IV.

PRECEDENT AND CASE ANALYSIS With respect to plaintiffs-appellants' claim for damages, the same was denied by
the trial court on the ground of insufficiency of existence. This is an error.
AGUIRRE V. AGUIRRE Sufficient proofs had been introduced by them at the trial as shown by the
following testimony —

Q. The properties having originated from the spouses, Gregorio

Republic of the Philippines Aguirre and Regina Antolin, how much share did your children
SUPREME COURT receive annually as their share?
Manila
A. More or less P200.00.
SECOND DIVISION
Q In the properties left by the spouses, Melencio Aguirre and
Fructuosa Perez, how much is the amount corresponding to your
two children?
G.R. No. L-33080 August 15, 1974
A More or less P800.00 annually.
LEONCIA D. AGUIRRE, LUIS D. AGUIRRE, JR., and AURELIA LUNINGNING
AGUIRRE, petitioners, Q And the stints of P200.00 and P800.00 respectively were not
vs. given to you for your two children since 1955 up to the up to the
VICENTA AGUIRRE, FELIPE AGUIRRE, ANDREA AGUIRRE, CARIDAD AGUIRRE, present?
SOCORRO AGUIRRE, SEVERINO AGUIRRE as substitute for his deceased father
DOMINADOR AGUIRRE, CRISTETA LAMAHANG, LUIS L. AGUIRRE, JR., and THE A Yes, sir, it was not given to me.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Q By refusal of the defendants to accede to the demands for
Felix M. Sulit for petitioners. partition of the properties mentioned in the complaint, what
damages if any did you incur?
Magno T. Bueser for private respondents.
A Actual damages P1,000.00 yearly for 1955 up to the present.
(Plaintiff's testimony t.s.n. p. 36 June 22, 1961).

BARREDO, J.:p The damages of P1,000.00 annually above-mentioned represents the value of the rice, corn,
mangoes, copras, salt and others, to which the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled but were unable
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA — G.R. No. 37717-R entitled Leoncia D. Aguirre et al. vs. Vicenta to receive by reason of the unjustified acts of the defendants-appellees as shown by the
Aguirre et al., in favor of petitioners, but claimed by them to be short of what they should be entitled to under the law, having in view the
findings of fact of the appellate court itself. .
following testimony —

This litigation started in the Court of First Instance of Batangas as an action for partition and Q. How were you able to get the corresponding share in the
damages among the surviving descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin produce of the lands mentioned in the complaint corresponding to
of the properties left by said spouses. The trial court rendered judgment for petitioners who were your two children?
plaintiffs there but made no award of damages. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, mainly
because of the failure of the trial court to award them damages, the appellate court made the A. The share regarding palay was given to me by Socorro Aguirre
following pertinent findings and conclusions of fact: the money coming from San Juan was given to me by Caridad
Aguirre and the copra coming from Lobo was given to me by
Dominador Aguirre. The salt, mangoes, palay and corn in In connection with the above-mentioned claims of P1,000.00 early, it is to be
Batangas were given to me by Maura Aguirre. noted that the lands subject of this suit are unsurveyed lands, which according to
the pertinent tax declarations contained an area of 500 hectares. Portions of
Q. How about the share of your two children in the properties in these lands in the names of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez are coconut
Bilogo, Taysan, Batangas, where did you get the same? lands. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo, Batangas, consists of around
3,000 fruit bearing coconut trees and the ricelands are cultivated by around 50
A. From Maura Aguirre also. families, residing at the place as permanent tenants. This is shown by the
following —
Q. How about the properties located in Rosario, Batangas, where
did you get the share corresponding to your two children? Q. More or less will you tell this Honorable Court how many
coconut trees there are?
A. From Tules, Rosario the share was given to me by Socorro
Aguirre, in Matamis, Rosario, Batangas the share was given to A. There are around three thousand (3,000) coconut trees, sir.
me by Dominador Aguirre.
Q. Fruit bearing or not?
Q. Until when were you receiving the corresponding share of the
produce of the lands mentioned in the complaint for your two A. All fruit bearing, sir. (t.s.n. p. 38, April 2, 1964).
children?
Q. All of them are situated at barrio Jaybanga, Lobo, Batangas?
A. Up to 1954.
A. Yes, sir. (t.s.n. p. 49, April 2, 1964).
Q. What happened in the year 1955 to the produce corresponding
to your two children in the properties mentioned in the complaint? Q. And the lands in Jaybanga, Pinagbayanan, Tulos and
Matamis, Rosario, Batangas what can you say as to that?
A. In 1955, Felipe Aguirre, Dominador Aguirre, Caridad Aguirre
and Socorro Aguirre divided the 1/6 share of my children, saying A. There are around fifty (50) tenants, sir.
the same will be given to Cristeta Lamahang.
Q. In their testimony these tenants are only transients or
Q. Did you agree to such division of the share corresponding to temporary, what can you say as to that?
your two children?
A. That is not true, sir. They have established homes there and
A. I did not agree. many tenants are qualified voters of that place (t.s.n. p. 39 April 2,
1964).
Q. When you did not agree, what happened?
Due to the wrongful acts of the defendants and intervenors, the plaintiffs were forced to litigate to
A. The 1/6 share corresponding to my two children was not given protect their rights, incurring additional actual damages in the form of attorney's fees, expert
to me. witness fees and miscellaneous expenses. These are established by the following testimony —

Q. Is that up to the present? Q. When the share in the produce of the lands mentioned to the
complaint, corresponding to your two children was not given to
A. Yes, sir. (t.s.n. pp. 33-35 June 22, 1961). you, what did you do?
 A. I consulted a lawyer. A. Well, I asked expenses for photostatic materials and for my
appearance here.
Q. What happened after the consultations?
Q. Usually how much?
A. This present complaint was filed.
A. I charged P500.00 (t.s.n. p. 5, Oct. 28, 1964).
Q. When you engaged the services of your counsel was there
any condition regarding attorney's fees? Upon these facts and considerations, the court rendered judgment as follows: .

A. Yes, sir. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that
Parcel No. 7 otherwise known as the property located in Matamis, Rosario,
Q. What? Batangas, as part and parcel of the mass of property left by the late Gregorio
Aguirre, is to be divided between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendants
A. Our contract was P5,500.00 (t.s.n. p. 35 June 22, 1961). on the others, awarding the plaintiffs damages, thus: attorney's fees —
P5,000.00; actual damages-P1,000,00; moral damages — P2.000.00; exemplary
damages — P1,000.00; and fees for expert witness — P500.00. As thus
Q. In your previous direct examination, you stated that you
modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without
suffered actual damages in the amount of P1,000.00 yearly, the
pronouncement as to costs.
sums corresponds to the share which ought to received from
1955 to 1956, is that the only damage you suffered?
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by petitioners it is evident that whereas the appellate court found as
a fact that the damages suffered by petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955, the
A. I sustained other damages in the form of attorney's fees and
dispositive portion of its decision simply says P1,000, without any qualification, which, of course,
miscellaneous expenses and also moral damages.
is a manifest ambiguity, if not inconsistency, that leaves the parties at a loss as to what exactly
should be the amount of actual damages recoverable by petitioners. Considering, however, the
Q. In the amount of how much? tenor of the opinion and the ratiocination in the decision in question, there can hardly be any
doubt that it was the intention of the appellate court to allow the recovery of the yearly damages
A. The attorney's fees P5,000.00 miscellaneous expenses it found to have been suffered by petitioners. If it went as far as to award attorney's fees of
P500.00 and moral damages P2,000.00 (t.s.n. p. 6, Oct. 12, P5,000, moral damages of P2,000, exemplary damages of P1,000 and even fees for experts of
1961). P500, it stands to reason that it could not have meant to award petitioners actual damages of
only P1,000. The absurdity of such a meager judgment of actual damages in the face of the
With respect to the fee for the expert witness which plaintiffs-appellants has incurred, the other special items of damages awarded is too plain to be ignored. In fact, had the judgment of
following testimony is a good guideline — the Court of Appeals been allowed to become final and the problem now besetting petitioners
were to be raised as an incident in the execution thereof, the chances are that a construction of
Q. In case where the client has the capacity to pay, especially in said judgment in the manner above-stated might be sanctionable notwithstanding jurisprudence
civil case, how much do you usually charge for examination of to the effect that it is the dispositive part of a decision that controls irrespective of what might
documents, testimonies given in the Court of First Instance appear in the opinion part thereof, for the simple reason that in this particular subject judgment,
regarding that examination? the inevitable conclusion from the findings of fact in the opinion of the Court of Appeals is so
indubitable that any argument to the contrary would appear flimsy and purely technical, apart
A. I would depend in the nature of the case. from being totally illogical.1 We have no doubt that any other view would precisely be the kind of
reasoning that might convince the people that our courts sometimes sacrifice substantial justice
Q. In this case how much did you charge the plaintiff herein? in the altar of technicalities. What is cause for wonder to Us in this case, however, is why such a
simple matter had to reach the Supreme Court. It is almost certain that a brief motion for
reconsideration calling the appellate court's attention could have made the instant proceeding
unnecessary. Or respondent could have readily yielded to petitioner's pose, considering the
manifest correctness thereof. Be that as it may, We must admit that delays in the administration
of justice could be considerably avoided if greater care were taken in the drafting of the
dispositive portions of decisions which in truth constitute the very essence thereof.

Petitioners also assign as error the failure of the Court of Appeals to sentence defendants to pay
them interests and costs. Again, We find merit in this contention. They are entitled to interest at
the legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial court. (Section 8, Rule 51; Article 2213,
Civil Code of the Philippines.) And to costs. (Section 1, Rule 142.)

Anent the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts
granted to them as a result of the rise in the rate of dollar exchange of the peso, We are of the
considered opinion that the facts extant in the record do not provide sufficient legal basis
therefor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with the modification that the
amount of actual damages awarded petitioners should be P1,000 annually from 1955 and the
respondents shall pay interest on all the amounts adjudged against them at the legal rate from
the date of the judgment of the trial court. Costs in all instances against respondents.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 See Filipino Legion Corporation vs. CA and Lentija, et al., L-22364, and Lentija,
et al. vs. Filipino Legion Corporation, L-28330, decided jointly on April 30, 1974.
 At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
PEOPLE V. MALMSTEDT ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
Republic of the Philippines to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
SUPREME COURT coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
Manila information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.2
EN BANC
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station,
set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
vs.
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection
from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. bus was seated at the rear thereof.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
PADILLA, J.: opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
factual background of the case is as follows:
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that
accused finally presented his passport.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body
number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made
him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer
came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
give credence to accused's defense.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was another.
planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation
when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20,
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The
SO ORDERED.4 required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
plastic bag owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and
attempted to flee.12 SO ORDERED.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received JJ., concur.
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very
same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused,
during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The
failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to
arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying
to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the
NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness
in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
MORALES V. PAREDES reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.
We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any
time after the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from
G.R. No. L-34428 December 29, 1930
the entry of the final decree of registration.
lawphi 1>net

BALTAZAR MORALES, petitioner,

In the case of Plurad vs. Alcaide, G. R. No. 27545, 1 their is an indication that there can no be no
vs.
review until the final decree has been issued. This indication is only obiter dictum and was not
ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, ET AL., respondents.
voted upon by the court; the determination of the case rested on other grounds and
the dictum was not taken into consideration by the court as a whole. A dictum not necessarily
Nicolas Belmonte for petitioner. involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as
The respondent Judge in his own behalf. such.
Turner, Rheberg & Sanchez for respondents P. Gavino, R. Gavino and Prudencio Gavino.
The plaintiff's view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
erroneous. This court had no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if other
adequate remedies are available, and such remedies are not lacking in the present case.
OSTRAND, J.
The case is therefore dismissed with the costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.
Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the
concur.
application was granted and a decision to that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims to
be the owner of the land, but he was not advised to the registration proceedings and was not
informed thereof until the early part of the month of September, 1930. He thereupon filed a
motion on September 18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the reconsideration of
the decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may still be pending. Without
dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought the present action praying that the
aforesaid decision be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with section 513 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without deciding that he
allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is to petition for a review under
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiff's contention that such review cannot be had
until the final decree has been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by this court. In
the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil., 836), the court said:

It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land
Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of
fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be
presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious
that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant
would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a
DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION V CA Notice of Appeal, and for the elevation of the original records of Civil Case No. 84-
23019 to the Court of Appeals.
THIRD DIVISION
The Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 29l47 a restraining order enjoining
[G.R. No. 121075. July 24, 1997.] respondents from enforcing the decision, subject of the petition, and ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to it on appeal. Delta filed in the Court of
DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. Appeals an Omnibus Motion praying that the March 11, 1987 writ of execution be
ROBERTO M. LAGMAN and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., Respondents. nullified and set aside. In its resolution of January 5, 1995, the Court of Appeals
denied Delta’s Omnibus Motion, holding that the matters prayed for in the Omnibus
Marcelo P. Villanueva for petitioner Motion are matters which were not raised as issued by petitioner and therefore not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to decide.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos for Private Respondent.
Delta then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in the Omnibus
SYNOPSIS Motion were included in the appellate Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; hence, it
had jurisdiction to rule on the Omnibus Motion.
In an action for a sum of money against Delta Motors (Civil Case No. 84-23019) filed
by private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI), Delta was ordered to pay The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in denying Delta’s Omnibus
SIHI P20,061,898.97. The decision could not be served on Delta because it was Motion. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 29147 had long
dissolved earlier. In the meantime, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine become final insofar as DELTA was concerned. As a matter of fact, at the time Delta
National Bank. SIHI moved for service of the decision by way of publication. On filed the petition in CA-GR SP NO. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and
March 11, 1987, a writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued they having been so issued at
properties of Delta were levied upon and sold. the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
correctly denied petitioner’s Omnibus Motion in keeping with jurisprudence
Delta filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court
No. 23068, insisting that the trial court’s decision was void since there was no proper of Appeals. Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by
service of summons, and that being void, the decision never became final and petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, which were limited to the trial court’s orders of 3
executory. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court’s decision did not become June 1992 and 14 September 1992. These were the only errors Delta argued
final and executory because no copy of the assailed judgment had been properly extensively in its brief. To allow Delta’s Omnibus Motion which it filed more than
served on PNB which assumed Delta’s operation. In a motion for reconsideration, eight months from promulgation of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, long after
Delta insisted that there was no valid service of summons and the decision of the finality of said case, would result in abandonment of sound Judicial process.
trial court was not in accordance with the Rules, hence, void.
Petition is dismissed.
Delta filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC in Civil Case No. 84-23019 and prayed
that the records of the case be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The trial court
dismissed the Notice of Appeal, and denied Delta’s motion for reconsideration of the SYLLABUS
dismissal.

Delta filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP 1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL DECISIONS, NOT
No. 29147, where it prayed for the annulment of the trial court’s order dismissing the SUBJECT TO REVIEW. — The decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1993 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 had long become final insofar as DELTA was concerned, 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBITER DICTUM; MAY BE DELETED FROM THE DECISION.
and it very well knew that the only issues raised therein concerned the trial court’s — The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the
orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at the time Delta phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum. The assailed phrase was indeed obiter
filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be declared null and dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its petition
void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having been so issued at assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of
the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA intended such the aforementioned issue. The body of the resolution did not contain any discussion
orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, it could have explicitly alleged on such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such statement.
them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed for the corresponding
affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially proved unavailing then
DELTA could and should have moved for reconsideration on that aspect. After the DECISION
finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had
become procedurally impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in the Omnibus Motion
could have been allowed during the pendency of said case by way of amendments DAVIDE, JR., J.:
to the petition.

