates in a constitutional convention) to be passed. This petition on the following grounds: a) that the Court has no
was subsequently approved by the President as R.A. 4913 jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or
which provided for amendments to be made subject to the to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of
people’s approval at the general elections of Nov. 1967. Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in
effect, render in operational the legislative department; and
Gonzales, a taxpayer, filed a class suit and prayed that: (1) c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid
COMELEC restrain from performing acts that would result reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of
in the holding of the plebiscite for ratification; and (2) rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
declare the Act unconstitutional. thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."

PHILCONSA (Philippine Constitution Association), on the Issues/ Held/Ratio:

other hand, prayed that the decision in this case be (1) WON the SC has jurisdiction.
deferred until an identical case pending (which was
expected soon) was decided on. COMELEC dismissed the Yes. "The judicial department is the only constitutional
petition which instigated the association’s filing of a review organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
by certiorari. SolGen maintains that the SC has no allocation of powers between the several departments and
jurisdiction upon the ground that the same is "merely among the integral or constituent units thereof." – Dr. Jose
political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. P. Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission.

It was urged by the petitioners that said resolutions are null The force of the precedent in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito
and void because: declaring the issue to be “merely political” has been
weakened by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs.
proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
Congressmen; under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
propose — amendments or call a convention therefore but necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
and call a convention — at the same time; having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
special election, not a general election, in which officers of party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth,
6
we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting
No digests for the first two sections of this chapter:
Separation of Powers and the Non-Delegation Doctrine to apportion the representative districts for the House of
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.13

Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment

had not been made as may be possible according to the “This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the
number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether
issues therein raised were political questions the the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for
determination of which is beyond judicial review. amendment to the people except under such conditions, is
another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves
— acting as a constituent assembly — violates the unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon
subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified speculation. “
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point. On the issue of insufficiency of the publicity and time for
discussion afforded by the mechanism of ratification
(2) WON R.A. 4913 is unconstitutional. provided by the legislature, again the minority but
prevailing opinion said:
No, it is constitutional. Even though it is urged that the
Congress became unconstitutional because the “We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
Apportionment Act was deemed illegal (act was not made Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
according to the number of inhabitants of the different Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
provinces of the Philippines), this argument isn’t tenable. something better to enlighten the people on the subject-
Failure to make the apportionment does not dissolve matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of
Congress or makes it illegal. human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no
legislation would be constitutional and valid.”7
On the argument that the acting congress was
unconstitutional because it failed to apportion itself within
three years, this is untenable. The fact that Congress is Tolentino v. COMELEC
under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not October 16, 1971, Barredo, J.
justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal or Facts:
unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto After the Constitional Convention of 1971 came into being
officers. and after its election of delegates, the convention, on Sept.
28, 1971, approved its first formal proposal to amend the
On the argument of the petitioners that Congress may only Constitution by Organic Resolution No. 1 (Lowering the
amend or call a convention but not do both, the SC ruled Voting Age to 18 in Article V). Arturo M. Tolentino filed a
that this was a question of wisdom and not authority and petition for prohibition to restrain COMELEC from holding a
hence was a political question. plebiscite on November 8 at which the proposed
amendment could be ratified by the people.
On the choice between a special election and a general
election, a majority of the SC, but not enough to constitute Issues/ Held/Ratio:
a qualified majority needed to declare a law (1) WON only Congress can call a plebiscite for ratification
unconstitutional, was of the view that the spirit of the of amendments.
Constitution demanded that “election” be read as “special
7
election” in order that the transcendental importance of a Despite this decision of the SC which cleared the way for
constitional amendment could command the undivided the plebiscite, the plebiscite nevertheless, overwhelmingly,
attention of the electorate. The minority but prevailing view, rejected Resolutions 1 and 3. – Mars.

however, said:
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.14

Constitution in its entirety which is necessary in order to

The SC chose not to answer the question on whether or amend a fragment or portion of its parts. Thus, a single
not the power to call a plebiscite was exclusively election of these amendments ensures that all the
legislative. “In the view the Court takes of the present case, proposed and accepted amendments are compatible with
it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that the entire Constitution and not just within the provision’s
question, grave and important as it may be Truth to tell, the scope.
lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the
members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the “We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under
essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should
1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is be submitted to them not separately from but together with
calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question Convention.”
until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the
basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any
can be.”

ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by

a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately may Occena v. COMELEC
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a April 2, 1981, Fernando, C.J.
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a Facts:
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the Occena and Gonzales filed an action of prohibition against
amendments are submitted to the people for their the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
ratification. proposing constitutional amendments, thereby implying the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental
(2) WON Sec. 1 Article XV is violated by the act of the law, regardless of the recent Javellana ruling.
Convention in calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1 and is Issues/ Held/Ratio:
thus unconstitutional. (1) WON the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law of
the land.
Yes. “The Court holds that there is [a violation], and it is
the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be Yes. It is too late to deny the applicability of the 1973
proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to Constitution. This was already decided on by a 6-4 vote in
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being Javellana v. Executive Secretary. “There is no further
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be obstacle to the new constitution being considered in force
submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the and effect.”
Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification (2) WON the Batasang Pambansa has the power to
of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by propose amendments:
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of
the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that Yes it does. The existence of the power of the Interim
direction are null and void.” Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar
Barredo reasoned out his grammatical argument by saying as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang
that partial amendments do not reflect a study of the whole Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.15

shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National congenital infirmity.
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of 3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity
proposing amendments. of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand in
Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs
Petitioners would argue that the amendments proposed are enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
so extensive as to constitute a revision. “At any rate, eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in
revised or totally changed would become immaterial the Gonzales vs. Comelec and subsequently officially adopted
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.” by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in
Regarding the issue of votes necessary to propose the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex,
amendments as well as the standard for proper complicated and radical amendments of our very structure
submission, petitioners have not made out a case that calls of government were considered and approved by the
for a judgment in their favor. The language of the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted
when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express
has been convened as the agency through which their will in a genuine manner."
amendments could be proposed.
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting): that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
1. Under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired
that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion in
the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view
to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,'
the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a
convened and not from the executive power as vested in fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the
the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can
power has been withheld. only be amended by the people expressing themselves
according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the
controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976 people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to
constitutional amendments which created the Interim be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments,
constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or
binding upon the Convention and the other departments of possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its
and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform
is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is
Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, that the government, in submitting an amendment for
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.16

ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency

within its structural framework to enlighten the people, Issues/ Held/Ratio:
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or (1) WON Questions No. 3 and No. 4 have been properly
rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submitted to the people.
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these Yes. The Constitution provides, under Sec. 2, Art. 16, a
safeguards the people still approve the amendments no period of three months for an information campaign
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the regarding the intended amendments. The sufficiency of the
people decree their own fate." period during which amendments are submitted to the
people before they vote to either affirm or reject depends
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt on the complexity and intricacy of the questions presented.
citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of The petitioners have failed to show that the addition of the
our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good one word "grant" to Section 11, Article XIV or that the
Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good addition of two paragraphs including one on urban land
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary reform to Section 12 of Article XIV result in amendments of
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for such nature that when the people go to the polls on
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the January 27, 1984 they cannot arrive at an intelligent
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought judgment on their acceptability or non-acceptability.
evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second
thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can More important, however, is that the necessity, expediency,
be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the
feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not
mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments
worse."' are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can
decide. The questions are presented for their
determination. Assuming that a member or some members
of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of
disposing of public land or an urban land reform program,
the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed
amendments by denying to the millions of voters an
opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue
before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the
proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of
the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the
voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the
dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a
case that the average voter does not know the meaning of
Almario v. Alba "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."
January 25, 1984, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting):
Facts: The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of
The Filipino electorate will go to the polls to approve or proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated by the
reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Court in Tolentino vs. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729)
resolutions of the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioners seek to mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification
delay the date of ratification/rejection in order to give ample of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it
time to study the ramifications of the two questions stated must provide the voter not only sufficient time, but ample
in Question No. 3 and No. 4 . basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.17

amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts

of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole." There must be fair submission and intelligent
consent or rejection.

As the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his

separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales vs.
Comelec, concurred in by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774, 817),
the people must be "sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine
manner."
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES initiate the case and they have failed to demonstrate the requisite of suffering proximate injury.
AND Issues raised premature and based on a fear of future violations of the Terms of Reference.
STATE POLICIES
(2) WON the “Balikatan” exercises violate the Constitution.
8
Lim v. Executive Secretary
2002, De Leon, Jr. J No. Petitioners claim that it violates the Renunciation Clause of the Constitution (The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy) but neither the MDT nor the
Two years after the VFA was approved in 1999, the terrorist attacks 9/11 prompted America to VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The VFA permits
declare an international terrorist campaign. Pres. GMA pledged the country’s support to the the USAF to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities”. The word was used to give
endeavor. leeway in negotiation by both parties. In this manner, the US may sojourn in the Philippines for
purposes other than military. Combat-related activities, as opposed to combat, are authorized
On January 2002, members of the USAF (United States Armed Forces) arrived in Mindanao by the MDT and the VFA.
to, along with the AFP, take part in the “Balikatan 02-1” exercises. The next month, the
Senate, after conducting a hearing on the military exercise, approved the Draft Terms of Although international laws are adhered to, as expressed by the Indoctrination Clause, it does
Reference upon presentation by then VP Guingona. not imply primacy of international law over national law. The Constitution espouses a view that
has marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country. The Court, if it sees
Petitioners Lim and Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the that the treaty runs counter to Congress or goes against the fundamental law, can nullify such
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They filed suit as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. Two an agreement. But in the case at bar, the question is WON American troops are engaged in
party-list intervenors, SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGAGAWA, aver that some of their combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of alleged training and exercise. The Court
members are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu and thus are directly affected by operations cannot answer this question because it lacks sufficient information. Newspapers or electronic
conducted in Mindanao. reports per se cannot be considered apt support for petitioner’s allegations. Facts must be
established according to the rules of evidence. WON Pres. GMA is engaged in doublespeak
They argue (a) that the Abu-Sayyaf bandits do not constitute an external armed force and involves a question of fact… the question is thus not fit for a special civil action for certiorari.
thus, the Philippines is not subject to armed external attack contemplated in the MDT (mutual
defense treaty) of 1951 to warrant US military assistance. They also claim that the VFA signed Petition is thereby dismissed.
in 1999 does not authorize US soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory,
not even to fire back if fired upon. Lasco, et. al. v. UNRFNRE
Feb. 23, 1995, Quiason, J.

Facts:
Lasco, et. al were dismissed from the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations.
Issues/Held/Ratio: The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United
(1) WON petitioners have legal standing. Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. They filed suit with the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal and damages.
No. They cannot file suit as taxpayers because the military exercise does not involve
Congress’ taxing or spending powers. Being lawyers does not invest them with personality to

8
A lot of dissenting opinions. Too lazy. Will get back to them when I have time.
Respondent UNRFNRE filed a motion to dismiss claiming the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
because the respondent enjoyed diplomatic immunity (citing the 1946 Convention on the Issues/Held/Ration:
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations).9 WON the respondent is immune by virtue of its diplomatic status.

Labor Arbiter subsequently dismissed the claim made by the petitioner. With their motion for As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts
reconsideration denied, they proceeded to appeal with NLRC which affirmed the Labor the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being
Arbiter’s decision. Without seeking a reconsideration of the resolution, they filed an instant a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and
petition for certiorari in the SC. Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that
private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its
respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
employment with petitioners. of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence
protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and United
all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3). Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural
resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people,
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the including that of petitioners.
mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a specified agency of the United Nations.
Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations. 10 This is not to say that petitioners have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each
9
In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes
dated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency
private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the is a party."
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine
Government was an original signatory (Rollo, p. 21).

10
"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. "Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution mphasis supplied).
"2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
"Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets
of the specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from
search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by
Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action".
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1,
Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621.) We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:
 Protection against deprivation of liberty without due process is not limited to Filipinos (extends
Mejoff v. Director Of Prisons to everyone except enemy aliens)11
1951 (Jackie Espenilla) Art 2, Sec. 3 – the Phils adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the Nation
Nature:
a 2nd petitition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff (a Russian who was brought to the country Phils was part of UN General Assembly that approved Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese)  Said Declaration outlined:
 All human beings are born free and equal in rights
Facts:  Everyone is entitled to the freedoms set forth in this Declaration w/o making any
Mejoff was arrested as a Japanese spy upon Phil liberation by the US Counter Intelligence distinctions
Corps; he was handed to the Commonwealth for disposition according to Commonwealth Act  Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent tribunals for acts
No. 682. The People’s Court later released him. violating fundamental rights granted to him by the Consti or law
 No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
The Deportation Board found that he had no travel documents and was thus an illegal alien.
Philippine law on immigration was copied from US law, thus the reasoning in Staniszewski v.
The Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that he entered the country illegally in Watkins applies (writ of habeas corpus was sustained. Petitioner was released w/ condition to
1944 and was ordered deported immediately inform immigration officials of his whereabouts every month until he can be properly deported)

Has been in detention ever since (failed attempts to deport him) while authorities try to make Further, petitioner has no pending charges against him and the prospects of bringing any
new travel arrangements against him are slim and remote.
The Court held that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of expulsion of
undesirable aliens and said detention for a reasonable length of time is a Government right
 No period was fixed within which immigration authorities would Kuroda v. Jalandoni
carry out the deportation (Jackie Espenilla)
 “Reasonable time” depends on the circumstances
Nature:
Issue/Held/ Petition to declare EO No. 6812 invalid/ petition to prohibit proceeding with the case
WON Mejoff should be discharged from custody
Facts:
Writ will issue commanding petitioner’s release w/ terms: shall be placed under surveillance; Kuroda was formerly a Lt. General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the
will put up a bond as surety Japanese forces in the Phils. he is now charged before a military commission convened by

Ratio:
Non-enemy Foreign nationals against whom no charge has been made other than the expiry
of their permission to stay may not be indefinitely kept in detention 11
Note: Petitioner’s entry in to the Phils was not unlawful as was brought in by a de facto
belligerent Jap govt (decrees were law)

12
EO No. 68 – established a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals.
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with having failed to discharge his says that participating lawyers have to be qualified in the Phils. Common in military tribunals
duties 13 that counsels are usually military personal

Kuroda now petitions SC to establish the illegality of EO No. 68 because (a) it violates local Spirit of comity esp. since US is a party in interest
laws and constitution and (b) because the Phils. is not a signatory of the Hague Convention
on Rules and regulations covering Land Warfare EO No. 68 is valid. Military commission can proceed.

Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid

Yes. SC says it is valid and constitutional

Art. 2, Sec. 3 of Consti – Phils. renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation
Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General
The Hague Convention and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the (Jackie Espenilla)
generally accepted principles of international law.
Nature:
Since both US and Japan signed them, their principles form part of our law even if Phils. was Appeal from a decision of lower court denying petition for naturalization of Eremes
not a signatory Kookooritchkin
Phils. was under the sovereignty of the US at the time the crimes were committed so we are
equally bound to uphold the principle Facts:
Kookoo applied for citizenship under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended by Act 535
Rights and obligations were not erased by assumption of sovereignty
Established at the hearing that he was a native born Russian and grew up in Russia under the
International jurisprudence established that all persons who have been guilty of planning or czars. When Bolsheviks took over, he fled the country and found his way to Manila in 1923
staging a war, committing atrocious crimes and offenses, etc are to be held accountable 14
Permanently established residence in Camarines Sur on May 1925
(2) WON respondents Hussey and Port can participate in prosecuting petitioner’s case  Remained a resident except from 1942-1945 because he
became an underground guerilla officer. After the liberation, he
Yes. It is not violative of Consti because the Military Commission is a special military tribunal went back to Camarines
governed by a special law and not by ROC which govern civil courts. Nothing in EO. 68 which  Has resided in Phils. for about 25 years

Married to a Filipina with whom he has a son

13
letting those in his command to commit atrocities and other high crimes against civilians and
prisoners in violation of the laws and customs of war Works as a shop superintendent with about 80 Pinoys under him. Gets income

14
EO No. 68 is in conformity with this
Can speak English and Bicol dialect. Intermingles with Pinoys. Has good moral character and
believes in the Phil Constitution
Applicant could have been chummy with the Japanese but instead, chose to fight in guerilla
movement

Although a Russian by birth, he disclaims allegiance to the present Communist govt of Russia.
He is thus STATELESS and a REFUGEE of this country

Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen is invalid and insufficient as a
basis for the petition for naturalization

Sec. 5 of Revised Naturalization Law – No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent Yamashita v. Styer
residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of (Jackie Espenilla)
arrival has been issued
i. Only a reconstituted declaration was presented as the records Nature:
of the Bureau of Justice were destroyed during the battle for the Petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Styer (Commanding General of the
liberation of Manila US Army Forces)
ii. Even if reconstituted, declaration is still valid coz proven by
other competent evidence Facts:
Yamashita was the commanding general of the 14 th army group of the Japanese army in the
(2) WON Kookoo established a legal residence in the Phils and WON he can speak and write Phils and is now charged before the American military commission for committing heinous
in Phil. Languages acts against Americans and Pinoys

Testimonies on the record show that he was a legal resident for a continuous period of not Was originally classified as prisoner of war but was later changed to war criminal
less than 10years as required by Sec. 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
Yamashita now wants to be changed back to prisoner of war and that the military commission
Lower court found that he could speak and write English and Bicol. Besides, no specific be prohibited from further trying him
standard has been set on the use of the principal Phil. Languages
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(3) WON Kookoo is really stateless and WON he is disqualified from citizenship WON Yamashita may seek writ of habeas corpus

Lower court is upheld in pronouncing Kookoo stateless. Nope. Petition DENIED.

Appellee’s testimony is uncontradicted and it is a well known fact that modern dictatorships
have scattered stateless refugees all over the world. Untenable. He doesn’t seek discharge from confinement, just restoration to old status as POW
i. Degree of confinement is a matter of military measure, beyond
Kookoo owes and feels no allegiance to Russia jurisdiction of civil court

Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.15

15
Jackie: Kookoo is Pinoy!
 ii. Military Commission has been validly constituted and has Issues/ Held/Ratio:
jurisdiction over petitioner (coz Yamashita fell into the hands of (1) WON the IBP has standing.
the US army)
No. They failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.
Under Par. 356 of the Rules of the Land Warfare, a Military Commission for the trial and “Upholding the rule of law and the constitution” is not sufficient to clothe it with standing. This
punishment of war criminals must be designated by the belligerent (the belligerent’s is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
representative in this case is Styer)

According to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific, the trial of
persons, units and organizations accused as war criminals will be the Military Commissions to (2) WON the President’s decision is subject to judicial review.
be convened by or under the authority of the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces.
Yes. When the President calls out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, the
Articles of War Nos. 12 and 15 recognized the military Commission appointed by military Court cannot question the wisdom or substitute its own. However, it can still conduct an
command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of examination on whether such a decision was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
the war not ordinarily tried by court martial.16 or whether or not it was exercised constituting grave abuse of discretion.

Further, it is alleged that Spain (Japan’s protecting power) as not given due notice before trial In lieu of such a decision made by the President, it is incumbent for the petitioners to show
was begun against petitioner, contrary to provision of Geneva convention. 17 that the decision was without factual basis. No evidence of such nature was adduced.

(3) WON grave abuse of discretion was committed in calling out the military when no
IBP v. Zamora emergency existed.
August 15, 2000, Kapunan, J.
In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
Facts:
IBP alleged that Erap, in ordering the military deployed in Manila, committed grave abuse of “More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the
discretion because: (a) no emergency existed, and thus no military deployment was peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace
warranted; and (b) through Letters of Instruction formulated by the head of the national police, is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
the joint exercise of ‘Task Force Tulungan’ (as visibility patrols) conducted by the marines and leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
the PNP was a violation of civilian supremacy because the task of law enforcement was only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
civilian in nature. attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
16
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
Yamashita is charged with permitting atrocities like rape of young girls, massacre of
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
noncombatants, destruction of property – offenses described in Par. 347 of the Rules of Land
Warfare
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling
of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring
17
Nothing in Convention saying that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of military martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.”
commissions appointed by victorious belligerent. Spain has also severed diplomatic relation with
Japan
(4) WON in deploying the marines, the President violated the civilian supremacy clause.
IBP contends that with the said agreement, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized Issues/ Held/Ratio:
and is thus in violation of Sec. 3, Article II of the Constitution. WON the ExecSec and DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute.
Court rules that there is no breach. The joint exercise merely constitutes a permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement; military participation in the conduct of joint visibility No. As chief architect of foreign policy, President is the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
patrols is appropriately circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI. Furthermore, leadership is international affairs. In the realm of treaty making, President has the sole authority to
vested in the PNP, a civilian institution, and their assigned role specifically gives them the negotiate with other states; ratification is under his/her authority. The Constitution, however,
responsibility of directing and managing the deployment of the marines. provides a limitation to such power to ratify by vesting in the Senate, the power to concur with
the President’s decision. It does not the agency delegated to ratify but the agency to concur or
There is no incursion of the military because the marines weren’t incorporated or enlisted as not with said decision. The duty being in the province of the President’s official duties, the
members of the PNP - the marines, in effect, merely provided assistance in these visibility court cannot compel the Executive branch by means of mandamus because it is beyond its
patrols; hence, such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. jurisdiction.

As evidenced by the long history of military and civilian agencies working in tandem with each
other, the joint visibility patrols instead of showing the alleged derogation of civilian Bayan v. Executive Secretary
supremacy, shows mutual support and cooperation in the deployment of the marines. October 10, 2000, Buena, J.

Puno, Separate: Facts:

He contends that the executive branch’s decision to cloud its activities under the political The VFA, after being ratified and concurred with, was put into effect on June 1, 1999.
question doctrine will not suffice. Petitioners contend that such an agreement is in violation of Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the
Constitution. Respondents claim that the applicable provision is Article VII Sec 21. since the
Mendoza, Dissenting, Concurring: VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves temporary visits engaged
There being no actual controversy manifest yet, the case should not be heard, but he concurs in joint military exercises.
with the dismissal of the petition because of the lack of standing.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.

No. As concerned citizens, taxpayers, and legislators, they fail to show that they have
sustained or in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary VFA. As taxpayers, the VFA doesn’t involve the exercise by Congress in taxing/spending
powers.
Facts:
The Rome Statute was signed by the Philippines through the DFA. Its’ provisions, however, (2) WON the applicable provision is that stated by the petitioners or that stated by
required that it be subject to ratification, acceptance and approval of the signatory states. respondents.
Pimentel, as senator, files a petition for mandamus claiming that the ratification of a treaty
(under domestic and international law) is a function of the Senate, hence, the Executive Dept. When the respondent says that temporary visits doesn’t make it a basing arrangement and
has a duty to transmit the signed statute to the Senate for ratification. thus invalidates the applicability of Article XIII Sec. 25, the Court considers this untenable
since the Constitution does not make a distinction between transient and permanent bases. Married businessman Silva cohabited with an unmarried actress Gonzales without benefit of a
When the respondent avers that said Article shouldn’t be controlling because no bases are marriage. Although they had two children, they eventually parted ways. Gonzales refused to
involved but merely troops and facilities, the Court finds it irrelevant because the provision’s allow Silva to be with the children on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights before
prohibition involves either one of the independent situations. the RTC. Petition was opposed by the mother of the children on the ground that Silva was a
womanizer and a gambler and such behavior would have detrimental effects on the children.
“It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, The RTC granted visitation rights which Gonzales still contended despite her marrying a
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in Dutch national and emigrating to Holland with the children. The CA ruled in favor of Gonzales
the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section because it saw that the rotation of custody would not be conducive to the welfare of the
21 opens with the clause “No treaty x x x,” and Section 25 contains the phrase “shall not be children.
allowed.” Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to
render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.”

“The fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply
with the strict constitutional requirements” regardless of what provision is deemed applicable. Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON visitations right should be granted.
The only thing to consider now is whether all the requirements of Article XVIII Sec. 25 have
been complied with: Yes. The Constitution doesn’t specifically mandate the “natural and primary rights of parents”
(a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when to those who have legitimate relationships with their children. And such visitations, contrary to
so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national the CA’s ruling, would not affect the children to such an extent that it would be detrimental to
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. their upbringing.

