Republic of the Philippines rebellious MNLF and MILF was cultivated.

8 Thus, the Autonomous Region of

SUPREME COURT Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created through Republic Act No. 6734. The law
Manila took effect on August 1, 1989.
EN BANC Then came the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos. He issued on September
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893 and 183951 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH 15, 1993, Executive Order No., 125 (E.O. 125) which provided for a
COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process with the Muslim rebels.
VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PINOL, for and in his own behalf vs. THE E.O. 125 created the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON give momentum to the peace talks with the MNLF.
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, In 1996, as the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations were successfully winding down,
ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. the government prepared to deal with the MILF problem. Formal peace talks
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and started on January of 1997, towards the end of the Ramos administration. The
duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the Buldon Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 19979 but time ran out for the
so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process negotiations to be completed.
Promulgated: President Joseph Estrada continued the peace talks with the MILF. The talks,
October 14, 2008 however, were limited to cessation of hostilities and did not gain any headway.
x--------------------------------------------x President Estrada gave both sides until December 1999 to finish the peace
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION process.10 They did not meet the deadline. The year 2000 saw the escalation of
PUNO, C.J.: acts of violence and the threats to the lives and security of civilians in Southern
It is the duty of the government to seek a just, comprehensive and enduring peace Mindanao. President Estrada then declared an "all-out war" against the MILF.11
with any rebel group but the search for peace must always be in accord with the He bowed out of office with the "war" unfinished.
Constitution. Any search for peace that undercuts the Constitution must be struck Thereafter, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed office. Peace
down. Peace in breach of the Constitution is worse than worthless. negotiations with the MILF were immediately set for resumption. Executive Order
I. Historical Roots No. 3, was issued "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure: For
A historical perspective of our Muslim problem is helpful. Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." On March 24, 2001, a General
From time immemorial, an enduring peace with our Muslim brothers and sisters Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF
in Mindanao has eluded our grasp. Our Muslim problem exploded in March of was signed. Republic Act No. 905412 was also enacted on March 31, 2001 and
1968 when Muslim trainees were massacred by army officers at Corregidor. About took effect on August 14, 2001 to strengthen and expand the Autonomous Region
180 Muslim trainees had been recruited in the previous year as a part of a covert of Muslim Mindanao. Through the Organic Act of 2001, six municipalities in Lanao
force named Jabidah,1 allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah from Malaysia. The del Norte voted for inclusion in the ARMM.
trainees were massacred when they reportedly protested their unbearable training On June 22, 2001, the ancestral domain aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
and demanded the return to their home.2 The Jabidah Massacre fomented the Agreement was signed in Libya. Several rounds of exploratory talks with the MILF
formation of Muslim groups clamoring for a separate Islamic state. One of these followed. Unfortunately, on April 2, 2003, Davao was twice bombed. Again, the
groups was the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), founded by the then peace talks were cancelled and fighting with the MILF resumed. On July 19, 2003
Governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam.3 Another was the Nurul Islam, led by the GRP and the MILF agreed on "mutual cessation of hostilities" and the parties
Hashim Salamat. returned to the bargaining table. The parties discussed the problem of ancestral
On September 21, 1972 Martial Law was declared by President Ferdinand E. domain, divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and governance.
Marcos. Among the reasons cited to justify martial law were the armed conflict On February 7, 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory Talks between the GRP and
between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim secessionist movement in the the MILF ended. The parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points of
Southern Philippines.4 The imposition of martial law drove some of the Muslim the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June
secessionist movements to the underground. One of them was the Moro National 22, 2001. The Joint Statement provides that:
Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Nur Misuari. In 1974, the MNLF shot to "Among the consensus points reached were:
prominence, when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) officially gave it · Joint determination of the scope of the Bangsamoro
recognition. During the 5th ICFM, they strongly urged "the Philippines Government homeland based on the technical maps and data submitted
to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, by both sides;
particularly with representatives of the MNLF in order to arrive at a just solution to · Measures to address the legitimate grievances of the
the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of national sovereignty and Bangsamoro people arising from the unjust dispossession
territorial integrity of the Philippines"; and recognized "the problem as an internal and/or marginalization;
problem with the Philippine Government to ensure the safety of the Filipino · Bangsamoro people's right to utilize and develop their
Muslims and the preservation of their liberties in accordance with the Universal ancestral domain and ancestral lands;
Declaration of Human Rights."5 · Economic cooperation arrangements for the benefit of the
In December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF under the auspices entire Bangsamoro people."
of the OIC started their peace negotiation in Tripoli, Libya. It bore its first fruit when On July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement on the Memorandum of Agreement on
on January 20, 1977, the parties signed the Tripoli Agreement in Zamboanga City Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was signed by Chairperson Rodolfo C. Garcia on
in the presence of the OIC Representative. behalf of the GRP Peace Panel, and Mohagher Iqbal on behalf of the MILF Panel.
President Marcos immediately implemented the Tripoli Agreement. He issued In the Joint Statement, it was declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD has
Presidential Proclamation No. 1628, "Declaring Autonomy in Southern already been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached a consensus
Philippines." A plebiscite was conducted in the provinces covered under the Tripoli to initial the final draft pending its official signing by the Chairmen of the two
Agreement to determine the will of the people thereat. Further, the legislature peace panels in early August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia."13
enacted Batasang Pambansa Blg. 20, "Providing for the Organization of The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at bar. These Petitions,
Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Legislative Assembly) in Each of Regions IX sought among others, to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD. On August 4, 2008,
and XII." President Marcos then ordered the creation of Autonomous Region IX a day before the intended signing of the initialed MOA-AD, this Court issued a
and XII. Temporary Restraining Order stopping the signing of the MOA-AD. Several
In the meanwhile, the MNLF continued enhancing its international status. It was petitions-in-intervention were also filed praying for the same relief. On August 8,
accorded the status of an observer in Tripoli, Libya during the 8th ICFM. In the 15th 2008 and September 1, 2008, the respondents through the Solicitor General,
ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984, the MNLF's status was further elevated from a submitted official copies of the initialed MOA-AD to the Court and furnished the
mere 'legitimate representative' to 'sole legitimate representative' of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention with copies of the same.
Bangsamoro people.6 All the petitions were heard by the Court in three separate days of oral arguments.
In April 1977, the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the In the course of the arguments, the Solicitor General informed the Court that the
Philippines (GRP) and MNLF Talks collapsed. Schism split the MNLF leadership. MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or any other form." 14 Thereafter,
The irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat led the government Peace Panel was dismantled by the President.
to the formation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), headed by II. Petitions should be Decided on the Merits
Hashim Salamat. Thus, the Maguindanao-led MILF, parted ways with the The first threshold issue is whether this Court should exercise its power of judicial
Tausug-led MNLF. review and decide the petitions at bar on the merits.
In 1986, the People Power Revolution catapulted Corazon C. Aquino to the I respectfully submit that the Court should not avoid its constitutional duty to
Presidency. Forthwith, she ordered the peace talks with the MNLF to resume. The decide the petitions at bar on their merit in view of their transcendental importance.
1987 Constitution was ratified by the people. It provided for the creation of the The subject of review in the petitions at bar is the conduct of the peace process
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through an act of Congress. But again with the MILF which culminated in the MOA-AD. The constitutionality of the
the talks with the MNLF floundered in May 1987.7 Be that as it may, it was during conduct of the entire peace process and not just the MOA-AD should go under
President Aquino's governance that a culture of peace negotiations with the the scalpel of judicial scrutiny. The review should not be limited to the initialed
MOA-AD for it is merely the product of a constitutionally flawed process of In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between statutes and
negotiations with the MILF. other acts that are self-executing and those that are not. If a statute
Let us revisit the steps that led to the contested and controversial MOA-AD. Peace is self executing, it is ripe for challenge as soon as it is enacted.
negotiations with the MILF commenced with the execution of ceasefire For such a statute to be subject to judicial review, it is not necessary
agreements. The watershed event, however, occurred in 2001, with the issuance that it be applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or some other
of Executive Order No. 315 entitled "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure enforcement officer in a concrete case.22
for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." Government Peace Negotiating Although Schwartz employs the term "statute," he qualifies that the principle
Panels were immediately constituted to negotiate peace with rebel groups, which enunciated applies to other governmental acts as well.23
included the MILF. Significantly, Executive Order No. 3 provides that in the Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the Court is confronted
pursuit of social, economic and political reforms, administrative action, new with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden with self-executing components. Far
legislation or even constitutional amendments may be required.16 Section 4 from the representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is not a mere
of Executive Order No. 3 states, viz: collection of consensus points,24 still bereft of any legal consequence. The
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the commitments made by the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the into (1) those which are self-executory or are immediately effective by the terms
"Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not of the MOA-AD alone, (2) those with a period or which are to be effective within a
mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a stipulated time, and (3) those that are conditional or whose effectivity depends on
coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be the outcome of a plebiscite.
limited to, the following: Let us cast an eye on the self executory provisions of the MOA-AD which will
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL demolish the argument of the respondents that the issues in the petitions at bar
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous are not ripe for adjudication.