2. ID.; COURT OF APPEALS; ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED MUST BE This is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
STATED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR; ERRORS NOT ASSIGNED, NOT seeking the reversal of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
SUBJECT TO REVIEW. — The Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner’s 29147 dated 5 January 1995 2 and 14 July 1995. 3 The former denied the Omnibus
Omnibus Motion in keeping with jurisprudence concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motors Corporation (hereinafter DELTA), while the
the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the Court of Appeals, which mandates that: latter amended the earlier Resolution.
Sec. 7. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the The pleadings and annexes in the record of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 disclose the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, following materials operative facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors. Clearly then, the Court
of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an
which were limited to the trial court’s orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. action for a sum of money against DELTA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
These were the only errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. To allow DELTA’s Manila, Branch VI. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-23019. DELTA was
Omnibus Motion which it filed more than eight months from promulgation of the declared in default, and on 5 December 1984, the RTC, per Judge Ernesto Tengco,
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, or long after finality of said case, would result in rendered a decision 4 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanrob1es
abandonment of sound judicial process. virtual 1aw library

3. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; OBITER DICTUM, DEFINED. — An obiter WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of ordering the defendant to pay unto plaintiff the amount of P20,061,898.97 as its total
law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, outstanding obligation and to pay 25% of the total obligation as and for attorney’s
or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, fees, plus cost of suit.
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly Upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the caused, or introduced by The decision could not be served on DELTA, either personally or by registered mail,
way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. due to its earlier dissolution. However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. This notwithstanding, SIHI moved, on 4
November 1986, for service of the decision by way of publication, which the trial Circular No. 1-88. A motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution of 9
court allowed in its order of 6 December 1986. The decision was published in the October 1991, a copy of which was received by DELTA on 31 October 1991. 10
Thunderer, a weekly newspaper published in Manila. After publication, SIHI moved
for execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted in its order of 11 March On 12 November 1991, DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal 11 with the RTC in Civil
1987 on the ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication of Case No. 84-23019, indicating therein that it was appealing from the 5 December
the decision. The writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto certain 1984 decision, and prayed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold. The sheriff
likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Notice
of Appeal be noted and the records of this case be elevated to the Court of Appeals.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, wherein DELTA insisted SIHI filed on 2 December 1991 a motion to dismiss DELTA’s appeal 12 on the
that: (a) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant ground that it was filed out of time, since DELTA obtained a certified true copy of the
(DELTA) since there was no valid/proper service of summons, thus rendering the decision from the RTC on 21 September 1990, hence it had only fifteen days
decision null and void; and (b) the void decision never became final and executory. therefrom within which to appeal from the decision. Despite DELTA’s opposition, 13
the trial court dismissed the Notice of Appeal. 14 DELTA moved to reconsider, 15
In its decision of 22 January 1991 5 the Court of Appeals ruled against DELTA on which SIHI opposed. 16 In its order 17 of 14 September 1992 the trial court denied
the first ground, but found that the record before it "is bereft of any showing that a Delta’s motion.
copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on P.N.B. which assumed
DELTA’s operation upon the latter’s dissolution." Accordingly the Court of Appeals DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
ruled that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library the Rules of Court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29147. 18 In its
petition, Delta prayed for the: (a) annulment of the order of the trial court dated 3
[T]he [decision] did not become executory (Vda. de Espiritu v. CFI, L-30486, Oct. 31, June 1992 dismissing the Notice of Appeal dated 6 November 1991; (b) annulment
1972; Tuazon v. Molina, L-55697, Feb. 26, 1981). of the order of the trial court dated 14 September 1992 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the former; and (c) elevation of the original records of Civil Case
It further opined that service by publication did not cure the fatal defect and thus No. 84-23019 to the Court of Appeals.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
decreed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On 30 October 1992 the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 a
WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by respondent restraining order enjoining respondents and any and all other persons acting on their
court, nonetheless it has not attained finality pending service of copy thereof on behalf "from enforcing or directing the enforcement of the Decision, subject of the
petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefore within the reglementary period. 6 petition." 19 Thereafter, in its resolution promulgated on 22 December 1992, 20 the
Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition in said case, considered the
In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid service of comments of private respondents therein as its answer and required the parties to
summons and the decision of the RTC was not in accordance with the Rules, hence, submit their respective memoranda.
void. 7 SIHI also filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that DELTA was not
dissolved, and even if it were, its corporate personality to receive service of On 17 June 1993 the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 21 in CA-G.R. SP
processes subsisted; moreover, its right to appeal had been lost. 8 These motions No. 29147, the dispositive portion providing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 27 May 1991. 9 Unsatisfied,
DELTA filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 100366) WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992,
which was denied in the resolution of 16 September 1991 for non-compliance with dismissing the notice of appeal dated November 6, 1991; and the order dated
September 14, 1992 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration filed It appearing that there is a pending petition for review with the Supreme Court of this
by the petitioner, through counsel, are hereby SET ASIDE; and respondent court Court’s Decision dated June 17, 1993, it would be improper for this Court to act on
hereby ordered to ELEVATE the records of the case to the Court of Appeals, on the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner Delta Motor Corporation . . . 26
appeal.
On 18 July 1994 this Court’s Second Division issued a resolution 27 in G.R. No.
On 18 January 1993, the RTC elevated the record of Civil Case No. 84-23019 to the 110677 denying the petition therein for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of
Court of Appeals. Appeals committed reversible error in the questioned judgment. SIHI’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in the resolution of this Court of 21 September 1994. 28
SIHI appealed to this Court from the decision by way of a petition for review. 22 It
contended that DELTA had lost the right to appeal in view of the lapse of more than On 26 October 1994 DELTA filed a manifestation and motion 29 to resolve its
15 days from DELTA’s receipt of a certified true copy of the RTC decision in Civil Omnibus Motion of February 10, 1994.
Case No. 84-23019. This petition for review was docketed as G.R. No. 110677. 23
In its resolution of 5 January 1995, 30 the Court of Appeals denied DELTA’s
While SIHI’s petition in G.R. No. 110677 was pending before this Court, DELTA filed Omnibus Motion, holding:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
on 14 February 1994, in CA G.R. SP No. 29147 of the Court of Appeals, an
Omnibus Motion 24 to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library [T]he matters prayed for in the Omnibus Motion of petitioner Delta Motor Corporation
dated February 10, 1994 and abovequoted are matters which were not raised as
1) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE issues by petitioner in the instant petition and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction
AND EFFECT THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT COURT DATED MARCH 11, 1987 and power of this Court in the instant petition to decide. 31
ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION;
On 27 January 1995 DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification 32
2) DECLARE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT ANY FORCE wherein it alleged that: (a) while it was true that the matters prayed for in the
AND EFFECT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE ORDER Omnibus Motion of petitioner were not raised in the instant petition, they were,
DATED MARCH 11, 1987; nevertheless, included in the general prayer in the petition "for such other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable in the premises;" (b) it could not file the Omnibus Motion
3) ALL OTHER PROCEEDINGS HELD, CONDUCTED AND EXECUTED BY with the RTC since the records of Civil Case No. 84-23019 had already been
RESPONDENT SHERIFF IMPLEMENTING THE AFORESAID WRIT OF elevated to the Court of Appeals and upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court
EXECUTION. lost jurisdiction over the case; and (c) the matters raised in the Omnibus Motion were
incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
SIHI opposed the motion 25 on grounds that: a) there was a pending appeal by
certiorari with this Court, thus the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a motion for clarification 33
entertain the Omnibus Motion; b) the Omnibus Motion was barred by res judicata; wherein it asked for the deletion, for being mere obiter dictum, the following
and c) the filing of the Omnibus Motion was a clear act of forum-shopping and paragraph in the Resolution of 5 January 1995, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
should then be denied outright.
While it is true that as a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of
In its resolution of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals merely noted the Omnibus Appeals dated January 22, 1991 ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019
Motion and stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which
may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and void . . .
SIHI argued that this paragraph was "not necessary to the decision of the case After a painstaking review of the record in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we are more than
before it" 34 and "cannot be considered binding for the purpose of establishing convinced that respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
precedent;" 35 likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the incident on its merits denying DELTA’s Omnibus Motion. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June
or consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective rights of the 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 had long become final insofar as DELTA was
parties concerned. concerned, and it very well knew that the only issues raised therein concerned the
trial court’s orders of 3 June 1992 and 14 September 1992. As a matter of fact, at
In its resolution of 14 July 1995, 36 the Court of Appeals granted SIHI’s motion for the time Delta filed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, the orders sought to be
clarification and denied DELTA’s motion for reconsideration. As to the latter, it ruled declared null and void in the Omnibus Motion had already been issued, they having
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library been to issued at the commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 23068. In short, if DELTA
intended such orders to be challenged in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, it could have
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed for the
Court of Appeals in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) which corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially proved
ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph unavailing then DELTA could and should have moved for reconsideration on that
aspect. After the finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or
"WHEREFORE, while the assailed decision was validly rendered by the respondent revive the issue had become procedurally impermissible. Plainly, the issues raised in
court, nonetheless it has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of said case by
petitioner DELTA, which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary way of amendments to the petition.
period."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner’s Omnibus Motion in
Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of keeping with jurisprudence 38 concerning Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court
the questioned orders of respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice on the Procedure in the Court of Appeals, which mandates that:chanrob1es virtual
of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14, 1992 of the 1aw library
same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through
counsel). 37 Sec. 7. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the
It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the assailed assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option,
paragraph. may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.

DELTA then filed the instant petition, insisting that the matters raised in the Omnibus Clearly then, the Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner in
Motion were incidental to and included in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, which were limited to the trial court’s orders of 3 June 1992
Appeals; hence, it had jurisdiction to rule on said motion. As regards the grant of and 14 September 1992. These were the only errors Delta argued extensively in its
SIHI’s motion to strike out a paragraph in the resolution of 5 January 1995 for being brief. To allow DELTA’s Omnibus Motion which it filed more than eight months from
obiter dictum, DELTA submitted that the latter contained a finding or affirmation of promulgation of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, or long after finality of said
fact, thus could not have constituted obiter dictum. case, would result in abandonment of sound judicial process.

After SIHI filed its comment, we gave due course to the petition and required the In light of the dispositive portions of the Court of Appeals’ decisions of 22 January
parties to submit their respective memoranda. DELTA and SIHI did so on 16 April 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23068, and of 17 June 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147, we
1996 and on 13 May 1996, respectively. cannot agree with SIHI that DELTA is barred by res judicata. This conclusion is
further fortified by the unequivocal statements of the Court of Appeals in its Narvasa, C.J., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
challenged resolution of 14 July 1995 that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Melo, J., took no part; a member of the CA in CA-G.R. 23068. See footnote no. 5.
[P]etitioner DELTA is not without remedy, especially considering the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 23068) . . .

x x x

Clearly, the only issue in this petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 29147) is as to the validity of
the questioned orders of respondent court dated June 3, 1992 (dismissing the notice
of appeal dated November 6, 1991) and the Order dated September 14, 1992 of the
same court (denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner through
counsel).

The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in deleting the phrase
SIHI protested as obiter dictum.

An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. 39 It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by
the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent. 40

The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised
by petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It
was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned issue. The body of the
resolution did not contain any discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of
law to support such statement.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged resolutions of

5 January 1995 and 14 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
LEE V. CA (2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of said land;

(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon presentation to him of the deed
Republic of the Philippines of reconveyance and payment of his legal fees, to cancel Transfer Certificate of
SUPREME COURT Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue a new one in lieu
Manila thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, married to plaintiff Alberta
Vicencio; and
EN BANC
(4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action.

The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal)
VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners,
vs. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and later an urgent
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTA VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON, in her own behalf, motion for reconsideration (pp. 114-116, Ibid), which were both denied by the trial court in its
as substituting heir of former deceased co-plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, and as guardian ad orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113-114, Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119-124, Ibid).
litem of the other substituting heir, minor Emiliano V. Simeon, respondents.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioners. affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 27-45, Rollo). A timely motion for reconsideration
(Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no
avail. (Annex C to Petition, p. 87, Ibid)
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap and Associates for private respondents.
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry
Lee.
ESGUERRA, J.: The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No. 732 in the name of
Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of Emiliano Simeon, issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771 which Ignacio had obtained from the government way back
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to in 1935. (p. 28, Ibid)
them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a
homestead with an area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by his spouse, Alberta
Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants (now Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon and his brother Deogracias
petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo). Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due Simeon, as the only surviving heirs, executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of extrajudicial partition
time their answer with affirmative defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a of the properties left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to Deogracias
decision on January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: and Lot No. 2 to Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering the said lots could not be
found, they were simply described as "Homestead No. 82945." (Ibid)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private respondents) agreed to
(1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of reconveyance of the sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee (Exh. 1). Upon request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband,
homestead land in question, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs (now private respondents) furnished him with a copy of the deed of extrajudicial partition
plaintiffs, upon the payment by the latter to them of the repurchase price of (Exh. 2) and a certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal that "there is no
P16,000.00; certificate of title issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at Antipolo covered by Plan F-54569".
Defendants (now petitioners) likewise verified the status of the property from the Land "On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty. Valeriano Santos,
Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands (pp. 48-49, Ibid). sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita Uy Lee, advising her that he desires to repurchase the
parcel of land situated at Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 in
On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed of sale of Lot No. 2 your name' and requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five days
in favor of defendants (now Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. The document prepared by from receipt hereof." Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants did not bother to make any
defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer, Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman, described the property as "Lot reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating
2 of Plan F-954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. the demand of Emiliano Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant
2). (p. 29, Ibid) Vita Uy Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the defendants
did not reply to the second letter. Consequently, for the third time, on June 24, 1961, Atty.
The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her own application for Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee repeating the same demand, with a warning
free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands (Exh. G.), in which application she expressly that if nothing is heard from her within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to
acknowledged that said property is a public land previously occupied by Ignacio Simeon and his court. Still the defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants, Atty.
heirs. The application was denied (p. 50, Ibid). Santos did not take any court action and apparently because of this indifference of their former
counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso Peña
(p. 32, Ibid).
Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in their names under
the provisions of Act No. 496. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land
court, favorably acted upon their application in a decision dated December 7, 1957 (Exh. 5). "On March 2, 1962, Atty. Peña addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee reiterating that
However, before the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it was Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in question. After receipt of this
discovered that the land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to register in their names, letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote Atty.
"has already been patented and is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting Peña on March 12, 1962, that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because
upon this information, the Court of First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its even assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of five (5) years
decision of December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid) within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view of this flat refusal of the defendants
to resell the lot in controversy to the plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p.
33, Ibid)
Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a motion praying for the
issuance of a substitute owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)
which was "irretrievably lost during the early period of the American liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from defendants (now
motion was granted. (p. 31, Ibid) petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 which provides as follows:

On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a document entitled Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
"Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With Partial Sale" (Exh. B), wherein the homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of
the sale by the latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. conveyance.
On that day, Original Certificate of Title No. 732 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in the name of Emiliano Simeon. Later that day, There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free patent (p. 36, Ibid),
the new Transfer Certificate was cancelled and replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of and that its sale is subject to redemption within five (5) years from the execution of the deed of
Title No. 57279 (Exh. 14) in the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject to the sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G.
provisions of ... the Public Land 5187; Bayaua vs. Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29
Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid) SCRA 736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA
329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid) Likewise, there is no question that private respondents
What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now substituted by surviving instituted the action to compel petitioners to resell the land to them only on June 25, 1965 when
spouse Alberta Vicencio as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the the redemption period had already elapsed. (p. 27, Ibid) The main issue to be resolved is
property sold to the spouses Lee. The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows: whether the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano
Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left
unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to repurchase the property.
Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their nature, to first Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the Court of Appeals'
examine the other questions raised herein. finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase the land in question still subsists. It
was respondent court's thinking that the first three letters sent by private respondent (now
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of
findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private
Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32, Brief for Petitioners) Petitioners based this respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo).
assignment of error on the requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
Court which states: The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of Emiliano Simeon's
"desire to repurchase" the land and requested that the latter be informed of Lee's conformity on
Sec. 4. Findings of the court. — Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall the matter within five days from receipt (t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The second letter sent on
contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it." November 3, 1960 (Exh. J) reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third
letter dated June 24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a warning that if nothing
More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days from receipt, respondent Simeon would seek
the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) judicial intervention (Ibid). In no instance was it shown that private respondent offered or
Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the period within which tendered the repurchase price.
redemption could be made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating that such omission
has impaired their position on appeal as another question is raised by them on the basis of the Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private respondents' desire to
"terminology of those three letters". (Ibid). repurchase the property and demanding its resale did not constitute a proper exercise of the
right of legal redemption, absent an actual and simultaneous tender of payment (p. 17, Brief for
We find no merit in this contention. Petitioners). Petitioners argue that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the
former intends to redeem the property sold, but he must at the same time offer to repay the
price. (p. 21, Ibid).
At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like the one invoked by
petitioner are to be given liberal construction. (Rule 1, Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had
the occasion to rule, the findings of facts which as found by the court and essential to support the This view deserves consideration.
decision and judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept. 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465) It is not necessary that the The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of
appellate court reproduce in their entirety the exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the
require the Court to do so would be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit:
documents when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the
purpose of the rule. The respondent Court did not disregard the three letters in question. Neither price of the sale ...".
did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each letter was properly referred to in the decision and its
message clearly reflected thereon. Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court misunderstood Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is not sufficient for the
the communication. vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but
he must immediately thereupon offer to repay the price ...". Likewise, in several other cases
Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the testimonies of Henry decided by the Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394;
Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and respondent Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la Cruz, et al. vs.
Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that these matters cannot be inquired into a review Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases) where the right to repurchase was held to
on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. have been properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been
Court of Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; made by the vendor.
Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs.
Bank of America, L-22614, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited above is an obiter
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97) dictum because in that case, the period of redemption had prescribed thereby rendering
immaterial the question of whether or not a tender of payment was made. This might be so;
nevertheless, a dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the
decisis rule (21 C.J.S. 309) may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing Karameros vs. repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs.
Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508). Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will
also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown above to
Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna vs. Javier and Cruz, be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence did not close the
110 Phil. 172, where the appellant failed to tender payment of the repurchase price within 30 door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided
days after the court below had decided by final judgment that the contract sue upon was a pacto that the same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and,
de retro and not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives a vendor instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period.
a retro "the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a
civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have lapsed, the judgment
in the subsequent case of Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In that appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered dismissing the complaint.
case, Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a part of the repurchase
price of P19,313.95. Holding that the vendor who desires to redeem the property should offer to No costs.
repay the price, the Court went further and declared that the full amount of the repurchase price
should be tendered. Makalintal, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to repurchase Aquino J, took no part.
the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the requirements
of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year
period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel
redemption after the lapse of the period.

Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment was ordinarily
required, that the same was not necessary in the instant case because petitioner Vita Uy Lee
refused their demands for reconveyance.

It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired, respondent (now
substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon sent petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters — one
in June 1960, the other in November of the same year, and the third in June 1961 — demanding
the resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the letters, she did not
send any reply. It was only when Simeon wrote her a fourth letter, this time after the redemption
period had elapsed, that petitioner Lee expressly signified her refusal to resell the land in
question on the ground that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid).

The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to Simeon's first
letters as refusal on petitioners' part to resell the property in question and held that such refusal
rendered tender of payment unnecessary (pp. 61-63, Ibid).

This position is untenable.

Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano
Simeon because the mere mention therein of respondent's intention to redeem the property,
without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule
ANG V. COURT OF APPEALS became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope
Republic of the Philippines
with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
SUPREME COURT
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
Baguio City
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-
SECOND DIVISION 4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS)
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure
vs. (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot
he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
DECISION
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
ABAD, J.: would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring
former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. send sa lahat ng chatter."4

The Indictment Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards
Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized
his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one
who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in
body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that
said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, the face and the body belonged to just one person.
psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face
The Facts and the Case was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October The subordinate issues are:
2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation
ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his 1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him. defined in R.A. 9262;

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him
to the police station. 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation
of his constitutional rights; and
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify
a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages in the case.
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why
the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims
The Court’s Rulings
that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six
pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A.
Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
dressed. woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim
during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of xxxx
human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January distress to a woman. Thus:
31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari. SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
The Issues Presented
xxxx
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
 h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.
xxxx
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
women through harassment are: mutual trust and love.

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their
taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at
harassment against the woman; and
her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a
her.
form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very
dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which
had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
the course of the relationship. Thus:
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such
the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two that she was already desensitized by them.
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. 7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial
or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to"
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
as in "He romanced her."
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that
Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9 would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card,
there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a credence to her testimony. 1avv phi 1

sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. proceedings.15
Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the
picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But SO ORDERED.
the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards
that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need
ROBERTO A. ABAD
such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Associate Justice
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during
the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that
the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon
him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was
that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish
and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14
GERONA ET AL V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION Department Order
No. 8, s. 1955

July 21, 1955

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
COMPULSORY DAILY FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
EN BANC
To the Director of Public Schools and the Director of Private Schools:
G.R. No. L-13954 August 12, 1959
1. Quoted below is Republic Act No. 1265 entitled "An Act making Flag Ceremony
GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, Compulsory in all Educational Institutions," which is self-explanatory.
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees. SECTION 1. All educational institutions henceforth observe daily flag ceremony,
which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
K.V. Felon and Hayed C. Cavington for appellant. Philippine National Anthem.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for appellees.
SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to
MONTEMAYOR, J.: issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the
flag ceremony herein provided.
Petitioners are Appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate dismissing their
complaint. Acting upon the "Urgent Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" filed on behalf of SECTION 3. Failure of refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act
petitioners of December 12, 1958, and without objection on the part of the Solicitor General, by and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of
resolution of this Court of December 16, we issued the corresponding writ of preliminary Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational
injunction restraining respondents from excluding or banning petitioners-appellants, their children institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative
and all other of Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action has been brought, from admission to punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general
public schools, particularly the Buenavista Community School, solely on account of their refusal circulation.
to salute the flag or preventing their return to school should they have already been banned, until
further orders from this Court. In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act,
the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation
The facts involved are not disputed. On June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1265 was approved of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such
and went into effect. Acting upon section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing the Secretary of failure.
Education to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony, said Secretary issued Department Order No. 8, series of 1955 on July 21, 1955 which SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Department Order quoting Republic Act No. 1265 in its entirety, we reproduce below for purpose
of reference: Approved, June 11, 1955.

"Republic of the Philippines 2. As provided in Section 2 of the Act, the rules and regulations governing the proper
Department of Education conduct of the required flag ceremony, given in the in closure to this Order, are hereby
Office of the Secretary promulgated. These rules and regulations should be made known to all teachers and
Manila school officials, public and private. The patriotic objective or significance of the Act
 should be explained to all pupils and students in the schools and to all communities c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison of
through the purok organizations and community assemblies. following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version 0, which may bring the ceremony
to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended
for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
(Sgd.) G. HERNANDEZ, JR.
Secretary of Education ENGLISH VERSION

Incl.: I Love the Philippines.

As stated It is the land of my birth,
It is the home of my people.
(Inclosure of Department order No. 8, s. 1955) It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private,
every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset.
3. The retreat shall be observed as follows:
The flag staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height
as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the
compound. a. Teachers and pupils or faculty members and students whose classes and after the last
school period in the afternoon before sun down shall assemble facing the flag. At
command, the Philippine National Anthem shall be sung with accompaniment of the
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony
school band. If the school has no band, the assembly will only sing the Anthem. Boys
every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted
who have been taking part in preparatory military training or Boy Scout activities shall
indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day.
attend the retreat in formation and execute the salute prescribed for them. Others shall
execute the same salute and observe the same deportment as required of them in the
The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner: flag-raising ceremony. The flag should be lowered slowly so that it will be in the hands of
the color detail at the sound of the last note of the Anthem.
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its
premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put b. If the school so prefers, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors", instead of the
away or held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats singing of the National Anthem, for the retreat. At the sound of the first note, the
shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony. assembly shall stand at attention facing the flag and observe the same deportment as
required in the flag-raising ceremony. Or, it may have its bugle corp play "To the Colors"
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school and at the sound of the first note everybody within hearing distance shall stand at
band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the attention, face the flag, and observe the same deportment as required in the flag-raising
school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While ceremony.
the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute.
Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing that hat over the heart. Those without 4. The flag should be handled reverently in raising or lowering it and not allowed to touch
hats may stand with their arms and hands downed and straight at the sides. Those in the ground. This can be insured by having one pupil hold the flag while another pupil
military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The fastening it to or unfasten it from the halyard.
salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.
 5. To display the National Flag at half-mast when necessary, it must be hoisted to full- not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They consider that the flag is an "image within
mast, allowing it to fly there for a moment, and then brought down to half-mast. To lower this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it.
the flag, it must again be hoisted to full-mast before bringing it down."
To further make clear the stand of petitioners as to the relative position and priority of religious
In his turn the Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 22, series of 1955, on July 30, 1955 teaching on the one hand and laws promulgated by the State on the other, we quote from
addressed to Division Superintendents of Schools, enclosing a copy of Department Order No. 8, appellant's brief on page 50 thereof:
series of 1955 and enjoining strict compliance therewith.
In Halter vs. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41, 27 S. Ct. 419, 51 L. Ed. 696 (1907), the United
It would appear that pursuant to the Department Order in question, the flag ceremony States Supreme Court held that the flag `is an emblem of National sovereignty,
contemplated therein was held daily in every school, public and private. Petitioners' children
attending the Buenavista Community School, Uson, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the To many persons the saluting of a national flag means nothing. To a sincere person who
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order believed in God and the Bible as his Word, and who is in a covenant with Almighty God
No. 8; as a result they were expelled from school sometime in September, 1955. It is said that to do his will exclusively, it means much. To such person "sovereignty" means the
other children similarly situated who refused or failed to comply with the requirement about supreme authority or power. Many believe that "the higher powers," mentioned in the
saluting the flag are under threats of being also expelled from all public schools in the Bible at Romans 13:1, means the "sovereign state"; but to the Christian this means
Philippines. Jehovah God and his son, Christ Jesus, Jehovah's anointed King. They, Father and Son
are the higher powers, to whom all must be subject and joyfully obey. (Emphasis
Petitioners thru counsel wrote to the Secretary of Education petitioning that in the supplied)
implementation of this flag ceremony, they and their children attending school be allowed to
remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and The question involved in this appeal is a highly important one. We are called upon to determine
that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the the right of a citizen as guaranteed by the Constitution about freedom of religious belief and the
reciting of the patriotic pledge, giving their reason for the same. On December 16, 1955 the right to practice it as against the power and authority of the State to limit or restrain the same.
Secretary of Education wrote to counsel for petitioner denying the petition, making it clear that Our task is lessened by the fact that petitioners do not challenge the legality or constitutionality of
the denial was the final and absolute stand of the Department of Education on the matter and Republic Act 1265. All that they question is the legality or constitutionality of Department Order
that counsel may thereafter feel free to seek a judicial determination of the constitutionality or No. 8, series of 1955 of the Department of Education implementing said Republic Act.
interpretation of Republic Act No. 1265 as construed and applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. The
letter also informed petitioners' counsel that with reference to his letter of December 1, 1955 The realm of belief and creed is infinitive and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
relative to the request for reinstatement of petitioners' children who had been expelled from though. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
school for non-compliance with Department Order No. 8, no favorable action could be taken may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear
thereon. So, on March 27, 1957 petitioners commenced the present action asking that a writ of to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
Schools from enforcing Department Order No. 8 "as applied to petitioners and all others of travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society
Jehovah's Witnesses for whom this action is brought and to restrain them from excluding from and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in
the public schools the children of the petitioners on account of their refusal to execute a formal and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
salute to the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, and that after hearing,
the trial court declare Department Order No. 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights and that
One may believe in polygamy because it is permitted by his religious, but the moment he
the preliminary injunction prayed for be made permanent.
translates said religious belief into an overt act, such as engaging or practising plural marriages,
he may be prosecuted for bigamy and he may not plead or involve his religious belief as a
Petitioners-appellants belong to what is called the JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, an unincorporated defense or as matter of exemption from the operation of the law.
body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by
the State. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5,
In the case of Reynolds vs. U.S. (98 U.S. 145) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
which say: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is
law prohibiting and punishing polygamy even as against the claim of religious belief of the
in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt
Mormons. Said the Court:
 So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the We understand that petitioners, during the flag ceremony, are willing to remain silent and stand
United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man at attention with their arms and hands down straight at the sides, and they agree that boys,
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would members of Jehovah's Witness who have been taking part in military training or Boy Scout
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and activities, and are in uniform, may execute the salute to the flag prescribed by the Circular for
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist them. So, the requirement contained in Department Order No. 8 that during the flag ceremony
only in name under such circumstance. (emphasis supplied) those without hats may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides, including
the formal salute by boys in military and boy Scout uniform, meets with the conformity of
Again, one may not believe in the payment of taxes because he may claim that according to his petitioners. Of course, there is the other requirement that boys and men with hats shall salute the
religious belief, the payment of taxes means service to one other than God. As long as he flag by placing their hats over the heart, but petitioners and other members of the Jehovah's
confines himself to mere belief, well and good. But when he puts said belief into practice and he Witness could well solve this requirements or avoid it by putting away their hats just as pupils
actually refuses to pay taxes on his property or on his business, then the States steps in, books, may put them away, at command (Rules and Regulations, Sec. 2, par. [a]).
compels payment, and enforces it either by court action or levy and distraint. Consequently, the opposition of petitioners to the flag salute may be reduced to their objection to
singing the National Anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge.
One of the important questions to determine here is the true meaning and significance of the
Filipino flag. Petitioners believe and maintain that it is an image and therefore to salute the same After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the
is to go against their religious belief. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven . . . thou shalt beginning of this decision, frankly we find nothing, absolutely nothing, objectionable, even from
not bow down thyself to them or serve them." They also claim that the flag salute is a religious the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he
ceremony, participation in which is forbidden by their religious belief. We disagree. Appellants loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people; that because
themselves (page 51 of their brief) concede that the flag is a symbol of the State. They give the it protects him, in return he will heed the counsel of his parents, obey the rules and regulations of
meaning of the word "image" on page 51 of their brief as follows: his school, perform the duties of a patriotic and law-abiding citizen; and serve his country
unselfishly and faithly, and that he would be a true Filipino in thought, in word, and in deed. He is
Under the word "image" this comment is given by Webster: "Image, in modern usage, not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands. So that
commonly suggests religious veneration." (Emphasis supplied) even if we assume for a moment that the flag were an image, connoting religious and veneration
instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants
against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in And as to the singing of the National Anthem, which we reproduce below:
our system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the
flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the Land of the morning,
recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office Child of the sun returning.
by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right With fervor burning,
hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promise to defend the Thee do our souls adore.
Constitution and even invokes the help of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of Land dear and holy,
Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking Cradle of noble heroes,
the oath on the ground that is religious ceremony. Ne'er shall invaders,
Trample thy sacred shores.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest Ever within thy skies and thy clouds,
with the courts. It cannot be left to a a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said and o'er thy hills and sea,
group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as Do we behold the radiance, feel the throb
many interpretations and meaning to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are of glorious liberty.
religious groups or sects or followers, all depending upon the meaning which they, though in all Thy banner, dear to all our hearts,
sincerity and good faith, may want to give to such ritual or ceremony. Its sun and stars alight.
O—never shall its shining field
Be dimmed by tyrant's might.
 Beautiful land of love, the validity of the State law providing for military training in the University. The petition was
O—land—of—light, denied by the State Supreme Court. In affirming the decision of the State Supreme Court, the
In thine embrace `tis rapture to lie. Supreme Court of the United States held that:
But is glory ever, when thou art wronged,
For us, they sons to suffer and die. . . . California has not drafted or called them to attend the University. They are seeking
education offered by the State and at the same time insisting that they be excluded from
the same thing may be said; that it speaks only of love of country, of patriotism, liberty and the the prescribed course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and consicientious
glory of suffering and dying for it. It does not even speak of resorting to force and engaging in objections to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the
military service or duty to defend the country, which service might meet with objection on the part facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion
of conscientious objectors. Surely, petitioners do not disclaim or disavow these noble and sacred that the due process clause of the Fourtheenth Amendment as a safeguard of liberty'
feelings of patriotism, respect, even veneration for the flag and love of coutnry for which the flag confers the right to be students in the state university free from obligation to take military
stands. training as one of the conditions of attendance.

