Associated Insurance and Surety Company v.

Iya ISSUE:

103 SCRA 972 Which of the mortgages should have

preference?

DOCTRINE:A building is an immovable property

irrespective of where or not said structure and the HELD:
land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
It was held in Lopez vs. Orosa that the building is
owner.
an immovable itself, separate and distinct from
the land. A building is an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said structure and
FACTS:
the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
Spouses Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino own same owner.
a house of strong materials. They filed a bond of P
11,000.00 subscribed by the Associated Insurance
and Surety Co., Inc. and as a counter-guaranty, Only personal properties can be the subject of a
the spouses Valino executed an alleged chattel chattel mortgage and since the structure in this
mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor case is an immovable, it cannot subject to a
of the surety company. chattel mortgage. Therefore the chattel
mortgage and the sale on which it was based
should be declared null and void. Also, while it is
The parcel of land on which the house is erected true that said document was registered in the
was still registered in the name of the Philippine Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal, this act
Realty Corporation but was able to obtain the produced no effect whatsoever for where the
same from them after full payment of the interest conveyed is in the nature of a real
purchase price. The Valinos acquired another property, the registration of the document in the
loan from Isabel Iya for P12,000.00, executing a registry of chattels is merely a futile act which
real estate mortgage over the house and lot. would produce no legal effect insofar as the
However, they were unable to pay off their other building is concerned.
loan which caused the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. The surety company was awarded the
land as the highest bidder in the auction but later Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo
on discovered that the land was subject to a real
G.R. No. 40411,
estate mortgage. The surety company then
requested that the house and lot be excluded DOCTRINE: Generally, machinery becomes
from the real estate mortgage. Iya, in her answer, immobilized when placed by the owner of the
said that she had a real right over the property plant or property. This rule does not apply should
and that the chattel mortgage on which the the machinery be placed by any other person
foreclosure was based should be declared null such as a tenant or usufructuary.
and void for non-compliance with the form
required by law. The CA ruled that the foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage is limited to the land FACTS:
alone and they awarded the structure to the
The petitioner company operates a sawmill in
surety company saying that the house is a
barrio Tigatu, Davao.
personal property and may be subject to chattel
mortgage. Said facility contained both movable and
immovable property (machines and other such
implements).
However, the land on which it is situated belongs This is so because while machines are generally
to another person. movable property, they may nevertheless be
“immobilized” by destination or purpose subject
The parties executed a lease contract providing
to several conditions.
that upon the expiration or termination of such
lease, the following shall happen:

The ownership of all structures and improvements This conclusion finds its ground under the fifth
introduced by the petitioner company shall be paragraph of Article 415. Here, machinery
transferred to the respondents without any cost or becomes immobilized when placed by the owner
obligation to pay. of the plant or property. This rule does not apply
should the machinery be placed by any other
The machines and their accessories shall not be
person such as a tenant or usufructuary.
included in said transfer.

It was noted by the court that in a previous case

between the two parties, judgment was rendered Applying the rule to the case on hand, the
against the petitioner company upon which a machinery was placed by the petitioner
writ of execution was brought against its company who was merely a lessee. As such, the
machines (as personalty) in favor of Castilllo, et al. equipment was never immobilized in the first
place.
Additionally, the records of the current case
reflected that the petitioner company had
treated its machinery as personal property by
Davao Saw Mill v. Castillo G.R. No. L-40411 August
executing chattel mortgages on them in favor of
7, 1935 Property
third persons.
AUGUST 24, 2018
Petitioner company contends that its machines
are immovable under the first and fifth FACTS:
paragraphs of Article 334 (now Article 415) of the
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., operates a sawmill.
Civil Code.
However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to another person. On the
land the sawmill company erected a building
ISSUE:
which housed the machinery used by it. Some of
W/N the machines of the petitioner company are the machines were placed and mounted on
movable or immovable property. foundations of cement. In the contract of lease
between the sawmill company and the owner of
the land there appeared the following provision:
HELD:
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon,
The machines are movable. all the improvements and buildings introduced
and erected by the lessee shall pass to the
exclusive ownership of the lessor without any
The court observed that the petitioner company obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
failed to register its protest at the time its improvements and buildings; also, in the event
machines were sold. Generally, this inaction the lessee should leave or abandon the land
would be inconclusive but it is indicative of the leased before the time herein stipulated, the
intention impressed upon the property in improvements and buildings shall likewise pass to
question. the ownership of the lessor as though the time
agreed upon had expired: Provided, however,
That the machineries and accessories are not
included in the improvements which will pass to but intended by a lessee for use in a building
the lessor on the expiration or abandonment of erected on the land by the latter to be returned
the land leased. to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment
of the lease.
In another action, wherein Davao Saw Mill was
the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor Machinery which is movable in its nature only
of the plaintiff in that action against the becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
defendant in that action; a writ of execution the owner of the property or plant, but not when
issued thereon, and the properties now in so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
question were levied upon as personalty by the person having only a temporary right, unless such
sheriff. person acted as the agent of the owner.