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and The MOA-AD provides that "the Parties affirm that the core of the BJE shall
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including the municipalities
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the province of
administrative action, new legislation or even Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite."
constitutional amendments. The MOA-AD then proceeds to enumerate the powers that the BJE possesses
xxxx within its area. The BJE is granted powers of governance which it can exercise
c. PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE without need of amendments to be made to the Constitution or existing law or
DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component involves the without imposing any condition whatsoever.
conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful The MOA-AD also gives the BJE the unconditional right to participate in
settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves the international meetings and events, e.g., ASEAN meetings and other specialized
effective implementation of peace agreements. (Emphasis agencies of the United Nations.25 It grants BJE the right to participate in Philippine
supplied) official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation of border
Executive Order No. 3, was later amended by E.O. No. 555, 17 and was followed agreements or protocols for environmental protection, equitable sharing of
by the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001. The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 incomes and revenues, in addition to those of fishing rights. 26 Again, these rights
became the basis for several rounds of exploratory talks between the GRP Peace are given to the BJE without imposing prior conditions such as amendments to
Panel and the MILF. These exploratory talks resulted in the signing of the Joint the Constitution, existing law or the enactment of new legislation.
Statements of the GRP and MILF peace panels to affirm commitments that Next, let us go to provisions of the MOA-AD with a period which will further
implement the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, including the ancestral domain aspect. demonstrate the lack of merit of respondents' posture that the petitions at bar are
The issuance of the Joint Statements culminated in the initialing of the MOA- not ripe for adjudication. The MOA-AD provides that "without derogating from the
AD.18 requirements of prior agreements27, the Government stipulates to conduct and
It is crystal clear that the initialing of the MOA-AD is but the evidence of the deliver, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the Memorandum of
government peace negotiating panel's assent to the terms contained therein. If Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated
the MOA-AD is constitutionally infirm, it is because the conduct of the peace in the list and depicted in the map as Category A x x x the Parties shall endeavor
process itself is flawed. It is the constitutional duty of the Court is to determine to complete negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the
whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from signing of the MOA-
of jurisdiction on the part of the government peace negotiating panel in the AD."28 Once more, it is evident that no conditions were imposed with respect to
conduct of the peace negotiations with the MILF. The Court should not the conduct of a plebiscite within twelve months following the signing of the MOA-
restrict its review on the validity of the MOA-AD which is but the end product AD. The provision starkly states that within twelve months, the government will
of the flawed conduct of the peace negotiation with the MILF. conduct and deliver a plebiscite covering areas under Category A of the MOA-
Requirements of Ripeness and AD.
Mootness are not bars to review We now come to respondents' argument on mootness. In determining whether a
In contending that this Court should refrain from resolving the merits of the case has been rendered moot, courts look at the development of events to
petitions at bar, two principal defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General: ascertain whether the petitioner making the constitutional challenge is confronted
the issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication and regardless of their with a continuing harm or a substantial potential of harm. Mootness is
ripeness, are moot. sometimes viewed as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To contend that an issue is personal interest must exist at the commencement of the litigation and must
not ripe for adjudication is to invoke prematurity;19 that the issue has not reached continue throughout its existence."29 Stated otherwise, an actual controversy must
a state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence, there is in reality no actual be extant at all stages of judicial review, not merely at the time the complaint is
controversy. On the other hand, to urge that an issue has become moot concedes filed.30
that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent developments make Respondents insist that the petitions at bar are moot for three reasons: (1) the
further judicial action unnecessary. Together, mootness and ripeness act as a petitioners North Cotabato and Zamboanga have already been furnished copies
two-pronged pincer, squeezing the resolution of controversies within a narrow of the MOA-AD; (2) the Executive Secretary has issued a Memorandum that the
timeframe.20 government will not sign the MOA-AD and, (3) the GRP Peace Panel has been
First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio Forestry Ass'n Inc. v. dissolved by the President.
Sierra Club,21 the following factors were identified as indicative of the ripeness of These grounds are barren grounds. For one, the press statements of the
a controversy: Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., are
1. Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; clear that the MOA-AD will still be used as a major reference in future
2. Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with negotiations.31 For another, the MILF considers the MOA-AD a "done deal," 32
further administrative action; hence, ready for implementation. On the other hand, the peace panel may have
3. Whether the Court would benefit from further factual development of been temporarily dismantled but the structures set up by the Executive and their
the issues presented; guidelines which gave rise to the present controversy remain intact. With all
Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the setting of a threshold for these realities, the petitions at bar fall within that exceptional class of cases
review and second, judicial application of the threshold to the facts extant in a which ought to be decided despite their mootness because the complained
controversy. I respectfully submit that where a controversy concerns unconstitutional acts are "capable of repetition yet evading review."33
fundamental constitutional questions, the threshold must be adjusted to allow This well-accepted exception to the non-reviewability of moot cases was first
judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved at the earliest stage enunciated in the case of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC.34 The United
before anything irreversible is undertaken under cover of an States Supreme Court held that a case is not moot where interests of a public
unconstitutional act. Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining character are asserted under conditions that may be immediately repeated,
ripeness, viz: merely because the particular order involved has expired.
In the petitions at bar, one need not butt heads with the Solicitor General to creating autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and going through
demonstrate the numerous constitutional infirmities of the MOA-AD. There is no the process of a plebiscite and enacting an organic act?
need to iterate and reiterate them. Suffice to stress that it is because of these My amendment is simply to clarify the term "Muslim Mindanao." I really
evident breaches, that the MOA-AD requires the present Constitution to undergo did not expect that this will go this far --- that it is being placed in the
radical revisions. Yet, the unblushing threat is made that the MOA-AD which Constitution, that it is a fait accompli and that all we have to do here is
shattered to smithereens all respect to the Constitution will continue to be a say "amen" to the whole thing and it we do not say "amen," they will still
reference point in future peace negotiations with the MILF. In fine, the MOA-AD is continue to be autonomous regions. I insist on my amendment, Madam
a constitutional nightmare that will come and torment us again in the near future. President.
It must be slain now. It is not moot. MR. OPLE: May I provide more information to Commissioner de Castro
Let us adhere to the orthodox thought that once a controversy as to the application on this matter.
of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue First of all, we have to correct the misimpression that the autonomous
which the Court is hide-bound to decide.35 Supervening events, whether contrived regions, such as they now exist in Mindanao, do not enjoy the
or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a recognition of the central government. Secondly, may I point out that
grave violation of the Constitution has already been committed or the threat of the autonomy existing now in Regions IX and XII is a very imperfect
being committed again is not a hypothetical fear.36 It is the function of judicial kind of autonomy. We are not satisfied with the legal sufficiency of these
review to uphold the Constitution at all cost or we forfeit the faith of the people. regions as autonomous regions and that is the reason the initiative has
III. The Deviation from the MNLF been taken in order to guarantee by the Constitution the right to
Model of Pursuing Peace with autonomy of the people embraced in these regions and not merely on
Rebels is Inexplicable the sufferance of any existing or future administration. It is a right,
The MNLF model in dealing with rebels which culminated in the Peace Agreement moreover, for which they have waged heroic struggles, not only in this
of 1996, was free from any infirmity because it respected the metes and bounds generation but in previous eras and, therefore, what we seek is
of the Constitution. While the MNLF model is ostensibly based on the Tripoli constitutional permanence for this right.
Agreement of 1976, its implementation was in perfect accord with Philippine laws. May I also point out, Madam President, that the Tripoli Agreement was
The implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 came in two phases: the negotiated under the aegis of foreign powers. No matter how friendly
first, under the legislative power of then President Marcos and the second, under and sympathetic they are to our country, this is under the aegis of the
the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution and its implementing 42-nation Islamic Conference. Should our brothers look across the seas
legislation, Republic Act No. 6734.37 to a conclave of foreign governments so that their rights may be
Under President Marcos, autonomy in the affected provinces was recognized recognized in the Constitution? Do they have to depend upon foreign
through Presidential Proclamation No.1628. It declared autonomy in 13 provinces sympathy so that their right can be recognized in final, constitutional
and constituted a provisional government for the affected areas. The proclamation and durable form.
was followed by a plebiscite and the final framework for the autonomous region THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Ople, the consensus here is to grant
was embodied in Presidential Decree No.1618. autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao?
The establishment of the autonomous region under P.D. 1628 was MR. OPLE: Yes.(Emphasis supplied)38
constitutionalized by the commissioners in the 1987 Constitution as shown Clearly, the mandate for the creation of the ARMM is derived principally from
by the following exchange of views: the 1987 Constitution. Thereafter, ARRM was given life by Republic Act No.
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, I have stated from the start of our 6734,39 the Organic Act of the ARMM. Our executive officials were guided by and
consideration of this Article on Local Governments that the autonomous did not stray away from these legal mandates at the negotiation and execution of
region exists now in this country. There is a de facto existence of an the Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Without ifs and buts, its Whereas
autonomous government in what we call now Regions IX and XII. Clauses affirmed our sovereignty and territorial integrity and completely respected
Region IX is composed of the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, our Constitution.40
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga del Norte, In stark contrast, the peace process with the MILF draws its mandate
including all the component cities in the provinces. Region XII is principally from Executive Order No. 3. This executive order provided the basis
composed of the Provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, for the execution of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 and thereafter, the MOA-AD.