Petitioners say that there must be concurrence by the US Senate as well as illuminated by (c).
Respondents claim that the only thing necessary is US recognition of the treaty which was Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
given when the US Ambassador stated the VFA was binding.
Facts:
The Court says : “To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this Married for 11 years, wife, former teacher of the husband in college, files petition for
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity for failure to support the family and
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.” contribute to the management of the household. She alleges that he spent most of his time
drinking with his friends and that because of his extramarital relations, he infected her with an
“Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their STD – testament to which was confinement of both parties in a hospital for treatment. RTC
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance dismissed the petition saying: “The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically
common use.” incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the
grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.” CA affirmed the decision of the RTC citing Santos v.
Silva v. CA CA: “It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
Facts: celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of
prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.”
 June 13, 1997, Mendoza, J.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON the instant case with the circumstances presented can serve as a ground for Facts:
psychological incapacity. CMTC’s timber concession was approved by Marcos after it was previously cancelled;
however, said concession, operating on TLA no. 106, was under another concession (TLA no.
No. In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish 360) operated by FLDC – after issuance by Ministry of National Resources. TLA no. 360 was
the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a given primacy over the TLA no. 106 allegedly because of Marcos’ sister who was behind
psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of FLDC. Two years later, however, on June 1986, Ministry head suspended TLA no. 360 and
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no cancelled the license of FLDC (because in spite of previous suspension order, logging still
evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic continued). CMTC, learning of the cancellation, sought to revalidate TLA no. 106 by writing a
marital obligations. letter to the said government agency.

DENR declared TLA no. 106 as no longer having force and effect, the petition being barred
PT&T v. NLRC because of latches: CMTC did not immediately file an opposition when FLDC was awarded
the said concession and because it had waited for two years before filing such a petition. In an
Facts: appeal to the Office of the President and after its second motion for reconsideration, CMTC
A woman’s (Grace de Guzman) employment was terminated by PT&T because of alleged claims that it had written a letter dated on the day to oppose FLDC’s grant of TLA. The Office
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds. De Guzman argues that the real of the President, however, again denied the petition on the basis of a “new policy of
reason she was fired was because she contracted the married during employment which is consideration on forest conservation and protection.”
against company policy. She admits, however, that when she applied to work she indicated
she was single when, in fact, she was already married. She was reminded by correspondence CMTC appeals to the SC saying that there were no latches and that the new public
of the company’s policy of not accepting married women as employees. She subscribed to the consideration averred to by the Office of the President denied the CMTC due process. There
defense that she wasn’t aware of such a policy and thus, had no intent to hide the fact that being no total log ban in the country (Congress still needing to make an announcement
she was already married. The labor arbiter decided that she was discriminated against regarding the issue), any notice to this effect “must be stated in good form, not implied”; and
because of having contracted marriage while employed with the company. PT&T appealed to that in any case, any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot
the NLRC but the latter upheld the decision of the labor arbiter modifying the decision by affect petitioner’s vested rights in its TLA no. 106.
saying the woman’s dishonest nature warrants a 3-month suspension from work.
Main Issue/ Held/Ratio:
Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON the new policy of forest conservation and protection could affect the previous TLAs
WON PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman mentioned.
worker who contracts a marriage, is discriminatory and thus contrary to the Constitution?
Yes. Although PT&T asserts that it dismissed Grace because of her dishonesty; records, not As evidenced by reports, it would seem that CMTC was one of those whose TLAs were
to mention the letter reminding her of her company’s policy, say otherwise; proving that she terminated in 1983, a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. Since petitioner failed
was terminated because of her civil status. Furthermore, it was the policy itself which was the to protest the grant of concession within a “reasonable time”, action is barred by latches.
cause of Grace’s secretive conduct (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.) PT&T’s allegations of misappropriation is insincere and self-serving. “because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the
process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of
the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion
CMTC v. Alcala, Sec. DENR courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.”
 They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.
the previous dispensation. . . .
Moreover, they content that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with
growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that:
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can
hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. . . . Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by
in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified appropriation made by law.
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, 11
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First,
for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market
Guingona v. Carague conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from
April 22, 1991, Gancayco, J. short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Facts: Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising
The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service
and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or
for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's
automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis
Decrees 81, 117, and 1967. of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has
to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer
Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically
Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened,
Constitution, it shall be void. only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the (3) WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation.
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and
Marcos." P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable
the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
Issues/ Held/Ratio: charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall
(1) WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the
for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution. need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment
and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. necessitated by the very nature of the problem being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless
are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to
are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness
mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as
but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt shown by the books of the Treasury.
service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
Cruz, Dissenting:
(2) WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for
(1), Article VI of the Constitutional. release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this
requirement. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”, Cruz
Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the says no such regulatory boundaries exist.
Constitution recognizes that:
Padilla, Dissenting:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or
amended, repealed or revoked. sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be
construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch.
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve
or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in my opinion,
pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied Paras, Dissenting: Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our security is per se
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. unconstitutional.
 In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
Tanada v. Angara legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J. the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
Facts: the Constitution is upheld."
The Philippines, by ratification of the President and concurrence of the Senate became a
member of the WTO. Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution (2) WON the WTO agreement and its three annexes contravene the respective provisions in
mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the “parity provisions” and “national the Constitution.
treatment” clauses scattered in the agreement, annexes and other parts of the treaty. These
allegedly place foreign nationals on equal footing as Filipinos in contravention of the Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
Constitution’s Filipino-first policy. Main provisions which are supposedly violated by the WTO By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies."
agreement are the following: The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of
the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
(1) Art II, Sec. 19 – Self-reliant, independent economy. executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
(2) Art. XII Sec. 10 – Capital owned by Filipinos; grants, privileges, concessions for national enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato , the
economy gives preference to qualified Filipinos. principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
(3) Art. XII Sec. 12 – Preferential use of Filipino labor, material and goods. courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
These provisions are allegedly desecrated in the areas of investment measures, trade
selected aspects of IPR, and in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to attain Balanced
Development of
The SolGen, on the other hand, argues (a) that the charter provisions are not self-executing Economy
and are mere general policies; (b) that the provisions shouldn’t be read in isolation but in
conjunction with Art. XII Sec. 1 and 13, which when read properly as a whole, ensures that the As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
WTO agreement doesn’t violate the Constitution; and (c) that WTO contains sufficient development, as follows: (1) A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of trade wealth; (2) A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation
liberalization. for the benefit of the people; and (3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality
of life for all especially the underprivileged.
By praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners
are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and
Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt
Issues/ Held/Ratio: measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-
(1) WON the petition presents a jusiticiable controversy? reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." In similar
language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires
the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"; and speaks of industries strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
"which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices." trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development."

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
System, et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy"
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the policy:
grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and
not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The "Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
there are. economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities."
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign on "equality and reciprocity," the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them. industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers
and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages policy of laissez faire.
to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
Security Council. enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than Oposa v. Factoran
 the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
Facts: the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
Petitioners, minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it was a forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
taxpayer’s class suit representing themselves, the countless multitudes, and future the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
generations of those who are entitled to the benefits of the country’s virgin tropical forests. present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
The plaintiff’s complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in the healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
Philippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else. environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987,
satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Recent (2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve a the petitioner’s cause of action?
surveys, in the meantime, show that only 2.8% of the country’s land area is composed of
tropical virgin rainforests. Yes. Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution provides the right. A cause of action is therefore
present but as far as cancellation of TLA’s is concerned, there is a need to implead the
Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation, the Philippine Islands will be guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties.
bereft of national resources after the end of the decade, if not earlier. Plaintiffs assert their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to (3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the non-impairment clause?
protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
No. Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the same cannot
The complaint was filed against Factoran, then head of the DENR; it would order the DENR to be stigmatized as a violation of non-impairment clause because it is within the State’s
cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country, and cease and desist exercise of police power to protect its ecology.
from accepting, processing, renewing, and approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done Feliciano, Concurring:
because it would not allow due process. The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier Although the petitioners are in fact entitled to a balanced and healthful ecology as stressed by
right to a sound environment, and added that (a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they the Constitutional right, one cannot classify such a right as “specific” without doing excessive
were considered protected by the non-impairment clause, the State may still revoke such violence to the language. The implications of making the Sections in Article II self-executory
agreements when public interest demands it; and (b) in granting more TLAs to cover more are not the subject of this case. Petitioners should seek a specific legal right. It is his
areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion, and is understanding that the Court’s decision implies that within the collection of statutes, there is a
therefore subject to judicial scrutiny. specific right which the petitioners can use.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.

The petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational Chavez v. Phil. Estates Authority 18
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means 18
As you’ll gather from the last few deplorable digests (and this last one) … I’ve run out of juice.
Feel free to fix/update/mock them at your convenience. – Mars.
 Respondents – Yes; satisfied petitioner’s prayer for disclosure of renegotiations; moot,
Facts: because already signed.
PEA, as authorized by its charter created by Marcos, was mandated to reclaim land, develop,
improve, etc… sell, and lease these reclaimed lands. During the time of Cory, more land was Petitioners - counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply
transferred to PEA under its name. Transfer Certificate of Titles of the then reclaimed fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
Freedom Islands were given to PEA during this time. During Ramos’ tenure as President, issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
PEA, entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation without ambit of judicial review.
public bidding. The JVA intended to develop the reclaimed Freedom Islands and reclaim an
additional 250 hectares surrounding said islands. In 1996, Senate President Maceda, in a Court - PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the
privileged speech, called the JVA “the grandmother of all scams.” An investigation ensued with signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
the report concluding the following: implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner’s principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation
(1) The lands being sold to AMARI were lands of the public domain which the government has of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
not yet classified as alienable, and therefore the PEA has no authority to sell yet. lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
(2) Transfer Certificate of Titles of the Freedom Islands are then void; and the implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.

(3) JVA entered into is illegal. Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
In 1997, a Legal Task Force was formed by the President to study the JVA; but contrary to the involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Senate investigation that decried the JVA, the task force upheld its legality. This prompted Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands
Chavez, in 1998, to file suit as a taxpayer, contending the following: from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the
right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the (“CA No. 141” for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect
to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the
pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.
The Amended JVA, however, pushed through after being signed by PEA and AMARI, with the
approval of then President Estrada. After such a maneuver, Chavez prayed that the Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
renegotiated contract be declared null and void based on constitutional and statutory grounds. because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to
portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
Issues/ Held/Ratio: AMARI the latter’s seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
(1) WON the case is academic and moot after subsequent events. reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the
entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
(2) WON the petition should be dismissed because judicial hierarchy wasn’t respected. PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that
the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance review.
to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to
the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
(3) WON the petition should be dismissed because of non-exhaustion of administrative alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
remedies. compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The
Respondent – they didn’t ask us for the information before proceeding to Court to issue a thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable
mandamus; this is in violation of the rule of mandamus. Tanada v. Tuvera is different from the lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
current situation because there, the ExecDept had an affirmative statutory duty to publish the constitutional duty to the nation.
President Decrees and thus, the mandamus was warranted. In the instant case, PEA has no
affirmative duty to disclose such information. Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,[28] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on matters of
Court - The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government transcendental importance to the public, thus -
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal “Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law is an issue of ‘transcendental importance to the public.’ He asserts that ordinary taxpayers
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of ‘paramount public
JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA interest,’ and if they ‘immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this people.’
legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to when the subject of the case involved public interest.
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal, ‘public interest [was] definitely involved
(4) Do petitioners have standing? considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.’ We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the
for upholding the petitioner's standing. Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access “An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
that the petition at bar should be allowed.” when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.”
(5) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement. PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to “definite propositions of the government.” PEA maintains the right
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people’s right to information on matters of does not include access to “intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
public concern in this manner: communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the ‘exploratory stage’.”
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for before the closing of the transaction.
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.” AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they
decide.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.” We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them
restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the
to hold public officials “at all times x x x accountable to the people,”[29] for unless citizens contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make
have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the bidding process.
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government
by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording,
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no “official acts, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to
official recommendation, there arises a “definite proposition” on the part of the government. research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
From this moment, the public’s right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the formulating government policies.
non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, the
Court ruled as follows: The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference
“Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However,
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records,
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is need, of course, to public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier – and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.” The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on
Contrary to AMARI’s contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
understood that the right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for which courts have long recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to other
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if limitations that Congress may impose by law.
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects. There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on
The right covers three categories of information which are “matters of public concern,” namely: on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void
information in several legislations. from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
(6) Whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution. Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may determination of factual matters.
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural 1. Calderon vs. Carale
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
kind of alienable land of the public domain. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Congress.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural x x x
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these From the three (3) cases above-mentioned (Sarmiento III vs. Mison, Mary Concepcion
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or Bautista v. Salonga and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of Commissions, et al.,), these doctrines are deducible:
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
kind of alienable land of the public domain. whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit,
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Civil Service and Election).
Constitution. Under Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully,
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor
otherwise provided for by law. Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission
was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the
xxx xxx xxx Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. system of the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by banc.
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be . . . The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent interpretado legis vim obtinent" � the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and competent court has the force of law.
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to ISSUE 2: Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as interpreted it?
amended by said RA 6715. In Endencia and Jugo vs. David, the Court held:
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard
those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific
HELD: No. portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires the Constitution by the Legislative department that would be neither wise nor desirable, being
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government,
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents particularly those governing the separation of powers. (Emphasis supplied)
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must estimate the scope of its
because: constitutional powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding relevant constitutional prohibitions.
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and . . . The Constitution did not change with public opinion.
It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . and as long as it it speaks not only The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
from the hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the people . . . essential elements must be present.
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether can sign on their behalf.
the latter squares with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
question." These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
(NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect. assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before - not after - signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect
2. Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) - Digest of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (”Lambino Group”) initiative void.
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
(COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
(c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals This omission is fatal.
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition. hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on and unelected individuals.
direct proposal by the people 2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiatives
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.
adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as
shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change
the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not
revisions to the Constitution. revisions.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan† includes “change in its
generally affects only the specific provision being amended. fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.”
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
amendment and not a revision. changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary,
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
three branches. alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks- The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between “amendment” and
and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. “revision” is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a changes are called “revisions” because members of the deliberative body work full-
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative are called “amendments” because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the not make an “occupation, profession, or vocation† out of such endeavor. The SC,
however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional on the ground
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such HELD:
categorical intent and language. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in
change the outcome of the present petition. It’s settled that courts will not pass upon the terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b)
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate
complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to
provisions of RA 6735: take a leave of absence.
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition. regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. statutory basis.
Source: http://jlp-law.com/blog/lambino-vs-comelec-gr-174153-25-october-2006-digest/ In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the
3. Sanidad vs. COMELEC prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990 prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and
PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter
The Commission on Elections, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not
a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. � During the plebiscite petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be economic life of the nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by perform essential government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply.
forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio
time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF
information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without
newspapers or to specific radio or television times. resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency
2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
hereby made permanent. whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
4. Leyson vs. Office of the Ombudsman through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
G.R. No. 134990 April 27, 2000 corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its
committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
existing contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; (d) In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized
unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24%
MT Marilag; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15
not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the
P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited
Cocochem. to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is
CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions
Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in
irregularities and corrupt practices. The OMB dismissed the complaint, based on the finding Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public
that the case involved breach of contract. respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the OMB committed GADLAEJ in dismissing the complaint With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by
HELD: Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a petitioner.
government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive Secretary v. Gordon
jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices 16 is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties
Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that � for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper
controlled corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is
private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to collection of a sum of money plus damages.
perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the ; October 16, 1971
Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M.
Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1�wphi1.n�t ; January 22, 1973
SO ORDERED.
PRELIMINARIES JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
; March 31, 1973
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA ; October 12, 1976

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; April 4, 1981
“ ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION” LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO
ROBERT CLINTON (1987) EN BANC; May 22, 1986

“ CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND FACTS/ISSUES

CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS” - Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003) - Her gov’t was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti.
- Proclamation No. 3- “…Aquino gov’t is installed through direct exercise of power of the
ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.”
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.
“ MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC” - April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they would pursue it by extra-judicial
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997) methods.

“ FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: HELD

DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM” Petitions have no merit.
VICENTE MENDOZA (1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.
(2) Legitimacy of gov’t is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where people are the only
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER) judge.
(3) People have already accepted such gov’t, which is in effective control of the country,
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO making it a de jure gov’t.
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.
(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her gov’t.
GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967 IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
;October 24, 1986
TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DE LEON V ESGUERRA August 31, 1987 - Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
constitution.
SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution.
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997 - Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national
and local laws. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to
FACTS the Constitution.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a - Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a
people’s initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power.
7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all elective government officials. He 3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to
asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
up signature stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The 4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon
COMELEC took cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.
Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory Decision Petition granted
petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, on the
other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar SEPARATE OPINION
as the initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that what the
petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK PUNO [concur and dissent]
and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.
RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on
ISSUES amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)

1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the VITUG
COMELEC
2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for people’s initiative The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the required number
3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid of signatures.
4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin petition FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]

HELD looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to include amendments
1. Yes. Comelec’s failure to act on roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the to the Constitution.
petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court
- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didn’t come up with PANGANIBAN
the minimum number of signatures
- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance. RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300,
2. No. The law is inadequate. it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.
- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a
delayed afterthought. The word Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said RESOLUTION
section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution. ;
ESTRADA V DESIERTO - Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more
PUNO; bombshells were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources
FACTS Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over > Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2 nd
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos
voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term. in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long > In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of - January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass
pesos from jueteng lords. resignations ensued
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he - Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as
accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson the President of the Philippines.
from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still > Estrada left Malacañang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves
from Gov. Singson Malacañang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the nation.
Committee on Justice for joint investigation > He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson. transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to - Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a
impeach Estrada. resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA.
to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern - Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos - Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution
joined the chorus as well. No. 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the
Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According impeachment court is functus offictio.
to J. Puno: "The heat is on.") - Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar - Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and case as per Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have
corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.
representatives to the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as ISSUES
judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding. 1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started. 2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of 3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president
Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he 4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the
affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment extent of the immunity)
account with their bank on Feb 4 2000. 5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD - Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:
done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente > it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law
differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency > by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally
was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.
to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA - In this regard, Gonzales:
swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding. > seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from
Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this acting as such
case so look at those provisions too.) > seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, recommendations
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material > seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the
relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8) PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both > prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on
Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political certain matters.
one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA
as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision ISSUES
without violating the principle of separation of powers.) 1. WON the case has become moot and academic
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. 2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
(Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or 3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.) 4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the President and
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. 5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government,
Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the
Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.
GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000 HELD
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
FACTS because the issues involved have become academic or dead. It is beyond the scope of
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by then President judicial power to give advisory opinion.
Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to “study and Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner to exist. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an
of implementing the same.” inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion.
1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the 2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
PCCR’s work until Dec 31 1999. threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20, 1999 and was fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
dissolved by the President on the same day. action.
Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and (ART I, II, IV, V)
personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not STATE DEFINED
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.19
3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, the FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. FACTS
Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3 million is - Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of
“appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency
President.” The appropriations were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955.
Treasury.’ The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the - Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
(5) Art VI of Constitution. - Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption.
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has - Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of
not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign
interest. power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, “the right of the people to information on matters impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
limitations as may be provided by law.”
- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied ISSUE
by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary
possesses the right. for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to
- “matters of public concern” is a term which “embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for HELD
the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or - Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’s Ruling.
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.” - If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's
Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
furnish petitioner with information requested. control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE - it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
19
in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within
it and maintaining its separate international personality. FACTS
- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted - Petition for Certiorari
area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power - DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to Round of Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of the
enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not Philippines
exact independence as a condition of statehood. o To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval
- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions
the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. (Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.)
National Internal Revenue Code. - The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for
their concurrence
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, - Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act,
hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category. the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses their concurrence in the
ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES - The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
and the agreements and associated legal instruments of that agreement.
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the - The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not only the WTO
people and all government authority emanates form them. agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on
commitments in financial services.
ART V SUFFRAGE - Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also claim that since the Senate
only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified impliedly rejected the Final act.
by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months ISSUES
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement 1. WON the case is justiciable.
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage 2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO agreement
violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (“economic
nationalism” clauses).
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the 3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts and impairs legislative power of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Congress.
4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and 5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot. implies rejection of the final act.

HELD
TANADA V ANGARA
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes. 5. No.
- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of - The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the
any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress proceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement,
2. No which they did.
- The declaration of principles are not intended to be self-executing, rather, they are - The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the member’s
just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature in deliberations.
enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative enactments to implement them.
REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
- The economic nationalism provisions should be read with other constitutional mandates, FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12.
- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the agreement with FACTS
respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
intended to help developing economies. Petitioner: William Reagan –civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers to the freedom assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines
from undue foreign control of the national economy. Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or July 7, 1959 –Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be April 22, 1960 –He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6,443.83
July 11, 1960 –petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was granted
pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.
provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in the
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson,
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. Jr. of the US Marine Corps.
3. No - As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and voluntarily as petitioner’s personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at
agreed to by the Philippines. P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the sum, petitioner
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country. sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.
- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. He contends that in legal
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations. jurisdiction to tax.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations - Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue:
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its soverign rights under the “While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation
concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue) of law on foreign soil.” The court resolved this by pointing out that the statement was merely
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.
of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens. ISSUE
WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still on the patent
HELD
owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product.
Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases
- The new rule should not really present any problem in changing the rules of evidence as the Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.
present law on the subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar presumption in cases of - The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
infringement of patent design. entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Likewise,
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies. it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a *The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks,
restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate previously held the funds:
in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no 1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their 2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, Avertina-Foundation accounts
but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by 3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. 4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts
- Therefore, the Philippines’ jurisdictional rights over the bases, certainly not 5. Maler Foundation accounts
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an
appropriate exemption was provided for. b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded
- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part) the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko
income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.
- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
CORONA; July 15, 2003
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
FACTS - Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family
PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the - The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the
Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos , inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
pursuant to RA 137920. conditions contained therein.
- PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 - It was stated in one of the “whereas clauses” the fact that petitioner Republic “obtained a
by then President Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of assisting the judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in
President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met….” The
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be
during is administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
relationship.” - Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) Agreements.
sought:
a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 - Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
million inclusive of interest as of the time of decision) deposited in escrow 21 in the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition.
Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth. - Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement “(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment”
20
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Procedure Therefor.
21
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the
third party, the money or instrument is said to be “in escrow”. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for
approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income
remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. - the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of
20 years from 1965 to 1984.
The Fund Transfer - This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos’ salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at P100,000/year),
additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. Imelda Marcos’ salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year),
This was granted. income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources.
- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of - Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before
Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998. he became President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after

The Petition for Summary Judgment - Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment “pertaining to the 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal practice is valid)
forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds: - The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.
a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents
in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding
ISSUES
b. respondents’ admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or
ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any 1. WON petitioner Republic’s action for certiorari is proper.
material fact in the present action 2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos summary judgment.
children. 3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, stating that
there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds, HELD
which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State. 1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marcos children followed. and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that availability of the remedy of appeal.
“the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long
to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds”, and thus denied petitioner’s motion for overdue.
summary judgment. Hence, the present petition. 2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at
- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss summary judgment
Federal Supreme Court decisions and their “authenticated translations” have not been Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that - a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever lacking in substance.
challenged. - Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition
- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied. for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). Their answers include “they have no sufficient knowledge” or “they could not proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of
recall because it happened a long time ago” or “the funds were lawfully acquired” without income.
stating the basis of such assertions. Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and
- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents’ answer qualifies as the specific denial convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other
called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and,
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand
not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. as proved.
- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been - the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in
specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of
Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses’ participation in the illegal acquisition
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment of funds.
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering RESOLUTION
summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the CORONA; November 18, 2003
issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious.
- motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the - SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matters for the
issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of Court to resolve.
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.
- It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the
pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due process?
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived - Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are entitled to
right it had to move for summary judgment. constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.
- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the - SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a
respondents’ answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a particular act
litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause.
from moving for summary judgment. - substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with
c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, the rights of a person to his property
estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. - there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or Respondents were not deprived of their property through forfeiture for
asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or arbitrary reasons.
public policy. - procedural due process means compliance with procedures or steps, even
- estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has it.
abandoned his right or declined to assert it. - forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature, contrary to
- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not respondents’ contention that they are penal in character. The proceedings under
only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture
unless the action is barred. in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired - Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven
when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful by preponderance of evidence. The Government is required only to state the
income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal
provenance to attach. Petitioner Republic having established this presumption,
 burden of proof shifted to respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence - No prescription against the Spanish Crown
that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate - Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make
sources of income. Respondents failed on this part. the title good
- essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)
submit one’s evidence in support of his defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their - Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser
case, defenses and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do so and have - Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the
tried to confuse the issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under
case Spanish laws
- “the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, - Plaintiff argues:
capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the - Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important
ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner – that is, the Republic of the Island of Luzon
Philippines – in the shortest possible time.”
ISSUE
Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality. WON Carino owns the land

DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM HELD

Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
HOLMES; February 23, 1909 possession, as a valid title by prescription.”
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners;
FACTS cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiff’s father was owner of land by the very
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of terms of this decree.
registration of their ancestral land through writ of error. - By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United
- Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and
also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was - Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the - The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white
lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is
to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain.
- Procedure - The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
- Court -– application of land registration granted (March 4, 1904 ) the decree, if not by earlier law.
- CFI of Benguet – appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US having taken Decision REVERSED
possession of property for military and public purposes; application dismissed - Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the
- Philippine SC – affirmed decision of CFI Benguet practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
- Federal SC – writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
- Respondents argue:
- Given that KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the MORAN; November 15, 1947
Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired
 majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the
FACTS constitutional question.
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila - To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc the constitution, offense that may be permanent.
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. - The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)
Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this - The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more
jurisdiction. comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta. ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal. WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal. - This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared. leak into aliens' hands.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal - This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources,
after the briefs have been presented. with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to public
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
agreeable to it. - This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.
- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) - It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino
transfers of residential lots to aliens. citizens.
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular. - Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a
withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
ISSUE - The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to
Jurisdiction: acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence,
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became
circular of the DOJ effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
Primary Issue:
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is FACTS
discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented. - Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional - Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of
issue should be avoided. Lands and Court of Appeals
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the - APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and - Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because
ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again Naga Cadastre) through accretion .
before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a - Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture
- Oct 21, 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510 and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore
ISSUES cannot institute for the nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are not the registered
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private – owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of
not public - domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration) Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is
the validity of a grant (this court says it does) undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant (in
recognized (this court says it should be). this case, the respondents) cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between
the grantee and the government.”
HELD
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.
embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the state’s capacity to own or
acquire property. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands 3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands – in appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto . This is fatal to them
Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular Government). In Valenton v based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
Murciano (1904), all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to
us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 § 48 says that
only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title
in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may based thereon becomes indefeasible.
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), “[t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law
the sole power is vested in Congress. and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are
The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the Secretary of against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by of registration issued is conclusive and final.
virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim). In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and
fraud committed by respondents. effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open – notices were published, sale and favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.”
awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer.
David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s application, wherein his deceased
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land. wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.
 (2) –As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs, in
The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resolution of March 14, behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit
1969 are affirmed of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to
administer the private contributions and donations given not only by the US government but
GONZALES V MARCOS also by private persons
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975 -Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently exercised by the
President and Congress
FACTS Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no encroachment and that it is
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President already moot and academic
on the legislative prerogative
- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES
style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our people’s consciousness in the PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
nation’s cultural heritage and encourage its preservation, promotion and development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by the Center as FACTS
coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation - Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)
- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is - Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission on -Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite personality to contest as a lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory;
taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations - Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)
and contributions and not one centavo came from taxation - Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,...
including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree
ISSUES lots.
1. WON petitioner has standing - Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)
2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative - Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and
3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP,
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial
HELD continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
not involve the use of public funds areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an by ICC but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are
agreement with a foreign country still nomadic or shifting cultivators.
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has assumed a moot and academic - Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that
character questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION (directing
NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; DENR Secretary to cease from
Obiter implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the
contributions and not by taxation State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 and imprescriptible.
ISSUES D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution, and it
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned - was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti.
(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's -Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution
ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other (1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the
natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE. land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE
(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS. (AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL).
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case
and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains that specifically and categorically recognizes native title.
and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution. b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a necessary implication is that AL is private.
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is (2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED
invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD.
departments. a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But the AD is owned in common by
the ICC/IP and not by one particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not only by
HELD the present possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP.
There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in accord with
case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if
petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. transferred to a non-member of IP.
- Those in favor of dismissing petition: c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title.
J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza (3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the right of ICC/IP to develop
- Those in favor of granting petition: lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR,
J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Implementing Rules of IPRA included
SEPARATE OPINIONS the term "natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12
of the 1987 Consti.
PUNO [dismiss] b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12
- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System of the 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these resources, by their very nature,
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
Crown. c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par.1 and 4,
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior
occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential rights.
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain (4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International Indigenous
from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner." Movement.
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public land" referred to
all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government . The Torrens system VITUG [grant]
requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the (1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains, as the notion of
person named is the owner of such property described. The certificate of title is indefeasible community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of self-
governance over the property. citizens. The State retains full control over such activities, through the imposition of
(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot override the requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the NR.
collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited :
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get Congress to look closely into the  to manage and conserve NR within territories;
customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them  to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of NR;
part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of  to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the area (refers only to
IP and imperatives of national interest. the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources);
 to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of
any project that will affect AD;
KAPUNAN [dismiss]
 to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects;
~Preliminary issues-
 to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights
(1) The petition presents an actual controversy. c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket
(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing. authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated ~Corollary issues-
and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain (1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected")
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy. belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous. Where the law
(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, (petition does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does not mean that the
importance of the issues raised. NCIP is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-IP.
~Substantive issues- c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the ancestral lands and domains relations in determining the ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties involved are
are not unconstitutional. members of IP.
a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since (2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of
time immemorial. control over the Executive Department.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are "absolutely Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was placed by Congress "under the
necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the State. Office of the President" and as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.
not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private property, as they have
acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property. MENDOZA [dismiss]
(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the (1) It is not a justiciable controversy.
natural resources within the ancestral domains. Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a controversies without upsetting balance of power.
right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private (2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
property of the IP. In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has NOT been procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest.
recognized in the Philippines. But in this case, “what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not
(3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens??”
unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural resources by its PANGANIBAN [grant]
- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that- She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for
A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. her application
which are owned by the State." was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shauf’s work
B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to
utilization of natural resources" which should under be the full control and the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then informed by
supervision of the State." CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Because of the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977.
State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an equal
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership . employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective right, still perpetually former by reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of
withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens Appeals reversed decision.
of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 ISSUES
hectares of alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral 1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance
lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that AD cover with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases
80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State).
2. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf.
in the country.
3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration,
development and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint venture or HELD
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not be sued without its
(and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of consent. This is a generally accepted principle of International law under Art II, Section 2. The
ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time limit. case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be
(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
granted perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorized
other law-abiding Filipino citizens. acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials by one
whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE the rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and
REGALADO; November 27, 1990 Sarmiento.
1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State.
FACTS 2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Despite Shauf’s
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member qualifications, Persi did not even consider the former’s application. Since the
of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the non-consideration of her
1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. application, the burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however
answered with mere denials of the charges.
 3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was no proof that she Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from
really was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages which are suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions.  this is part of the
merely possible are speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss. second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But
WYLIE V RARANG
even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation 22. The doctrine
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for
acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties.
FACTS
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an
independence and equality of States.
employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them ––
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” a daily
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
publication that featured among others, an “action line inquiry”. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts
published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by
jure imperii.
the merchandise control inspector and that a certain “Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the
There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the
office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S.
for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow
the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
inadvertent publication.) It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule. 2. No.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of
officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held
being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official
subject matter and the parties involved. duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
country can’t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
ISSUES
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation
duties, are immune from suit. against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the
covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because
under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act
HELD or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed
the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the
1. Yes, they are immune.
damages they caused the private respondent.
22
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon
its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states
 - Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO
CRUZ; February 26, 1990 G.R. No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnel, an extension of Clark Air
FACTS Base.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the - He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye
RTC of Angeles City and Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and special agents of the United States Air
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all involving state immunity. Force Office of Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed from employment.
G.R. No. 76607 - He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioners.
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in - Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained
services in the said base. of and that the suit was against the United States without its consent.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and individual - Motion was denied by respondent judge.
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to allow - Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating concessions pending
litigation. G.R. No. 80258
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status quo. - Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a result of the
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary acts of herein petitioners.
injunction on the ground that the action was a suit against the United States, which - According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants (herein petitioners) beat them up,
has not waived its non-suability, and that as officials/employees of the U.S. Air handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them extensive
Force, defendants were also immune from suit. injuries.
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the motion to - According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs
dismiss. because they were struggling and resisting arrest.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. - The United States of America and the individually named defendants moved to
dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United
G.R. No. 79470 States which has not given its consent to be sued. The defendants also claimed
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for immunity for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station in - Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: facts were ascertained: - Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables served to club
customers. ISSUES
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove and referred the case to the Board of 1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits against the United States, to which it has
Arbitrators, which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. not consented
- Defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the 2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from suit by mere assertion that the
complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force, was immune acts were done by them in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of
from suit, and that the suit was in effect against the United States, which has not the United States
given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied. HELD
1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a contract in the discharge of its - However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in the court below must still be
commercial, proprietary and private function, then the state will be deemed to have impliedly dismissed. Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence
consented to the suit. that they acted properly in terminating Genove for his disgusting offense.
Reasoning - Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now expressed in Article XVI, G.R. No. 80018
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international - Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions, and not in
law. their private or unofficial capacity.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other. - It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
may be sued if it consents. sued.
- Consent may be express or implied. - Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
- Express-embodied in a general or special law G.R. No. 80258
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation - The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record is too meager to indicate if the
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suability—a distinction must be made individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official functions, or had actually
between contracts entered into in a state’s governmental and sovereign capacity or private, exceeded their authority.
proprietary and commercial capacity - Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not. individual petitioners were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity is
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of applicable.
their official functions as officers or agents of the United States, then they may not invoke - Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and
immunity form suit. decision.
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
- The fact that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the PUNO; December 15, 1994
performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States is a
matter of evidence, and charges against them may not be dismissed just by mere assertion. FACTS
If the individual petitioners are found liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not - Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP)
involved, then they alone must satisfy the judgment. working at JUSMAG Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-1992); was
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases) dismissed on April 27, 1992
G.R. No. 76607 - He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment (March 31, 1992) on the
- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US are commercial enterprises operated ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement
by private persons. The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners cannot plead any - JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of US;
immunity. also alleged lack of employer-employee rel’p and it has no juridical personality to sue and be
- Petition is dismissed. sued
G.R. No. 79470 - Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business - NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG
enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. Petitioners cannot failed to refute the employer-employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it has waived its right
invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them. to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramento’s services.
 - NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (“US Govt waived its immunity from suit by - It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was
entering into a contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the performing a governmental function on behalf of the US. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one
jurisdiction of local courts”) against the US Government.
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in - In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle. Immunity is
reversing the labor arbiter’s decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its immunity from understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
suit, in finding an employer-employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento, and in another state.
considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure - A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, without its consent or waiver. An
to present proof. exception to the doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al:
“the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a
ISSUE contract, the sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and its consent to be
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.”
suit? - it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign
HELD states may, at all times, be sued in local courts.
Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been - US vs. Ruiz: “...does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot be sovereign functions”
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts. - US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: “petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity...the reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove
Reasoning
in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a governmental function sovereign immunity from suit.”
on behalf of the US pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in effect, one - SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not
against the US and, considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the estopped from denying employer-employee relationship
complaint cannot prosper. Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC is reversed and set aside
- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law
that the Phils. Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. This is anchored on the PNB V CIR
principle of sovereign equality of states (an equal has no power over an equal). FERNANDO; January 31, 1978
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG FACTS
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947 - Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was served upon its branch on QC by
between the Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise and assist the an authorized deputy sheriff of the court
Philippines on air force, army and naval matters *** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the salaries of SASP Corporation deposited at the petitioner’s branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the
and security guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities respondent court
- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-Phils - PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds:
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP 1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational control of the Chief serve the writ of execution was contrary to law
JUSMAG-Phils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement pay liability for all *** PNB contends that the service of notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of this court
appointed SASP contravenes Sec. 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 10523

23
“All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court, in
the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance
*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who is its Ex- up to the present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially
officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and that the actual published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public
service of the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order auction of the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiff’s letter to defendant demanding the
2. the funds subject of the character “may be public in character” latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their
- COIR denied PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly amortizations,
defendant SSS still went on to publish second and third publications of foreclosure.
ISSUE - On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of First Instance of
WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying, for lack of merit, petitioner Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of
PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment 24 can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
discretion. amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment against
defendant SSS. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s decision. Hence, this petition for
HELD review on certiorari.
No. There’s no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio ISSUES
1. RA No. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is (1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of as would have foreclosure
of this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and notices (2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. And 2 nd, the People’s (3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued.
The premise that the funds spoken of are public in character may be accepted in the sense HELD
that it was government-owned. However, it does not follow that they were exempt from (1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual findings of the lower court are
garnishment. not subject to review by this Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this ratio. Applying the rule, it can be
SSS v CA said therefore, that the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors have not in
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983 fact violated their contract because SSS accepted their installment payments although given
late will not be disturbed on appeal.
FACTS (2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for and were an enabling law, is deemed to have waived immunity from suit, although it does not thereby
granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. concede its liability.
Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First
Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on March Instance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National Power Corporation as an
26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which entity performing governmental functions. In that case it said, “It is sufficient to say that the
was later increased to P48,000.00 covering said property. government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site and
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the be sued in any court under its charter.” The enabling law is R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others the present case, the SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the default on Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24. Hence, there’s a statutory consent by
the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit.
debt and the interest thereon, and all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter
24
Garnishment – a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt
-- also the attachment of such property
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be adjudged against a party which Total due from the government, including attorney’s fee of ten percent amounted to
commenced foreclosure proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of his P214,356.75.
installments. - Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the compensation, relied on Article 1250 of
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is true that the payments of the the New Civil Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from
monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the what has been agreed on because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.
appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment - The government, through the Solicitor General, appealed the decision contending that the
of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly court a quo erred in applying its method and violated the high court’s order to make as a basis
installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors of compensation the price or the value of the land when it was taken. The Solicitor General
apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. also took issue with the award of ten percent as attorney’s fees as exhorbitant considering
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. that Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part. ISSUES
1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper
SEPARATE OPINION 2. WON the attorney’s fees awarded were exorbitant

MAKASIAR [dissent] HELD

 What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly negligent bordering on malice 1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil Code, the Court noted that the provision
or bad faith) of the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage of the wrong applies only if there was a contract or agreement. Using the precedent, Velasco vs Manila
mortgage-debtor Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971), the court expressed the view that the taking of private
 SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its employees in property by the government in the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a
the performance of their regular functions
contractual obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of because the obligation of the
 SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune from suit despite its Charter
government sought to be enforced does not originate from contract, then Article 1250 does
provision that it can sue and be sued.
 SSS exercises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without its consent for not apply. The just compensation is the value of the property at the time it was taken.
the tortious acts of its personnel - Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the land as there was no motion of
reconsideration from the Solicitor General before the decision became final.
COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS 2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000 attorney’s fees and hence the
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980 amount requested is reasonable.

FACTS Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the price of the
- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu land. And the price of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79 plus six percent
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the compensation determined is now the per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was taken to the time the
issue. The value of the property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter based on the price compensation is paid.
used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in the same area at about the same
time. However, the court a quo in determining due compensation, considered the value of the GOVERNMENT
pesos to the dollar at the time the case was being decided. So instead of just P14,615.79 the
amount awarded became P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided by 2 {the UNITED STATES V DORR
exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being LADD; May 19, 1903
multiplied by 6.775). Based on this amount, the court determined interest to be P145,410.44.
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which authority of
the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands. Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are
the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into
upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission 25. The alleged libel was published as an disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private
editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6, 1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no seditious
Commission and its members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)
peace and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal, were Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted.
explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.
TERRITORY
ISSUES ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression “the Insular Government of the
Philippines”?26 The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and water
2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292? embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea,
HELD the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
1. Ratio The term “government” as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
the concrete organism of the Government – the Houses of Congress and the Executive.
Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term “government” provided: a. in a REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046
general and abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or b. the An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines
aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered. The first admissible definition is derived from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on - Approved: 17 June 1961
July 14, 1798, commonly known as the Sedition Act) 27 Whereas clauses –
1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:
2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292 of the United  All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and
States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to US-Britain treaty (1930).
produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the  All waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the archipelago.
Government and obedient to its laws.  All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but within limits of boundaries set
- The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is determined consist of straight
members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the
lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago.
United States Philippine Commission.
Section 1 – It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the Phils.
Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government system of the
Section 2 – All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are considered inland or internal
U.S., and though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its
waters of the Phils.
25
“Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics mine) 
26
N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the next issue. R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining
27
“It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further says that the definition of the
in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States…"
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, - The President may authorize a government agency to promulgate rules for the purposes of
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils. has acquired dominion and this decree
sovereignty. Approved September 18, 1968. - Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine (P2,000-
P100,000) or imprisonment (6 mos – 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or articles
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596 used shall be confiscated.

June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring certain area (the Kalayaan Island PEOPLE
Group or more commonly known as the “Spratly Islands”) as Philippine territory as well as PREAMBLE
providing for its Government and Administration.
 said area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and much We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
of it is part of the continental margin of the Phil. archipelago and humane society and establish s Government that shall embody our ideals and
 the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by reason of history, aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
indispensable need, effective occupation and control established in accordance with ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
international law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and air
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
space) must be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the Phil.
promulgate this Constitution.
 other states’ claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the claims of the
Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds
 named it “Kalayaan” and constituted it as a distinct and separate municipality of ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Palawan
 administration and government shall be vested in the Secretary of National Defense Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
or in other Civil govt. or AFP officers as may be designated by the Pres. people and all government authority emanates from them.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599 Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other Purposes Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the service.
exploration and use of marine resources – Wikipedia
- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
territorial sea consciousness among them.
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall be determined by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ? Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and healthful
management of the natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of
ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of
the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution, and scientific
research Sec 2:
o Other rights recognized by international law or state practice Sec 7:
- It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec 4: - Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The
birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Español father and to a mestiza
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS Español mother.