Men may differ and do differ on religous beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put aside as
and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of untenable . . .
love of country, reverence for the flag, national unity and patriotism, they can hardly afford to
differ, for these are matters in which they are mutually and viatlly interested, for to them, they In United States vs. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. ed. 1302, 51 S. Ct. 570, a later
mean national existence and survival as a nation or national extinction. naturalization case, the applicant was unwilling, because of conscientious objections, to
take unqualifiedly the statutory oath of allegiance which contains this statement: "That he
In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and will support and defend the constitution and laws of the United States against all
for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." U.S.C.
persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they title 8, Sec. 381. His petition stated that he was willing if necessary to take up arms in
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education defense of this country, "but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity." In
being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular amplification he said: "I do not undertake to support "my country, right or wrong" in any
expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to poromise beforehand, and without
the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools. knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not
"take up arms in defense of this country," however "necessary" the war may seem to be
In the case of Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed. 343, quite similar to to the government of the day." The opinion of this court quotes from petitioner's brief a
the present case, appellants therein were taxpayers and citizens of the United States and of statement to the effect that it is a fixed principle of our Constitution, zealously guarded by
California. The University of California received endowment and support from the State our laws, that a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has
legislature under certain conditions such as that any resident of California of the age of 14 years conscientious religious scruples against doing so." And, referring to that part of the
or upward of approved moral character shall have the right to enter the University as a student argument in behalf of the applicant this court said (p. 623): "This, if it means what it
and receive instructions therein. The University as part of its cirriculum and instruction required seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the
military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Appellants conformed to all Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation
requirements of the University except taking the course in military science and tactics and for this to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because,
the regents of the University suspended them. Appellants were members of the Methodist and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him . . .
Espiscopal Church and of the Epworth League. For many years their fathers have been ordained The previlege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not
ministers of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war is a violation of their from the Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the
religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to war. They believed that war, exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious
training for war, and military training were immoral, wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with
the teaching of God and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for exemption from the well-nigh limitless extent of the war power as above illustrated, which include by
the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military training optional necessary implication, the power, inthe last extremity, to compel armed serviced of any
or to exempt them and they were suspended. So they initiated court action with a California citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or
Supreme Court to compel the regents of the University to admit them. In that action they assailed morality of the particular war or of war in general. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
 U.S. 11, 29, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas, 765, this Court (upholding a indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such training.
state compulsory vaccination law) speaking of the liberties guaranteed to the individual Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is
by the Fourteenth Amendment, said: "... and yet he may be compelled, by force if need not an interference by the state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the
be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary intersts, or constitution are read in the light of a century and a half of history during days of peace
even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his and war . . .
country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been
And see University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 A. 54, a case, similar to that dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
now before us, decided against the contention of a student in the University of Maryland refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in
who on conscientious grounds objected to military training there required. His appeal to furtherance of any other end, condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral.
this Court was dismissed for the want of a substantial federal questions. 290 U.S. 597, The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the
78 L. ed. 525, 54 S. Ct. 131. compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle—which
may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an error—does not prove by his martyrdom
Plainly there is no ground for the contention that the regents' order, requiring able-bodied that he has kept within the law."
male students under the age of twenty-four as a condition of their enrollment to take the
prescribed instruction in military science and tactics, transgresses any constitutional right We are not unmindful of the decision of the United States Federal Supreme Court on similar set
asserted by these appellants. of facts. In the case of Minersville School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L. ed. 1375, two
Jehovah Witnesses children were expelled from the public school of Minersville for refusing to
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion said: salute the national flag in accordance with the regulations poromulgated by the school board for
the daily flag ceremony. Their father Gobitsi on behalf of his two children and in his own behalf
I assume for present purposes that religious liberty protected by the First Amendment brought suit to enjoin the school authorities from continuing to exact the execution of the flag
against invasion by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against ceremony as a condition of his children's admittance in school. After trial, the District Court gave
invasion by the states. him relief and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Federal
Supreme Court, the decrees of both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals were
reversed with the lone dissent of Chief Justice Stone, on the ground that the requirement of
Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by the
participation of all pupils in the public schools in the flag ceremony did not infringe the due
state to "the free exercise" of religion as the phrase was understood by the foundrs of hte
process law and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the one referring to religious
nation, and by the generations that have followed. Davis vs. Beasin, 133 U.S. 333, 342,
freedom and belief. Three years later, that is, on June 14, 1943, the ruling laid down in the
33 L. ed. 637, 10 s.Ct. 299.
Minersville School District vs. Gobitis case, was in the case of West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Bernette, 319 U.S. 624-671 reversed by a sharply divided court, the majority
There is no occasion at this time to mark the limits of governmental power in the exaction opinion being penned by Mr. Justice Jackson in which Justice Black, Douglas and Murphy
of military service when the nation is at peace. The petitioners have not been required to concurred; while Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in the Gobitis case, filed a long
bear arms for any hostile purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. dissenting opinion, and Justices Roberts and Reed adhered to the views expressed in the
They have not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join courses of Gobitis case.
instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to resort to an institution for higher
education maintained with the state's moneys, then they are comanded to follow courses
Neither attempting to justify the ruling laid down in the Minersville vs. Gobitis case nor desiring to
of instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be condemned by
criticize the doctrine of the West Virginia vs. Barnette case, frankly, we are more inclined to favor
some unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is violence to conscientious scruples, either
the former as more in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and the government policy as
religious or merely ethical. More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught. In
laid down in Republic Act No. 1265 entitles "An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory In All
controversies of this order courts do not concern themselves with matters of legislative
Educational Institutions".
policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured by the organic law. The first
Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law `respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in military We cannot help thinking that one reason that may have possibly influenced the decision in the
science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette case, was that the children involved in said
case and their parents found themselves in a serious dilemma for refusing to salute the flag as
required by the regulations of the School Board. They were expelled by the School Board and . . . without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his subsequent
their absence was considered unlawful and because of the law of compulsory school atendance statments in the record, his position may be compendiously stated as one of non-
of all children of school age, they were considered as truants and the school officials threatened violence. Petitioner will not serve in the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference
to send them to reformatories maintained for criminially inclinded juveniles. Parents of such between the military and police forces, he would not act in the latter to coerce threatened
children have been prosecuted or were threatened with prosecution for cause such as alleged violations. Petitioner would not use force to meet aggression against himself or his
delinquency and if convicted, were subject to fine not exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not family, no matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodily harm to
exceeding 30 days. That is why in the majority opinion it was stated: himself or others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his
attitude toward service in the armed forces.
. . . The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. The state asserts
power to conditions access to public education on making a prescribed sign and It was not denied that Summers was unwilling to serve in the militia of Illinois because of his
profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child religious belief. In affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court excluding Summers from
... the practice of law in that state, the Federal Supreme Court held that the action of the State
Supreme Court did not violate the principle of religious freedom contained in the Constitution.
Such a grave and embarrassing situation, however, does not obtain in the Philippines. True, we
have a law (Republic Act 896) requiring compulsory enrollment of children of shcool age, but If a man lived, say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he would normally
said law contains so many exceptions and exemptions that it can be said that a child of school have complete and absolute rights as to the way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he
age is very seldom compelled to attend school, let alone the fact that almost invariably, there is practices his religious beliefs. There would be no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to follow.
school crisis every year wherein the pupils applying for admission in public schools could not be He would be subject only to Nature's physical laws. But man iis gregarious by nature and instinct
accommodated, and what is equally important is that there is no punishment or penal sanction and he gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of society and of
either for the pupil who fail to attend school or is expelled for failure to comply with school social and political organization. The moment he does this and he becomes a member of a
regulations such as the compulsory flag salute ceremony, or his parents. community or nation, he has to give rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the general
welfare, just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a limitation of their rights in his
In the case of re Summers, 325 U.S. 561-578, decided on June 11, 1945, that is, two years after favor. So, with his religion. He may retain retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to
the decision in the case of West Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed a practising the same, he would have to give up some of those practices repugnant to the general
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court refusing admission of petitioner Clyde Wilson Summers to welfare and subordinate them to the laws and sovereignty of the State. In order words, the
the Illinois Bar. Summers had complied with tall the prerequisites to admission to the Bar of that practice of religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and non-discrminatory laws and
state, but he was a conscientious objector who did not believe in the use of force or war because regulations by the state.
of his religious belief. He described this attitude of his as follows:
In the case of Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 88 L. ed. 645, the United States
The so-called "misconduct" for which petitioner could be reproached for is his taking the Supreme Court affirmed a decision convicting Sarah Prince of a violation of the Child Labor Law
New Testament too seriously. Instead of merely reading or preaching the Sermon on the of Massachusetts. Mr. Justice Rutledge who wrote the opinion tersely described the case thus:
Mount, he tries to practice it. The only fault of the petitioner consists in his attempt to act
as a good Christian in accordance with his interpreation of the Bible, and according to The case brings for review another episode in the conflict between Jehovah's Witneses
the dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit that the profession of law does nt and state authority. This time Sarah Prince appeals from convictions for violating
shut its gates to persons who have qualified in all other respects even when they follow Massachusetts' child labor laws, by acts said to be a rightful exercise of her religious
in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the Sermon on the convictions.
Mount. We respectfully submit that under our Constitutional guarantees even good
Christians who have met all the requirements for the admission to the bar may be When the offenses where committed she was the aunt and custodian of Betty M.
admitted to practice law Simmons, a girl nine years of age. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution of Illinois required service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner's age The defendant in this case allowed Betty, under here legal cutody who was at the same time
group. The Federal Supreme Court defined the position of Summers as a conscientious objector niece, to distribute religious pamphlets intended to propagate the religion of Johovah Wiitness.
in the following words: The question involved was whether or not the law in question contravened the Fourtheenth
Amendment by denying appellant freedom of religion and denying to her the equal protection of flag when that person desires to salute it. It is entirely wrong to interfere with that right or prevent
the law. Defendant claimed that the child was exercising her God given right and her such one from saluting the flag. Conversely, it is also true that it is wrong and illegal to compel
constitutional right to preach the gospel and that no preacher of God's commands shold be one who, for concience' sake, cannot participate in the ceremony." (p. 85, Appellant's Brief)
interfered with. She rested her case squarely on freedom of religion. In affirming the judgment of
conviction and upholding the law as agains the claiim of relgion and the exercise of religious The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony aside from the fact
belief, the court said: that they have no valid right to such exemption is that the latter would disrupt shcool discipline
and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. If the
. . . And neither rights of religion nor lights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the young ones
guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict seeing no reason for such exemption, would naturlly ask for the same privilege because they
the parent's control by requiring shcool attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's might want to do something else such as play or study, instead of standing at attention saluting
labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent the flag and singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, all of which consume
grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, considerable time; and if to avoid odions discrimination this exemption is extended to others,
he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself then the flag ceremony would soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few
on relgious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes,
death. . . . It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such and patriotism — a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the shcool
evils is withinthe state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. In a way that might be
child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action. regarded as tyranny of the minority, and a small minority at that.

Incidentally, it must be noted that this case was decided after that of West Virginia vs. In a few cases, such exemptions in a limited way have been afforded members of a religious
Barnette, supra. group. Conscientious objectors in the United States who because of their religion were unwilling
to serve in the war particularly as regards actual fighting or field duty, were allowed to do some
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of work in relation to the war, but not involving combat duty or the use of force. But that was by
Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It special legislation. If that is possible here as regards exemption from participation in the flag
was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether ceremony, then petitioners would have to look to the Legislature, not the courts for relief.
Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty
imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and regulations promulgated by competent authority. As was said by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in h is
teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIV, section 5 of the Constitution). It does nothing more than dissent in West Virginia vs. Barnette, supra:
try to inculcate in the minds of the school population during the formative period of their life, love
of country and love of the flag, all of which make for united and patriotic citizenry, so that later in The constitutional protection of religious freedom ... gave religious equality, not civil
after years they may be ready and willing to serve, fight, even die for it. It is well known that immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
whatever is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of God, of parents, respect for conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious loyalties may be exercised
elders, love of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word and respecting the rights of other, becomes without hindrance from the State, not the State may not exercise that which except by
a habit or second nature that will remain with them always. School children of kingdoms and leave of religious loyalties is within the domain of temporal power. Otherwise, each
empires are taught early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers and individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously
sovereigns symbolize the nation, and the children as future citizens or subjects will come to love deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws. (West Virginia
their country. State Board vs. Barnette, supra, at p. 653; emphasis supplied)

Petitioners do not question the right of public schools to conduct the flag salute ceremony In conclusion we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious
regularly but they do "question the attempt to compel conscientious objectors guided by the word veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of
of God to salute the flag or participate in the ceremony to specific commandment of Jehovah freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is nt a religious ceremony but an act and
God. It is perfectly proper and lawful for one nt bound by a covenant with Jehovah to salute the
profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; to the Court except to apply the rationale of the grave-and-imminent-danger rule and to enjoin,
that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate under the circumstances, the enforcement of the West Virginia School Regulation.
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Fortunately the problem the instant case presents to us is unaccompanied by such dire
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with consequences. Non-compliance with our prescribed flag ceremony does not result in criminal
the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school disicipline, including prosecution either of the pupil or of the parent. All that the unwilling pupil suffers is inability to
observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for continue his studies in a public school. If this and nothing else is the consequence, as it
failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and presently appears to be the complaint of appellants in this case, then I perceive no clear offense
dismissed from the public shcool they were attending. is done to the Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction One other significant distinction between the Barnette case and the one before us is the
heretofore issued is ordered dissolved. No costs. substnatial difference in the manner the flag salute is to be executed under the two laws, and of
course, the varying reaction and attitude taken by the Jehovah's Witnesses in relation thereto. In
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur. West Virginia, the law requires the "Stiff-arm" salute, the saluter to keep the right hand raised
with palm turned up while the following is repeated: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nations, indivisible with liberty and
justice for all." The Jehovah's Witnesses considered this posture of raising the hand at the same
time reciting the pledge as an act of obeisance contrary to their religious beliefs.
Separate Opinions
Here, what is required of all persons present during the flag ceremony is to stand at attention
BARRERA, J., concurring: while the flag is being raised and the National Anthem is being played or sung. Boys and men
with hats shall place the hat over the heart. Those without hats may stand with their arms and
I am in substantial accord with teh well-thought and well-expressed opinion of Mr. Justice hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute
Montemayor. prescribed by their regulations.