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. This autonomous During the whole process, the government peace negotiators conducted
region has its central governmental headquarters in Zamboanga City themselves free from the strictures of the Constitution. They played fast and
for Region IX and in Cotabato City for Region XII. In fact, it is stated by loose with the do's and dont's of the Constitution. They acted as if the grant of
Commissioner Ople that it has an executive commission and a executive power to the President allows them as agents to make agreements with
legislative assembly. the MILF in violation of the Constitution. They acted as if these violations can
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. anyway be cured by committing that the sovereign people will change the
MR. ALONTO: These two regions have been organized by virtue of Constitution to conform with the MOA-AD. They forgot that the Constitution grants
P.D. No. 1618 of President Marcos, as amended by P.D. No. 1843. power but also sets some impotence on power.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. IV. The Exercise of Executive Power is
MR. ALONTO: If the Gentleman will bear with me, I will explain to him. Subject to the Constitution
That is why there is a de facto autonomous government existing in Clearly, the respondents grossly misunderstood and patently misapplied the
Mindanao executive powers of the President.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President. The MILF problem is a problem of rebellion penalized under the Revised Penal
THE PRESIDENT: May we please allow Commissioner Alonto to finish Code.41 The MILF is but a rebel group. It has not acquired any belligerency status.
his remarks before any interruption? The rebellion of the MILF is recognized expressly by E.O. No. 3 42 as well as by
MR. DE CASTRO: Yes Madam President. E.O. No. 555.43 The President's powers in dealing with rebellion are spelled out in
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, this autonomous region is recognized Article VII, section 18 of the Constitution, viz:
by the present regime for the very reason that the present regime is The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
now in the process of a negotiation with the Moro National Liberation the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
Front. In a way, what we are doing is to give constitutional basis for the such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
President of this country today to proceed with the negotiation with the rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
Moro National Liberation Front. requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Uka is recognized. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
MR. UKA: Madam President, not only that. President Corazon C. part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
Aquino has appointed Mr. Albert Tugum as the Chairman of Region IX proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
and Mr. Datu Zakaria Candau as chairman of Region XII. They are of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
doing their work well right now. So there are two recognized writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
autonomous regions. They have also a complete regional assembly as least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
the legislative body. So, it is only a matter of putting this in the revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
Constitution. set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
THE PRESIDENT: So, what is before the body is the proposed Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
amendment on Line 11 of Section 1. suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
Commissioner de Castro is recognized. invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, if there is now an autonomous The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
region in Mindanao and if, according to the Honorable Ople, this has such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
the recognition of the central government, what then is the use of without need of a call.
 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by Constitution was ordained by the sovereign people and its postulates may not be
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent.
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas V. The Constitution as Compact of the People
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF,
thereon within thirty days from its filing. why cannot the Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution and seek their ratification later by its amendment or revision?
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question.
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military Yet, no theory has been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the social
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to contract theory,46 articulated by John Locke, viz:
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
corpus. made a community, they have thereby made that community one body,
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being
or directly connected with, invasion. only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent
days, otherwise he shall be released. of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body,
These are the well crafted commander-in-chief powers of the President. They one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it,
enumerate with exactitude the powers which the President should use in dealing agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
with rebellion. They are graduated in degrees. The strongest of these powers is concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies,
the power to declare martial law and worthy to note, its exercise is subject to empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that
restraints. But more important, all these commander-in-chief powers can only be positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for
used to quell the rebellion. They cannot be utilized to dismember the State or to the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of
create a state within our State and hand it over to the MILF rebels. nature and reason, the power of the whole.47
In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may, however, opt not to The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non-derogability
use force but negotiate peace with the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as of this social contract, viz:
Chief Executive can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article VII, section But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the
1 of the Constitution vests in the President the entire panoply of executive power, sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in anything
to reach peace with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the exercise of executive that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of some portion
power to secure peace with rebels is limited by the Constitution. of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by which
All these are due to the preeminent principle that our government is fundamentally it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing produces
one of limited and enumerated powers. As well stated in Angara v. Electoral nothing.48
Commission,44 viz: Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and seminal work, Philippine Political Law, viz:
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and instrument which serves as the fundamental law of the state. In theory,
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, it is the creation of the will of the people, who are deemed the source
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off of all political powers. It provides for the organization of the essential
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political departments of government, determines and limits their powers, and
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the individual.49
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the xxxx
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact,
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several an "agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government of
In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run riot. There is no power themselves." This notion expresses the old theory of the social contract
in the Constitution that is unbounded. There is no power in the Constitution that obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual or group
can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all powers in the less than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not have the
Constitution are designed to preserve the Constitution. attribute of law.50 (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the President as Chief Executive can negotiate peace with the In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution
MILF but it is peace that will insure that our laws are faithfully executed. The on the part of any official of government. No one can claim he has a blank
President can seek peace with the MILF but without crossing the parameters of check to violate the Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the
powers marked in the Constitution to separate the other branches of government violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents' thesis of
to preserve our democracy. For even in times of war, our system of checks and violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution.
balances cannot be infringed.45 More so in times where the only danger that faces I vote to grant the petitions.
the State is the lesser danger of rebellion. REYNATO S. PUNO
Needless to stress, the power of the President to negotiate peace with the MILF Chief Justice
is not plenary. While a considerable degree of flexibility and breadth is accorded
to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its limits - the Constitution. The
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON,
petitioner-in-intervention, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES,
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioners-in-intervention, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA- REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003 LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
petitioners-in-intervention, GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
vs. GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
x---------------------------------------------------------x ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO,
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003 JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
petitioner-in-intervention, GALLOR, petitioners,
vs. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF petitioner-in-intervention,
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS vs.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL.,
EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, respondents.
LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL vs.
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY- HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ- REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, x---------------------------------------------------------x
JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE vs.
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, x---------------------------------------------------------x
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA vs.
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
LOPEZ, respondents, ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents. VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
x---------------------------------------------------------x SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003 CARPIO MORALES, J.:
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
vs. passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
respondents. provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
x---------------------------------------------------------x Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003 turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
vs. House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND upon by a political crisis of conscience.
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents. methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
x---------------------------------------------------------x resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003 from, the Constitution.
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
vs. mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
x---------------------------------------------------------x governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003 At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
vs. three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN equality.
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents. among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
x---------------------------------------------------------x enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003 what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, suprema lex.
vs. Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE ARTICLE XI
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE Accountability of Public Officers
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
x---------------------------------------------------------x employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003 with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
petitioner. Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
x---------------------------------------------------------x the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003 conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
vs. other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR provided by law, but not by impeachment.
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
x---------------------------------------------------------x endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003 Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE thereof.
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT vote of each Member shall be recorded.
OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU forthwith proceed.
CHAPTER, petitioners, (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
vs. official more than once within a period of one year.
 (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
the Members of the Senate. of the House of Representatives.13
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
law. the same official more than once within a period of one year."
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available
underscoring supplied) legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation: capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be
declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate
Impeachment. – Impeachment Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
shall be initiated only by a verified – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
any Member of the House of that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a impeachment complaint.
Representatives or by any citizen resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
upon a resolution of endorsement impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed
by any Member thereof or by a initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance,
verified complaint or resolution of verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
impeachment filed by at least one- case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
House. Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a
case may be, is not sufficient in substance. writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the impeachment trial.
time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
of impeachment with the Secretary General.
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
impeachment proceedings shall be Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can
initiated against the same official be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; complaint.
more than once within the period of emphasis and underscoring supplied) In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
one (1) year. recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the complaint be declared unconstitutional.
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3 members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint Impeachment to the Senate.
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
which reads: impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers'
to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
from receipt thereof. Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to dismiss the same commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
Impeachment be declared null and void. were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives,
second impeachment complaint. a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared participate.
unconstitutional. Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to
behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the would render the petitions moot.
Judiciary. Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
course. issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent,
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Constitution."22
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to
the (JDF)." (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before
impeachment complaint be declared null and void. it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not,
locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in proceedings in the House of Representatives.
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene"
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra
the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
conducting any proceedings thereon. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
proceeding with the impeachment trial. Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court, 18 prayed for the invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. a) locus standi of petitioners;
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void c) political question/justiciability;
for being unconstitutional.
 d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
impeachment; dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
impeachment; judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a- expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original) because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; underscoring supplied)
(2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the
These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim. course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as
Judicial Review a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint. and enforceable."26
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
government. (Emphasis supplied) rank.
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great supplied)
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has or practice to the contrary.
established a republican government intended to operate and function When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
Constitution. various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
xxx sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
lower courts as may be established by law. As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking
I suppose nobody can question it. through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
explain. fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
part or instrumentality of the government. also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had Moran declared:
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
the government set up the defense of political question. And the substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and
pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was underscoring supplied)
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in that:
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
regime. x x x one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
xxx others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is to stand together.
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
of this nature. lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this (Emphasis supplied)
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court Secretary, this Court expounded:
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
principles of constitutional construction. proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as underscoring supplied)
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for coverage of judicial review.
construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis and underscoring Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
supplied) impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power
Secretary38 in this wise: to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al.
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate
since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential
Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment. member of the National Assembly.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
impeachment proceedings. limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power Standing
of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments constitutional questions.69
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
and pride."56 Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above- since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non- Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review. this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter
Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the party-in-interest.
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration
VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on role of the judiciary in certain areas.
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured
held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
 such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
constitutional questions." to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that
xxx a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted) interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
Court. additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in Petition-in-Intervention.
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the mere fact that he is a Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc.