Sec 2: Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following
ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
Sec 25: - Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed
a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS English translation of (b)
VITUG; March 3, 2004 - Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office
FACTS stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of - Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. - FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:
- His real name was stated to be “Fernando, Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila - Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
on August 20, 1939. in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify - Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural- - Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
born Filipino citizen. - Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of
- According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe Lorenzo Pou,
was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of - Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. - Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino - Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. - Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during
marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified” copy of a supposed World War II
certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. - January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier
- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the
only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.
reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan - February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a
was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American. writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
- FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou. execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in - The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the
September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos, jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and
Pangasinan. exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
 - The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in
ISSUES assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed? because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President
misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
- A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election
HELD protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
- The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate - “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the
could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court. President or Vice-President of the Philippines.” (Rule 12)
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before - “An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition
it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President.” (Rule 13)
before the elections are held. - “Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the
Reasoning second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed? or the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the
- Fornier petition - Yes proclamation of the winner.” (Rule 14)
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the - The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
following: returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates
- “A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of for President or Vice-President.
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…” 2. Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate
(Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78) opinion)
- “…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and - The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of of civil law and should not unduly impinge on the domain of political law.
enduring free, orderly and honest elections…” (Sec. 52, same) - The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
- “any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the regardless of whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate.
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same) Reasoning
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the - Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially
Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that, misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?
according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, “any decision, order or ruling of each - Concept of citizenship
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved - Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in the administration of justice and
party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” in the holding of an office and the state would be composed of such individuals in
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts order to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and - Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion obligations on the other.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality - Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries.
of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution). - In the 18th century, the concept was civil citizenship which established the rights
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No necessary for necessary for individual freedom (eg. Rights to property, personal
liberty and justice)
 - In the 19th century, it expanded to include political citizenship which - An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1899.
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. - Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born between April 11, 1899 and July
- In the 20th century, there was the development of social citizenship which laid 1, 1902 as there was no citizenship law in the Philippines. The common law
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. principle jus soli (principle of territoriality) was said to govern those born in the
- Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing development. Philippines during this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) – A native born inhabitant of the Philippines
- Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to the present was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if:
- During the Spanish period, no such term as “Philippine citizens,” only “Spanish - A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
subjects.” In church records, natives were identified as “indios.” - Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- Spanish laws on citizenship included: - Since that date, not a citizen of another country
- Order de la Regencia of 1841 - 1935 Constitution – provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis for
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the political status of children born citizenship, as stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
in the Philippines) - Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870 the Constitution
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the Philippines because the - Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
colony was to be governed by special laws. of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the following were Spanish citizens: - Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
- Persons born in Spanish territory - Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
- Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of - 1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when
any town of the Monarchy taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands.
inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and natives This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from
who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children
Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following are
renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they citizens of the Philippines:
reside. - Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Philippines became Constitution
Spanish subjects. - Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
- They did not become American citizens but were issued passports describing - Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to protection of the US. Constitution
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first appearance of the term “citizens of the - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
Philippine islands.” A citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act was: - Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the
- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. Philippines who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her
- An inhabitant meant: act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law.
- A native born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
 - 1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the of official duty in the preparation of the statement made. The penalty
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that affixed to a breach of that duty. Routine and disinterested origin of most
the following are Filipino citizens: such statements. Publicity of the record which makes more likely the prior
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this exposure of such errors as might have occurred
Constitution - It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence at the time of death
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines was the same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine would attest otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. citizenship would then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish colonization period.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should be, among the - Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the crucial
many requirements, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2). period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record to attest to that
- Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform claim.
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship - Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the country during that
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and father same time period.
Allan F. Poe’s citizenship - Lorenzo’s residence at the time of death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino. - For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn from the documents in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJ’s
presented: maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe,
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley. recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the
- FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939. children in one house as one family) would be accepted.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September - Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should apply because
16, 1940. FPJ was an illegitimate son.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou. - Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement
- At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 in the birth certificate by signing name)
years old. - In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth
- The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy. certificate of FPJ.
- The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of - 1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement of illegitimate children of three
Bessie and Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true types which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent:
copies of the originals. - Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a statement before
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state that when the subject of the the court in authentic writing)
inquiry is the content of the document, no evidence shall be admissible - Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate
except the original document itself. One of the exceptions however is child who was recognized as natural)
when the original is a public record in the custody of a public office is - Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in
recorded in a public office. his favor any evidence to prove filiation)
- As public documents, the three documents are prima facie proof of their - The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172,
contents as stated in the Rules of Court (130, Section 44) that the entries 173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255).
in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty These provisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is grounded on:’
 of the family. There is little indication that this should also govern his 1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJ’s citizenship but the evidence
political rights. preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his
- This should be taken in the context of civil law, being that branch of law which certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of
is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property. discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition.
The relevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code. 2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship status should be
deemed independent from those prescribed for civil code purposes. The SEPARATE OPINION
ordinary rules should govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to. PUNO
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s Jurisdiction
citizenship. - SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction
- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would - Tecson and Valdez petitions – petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution
not have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. because the word “contest” means that the Court can only be invoked after the
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no “contest”
his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior before a winner is proclaimed.
existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of - Fornier petition – as a review under R64 in relation to R65 of the RoC, Court has
this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful. jurisdiction.
- Fornier also contended that even if Allan and Bessie’s marriage was not - COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to
bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate because his parents were married after he prove by substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizan in his CoC
was born. Fornier based his arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo,
- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions is a limited power
Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic.
- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the ground that COMELEC
- In the cases cited above, it is important to note the lis mota in each case.
committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or capricious)
If the pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the lis mota, it would
- The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe is based on
constitute doctrine courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere obiter
substantial evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capricious
dictum.
- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC – misrepresentation must not only be material but
- In all of the mentioned cases, there was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota
also deliberate and willful
of the cases. If there was jus sangunis mentioned, it was mere obiter
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show that (1) respondent made
dictum.
misrepresentation in his CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the position to
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the father’s
which he is candidate and (3) that material misrepresentation was made deliberately
citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal
and willfully
protection clause.
- Analysis of petitioner’s evidence
- For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s
- Certificate of birth – only proved the date of birth of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-
citizenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the
born citizen
assumption that the mother would gain custody.
- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Poe with bigamy and marriage
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period
license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented thru Dir. Manapat – pulled
and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are citizens of the
out because they were fabricated
Philippines.
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show that the files submitted by the
petitioner are fabricated by Manapat’s instructions
Decision
 - Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered because of technical - “The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The
grounds right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate.
- SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and are not bound by the - To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and declare respondent Poe as a
technical rules of evidence. natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe – also fabricated; does not prove anything besides birth - Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status as natural-born
- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo citizen --- that is the law.
Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907 – manufactured - The law does not make any distinction in applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives Div that the Register of Births that children.
there is no information on the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the spouse - Morano v Vivo – WON the stepson was to file the natural cerebral house.
Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes – lack of information is not proof - Chiongbian v de Leon – a legitimate son whose father became Filipino because of
- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted himself as Filipino election to a public office before the 1935 constitution
- “For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Poe is entitled to an - Serra v Republic – an illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.” Poe does not need to present contrary - Paa v Chan – Quintin claims that his father is Filipino because his grandmother is a
evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him. Filipina. The court ruled that since there is no proof that his grandmother is Filipino
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of whether then his father is not Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well. The court’s ruling
respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier petition should have stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if
need not be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of evidence Quintin’s father were Filipino, he would not be Filipino because he was illegitimate.
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to prove his case is a - The statements on the illegitimate child were unnecessary and were just obiter
palpable error dicta and not ratio decidendi, therefore do not constitute stare decisis.
- “In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner - Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if repeated endlessly.
Fornier is not only wring with his facts but also wrong with his law. - Reasons why court should create new doctrine:
- Remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings - There is no textual foundation
have long been closed and terminated; to give another chance to prove facts which he - It violates the equal protection clause
failed to prove before - People v Cayat – established the doctrine on constitutionally allowable
- Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant because of political neutrality distinctions. Such distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law.
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation, hence, - Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor – “The duty of this Court is to forsake and
unconstitutional abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.”
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation - Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus , especially if the distinction
in his CoC when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen has no textual
- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the character of a S78 proceeding - Merlin Magallona – transmissive essence of citizenship
(WON FOJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just an issue - To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen, all that is needed is proof of his
incidental to the issue of material misrepresentation) filiation to his father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical fact.
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is something only legislature can - Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondent’s father is well established.
change by another law - To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty obligation.
- Remand will violate respondent Poe’s right to due process, hence, unconstitutional Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves
- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is no longer an impartial tribunal a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down the
is there are three of the seven members of the commission that have given firm view middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult
that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen by the interplay of national and international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is qualified. Delay members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the
will also prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political opponents. next President. For on political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not.
To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to - SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
elect in behalf of the people. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti)
DISMISSED. WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
DAVIDE 1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
FACTS 2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
- January 9, 2004 – Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of 3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
candidacy for the May 10 elections because of he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen 4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the case declaring that its jurisdiction is limited to shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and Philippine Bill of 1902.
city officials, but not those of national officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate child whose father is Filipino and
sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the
the ground of false material representation. citizenship of the father
- Findings: COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino
- Fornier evidence is not substantial citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make any distinction between
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen Petitions are dismissed.
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge
jurisdiction of COMELEC over the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. They claim that only the Sc has SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti) May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the election?
- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues: - Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidates.
- Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due course or cancel Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates - Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion said,
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of Tecson, Velez and Fornier “In my view, the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if he’s a natural-born Filipino citizen disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to
Jurisdiction be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be
- Tecson and Velez petitions questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
- The provision in the constitution only refers to past-election remedies, they should election protest in the appropriate forum.”
have resorted to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are implemented by the - Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.
COMELEC Rules of Procedure - Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the “masses,” a situation not
- Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC allowed by the Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian Council.This
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original jurisdiction to determine whether a Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a
candidate for an elective office ineligible for the office for which he filed his certificate genuine, free and fair election.
of candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.
- Fornier petition Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissinG Fornier’s
- SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7 Consti ) petition for disqualification against respondent
- Salcedo v COMELEC – the only instance when a petition raising the qualifications of a
registered candidate is before election (S78 OEC)
 - To justify the cancellation of CoC, false representation mentioned must pertain to - In re Bosque – expiration of the term of 18 months without making an express declaration of
material matter intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter and thereby
- There must be deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide fact which would becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these islands
render a candidate ineligible - Palanca v Republic –
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP – where COMELEC acted with grave abuse of - “A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject
discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holding that “considering the evidence presented by of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of
the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of
misrepresentation when he stated in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen” 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines
Allegations in the COMELEC petition: because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”
1. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his Certificate - Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens as
of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen; and to whether this only applies to legitimate children or not.
2. He knowingly made such false representation. - Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus , especially if the distinction has
- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are aliens.
no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes
- Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the marriage contract of FPJ’s
an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)
parents and his father’s birth certificate.
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat . – he who asserts, not he who denies, vis-à-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive
must prove; S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo – burden of proof is on the party
essence of citizenship in blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
asserting the affirmative of an issue
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in rendering its
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of certiorari can only be granted if it can be assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.
proven that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion; WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with Senior Justice
-Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s petition
patent and gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law CARPIO-MORALES
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC gravely abused its Issues for Resolution:
discretion in dismissing Fornier’s petition. Indeed, his availment of the extraordinary writ of 1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
certiorari is grossly misplaced.
presidential candidates;
Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when he declared in
his CoC that he is a natural-bron Filipino citizen 2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues its Resolutions
- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification;
because his father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constitution. 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek election as President.
- Valles v COMELEC – Philippine law on citizenship adheres to jus sanguinis
- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father 1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain because his - Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are citizens of Spain. - Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original
- The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified. jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for President:
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
- Allan’s father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of the Philippines - The Supreme Court, sitting en banc , shall be the sole judge of all
on April 11, 1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Jones Law) President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- refers to this Court’s jurisdiction over electoral contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President, and not to the
 qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a and held that held that Fornier should have presented “proof of misrepresentation
candidate; petition: premature. with a deliberate attempt to mislead” on the part of FPJ— confined the issue in the
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the Petition for Disqualification to whether FPJ “must have known or have been aware
Presidency may also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate.”
Article VIII of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the - Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was
Rules of Court, specially considering that the instant case is one of transcendental aware of a false material representation in his Certificate of Candidacy without first
importance. determining whether such material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not available born citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public document ( i.e., his
where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring natural-born
course of law—like in this case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification) citizenship does not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is other
- in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing, should be relaxed evidence to show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such
on the ground of “transcendental importance,” the following should be evidence.
considered: the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
in raising the questions being raised. Considering that the substantive issues - Five crucial factual questions
raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, (1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the
respectively, are virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. birth of his son, Allan F. Poe;
- the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine
No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the “transcendental importance” of
citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering the
the issues raised herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of Philippine Islands. (no evidence as to his residence, only prima facie evidence.)
the Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under (2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of the birth
Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. of the latter;
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824 - Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship independently of his father’s by
- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari questioning the virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the Philippines on
Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of November 27, 1916.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born in the Philippines on
Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this Court with the power of review over decisions,
November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a
orders, or rulings of the COMELEC. citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a showing that he was judicially declared to
- COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for Disqualification be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or
- not really a constitutional question… applied in the Philippine Islands:
2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the (3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
Petition for is qualification for Lack of Merit. - FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his parents were married, and that he is a
- the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them: legitimate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his putative parents, Fernando
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification without stating the R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he
factual bases therefore: was born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting
- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “[n]o decision shall be parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry
therein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater weight
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
than the birth certificate, which was executed by a physician who had to rely on
the law on which it is based.” hearsay as regards FPJ’s legitimacy.
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on - FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child at birth.
the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. (4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming
- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of citizenship, the arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship)
COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
 - As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by petitioner Fornier, - OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
both before the COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil
affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for Philippine Army Personnel.
citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the
Family Code. - Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG):
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. 1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen
- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother 2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable
who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted
citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth , thus leaving the that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time)
illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing - Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstances: continuous and
more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born).
uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected public official
- no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge
FPJ as his own son at birth
ISSUE
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father,
1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time
the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable
and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.
conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
2. WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship
Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and
161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004
and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3)
DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, HELD
a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation. 1. No, Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd
w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when
IN RE: CHING he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ’99. He was already more then 14
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999 yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence compel
FACTS the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process.
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution. Father’s citizenship is promptitude.
followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority 2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
application to take the ’98 Bar Examinations. election.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil Decision Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar
citizenship
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC. KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required
to submit more proof of citizenship. FACTS
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of - Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: “no person shall
Allegiance. be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen.”
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac on April 27, taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil
1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence - Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be restored to his
he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born
lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a citizen because of his repatriation.
foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
as a US citizen on June 5, 1990. consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local
- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. Civil Registry
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his - 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing
opponent was Bengson. Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
natural-born citizen by the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-born by the applicable law for reacquisition.
citizens as “citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such - Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire
citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House. his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
2. No.
ISSUES Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating
1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be to the elction, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Court’s jurisdiction is
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no
Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of the House might be occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
addressed
2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation amounting to SEPARATE OPINION
excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
HELD Additional Facts:
1. Yes. - In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor declaring himself
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship to be a naturalized Filipino citizen
o By birth – natural born citizens - Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself as natural-born
o Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens - Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase “from birth” in Art IV,
through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be Sec 2 of the Consti
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and - Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and must be continuous, constant
none of the disqualifications and without interruption
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens: - Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
o Natural born “natural-born”
o Naturalized - J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts. To repatriate,
or by direct act of Congress.
Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen.
o Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-born citizenship
o Repatriation – available for those who have lost their citizenship due to
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of
desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years, more
Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process: stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and
 clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through consti c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion. d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable contagious disease
f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos
An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship by Naturalization, and to g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines are at war – during such war
repeal Acts 2927 and 3448 h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!] whose laws don’t grant Filipinos
right to become naturalized citizens/subjects
Sec 1: Title: “Revised Naturalization Law” Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may become Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide intention to
citizens of the Philippines by naturalization? become a citizen of the Philippines
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition - under oath
2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of >10yrs - 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship
3. of good moral character of the Bureau of Justice
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution (1935 Consti)
-contents+ name
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during entire period of residence in
+ age
the Philippines in relation with constituted government and community with community in
+ occupation
which he is living
+ personal description
4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative
trade/profession/lawful occupation + place of birth
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the principal Philippine language +last foreign residence and allegiance
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the public schools/private schools +date of arrival
during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of +name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the Philippines
his petition +place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration *to be valid:
…School: establish lawful entry for permanent residence + issued certificate showing date, place, and
- recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines manner of arrival
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as part of the school *also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6))
curriculum *2 pictures of himself
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualification required in Sec2(2) Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declaration of intention not
could be reduced to a continuous 5 years? required to file declaration of intention
1. had honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under that of any of the Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly American
*a petition in triplicate
citizens, were the ones who were governing the country prior to the Commonwealth]
2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines contents of petition:
3. married to a Filipino woman +name and surname
4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs +present and former places of residence
school: public/recognized private school + not established for exclusive instruction of children +occupation
of persons of particular nationality/race +place and date of birth
5. born in the Philippines +status; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and residence of wife and
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons… each child
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any association or group of persons who +approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized gov’t +name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered)
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal assault/assassination for
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
the success and predominance of their ideas
 +declaration that he has complied with sec. 5 Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and declarations
+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing petition to admission as RP of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization certificate
Citizen Sec 14. Fees.
*2 photographs of petitioner *P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings + issuance of certificate)
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible persons (see *P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered)
provision for requirements) sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr *on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also naturalized)
immediately preceding the filing of the petition *on minor children:
Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court …if born in the Philippines: Filipino
…publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in one of gen circulation newspapers in …if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent:
the province where petitioner resides Filipino
…post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, birthplace and residence of …if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent:
petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the petition) Filipino during minority, unless resides in the Philippines permanently and still a
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last publication of notice minor, then legally Filipino upon age of majority
…forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization certificate and pertinent data to …if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails to register and
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine take oath 1 yr after age of majority
Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner resides Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have _died: continue
Sec 10. Hearing of the petition. proceedings, same legal effect
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ express consent of the
*public hearing National Assembly
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth at all Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued
proceedings *upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-General/representative/proper
*upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification of petitioner, court order proper provincial fiscal
naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753) *cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally
Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after
notice to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue naturalization issuance of naturalization certificate
certificate c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
contents of certificate of naturalization” d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of
*file no. of petition parents either by neglect to support or by transferring them to another school(s)
*number of naturalization certificate e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal provision
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of court requiring Philippine citizenship
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition both, naturalization cancelled
*date of decision granting petition Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from detection/discovery of commission of
*name of the judge who rendered deci offense
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
*oath declared in open court [refer to the original] *Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations
 *Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization certificate commission, & taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only
blanks, etc. in connection with his service to said foreign country : & provided that any Filipino citizen
Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amended by Act No. 3448 who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of foreign country
[Naturalization Law] under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of RP during
period of service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon
An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization his discharge;
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previous law, prob. Act (6) having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless
423, below) pardon or granted amnesty; &
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the publication (7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country,
- Decisions granting the application become executory only after 2 years, and she acquires his nationality.
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during the intervening time, applicant *** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June 2, 1947
has: *when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
 NOT left the Philippines …acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-
 Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or profession American countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country grants same privilege to its
 NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of govt. rules citizens –agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and foreign country from which
 NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
citizenship is acquired.
govt. announced policies
- After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will be registered and the oath Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.
taken by the applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of citizenship. (1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in sec 2, Act No.
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423. 2927 (repealed by CA 473 – so sec 4)
- Approved, June 16, 1950. (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may
be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 marital status;(see PD 725 for more details)
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be lost or (3) direct act of the National Assembly.
reacquired Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No.
2927 (now CA 473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. in the next preceding sec: Provided, qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sec
(1) naturalization in a foreign country; 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required (sorry guys, I can’t find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; I don’t know what these sections are in CA 473): further, applicant…
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of foreign country upon (1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for naturalization;
+21y.o.: a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war; (2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign country: +the entire period of his residence in RP
rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of foreign +in his relations with the constituted government
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall +with the community in which he is living; and
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is present: (3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all
(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or faith and allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or
(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: subject.
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or acceptance of said
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Ratio
Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry. (used in the - Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication
Bengzon Case) (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473 citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired
Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation.
YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO - He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued
PADILLA; January 24, 1989 Philippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioner’s insistence, SC had
FACTS
to do it.
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
- 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same
suppressed when convenient.
period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
SEPARATE OPINION
- April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun
Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese
CRUZ [concur]
- July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport
Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino
will expire July 20, 1986.
by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof
Procedural Facts:
of Yu’s unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its
- July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the
significance & consequences as provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are
Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his
not proof enough of renunciation.
acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988 – oral arguments
FERNAN [dissent]
- Nov. 10, 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such
jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention.
decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implication. In a
Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.
deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, he’s entitled to
- Dec. 5, 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order.
have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown
- Dec. 7, 1988 – SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending
trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts.
conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88.
Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as denaturalization should be
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. Opposed
filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due process clause. When a
vigorously to lifting of TRO.
person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply
given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous
revealed aforementioned substantive facts.
precedent to allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based
on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may
ISSUE
have passport for other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high gov’t officials have
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
done acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than mere use of passport or
different citizenship has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yu’s morality is beside the
HELD
Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. point. He deserves his full day in court.
 JAO V REPUBLIC
CORTES [dissent] VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yu’s Filipino citizenship has not been
established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine consul, thus not FACTS
substantial and are inadequate. - Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a Chinese father and
an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married. - She married a Chinese man and
PEOPLE V AVENGOZA therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead.
RELOVA; December 7, 1982 - Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an alien and she was issued an Alien
FACTS Certificate of Registration (ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition for repatriation filed in CFI of
- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur
Davao.
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese, together with the former’s mother - CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as “judicially repatriated,” and ordered cancelled her
Gavina Avengoza and Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy ACR.
Law on transactions for the spouses to own agricultural lands in the Philippines. - Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the case.
- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired Chinese citizenship
- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local agricultural land. ISSUE
- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away. WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for repatriation.
- Upon Go Gam’s passing, Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP and filed it with
HELD
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as “judicially repatriated” are a complete nullity. There
repatriation, averring by reason whereof that her criminal liability is thereby extinguished; and is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a judicial proceeding.
that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and academic Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held that “there is no proceeding
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma had validly established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
reacquired Philippine citizenship declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.” All that is needed
for a female citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil.
citizen, upon the termination of her martial status, “is for her to take necessary oath of
ISSUES
allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry.”
1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing an oath of allegiance to the RP and Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside. 5 Justices concur.
filing it with the Municipal Treasurer Obiter Petitioner’s claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedly an
2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted her from liability for the violation of illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an action
the Anti-Dummy Law where the mother or her heirs are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction that
Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit where the persons whose rights
HELD are affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as an action for declaratory relief,
1. No. petition for judicial repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an alien.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
Would-be repatriate should show conclusive proof that she has the qualifications to be so VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; MALCOLM; March 25, 1919
however this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.
2. No. FACTS
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like an alien who became a naturalized - Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the city’s
Filipino citizen, her repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the red light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up and
Anti-Dummy Law. kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week. On the
night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and
Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity to
consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and were action because it did not want the public to see a clash between executive officials and the
met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
Castillo, etc. good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
- During their voyage, the women’s relatives and friends initiated an application for habeas
2 nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. The
corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and others
deprived the women of their liberty. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. However, the court decided that there was
ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to
none of the women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this time Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident
calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents were finally closed.
only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ.
3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable, his methods
ISSUES were unlawful. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ: habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
a. WON the petitioners had standing Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of events and had
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
2. WON there was compliance with the court orders but failed. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some
3. On contempt of court were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was
merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.
HELD Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall
1a. Yes pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court.
Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc, another
person may submit it in his/her behalf. KURODA JALANDONI
Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with MORAN; March 26, 1949
the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from society and then
shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. FACTS
1b No Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Military Commission
Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing crimes/atrocities against civilians,
anywhere in the Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which established a
to (whether before the SC or before a lower court).
Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port
Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case involves parties from different
(both American) have no authority to practice law in the country. As such, the respondents
parts of the country. Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
should be prohibited from proceeding with this case.
persons from unlawful restraint.
1c. Yes
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of ISSUES
freedom of locomotion. 1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional
Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into 2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of Court
such restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. B. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution

2. 1 st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the court on the day HELD
named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail however, the court forebore drastic
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate an Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City
unfinished aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the Treasurer of Manila.
issuance and enforcement of EO68. - Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a Natl. War Crimes Office and A. Police Power
provide for rules and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It conforms to the generally - the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
accepted principles/policies of international law, including the Hague Convention and the illimitable
Geneva Convention, which are part of the law of the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise - necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
of the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. Iin B. Equal Protection Clause
Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that “the power to create a military commission for the trial - against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A military commission has oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.” circumstances and conditions
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a special law and - is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
not by the Rules of Court. class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that counsel appearing before said making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
commissions must be attys. qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance with the Rules - Criteria for Test of EPC
of Court. 1. presence of public interest and welfare
2B. No 2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our national 3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made
sovereignty. C. Due Process clause
Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has submitted the vindication of - has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power
crimes against her govt. and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed - Questions for test:
representation in the trial of those very crimes. 1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with 2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose;
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, 3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified
this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Petition interference with private interest?
denied. With costs de oficio.
ISSUES
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO 1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957 2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of
law.
FACTS 3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the
- Injunction and Mandamus bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” It 4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned Philippines.
by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail
business. HELD
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, 1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the
corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursued and the classification
or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real - Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise, certificate, or any other form of
and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Philippines”
Reasoning c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers - The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its
and the people on whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold
the country. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess
like the ff: of the legislative power.
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws 3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire
- believed to have evaded tax laws contents of the law.
- bribing public officials Reasoning
b. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national a. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these
income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that have always been included within the term regulation.
would help the country’s economy and increase national wealth.
c. precedents 4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a GONZALES V HECHANOVA
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were FACTS
found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial - Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement
antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
pursued. Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file
proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of answer and hearing was set.
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. - on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
Reasoning Petitioner’s stand:
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law - Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a Administration and any other gov’t agency.
strangle hold upon our economic life\ Respondents’ stand:
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic - Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. - Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before coming to court.
b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution - Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was
authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such,
Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for any special authority.
- Also, they say it’s not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by - The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
“government agency” and not the government itself. economic security of all the people," especially the, less privileged.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for - In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall
the benefit of the people. regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase of rice with equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. Significantly, there was also the specific
Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the contracts injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
should prevail because it came later. These contracts have been consummated bec. the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Phils. has already paid. - The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its sections:
ISSUE - SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this
HELD end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
- RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils. subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
Petitioner has sufficient interest. taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the exemption from payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers “all - R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
importations of rice and corn into the Phils.” enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec. RA 2207 talks principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which
about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452 also was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs are only in acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which says that in all purchases by gov’t, incl. those retention limits for landowners.
for armed forces, preference is given to materials produced in the Phils. - On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
- The “benefit of the people” argument can’t be accepted because there is no local rice ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
shortage. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population. unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. Even if they were, followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
they are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render this comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the
case academic. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may mechanics for its implementation.
have been made but the actual importation has not yet taken place. - With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on
Disposition - For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED. July 27, 1987) took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations,
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in question and he including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The
exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
contrary to its provisions. known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
CRUZ; July 14, 1989 with its provisions.

FACTS ISSUES
1. WON petitions are justiciable. 1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied
6657 contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due but even if they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
taken for public use without just compensation. the serious constitutional questions raised.
Sub issues 2a. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
a. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the
the President of the Philippines. said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec. 16f)
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in 2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
cash but not in the form of bonds or other things of value. money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. eminent domain.29 This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agrarian problems is relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
placed on the owners only of agricultural lands. perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by 2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the land they acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, they contend of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
that she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the period. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
not in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time. transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems exclusively their payment for the land.
own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their right to equal 2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
protection has been violated. alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not only
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these
property. two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. 30
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the 2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
uniformity rule.28 2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not
to be expressed in its title. correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for,
like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
HELD 29
The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. It is the power “to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.” It is inherent because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or
even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other two are police power and taxation.
28 30
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation would Frankly, I don’t like the way this ponente argues. He’s like saying, now I don’t want to explain why. If you can’t see the reasoning it’s your fault. Anyway,
be. we’re infallible remember?  His next sentence: There is no need to elaborate on this matter. Tsk…
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress she is against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 compensation to their respective owners.
whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of recognized.
said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
agrarian reform. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular pronouncement as to costs.
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)
reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate
appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR
legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as PARAS; December 4, 1990
it were, both houses of Congress.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification FACTS
have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same Reform
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on - 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be includes the raising of livestock, swine and poultry
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the 1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here Production and Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32)
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. - 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11 (commercial farms)
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found in the -Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just 6657
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of -petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is also prayed that a preliminary
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction denied)
and (2) just compensation.31 8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the -Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA 6657:
Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. 27.  S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of “Agricultural Enterprise/Activity”
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of  S11: defines “commercial farms” as “agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
its most controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded poultry and swine raising
to each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)  S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of gross sales & 10% of gross profits
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will to workers as additional compensation)
 S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine compensation to be paid for lands
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other.
covered by RA 6657
Decision  S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: -the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, “Agrarian and Natural Resources
Reform”
31
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the Constitution’s “the
just distribution of all agricultural lands” clause. Then he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.
which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless, the right to directly or collectively FACTS
own the land they are tilling Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:
-livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in that land is not a primary input in - It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national
the former economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices
ISSUE - He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives
WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and land with the complicity of their own government
Guidelines - Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or
invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval
HELD o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single
law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its proprietorship
Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null and void for being o “The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on the
extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act”
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent
- Under Section 7, “non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of
Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction; in construing any ambiguous
domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by
provisions, the courts may look to the debates of the concon
existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof."
-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the meaning of the word “agricultural” (its
- However, the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive aspect of
dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry industries in its
regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long
coverage;
as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not
there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agrarian reform
detrimental to but are good for the national economy.
-S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus violative of due process
o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals
by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws
SEPARATE OPINION o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law
and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export
SARMIENTO enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in
-agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one of consti construction and equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for
interpretation Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big.
A13, S4: “..in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof…”—this o List C - contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve
phrase provides a possible coverage of livestock, poultry and swine adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further
foreign investments."; However, existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if
-every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute
not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too
ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection clause of the consti - Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an area of
-clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms are not similarly situated, hence the investment should be included in list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria
inclusion of the former in CARP would be violative of the equal protection clause enumerated in said section are met
- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA
GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 7042.
CRUZ; December 2, 1991 - By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, RA No.
7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important
requirements for doing business in the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign - Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of
investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment investment for inclusion in List C
Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will
enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country. have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the
Sol-Gen answers: economy and the consumers."
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy
the criteria inclusion in List C.
o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code
Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine national could,
without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to
enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and
not registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the non- recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9
Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital of the Act
o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a - Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the o it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section
total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof 5", and the “SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if
exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was required. the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can
- With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic
not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant.
SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments.
provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos
Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with
requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines.
the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be an
- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market
actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution
law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.
of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas
of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where
ISSUES
existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer.
1. WON there is actual controversy
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their
rights and interests over the national economy. 2. WON petitioners have legal standing
o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the 3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case
extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for 4. WON this entails a political question
Filipinos
o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it HELD
is regulatory. It channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises 1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly because of the absence of
where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect
supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises. a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not
o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do not adequately meet-the conjectural or anticipatory
needs of the consumers should not be included in list C; if not, consumers would be at 2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as a member of the House of
the mercy of unscrupulous producers Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
necessarily come within the protection of the law.
3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked, - Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
prematurely. Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the authority to promulgate rules and
- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it.
a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments
c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law ISSUES
has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental 1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
law before it was finally enacted. delegation of legislative power.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner 2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with
d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter
locomotion.
on which we are not competent to rule.
a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of 3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the constitutional precept
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all the people.
b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments HELD
simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. 1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can make a law to delegate
c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave abuse of a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
make, its own action depend.
instrumentality of the Government.
Decision Petition dismissed. Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard – it was held here that discretion
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
acts, final on questions of fact.
2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
FACTS
The provision that “….the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with modification the
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was
control the use of and traffic on national roads…”, is an administrative function which
favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7
3. practicality
a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of govt’l
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption,
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations.
well.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and - Considering transcendental public interest and the Court’s duty to check on limits of other
with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the branches of gov’t, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the
public. (police power of the State) petition.
Reasoning Substantive Issues:
1. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar) 1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not mean that gov’t
2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its can’t regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is “state authority to enact
preservation legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare.” PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to gov’t, but to society as well.
3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes, its
number.
power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures
of Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take
PARAS; May 14, 1991
back the power. Also, Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. The power is now vested exclusively on national government.
FACTS
Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government, such
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise under PD 1067-B
as PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a potential
The power of local gov’t to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress
source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD
may provide. It can’t be violative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy.
1869 was passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all
Local autonomy doesn’t make local gov’t sovereign w/in state; it simply means
games of chance, giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
decentralization. The local gov’t has been described as a political subdivision of state
PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of gov’t revenue, next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign
sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time employed 4,494 employees
subdivision of a sovereign nation, it can’t be an imperium in imperio.
in its 9 casinos.
3. Equal protection doesn’t preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that some gambling
activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are
ISSUES
prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional.
Procedural Issue
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. But as of now,
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the annulment
every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
of PD 1869
must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of Constitution.
Substantive Issue/s
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to gov’t policies, it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:
repeal or amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license
fees
OPOSA V FACTORAN
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and crony economy
FACTS