As much reliacne has been place by appellants on the Barnette case decided by the Supreme Appellants here have manifested through counsel, both in their brief and, I understand, in the
Court of the United States (West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, course of the oral argument, that they do not object to this requirement of standing at attention
87 L. ed. 1628), two fundamental features distinguishing that case from the one before us, bear with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Consequently, there seems to be no
some stressing. irreconciliable fundamental conflict, except perhaps as regards the singing of the National
Anthem and the recital (unaccompanied by any particular physical position) of the patriotic
pledge near the close of the ceremony. As to the import of the National Anthem and the Patriotic
The underlying and, I belive, compelling consideration that impelled the majority in the Barnette Pledge, I can add nothing to the very sober and well-considered opinion of Justice Montemayor.
case to overrule the Gobitis decision (Minersville School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 84 L.
ed 1375) was the compulsory nature of the order of the State Board of Education making non-
compliance therewith virtually unlawful in the sense that under the West Virginia Code, upon As I see the issuance, disentangled as it should and could be from the stress and strain of
counsels' doctrinal discussion and argumentation on the fundamentals of the freedom of religion
expulsion of the disobeying pupil, his parents or guardian become liable to criminal
prosecution1 for such absence due to expulsion and if convicted are subjected to fine not about which there could be no serious disagreement, and if viewed and interpreted rationally —
in a spirit of harmony, goodwill and in keeping with an appropriate sense of nationalism — I find
exceeding $50 and jail term not exceeding thirty days.2 The delinquent pupil may be proceeded
against and sent to reformatories maintained for ciminally inclined juveniles.3 Hence, the Court no reasonable consideration making the flag ceremony executed in the manner prescribed by
treated the case as one where "the sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. the questioned Department order and regulation, clearly repugnant to the Constitution.
The State asserts power to condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign
and profession, and at the same time to coerce attendance (in school) by punishing both parent
and child". As thus presented, really the conflict there between authority and liberty become
deeply sharpened and has attained the proportion of repugnance to a degree that left no choice
EBRALINAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT SCHOOLS OF CEBU THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and MR. MANUEL F.
BIONGCOG, Cebu District Supervisor, respondents.

Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 95887 December 29, 1995

SUPREME COURT
Manila MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO, REDFORD
ALSADO, JOEBERT ALSADO, & RUDYARD ALSADO represented by their parents MR. &
EN BANC MRS. ABELARDO ALSADO, NESIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO and LILIBETH ALSADO,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO, SUZETTE NAPOLES,
represented by her parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES and OPHELIA NAPOLES, JESICA
CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES, BABY
G.R. No. 95770 December 29, 1995 JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS,
GERALDINE ALSADO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO, RAQUEL
DEMOTOR, and LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO
ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents, MR. & MRS.
DEMOTOR, JURELL VILLA and MELONY VILLA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father, AMOS
JOVENIANO VILLA, JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE MAHINAY, and
TANTOG, JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER
MAGDALENE MAHINAY, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FELIX MAHINAY,
OYAO, JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS.
JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIPE
GODOFREDO DIAMOS, SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents
ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA, MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO, represented by her
MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA, IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO, represented by their
parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA CABUYAO, NOEMI TURNO represented
parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO, NAPTHALE TUNACAO represented by his parents
by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO, SOLOMON PALATULON,
MR. & MRS. MANUEL TUNACAO PRECILA PINO represented by her parents MR. & MRS.
SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINA PALATULON, represented by their parents
FELIPE PINO, MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. &
MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA PALATULON, petitioners,
MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR, FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR,
vs.
represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR,
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and ANTONIO A.
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR, MARTINO VILLAR,
SANGUTAN, respondents.
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR, PERGEBRIEL GUINITA &
CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA, ALVIN
DOOP represented by his parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP, RHILYN LAUDE R E SO L U T I O N
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE, LEOREMINDA MONARES
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES, MERCY MONTECILLO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO, ROBERTO TANGAHA,
represented by his parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA, EVELYN MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA KAPUNAN, J.:
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA, MAXIMO EBRALINAG
represented by his parents MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG, JUTA CUMON, GIDEON The State moves for a reconsideration of our decision dated March 1, 1993 granting private
CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON, EVIE respondents' petition for certiorari and prohibition and annulling the expulsion orders issued by
LUMAKANG and JUAN LUMAKANG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. the public respondents therein on the ground that the said decision created an exemption in
LUMAKANG, EMILIO SARSOZO & PAZ AMOR SARSOZO, & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO favor of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in violation of the
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO, MICHAEL JOSEPH & "Establishment Clause" of the Constitution. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public
HENRY JOSEPH, represented by parent ANNIE JOSEPH, EMERSON TABLASON & respondent, furthermore contends that:
MASTERLOU TABLASON, represented by their parents EMERLITO
TABLASON, petitioners, The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand for special treatment
vs. in favor of a minority sect even on the basis of a claim of religious freedom may
be criticized as granting preference to the religious beliefs of said sect in violation
 of the "non-establishment guarantee" provision of the Constitution. Surely, the utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does
decision of the Court constitutes a special favor which immunizes religious not involve any religious ceremony. . . .
believers such as Jehovah's Witnesses to the law and the DECS rules and
regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct required by law and the After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
rules and regulation (sic) are violative of their religious beliefs. The decision ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect,
therefore is susceptible to the very criticism that the grant of exemption is a much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion
violation of the "non-establishment" provision of the Constitution. and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings
to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects
Furthermore, to grant an exemption to a specific religious minority poses a risk of or followers.
collision course with the "equal protection of the laws" clause in respect of the
non-exempt, and, in public schools, a collision course with the "non- Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest
establishment guarantee." protection among human rights," this Court, in Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools
of Cebu4 re-examined our over two decades-old decision in Gerona and reversed expulsion
Additionally the public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral stance" by reverting to orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion
its holding in Gerona declaring the flag as being devoid of any religious significance. He stresses clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution.5
that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but regulation of the exercise of religious
belief. Finally, he maintains that the State's interests in the case at bench are constitutional and From our decision of March 1, 1993, the public respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on
legal obligations to implement the law and the constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth grounds hereinabove stated. After a careful study of the grounds adduced in the government's
patriotism and nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs, Motion For Reconsideration of our original decision, however, we find no cogent reason to
referring to the test devised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. vs. O'Brien.1 disturb our earlier ruling.

II The religious convictions and beliefs of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses are widely known and are equally widely disseminated in numerous books,
All the petitioners in the original case2 were minor school children, and members of the sect, magazines, brochures and leaflets distributed by their members in their house to house
Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their classes by various distribution efforts and in many public places. Their refusal to render obeisance to any form or
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and symbol which smacks of idolatry is based on their sincere belief in the biblical injunction found in
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by Exodus 20:4,5, against worshipping forms or idols other than God himself. The basic assumption
Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of Education. Aimed in their universal refusal to salute the flags of the countries in which they are found is that such a
primarily at private educational institutions which did not observe the flag ceremony exercises, salute constitutes an act of religious devotion forbidden by God's law. This assumption, while
Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to observe the "bizarre" to others is firmly anchored in several biblical passages.6
flag ceremony with public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit
on second offense. And yet, while members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious convictions, refuse to
perform an act (or acts) which they consider proscribed by the Bible, they contend that such
The implementing regulations issued by the Department of Education thereafter detailed the refusal should not be taken to indicate disrespect for the symbols of the country or evidence that
manner of observance of the same. Immediately pursuant to these orders, school officials in they are wanting in patriotism and nationalism. They point out that as citizens, they have an
Masbate expelled children belonging to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses from school for excellent record as law abiding members of society even if they do not demonstrate their refusal
failing or refusing to comply with the flag ceremony requirement. Sustaining these expulsion to conform to the assailed orders by overt acts of conformity. On the contrary, they aver that they
orders, this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education3 held that: show their respect through less demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their
simple obedience to the country's laws,7 by not engaging in antigovernment activities of any
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an kind,8 and by paying their taxes and dues to society as self-sufficient members of the
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom community.9 While they refuse to salute the flag, they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully
and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the at attention, hands on their side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb those who
complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is believe differently.10
The religious beliefs, practices and convictions of the members of the sect as a minority are The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the symbol of the
bound to be seen by others as odd and different and at divergence with the complex nation appears to be integrally related to petitioner's disagreement with the message
requirements of contemporary societies, particularly those societies which require certain conveyed by the refusal of members of the Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or
practices as manifestations of loyalty and patriotic behavior. Against those who believe that participate actively in flag ceremonies on religious grounds.20 Where the governmental interest
coerced loyalty and unity are mere shadows of patriotism, the tendency to exact "a hydraulic clearly appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an idea, a religious doctrine or practice or
insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards,"11 is seductive to the bureaucratic mindset as an expression or form of expression, this Court will not find it difficult to sustain a regulation.
a shortcut to patriotism. However, regulations involving this area are generally held against the most exacting standards,
and the zone of protection accorded by the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a
No doubt, the State possesses what the Solicitor General describes as the responsibility "to showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to
inculcate in the minds of the youth the values of patriotism and nationalism and to encourage protect.21 Stated differently, in the case of a regulation which appears to abridge a right to which
their involvement in public and civic affairs." The teaching of these values ranks at the very apex the fundamental law accords high significance it is the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act),
of education's "high responsibility" of shaping up the minds of the youth in those principles which which is the exception and which requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at bench, the
would mold them into responsible and productive members of our society. However, the government has not shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the assailed
government's interest in molding the young into patriotic and civic spirited citizens is "not totally orders, which respondents point out attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code of
free from a balancing process"12 when it intrudes into other fundamental rights such as those 1987, would pose a clear and present danger of a danger so serious and imminent, that it would
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the constitutional right to education and the prompt legitimate State intervention.
unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children in accordance
with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious beliefs.13 Recognizing these In a case involving the Flag Protection Act of 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
values, Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, the writer of the original opinion, underscored that a "State's asserted interest in preserving the fag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity was
generation of Filipinos which cuts its teeth on the Bill of Rights would find abhorrent the idea that an interest related to the suppression of free expression . . . because the State's concern with
one may be compelled, on pain of expulsion, to salute the flag sing the national anthem and protecting the flag's symbolic meaning is implicated only when a person's treatment of the flag
recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony.14 "This coercion of conscience has no place in communicates some message. 22 While the very concept of ordered liberty precludes this Court
a free society".15 from allowing every individual to subjectively define his own standards on matters of conformity
in which society, as a whole has important interests, the records of the case and the long history
The State's contentions are therefore, unacceptable, for no less fundamental than the right to of flag salute cases abundantly supports the religious quality of the claims adduced by the
take part is the right to stand apart.16 In the context of the instant case, the freedom of religion members of the sect Jehovah's Witnesses. Their treatment of flag as a religious symbol is well-
enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule, not the exception. To view the founded and well-documented and is based on grounds religious principle. The message
constitutional guarantee in the manner suggested by the petitioners would be to denigrate the conveyed by their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony is religious, shared by the entire
status of a preferred freedom and to relegate it to the level of an abstract principle devoid of any community of Jehovah's Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic beliefs and
substance and meaning in the lives of those for whom the protection is addressed. As to the convictions. The subsequent expulsion of members of the sect on the basis of the regulations
contention that the exemption accorded by our decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to assailed in the original petitions was therefore clearly directed against religious practice. It is
re-emphasize that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did obvious that the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the free exercise of
not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity."17 The essence of the free the religious beliefs of the members of the sect and their minor children.
exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to
law because of religious dogma.18 Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the State's pleadings to Furthermore, the view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular symbol expresses a
the effect that the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly applied to all citizens majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of
regardless of sect or religion and does not thereby discriminate against any particular sect or the belief that an act of saluting the flag might sometimes be — to some individuals — so
denomination escapes the fact that "[a] regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, offensive as to be worth their giving up another constitutional right — the right to education.
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens Individuals or groups of individuals get from a symbol the meaning they put to it.23 Compelling
the free exercise of religion."19 members of a religious sect to believe otherwise on the pain of denying minor children the right
to an education is a futile and unconscionable detour towards instilling virtues of loyalty and
III patriotism which are best instilled and communicated by painstaking and non-coercive methods.
Coerced loyalties, after all, only serve to inspire the opposite. The methods utilized to impose
them breed resentment and dissent. Those who attempt to coerce uniformity of sentiment soon
find out that the only path towards achieving unity is by way of suppressing dissent.24 In the end, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
such attempts only find the "unanimity of the graveyard."25
SO ORDERED.
To the extent to which members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect assiduously pursue their belief
in the flag's religious symbolic meaning, the State cannot, without thereby transgressing Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Francisco and
constitutionally protected boundaries, impose the contrary view on the pretext of sustaining a Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
policy designed to foster the supposedly far-reaching goal of instilling patriotism among the
youth. While conceding to the idea — adverted to by the Solicitor General — that certain Panganiban, J., took no part.
methods of religious expression may be prohibited26 to serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal
to participate in the flag ceremony hardly constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive
Padilla, J., I reiterate my Separate Opinion in G.R. No. 95770 (Ebralinag vs. The Division
and noxious as to prompt legitimate State intervention. It is worth repeating that the absence of a
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu), 1 March 1993, 219 SCRA 276.
demonstrable danger of a kind which the State is empowered to protect militates against the
extreme disciplinary methods undertaken by school authorities in trying to enforce regulations
designed to compel attendance in flag ceremonies. Refusal of the children to participate in the
flag salute ceremony would not interfere with or deny the rights of other school children to do so.
It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave
and imminent as to warrant the state's intervention.