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common intervene were hereby granted.
to all members of the public.80 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a member of the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83 granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing wit:
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that
novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or
rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it. that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 94
all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in (Citations omitted)
the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought Ripeness and Prematurity
to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
however, their petition will stand. case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was
is mum on his standing. done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
importance. Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted. principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and martial law failed because the government set up the defense of
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
to dismiss. thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated
the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries. September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact,
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath
Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on
grant it. June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Justiciability Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law,
defined the term "political question," viz: some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972,
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original) suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to
of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the
political questions, viz: referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session
the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and
Committee on the Judiciary. the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
lower courts as may be established by law. proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government
I suppose nobody can question it. was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and jurisdiction to entertain the case.
explain. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective
part or instrumentality of the government. places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
 group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
up. There have been a number of other cases in the past. arising from the political question doctrine.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
the issue was clearly justiciable. truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
is a political question? duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties political questions."
as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce not truly political in nature.
them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College
dignity." of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that: which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . . Cortes, held:
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
Court has, also another important function. The powers of under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
government are generally considered divided into three branches: departments to decide.106 x x x
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. this Court declared:
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice. must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
of this nature. ruled:
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
question. would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied) Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus: two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
in other lower courts as may be created by law. question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example? discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
there is a difference. undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"? respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide. demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
xxx department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes. determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of
political question doctrine? one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
MR. CONCEPCION. No. The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
FR. BERNAS. It is not. judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . . whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
intended to do away with the political question doctrine. justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not. constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues: En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. Commttee,122 viz:
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution. of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice Article VI thereof provides:
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113 In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than Constitution which reads:
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. shall forthwith proceed.
Lis Mota They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held: complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit: the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied] included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should from receipt thereof.
be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that
"the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
the precise facts to which it is applied."119 representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
(a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
(b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on impeachment complaint.
the independence of the judiciary.121 While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the
and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only
the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus,
separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in
is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
ruling. determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
prejudiced by this Court's decision. judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as
are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
Judicial Restraint majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the
all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his
review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of
proceedings. his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty
argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Representatives are subject to them. Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this exercises its power of judicial review.
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the necessary to a decision of the case.'
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally 3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130 ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose ground.
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint
held: of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
Senators. federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
fundamental law. even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom omitted).
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at encapsulated into the following categories:
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated 2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required
to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such by the facts of the case
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the 3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices 4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
and Senators, singly and collectively. operation of the statute
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the 5. that the parties are not in estoppel
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in exercise of judicial review:
 1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible complaint and take initial action on it.
opportunity "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136 begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
confidence and faith in the judiciary. initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by on Justice.
the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act. Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself can be pried from its records:
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
quasi-validation, follows." 138 procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain need some time for Committee action.
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime. a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land. impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141 report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. Senate.
If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were xxx
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that
of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
personal beliefs.142 containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure body.
for Impeachment Proceedings As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
adopted by the 12th Congress Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
"initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The
any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief xxx
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order. Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, impeachment.
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this
this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the
 phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-
section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded." of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as Constitution.
the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they
the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied) To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers. 144 Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment "impeachment proceeding."
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate taking initial action of said complaint.
the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice
Constitution."145 or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the official within a one year period.
complaint moving. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding
power to initiate all cases of impeachment. of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
xxx sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied) impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding." contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention)
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or deliberations and proceedings thereof.
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret
of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however,
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment is misplaced.
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court. effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House Section 3. (1) x x x
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
series of steps that follow. hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
 to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for body or tribunal."
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
thereof. the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
vote of each Member shall be recorded. reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall xxx
forthwith proceed. In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
official more than once within a period of one year. its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the Constitution without need of referendum. the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
149
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, this Court held that it is within the province of either power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this
150
of the Commission on Appointments, Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under
Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may departments of government.155
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and xxx
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz: wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the Court against the other branches of government despite their more
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over by the people.156
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation xxx
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
procedure by legislators. of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held: provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught
"x x x us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may abuses in government. x x x
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of xxx
this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
rules: government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Rule XV Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890) constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make emphasis and underscoring supplied)
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution
are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over
Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable ordered our society upon the rule of law.
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court
of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing
is to be exercised. could be farther from the truth.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts.
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing." government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, sequitur.
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
officer within a one-year period. he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
Conclusion individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for
or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though
over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran the use of force and aggression upon each other.
high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take Article XI of the Constitution.
no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of SO ORDERED.
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and concurring opinion.
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
bearing on the impeachment proceedings. Carpio, J., concur.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of
of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief J. Vitug.
Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose Footnotes
1
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."
2
the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the same was
under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that submitted before this Court.
3
squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was
but for it to pass upon that problem head on. established "to help ensure and guarantee the independence of the
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy and
of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a special
without basis in fact and in law. fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated office equipment and facilities."
4
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."
5
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District,
Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Davao City.
14
Corona, and was later amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two
Leonardo A. Quisumbing. separate impeachment complaints before the House of
6
Supra note 4 at 123-124. Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
7 15
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A." 299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued
8
that as a taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9 petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all negotiations
999 and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the
9
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8. Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the
10
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11. matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of
11
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B." transcendental importance to the public. The Supreme Court, citing
12
Supra note 2. Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v. Civil Service
13
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA
reveals the following signatories to the second impeachment complaint 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court, however, went
and the accompanying Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, on to elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of
Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella, NPC, petitioner Chavez was rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons
Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.
16
NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig 384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, Development Corporation, wherein the petition sought to compel the
NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman, House Committee on Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then on-going
Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Independent, 1st District, North negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim
Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez
Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis had the standing to bring a taxpayer's suit because the petition sought
Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
17
Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 224 SCRA 792 (1993).
18
13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar
Mathay III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, relief. Other than the petitions, this Court also received Motions for
Reporma, Lone District of Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and
District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Senate President Franklin Drilon.
19
Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Supra note 2 at 10.
20
Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners
Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ,
C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin, NPC, 1st Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and Solicitor
District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C.
25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.
21
Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.
22
Lone District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd Id. at 292.
23
District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-LDP, 2nd 63 Phil 139 (1936).
24
District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Id. at 157-159.
25
Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco,
Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33. 103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del Norte 34. 659, 665 (1987).
26
Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.
27
District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District, 5 US 137 (1803).
28
Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa Id. at 180.
29
38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute
T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, allowing for imprisonment for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In
2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court invalidated a statute
District, South Cotobato 42. Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant
Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in
44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which could not be
Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil
NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as amended,
District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of which provided that judges of the first instance with the same salaries
Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H. would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was declared
Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment vested in the
Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No.
53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District, Santiago, Isabela 54. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum
Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde, which have been validly located and held, was declared invalid for being
Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of a depravation of property without due process of law. In U.S. v. Ang
Zamboanga City 57. Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the
del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation and to make
Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60. the sale of rice in violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared
Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene an invalid delegation of legislative power.
30
Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato & General Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time
Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63. Rodolfo 62-53 (2003).
31
G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party Supra note 23.
32
List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato Id. at 156-157.
33
66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring
LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37
Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).
34
NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District Ibid.
35
of Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73. I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).
36
Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B. 31 SCRA 413 (1970)
37
Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988);
Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192
NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC,
SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez
(1990). v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15
38
194 SCRA 317 (1991). SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano,
39
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581. 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
40 80
152 SCRA 284 (1987). BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA
41
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79;
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra
and I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21 ( Fourth note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG,
Ed. ). supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v.
42
82 Phil 771 (1949). COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez
43
Id. at 775. v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note
44
Supra note 38. 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79;
45
Id. at 330-331. Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
46 81
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC,
365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v.
SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
47 82
Supra note 2. Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
48
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Morato, supra note 70 at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992);
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC,
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
83
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v.
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be Mathay, supra note 79.
84
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89
Members of the Senate. Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng
49
Supra note 21. mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
50 85
506 U.S. 224 (1993). Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing
51
Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary,
Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, supra note 79.
86
p. 119. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
52 87
227 SCRA 100 (1993). MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines,
53
Id. at 112. G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v.
54
US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P 640;
have the sole Power of Impeachment. Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
55 88
1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559,
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of 570-571 (1974), citing Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages
impeachment. 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al.,
56
Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico,
Constitutional Democracy, 1984, pp. 112-113. 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).
57 89
369 U.S. 186 (1962). MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines,
58
141 SCRA 263 (1986). supra note 87, dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita
59
Supra note 25. Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989);
60
298 SCRA 756 (1998). Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña Paz, 159 SCRA
61
272 SCRA 18 (1997). 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257,
62
201 SCRA 792 (1991). 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing
63
187 SCRA 377 (1990). Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and
64
180 SCRA 496 (1989). Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.
65 90
Supra note 25. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
66 91
Supra note 23. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union
67
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330- v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra
331. note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra
68
Id. at 158-159. note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v.
69
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997);
568 (1993); House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker v. Carr, SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v.
supra note 57. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmeña v. COMELEC,
70
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995). 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991);
71
Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra
330 (1997). note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.
72 92
Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531
163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988). (1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v.
73
Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).
93
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, Supra note 79.
94
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized Id. at 403.
95
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in Supra note 81.
96
the name of the real party in interest. Id. at 681.