HELD
Procedural Issue:
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the misappropriation or 2. WON minors can assert that they represent other generations and those succeeding
impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital theirs?
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Philippine of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal right?
Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and 4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-impairment clause found in the
Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new Constitution?
secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a taxpayer’s class suit as it alleges
that all citizen’s of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s HELD
virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are 1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
sharing the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of interest to all citizens of the Philippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them all to
them could go before the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of court. The plaintiffs in this case are numerous and representative enough to ensure that all
the current generation and generation that are yet to be born. interests is protected.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Natural 2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every generation
Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on its behalf to, 1. Cancel all has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. to cease and desist from receiving, balanced and healthful environment.
accepting, processing, and renewing or approving new timber license agreements. 3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country, the country’s islands, its because it failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners which is the right to a balanced
natural resources, and scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the country to and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II.
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for - Moreover, this rights need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with rights that are
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses). They asserted that assumed from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why it was written was because
deforestation resulted in, a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and loss of soil the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in the state policies future generations
fertility d. extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced
indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought h. increasing velocity of healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it could also be said that this right is
typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands j. siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k. further supported by Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 making
reduction of earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide. the cause of action existent.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action, of being political 4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not contracts,
question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence properties or a property right that is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
this case. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the As the court held in Tan v. Director of Forestry, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do
Civil Code (the right to a sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief
for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Executive may validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when national interests so
safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. require.
1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept - Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the case still does not affect it given
of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self- that no law or action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses so
preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law. it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law passed it
would not be considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the
ISSUES law deals with the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the people
1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit? to a balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to the police power of
the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as defendants the and control the practice of medicine also includes the power to regulate admission to the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
2. The police power of the State is validly exercised if
DECS V SAN DIEGO - (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
CRUZ; December 21, 1989 require the interference of the State <lawful subject>; &
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to
FACTS be accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method>
- decided en banc, unanimous decision - The case at bar complies with this requisites...
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology graduate from UE. He has taken <subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. His application to take a fifth examination profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
was denied by petitioner DECS on the basis of the “three-flunk rule” under MECS Order #12, lives and health.
Series of 1972. <method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC, invoking his constitutional medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended complaint, he raised the 3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. The Constitution also provides that
additional grounds of due process and equal protection and also challenged the "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
constitutionality of the aforementioned order. reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was allowed to take a fifth attempt at - It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
NMAT. This attempt he also failed. Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and declared the challenged order 4. What the equal protection clause requires is equality among equals. A law does not have
invalid. It held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. of the Constitution.
- A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not
ISSUE subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
take it again. vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the State profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so
need not be similarly treated.
HELD - There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and the three flunk rule, designed to gauge the admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
academic preparation of an applicant fall within the valid exercise of the police Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
power of the State. constitutional right to be a doctor. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. It is
Reasoning time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who and evaluations.
have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Costs against private
- analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar – issue is academic preparation of the applicant. respondent San Diego.
Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the
medical profession. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches is a CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This power to regulate MALCOLM; February 23, 1909
 tenants at will. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers
FACTS of Spain.
- An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which - Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 – Where such possessor shall not be able to produce title
affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet, dismissing an deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as valid title by
application for the registration of certain land. prescription. As prescription, even against the Crown, was recognized by the laws of Spain,
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the registration of a certain land in the the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard
Province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, in 1899, the to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it - Decree of June 25, 1880 – For private ownership, there must have been a grant by
and maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and competent authority. For all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times
had used parts for pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his father in accordance shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, 20 years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this
with Igorot customs and had used it for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the
the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish crown decree. This being the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at
and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the any such proceedings against him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the
royal decrees then in force, nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition, alleging registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him. Moreover, the decree
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion that ancient family possessions
establishing only a possessory title. were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
- Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted
Philippine Commission’s Act No,496 of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice and belief of those among
jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms whom he live, was his property.
applications to be made by persons claiming to own the land.
- The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited
time to make the title good; that the applicant’s land was not registered, and therefore became FACTS
public land; that he United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and that the he has no rights - Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the
that the Philippine government is bound to respect. provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain
ISSUE there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the
WON the applicant owns the land resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is
approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of
HELD the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the
- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired by the United provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitants of the Philippines. Thus, reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed to have been held in the same way before - The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr..
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he does not own the land. Spain did not The law’s primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of
assume to convert all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into trespassers or even into Mindoro. In one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the
opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes
to live on. Pursuant to the Governor’s powers under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, - There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does
800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same
refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the law?
provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of - But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way?
introduce civilized customs among them. - To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
ISSUES adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
1. WON the Mangyan’s were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose their homes question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent
were limited by the law. state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
transfer of the Mangyanes. Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in
the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with
HELD humanity and with national conscience.
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. - The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and
under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. To allow them to successfully invoke
law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt,
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether - Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has not
justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
"Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens 2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. - As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt, would
Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.) lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should
assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that
full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every contact.
really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on - The contention that in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute,
that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the rest of the
of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting fifteen thousand Manguianes by the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in MOIR
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary - I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice will not
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas be the legal and human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
corpus can, therefore, not issue. - The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of
the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are
SEPARATE OPINION accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are
Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country.
CARSON And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from
- The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he
standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied
removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is the equal protection of the law. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own
used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life good and the general good of the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the civilization
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "brought
control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners charged with any
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to any crime having been committed by these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the - It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary
members of the tribe. body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its
- So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group must be found power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people
to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within have, through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary
to a "non-Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any
tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non- arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a
which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further - There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-
discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department have the power under
consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and
they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would
arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a
government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom and for whom all government provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would
exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial,
that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within
final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the - There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in
pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the
of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the Moros.
the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may - I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of
be a government of law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.
being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
- It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine PIT-OG V PEOPLE
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its FERNAN; October 11, 1990
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to
deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion FACTS
the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative - Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in - There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It was owned by
all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the original owners thereof named
take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan
confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death. to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the tayan, in order that the
- From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less tomayan would have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale
magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a was made in consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward Pasiteng, whose
wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the unregistered property would be
fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields-than it registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.
would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are Besides Cullalad, several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on
"non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If
the notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for taxation
purposes and paid taxes thereon. HELD
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions 1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the sugarcane and
destroyed the fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth bananas believing them to be her own.
P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the matter - Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence to prove ownership over the
to the police. Three days later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these documents, in conjunction with the
Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc. testimonial evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan belonged to her, her father doubt upon Pit-og’s culpability. The deed of sale describes the property as containing an area
Lobchoken being a descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land for taxation purposes of 400 sqm, while the tax declarations show that the property contains an area of 512 sqm.
because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any The testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated
member of the tomayan could make improvements on the land and claim them as his own. by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other that the possibility of
Anyone who abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person confusion as to who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before the filing of this case,
outside the tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of the tayan. Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had planted in
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his widow Pidchoy the area. The fact that Edward had built a fence around the area he claimed as his does not
and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary thereon. The land necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had purchased from the
was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to tomayan. After all, he had declared as his own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more
build a house behind the place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house because than the area he bought.
Edward was Erkey's uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and - There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by Edward but there
avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented her from are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. Proof on the matter,
cutting the sugarcane and the other plants. however, is important for it means the Identification of the rightful owner of the stolen
The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story emphasizing that her claim of continuous properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and
occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove indispensable to clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his
such claim. It found that an the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were present knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.
and accordingly rendered the judgment of conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts with the following 2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to claims of ownership over the tayan
findings and observations: should be threshed out in an appropriate civil action.
- Pasiteng’s claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a public document - Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous Community
which was executed between him and the members of the tomayan group. The validity of this - We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of ownership founded on customs
public document has never been questioned by any one of the previous owners belonging to and tradition and another such claim supported by written evidence but nonetheless based on
the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax the same customs and tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be
payments by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are, nevertheless, prima too careful More so in this case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be
facie evidence of his possession of the land in question. In contrast to these documentary expected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty on account of an
evidence, petitioner offers nothing better than her bare claim. The personal property taken by oversight in the court's appreciation of the evidence.
accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she
thereof without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft. committed the crime of theft. No costs.

ISSUES KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO

1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas. MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.
FACTS respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already settled aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)
Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in - These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or
operating an on-line lottery, and these questions can no longer be reopened. those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act according to law Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
and that the two new appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of necessity align controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the
the new majority in the second lotto case. political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of - Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not
the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit
the first decision in the first case was later reversed. because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) which was overturned in members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
People v. Yang. complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as
ISSUES amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in
1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE
invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT
are inconsistent with them FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY
2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given that the STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF LEASE
Constitution guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and reasonable participation at all DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE.
levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were
cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on- considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new
line lottery. contract.

HELD VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR

1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer CORTES; February 13, 1989
rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect FACTS
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO - Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm reports that certain members of the
may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the opposition, were granted “clean” loans
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
from the GSIS before the February 1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a special civil
not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit ." (Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]). action for mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to:
It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, 1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members of the defunct Batasang
therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, Pambansa who were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.
- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it the requisite personality to 2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing said loans.
question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall
3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information.
 desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of
ISSUES mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain right to the thing
Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies? demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required.
Substantive:
CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under “matters of public concern”?
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its borrowers?
3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insurance function, private
FACTS
in nature?
- These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin
respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
HELD
any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and
Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by
abroad – including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and (2) to “compel respondents to make
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, can be passed upon by the court more competently than GSIS or its Board of
public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents
related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
Trustees.
heirs.”
Substantive:
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought this action in response to
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and not to public
execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
and governmental agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities, as
on how to split or share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a
a corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an
temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
representatives from “entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten
chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions
wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed
in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
before the Court a motion for intervention. They aver that they are “among the 10,000
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.
claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is recognized
3. No. The “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long
by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”.
been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running
some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. That the GSIS was
ISSUES
exercising a proprietary function in granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered
Procedural:
1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and
into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation, are
2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.
within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
 Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable regulations. The
petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2 nd and 3rd alternative acts sought by agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
petitioners. 2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
 The same cannot be said, however, of the 1st act sought. Although citizens are entitled to Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
“access to official records”, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their HELD
Procedural: the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information
1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution taxes the property to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a
the action. certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on
habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that petitioner should have properly sought relief their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under
before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of the compromise agreements was pending the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will
resolution seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be
enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public uniform and equitable”.
the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the dismissal of all
public disclosure of “all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a
and documents related or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well
and the Marcos heirs”. In other words, the petition is not merely confined to the settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge.
undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the
the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG
transactions”. cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the
Substantive: courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, “whether past, present, or
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. “Ill-gotten wealth”, by its very nature, future, matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses. This all-encompassing stipulation is
assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. This is a
the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that “transactions” contemplates effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transaction, it is incumbent upon v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the submit an inventory of their total assets.
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the
and the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws. Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement
sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the pertains only to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the
present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for
EO No. 14 as amended by EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses, vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos’ approval of the principal Agreement, an
who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable.
Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
 indispensable, parties to the instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to
RESOLUTION enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999 acting within the bounds of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual
FACTS questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts . Inasmuch as the petition at bar
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved
the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
they were parties and signatories to the General and Supplemental Agreements which this 3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained in the
Court declared “NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution.” They claim to Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and
“have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered moot and academic simply by the
interest against both as to warrant their intervention.” They add that their exclusion from the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal 4. No. The PCGG’s grant to the claimants’ mother of access rights to one of their sequestered
protection. They also the raise the “principle of hierarchical administration of justice” to impugn properties cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to
the Court’s cognizance of petitioner’s direct action before it. ratification.
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a
ISSUES citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political question involved. The power and
Procedural: authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating the
WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed. Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused its discretion.
Substantive:
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings regarding the Agreements to BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA
which they were parties and signatories was a denial of “their property right to contract without BUENA; October 10, 2000
due process of law”;
2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice by ruling upon FACTS
the validity of the Agreements; - This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
3. WON the issue of right to information raised by petitioner was rendered moot and academic Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
by the submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements to - March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing,
the Sandiganbayan; among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.
4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial implementation; and - August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case and a justiciable question. treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
HELD - 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of
Procedural: Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.)
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be - February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of
filed before rendition of judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already conferences and negotiations.
terminated by final judgment. - October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
Substantive: - May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA.
1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers,
no rights and creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla,
protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not
Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel, agreement covering only troops – not bases—like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII
Legarda-Leviste. Total=5) makes no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be “transient” or “permanent”, so the
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under VFA is covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability
which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required
an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines . It to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of
also defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal the Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred in by the Senate” with no
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of specified number).
equipment, materials and supplies.
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?
ISSUES Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty.
question the constitutionality of the VFA. b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum.
-- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP) .
members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops,
Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not
or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and required it.
when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-- Complied
referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State) with. Ambassador Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on the US gov’t and
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty. that in international legal terms such agreement is a ‘treaty’.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses - A ‘treaty’, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an “international
committed by the US Military personnel. instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law,
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.”
by reclusion perpetua or higher. - In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in within their powers.
ratifying/concurring with the VFA? 3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx” (this doesn’t really
against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution. answer the issue above, but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an
abdication of sovereignty.. oh well… here goes…)
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds - With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound
raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to
standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. We cannot
institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations,
paramount importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL duties and responsibilities under international law.
importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the
petitions. - Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations.
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The ‘or’ is important to Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.
take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in - “With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive
ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No. agreements under the US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is of our country by drawing a bright line between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish it, The VFA as a sole executive
manner. agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of the members of that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil must be
Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of ‘recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state’. I vote to grant the petitions.”
the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted
by the Constitution. KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate DAVIDE; May 5, 1994
alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an FACTS
abuse of power. Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary
injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO and
Decision Petitions Dismissed PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part. 1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO decided to establish an online
lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources
SEPARATE OPINION of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in
Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and organized
PUNO [dissent] with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Philippine
- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).
requirements above). 2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do not apply as the VFA contemplates a Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the citizenship
temporary visit of the troops, while the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its
troops. shares owned by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to
reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense
stockholdings to local investors.
Treaty between RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits. VFA 3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the
does not provide for a specific and limited period of effectivity. Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. (This was
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state” is preceded by complaints from the Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry 4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-
of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the US treated it signal to operate the countr's on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in
Manila Times, PDI, and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
as an executive agreement.
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos strongly opposing
- The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. The Court will be standing the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the meeting
constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions on the constitutional basis and of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
legal effects of sole executive agreements under the US law. 6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the opposition, Malacanang will push
through with operation of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while
winning corporate bidders merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow,
award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed KILOSBAYAN that strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity,
the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
date, an agreement denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the
and PGMC. PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership
8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of where there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They
Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the
1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate
PETITIONERS' CLAIM a public utility
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the - They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that
PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that
lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and the ambit of judicial review."
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent ISSUES
PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO." Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended
establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to
association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether
construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as
amended. domestic or foreign."
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be
granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 HELD
Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to 1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in
about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully their favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
— are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems. and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS - The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive
lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
or joint venture' with PGM.
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the
Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of
that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject 2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the
contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." least will be conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association” and in the most “in joint
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, vernture” with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to
and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of the operation of the on-line lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot whole exercise will go to PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.
share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither
can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. MELO [dissenting]
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights,
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an attempt to restrain
privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee ....
[o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must expenditure of public funds. The contract involves strictly corporate money.
prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot - By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not cure the lack of locus standi on the
enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not part of the petitioners. The contract does not involve an illegal disbursement of public funds.
unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication." No public fund raised by taxation is involved.
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the PUNO [dissenting]
contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the
- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to
contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument. open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the - It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual controversies involving
reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”/
piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the - Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of
least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties. the case, and perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. Association
of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government.
means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or
business. Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks . KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
) MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither
funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that FACTS
although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the - As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232
government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and
SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a
suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the
and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into
expenses and risks." negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO]
charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
SEPARATE OPINION - On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called
ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
CRUZ [concurring] consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the
- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no matter how the assistance is PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental
called or the contract denominated. computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed
and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual
PADILLA [concurring] minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the
- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint venture because each part proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)
contributes its share in the enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities, technology and Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169,
expertise, while PCSO contributes the market through the dealers and in the totality the mass § (B) )
of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of gross receipts; the residue of the
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation ISSUES
of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3) 1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is 2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the “law of the case”, thus
responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners?
their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the 3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked
option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million. by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-executing)?
- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its
manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the HELD
ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek Ratio
the declaration of the amended ELA as null and void. 1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that case is
- The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners' concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not.
standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in its petition as 2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing.
"composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed General Reasoning
to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their - Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case", nor that of conclusive of
individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit.
petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are - Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law
members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens." does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled
parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who, in questioning
other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer,
the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716,
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened. Sept . 22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of Congress have standing to
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the question the validity of presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the illegality of the veto
Constitution: would impair their prerogative as members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have stnding the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution Association v
blessings of democracy. (§5)] Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic - There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing. The voting on
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members
Government. (§12) sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote their majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the members of the Court, with the
patriotism and nacionalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and
The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human as to petitioners' standing.
liberation and development. (§17) Specific Reasoning
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7) 1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA
is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare
invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife
by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for
that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this
parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his
- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax
strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
INVOLVED. 32 The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the
within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L.
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though
They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which
or affect their rights. occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or
transaction identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
"law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when
a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. 3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which can give rise to
- The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses a cause of action in the courts.
the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res - They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of
judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is contract law. More specifically, the question is whether petitioners have legal right which has
confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in been violated.
the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in SEPARATE OPINION
G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case."
The parties are the same but the cases are not. FELICIANO [dissent]
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of - I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my distinguished
"conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed brother in the Court, Mendoza, J.
upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future - I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my esteemed brothers Regalado and
action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. Davide, Jr., JJ. In respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also reiterate the concurring
303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960)) opinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my mind,
- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case,
collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims still exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or
are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979); second Kilosbayan case, I fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly
BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today clamped on our own limbs.
SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v.
PADILLA [concur]
32
COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes clearer: The concept of legal standing is a constitutional law
concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no constitutional
issues are raised the governing principle should be the concept of “real party in interest” in the Rules of Court.
- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. It is the duty of the have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused
Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President, by this majority view.
(unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's - I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factual and procedural situations
personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law. where such doctrine may apply, through its undue insistence on the remedial procedure
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G.R. No. 113375), expressed the involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher
view that the rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the court. Even in American law, the "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to
issue then was of paramount national interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease express the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and,
contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final
undeniably a form of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an "association, determination of the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it was
collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC. conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of res
judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.
REGALADO [dissent] - Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on
- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now evolved other adjective theories which a writ of certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same
are represented to be either different from or ramifications of the original "standing to sue" case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is
objection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard my own humble observations thereon. that where, as in the instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the handed down in an original action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it would have
original majority ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an had if promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an original
issue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be
court, that case being then remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to
prior resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "law of the case" in any other constitute the law of the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally
proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuated that said doctrine could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken.
exists only under such a scenario.
- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied, 2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus standi bar to petitioner's suit is not
two "appeals" are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot be an ironclad guaranty against it, the majority position has taken a different tack. It now invoked
reexamined in the second appeal. If so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first the concept of and the rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from
recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an its previous positions, insists that what is supposedly determinative of the issue of
original action for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless did not dispose representation is contract law and not constitutional law. On the predicate that petitioners are
of the entire case below because it was either a special proceeding or an action admitting of not parties to the contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in interest, and
multiple appeals. for lack of cause of action on their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot
- That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which, unfortunately, does not maintain the present petition.
appear to have been taken into account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogism of the majority can claim the
particular American concept was cited as authority in the majority opinion. No attempt was merit of logic but, even so, only on assumed premises. More importantly, however, the
made to ascertain whether in the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or blemish in its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the
even substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of review by a higher court on either same as lack of locus standi, that is, the absence of the remedial right to sue. As the
an appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari, prohibition or commentators of Castille would say, the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo
mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and without a showing that the situations are in perro con distinto collar." That re-christened ground, as we shall later see, has already been
pari materia, we are told that since the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence of foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case.
an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal to a higher court, a remand to the lower court, It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its
and then a second appeal to the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. I purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest
based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only
nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases the legalities in the case but also the realities of life.
should not be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there is the caveat that "the adoption of 3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two members of the
provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest does Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court
not solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to institute suit, although it may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and
obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not
one may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found any sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a
concise definition of the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which
each separate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the resolution thereof,
interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.) stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind
The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but unfortunately fails to put the criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not
proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be that which should correctly unknown to this Court.
be stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce: - I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action -
It is important to note. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action - has
underspinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the
real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle, I see no reason
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require why that particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res
a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the judicata. 11
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have its way in It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is identity of parties, subject matter
this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court of
government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. This legal competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and has long become final and
dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in the majority executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first action is
opinion, to wit: different from that in the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter
Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived is the supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction.
illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which nevertheless
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised continues to operate under the same basis, with on the property, fore the same purpose, and
in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject matter in
addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be both cases,. This would be to exalt form over substance. Furthermore, respondents
thought that a government corporation . . . has offended against its corporate charter or themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just
misused its franchise. . . some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners contrary assumption now being floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial
are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the finality of
suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with judgments.
those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now - Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the expanded lease
sustain the assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the
Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate actionable
bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione, not only because one has wrong or delict, that would merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the
to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but because he is himself the former and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we would
still have a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant within a just regime of law
of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be still in posse.
conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes at the
very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue DAVIDE [dissent]
respondents on the contracts concerned. - I register a dissenting vote.
In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist, or of conclusiveness of judgment, - I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona,
which I assume arguendo - what is now being primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to et al. 1 referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the
sue, aside from the postulated invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored lottery exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as
system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the
standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that matter, were likewise so contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine
recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now mysteriously Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a compelling need for (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and
reexamination of the doctrine, and, for economic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers
nation. and litigants, in the certainly and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the
floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to
substantive considerations, not on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into impse sanctions for their opposite conduct.
the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the benefit of - It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally accepted by the
a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and PCSO and the PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would
should even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any suspicions or lingering doubts not ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new equipment lease agreement
arising from the fact that the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different. consistent with the decision and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a
- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate my concurrence with the findings copy of the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2
and conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion, the presentation whereof is - As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the exception to paragraph B, Section
completely devoid of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has the virtue of being 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments
based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in adduced in the majority opinion it justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. While
dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative data. I find the same to be an amply there are exceptions to the aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to
sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract. upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and
- One concluding point. I am not impressed by their stance of the majority that our taking irresistible desire to rectify an error, none of such considerations and nothing of substance or
cognizance of this case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions.
overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since - In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, and in no uncertain terms
the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made declared:
constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
interest. raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling locos standi or right of action many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
doctrines posited by the majority in this case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing than of the
such stultification. This is a contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
grounds or considerations of importance which strengthened the legal standing of the 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the
petitioners to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a) the public character of the funds or doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of
other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of the Civil Code which provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws or the
a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of any other constitution shall from part of the system of the Philippines."
party with a more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d) - These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. They are based on public
the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation. policy and other considerations of great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned
Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 this Court, speaking through Mr. in a cavalier fashion. Yet, they are now put to naught in this case.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the - The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. There
petitioners, locus standi therein, invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court
case. He stated: to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members."
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts 7
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations - It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inapplicable that doctrine applies only
allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court.
to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a
Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989]. sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case.
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO
to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced
action. the instant petition also in the said case. Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not
- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the first lotto case on the issue be decided in the said case because the decision therein had became final does not detract
of locus standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the
V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi ruling in the raping controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC,
first lotto case to deny legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said: on the other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system.
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens. In the cases in which citizens Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of
were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it though the constitutional claims conclusiveness of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a question, as this
pressed for decision to be of "transcendental importance," as in fact it subsequently granted case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of locus standi which was
relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every
the Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majority for subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding
upholding petitioner's standing, this Court took into account the "paramount public interest" of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration, association; or joint venture with any person,
involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral well-being of the association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is not different from or unrelated
people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line to the first nullified contract, for it in nothing but a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato
lottery system." Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery. was even candid enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the
Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his concurring nullified contract was sufficient.
opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that preclusion or collateral estoppel
who was not yet a member of this Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved, is
concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said issue. misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case
- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are and in this case is one and the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same
bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the
and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the PCSO the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately discard it are
and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system. unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion contends, that "[t]he previous
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be considered a departure from settled ruling on
exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d Judgments $ 28), the real party in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved."
second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was
may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply never put in issue in the previous case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the
means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment. Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein, only locus
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which standi deserved consideration. Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate dissenting
has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of
other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed in the concurring opinion of Justice
and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved therein. Finally, as shall hereafter
fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting be discussed, in public law the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of
the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the locus standi.
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, - Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that the ruling locus standi in the
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners'
those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation, and that
thereto."10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons - there had been changes in the membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices
which I do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictabiity which is Isagani A. Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the and Ricardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was reiterated in
stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished. Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi and a re- Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case did not have the same
examination of the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, importance as the lotto case, he thereby accepted the concession of standing to the
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in
effects of judgment expressly provides: the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter cases the judgment or concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could have strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.
been parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the petitioners
action or special proceedings, litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold
capacity. move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby
same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a
facts of issues in action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11 party to that proposition.
Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well - The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the restrictive rule on real party in
as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments: that interest cannot be justified by the claim that is involved here is contract law, not constitutional
controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however, dealing here with an ordinary
decisions shall not be made on the same set of facts; and that there be an end to litigation contract between private parties, but a contract between a corporation wholly owned by the
which, without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but government - hence, an instrumentality of the government - and a private corporation for the
recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to contract of the lotto, which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and
individual rights and gives and respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given in other public policy considerations because the lotto has counter - productive and retrogressive
effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and provokes containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing
issues that immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. We the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such
said so in the first lotto case. hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site
of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas.
GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS - Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whether or not the investor
GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990 given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site
FACTS may change simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that
- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/ Department the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing
of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical plant from that was set by BOI.
Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha - A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed, asking that the Court resolve
and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and
Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management and ownership of the executory, and therefore petitioner has not waived his right. Court resolution stated that BOI,
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). not the investor has final choice on the matter and that even a choice approved by BOI may
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical not be ‘final’ for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may
Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail.
petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one of the terms and conditions for However, petition was denied.
registration was the use of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant, - Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choice.
which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on
Feb. 24, 1988. ISSUES
- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives, like, (1) exemption 1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to
from taxes on raw materials, (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it Batangas
is used as raw materials for the petrochemical plant. 2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or LPG the
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC)
BPC expressed to DTI Secretary his desire to amend the original registration certification of its 3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of
project by changing the job site from Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI
unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding
by Philippine Shell Corporation. Other requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing
the investment amount from $220 million to $320 million; (2) increasing the production HELD
capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the 1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court has constitutional duty to step
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. into this controversy to determine the paramount issue.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, The BOI recognizes and respects 2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is unjustified.
the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis - The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
provide the funding or risk capital for the project. - The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in
- In the petition entitled “Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. The Board of Investments”, this Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas.
court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the - The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned Filipino corporation, can provide the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on feedstock requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the country is short of LPG and there is
the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce dollars
respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers unnecessarily.
- R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem tax but excluded LPG from the among the three co-equal branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-
exemption. This law was specifically for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign making.
investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from
naphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the ART VI: LEGISLATURE
project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.
- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner, thus giving the government TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical FACTS
plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to - These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other of RA 7716.
circumstances to the contrary not withstanding. - RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National
- The government has already granted incentives for this particular venture. Through the BOI Internal Revenue Code.
decision, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice - Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC
free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in relative to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c
the best interests of the Filipino people. recommended for approval H No 11197.
- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous - H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third
laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution (Sec. 1 and 10, Art. and final rdg.
XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest. - It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The
Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as null and void. Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution
of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197
SEPARATE OPINION - Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and
1 abstention.
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting] - H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4
- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the amendment of the times, recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as
investor’s application for registration of its project, neither does the law prohibit the BOI from reconciled and approved by the conferees.
approving the amended application. - The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled
- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investor’s project is a political and bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May
economic decision which only the executive branch, as implementer of policy formulated by 12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.
the legislature, is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what is, or should - RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations.
be, the BOI’s “final choice” of plant site and feedstock. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation
- The petitioner’s recourse against the BOI’s action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT.
1987 Investments Code), not to this Court. - Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses.
Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting] - Petitioners contend:
- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly Re: Art VI Sec 24
transformed itself into what might be termed a “government by the Judiciary,” something never
intended by the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers
 1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was 1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn.
consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says there’s possibility that exemption
“shall originate” is qualified by the word “exclusively”. may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senate’s power in revenue bills to compensate for Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross
the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power. receipts on advertisements.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored
1129). Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630. treatment.
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2) 3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994. than P750,000 is discriminatory.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing 4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press.
budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country. - Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197. Re: Art III Sec 5
Re: BCC acted within its power 1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested
1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the in Congress and the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of
HB or SB and these were “surreptitiously” inserted. BCC met behind closed doors. religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses. - Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:
3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Re: Art III Sec 10
Report didn’t contain “detailed and explicit statement of changes” 1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of
4. It is required that the Committee’s report undergo three rdgs in the two houses. contracts
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: - Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1) Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL 1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize
transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected education
in the title.
2. Besides, amendment of PAL’s franchise may be made only by special law which will ISSUES
expressly amend the franchise (§24 of PD 1590). Procedural
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends: 1. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House
Re: Art III Sec 1 of Reps)
1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric 2. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days)
cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal 3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power
protection of law. 4. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: title) / WON amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no
2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%. mention is made therein
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Substantive:
3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation. 5. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: 6. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated
Re: Art III Sec 4 7. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified
11. WON Art II § 17 (gov’t priority on education, science and tech) is violated urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the
HELD Court.
- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres
depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti. likewise certified H No 9210 then pending.