Finally, the respondents' insistence on the validity of the actions taken by the government on the
basis of their averment that "a government regulation of expressive conduct is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government (and) furthers an important and
substantial government interest"27 misses the whole point of the test devised by the United States
Supreme Court in O'Brien, cited by respondent, because the Court therein was emphatic in
stating that "the government interest (should be) unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." We have already stated that the interest in regulation in the case at bench was
clearly related to the suppression of an expression directly connected with the freedom of
religion and that respondents have not shown to our satisfaction that the restriction was
prompted by a compelling interest in public order which the state has a right to protect.
Moreover, if we were to refer (as respondents did by referring to the test in O'Brien) to the
standards devised by the US Supreme Court in determining the validity or extent of restrictive
regulations impinging on the freedoms of the mind, then the O'Brien standard is hardly
appropriate because the standard devised in O'Brien only applies if the State's regulation is not
related to communicative conduct. If a relationship exists, a more demanding standard is
applied.28

The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good citizenship, and moral
uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with parents and other societal institutions
such as religious sects and denominations. The manner in which such values are demonstrated
in a plural society occurs in ways so variable that government cannot make claims to the
exclusivity of its methods of inculcating patriotism so all-encompassing in scope as to leave no
room for appropriate parental or religious influences. Provided that those influences do not pose
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to society and its institutions, expressions of
diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority, are the price we pay for
the freedoms we enjoy.
STOGNER V. CALIFORNIA "manifestly unjust and oppressive" retroactive effects. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
391. Second, the law falls literally within the categorical descriptions of ex post
U.S. Supreme CourtJun 26, 2003Full title factolaws that Justice Chase set forth more than 200 years ago in Calder
No. 01-1757 (2003)Copy Citation v. Bull, which this Court has recognized as an authoritative account of the Clause's
No. 01-1757•539 U.S. 607•123 S. Ct. 2446 scope, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 46. It falls within the second category,
Breyer which Justice Chase understood to include a new law that inflicts punishments
where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment. Third, numerous
539 U.S. 607 legislators, courts, and commentators have long believed it well settled that the
123 S.Ct. 2446 Clause forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution. The Reconstruction
Congress of 1867 rejected a bill that would have revived time-barred treason
MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER, PETITIONER, prosecutions against Jefferson Davis and others, passing instead a law extending
v. unexpired limitations periods. Roughly contemporaneous State Supreme Courts
echoed the view that laws reviving time-barred prosecutions are ex post facto. Even
CALIFORNIA courts that have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of limitations have
consistently distinguished situations where the periods have expired, often using
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST
language that suggests a presumption that reviving time-barred criminal cases is not
APPELLATE DISTRICT.
allowed. This Court has not previously spoken decisively on this matter. Neither its
recognition that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination does not
In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting apply after the relevant limitations period has expired, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired 591, 597-598, nor its holding that a Civil War statute retroactively tolling limitations
if, inter alia, the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. A periods during the war was valid as an exercise of Congress' war powers, Stewart v.
subsequently added provision makes clear that this law revives causes of action Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 503-504, dictates the outcome here. Instead, that outcome is
barred by prior limitations statutes. In 1998, petitioner Stogner was indicted for sex- determined by the nature of the harms that the law creates, the fact that the law falls
related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. At the time those crimes within Justice Chase's second category, and a long line of authority. Pp. 3-26.
were allegedly committed, the limitations period was three years. Stogner moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of
93 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, reversed.
a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court
of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR,
which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Factoand Due Process
SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
Held: A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-
barred prosecution. California's law extends the time in which prosecution is allowed,
California has brought a criminal prosecution after expiration of the time periods set
authorizes prosecutions that the passage of time has previously barred, and was
forth in previously applicable statutes of limitations. California has done so under the
enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged offenses had expired.
authority of a new law that (1) permits resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal
Such features produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids. First, the
prosecutions, and (2) was itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had
law threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for the Clause
expired. We conclude that the Constitution's Ex Post FactoClause, Art. I, §10, cl. 1,
protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with
bars application of this new law to the present case.
I The Constitution's two Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit the Federal Government and
the States from enacting laws with certain retroactive effects. See Art. I, §9, cl. 3
In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations governing sex- (Federal Government); Art. I, §10, cl. 1 (States). The law at issue here created a new
related child abuse crimes. The new statute permits prosecution for those crimes criminal limitations period that extends the time in which prosecution is allowed. It
where "[t]he limitation period specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has expired"— authorized criminal prosecutions that the passage of time had previously barred.
provided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to the police, (2) "there Moreover, it was enacted after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged offenses
is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim's had expired. Do these features of the law, taken together, produce the kind of
allegation," and (3) the prosecution is begun within one year of the victim's report. retroactivity that the Constitution forbids? We conclude that they do.
1993 Cal. Stats. ch. 390, §1 (codified as amended at Cal. Penal Code Ann.
§803(g) (West Supp. 2003)). A related provision, added to the statute in 1996, First, the new statute threatens the kinds of harm that, in this Court's view, the Ex
makes clear that a prosecution satisfying these three conditions "shall revive any Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid. Long ago the Court pointed out that the Clause
cause of action barred by [prior statutes of limitations]." 1996 Cal. Stats. ch. 130, §1 protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with
(codified at Cal. Penal Code Ann. §803(g)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2003)). The statute "manifestly unjust and oppressive" retroactive effects. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391
thus authorizes prosecution for criminal acts committed many years beforehand— (1798). Judge Learned Hand later wrote that extending a limitations period after the
and where the original limitations period has expired—as long as prosecution begins State has assured "a man that he has become safe from its pursuit . . . seems to
within a year of a victim's first complaint to the police. most of us unfair and dishonest." Falter v. United States, 23 F. 2d 420, 426 (CA2),
cert. denied, 277 U. S. 590 (1928). In such a case, the government has refused "to
In 1998, a California grand jury indicted Marion Stogner, the petitioner, charging him play by its own rules," Carmell v. Texas, 529 U. S. 513, 533 (2000). It has deprived
with sex-related child abuse committed decades earlier—between 1955 and 1973. the defendant of the "fair warning," Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 28 (1981), that
Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence. F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading
could not have prosecuted Stogner. The statute of limitations governing prosecutions and Practice §316, p. 210 (8th ed. 1880) ("The statute [of limitations] is . . . an
at the time the crimes were allegedly committed had set forth a 3-year limitations amnesty, declaring that after a certain time . . . the offender shall be at liberty to
period. And that period had run 22 years or more before the present prosecution was return to his country . . . and . . . may cease to preserve the proofs of his
brought. innocence"). And a Constitution that permits such an extension, by allowing
legislatures to pick and choose when to act retroactively, risks both "arbitrary and
Stogner moved for the complaint's dismissal. He argued that the Federal potentially vindictive legislation," and erosion of the separation of powers, Weaver,
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, §10, cl. 1, forbids revival of a previously supra, at 29, and n. 10. See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137-138 (1810)(viewing
time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed that such a revival is unconstitutional. the Ex Post Facto Clause as a protection against "violent acts which might grow out
But the California Court of Appeal reversed, citing a recent, contrary decision by the of the feelings of the moment").
California Supreme Court, People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737, 982 P. 2d 180 (1999),
cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1108 (2000). Stogner then moved to dismiss his indictment, Second, the kind of statute at issue falls literally within the categorical descriptions
arguing that his prosecution is unconstitutional under both the Ex Post Facto Clause of ex post facto laws set forth by Justice Chase more than 200 years ago in Calder
and the Due Process Clause, Amdt. 14, §1. The trial court denied Stogner's motion, v. Bull, supra—a categorization that this Court has recognized as providing an
and the Court of Appeal upheld that denial. Stogner v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. authoritative account of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Collins v.
4th 1229, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37 (2001). We granted certiorari to consider Stogner's Youngblood,497 U. S. 37, 46 (1990); Carmell, supra, at 539. Drawing substantially
constitutional claims. 537 U. S. 1043 (2002). on Richard Wooddeson's 18th-century commentary on the nature of ex post
facto laws and past parliamentary abuses, Chase divided ex post facto laws into
II categories that he described in two alternative ways. See 529 U. S., at 522-524, and
n. 9. He wrote:
"I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated"
the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when committed," in the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. sense that, and to the extent that, it "inflicted punishment" for past criminal conduct
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when that (when the new law was enacted) did not trigger any such liability. See also H.
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater Black, American Constitutional Law §266, p. 700 (4th ed. 1927) (hereinafter Black,
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that American Constitutional Law) ("[A]n act condoned by the expiration of the statute of
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the limitations is no longer a punishable offense"). It is consequently not surprising that
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the New Jersey's highest court long ago recognized that Chase's alternative description
offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." Calder, of second category laws "exactly describes the operation" of the kind of statute at
supra, at 390-391 (emphasis altered from original). issue here. Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203, 217 (1881) (emphasis added). See also
H. Black, Constitutional Prohibitions Against Legislation Impairing the Obligation of
In his alternative description, Chase traced these four categories back to Contracts, and Against Retroactive and Ex Post Facto Laws §235, p. 298 (1887)
Parliament's earlier abusive acts, as follows: (hereinafter Black, Constitutional Prohibitions) ("Such a statute" "certainly makes
that a punishable offense which was previously a condoned and obliterated
Category 1: "Sometimes they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, offense").
which were not treason, when committed."
So to understand the second category (as applying where a new law inflicts a
Category 2: "[A]t other times they inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by punishment upon a person not then subject to that punishment, to any degree)
law, liable to any punishment." explains why and how that category differs from both the first category (making
criminal noncriminal behavior) and the third category (aggravating the punishment).
Category 3: "[I]n other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law And this understanding is consistent, in relevant part, with Chase's second category
annexed to the offence." examples—examples specifically provided to illustrate
Chase's alternative description of laws " `inflict[ing] punishments, where the party
Category 4: "[A]t other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a was not, by law, liable to any punishment,'" Calder, supra, at 389.
deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law required
two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; Following Wooddeson, Chase cited as examples of such laws Acts of Parliament
or other testimony, which the courts of justice would not admit." 3 Dall., at 389 that banished certain individuals accused of treason. 3 Dall., at 389, and n. ‡; see
(emphasis altered from original). also Carmell, 529 U. S., at 522-524, and n. 11. Both Chase and Wooddeson
explicitly referred to these laws as involving "banishment." Calder, supra, at 389, and
The second category—including any "law that aggravates a crime, or makes n. ‡; 2 Wooddeson, Systematical View 638-639. This fact was significant because
it greaterthan it was, when committed," id., at 390—describes California's statute as Parliament had enacted those laws not only after the crime's commission, but under
long as those words are understood as Justice Chase understood them—i.e., as circumstances where banishment "was simply not a form of penalty that could be
referring to a statute that "inflict[s] punishments, where the party was not, imposed by the courts." Carmell, supra, at 523, n. 11; see also 11 W. Holdsworth, A
by law, liable to any punishment," id., at 389. See also 2 R. Wooddeson, A History of English Law 569 (1938). Thus, these laws, like the California law at issue
Systematical View of the Laws of England 638 (1792) (hereinafter Wooddeson, here, enabled punishment where it was not otherwise available "in the ordinary
Systematical View) (discussing the ex post facto status of a law that affects course of law," 2 Wooddeson, Systematical View 638. As this Court previously
punishment by "making therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or recognized in Carmell, supra, at 523, and n. 11, it was this vice that was relevant to
disability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law" (emphasis added)). After (but Chase's purpose.
not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner
It is true, however, that Parliament's Acts of banishment, unlike the law in this case, Consequently, to resurrect a prosecution after the relevant statute of limitations has
involved a punishment (1) that the legislature imposed directly, and (2) that courts expired is to eliminate a currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding
had never previously had the power to impose. But these differences are not prosecution, and thereby to permit conviction on a quantum of evidence where that
determinative. The first describes not a retroactivity problem but an attainder quantum, at the time the new law is enacted, would have been legally insufficient.
problem that Justice Chase's language does not emphasize and with which the And, in that sense, the new law would "violate" previous evidence-related legal rules
Constitution separately deals, Art. I, §9, cl. 3; Art. I, §10, cl. 1. The second difference by authorizing the courts to " `receiv[e] evidence . . . which the courts of justice
seems beside the point. The example of Parliament's banishment laws points to would not [previously have] admit[ted]' " as sufficient proof of a crime, supra, at 5.
concern that a legislature, knowing the accused and seeking to have the accused Cf. Collins, 497 U. S., at 46 ("Subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible
punished for a preexisting crime, might enable punishment of the accused in ways than overt ones"); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 329 (1867) (The Ex Post
that existing law forbids. That fundamental concern, related to basic concerns about Facto Clause "cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is
retroactive penal laws and erosion of the separation of powers, applies with equal exerted"). Nonetheless, given Justice Chase's description of the second category,
force to punishment like that enabled by California's law as applied to Stogner— we need not explore the fourth category, or other categories, further.
punishment that courts lacked the power to impose at the time the legislature acted.
See Black, Constitutional Prohibitions §235, at 298 ("It would be superfluous to point Third, likely for the reasons just stated, numerous legislators, courts, and
out that such an act [reviving otherwise time-barred criminal liability] would fall within commentators have long believed it well settled that the Ex Post Facto Clause
the evils intended to be guarded against by the prohibition in question"). Cf. 1 F. forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution. Such sentiments appear already to
Wharton, Criminal Law §444a, pp. 347-348, n. b(rev. 7th ed. 1874) (hereinafter have been widespread when the Reconstruction Congress of 1867—the Congress
Criminal Law). that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment—rejected a bill that would have revived
time-barred prosecutions for treason that various Congressmen wanted brought
In finding that California's law falls within the literal terms of Justice Chase's second against Jefferson Davis and "his coconspirators," Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d
category, we do not deny that it may fall within another category as well. Justice Sess., 279 (1866-1867) (comments of Rep. Lawrence). Radical Republicans such as
Chase's fourth category, for example, includes any "law that alters the legalrules Roscoe Conkling and Thaddeus Stevens, no friends of the South, opposed the bill
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the because, in their minds, it proposed an "ex post facto law," id., at 68 (comments of
time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." Calder, Rep. Conkling), and threatened an injustice tantamount to "judicial murder," id., at 69
supra, at 390. This Court has described that category as including laws that diminish (comments of Rep. Stevens). In this instance, Congress ultimately passed a law
"the quantum of evidence required to convict." Carmell, supra, at 532. extending unexpired limitations periods, ch. 236, 15 Stat. 183—a tailored approach
to extending limitations periods that has also been taken in modern statutes, e.g., 18
Significantly, a statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a U. S. C. §3293 (notes on effective date of 1990 amendment and effect of 1989
certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict. See United States v. amendment); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §805.5 (West Supp. 2003).
Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 322 (1971). And that judgment typically rests, in large part,
upon evidentiary concerns—for example, concern that the passage of time has Further, Congressmen such as Conkling were not the only ones who believed that
eroded memories or made witnesses or other evidence unavailable. United States v. laws reviving time-barred prosecutions are ex post facto. That view was echoed in
Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979); 4 W. LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal roughly contemporaneous opinions by State Supreme Courts. E.g., State v.
Procedure §18.5(a), p. 718 (1999); Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice §316, Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. 66, 67 (1860); Moore, 43 N. J. L., at 216-217. Cf. State v.
at 210. Indeed, this Court once described statutes of limitations as creating "a Keith, 63 N. C. 140, 145 (1869) (A State's repeal of an amnesty was
presumption which renders proof unnecessary." Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, "substantially an ex post factolaw"). Courts, with apparent unanimity until
139 (1879). California's decision in Frazer, have continued to state such views, and, when
necessary, so to hold. E.g., People ex rel. Reibman v. Warden, 242 A. D. 282,
285, 275 N. Y. S. 59, 62 (App. Div. 1934); United States v. Fraidin, 63 F. Supp. 271,
276 (Md. 1945); People v. Shedd, 702 P. 2d 267, 268(Colo. 1985) (en banc) (per facto). Cf. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 514 (1880) ("[I]n any case where a
curiam); State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash. 2d 662, 667-669, 740 P. 2d 848, 851-852 right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the period of
(1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 938 (1988); Commonwealth v. limitation, that period is subject to enlargement or repeal without being obnoxious to
Rocheleau, 404 Mass. 129, 130-131, 533 N. E. 2d 1333, 1334 (1989); State v. the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws").
Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 218, 768 P. 2d 268, 277-278 (1989); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho
244, 247, 796 P. 2d 121, 124 (1990); State v. Hirsch, 245 Neb. 31, 39-40, 511 N. W. Given the apparent unanimity of pre-Frazer case law, legal scholars have long had
2d 69, 76 (1994); State v. Schultzen, 522 N. W. 2d 833, 835 (Iowa 1994); State v. reason to believe this matter settled. As early as 1887, Henry Black reported that,
Comeau, 142 N. H. 84, 88, 697 A. 2d 497, 500 (1997) (citing State v. Hamel, 138 N. although "not at all numerous," the "cases upon this point . . . unmistakably point to
H. 392, 395-396, 643 A. 2d 953, 955-956 (1994)); Santiago v. Commonwealth, 428 the conclusion that such an act would be ex post facto in the strict sense, and void."
Mass. 39, 42, 697 N. E. 2d 979, 981, cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1003 (1998). Constitutional Prohibitions §235, at 297. Even earlier, in 1874, Francis Wharton
Cf. Thompson v. State,54 Miss. 740, 743 (1877) (stating, without specifying further supported this conclusion by emphasizing the historic role of statutes of limitations
grounds, that a new law could not take away a vested statute-of-limitations as "acts of grace or oblivion, and not of process," "extinguish[ ing] all future
defense); State v. Cookman, 127 Ore. App. 283, 289, 873 P. 2d 335, 338 prosecution" and making an offense unable to "be again called into existence at the
(1994) (holding that a law resurrecting a time-barred criminal case "violates the Due caprice of the prince." 1 Criminal Law §444a, at 347-348, n. b. More modern
Process Clause"), aff'd on state-law grounds, 324 Ore. 19, 920 P. 2d 1086 commentators—reporting on the same and subsequent cases—have come to the
(1996); Commonwealth v. Guimento, 341 Pa. Super. 95, 97-98, 491 A. 2d 166, 167- same conclusion. E.g., 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §294, pp. 349-350 (1998 and
168 (1985) (enforcing a state ban on ex post facto laws apparently equivalent to the Supp. 2002); 16A C. J. S., Constitutional Law §420, p. 372 (1984 and Supp. 2002);
federal prohibition); People v. Chesebro, 185 Mich. App. 412, 416, 463 N. W. 2d 4 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure §18.5(a), at 718, n. 6; 2 C. Antieau &
134, 135-136 (1990) (reciting "the general rule" that, "`where a complete defense W. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law §38.11, p. 445 (2d ed. 1997); Adlestein, Conflict