74 97
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 SECTION 3. x x x
(2000). (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
75
246 SCRA 540 (1995). Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
76
Id. at 562-564. upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
77
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP v. three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998). and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
78
Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15. report to the House within sixty session days from such
79
Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
Inc., et.al. v. Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v. within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
 126
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
127
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v.
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA
shall be recorded. 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
98 128
Supra note 25. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).
99 129
Id. at 1067. Ibid.
100 130
Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castañeda, Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
131
91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977). Supra note 127.
101 132
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
133
SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 note 127; Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.
134
(1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82. Supra note 119 at 210-211.
102 135
50 SCRA 30 (1973). Supra note 119.
103 136
Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434- Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v.
436. PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority,
104
Id. at 439-443. 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern Airlines, 210
105
177 SCRA 668 (1989). SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism
106
Id. at 695. Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).
107 137
203 SCRA 767 (1991). Supra note 2 at 353.
108 138
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990). Supra note 33 at 32.
109 139
Supra note 64. Supra note 102.
110 140
Id. at 501. Supra note 33.
111 141
Supra note 57. 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
112 142
Id. at 217. Id. at 251.
113 143
2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286. 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.
114 144
Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286. Id. at 416.
115 145
76 Phil 516 (1946). Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
116 146
Id. at 522. 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416
117 147
Supra note 37. 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
118 148
Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
149
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989). 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
119 150
Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
151
v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
152
208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
120 153
As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of 144 U.S. 1 (1862).
154
the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant Supra note 152 at 304-306.
155
to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the parties. Id. at 311.
121 156
Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38. Id. at 313.
122 157
Supra note 107. Supra note 152 at 314-315.
123 158
Id. at 777 (citations omitted). Supra note 50.
124
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
125
Supra note 2 at 342.
EN BANC DECISION
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 LEONEN, J.:
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23chanrobleslaw
exclude all foundlings from public service.
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares,
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a both an American and Filipino national since birth.24 The marriage took place in
diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25cralawred On July 29, 1991,
inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband.26 For some time,
one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to she lived with her husband and children in the United States. 27chanrobleslaw
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these inferences are
made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian),
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the
is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika
Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution. on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29chanrobleslaw
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The 2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States passport.31chanrobleslaw
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political
powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the
ways to raise questions of citizenship. Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections.32 To support her
father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United
(David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she gave
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35chanrobleslaw
Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually
to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for "slipped into a coma."36 Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the country
being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling
Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion of his estate.39chanrobleslaw
for Reconsideration.
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose for work again in the United States.40chanrobleslaw
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting her children,
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan
Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. 9 She was given the States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following semester.43
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."46chanrobleslaw
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY
EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005. 47chanrobleslaw
JARO . . .11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Philippines:48
Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
(more popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
Finality.14chanrobleslaw this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-
San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50 She also
15
certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe. "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who
This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate: were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time."51chanrobleslaw
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe
as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July
Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro
138.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition
when she turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being
Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
18
Manila on December 13, 1986. chanrobleslaw thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American
passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to
passport. Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original)
19

13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.20 Having become Senator, In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the
she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19, Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225." 54 Until
2013.21chanrobleslaw now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of Justice or any
other agency of Government."55chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines,
Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in
degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from the name of Senator Poe and her children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a
 "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang
2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-
Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim
9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
2006."57chanrobleslaw aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng
mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas;
on August 31, 2006.58chanrobleslaw na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga
kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935. 59 She used her pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July
2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
October 2010."60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of
Immigration:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010,
Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
p a r t u r e s F l i g h t N o . Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July
e m b e r 1 , 2 0 0 6 S Q 0 7 1 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information
for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice
y 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 P R 7 3 0 Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator
Poe.71 The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service,
Department of State, on February 3, 2012.72chanrobleslaw
o b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 7 P R 3 0 0
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On September
o b e r 2 , 2 0 0 8 P R 3 5 8 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as
i l 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 0 4 Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75chanrobleslaw

y 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 P R 7 3 0 David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He
o b e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 0 2 contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship
and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."77chanrobleslaw
m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 0 3
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring
m b e r 2 7 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 1 2 David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." 78 David filed his amended
Petition on August 17, 2015.79chanrobleslaw
c h 2 7 , 2 0 1 0 P R 1 0 2
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral
r i v a l s F l i g h t N o . Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
e m b e r 4 , 2 0 0 6 S Q 0 7 6 Petition.80chanrobleslaw

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the
y 2 3 , 2 0 0 7 P R 7 3 1 Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from
the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015.81 The documents requested
e m b e r 5 , 2 0 0 7 P R 3 3 7 included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. 82 On
August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04
y 8 , 2 0 0 8 P R 1 0 3 granting the Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the
Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of
o b e r 5 , 2 0 0 8 P R 3 5 9 Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the
officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents. 85
2 1 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 0 5
The subpoenas were complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the
National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.86chanrobleslaw
u s t 3 , 2 0 0 9 P R 7 3 3
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1)
6 1
m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 9 P R 1 0 3 Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds
for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of
Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Court.87chanrobleslaw
Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-
American Citizenship,63 stating: 05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before
September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed
residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription." 90chanrobleslaw
having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and
state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21,
United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and 2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda],
privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within
this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any thirty (30) days from the said date."92chanrobleslaw
duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. 65 On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission
On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and of DNA test results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on
assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November 5, 2015,
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing, 95 which
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would
shed light to the real identity of her biological parents."96 The Manifestation also I
stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a
submit any development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He
submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate citizenship.
Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted
for resolution."98chanrobleslaw Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of
two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the
qualified to hold office as Senator.99 The Decision Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary I. A
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act Constitution:112
to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship. ARTICLE VI
.... The Legislative Department
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino ....
citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
"final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship. may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
.... the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today. Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is Elections113) the power to rule on contests114 relating to the election, returns, and
DISMISSED. qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and distinct
No pronouncement as to costs. constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted) any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The Senate other function.
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving
Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal
Reconsideration.102chanrobleslaw system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the
legislature and specially created for that singular purpose." 115 The 1935
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the
December 1, 2015.103 David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of
Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015:104 the National Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system introduced by
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for prior organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine
Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve
Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015. such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended
to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 made for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of
November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but
the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as
amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal
Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, shall be the "sole" judge.
Respondent."
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
105
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original) The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the
106
by David. On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
before this Court.107chanrobleslaw unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full,
fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
110
Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December 30, 2015. Senator Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
111
Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016. chanrobleslaw Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is,
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election
Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship. challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and
Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding that The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article
private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be
Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not the point of being grossly unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue. 130chanrobleslaw
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." I. C
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120 or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House or excess of jurisdiction.
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship
status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father
cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a
has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private
clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in a position to
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at
in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required in
area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."131chanrobleslaw
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the
determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from
judgment. reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
I. B did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the
invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation II
of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o
certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. 122 The viability Philippines."
of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of
discretion."123chanrobleslaw Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2)
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she
of jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with
discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the acquisition Act of 2003.
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of
have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more
were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. 125chanrobleslaw specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as private respondent's foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino
well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to
also considered grave abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a
disregard of the current state of our law. natural-born Filipino.
III
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely,
from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet,
badge of hostile intent against a party. by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving
to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.
a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a
tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's
very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same
standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words—
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to text—and how they are situated within the whole document—context—govern.
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are
even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not
construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws142 and in similar
clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution. mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still
III. A resonate today.
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily
begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal
principal source from which this Court determines constitutional interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular
intent.133chanrobleslaw and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144 this
Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.134 The Constitution is truly a Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively)
public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective extant ambiguity.
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for purports to bolster.
construction is reduced to a minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary
greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its belief wrongly assumes that language is static.
components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is
called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
foundational principles to its finest fixings.137chanrobleslaw effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing
legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union primacy.
v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here,
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole,
but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read,
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable III. B
construction, the two can be made to stand together. Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be
resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. 146 It is only
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
favor of construction which will render every word operative, rather than one Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading
which may make the words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted) of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has the meaning yielded by such reading.
previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded
on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that
the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system."140 Jurisprudence is not an the business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The
independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that
of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and
because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
text brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with
considering prior interpretation as immutable. finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its
democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle
evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re- underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory
adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules. opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are
Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules. entertained.147chanrobleslaw

One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is,
iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), 148 as
syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such well as thematically similar statutes and international norms that form part of our
as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of
terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when
imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the
galvanizes meaning.
framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other similar (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
accounts, can be illuminating.
III. C Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest approach. from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not (Emphasis supplied)
necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are
engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with those who may count themselves as natural-born.
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that
motivated them were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated
understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of when supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship
actions made within specific historical episodes through detached, and not and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term "natural-
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses. born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.
V. B
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have
uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil rights."151 It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political
Liberties Union:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the
of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
152
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail grievance. chanrobleslaw
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the
gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe moment of the citizen's birth.
the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the historical development
than in the framer's understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied) of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the
IV Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church records show that native
without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is for native inhabitants as inferior.157 Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience
not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications in their own land.
of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory,
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however,
which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that
Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized with the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was only on December
Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that
provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens, 159
The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
respondent's Filipino parentage.