Procedural 3. YES the BCC acted within its power

Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. a. “Give and take” often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in
An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. the executive sessions of the BCC.
This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a
more than “surreptitiously” inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in
SC gives due respect to other branches of gov’t. nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3 rd version be germane to subject of the HB
and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC
1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24 is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid.
a. It’s not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of b. This could have been caused by stenographer’s limitations or to incoherence that
Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a sometimes characterize conversations.
revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senate’s c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice
power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative in bill-drafting.
power of the two houses. Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek
exercise of check on executive power. modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills
c. There’s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report.
hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter.
Consti simply says that it’s the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The 4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to § 103 of NIRC be
House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content.
Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of
on Ways and Means. franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress
when common good requires.
2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)
a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing Substantive
and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the - as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom
necessity…” qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days of law should be in Congress.
and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To
construe that the “except” clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules 5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated
and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill. - When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when
property is imperiled, lawmakers’ judgment prevails.
 a. This is actually a policy argument. Padilla, Separate Opinion
b. This is a mere allegation. Vitug, Separate Opinion
c. This is also short of evidence. Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated Romero, Dissenting Opinion
a. There’s no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
the State. Puno, Dissenting Opinion
b. It’s not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously
granted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA
that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. FACTS
This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. - The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal problems, revenue
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is generation, and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to create a law to address
a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of such problems. This gave way to the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as
privilege or right. Republic Act No. 9337. The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic Act
9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In this case there
7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated were 4 different petitioners: Abakada Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./ Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/
religious materials by religious org. Osmeña, Congressman Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of them question the
8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated constitutionality of RA 9337.
a. Parties to a contract can’t fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of - Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. > VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange, or
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in lease of goods or properties and services.
reach of higher income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 > It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of goods or services may pass on the
are exempted. amount of tax paid to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and end-
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we “evolve” a consumers.
progressive taxation system. - RA 9337’s legislative history is as follows:
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27 th of January 2005 and House
religious materials by religious org. Bill 3705 that was approved on the 28 th of February 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 approved on the 13th of April 2005. This was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference
a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press. Committee. The Bicameral Conference Committee inserted and deleted some of the original
provisions. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate and 10 th of May 2005
Decision Petitions are dismissed. by the House of Representatives.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, it’s equal to 10% of
gross selling price ISSUES
Procedural
Narvasa, Separate Opinion 1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
Cruz, Separate Opinion houses thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress.
2. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article VI Sec 26 that states that no FACTS
amendment would be done after three readings. - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec 24. - 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
Substantive filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, “RP vs. Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and Secretary of Finance. al.”
5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the Constitutional provision Art VI -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of
Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to
progressive system of taxation. enrich themselves at the expense of the
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
HELD -obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the violation of the senate and house PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject
rules unless there is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc.
rights of private individuals. (favorite ratio Ü) 8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market
2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquino’s brother-
of Congress with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses before the bill is in-law, Ricardo Lopa
transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and amendment. –Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed amendments after the House Bills Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or
were approved. The Bill still originated through the House of Representatives. consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government
4. No, because the President is just executing the law and is still working within the standard -the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue
and policy of the law. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he is Ribbon Committee)
considered as an alter ego of the president thus following the same logic, he is only executing -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on “what they know”
the law. about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is directed towards a goal of a -at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process
progressive taxation. clause, and both averring that such testimonies would “unduly prejudice” the defendants of
civil case no.0035
SEPARATE OPINION -petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction
PANGANIBAN and legislative purpose
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax rates on domestic, making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting
resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of tax credit against Angara v. Comelec)
taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the -the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to
reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense were not really part of the House delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue
version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the origination clause in Article VI Section Ribbon Committee
24.
ISSUES
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.
PADILLA; November 20, 1991 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of
government.
3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
 US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate, a
HELD legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed.
1. NO Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is not in aid of legislation -the requirement that an inquiry be “in aid of legislation” is easier to establish here where
- Sen. Enrile’s inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the Congress’ legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every
alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations—there was no intended legislation as required by question be material to the proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject of the
A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must inquiry.
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the -the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may
Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress’ power of inquiry is broad but limited, investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently
that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate under trial.
task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself.
2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by -A6 S21 provides that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinions—as held in respected.”
Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the However, such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations
Judiciary. where a violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be
3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process respected.
- It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant -the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, including…the Bill of Rights”. As posed, but the witness may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar,
held in Hutcheson v. US, it can’t be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is
public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states premature.
that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by
law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. CRUZ [dissent]
Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and
produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.
pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/
the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED. legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the
contrary.
SEPARATE OPINION -an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA
3019 in the disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the
GUTIERREZ [dissent] legislature
Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation …
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation. expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual grant—
even so, it is expressly granted by A6 S21. Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry -the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke
does not limit the power of inquiry the right against self-incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot refuse
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to taking the witness stand outright.
legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.
SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES; 3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
FACTS 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. no. 46433 issued Sept. 28, 2005 HELD
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated : Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Primary Issue
Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16 1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating
invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to reasons therefor.
appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the - Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless
NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O.
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the
for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to
because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
already been completed. cannot be presumed to be valid.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. Reasoning
464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not Executive Privilege
allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written -The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain
approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend types of information of a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.
due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several - The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony that it may
respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to
Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit. compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
ISSUES As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was
Primary Issue intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is
1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.
Secondary Issues - Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
2. Justiciability of the case: Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to
a. Legal standing of petitioners: appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils. it valid on its face.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL - Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban branches of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres.
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
b. Actual Case or Controversy - Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
33
E.O. 464 “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.”
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)
determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting - When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws
the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. must be direct and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding
that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the
privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional requirement of personal interest.
nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)
Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by - There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific
the highest official in the executive hierarchy. interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-Laban no standing.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464 b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President - A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and
prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.
se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does - The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from
not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the 3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public
circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry. concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations deprives the people of information.
Secondary Issues 4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners: on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt
Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and from the need of publication. Due process requires that the people should have been
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented.
validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared
legislators. void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must
be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of GUINGONA V CARAGUE
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991
and specific interest in raising the questions raised.
FACTS
The Senate of the Philippines - The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service)
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted
intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the
executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential
information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.
such a controversy. - Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the
Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL) Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the
- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 Constitution, it shall be void.
infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct - They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they
investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the
laws.
one man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current 1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B
appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable. for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that: adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the 2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the (1), Article VI of the Constitutional.
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. 3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress
to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate HELD
Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows 1. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided.
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount
appropriation made by law. allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The
otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs
advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot
for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from
short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our 2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Constitution recognizes that:
Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain
estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's - This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution
to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically - Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
- Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the 3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
Marcos." banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they
shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as
ISSUES the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the - On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
country. have become Republic Act No. 766334, the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. On the
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either
are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not House of Congress to override the vetoes.
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to - In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a
pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness Development Fund or “pork barrels,” the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of
sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS;
shown by the books of the Treasury. and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994
- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
SEPARATE OPINION imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
CRUZ [dissent] Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for debt service.
release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this - In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Tañada together with the Freedom from Debt
requirement. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”, Cruz Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging the
says no such regulatory boundaries exist. constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
PADILLA [dissent] - In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Tañada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the
- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch. - In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the
- Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene
the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion,
pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government. G.R. No. 113105

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ ISSUES

QUIASON; August 19, 1994 Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing35
FACTS Substantive
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. 34
Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
35
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other
petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or “pork barrels” is an encroachment by power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in state policies or objectives.
implementation of a law 4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education 36 as the highest priority in allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the
the allocation of budget unconstitutional House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment.
4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Decision
Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution 37 Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
HELD Substantive
Procedural 2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, hence
1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto constitutional
or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. 3. No. Congress’ act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises its power to respond to the
Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US case (United imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in 4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v.
Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae. G.R. No. 113105
Substantive G.R. No. 113174
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad ISSUE
as Congress wants it to be. WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for
Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
qualified beneficiaries…" It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the Constitution38
appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to HELD
propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
the GAA of 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is the President beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” 39 which can be
who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of vetoed separately from an item.
Congress are merely recommendatory. Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent. It also cited another case,
priority to education is merely directory. Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the
Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague. While it is true that under provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
budgetary priority to education” it does not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
36
Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching 38
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment." Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
37 revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object.”
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 39
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in Also included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” which are intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations." appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Citing Henry v. [1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which
such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's (President’s) item can be vetoed separately from an item41
veto power over general appropriation bills. Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5
issues in this section. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice how the
Decision ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive)
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of the item on debt 6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative
service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill.
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals 42 in discussing the issue of
case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case.
The said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct 7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by
connection with the item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are
said provisions is void. faithfully executed.

G.R. No. 113174 Decision

G.R. No. 113766 1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions.
G.R. No. 113888 2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
ISSUES hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by
1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) is contract.
unconstitutional 3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance is vetoing the said item.
unconstitutional 4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
equipment is unconstitutional vetoed.
5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is 5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
unconstitutional pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
6. WON the President’s directive that the implementation of the Special Provision to the item System is violative of Sections 25(5) 43 and 29(1)44 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus
on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an veto is not unconstitutional.
administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to 6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.
dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment 40) Impliedly, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.
7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the
Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional 41
Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. This can be implied from, “Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.” Hence, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.
42
Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law
HELD Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal
43
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
40 Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue . Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. "
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of 44
Funds, Harvard Law Review) "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising his - substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected
constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully. - The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who are sued in their official
capacity for the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989
Dispositive - December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 - eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed Budget of the President
only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service - presented to President for approval
specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and - December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law (became RA 6688)
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for - The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar - February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate Resolution No. 381 that the veto of
as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2 nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of Sec. 55 was unconstitutional
the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of - April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed
medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED. - assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent - enjoined the implementation of RA 6688
- No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court
SEPARATE OPINION - September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course to the petition
- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition which raised
PADILLA [concur and dissent] the same issue as the original petition (questioning the presidential veto)
- The vetoed provisions include:
- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms - Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item submitted by the President which has
the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig been reduced by Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is deemed disapproved
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto if there is no corresponding appropriation in the Act.
power of the Executive. - Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations
Act except that this was lumped together with the use of savings
VITUG [concur] - The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the
"use of savings" is in Section 12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990 \Appropriations
- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16
colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is - The reason for the veto:
not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it - Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in - Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President, the Senate President,
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General Appropriations law
GONZALES V MACARAIG - If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot augment any item
MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990 and appropriation from their savings even if special circumstances like calamity
- Petitioners' arguments:
FACTS 1) The president's line veto power regarding the appropriations bill is limited to item/s and
- The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special and general does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections 55 and 16 are
provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for 1989 provisions)
- The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of: 2) When the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill, it is not possible to
- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee exercise the item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well
 3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over a particular item in an
restrictions for that would be legislation already (violative of separation of powers) appropriations, revenue or tariff bill. The president may not veto less than all of an item (no
4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided by law so Congress has authority to veto part of an item and approve the remaining portion of that item).
prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that power - Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916
- SolGen's arguments: - 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more expansive since it included
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a political remedy which is to provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills
override the veto. - 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as the only official
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and should merit a veto. who has the power
3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the executive - 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973 provision except that a different public
branches already provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of PD 1177 as official (the President) was now involved and eliminated the reference to a veto of a
amended by RA 6670) provision
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other distinct and severable parts. - The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any reference to the veto provision,
the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has
ISSUES not changed.
1. WON the issue is justiciable - An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details, distinct and severable parts of the bill
2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its whereas a provision is of a more general nature.
counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect - A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of the bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks
HELD the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
1. The issue is justiciable, not political. specifically to some particular appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Senate and the Executive its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria v. Alba case declared that - A provision does not relate to the entire bill.
the Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a government branch void if beyond that - The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative power as stated in the Bengzon
branch's powers case:
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative need for - The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has the negative
definitive ruling by the Court power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature.
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad - The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
ruling (the Court may or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the Tolentino v. - The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same
COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have personality when a Constitutional way that they presume constitutionality of an act passed by the Legislature.
issue is raised) were used. This is also not the first time that the veto power was * Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
discussed. - Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec.
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto but reversed by the US 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense.
Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not involved. - Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate specifically to some particular
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto in an Appropriations Bill appropriation therein. Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.
2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They apply generally to all items
Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of provisions. b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill.
- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and if exercised would veto the entire bill augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs. 55 and 16 are
 inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the veto power. ATITIW V ZAMORA
*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible to a veto. TINGA; September 30, 2005
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and
where conditions are attached, veto powers do not have the power to strike them FACTS
out. - This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can impose conditions on expenditure of declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA 8760 (General
funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while allowing the Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
appropriation itself to stand. or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAA has
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the real sense of the term. Restrictions long been implemented, the issuance is already moot and academic. But the Court shall pass
should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of upon the constitutional issues.
expenditures. The test is appropriateness. - Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR):
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions. - President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras.
- Actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and therefore separate These dialogues focused on the establishment of an autonomous government in the
legislation. Cordilleras.
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or - Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions
disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and Section 18, Article X mandates the
compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President. congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions.
* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto - President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July 15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority of the Chief the interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the
Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Cordilleras.
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective -Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989, Congress enacted RA 6766 ( An Act
appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)). Providing for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region ). A plebiscite was held
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law. where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an
- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao
savings in another item in the appropriation of a government branch so as to afford province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds. disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way. effect.
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the constitutional and statutory -February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the
authority of the President in the interest of expediency and efficiency. assailed Special Provisions:
- The special power of augmentation from savings is merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The “1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities
GA Bill is one of primary and specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public and operations of the CAR, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of
treasury. The power of augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation all affected officials and employees…”
of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure. -July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementation of the
- To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the Executive and other officials and winding up of operations of the CAR.
put in jeopardy the exercise of that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were ISSUES
unconstitutional, a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress. 1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional
But Congress made no attempt to do so. 2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O.
No. 220
3. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO 220.
Still
HELD 1. Contention that Congress can’t unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220: Rejected. There is no
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is constitutional such thing as an irrepealable law.
a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the subject of the bill in which it is 2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to
incorporated. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec 25(2) “No provisions or support CAR’s activities is legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.
some particular appropriation therein…” and Sec 26(1) “Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in the title thereof” ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress: it simply FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items, or non-appropriaton items which
relate specifically to appropriation items. FACTS
- Test: It must be 1) Particular – if it relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation; 2) - Petition for review of the decision of the HRET
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the
Unambiguous – when its application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no reference
lone district of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election protest
to details/souces outside the bill; 3) Appropriate – when its subject does not necessarily have before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His grounds:
to be treated in a separate legislation. alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files
- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test. counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS; dismissed by HRET.
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and appropriate to the appropriations bill - HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities found. Justice Gancayco’s Report
to which it belongs, it shall not be considered to be a rider and Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET
b. Petitioners allege: officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently reduced … while Syjuco was always
constant…”
- that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it had the effect of
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA submits certified true copies of the
abolishing the CAR
Revision Reports and election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of documentary
- since a special law created the CAR, the 2000 GAA is not the place for
evidence, “mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison with the original
amending or repealing a standing law.
documents or identification by any witness…."
- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been deactivated.
- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture (revision and recount
- Abolish – to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy completely, office ceases to exist; of ballots) to what he calls a “truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" — the
- Deactivate – render inactive, break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, office PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES.
continues to exist, albeit dormant. - By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of
- But even if the limitation of the CAR’s budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices, the his protest, change his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action in violation
Congress has he power to do so. of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest
- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function should not be dismissed.
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may abolish - 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the three
the office if it sees fit. Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and thereafter to decide the case on
the merits.
Constitution. EO 220 has not established an autonomous regional government; rather, it has
- JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter.
only created an administrative region. It can be considered a regional coordinating agency of - 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling
the National Government. JA's proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. Said decision also refers
the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions.
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph is a rider, the rest of the arguments - Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.
look into the wisdom and efficacy of said provisions. Political questions
ISSUES
1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in - Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to
a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS’ “precinct level document based sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair
anomalies/evidence" theory; expression of the popular will, and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the
evidence was procured; & expression of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. Corollarily,
c. annulling election results in some contested precincts. the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the
2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result
was affected thereby, even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to
HELD punishment. 32 These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered
1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion voters had taken place in the questioned precincts.
a. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory - General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error
- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what AS originally through a motion for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the
sought. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes
Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental
was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protest… principle of due process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if
this a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion . No further hearings were petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated.
conducted…JA's right to due process was clearly violated. - Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules
filing of the election protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the
the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory
counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended application.
pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter - Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and
protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most
cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and uniformity of
adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else.
<principle of estoppel> - Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its majority decision
b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyo’s proclamation as the winning congressman of
- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all.
substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital election
documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and 2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the - Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to
majority decision, never offered in evidence by either of the parties. seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court
- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the participation of - Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the language
any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the contested employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and established rule that derogatory
signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers
submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is
required to constitute a valid quorum). Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and
c. Nullification of election results public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby
for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism: fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts receipt of this decision.
were involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, BONDOC V PINEDA
irregularities or terrorism. GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991
FACTS the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the majority in the Tribunal.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party - March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991
(NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the in HRET Case No. 25.
province of Pampanga. - March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28,
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly
In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR,
Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional
through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the prerequisite.
party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: - March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated
March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and
Associate Justice, SC rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal .
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member - Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of
this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
Associate Justice, SC
because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a
Associate Justice, SC motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member said that:
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP > Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP > Suggestions:
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member + The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member would be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP of election contests.
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).
affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity. (like that’s possible)
- July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition - During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the
- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members
in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and,
delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re- therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. - March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership
Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court even said that all members of
of the contest. these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of
- March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-
that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges.
The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty. HELD
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc - Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional
Rep and HRET praying this Court to: representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET - The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
his functions as a member of the HRET; and 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable. non-political body in a sea of politicians.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition - To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent.
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National
sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of
power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal member's term of office is not commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating + Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole + Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
question beyond the reach of judicial review. functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable + Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to
Camasura's membership in the HRET. security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House
because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member of the HRET. member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political
impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it
of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR violated his right to security of tenure.
would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura’s seat in the Tribunal. - Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
ISSUE tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may - I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
not be interfered with by the House Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. which the Court cannot intervene.
The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong - The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is - Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91- maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should
0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the independence.
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in LOZADA V COMELEC
the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs
against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. FACTS
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice. - Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a representative
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. suit45 to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing
vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on
SEPARATE OPINION Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution 46.
- Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient
PADILLA [dissent]
voter of Quezon City, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while Igot
-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) great departments. Each separate from, yet coordinate and co- alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special
equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege
- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and that they are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and that they filed this petition in
treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects are of profound and general interest.
as nugatory and not binding in every other department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal provided ISSUES
that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
1. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for mandamus
- The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a
2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition
member of the House Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said
3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
member.
- The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the
House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House HELD
of Representatives should have done what it has done. 1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus
- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority of the - As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that
legislature The judicial department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair tax money is being illegally spent. Action complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call
action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it a special election, and therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act
by the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal
powers. expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
SARMIENTO [dissent]

45
for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation
46
Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
- As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to adequate representation for every province which forms only part of a certain region, specially
maintain and prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing is to have personal and considering that the Body is only transitory in character.
substantial interest in the case, or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest - That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in included in
held in common by all members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be Transitory Provisions adds to the intention that the provision applies only to the regular, and
sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury, whether actual or not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
threatened, is that indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute.
Decision Petition dismissed.
2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section II of the FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
1973 Constitution47. In this case, there is no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the
standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC FACTS
has unlawfully neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on
petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on
ministerial duty of COMELEC. September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for special elections, recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session
and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President
COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a
Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then
the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner
body, not the COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission
the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration
mandamus. of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang
Pambansa ISSUES
- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim Batasang
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments (CA),
Pambansa. without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim Batasang Pambansa was to be appointment.
composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent 2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being an independent organ of the
President and Vice-President, and the members or the Senate and House of Representatives Constitution.
of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing
each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt HELD
absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering 1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect.
the uncertainty of the duration of its existence.
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then
Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa, because a province or
duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.
representative district would have only one representative in said body. The need to fill up the
Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor urgent, as there would always be
Reasoning
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the
47
Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
receipt of a copy thereof.
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to
grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final FACTS
disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a - Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature.
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case, The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the
Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s constitutional
reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would power to elect its own president
dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Tañada and
members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges 48 against the then Senate
Commission. President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and
In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States,
reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for all the Senators were present.49
reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no - TAÑADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAÑADA from
effect whatsoever. delivering his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair
reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved. and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously approved, among
b. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the others, a resolution “declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
the next adjournment of Congress.” President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President.
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring - Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate
confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, President and oust CUENCO.
the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office.
As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is ISSUE
effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.
HELD
2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this NO (6-4 vote)
Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political
legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. question.
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and Reasoning
purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an - The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
as will constitute a denial of due process. themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them . If
the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
AVELINO V CUENCO Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949 48
BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to
which AVELINO was a member); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINO’s assumption of office; and
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC justification of electoral fraud.