Davao Saw Mill has on a number of occasions “Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements
treated the machinery as personal property by intended by the owner of the tenements for the
executing chattel mortgages in favor of third industrial or works that they may carry on in any
persons. One of such persons is the appellee by building or upon any land and which tend
assignment from the original mortgages. directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works.”
ISSUE:
Machinery which is movable in its nature only
Whether or not the machinery in dispute is a
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
personal property.
the owner of the property or plant. Such result
would not be accomplished, therefore, by the
placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a
RULING:
usufructuary or any person having only a
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, temporary right.
is in point. According to the Code, real property
consists of —
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
kinds adhering to the soil;
FACTS:
xxx xxx xxx
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or approved granting authority to all municipalities
implements intended by the owner of any and chartered cities to undertake and carry out
at their own expense the reclamation by
building or land for use in connection with any
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
industry or trade being carried on therein and lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
which are expressly adapted to meet the construct, maintain and repair proper and
requirements of such trade of industry. adequate docking and harbor facilities as such
municipalities and chartered cities may
Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and determine in consultation with the Secretary of
appellees the last mentioned paragraph. Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
While not conclusive, the characterization of the
property as chattels by the appellant is indicative Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was
of intention and impresses upon the property the passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
character determined by the parties. foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and
entered into an agreement with Republic Real
It is machinery which is involved; moreover, Estate Corporation for the said project.
machinery not intended by the owner of any
building or land for use in connection therewith,
 Republic questioned the agreement. It
contended, among others, that the agreement SALVADOR H. LAUREL v. RAMON GARCIA, GR No. 92013,
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for 1990-07-25
the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Facts:
Pasay City and RREC countered that the
object in question is within the commerce of man The subject property in this case is one of the four
because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
the term “foreshore land” than that in the government under the Reparations Agreement
definition provided by the dictionary. entered into with Japan

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City The properties and the capital goods and
and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the services procured from the Japanese
CA with modifications. government for national development projects
are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
ISSUE: people for their losses in life and property and
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” their suffering during World War II.
includes the submerged area.
Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law,
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the
prescribes the national policy on procurement
reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
and utilization of reparations and development
loans. The procurements are divided into those
HELD:
for use by the government sector... and those for
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and
private parties in projects as the then National
unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
Economic Council shall determine. Those
respondent court that the term “foreshore land”
intended for the private sector shall be made
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the
available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
term "foreshore lands" refers to:
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities...
The strip of land that lies between the high and
in national development projects.
low water marks and that is alternately wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide. The Roppongi property was acquired from the
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a Japanese government under the Second Year
lake or stream); the part of a seashore between Schedule and listed under the heading
the low-water line usually at the seaward margin "Government Sector",... As intended, it became
of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave the site of the Philippine Embassy... until the latter
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22,
scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International 1976when the Roppongi building needed major
Dictionary) repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling provide necessary funds, the Roppongi... property
Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its has remained undeveloped since that time.
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof.
If the intention of Congress were to include A proposal was presented to President Corazon
submerged areas, it should have provided C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese
from the term “foreshore lands.” firm - Kajima Corporation - which shall construct
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay two (2)... buildings in Roppongi and one (1)
City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by building in Nampeidai and renovate the present
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
attack, have been found to be outside the consideration of the construction would be the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of
therefore ultra vires and null and void. the... buildings to be constructed in Roppongi
and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai.

The other building in Roppongi shall then be used

as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end
of the lease period, all... the three leased As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot
buildings shall be occupied and used by the is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
Philippine government. No change of ownership alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
Comment) The Philippine government retains the application to the satisfaction... of collective
title all throughout the lease period... and needs, and resides in the social group. The
thereafter. However, the government has not purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical
acted favorably on this proposal which is pending person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
approval and ratification between the parties. common and public welfare and cannot be the
Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino object of appropriation.
created a committee to study the...
disposition/utilization of Philippine government The fact that the Roppongi site has not been
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through used for a long time for actual Embassy service
Administrative Order No. 3, followed by does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D. property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use
Issues:
A property continues to be part of the public
The petitioner in G. R. No. 92013 raises the domain, not available for private appropriation or
following issues: ownership "until there is a formal declaration on
the part... of the government to withdraw it from
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its being such
kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?;
and A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell failure by the government to repair the building in
the Roppongi property? Roppongi is not... abandonment since as earlier
stated, there simply was a shortage of
Ruling: government funds.

Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares
property is classified as one of public dominion, an "authority to sell", does not have a provision in
and not of private ownership under Article 420 of its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four
the Civil Code properties procured from Japan for the
government sector. The executive order does
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property not... declare that the properties lost their public
comes under "property intended for public character. It merely intends to make the
service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. properties available to foreigners and not to
He states that being one of public dominion, no Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other...
ownership by any one can attach to it, not even disposition.
by the
It is exceedingly strange why our top government
State. officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist
that in the sale of extremely valuable government
The Roppongi and related properties were
property, Japanese law and not Philippine law
acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and
should prevail. The Japanese law -- its
consular quarters, buildings and other
coverage... and effects, when enacted, and
improvements"... he respondents, for their part,
exceptions to its provisions -- is not presented to
refute the petitioner's contention by saying that
the Court. It is simply asserted that the lex loci...
the subject property is not governed by our Civil
rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without
Code but by the laws of Japan where the
stating what that law provides. It is assumed on
property is located. They rely upon the rule of
faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
lex... situs which is used in determining the
applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer The issues are not concerned with validity of
and devolution of the title to a property. ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is LAUREL VS GARCIA
the authority of the respondent... officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
State. And the validity of the procedures Laurel vs Garcia
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Philippine law. The rule of... lex situs does not
apply. Facts:

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine
the Roppongi property is no longer of public Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by is located in Japan. It is one of the properties
the respondents. given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the
There is no law authorizing its conveyance. former during the war.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the
property. It was given to the Filipino people in subject property is property of public dominion.
reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who As such, it is outside the commerce of men.
died and suffered during the Japanese military Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
occupation, for the suffering of... widows and
orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not
the homes and other properties lost by countless Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because
Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are the property is located in Japan. They posit that
a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the the principle of lex situs applies.
Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the...
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino Issues and Held:
heroes, we do not expect economic or financial
benefits from them. But who would think of selling 1. WON the subject property cannot be
these monuments? Filipino honor and national alienated.
dignity dictate that we... keep our properties in The answer is in the affirmative.
Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who
died and suffered. Even if we should become Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that
paupers we should not think of selling them. For it it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
would be as if we sold the lives and blood and shown that the property has become patrimonial.
tears of our... countrymen. This, the respondents have failed to do. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more alienated.
so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos - 2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
veterans and civilians alike.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Whether or not the Roppongi and related
properties will eventually be sold is a policy We see no reason why a conflict of law rule
determination where both the President and should apply when no conflict of law situation
Congress must concur. exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when:
(1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of
an immovable, such that the capacity to take
and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of
the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the of several Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), four
need to determine which law should apply. of which are registered in the names of the
petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport
In the instant case, none of the above elements
exists. Authority (MCIAA) and the Republic. They
alleged that the subject properties were owned
The issues are not concerned with validity of by their predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the
ownership or title. There is no question that the Original Certificates of Title were lost during the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the Second World War. Respondents alleged that
authority of the respondent officials to validly
the mother of therein defendants Ricardo
dispose of property belonging to the State. And
Inocian, Emilia I. Bacalla, Olympia I. Esteves and
the validity of the procedures adopted to effect
Restituta I. Montana pretended to be "Isabel
its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule
of lex situs does not apply. Limbaga" and fraudulently succeeded in
reconstituting the titles over the subject properties
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of to her name and in selling some of them to the
Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs other defendants.[2]
rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured
It will be recalled that the subject properties were
through reparations nor the existence in what
acquired by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
body of the authority to sell them. In discussing
(CAA) through expropriation proceedings for the
who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law
which should determine who can acquire the Airport,[3] which was granted by the Court of First
properties so that the constitutional limitation on Instance (CFI) of Cebu City, Branch 3, in Civil
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Case No. R-1881, on December 29, 1961.
Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Subsequently, however, Lahug airport was
Filipinos is inapplicable. ordered closed on November 29, 1989,[4] and all
its functions and operations were transferred to
petitioner MCIAA[5] after its creation in 1990
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958,
otherwise known as the Charter of the Mactan-
574 Phil. 755
Cebu International Airport Authority.