has arisen under [a statute of limitations], it cannot be taken away by a subsequent of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 Wm. & Mary
repeal thereof' "). L. Rev. 246 (1995); C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §1.6, p. 35 (1993 Supp.); F.
Black, Statutes of Limitations and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 26 Ky. L. J. 42 (1937);
Even where courts have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of limitations Black, American Constitutional Law §266, at 700. Cf. H. Wood, Limitation of Actions
(extensions that our holding today does not affect, see supra, at 5-6), they have §13, p. 43 (3d ed. 1901) (The State "may be said" to be "estopped from
consistently distinguished situations where limitations periods have expired.Further, prosecuting"). Likewise, with respect to the closely related case of a law repealing an
they have often done so by saying that extension of existing limitations periods is amnesty—a case not distinguished by the dissent—William Wade concluded early
not ex post facto "provided," "so long as," "because," or "if" the prior limitations on that "[s]uch an act would be as clearly in contravention of the inhibition of ex post
periods have not expired—a manner of speaking that suggests a presumption that facto laws as though it undertook to annex criminality to an act innocent when done."
revival of time-barred criminal cases is not allowed. E.g., United States v. Madia, 955 Operation and Construction of Retroactive Laws §286, p. 339 (1880). But cf. post, at
F. 2d 538, 540 (CA8 1992) (" `provided' "); United States v. Richardson, 512 F. 2d 7 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
105, 106 (CA3 1975) ("provided"); People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 440, 292 N. E.
2d 364, 366 (1973) ("so long as"); United States v. Haug, 21 F. R. D. 22, 25 (ND This Court itself has not previously spoken decisively on this matter. On the one
Ohio 1957) ("so long as"), aff'd, 274 F. 2d 885 (CA6 1960), cert. denied, 365 U. S. hand, it has clearly stated that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
811 (1961); United States v. Kurzenknabe, 136 F. Supp. 17, 23 (NJ 1955) ("so long selfincrimination does not apply after the relevant limitations period has
as"); State v. Duffy, 300 Mont. 381, 390, 6 P. 3d 453, 460 (2000) ("because"); State expired. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 597-598 (1896). And that rule may suggest
v. Davenport, 536 N. W. 2d 686, 688 (N. D. 1995) ("because"); Andrews v. State,392 that the expiration of a statute of limitations is irrevocable, for otherwise the passage
So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. App. 1980) ("if"), review denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (1981). of time would not have eliminated fear of prosecution.
See, e.g., Shedd, supra, at 268 (citing Richardson, supra, and Andrews, supra, as
directly supporting a conclusion that a law reviving timebarred offenses is ex post
On the other hand, in Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 503-504 (1871), this Court unfair. And, like most other judges who have addressed this issue, see supra, at 9-
upheld a statute, enacted during the Civil War, that retroactively tolled all civil and 10, we find the words "ex post facto" applicable to describe this kind of unfairness.
criminal limitations for periods during which the war had made service of process Indeed, given the close fit between laws that work this kind of unfairness and the
impossible or courts inaccessible. Stewart, however, involved a civil, not a criminal, Constitution's concern with ex post facto laws, we might well conclude that
limitations statute. Id., at 500-501. Significantly, in reviewing this civil case, the Court California's law falls within the scope of the Constitution's interdiction even were the
upheld the statute as an exercise of Congress' war powers, id., at 507, without dissent's historical and precedent-related criticisms better founded than they are.
explicit consideration of any potential collision with the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Moreover, the Court already had held, independent of Congress' Act, that statutes of We need not examine that possibility here, however, because the dissent's reading
limitations were tolled for "the time during which the courts in the States lately in of the relevant history and precedent raises far too many problems to serve as a
rebellion were closed to the citizens of the loyal States." Id., at 503; see also Hanger foundation for the reading of "ex post facto" that it proposes. In our view, that reading
v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 539-542 (1868). Hence, the Court could have seen the is too narrow; it is unsupported by precedent; and it would deny liberty where the
relevant statute as ratifying a pre-existing expectation of tolling due to wartime Constitution gives protection.
exigencies, rather than as extending limitations periods that had truly expired.
See id., at 541; see also Stewart, supra, at 507. In our view, Stewart therefore no A
more dictates the outcome here than does seemingly contrary precedent regarding
the Fifth Amendment privilege. In the dissent's view, Chase's historical examples show that "Calder's second
category concerns only laws" that both (1) "subjec[t] the offender to increased
Instead, we believe that the outcome of this case is determined by the nature of the punishment" and (2) do so by "chang[ing] the nature of an offense to make it greater
harms that California's law creates, by the fact that the law falls within Justice than it was at the time of commission." Post, at 10 (emphasis added). The dissent
Chase's second category as Chase understood that category, and by a long line of does not explain what it means by "changing the nature of an offense," but we must
authority holding that a law of this type violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. assume (from the fact that this language comes in a dissent) that it means
something beyond attaching otherwise unavailable punishment and requires, in
III addition, some form of recharacterization of the crime. After all, the dissent seeks to
show through its discussion of the relevant historical examples that a new law
In a prodigious display of legal and historical textual research, the dissent finely subjecting to punishment a person not then legally subject to punishment does not
parses cases that offer us support, see post, at 1-6; shows appreciation for 19th- fall within the second category unless the new law somehow changes the kind of
century dissident commentary, see post, at 6-8; discusses in depth its crime that was previously at issue.
understanding of late 17th-century and early 18th-century parliamentary
history, post, at 10-17; and does its best to drive a linguistic wedge between Justice The dissent's discussion of the historical examples suffers from several problems.
Chase's alternative descriptions of categories of ex post facto laws, post, at 9-10. All First, it raises problems of historical accuracy. In order to show the occurrence of a
to what end? The dissent undertakes this Herculean effort to prove that it change in the kind or nature of the crime, the dissent argues that Parliament's effort
is not unfair, in any constitutionally relevant sense, to prosecute a man for crimes to banish the Earl of Clarendon amounted to an effort "to elevate criminal behavior of
committed 25 to 42 years earlier when nearly a generation has passed since the law lower magnitude to the level of treason." Post, at 11. The dissent supports this
granted him an effective amnesty. Cf. post, at 17-22. argument with a claim that "the allegations [against Clarendon] could not support a
charge of treason." Ibid. Historians, however, appear to have taken a different view.
We disagree strongly with the dissent's ultimate conclusion about the fairness of But cf. post, at 14-15. In their view, at least one charge against
resurrecting a long-dead prosecution. See infra, at 23-25. Rather, like Judge Clarendon did amount to treason.
Learned Hand, we believe that this retroactive application of a later-enacted law is
Clarendon was charged with "betraying his majesty's secret counsels to his enemies To repeat, the example of Clarendon's banishment is an example of an individual's
during the war." Edward Earl of Clarendon's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 292, 350 (1667) being punished through legislation that subjected him to punishment otherwise
(hereinafter Clarendon's Trial). In the words of one historian, this charge unavailable, to any degree, through "the ordinary course of law"—just as Chase and
"undoubtedly contained treasonous matter." Roberts, The Impeachment of the Earl his predecessor Wooddeson said. Calder, 3 Dall., at 389, and n. ‡; 2 Wooddeson,
of Clarendon, 13 Camb. Hist. J. 1, 13 (1957) (hereinafter Roberts, Impeachment); Systematical View 638. See also Carmell, 529 U. S., at 523, n. 11.
accord, G. Miller, Edward Earl of Clarendon's Trial 21-22 (1983); 10 Dictionary of
National Biography 383 (L. Stephen & S. Lee eds. reprint 1922). See also Roberts, A second problem that the dissent's account raises is one of
The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 84 Yale L. J. historical completeness.That account does not explain how the second relevant
1419, 1426 (1975); R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 45, n. 193 example—the banishment of the Bishop of Atterbury—can count as an example of a
(1974) (acknowledging and not contradicting the historian Henry Hallam's conclusion recharacterization of a pre-existing crime. The dissent concedes that Atterbury was
that "`one of the articles did actually contain an unquestionable treason' "). And it charged with conduct constituting a "conspiracy to depose George I." Post, at 15. It
was on the basis of this specific charge—a charge of conduct that amounted to ought then to note (but it does not note) that, like the charge of "`betraying his
treason—that the House of Commons (which had previously refused to impeach majesty's secret counsels,'" supra, at 15, this charge was recognized as a charge of
Clarendon on other charges that did not amount to treason) "voted to impeach treason, see 2 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 266-267 (1883).
Clarendon for high treason." Roberts, Impeachment 13; accord, Clarendon's As the dissent claims, the evidence upon which Parliament based its decision to
Trial 350-351. banish may have been "meager," and the punishment may even have been greater
than some expected. Post, at 15-16. But the relevant point is that Parliament did not
The House of Lords initially thought that the Commons had failed to provide recharacterize the Bishop's crime. Rather, through extraordinary proceedings that
sufficient evidence because it failed to provide "special articles" laying out concluded with a punishment that only the legislature could impose, Parliament
"particulars to prove it." Roberts, Impeachment 14. The Lords and Commons aggravated a predefined crime by imposing a punishment that courts could not have
deadlocked over whether a "general charge" was sufficient. Ibid. See imposed in "the ordinary course."
also Clarendon's Trial 351-374. But Clarendon fled, thereby providing proof of guilt.
10 Dictionary of National Biography, supra, at 383; see also Clarendon's Trial 389- Third, the dissent's account raises a problem of vagueness. The dissent describes
390; 2 H. Hallam, Constitutional History of England: From the Accession of Henry VII Justice Chase's alternative description of the second category as "shed[ding] light on
to the Death of George II, p. 373 (8th ed. 1855). See also Berger, supra, at 44-45, the meaning" of the category, post, at 10, and describes the historical references
and n. 189. The Lords and Commons then agreed to banish Clarendon. The Act of that accompany Chase's alternative description as "illustrative examples," post, at
banishment —the only item in this complicated history explicitly cited by Chase— 17. But the question is would the dissent apply the term ex post facto to laws that fall
explained that Clarendon was being banished because he had "been impeached by within the alternative description—or would it not? If not, how does it reconcile its
the Commons . . . of Treason and other misdemeanours" and had "fled whereby view with Carmell? See 529 U. S., at 522, n. 9; see also id., at 523 (Wooddeson's
Justice cannot be done upon him according to his demerit." 19 & 20 Car. II, c. 2 categories "correlate precisely to Calder's four categories"). If so, how does it explain
(1667-1668) (reprint 1963). the fact that the alternative description nowhere says anything about
recharacterizing, or "changing the nature," of a crime?
In sum, Clarendon's case involved Parliament's punishment of an individual who
was charged before Parliament with treason and satisfactorily proven to have In our view, the key to the Atterbury and Clarendon examples lies not in any kind of
committed treason, but whom Parliament punished by imposing "banishment" in recharacterization, or the like, but in the fact that Atterbury and Clarendon suffered
circumstances where the party was not, in "the ordinary course of law," liable to any the "same sentence"—"banishment." 2 Wooddeson, Systematical Analysis 638; see
"banishment." See supra, at 6-7. Indeed, because Clarendon had fled the country, it also Calder, supra, at 389, n. ‡ (using the word "banishment" to describe both
had become impossible to hold a proper trial to subject Clarendon to punishment examples). As we have argued, supra, at 6-7, Parliament aggravated the crimes at
through "ordinary" proceedings. See 19 & 20 Car. II, c. 2; Clarendon's Trial 385-386. issue by imposing an otherwise unavailable punishment—namely, banishment—
which was, according to Wooddeson, a "forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the More importantly, even were we to accept the dissent's view that Chase's second
ordinary course of law," 2 Systematical Analysis 638. category examples involved some kind of recharacterization of criminal behavior
(which they did not), why would recharacterization be the ex post factotouchstone?
Fourth, the dissent's initial account suffers from a technical problem Why, in a case where (a) application of a previously inapplicable punishment and (b)
of redundancy.Were the second category always to involve the recharacterization of recharacterization (or "changing the nature") of criminal behavior do not come hand
an offense in a way that subjects it to greater punishment, see post, at 10, the in hand, should the absence of the latter make a critical difference? After all, the
second category would be redundant. Any law falling within it would also necessarily presence of a recharacterization without new punishment works no harm. But the
fall within the third category, which already encompasses "`[e]very law that . . . presence of the new punishment without recharacterization works all the harm.
inflicts a greater punishment,'" supra, at 4 (emphasis added). Indeed, it works retroactive harm—a circumstance relevant to the applicability of a
constitutional provision aimed at preventing unfair retroactive laws. Perhaps that is
Fifth, the dissent's historical account raises problems of pertinence. For one thing, to why Justice Chase's alternative description—which, like Wooddeson's, speaks of
the extent that we are construing the scope of the Calder categories, we are laws "affect[ing] the punishment," 2 Systematical View 638—does not mention
trying not to investigate precisely what happened during the trials of Clarendon and recharacterization or the like.
Atterbury, but to determine how, several decades later, an 18th-century legal
commentator and an 18th-century American judge who relied on that commentator— B
and, by extension, the Framers themselves —likely understood the scope of the
words "ex post facto." Hence, the dissent's account seems of little relevance once The dissent believes that our discussion of the case law is "less persuasive than it
we recognize that: may appear at a first glance." Post, at 1. The dissent says that this case law is
"deficient," and that we rely on an "inapposite" case and other cases that "flatly
(1) When Justice Chase set forth his alternative language for the second category contradict" the "principles" on which we rely. Post, at 2-3.
(the language that the historical examples are meant to illuminate), he said nothing
about recharacterizing crimes, Calder, 3 Dall., at 389; Having reviewed the relevant cases and commentary, we continue to believe that
our characterizations are accurate. We say that courts, "with apparent unanimity
(2) When Chase speaks of laws "declaring acts to be treason, which until California's decision in Frazer, have continued to state" that "laws reviving time-
were nottreason when committed," ibid., he uses this language for his alternative barred prosecutions are ex post facto" and, "when necessary, so to hold." Supra,at
description of first category laws, and not second category laws, supra, at 5; and 9-10. That statement is accurate. The dissent refers to no case, outside of California,
that has held, or even suggested, anything to the contrary.
(3) Wooddeson says nothing about recharacterizing crimes and instead uses the
Clarendon and Atterbury examples to illustrate laws that "principally affect the Of course, one might claim that the judges who wrote the cited opinions did not
punishment, making therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or consider the matter as thoroughly as has the dissent or used precisely the same
disability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law," 2 Systematical View 638 (some kind of reasoning. The dissent makes this kind of argument in its discussion of the
emphasis added). old New Jersey case, Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203 (1881)—a case that we believe
supports our view. The dissent says that the Moore court "expressly stated that a
Of course, we do not know whether Chase and Wooddeson, in using such language, statute reviving an expired limitations period `is not covered by any of [Justice
had statutes of limitations specifically in mind. We know only that their descriptions Chase's] classes.' " Post, at 3. And the dissent draws from this language the
of ex post facto laws and the relevant historical examples indicate an ex post conclusion that Moore "flatly contradict[s]" our views. Post, at 3-4.
facto category broad enough to include retroactive changes in, and applications of,
those statutes. And we know that those descriptions fit this case—the dissent's
historical exegesis notwithstanding.
The dissent, however, has taken the language that it quotes out of context. In We add that, whatever the exact counts of categories of cases that we cite,
context, the court's statement reflects a conclusion that the language of Justice cf. post,at 1-2, it is not surprising that most of these cases involve dicta, while only a
Chase's first description of the categories (which Moore used the word "classes" to handful involve clear holdings. Where the law has long been accepted as clearly
describe) does not fit cases in which a State revives time-barred prosecutions. settled, few cases are likely to arise, and cases that do arise most likely involve
The Moore court immediately adds, however, that Chase's alternative description of bordering areas of law, such as new limitations statutes enacted prior to expiration of
second category laws does fit this case. Indeed, it "easily embraces" a statute that, pre-existing limitations periods. Consistent with this expectation, one commentator
like the statute here, retroactively extends an expired statute of limitations and noted in 1993 that the question of whether to give retroactive effect to the extension
"exactly describes [its] operation." 43 N. J. L., at 216-217 (emphasis added). Had the of unexpired limitations periods had "become timely due to state legislature
New Jersey court had the benefit of Carmell, 529 U. S., at 522-524, and n. 9, or amendments during the early 1980s that lengthen the limitation period for the crimes
perhaps even of the dissent itself, post, at 10, 17, would it not have recognized of rape and sexual intercourse with a child." Corman, Limitation of Actions §1.6, at
Chase's alternative description as an authoritative account of elements of Chase's 36. The law at issue today represents a kind of extreme variant that, given the legal
"classes"? Would it then not have withdrawn its earlier statement, which the dissent consensus of unconstitutionality, has not likely been often enacted in our Nation's
quotes? Would it not have simply held that the statute did fall within the second history. Cf. 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law §219a, p. 127 (rev. 4th ed. 1868) (declining to
category? Our reading of the case leads us to answer these questions affirmatively, answer whether a law reviving time-barred prosecutions was ex post facto in part
but we leave the interested reader to examine the case and draw his or her own because "it is not likely to come before the courts").
conclusions.
Neither should it be surprising if the reasoning in a string of cases stretching back
The dissent draws special attention to another case, State v. Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. over nearly 150 years is not perfectly consistent with modern conceptions of how
66 (1860), arguing that it is "inapposite" because it "avoided the issue" of whether a legal analysis should proceed. After all, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), an
law was ex post facto "by holding that the statute was not meant to apply opinion relied on by the dissent, post, at 8-9, is itself vulnerable to criticism that its
retroactively." Post, at 2. Here is the court's analysis, virtually in full: "method of analysis is foreclosed by this Court's precedents," post, at 6.
See Collins,497 U. S., at 45-46. In assessing the case law, we find the essential fact
"In this case the bar of the statute of limitations of one year was completed before to be the unanimity of judicial views that the kind of statute before us is ex post
the code went into operation The state having neglected to prosecute within the time facto. See supra, at 9-11.
prescribed for its own action, lost the right to prosecute the suit. To give an act of the
legislature, passed after such loss, the effect of reviving the right of action in the The situation is similar with respect to commentators. Here, the essential fact is that,
state, would give it an operation ex post facto, which we cannot suppose the over a span of well over a century, commentators have come to the same
legislature intended." 25 Tex. Supp., at 67. conclusion, and have done so with virtual unanimity. See supra, at 11-12. We say
"virtual," for the dissent identifies one commentator who did not, namely, Joel
The reader can make up his own mind. Bishop—the same commentator relied on 122 years ago by the dissent in Moore,
supra, at 240. The Moore majority rejected Bishop's conclusion. So did other
Neither can we accept the dissent's view that Judge Learned Hand's like-minded contemporary courts and commentators. Supra, at 9-12. We do the same.
comments in Falter were "unsupported," post, at 5. In fact, Judge Hand's comments
had support in pre-existing case law, commentary, and published legislative C
debates, supra, at 9-12, and Hand's opinion specifically cited Moore and two other
early cases, Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506 (1880), and People v. The dissent says it is a "fallacy" to apply the label " `unfair and dishonest' " to this
Buckner, 281 Ill. 340, 117 N. E. 1023 (1917). Falter, 23 F. 2d, at 425. statute, a law that revives long-dead prosecutions. Post, at 18-19. The dissent
supports this conclusion with three arguments. First, it suggests that "retroactive
extension of unexpired statutes of limitations" is no less unfair. Post, at 19. Second, constitutional interest in forbidding the State to revive a longforbidden prosecution.
the dissent refers to the small likelihood that "criminals keep calendars" to mark the And to hold that such a law is ex post facto does not prevent the State from
expiration of limitations periods, and it mocks the possibility that revival "destroys a extending time limits for the prosecution of future offenses, or for prosecutions not
reliance interest." Ibid. Third, the dissent emphasizes the harm that child molestation yet time barred.
causes, a harm that "will plague the victim for a lifetime," and stresses the need to
convict those who abuse children. Post, at 20-21. In sum, California's law subjects an individual such as Stogner to prosecution long
after the State has, in effect, granted an amnesty, telling him that he is "at liberty to
In making the first argument, the dissent reverses field, abandoning its historical return to his country . . . and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
literalism to appeal to practical consequences. But history, case law, and proofs of his innocence," Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice §316, at 210. See
constitutional purposes all are relevant. At a minimum, the first two of these also Moore, 43 N. J. L., at 223-224. It retroactively withdraws a complete defense to
adequately explain the difference between expired and unexpired statutes of prosecution after it has already attached, and it does so in a manner that allows the
limitations, and Chase's alternative description of second category laws itself State to withdraw this defense at will and with respect to individuals already
supports such a distinction. See supra, at 5-6, 10-11. identified. See supra, at 3-4. "Unfair" seems to us a fair characterization.