49
Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal - If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted?
to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the
that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens . It is absence from the country of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23
furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature. quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a
Decision Petition dismissed. majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring
less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
SEPARATE OPINION Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.
PERFECTO [dissent]
RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn is one of the
exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single FACTS
individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and - In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino
its opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them),
without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case
in a democratic social order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly ISSUES
authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the 1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case
presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary 2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America, upon which ours
is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision. HELD
- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said 1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
effect was properly made and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support subsequent events which justify its intervention.
AVELINO’s claim. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and 2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds
the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a
defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice
AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group. [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as
transact business. – The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall constitute a Senate President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional]
quorum to do business…” [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no
provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
"each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of For this reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to
Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with
than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half. Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
FERIA [concur]
SEPARATE OPINION
 to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested
FERIA [concur] in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The collective body
constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative
amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National chamber. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the is restored.
majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or - At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to
incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to renounce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow
House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINO’s refusal to attend the sessions,
through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to notwithstanding CUENCO’s commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.

PERFECTO [concur] OSMENA V PENDATUN

BENGZON; October 28, 1960
- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the
National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of FACTS
Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National - On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before
Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of
who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to
only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmeña to appear
members. before it to substantiate his charges.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical - On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief,
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada
(1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said
senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the
two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour
composing the Senate. for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined
- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House
purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12 provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words
senators was enough quorum. The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House
constitute a quorum…, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel - Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. and is supreme within its own sphere.
- Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power, under the - "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
Constitution, to suspend one of its members. as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that 3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted
Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist. be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
ISSUES legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
words spoken in the House measure."
2. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished 4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or
3. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other
could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their
business had intervened after gave the speech in question
4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take,
disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have
HELD been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be supplementary manner to its proceedings.
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 Decision Petition DISMISSED.
of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
itself .
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege FACTS
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator - Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil mandatory and prohibitory injunction
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not - HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and House of Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the amendment on HB 9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentino’s substantial
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM.
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court - After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, passed by the Senate with amendments. However, the attached amendments were not Sen.
it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to Tolentino’s but Sen. Roxas’amendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President.
The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” pursuant to
who affixed his signatures by way of approval – enacted the bill into R.A. No. 4065 50 Article XV of the Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine)
- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a which is not in the province of the judiciary.
press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version - using J. Bengzon’s separate opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that the case at bar
passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments he made. The Senate is justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
President then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of
the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and due enactment of provisions of acts.
could not validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. The President - basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which
then withdrew his signature on the HB 9266. requires the judicial department to “accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President of the authenticated by it.
Philippines, Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of 2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the
business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the certification/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress
Chief of Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect already present upon it.
said RA.
Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication; signify the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction
ready for his approval or disapproval
and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel
respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
3. Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution for the
validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
- Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved proof of its due enactment.
by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of
decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official due enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress’ proceedings [comparison of
trip, Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI,
Acting Mayor under the RA 4065. sec 27(1)]
4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled
ISSUES bill doctrine, (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress
1. WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the “enrolled bill doctrine” and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the proceedings of the Congress entered
2. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the bill and into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is
validates it into a law deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3 rd reading and the attestation of the
3. WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers, the “journal entry” in the presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon referring to
Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment the journal entries of the proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that substantial
4. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law and lengthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the
printed text which was signed by the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President
HELD of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signatures, then RA 4065 was
1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become
evidence for the due enactment of a bill. law. TRO made permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I don’t know the
Obiter difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]
- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the
issue of WON a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935 MARTINEZ V MORFE
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been passed by a “vote for three- FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
50
An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No.
409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates of the 1971  However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a
Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecution privileged class if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document for stating under oath in his immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on same.
June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born on June 20, 1946  A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well without the need
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election Code in that he for any transgression of criminal law.
gave and distributed free of charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings  If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution, he should be treated like any
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be quashed, by virtue other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime
of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the should not go unpunished.
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative .
Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
 Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who shall, during the session of
Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
ISSUES committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest  RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together with Article 145  Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: “All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
of the Revised Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional immunity continue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
HELD amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines…”
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests.  Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them from arrest
even if warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with the Constitution, and is
 Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
consequently inoperative.
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative.
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
 Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: “The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of peace, CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech o debate therein, they shall not FACTS
be questioned in any other place.” - Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the
 Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang
peace - Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not
o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies and giving them
libelous since he was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House
aid and comfort
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law Committee on National Defense
o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPC or any special statute - The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958
 History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members while congress was presumably not in session.
of the National Assembly from criminal arrest - Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.
 The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to - The open letter was an exposé on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to
carry out its function without obstacle be an insidious plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Nat’l Defense, Jesus Vagas,
 In England, operation of parliamentary privilege excludes all crimes, applies only to by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate
prosecutions of civil nature for President in 1961. (Plan II – A coup d’etat;Plan III – A modification of Plan I)
 There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the Congress, and - The letter also implicated that the “planners” have under their control the following : (1) Col.
likewise, delegates of the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt.
enable them to discharge responsibilities
Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna…….” It is of course possible that the officers mentioned
above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.”
- Lower Court dismissed changed” except by Acts of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition
- Petitioners appealed of a majority of the voters in areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the
municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated.”
ISSUES - Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
1. WON the publication is a privileged communication instituted the present civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
2. (if not) WON it is libelous the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
HELD disbursement by said municipalities.
1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the - The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case.
President published by the defendant when the Congress was not in session. And in thus - Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici curiae.
causing it to be published he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any House Committee. ISSUES
- The phrase “speech or debate therein” as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution 1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the ground that Section 68 of RAC, which
refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such was the basis of the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in 2. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under RAC amount to an undue
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts delegation of legislative power.
performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly HELD
authorized to perform its function as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in 1. Yes. RA 2370’s denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
question. negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages. Although barrios.
the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise 2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
added that it was possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself – it
absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the “delegate” - and
entitling them to recover damages. (b) fix a standard – the limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL - Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965 power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
FACTS precise to avoid the evil effects of the power the President.
- During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, Reasoning
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US)
Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities. - It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of legislative power
- RAC Section 68 because it supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
- provides, among others, that the President may by executive order define the boundary of b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC)
municipality, increase or diminish its territory provided that the authorization of the - Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained. “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA 2370 Section 3 exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by LAW. (take
which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names note: such control does not include the authority either to abolish or create)
Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent are - The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the municipalities concerned. Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:
ARNAULT V NAZARENO a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
OZAETA; July 18, 1950 b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
FACTS - During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE transactions.
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the - During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and
Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When
option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name
million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also
the accrued rentals of P 324,000. said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non- approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found
resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms
payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed. until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong - Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme
estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds:
generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is
from Burt. not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approved bills related to the
property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a transactions.
notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative
Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the session.
cancellation of Burt’s title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
Administration. - rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt
the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the
(P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the
1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices.
two corporations acting as Burt’s attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the The discussions were as follows:
trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault. a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of
Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely
institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress. and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information
that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have
 them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Decision Petition is denied
Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress SEPARATE OPINION
has jurisdiction to inquire.
TUASON [dissent]
ISSUES
WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted - The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its
attainment of the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where
HELD disagreement occur.
a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as - Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to
contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the the contemplated legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the
transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined question as to who received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the
by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such vindication. The Senate
Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to prepare the way for court action
matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a since they could not expect the Justice department to take the initiative to investigate and
clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department had
be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.
their scope. - The Committee’s report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact
- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the case
for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the there is no need to extract names. The importance of names is when it comes to a criminal
Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he prosecution.
so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him - In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and
until he complies with said requirement. legal. His main objection lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of trespassed on the territory of other braches of government “when it imprisoned a witness for
the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot”.
Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of
Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for
a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two FACTS
years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat - On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic
of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court. SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
c. Arnault’s claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
him. Arnault’s testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be
gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.
 known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which
of the municipality shall be in Togaig. is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large
in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials. aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. apply to a motely group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one?
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the 3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to vote in
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town; he
Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato, prays that may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy
Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote
should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional
ISSUES direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the
1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a community affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to
bill shall be expressed in the title NO vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES
MILLER V MARDO
HELD BARRERA; July 31, 1961
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8
- projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation FACTS
of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of - These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of - 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not - Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province - Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. standards
2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts - 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not
will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts of the statute are being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or - same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue - 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. When the foregoing bill was seamstress
presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios - Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money
- was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an - Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
be heard
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition.
- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice. is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power to adjudicate contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
money claims where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan is null and void
ISSUE
insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of
the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own
ISSUES
effectivity dates
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as
amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the
HELD
Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to
etc. official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or
HELD otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does
1. No it is not valid. not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The
publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a
- While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred merely to
requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power informed of its contents.
rests exclusively on the judiciary Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and
to the exercise of administrative dunctions effect.
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are
create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress both executive & legislative powers.
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) - The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this
of RA 997 case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two houses are to for ignorance as an excuse.
hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a - Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.
TANADA V TUVERA
TANADA V TUVERA CRUZ; December 29, 1986
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
FACTS FACTS
- Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. - In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
 "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
published, they shall have no binding force and effect." TINGA; February 24, 2004
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision, specifically, on the
following questions: FACTS
- LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition called Koalisyon ng
ISSUES Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? - KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the Phils in the
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? May 2004 elections
3. What is meant by "publication"? - LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination of candidates for the upcoming
4. Where is the publication to be made? elections
5. When is the publication to be made? - on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the COMELEC
a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo Angara or his authorized representative
HELD may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates
1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General, Representative Agapito Aquino, on “indefinite
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply forced leave” and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen
to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and - Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not have authority to impose
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by - pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was filed with COMELEC, naming Sen.
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the Panfilo Lacson as LDP’s Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed by Rep.
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, Aquino
at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must - the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that the period for
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a filing for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the petition for both Petitioner
valid delegation. (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates nominated by both
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the parties as the official candidates of the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the “Angara
public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, Wing” and the “Aquino Wing”
the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of - Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication with grave abuse of discretion
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.51
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication ISSUE
of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and divided LDP into
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the “wings”
legislature.
5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, HELD
to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, YES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue to be resolved by the Commission
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a certificates of candidacy. To resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the Party
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time. Constitution. Equity is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to resolve the
51 issue which is not the case here.
This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
 - as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC has the authority to ascertain the - Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through its commissioners still decided to
identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers; consequently it has the power to implement Phase 3
settle any controversy regarding leadership of the party as an incident to its power to - GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund the AES for the May 10 ’04
register political parties. This matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino elections. Also issued EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project.
and Angara had the authority to certify LDP’s candidates - Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic transmission of
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who has the power to sign results because according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress has the sole authority
documents in behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when to canvass votes for President and VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the
authorized by the Chairman. That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as found by authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional authority
the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it does not follow that said authority is still - Aside from Drilon’s apprehension, there were budget problems for implementation because
existing since it can be gathered in Angara’s Manifestation that Aquino’s authority had been the money allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC,
revoked, which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his authority to grant however, still conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on
such power 04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. 277. Read just in case.)
- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify candidates does not cancel the - COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections, approved RESOLUTION 6712
certificates he signed. The candidates named will only be treated as independent stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall
candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. 6453, section 7 be electronically transmitted in advance to COMELEC, Manila. They established a National
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate their own candidates, confused the Consolidation Center (NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality
electorate as to which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies that the LDP and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the
represents results garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character.
- The constitutional policy towards a free and open party system envisions a system that - Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to SC.
shall “evolve according to the free choice of the people” and not one molded by the
COMELEC ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have locus standi
BRILLANTES V COMELEC 2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004 jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712
FACTS
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing COMELEC to use an automated HELD
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and 1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution obviously involves
canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May 11 ’98. Also the expenditure of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question its validity. Most of
allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices to adopt the petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL, the citizens’ authorized arm to
new electoral forms and printing materials. However, the failure of the machines to read conduct an unofficial quick count during elections. Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of
ballots correctly deferred implementation of modernization plan. Congress, the sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a three-phase modernization 2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
program for the 2004 elections. returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP.
o Phase 1 – computerized registration and validation COMELEC’s claim that it is not prohibited because it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable.
Encountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting to old listing of - the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the
voters treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art VI). Because the
o Phase 2 – computerized voting and counting tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In
Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual voting and counting system due to fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of
the problems encountered with validation public funds/property).
o Phase 3 – Electronic transmission of unofficial results (which is challenged in this case)
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by NAMFREL by said Section 40(e), such assessments should be based not on the value of the
using a copy of the election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of properties but upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations .
election returns for counting. - 28 September 1966—Public Service Commission denied request for reconsideration. Their
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all reason:
candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec 52 of the Omnibus o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" in section 40(e) of
Election Code. There are 2 conditions that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking the Public Service Act as an alternative base for supervision fees collectible, applies to
technology for electoral purposes: take into account the situation prevailing and the funds both stock and non-stock corporations.
available, and notify authorized representatives. These conditions give the affected people an o to use the value of property and equipment as an alternative base for fixing the rates only
in case of public services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable discrimination
opportunity to object if need be. Details on p 302-303.
against the latter
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and another after the words
and unofficial tabulation of results. It also doesn’t make sense that Phase 3 of the program "Capital invested," immediately preceding the clause "property and equipment, whichever
should go on when the first two phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a is higher," indicates the intention of the legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative
whole and not independent of each other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the of both stock and non-stock corp.
unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what is the use of spending all that
money for something uncertain, something that the NAMFREL had always undertaken? It is ISSUES
an unnecessary waste of government funds and effort. 1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public utilities issuing shares and those that
- COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason for the resolution. Accdg to do not as the capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares have been issued.
them, modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of dagdag bawas but it Thus, the value of their property or equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for
doesn’t make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human intervention. No matter how this class of operators
modern the technology for electoral purposes is, there will always be the need for human 2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have bearing
intervention so the problem will not be eradicated. 3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as supervisory fees
Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is NULL AND VOID.
HELD
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital investment of public service
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975 operators that do not issue stocks. These companies are required to submit annual reports of
finances and operations
FACTS 2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory construction
- September, 1964 – the Public Service Commission assessed several public utilities for - the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all
supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year - the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main argument that
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company - P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics nothing in the law justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the property or
Corporation - P11,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company - P23.921.60; and General equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not issuing shares of capital stock.
Shipping Company - P33,146.80 3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed were designed to raise revenue
- The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respective properties or for the general expenses of the Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual
equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act expenditures in supervision.
3792 - we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in collecting the
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said corporations sent Separate letters to the fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property and equipment without due
Commission, (except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition allowance for depreciation.
instead) requesting for reconsideration of the assessments  their ground: under the Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision fees payable under Republic
Act No. 3792 should be computed upon present values of properly and equipment in use; the
appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED
 - The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE “to promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to
COCONUT AUTHORITY ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998 - the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure
FACTS - PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the PCA is to “formulate and adopt a general
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to applicants for the program of dev’t for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects”
establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants— issuance would violate PCA’s o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring volumes of production and admin. Of
Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses market forces how the industry will develop
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.018-93 providing for the - Constitution Art.XII
withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing industry; registration o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands
would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and admin of quality
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires
standards
o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the gov’t. The regulatory
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
processing plants dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID
ISSUE
- Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for SEPARATE OPINION
that is what the resolution in question actually is.
ROMERO [dissent]
HELD
- The power given to the PCA “to formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the - The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated legislation.
coconut and other palms oil industry” is not a roving commission to adopt any program Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be achieved by the laws regarding
deemed necessary to promote the dev’t of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to the coco industry, particularly “to promote accelerated growth and dev’t of the coco industry”
be exercised in the context of the regulatory structure. and “the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coconut industry”
Reasoning - The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adapt to ever-changing business
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the powers and needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature
functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil. Coco - Trimming down an admin agency’s functions of registration is not an abdication of the power
Research Institute to regulate but is regulation itself
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public corp...charged with
carrying out State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coco and SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998
beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing FACTS
plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in the - On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the
industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export performance of coco-based products eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing establishment and operation of Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared the
additional DCN plants because of increased demand in world market
duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader. speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the - "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies
agreement of Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
belonged to the "minority." the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter 2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator - While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby
- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the automatically become the minority leader.
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator Guingona - While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
ISSUES merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision.
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution - Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem.
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
minority leader exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to
leader protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
HELD into the internal workings of the Senate.
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to 3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or of Senate minority leader.
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives - Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding
observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and
- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, 4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, - By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
upon political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Subic military reservations including
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing > created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party > granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such businesses from local and national taxes
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a > gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by - Aug 16, 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in preparing for a joint
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their destinations and recreation centers
competence and authority. - Dec 16, 1993 – BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM Development and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003 Poro Point for tourism and recreation
Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s Resolutions to BCDA
FACTS > Sept 29, 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located within Camp John
- Petitioners : John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino Foundation Inc., Center Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for development
for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin represented and joined by > Jan 19, 1994 – abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being
her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH
Katherine Pe represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia > Feb 21, 1994 – 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of
Pacalso alias “Kevab,” Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias “Ba-yay,” Edilberto the environment, making of a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employment of
Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed participation of the city government
- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and Development Authority; John in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses
- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for temporary BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential > modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, “Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area development according to RA 7227
Covered by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to - May 11, 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order determination of
Republic Act No. 7227” realty taxes which may be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real
- RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing - June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and
Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR “Bases Conversion and Development Act of supporting subject to its concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential
1992” proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA
> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into alternative 7227
productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of - July 5, 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which
reads
 Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City 6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone environmental
Council of Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John Hay… as John Hay Special impact assessment is being illegally considered without a valid environmental impact
Economic Zone assessment
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectares surveyed and - a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city
verified by DENR government from implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from
Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases Conversion and proceeding with their plan respecting CJH’s development pursuant to the JVA
Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ, authorized to determine - Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege
utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights and in consultation and 1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants , and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA
to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone 2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives
thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing arm to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely
for its economic development and optimum utilization implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the business activity or investment
JH Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement necessary policies, rules and 3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with equal protection clause
pertinent government departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the 4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the absence of an actual
SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export controversy
Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
1991, and new investment laws that will be enacted. - Petitioners Reply
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of 1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are invoking
departments, etc of the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or restrain
implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas
programs. 2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basic autonomy and
identity. ISSUES
- April 25, 1995 – petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc. Procedural
No. 420’s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA 1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD 2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic
- Petitioner’s Allege: 3. WON present petition complies with the requirements of SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over
1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional constitutional issues
exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature Substantive
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is 4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption
invalid, illegal and unconstitutional within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform 5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonomy of Baguio
and equitable City
4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal
5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it
except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional
and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the > as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal and substantial
exercise of SC’s primary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act
to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military being challenged; material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No.
reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City
Reasoning > Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where SC characterized
- Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Besides, their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual,
remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues real, vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they
- transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of an area TF a breathe
crucial issue. Conversion involves > Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of
> focal point for investments by local and foreign entities Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents on
> site for vigorous business activity spurring country’s economic growth the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment supported Proc. No. 420
center 3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity
> critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting communities are 4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
located and nation in general - 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable 4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express extension of tax
transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of scarcity of water exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any presidential proclamation
supply in Baguio City granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec
2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues regarding them as 28(4) which gives the legislature, not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or
moot and academic. corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review. power to tax.
Reasoning Reasoning
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review - Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parties pitted against each - Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: … the zone shall have all the applicable
other due to their adverse legal interests incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act
respondents arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted
SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the > Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ
respondents claiming otherwise (b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national and local taxes of business
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the entities
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial (d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties
controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the (f) liberalized banking and finance
Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial duty (g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question - deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation privileges
of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to (discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)
vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of communities in the Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that “THE SPECIAL
utilization of such base areas) ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 THE FOLLOWING POLICIES”… it is very clear that these principles and policies are Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and regulations on the
applicable only to Subic as a free port billing of telecommunications services:
… so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the 1. Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days
zone to Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic from the end of each billing cycle . In case it is received beyond 30 days, SS shall have a
zones within the baselands grace period within which to pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be
… the provision now will be confined only to Subic disconnected from service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE).
> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt,
- privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer’s own equipment.
and raw materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions 3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards .
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully
> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991 consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of first use to replenish SIM card. The
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of the SS at no addtl
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like and no express extension of the 4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call
aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation ; using the cards.
also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether postpaid or
Proc. No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the prepaid shall be reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The authorized rates per minute
enactment of RA 7227 shall be divided by 10.
- SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two grounds – - The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of
infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and clearly, Proc. No. 420 general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP Law Center.
infringes upon the Constitution - June 22, 2000 – MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC provisions regarding sale and
5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions is use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC
has been granted. - August 30, 2000 – NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service operators (SO)
Reasoning which contained measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell phone units . It
- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following directed CMT SO to:
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace 1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and
Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be transferred to it by the President addresses of prepaid SIM card customers
- such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually 2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply with MC
has control over it subject to certain limitations of law 3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using stolen cell phone units or cell
Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect. phone units registered to somebody else when properly informed of all information
Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective relative to the stolen cell phone units
4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SO in order to prevent
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS their use
COMMISSION 5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003 identification cards.
- October 6, 2000 – NTC issued another Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, which
FACTS was “for strict compliance.”
- June 16, 2000 – NTC, pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers , issued 1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7,
 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from date of first use. - Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7, 2000. determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
- Procedure branch or instrumentality of the gov’t.
 October 20, 2000 – ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an action for - Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
Declaration of Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 6 Memorandum , question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
with prayer for injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds that- that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
a. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils
the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause (deprivation of property)
c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by unduly prolonging 2. No.
the expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative
d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement agency, in exercise of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust
are unreasonable administrative remedies before going to court. Only judicial review of decisions of
 GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
 October 27, 2000 – RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing MC exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
 November 20, 2000 – RTC denied NTC’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Injunction is - Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable, records show
granted, pending finality of the decision of the case.
that petitioners have complied with such requirement:
 October 9, 2001 – CA granted NTC’s petition for certiorari and prohibition.
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered their protests and submitted
 January 10, 2002 – Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA
proposed schemes for the Billing Circular.
ISSUES - After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the suspension and
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case reconsideration of the MC.
2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable - Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This
was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of their requests.
HELD Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of CA and its Resolution are
Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi- reversed. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the proceedings.
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
 Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations, which should be ART VII: EXECUTIVE
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to such
administrative agency. The regulations must be germane to the purposes of the law, and GONZALES V MARCOS
not in contradiction to the standards prescribed by law. FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
 Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative agency when it performs in a (SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive nature, where the power to act
in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
administrative duty entrusted to it.
CORTES; September 15, 1989
1. Yes.
Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency FACTS
in the performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, the regular courts have jurisdiction. Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for mandamus and
The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to
Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI- enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
JUDICIAL function. Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired followers to destabilize the country and the precarious state of the economy were the factual
by any authority/agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. They also bases for the President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses during that time would
invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to leave any chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
country, including his own, and to return to his own country, and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that “no one shall be become serious and direct. The preservation of the State – the fruition of the people’s
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” Respondents contend that the issue sovereignty – is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and
of whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more primordial and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that
transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves a political responsibility.
question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the
Constitution. They also point out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to SEPARATE OPINION
the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.
FERNAN [concur]