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily of Spain,
engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to
opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.160
is a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international 1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were
instruments. ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which
V was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens. 161 Instead, it
from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to left the determination of the native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the
consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently United States:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
as Senator of the Republic. such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory
V. A they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
Thus -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Congress.162chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who
had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
States."163chanrobleslaw read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:164 voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside least ten years immediately preceding the election.
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children the term.
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and Constitution rectified this problematic situation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied) SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to this Constitution.
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common
law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165chanrobleslaw
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the
legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing the law, to have renounced her citizenship.171chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
United States if residing therein.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of citizenship.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:167 The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the Constitution."173chanrobleslaw
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: Section 1. The following
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to are citizens of the Philippines:
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such this Constitution;
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing natural-born citizens, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
therein. Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other (Emphasis supplied)
country."168chanrobleslaw Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that
was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage
vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term
Constitution provided:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary "natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary presidency are not even found in the records of constitutional deliberations.176
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the However, it has been suggested that, as the United States was under British
adoption of this Constitution. colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born was
introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before
national government:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in
the Philippine Islands.
response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national
Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Citizen.
Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice- Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had
served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was
suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting V. E
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
monarch.177chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis. citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
V. C
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and
naturalized. ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It
the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect does not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is
Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 ethnically foreign.
articulates this definition by dichotomy:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship
Filipino.179chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized V. F
citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents
in order to become Filipino citizens."180chanrobleslaw were Filipino citizens.

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible.
required to file a verified petition.181 He or she must establish. among others, that To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned
he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity to almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in
adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
Philippines for a significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals
that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
core beliefs.183chanrobleslaw economic cost, prohibitive.
V. D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent
Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional to establish her parentage.
definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.
Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text, In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
thus establishing its contemporaneous intent. Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular
bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
unequivocal definition. People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial
evidence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the
Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural- fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact
born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion. 188
citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she (Citation omitted)
underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates
when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal
She did not. proceedings:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the is sufficient for conviction if:
actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more
effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) There is more than one circumstances;
of proof.
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to cralawlawlibrary
foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The beyond reasonable doubt.
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial
capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless
filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. 189 There is no
Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof
premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born in civil and/or administrative proceedings.
citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive
process of naturalization. In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction
(which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond
status is clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural- reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard,
born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in
citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate
of the status of citizens. Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190chanrobleslaw
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all— happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. 200 The other
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population.192 Private party then bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal that which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet and
2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party
who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is
or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, respondent.
along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of
Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima
ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it. facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of
private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is
the following table is support of his statistical inference:196 by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE the burden of evidence to private respondent.
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014
FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes
YEAR other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as
IN THE PHILIPPINES THE PHILIPPINES
substantive evidence of private respondent's
1965 1,479 795,415 parentage:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1966 1,437 823,342 (1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570 (2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762 (3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385 (4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered
1973 1,212 1,045,290 as a foundling;
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837 (5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685 (6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of
typical Filipinos.
2012 1,454 1,790,367
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive
2013 1,315 1,751,523 bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable
2014 1,351 1,748,782 inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents is
a Filipino.
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible]197chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary VII
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent
0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born
that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen. citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage. countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's
VI biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained VII. A
by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's
and validated by a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner
considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining to the intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship
circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider may be indulged in resolving this case.203 He insists that it is private
petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of proving— respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based
a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error. on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the
newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court
circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather,
proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under
that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply Spanish colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as
not known. indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of residence
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue before death, which subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This
by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;198 that is, the Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son
party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr.
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the 1935 well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access
Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They must also
was in effect:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments,
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative the state to enhance children's well-being and to project them from conditions
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be prejudicial to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, apparatus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo ARTICLE II
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine ....
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would State Policies
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 ....
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. 206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. Ramos208 (which and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in ....
citizenship cases. ARTICLE XV
The Family
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ....
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. 209 (Emphasis special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
supplied) and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the
recent ruling in Tecson. Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to
natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be (1) President;212
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the
claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the (2) Vice-President;213
respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using the definitive (3) Senator;214
article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic language. (4) Member of the House of Representatives;215
Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in (5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;216
that same sentence: "no presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of (6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission;217
Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used other words that
would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can (7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;218
be indulged in favor of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no (8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;219
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its (10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;221 and
statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear (11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. 222
evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as
an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include,
alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship among others, city fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and
and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. 225 Certain
presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally
her parents' foreign citizenship. established benefits and incentives.227chanrobleslaw

Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
that the same pronouncement was generally permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never
applicable:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 210 (Emphasis the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
supplied) merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual
and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this case. Go If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an
election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to
the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced. opportunities for public service:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VII. B ARTICLE II
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least ....
either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless State Policies
there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a ....
whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."211chanrobleslaw SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, ....
Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in ARTICLE III
isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the Bill of Rights
 Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations Convention
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth;
laws. second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of
.... their birth status.231 Pertinent portions of the Convention
ARTICLE XIII read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Social Justice and Human Rights Preamble

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of The State Parties to the present Convention,
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
common good. (Emphasis supplied) inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like freedom, justice and peace in the world,
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter,
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and
oppression of inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction229
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth. Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and
Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them— agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those other status,
who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation. has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
....
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to
effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and Have agreed as follows:
development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes Article 2
based on circumstances of birth. 1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race,
respect. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
ARTICLE II national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
.... birth or other status.
State Policies 2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
.... ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied) activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's
VII. C parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of Article 3
constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-
the Philippines. being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all
Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put Article 7
this mandate into effect. 1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
Act of 2006, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary know and be cared for by his or her parents.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
observed at all times: rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary. . . . this field, in particular where the child would otherwise
be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
that will ensure the observance of international standards of child Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty
protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire
before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a a nationality. It similarly defends them against
manner which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself discrimination:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation and Article 24. . . .
implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the
concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied) 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most his family, society and the State.
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary a) Child study;

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

.... c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall d) Medical evaluation/history;
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and cralawlawlibrary
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied) f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 233 passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by
Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require foreigners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
concurrence by the Senate before they became SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified
binding:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by required:
Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the
Duque III, et al.:234 Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of Commitment executed after the birth of the child.
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.238 (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 235 Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have
(Emphasis supplied) recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a
necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's
servanda. natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object
of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an
and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
undermine their development. the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the
Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and natural-born citizenship.239chanrobleslaw
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional VIII
dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from
foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth. Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites
of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on of Republic Act No. 9225.
Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted VIII. A
as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent
abandoned."236chanrobleslaw was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section
1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when
237
No. 8552: she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the
child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241chanrobleslaw
be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared
abandoned. (Emphasis supplied) Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63242 and Republic
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Act No. 8171243 specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. become naturalized citizens of other countries."244chanrobleslaw
As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino
children" who may be adopted:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This
placement, the following documents must be submitted: to the Board: Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep.
Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country."247chanrobleslaw (5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and those who:
immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned
Republic:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme run for elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements:
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
reservation or purpose of evasion." This effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws,
taking the aforesaid oath. provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after satisfied.250chanrobleslaw
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that
is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 251
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.252chanrobleslaw
those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."253 This,
conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening makes one eligible for elective public office.
period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though
it was never lost at all. As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required
VIII. B sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural- Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks
"subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities." 248 However, other to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
conditions must be met for the exercise of other country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this
faculties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of VIII. C
the Philippines and the following conditions: Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7,
2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 256
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly,
on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. 258 This
was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet Nationality of the United States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the on July 12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011261 and the
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State,
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any on February 3, 2012.262chanrobleslaw
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born
citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility
to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with
its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-
office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act
the country where they took that oath; No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and

immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
engage in such practice; and her natural-born status.

To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re"
signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante
that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things
were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see dissenting opinion.
new status, it should not have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act Jardeleza, J., in result.
No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship Endnotes:
1
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements. Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that Id. at 73
3
repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's Id. at 227-258.
4
original nationality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis 5
Rollo, pp. 80-83.
6
supplied) Id. at 8.
7
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, Id. See also rollo, p. 227, SET Decision.
9
its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and Id. at 227.
10
immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to Id. at 681, Poe Comment.
have lost their Philippine citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the once 11
Id. at 8.
12
naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status. Id. at 681.
17
There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the Id. at 9.
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born 20 Id. at 228.
21
status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Id. at 682.
22
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or Id. at 9 and 682.
23
she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the Id. at 9.
24
intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Id. at 682-683.
25
cralawred Id. at 228.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the 27 Id. at 9.
28
Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but Id. at 683.
30
these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for Id. at 9.
32
effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is Id. at 683.
markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process 33 Id. at 9.
35
with which the former natural-born citizen must comply. Id. at 683.
36
IX Id. at 10.
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is not only 40 Id. at 684.
to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice 41 Id. at 228.
42
to injustice. Id. at 684.
44
Id. at 685.
47
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice Id. at 228.
48
are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the Id. at 10.
49
inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are Id. at 685.
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing 50 Id. at 228.
51
destitution that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief. Id. 686.
52
Id. at 228.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate 53 Id. at 686.
56
an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune Id. at 686-687.
57
because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert Id. at 687.
59
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat. Id. at 256.
62
Id. at 10.
63
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against Id. at 687.
64
other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to Id. at 687-688.