In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations in

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.: the complaint and by way of special and
affirmative defenses moved for the dismissal of
This petition assails the May 12, 2006 Decision[1] of
the complaint. Likewise, defendants Ricardo
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159,
Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor Arcinas
which reversed the June 14, 2001 and August 10,
and Marilyn Dueñas filed their separate motions
2001 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
to dismiss.
Cebu City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-24012.
Also assailed is the September 12, 2006 Resolution
On June 14, 2001, the RTC dismissed the
denying the motion for reconsideration.
complaint on the grounds that the respondents
had no cause of action, and that the action was
The facts of the case are as follows:
barred by prescription and
laches.[6] Respondents filed a motion for
On July 6, 1999, respondents, through their
reconsideration which was denied; hence, they
attorney-in-fact Anecito Invento, filed a
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which
complaint against several defendants for
reversed the Orders of the RTC. The appellate
recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity
court held that the complaint alleged "ultimate
facts" constituting respondents' cause of action; reconveyed to the real owners considering that
that the respondents cannot be faulted for not the purpose for which the properties were
including therein "evidentiary facts," thus causing expropriated is no longer relevant in view of the
confusion or doubt as to the existence of a cause closure of the Lahug Airport.[11]
of action; and assuming the complaint lacked
some definitive statements, the proper remedy for A cause of action is an act or omission of one
the petitioner and other defendants should have party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its
been a motion for bill of particulars, not a motion elements are the following: (1) the legal right of
to dismiss. Further, the determination of whether plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
respondents have a right to recover the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
ownership of the subject properties, or whether defendant in violation of said legal right.[12] The
their action is barred by prescription existence of a cause of action is determined by
or laches requires evidentiary proof which can be the allegations in the complaint.[13] Thus, in the
threshed out, not in a motion to dismiss, but in a resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure
full-blown trial.[7] The dispositive portion of the to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged
Decision reads: in the complaint must be considered. The test in
cases like these is whether a court can render a
valid judgment on the complaint based upon the
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated 14 June
facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.
2001 and 10 August 2001, both issued by the
Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 in Civil
generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer
Case No. CEB-24012, are hereby REVERSED and
which hypothetically admits the truth of the
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we REMAND the case to
factual allegations made in a complaint.[14]
the court a quo for further proceedings. We are
also directing the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8 to
However, while a trial court focuses on the
REINSTATE the case, and to conduct a TRIAL ON
factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot
THE MERITS and thereafter render a decision.
disregard statutes and decisions material and
relevant to the proper appreciation of the
SO ORDERED.[8]
questions before it. In resolving a motion to
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it dismiss, every court must take judicial notice of
was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, decisions this Court has rendered as provided by
2006.[9] Hence, this petition for review based on Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[15] to
the following grounds: wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. --
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF A court shall take judicial notice, without the
ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER IN CIVIL CASE NO. introduction of evidence, of the existence and
CEB-24012. territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality,
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT courts of the world and their seals, the political
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND THAT constitution and history of the Philippines, the
THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, HAS official acts of the legislative, executive and
PRESCRIBED.[10] judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the
Respondents argue that the properties which
geographical divisions.
were expropriated in connection with the
operation of the Lahug Airport should be
In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of the right of repurchase. However, we qualified
Appeals failed to consider the decision of this our Decision in that case, thus:
Court in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v.
Court of Appeals,[16] rendered on November 27,
We adhere to the principles enunciated
2000, which settled the issue of whether the
in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
properties expropriated under Civil Case No. R-
Authority, and do not overrule them. Nonetheless
1881 will be reconveyed to the original owners if
the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as
the purpose for which it was expropriated is
regards the properties of respondent Chiongbian
ended or abandoned or if the property was to be
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
used other than the expansion or improvement of
Authority, must be commensurate to the facts
the Lahug airport.
that were established therein as distinguished
from those extant in the case at bar. Chiongbian
In said case, the Court held that the terms of the
put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence,
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 were clear and
while in the instant case we have preponderant
unequivocal. It granted title over the
proof as found by the trial court of the existence
expropriated land to the Republic of the
of the right of repurchase in favor of
Philippines in fee simple without any condition
petitioners.[20] (Emphasis provided)
that it would be returned to the owners or that
the owners had a right to repurchase the same if Thus, the determination of the rights and
the purpose for which it was expropriated is obligations of landowners whose properties were
ended or abandoned or if the property was to be expropriated but the public purpose for which