History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive
ISSUES Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many
1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from terms are applied to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,” “aggregate,”
returning to the Philippines. “emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently.
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. GUTIERREZ [dissent]

HELD The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers impaired only upon lawful order of the court, not of an executive officer, not even the
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of President. I do not think that we should differentiate the right to return home from the right to
“executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.
than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be CRUZ [dissent]
considered in light solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino then invoked.
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit PARAS [dissent]
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return to his own country, except
only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security.
2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in PADILLA [dissent]
prohibiting their return. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the - Hence, this petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena contends that:
interest of national security, public safety, and public health. Power of the state to restrict the > SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to file administrative charges against
right to travel finds abundant support in police power. The government failed to present him, and to decide the merits of the charges because the power to suspend, to try and
convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’ right to return to this country. punish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other agencies of the government.
> SI’s acts are null and void because:
SARMIENTO [dissent] + SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the President when SI suspended
him (Villena).
The right to return to one’s own country cannot be distinguished from the right to travel and + SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the provisions of law and
freedom of abode. While the President may exercise powers not expressly granted by the the provisions of law governing the trials and charges of against elective municipal
Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom, the latter must yield to the paramountcy of officials are those contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.
the Bill of Rights. Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only within + SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the
the limits provided by law. The President has been divested of the implied power to impair the same time the judge of the charges he filed against him.
right to travel. The determination of whether the Marcos’ return poses a threat to national + SI’s action didn’t follow the procedure under Sec. 2188 of the AC, which requires that a
security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be satisfied that complaint be based on a private person’s or citizen’s sworn statement.
the threat is not only clear but also present. - Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and his agents from
proceeding further with the investigation until this case is heard; that SI be declared as without
ESTRADA V DESIERTO authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared as without
PUNO; authority to file charges against him and to investigate such charges.
(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION) - His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR > Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC expressly empowers the SI to
LAUREL; April 21, 1939 “order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department” and in connection therewith to “designate an official or person
FACTS who shall conduct such investigation.”
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and > Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doesn’t preclude SI from exercising the
his agents from proceeding with the investigation against him until this case was settled by the powers stated in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked section, must be read
SC. in relation to sec. 37 of the Reorganization Law of 1932.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice > Villena didn’t question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start of the investigation but merely
conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed bribery, contended that such charges were not in accordance with law for the reason that they didn’t
extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. bear the oaths of the complaints.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended so as to prevent > The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a subordinate necessarily
the coercion of witnesses. The President verbally granted the recommendation on the same carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem
day. necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, including suspending the officer;
- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instructed the Provincial Governor of plus, the President authorized the suspension.
Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension. > Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction from performing
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and notifying him that any official act, which they are required by law to perform, or acts, which are not in excess
Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case. of the authority, and discretion reposed in them.
- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would begin. But
eventually postponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents and postponements. ISSUES
1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation, by a special investigator promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity against Villena. Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending the investigation of the Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Gov’t, there is one purpose which is
charges. crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that it is,
the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
HELD - The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a
petitioner, Villena, and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. President of the Philippines.”
- Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control, direction and supervision over bureaus - Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality
and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of is reality but the projection of that of the President.
the same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior “executive supervision over the - Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ “each head of a department is, and must be, the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law
subdivisions.” to exercise authority.”
- Citing Planas v. Gil: “ Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is - As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious the particular field.
and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts - The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive
and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.” Department before his own conscience
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
municipality who is under investigation.
- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval or acquiescence of the SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
President to the suspension. It was said that if the justices were to accept that the President COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT
had the authority to suspend the petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the BUENA; February 27, 2002
President approved it, should be sustained. Then this was followed by the discussion
regarding certain acts of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval or FACTS
ratification. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive - On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued Memorandum
that should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
proclamation of martial law and the exercise of pardon.) But there were doubts regarding the Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to “effect the transfer of regional functions of that office
verbal approval by the President of the suspension if such could be considered as ratification to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office…”
in law (with law giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio. - On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
Ratio “xxx…under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTFRB chair,
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by par. 1, sec. praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without
12, Art.VII of our (1935) Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are effect.”
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are - On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DOTC
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The lower court issued a writ of
is required by the Constitution or the law to act personally , the multifarious executive and preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996.
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive - On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued Department Order
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and No. 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office “as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR…”
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos. bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case was decreed “in the interest of
96-735 and 97-1025 “null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions
provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative in CAR.”
department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other - The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-B of the
office or employment in the Government.” Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely designated
to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the
ISSUE direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular
WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC Regional Office as an LTFRB LTFRB Regional Office.
Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power.
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
HELD RESOURCES
- The President may, through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter ego, legally and FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
validly decree the reorganization of the National Government in exercise of authority granted
by law. FACTS
- A public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution - Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a domestic Mining
(fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law. corporation’s (Benguet Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three mining claims
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the in Benguet, Mountain Province.
third mode. - Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed the various departments and - Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource maintaining the
agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their sufficiency of her adverse claim
regional offices in CAR. - At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for reconsideration and
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR ordered a formal hearing of the case
Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to implement - Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.
- The President’s control over all executive departments come from Section 17, Article VII of ISSUES
the 1987 Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize the national government is 1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary, upon a
vested by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 (as question of fact, is justiciable
ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary). 2. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can be precluded from
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: “without minimizing the importance of the heads of conducting his own inquiry
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.” 3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to abide by the requirements of the
Thus, their acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless law
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” HELD
- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the 1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as and commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the courts unless there is a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and other departments). imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. A evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made
Reasoning - Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on “reasonable
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.”
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the acts of the Chief - August 30, 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889.
Executive - September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the
2. The State acting through the legislature through its power of imperium acting as a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces,
sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise its power of cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao,
dominium as owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance with law North and South Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac,
Reasoning Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.
Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired ISSUES
3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines “when affirmed by the 1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive,” in which case the required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court where only questions of law may 2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it complied with ART III Section 1
be raised par 1452 and ART VII Section 10 par 253 of the Constitution?
Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary that’s why he ordered a hearing. It is but a 3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889
right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be 4. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained should be released
conducted
Decision : petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Unanimous HELD
1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and
LANSANG V GARCIA Montenegro v Castañeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the grounds
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971 prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better
FACTS: position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant of power to
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus. suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege
Other petitions: of the writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative –
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense “shall not be… except”), and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative
L-33973 David vs Garcia department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia inquired into by courts of justice.
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia - The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia Executive is supreme within its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago hand with the system of checks and balances. The authority to determine whether or not the
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia Executive acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary.
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia 2. YES.
- August 21, 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A, declared the existence of an
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of uprising -- “lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the avowed
the writ of habeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII
Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that “lawless elements have created a 52
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State…” and in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”
53
that “public safety requires immediate and effective action” “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof
when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”
purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection of probable cause. That is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable
and rebellion xxx” search and seizure.
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be ‘invasion, insurrection, or rebellion’ - To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the law are to be availed of is to
or ‘imminent danger thereof’ and b) ‘public safety must require the aforementioned ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
suspension’ are PRESENT. offense without due process of law.
c. The 1st condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already –
HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the existence AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE
of a rebellion. MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974
d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of
several mass-based organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters with the military, FACTS
etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP and - September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081,
its front organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a plan proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines
of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of property, etc. - September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which provided an
3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intelligence reports, he order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals
consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was critical. The suspension named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in
of the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as he could not have the country and to take over the government by force
ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted - Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of the
the suspension. herein petitioners
4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue is moot and - Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for habeas corpus
academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison, still - Respondents filed their “Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition” and prayed that the
under detention, they have been charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of petition be dismissed
overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN 889 being valid, their release may not be ordered - Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr.
by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary and Sen. Jose Diokno), were released from custody on different dates under a “Conditional
investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is Release”
found or otherwise , to order their release. - December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing delay in the
Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the
L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the
and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention. New Constitution, he cannot “reasonably expect to get justice in this case”
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue. - The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public interest in the
decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue,
SEPARATE OPINION unfair and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Diokno’s motion with a vote of 5 to 7
FERNANDO [dissent] - Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Muňoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo
voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition
- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should be
set free. ISSUES
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the
arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding proclamation of martial law
2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial
Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law rather than political.
3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus - The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court is necessarily limited to the
ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light of the credible information
HELD furnished by the President, was arbitrary. The question before the judiciary is not the
All petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by the respective correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken.
petitioners with the approval of this Court. - Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court sustained the presidential proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur. in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to the executive, the judiciary merely acting as a
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his concurrence in the dismissal of check on the exercise of such authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the
all the petitions. exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check, not to supplant the
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion. Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion. jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or the determine the wisdom of his act.
Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion. TEEHANKEE [justiciable]

SEPARATE OPINION "it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [stated in the
WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the country
proclamation of martial law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation) under martial law as the case may be, since the requirements for the exercise of these powers
are the same and are provided in the very same clause] in order to determine the
CASTRO [justiciable] constitutional sufficiency thereof."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of
power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into the “existence upon by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is
of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as
determine the sufficiency thereof.” an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress
- The judicial department can determine the existence of conditions for the exercise of the its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
President’s powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the suspended x x x.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege
circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'-or under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent
habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The danger thereof-'when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
President’s findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts. suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far
from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
FERNANDO [justiciable] circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be
- The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a legislative act exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
has the duty to look into its validity. A showing that plenary power is granted either And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department of government may not be and obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Necessarily then, it inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon
becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of our Constitution could not have intended to - Political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction…but that as a matter of
engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility." policy, implicit in the Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executive’s Proclamation.
BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]
ANTONIO [political question]
- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the constitutional
sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President should not go beyond facts of - The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of
judicial notice and those that may be stated in the proclamation,, if these are by their very sovereignty. To protect the nation's continued existence, from external as well as internal
nature capable of unquestionable demonstration. threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the
- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive, the Court’s inquiry into its time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as
constitutional sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in Lansang, involve the reception such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions"
of evidence to be weighed against those on which the President has acted, nor may it extend - These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's protection and security have been
to the investigation of what evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be lodged by the Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the
limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the
of judicial notice. powers shall be called forth.
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitutional prerogatives vis-à- - Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of
vis the proclamation and the existing martial law situation, given the reasons for the the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated the principle that when the
declaration and its avowed objectives. Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act
1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists,
the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas
emanate from it. corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government.
2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate
And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of
arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means.
3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution, the the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will presume that such conditions continue to
President is the specifically assigned protector of the safety, tranquility and territorial exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist. These
integrity of the nation. This responsibility of the President is his alone and may not be doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The
shared by any other Department. "doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any
4. The Constitution expressly provides that “in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or person, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, the Executive may place the facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law”
authority." The political department according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the
5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the
Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares either of these
Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that power, without any emergencies to exist, its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial
limitation or qualification. department of the State.
6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law readily reveals that the Constitution’s concern for individual rights and liberties is not MAKASIAR [political question]
entirely above that for the national interests, since the deprivation it enjoins is only that AQUINO [political question]
which is without due process of law and laws are always enacted in the national interest
or to promote and safeguard the general welfare.
7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that the privilege of FERNANDEZ [political question]
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no similar injunction whether
expressed or implied against the declaration of martial law.
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim martial law. It is presidential power granted under the Constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of
similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of invasion, insurrection, habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; that responsibility and duty of the Court must be
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the President preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last bulwark of
as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of democracy in this country.
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. The proclamation
and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political question. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature is justiciable Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law
there can be no clearer example of a political question than Proclamation No. 1081. It is the
exercise by the highest elective official of the land of a supreme political duty exclusively CASTRO [valid]
entrusted to him by the Constitution. Our people have entrusted to the President through a
specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a powerful - Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual
weapon. The people have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are so ominous and invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of “imminent danger” thereof.
threatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must be used. - The so called “open court” theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our
- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determination of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where
occasions for its exercise. It is not given the authority by the Constitution to expand or limit the the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence of invasion, insurrection, or
scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too simplistic for our day, what with the universally
Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater recognized insidious nature of Communist subversion and its overt operations
Manila. Much less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its
existence, to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by FERNANDO [valid]
the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. The Court's function in
such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates, in a transitory provision, that:
constitute a political question or not. Its function is to determine whether or not a question is All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
indeed justiciable. incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding,
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but justiciable, it is still valid because the and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it. modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
ESGUERRA [political question] repealed by the regular National Assembly.

- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; that the veracity or TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement]
sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question
presented by the petitions is political in nature and not justiciable. Whether or not there is BARREDO [valid]
constitutional basis for the President’s action is for him to decide alone.
- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia, since a major
surgery is needed to save the nation’s life.
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave responsibility of
checking executive action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the
The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under martial law - The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain order and to insure the
was necessary. The President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. An arbitrary act is success of the battle against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient means without
one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of the loss of time and with the minimum effort. This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of
actor, one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason, is without adequate those contributing to the disorder and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and
determining principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the actor's will. Such is not the comfort to the enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean anything at all.
case with the act of the President, because the proclamation of martial law was the result of
conditions and events, not of his own making, which undoubtedly endangered the public ANTONIO [legal]
safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the exercise of
his power under the Constitution to proclaim martial law - The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest and detention of petitioners.
Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 by the
WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and
detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the
CASTRO [legal] President, as amended by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now
be assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary.
- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest and detention of those - It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law, the
reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on
questioning. the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an important
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of the petitioners incident of a declaration of martial law.
on the ground of reasonable belief in their complicity in the rebellion and insurrection. Except
Diokno and Aquino, all the petitioners have been released from custody, although subject to FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended
defined restrictions regarding personal movement and expression of views. As the danger to upon a proclamation of martial law]
public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the continued detention of Diokno and Aquino
and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial law did not carry with it the
not prepared to say that the continued imposition of martial rule is unjustified. automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus]

FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not automatically carry the - First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in the early portion
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus] of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available
safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere implication.
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution)
President himself, it carries with it a presumption of validity. The test is again arbitrariness as categorically states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
defined in Lansang. While the detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered, as except for causes therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is not one of those
dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then enumerated.
his release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. - Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935
Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides specifically for three different
BARREDO [legal] modes of executive action in times of emergency, and one mode does not necessarily
encompass the other, viz, (a) calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness,
- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of etc., (b) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) placing the country or
the writ of habeas corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot a part thereof under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes for the executive
be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process.
action are the same, still the exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension of the c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of martial law and vice versa. structure and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and
- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when, with the assessing the security situation.
d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City North Edsa, Araneta Shopping
declaration of martial law, there is a total collapse of the civil authorities, the civil courts are
Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations
closed, and a military government takes over, in which event the privilege of the writ is and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that, - On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
however, is not the case with us at present because the martial law proclaimed by the deployment of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency
President upholds the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,and the courts are situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law
open to issue the writ. enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the
military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment creates
IBP V ZAMORA a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. It
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000 also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution.
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
FACTS Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief.
- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila
verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the through more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. He further
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. stated that to heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
implement the said order. each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated Letter of preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
Instruction 02/2000, which contains the ff: services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national reasonable period only.
security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary ISSUES
criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former 1. WON the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
police/military personnel. The police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence subject to judicial review
of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. a. WON petitioner has legal standing
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile 2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy , over the military and the civilian character of
those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/military the PNP
personnel
> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations: HELD
a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and the Philippine 1. On Judicial Review
Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the AFP.
b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may - grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
brush aside technicalities of procedure. gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
> Definition of locus standi an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or - There is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged the armed forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the proposition that grave
+ “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
+ gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 of the Constitution to
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions the necessity for the exercise of such power The full discretionary power of the President to
> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case reinforced in the rest of the said provision.
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It - Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
has not shown any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. There is no
questioned government act. such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines call out the armed forces
Definition of political question - Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
measure being assailed - Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief; when he exercises
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign this lesser power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it is necessary, his judgment
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the cannot be reviewed by anybody
legislative or executive department; if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the - Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge necessity,
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
the people themselves then it is held to be a political question courts. On the other hand, the President has a vast intelligence network to gather
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political question is information.
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for infringe the civilian character of the police force
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent - limited participation by the Marines
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; - real authority belongs to the PNP
or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian character of the police force
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on - the real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the one question the PNP, and not with the military
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of - since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of
is justiciable—the problem being one of legality or validity. - the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols;
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
 Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction - (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be admitted to its
- Military assistance in: elections, administration of the Phil. Red Cross, relief and membership
rescue operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary inspections, conduct of - (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
census work, etc. performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of - (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
Congress and, yet, never before questioned legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the legislature’s exercise
- Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference
derogation of civilian supremacy - (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with Congress’power to discipline its
Decision Petition dismissed members
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares- - (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of the
Santiago, De Leon) subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a quorum
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing) - (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice
- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo) of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is subject
to constitutional limitations, which are mandatory in nature.
SEPARATE OPINION - (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and
its power does not come from Congress but from the Constitution
PUNO - (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was held to
- Political questions are defined as those questions which under the Constitution, are to be be justiciable and not a political issue. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government They have a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive their authority from the fundamental
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political law and they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional
capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or limits
particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. - (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing
- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one department has no authority to amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent
inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other assembly
department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by - In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction
him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon
existence of those facts. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Once a the Legislature
determination is made by the executive and legislative departments that the conditions - The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive Power
justifying the assailed acts exist, it will presume that the conditions continue until the same - (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-
authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive branch, thru its civil and military General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know
branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace and order from every corner of the needs of the country than any other member of the executive department, and with full
the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its very limited machinery confidence that he will perform such duties as his judgment dictates
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its - (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that it was not
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field
the exercise of his office. The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its
make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any part within certain discretionary limits.
branch thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any
judicial process
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The President’s inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is - (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into every
universally denominated as political, and this power continues to exist for the preservation phase and aspect of a person’s detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to
of peace and domestic tranquility of the nation the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the - The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts
President upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of
from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the government
exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive - It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines,
office may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary;
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
has the power to determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective
terminated. It is within the province of the political department and not the judicial sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional parameters
department of government to determine when war is at the end of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen justiciable issue and is not a political question.
requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision is final - On the use of Bernas’ opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from the convention
and conclusive on the courts. which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the
- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political people.
question. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither - When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume
absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended
except only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and VITUG
(2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the Philippines, an executive
power, which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations. The function of prerogative, to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis, does not constitute
the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that the issue of MENDOZA [concur and dissent]
whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the decisive
issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without - The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an
constitutional ratification, was a political question actual case involving real parties with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the President’s declaration of martial law. On challenged executive action
whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question, - A citizen’s suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action requires that (1) the
the Court was almost evenly divided. petitioner must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there must
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order by the be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is
President was not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or national emergency, the likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in - Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best
peril position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do not
have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the consequent lack of an 1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties
actual case or controversy b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TINGA; February 3, 2004 HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
FACTS merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These
- July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as
and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.
of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief. - Justiciable even if moot
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both - Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review
declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. - Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. - Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the
- August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration. Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury,
- PARTIES then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)
> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD) - Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed from the governmental act that is being challenged. People’s organization status would not
forces vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances
o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
had ceased. - SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal
> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
reviewers
2. Presidential issuances are valid
o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous
- Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ
public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional
of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law.
rights of citizens
o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the - 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)
law - It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The
o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President foremost, Executive powers
> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives - US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and office
therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2 - President’s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
> Sen. Pimentel
chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists
has no constitutional basis
> Solicitor-General and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration - Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson)

ISSUES
- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
factual basis. stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law. some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members
of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. [4] They
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006 government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the
FACTS facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS’ COUNSELS.
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In
of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out upon the people to “show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, bands on our left arms.” [5]
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “ Oplan
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to Hackle I ” which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction ; and as provided in Section including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. [6] Upon the advice of her
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the
Emergency. height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
- The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing concerted efforts of On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in
Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo Government. Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of
- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017 (hence, the the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s Army (NPA),
same premise as PP1017), thus: a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents. [7]
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the “ Magdalo’s D-Day would
vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that
No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to “disavow” any defection. The
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: “ All SAF units are under the effective
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable
officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and loyalty.”
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco,
and lawless violence. President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported
and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s
plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the
identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to
“it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo. ”[8] avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co.,
number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of
the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, “censorship” or “prior restraint.” They also claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to
there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is “ absolutely no
chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately In G.R. No. 171485 , petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G.
took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including
Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “ usurpation of legislative
within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of martial law.” They alleged
and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “ The Communist that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without
Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there
coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of is necessity to do so.”
rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it .”[9] In G.R. No. 171483 , petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
(NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: “ Anti-Arroyo groups within the military Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and
and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to
of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the redress their grievances.
field.” He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo In G.R. No. 171400 , petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP
conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II,
2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section
2006. 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017
sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers .” And
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that “ it
death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional
ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the approval.” In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the nature and
provinces in mass protests.[10] function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.”
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP
several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are “ unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression,
She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to
of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the
trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in 1987 Constitution.” In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully
the entire National Capital Region. prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS - In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the
petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of
(ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz the protection given by constitutional guarantees. [35] And lastly, respondents’ contested
et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In
Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances. Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However,
they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot”
ISSUES case may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
Procedural continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. ” The present case
1. WON the moot and academic principle precludes the Court from taking falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
cognizance of the cases 2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case
171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal is of transcendental importance.
standing Reasoning
Substantive - Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” [37]
3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 1017 In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in
4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every
a. Facial Challenge action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest .”
b. Constitutional Basis Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured
c. As Applied Challenge by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ”[38] Succinctly
put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
HELD - By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Procedural Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave provided that the following requirements are met:
violation of the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the 1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires 2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, tax measure is unconstitutional;
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] 3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
Reasoning in question;
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of 4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of 5. or legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, the case is their prerogatives as legislators.
capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] - Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of - The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares
G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating - In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of
legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the
is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their “transcendental importance” doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases.”
rights. - This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] - Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT ARROYO AS RESPONDENT.
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan ,[61] Association of SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform ,[62] Basco v. OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY,[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE,
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, [63] and Tañada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will
issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
the execution of the laws. into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from
- In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
be granted standing to assert the rights of their members .[65] We take judicial notice of one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the impeachment.[69]
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [66] Substantive
the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and 3. The President’s “calling-out” power is a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. However, “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This ruling is based on Section 1,
petitioner have locus standi. Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies
is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine
allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. government.” The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect discretion of the political departments of the government. [81] It speaks of judicial prerogative
the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82]
importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. - However, “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. [83] It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
doctrine” on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis ” and that if he fails, by way
No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. - And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance whether this situation exists.
of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing - Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. meaning and differ as to its application. ”[110] It is subject to the same principles governing
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes
President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not
permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. (This even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to
interpretation was based on Article VIII, section 1 establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of
a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted PP 1017.
to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2) b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to
that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests
other alternative remedies available. and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be facially invalid only if men of common media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
Reasoning declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim - The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce obedience of
that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens. such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
- A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and contracts and the like.
foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” - The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the
statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos.
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to - In the absence of delegated authority from Congress, the authority of the President to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take
Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech) . Moreover, the public interest.
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate - Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor.
conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” Reasoning
and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Calling-out Power
- Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be - The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated
used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”[107] The reason powers. These are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of
the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion .”
situations not before the Court. [108] Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue
PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As
determine the actual condition of the country. such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be
- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press
or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law
wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to - Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.
declare a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” emanates from assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: “Take Care” Power
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or - The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
which shall have the force of an executive order. and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
- President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status - As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, [115] the primary function of the
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” [116] In the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his
or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, [117] including the
power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Philippine National Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government. [119]
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?
Sanlakas. - PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x
- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. ”
Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein - The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order
that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to issue executive orders,
- In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice ” on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders/circulars, general or special
Vicente V. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
medicine which should not be resorted t