65
consider legal text, but always with justice in mind. Id. at 688.
66
Id. at 229.
67
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we Id. at 689, Poe Comment.
68
must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less Id. at 229.
78
fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people. Id. at 230.
88
Id. at 231.
99
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional Id. at 257.
100
competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen Id. at 253-257.
101
qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, Id. at 84-100.
102
there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution. Id. at 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
103
Id. at 81.
104
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Id. at 80-83.
105
Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or Id. at 82.
106
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in Id. at 7.
107
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Id. at 7-8.
108
Resolution. Id. at 647, SET Comment.
110
Id. at 669.
111
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino Id. at 677-828.
112
citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice-
President was also created by the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the 1987 Constitution.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. CONST., art. VII, sec. 4 provides:
Carpio, J., no part. SECTION 4 . . . .
Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part. ....
Brion, J., no part. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
Del Castillo, J., not natural born until proven otherwise. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
Mendoza, J., with some reservation. President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Reyes, J., dissenting.
113
Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over 5/211833_leonen.pdf> 4-5 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
123
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of local elective RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 provides:
offices. SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or
CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(2) provides: his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
exercise the following powers and functions: petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city require.
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
124
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En
not appealable. Banc].
125
Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations
114
The term "contest" refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission Commission (First Division) and Arnulfo R. Flores, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011)
on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court referring to [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
the counterpart electoral tribunal for the President and Vice President — the 126
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096,
Presidential Electoral Tribunal - explained: "Ordinary usage would characterize a October 14, 2015
"contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/october
eitheir an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct 2015/212096.pdf> 7 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
127
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e. to dislodge the whining Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777-778, 782 (2010) [Per J.
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Brion, En Banc].
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" promulgated by the 128 Id. at 787.
129
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise. . . . Id. at 778. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for relying
on very select facts that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a
"The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests manner as to make it appear that the candidate whose residence was in
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice- question was not qualified. Viewing these facts in isolation indicated a practically
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice- deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at sustaining a previously-conceived myopic
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action conclusion:
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a "In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post- focused solely on its consideration of Mitra's residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the [Commission on
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election Elections'] view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra's
residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra's
"It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home
Presidential Electoral Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 to make it one's residence. This was the main reason that the [Commission on
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held." "Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a
dwelling as showm by and examined only through photographs, is far from
115
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399 reasonable; the [Commission on Elections] thereby determined the fitness of a
(1988). [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. dwelling as a person's residence based solely on very personal and subjective
116
CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 4 provides: assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used.
SECTION 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence - i.e., the dwelling where a person
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six permanently intends to return to and to remain - his or her capacity or inclination
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial."
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
130
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315 (2010) [Per J.
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole Brion, En Banc], this Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil.
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the 1214, 1226 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] stated: "[A] court abuses its discretion
Members of the National Assembly. when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors
relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings,
117
CONST. (1935 amended), art. VI, sec. 11 provides: considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to
SECTION 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the factual or legal conclusions."
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral 131 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5.
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of 132 CONST., art. IV, sec. 1(2):
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
133
largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil.
shall be its Chairman. 308, 338 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
118 134
250 Phil. 390 (1988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc]. See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709
119
Id. at 399-400. Phil. 478, 501-523 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
120 135
347 Phil. 797 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 885 (2003) [Per J.
121
Id. at 804-805. Carpio Morales, En Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
122
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rappler v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]. This
April 5, 2016 was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/april201 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/january
6/222702.pdf> 2-3 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and in Villanueva v. Judicial Bar 2016/212426.pdf> [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
136
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003) [Per J.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/april201 Carpio Morales, En Banc].
137 163
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos (Resolution), 486 Phil. 754, Id. at 467.
164
773 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] states that "[t]he Constitution should Id. at 467-468.
165
be read in broad, life-giving strokes." Id.
138 166
272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc]. Id. at 468.
139 167
Id. at 162, as cited in Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Id.
168
Phil. 326, 341 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]. Id. at 469.
140 169
CIVIL CODE, art. 8. Id.
141 170
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J. B. L. Reyes, Id.
171
En Banc]. CONST. (1973), art. III, secs. 1 and 2.
142 172
The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine CONST. (1973), art. III, sec. 4.
173
Organic Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of "Philippine citizens." See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 470 (2004) [Per J. Vitug,
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 467-468 (2004) per J. Vitug, En Banc].
174
En Banc]. The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
143
For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that
December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For
citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 465 (2004) comparison, the 1935 provisions state:
[Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines.
144
G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/april201 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
5/208062.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. this Constitution.
145
Id. at 26.
146
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421 (2012) [Per (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
J. Reyes, En Banc]: "Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or Islands.
more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings." (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
147
See, for example, In the Matter of Save the Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
Development Fund, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015 age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/january
2015/15143.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-
279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
148
Cf. what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the provided by law.
175
very same text. See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The
149
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 887 [Per J. Carpio Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
176
Morales, En Banc], citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. Id. at 3-4.
147, 169-170 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].
150 177
The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the Id. at 5.
178
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that 409 Phil. 633 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
179
the present Constitution provides clarity for "natural born" status. For Id. at 651.
180
comparison, the 1935 provisions state: Id. at 656.
181
See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines. SECTION 5. Petition for Citizenship. — (1) Any person desiring to acquire
Philippine, citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly
this Constitution. typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's
passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the forth the following:
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands. Com. Act No. 473, sec.7 provides:
SECTION 7. Petition for Citizenship. — Any person desiring to acquire
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the
name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; the
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of
debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a
SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
provided by law. same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of
this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act;
151
C.J. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing
152
Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The
149 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing BERNAS, THE 1987 petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are
COMMENTARY (2009 ed.). citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of
153
Id. the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good
154
468 Phil. 421 (2004) [Per J.Vitug, En Banc]. repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in then opinion all
155
Id. at 464-470. the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in
156
Id. at 464. any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set
157
Id. forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
158
Id. at 465. may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and
159
Id. the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
160
Id. at 465-466, citing The Civil Code of Spain, art. 17.
161
Id. at 466-467, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND 182See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 3 provides:
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). SECTION 3. Qualifications. — Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
162
Id. at 466, citing RAMON M. VELAYO, PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the
NATURALIZATION 22-23 (1965). following qualifications:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines (d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
and residing therein since birth;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
filing of his/her petition; (f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himselfherself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in (g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as such war; and cralawlawlibrary
with the community in which he/she is living;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, Com. Act No. 473 (1939), sec. 4 provides:
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: SECTION 4. Who are Disqualified. — The following can not be naturalized as
Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must Philippine citizens:
have enrolled them in similar schools;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Persons opposed to organized government or
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and doctrines opposing all organized governments;
if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders (b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their
by reason of their citizenship; ideas;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
dialects of the Philippines; and cralawlawlibrary
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino (e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
people.
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
Comm. Act No. 473, sec. 2 provides: mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Qualifications. — Subject to section
four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst. He must be not less than twenty-one years of (h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
age on the day of the hearing of the petition; laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
184
less than ten years; The Civil Code states:
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in may be lost.
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
profession, or lawful occupation;
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
principal Philippine languages; prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of religious belief or political opinion.
of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for life, except in cases specified by law.
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
183 185
Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), sec. 4 provides: 571 Phil. 170 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 4. Disqualifications. — The following are 186 Id. at 189-190, citing Lack County v. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74, p. 212; State
not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act: v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494, 21 S.W. 193; and Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8.
187
374 Phil. 810 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
188
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Those opposed to organized government or Id. at 822.
189
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach See Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. De
doctrines opposing all organized governments; Laig, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 172 Phil. 283 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First
Division]; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, Division]; and Heirs of Celestial v. Heirs of Celestial, 455 Phil. 704 (2003) [Per J.
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
190
ideas; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc]. Also, Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodie's, a fact may be deemed natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
conclusion. immediately preceding their appointment.
191 218
Rollo, p. 8. CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 1(1) provides:
192
See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions
Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016 ....
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2 C. The Commission on Elections
016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
193
Id. SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
194
Id. Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
195
G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016 Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2 holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
016/221697.pdf> position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
196
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been
Elections, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016 engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/march2
219
016/221697_leonen.pdf> 83 [Per J. Perez, En Banc]. CONST., art. IX-D, sec. 1(1) provides:
197
Id. at 84. ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions
198
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. ....
199
Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First D. Commission on Audit
Division].
200
Id. SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a
201
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the
202
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5. Philippines and, at the time of men-appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
203
Rollo, pp. 56-58. certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience,
204
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 473-474 (2004) [Per J. or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
Vitug, En Banc]. for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective
205
Id. at 473-474 and 488. position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time
206
Id. at 487-488. shall all Members of the Commission beloiig to the same profession.
207
128 Phil. 815 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
208 220
614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. CONST., art. XI, sec.8 provides:
209
128 Phil. 815, 825 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. ARTICLE XI. Accountability of Public Officers
210
Go v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second ....
Division]. SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of
211
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
C.J. Fernan, En Banc]. recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
212
CONST., art. VII, sec. 2 provides: must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
ARTICLE VII. Executive Department preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a
.... judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
221
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born CONST., art. XII, sec. 20 provides:
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty ARTICLE XII. National Economy and Patrimony
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at ...
least ten years immediately preceding such election. SECTION 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary
authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino
213
CONST., art. VII, sec. 3. citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall
214
CONST., art. VI, sec. 3 provides: come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall
.. . provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for institutions performing similar functions.