used other than as the Lahug airport.[17] When eminent domain was exercised no longer subsist,
land has been acquired for public use in fee must rest on the character by which the titles
simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of thereof were acquired by the government. If the
eminent domain or by purchase, the former land is expropriated for a particular purpose with
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public the condition that it will be returned to its former
use may be abandoned, or the land may be owner once that purpose is ended or
devoted to a different use, without any abandoned, then the property shall be
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reconveyed to its former owner when the
reversion to the former owner.[18] purpose is terminated or abandoned. If, on the
contrary, the decree of expropriation gives to the
Had the appellate court considered the import of entity a fee simple title, as in this case, then the
the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. land becomes the absolute property of the
Court of Appeals, it would have found that expropriator. Non-use of the property for the
respondents can invoke no right against the purpose by which it was acquired does not have
petitioner since the subject lands were acquired the effect of defeating the title acquired in the
by the State in fee simple. Thus, the first element expropriation proceedings.[21]
of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's legal right, is
not present in the instant case. Even assuming that respondents have a right to
the subject properties being the heirs of the
We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of alleged real owner Ysabel Limbaga, they still do
Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International not have a cause of action against the petitioner
Airport Authority,[19] concerning still another set because such right has been foreclosed by
of owners of lands which were declared prescription, if not by laches. Respondents failed
expropriated in the judgment in Civil Case No. R- to take the necessary steps within a reasonable
1881, but were ordered by the Court to be period to recover the properties from the parties
reconveyed to their previous owners because who caused the alleged fraudulent reconstitution
there was preponderant proof of the existence of of titles.
 statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or
Respondents' action in the court below is one for where a defendant has been declared in
reconveyance based on fraud committed by default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that
Isabel Limbaga in reconstituting the titles to her the facts demonstrating the lapse of the
name. It was filed on July 6, 1999, or 38 years prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and
after the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the
granted the expropriation, or even longer if we averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise
reckon from the time of the fraudulent established by the evidence.[27] (Citations
reconstitution of titles, which date is not stated in omitted)
the complaint but presumably before the
In the instant case, although the complaint did
complaint for expropriation was filed by CAA on
not state the date when the alleged fraud in the
April 16, 1952.[22]
reconstitution of titles was perpetuated, it is
however clear from the allegations in the
An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy
complaint that the properties sought to be
granted to a landowner whose property has
recovered were acquired by the petitioner in Civil
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
Case No. R-1881 which was granted by the trial
another's name.[23] However, such action must
court on December 29, 1961. Clearly, the filing of
be filed within 10 years from the issuance of the
the action in 1999 is way beyond the ten 10 year
title since the issuance operates as a constructive
prescriptive period.
notice.[24] Thus, the cause of action which
respondents may have against the petitioner is
Further, while it is by express provision of law that
definitely barred by prescription.
no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides
prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an
that when it appears from the pleadings or the
enshrined rule that even a registered owner may
evidence on record that the action is already
be barred from recovering possession of property
barred by statute of limitations, the court shall
by virtue of laches.[28] The negligence or
dismiss the claim. Further, contrary to
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
respondents' claim that a complaint may not be
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to
dismissed based on prescription without trial, an
assert it had either abandoned it or declined to
allegation of prescription can effectively be used
assert it also casts doubt on the validity of the
in a motion to dismiss when the complaint on its
claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right
face shows that indeed the action has
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more
prescribed[25] at the time it was filed.
or less great, and other circumstances causing
prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar
Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato:[26]
in a court of equity.[29]

We have ruled that trial courts have authority and Respondents' inaction for a period of 38 years to
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of vindicate their alleged rights had converted their
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other claim into a stale demand. The allegation that
facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; petitioner employed threat or intimidation is an
and it may do so on the basis of a motion to afterthought belatedly raised only in the Court of
dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground Appeals. As such it deserves scant attention.
as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is
alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense for review is GRANTED. The May 12, 2006 Decision
has not been asserted at all, as where no and September 12, 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 dated
June 14, 2001 and August 10, 2001 in Civil Case
No. CEB-24012, dismissing respondent's complaint
for reconveyance on grounds of lack of cause of
action, prescription and laches and denying the
motion for reconsideration, respectively,
areREINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A.

Abarintos and concurred in by Associate Justices
Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

[2] Rollo, pp. 59-60.

[3] Id. at 62.

[4] See Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr.,

G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 544,
548.

[5] See Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-

Cebu International Airport Authority, G.R. No.
156273, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 288, 294.