222
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. CONST., art. XIII, sec. 17(2) provides:
ARTICLE XIII. Social Justice and Human Rights
215
CONST., art. VI, sec. 6 provides: ....
ARTICLE VI. The Legislative Department Human Rights
....
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives SECTION 17. . . .
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
immediately preceding the day of the election. the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
223
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act
216
CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7(1) provides: Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen
ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three thousand ten, is further
.... amended to read as follows:
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Sec. 38. The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals. — There shall be in the
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must Office of the City Fiscal one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the rank,
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the salary and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, an assistant chief
practice of law in the Philippines. to be known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second assistant city fiscals
217
CONST., art. LX-B, sec. 1(1) provides: who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven assistant fiscals, who shall
ARTICLE IX. Constitutional Commissions discharge their duties under the general supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
.... To be eligible for appointment as City Fiscal one must be a natural born citizen
B. The Civil Service Commission of the Philippines and must have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of
not less than ten years or held during a like period of an office in the Philippine
SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite. To be eligible for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural be entitled to transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in
born citizen of the Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years no case exceed FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) per month.
240
prior to his appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine CONST, art. IV, sec. 3.
241
Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable Rollo, pp. 685-686.
242
requisite. (Emphasis supplied) An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be Lost or
224
Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963). Reacquired.
225 243
Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women who have Lost their
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and Natural-born Filipinos.
244
Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the See Calilung v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 110, 117-18 (2007) [Per
National Youth Commissioner, among others. J. Quisumbing, En Banc] in which this Court stated that this was the clear intent
226
Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast of the legislature when it enacted Republic Act No. 9225.
245
Guard, among others. Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
227 246
Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain 551 Phil. 110 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
247
investment rights. Id. at 118.
228 248
Sameer v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 22, 57 [Per Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5.
249
J. Leonen, En Banc]. Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 3, par. 2:
229
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division]. Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - . . .
230
Ratified on August 21, 1990.
231
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
(visited March 7, 2016). become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
232
Ratified on October 23, 1986. taking the aforesaid oath.
233 250
See Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5 provides:
Banc], citing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
234
561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
235
Id. at 397-398. rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
236
Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), sec. 2(b) provides: laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
251
Section 2 (b). In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, CONST., art. V, sec. 1 provides:
his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 1. Suffrage maybe exercised by all citizens
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year,
and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
252
Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(1) provides:
through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
abandoned. acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
237
See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), An Act Requiring the Certification of the rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to Declare a "Child laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Legally Available for Adoption" as a Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings,
Amending for this Purpose Certain Provision of Rep. Act No. 8552, otherwise chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Those intending to exercise their right of
known as the Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Decree No. 603, suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes. Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
253
Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), sec. 2 provides: Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 5(2) provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
Act, the following terms shall mean: full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority conditions:
to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
.... for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling. authorized to administer an oath;
238
DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No. 254 692 Phil. 407 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
255
8239 (1997), Philippine Passport Act. Id. at 428.
239 256
Pres. Decree No. 1986, sec. 2 provides: Rollo, p. 10.
257
Section 2. Composition; qualifications; benefits. - The BOARD shall be Id. at 687.
258
composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall Id.
259
all be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice- Id. at 229.
260
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one Id.
261
(1) year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That Id.
262
they shall be eligible for re-appointment after the expiration of their term. If the Id.
Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman or any member of the BOARD fails to complete 263Bengson v. Bouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 409 Phil. 633, 649
his term, any person appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
264
unexpired portion of the term of the BOARD member whom he succeeds. Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), sec. 2.
265
Rollo, p. 35.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen DISSENTING OPINION
of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community; Provided, That in the selection of the PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such qualifications I dissent.
as would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas I respectfully submit that the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) committed grave
of motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members abuse of discretion in ruling that private respondent Mary Grace Poe-
of the BOARD shall be members of the Philippine Bar. Provided, finally That at Llamanzares (respondent) was a natural-born citizen and, thus, qualified to hold
least fifteen (15) members of the BOARD may come from the movie and office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. 1chanrobleslaw
television industry to be nominated by legitimate associations representing the
various sectors of said industry. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a However, the foregoing "circumstantial evidence" do not adequately prove the
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation determination sought to be established: that is, whether or not respondent can
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by trace her parentage to a Filipino citizen. These circumstances can be easily
reason of passion and hostility.2 In this relation, "grave abuse of discretion debunked by contrary but likewise rationally-sounding suppositions. Case law
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the holds that "[m]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be
law or existing jurisprudence."3chanrobleslaw strictly complied with."10 The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a
candidate's qualifications must therefore be solid. This Court cannot make a
The advent of the 1935 Constitution established the principle of jus sanguinis as definitive pronouncement on a candidate's citizenship when there is a looming
4
basis for acquiring Philippine citizenship. Following this principle, citizenship is possibility that he/she is not Filipino. The circumstances surrounding
conferred by virtue of blood relationship to a Filipino parent.5chanrobleslaw respondent's abandonment (both as to the milieu of time and place), as well as
her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By parity of
It was admitted that respondent was a foundling with unknown facts of birth and reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment
parentage. On its face, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution - the in the Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her physical
applicable law to respondent's case - did not include foundlings in the features only tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it
enumeration of those who are considered Filipino citizens. It reads: remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the statistics cited -
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: assuming the same to be true - do not account for all births but only of those
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain how "encompassing" was the Philippine's
adoption of this Constitution. civil registration system at that time - in 1968 - to be able to conclude that those
statistics logically reflect a credible and representative sample size. And even
assuming it to be so, 1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering it factually
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the possible that respondent belonged to this class. Ultimately, the opposition
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the against respondent's natural-born citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact
Philippine Islands. that her parents are unknown directly puts into question her Filipino citizenship
because she has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from which she could
have traced her Filipino citizenship.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
Absent satisfactory proof establishing any blood relation to a Filipino parent, and
without any mention in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings are considered or
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon even presumed to be Filipino citizens at birth, it is my view that, under the
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. auspices of the 1935 Constitution, respondent could not be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen. As worded, the provisions of Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution are clear, direct, and unambiguous. This Court should
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. therefore apply the statutory construction principles of expressio unius est
This case was originally a quo warranto proceeding before the SET.6 The initial exclusio alterius and verba legis non est recedendum. Consequently, it would be
burden, thus, fell upon petitioner Rizalito Y. David to show that respondent unnecessary to resort to the constitutional deliberations or to examine the
lacked the qualifications of a Senator. However, upon respondent's voluntary underlying intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union
admission that she was a foundling, the burden of evidence was shifted to her. v. The Executive Secretary,11 this Court remarked
In his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
pertinently explains: Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
[I]n quo warranto, the petitioner who challenges the respondent's qualification to the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
office carries the burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, the facts they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
constituting the disqualification. Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
respondent who must now present opposing evidence constituting his or her instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it [is] safer to construe the
defense or establishing his or her affirmative defense. constitution from what appears upon its face."12
In fact, it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in
xxxx its final form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings
being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is
In the present case, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent is a foundling. therefore indicative of the framers' prevailing intent.13 The ponencia's theorized
He posits that, as a foundling has no known parents from whom to trace the "harmonization"14 of the constitutional provisions on citizenship with the
origins of her citizenship, the respondent is not a Filipino citizen and is, provisions on the promotion of children's well-being,15 equal protection,16 public
therefore, not eligible for the position of senator. service,17 and even human dignity and human rights18 appears to be a tailor-
fitted advocacy for allowing foundlings to run for key national posts that, quite
Significantly, the respondent admitted her status as a foundling, thus, lifting the frankly, stretches the import of these distinct provisions to the separate and
petitioner's burden of proving his claim that she is a foundling. With the unique matter of citizenship. There seems to be an evident logical problem with
admission, the fact necessary to establish the petitioner's claim is considered the argument that since the Constitution protects its children, and respects
established.7 human rights and equality to run for office, then ergo, foundlings should be
In this case, respondent failed to present competent and sufficient evidence to presumed to be natural-born. It appears that this approach aims to collate all
prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine possibly related constitutional text, albeit far-flung, just to divine a presumption
natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. This when unfortunately, there is none.
notwithstanding, the ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are
substantial evidence justifying the inference that respondent's biological parents Moreover, as Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) aptly
are Filipino:8chanrobleslaw pointed out in his Dissenting Opinion before the SET, it would be insensible to
suppose that the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended that foundlings be
(a) Circumstances of abandonment: Respondent was found as a newborn considered as natural-born citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968, [N]one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born
Iloilo, as did most if not all other Philippine provinces, had a predominantly in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution,
Filipino population. In 1968, there was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
(b) Physical features: She is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at citizens. If, as respondent would like us to believe, the framers intended that
only 5 feet and 2 inches tall. foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would create an
absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a
(c) Statistical inference: in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. better position than child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen.
Commission on Elections,9 former Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay underscored The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such
how it was statistically more probable that respondent was born a Filipino absurdity.19
citizen, submitting that out of 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, While the predicament of foundlings of having their parents unknown would
over 1,595 or 0.18% were foreigners. This translates to, roughly, a 99.8% seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of proving their Filipino
probability that respondent was born a Filipino citizen.