In making its second argument, which denies the existence of significant reliance IV
interests, the dissent ignores the potentially lengthy period of time (in this case, 22
years) during which the accused lacked notice that he might be prosecuted and The statute before us is unfairly retroactive as applied to Stogner. A long line of
during which he was unaware, for example, of any need to preserve evidence of judicial authority supports characterization of this law as ex post facto. For the
innocence. See supra, at 3. Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear. reasons stated, we believe the law falls within Justice Chase's second category
See supra, at 8. Such problems can plague child abuse cases, where recollection of ex post facto laws. We conclude that a law enacted after expiration of a previously
after so many years may be uncertain, and "recovered" memories faulty, but may applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to
nonetheless lead to prosecutions that destroy families. See, e.g., Holdsworth, Is It revive a previously time-barred prosecution. The California court's judgment to the
Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The contrary is
Controversy and Its Potential Legal Implications, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 103, 103-
104 (1998). Regardless, a constitutional principle must apply not only in child abuse Reversed.
cases, but in every criminal case. And, insofar as we can tell, the dissent's principle
would permit the State to revive a prosecution for any kind of crime JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and
without anytemporal limitation. Thus, in the criminal context, the dissent JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
goes beyond our prior statements of what is constitutionally permissible even in the
analogous civil context. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 312, n. California has enacted a retroactive extension of statutes of limitations for serious
8, and 315-316 (1945) (acknowledging that extension of even an sexual offenses committed against minors. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §803(g) (West
expired civil limitations period can unconstitutionally infringe upon a "vested Supp. 2003). The new period includes cases where the limitations period has
right"); William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., 268 U. S. 633, 637 expired before the effective date of the legislation. To invalidate the statute in the
(1925) (holding the same). But see post, at 6, 22. It is difficult to believe that the latter circumstance, the Court tries to force it into the second category
Constitution grants greater protection from unfair retroactivity to property than to of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), which prohibits a retroactive law
human liberty. "'that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.'" Ante, at
4 (quoting Calder, supra, at 390 (emphasis in original)). These words, in my view, do
As to the dissent's third argument, we agree that the State's interest in prosecuting not permit the Court's holding, but indeed foreclose it. A law which does not alter the
child abuse cases is an important one. But there is also a predominating
definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime "greater The case law compiled by the Court is deficient, furthermore, at a more fundamental
than it was, when committed." Until today, a plea in bar has not been thought to form level. Our precedents hold that the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause is strictly
any part of the definition of the offense. limited to the precise formulation of the Calder categories. We have made it clear
that these categories provide "an exclusive definition of ex post
To overcome this principle, the Court invokes "a long line of authority holding that a facto laws," Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 42 (1990), and have admonished
law of this type violates the Ex Post Facto Clause." Ante, at 13. The Court's list of that it is "a mistake to stray beyond Calder's four categories," Carmell v. Texas, 529
precedents, ante, at 9-11, is less persuasive than it may appear at a first glance. Of U. S. 513, 539 (2000). Justice Chase himself stressed that the categories must be
the 22 cases cited by the Court, only 4 had to decide whether a revival of construed with caution to avoid any unnecessary extension: "I am under a necessity
expired prosecutions was constitutional. See Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203, 216- to give a construction, or explanation of the words, `ex post facto law,' because they
217 (1881); United States v. Fraidin, 63 F. Supp. 271, 276 (Md. have not any certain meaning attached to them. But I will not go farther than I feel
1945); People v. Shedd, 702 P. 2d 267, 268 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (per myself bound to do; and if I ever exercise the jurisdiction I will not decide any law to
curiam); Commonwealth v. Rocheleau, 404 Mass. 129, 130-131, 533 N. E. 2d 1333, be void, but in a very clear case." 3 Dall., at 395.
1334 (1989), cited ante, at 9-10. These four cases— which are the only cases that
are relevant—will be discussed in due course. The Court seems to recognize these principles, ante, at 4, but then relies on cases
which flatly contradict them. The opinion of the New Jersey's Court of Errors and
The case of State v. Sneed, 25 Tex. Supp. 66, 67 (1860), cited ante, at 9, is Appeals in Moore v. State, supra, on which the Court places special emphasis,
inapposite. There, the court avoided the issue by holding that the statute was not see ante, at 6, 9, 21, 23, 25, expressly stated that a statute reviving an expired
meant to apply retroactively. Interpreting the statute so as to avoid invalidation on limitations period "is not covered by any of [Justice Chase's] classes." 43 N. J. L., at
constitutional grounds, Sneed did not pass on the merits. Even if the court 216. The Moore court made a fleeting mention that the statute might fall within
addressed the merits, its cursory paragraph-long opinion, reproduced by the majority Chase's fourth category, but immediately dismissed this line of inquiry. Instead, it
in its entirety, ante, at 22, contains no reference to Justice Chase's classification, nor proceeded to "[l]oo[k] away from his classification to what he states to have been the
indeed any analysis whatsoever. This unreasoned opinion scarcely supports the motive for and principle sustaining the edict." Ibid. As Collins and Carmellexplained,
majority's novel interpretation of Calder's second category. this expansive approach to the Ex Post Facto Clause is contrary to Calder's
admonition that its categories must be followed with care.
In the remaining 17 cases, the question was not presented. As the Court itself
concedes, eight of these cases considered only extensions of unexpired statutes of The majority's lengthy defense of Moore's legitimacy, ante, at 21, exposes the
limitations, and upheld them. Ante, at 10-11. The Court does not mention that nine weaknesses both of that case and of the Court's opinion. The majority
other cases have done so as well. See People ex rel. Reibman v. Warden, 242 App. argues Moore's statement that the statute was not covered by Justice Chase's
Div. 282, 275 N. Y. S. 59 (1934); State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash. 2d 662, 740 P. 2d categories referred only to the principal description of these categories, but not to the
848 (1987)(en banc); State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 768 P. 2d 268 alternative one the Court now seeks to embrace. The view that a statute not covered
(1989); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 796 P. 2d 121 by Justice Chase's main formulations—the only formulations our cases have treated
(1990); State v. Schultzen, 522 N. W. 2d 833 (Iowa 1994); State v. Comeau, 142 N. as authoritative— may still be ex post facto if it falls within his historical examples is
H. 84, 697 A. 2d 497 (1997); State v. Hamel, 138 N. H. 392, 643 A. 2d 953 a view no court until today has endorsed. The Moore court was no exception. When
(1994); Santiago v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 39, 697 N. E. 2d 979 (1998), it held that the state statute was "not covered by any of [Justice Chase's]
cited ante, at 9-10. Because these cases did not need to decide whether the Ex Post classes," Moore made clear it was looking beyond the language of
Facto Clause would bar the extension of expired limitations periods, the question the Calder categories: "Judge Chase did not consider his classes as exhaustive,"
did not receive the same amount of attention as if the courts were required to and so "a statute substantially imposing punishment for a previous act which, without
dispose of the issue. the statute, would not be so punishable, is an ex post facto law, although it may not
be included in the letter of Judge Chase's rules." 43 N. J. L., at 216, 220. The point
was further emphasized by the separate opinion of Chancellor Runyon, a member of 123 (citing Falter and supplying no analysis of its own); State v. Hirsch, 245 Neb. 31,
the one-judge Moore majority that invalidated the law as ex post facto: "[W]here the 39, 511 N. W. 2d 69, 76 (1994) (relying on Falter); Hamel, 138 N. H., at 395, 643 A.
enactment, in whatever guise legislative ingenuity or subtlety may present it, inflicts 2d, at 955 (same). Since these cases applied the methodology our Court has
the substantial injury, and does the essential wrong which the constitution sought to disavowed, they provide the majority with scant support. None of them even
guard against, a true interpretation will hold it to be within the prohibition." Id., at 226. discussed the issue in terms of Calder's second category, much less construed that
The references to "substantia[l] imposi[tion of] punishment" and "substantial injury" category in the manner today's decision improperly proposes. The flaw of these
are reminiscent of the references to "substantial protections" and "substantial cases is not, as the majority argues, that they are "not perfectly consistent with
personal rights" used to enlarge the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause and modern conceptions of how legal analysis should proceed," ante, at 23; the flaw is
disapproved of in Collins. 497 U. S., at 46. By endorsing Moore, the majority seeks that their method of analysis is foreclosed by this Court's precedents.
to resurrect this rejected reasoning here.
The majority turns for help to a roster of commentators who concluded that revival of
The other precedents the Court invokes—both the cases where extension of expired statutes of limitations is precluded by the ex post facto guarantee.
expired statutes of limitations was at issue and the cases which merely opined on See ante, at 11-12. Some of the commentators applied the same expansive
the question in dicta—have the same flaw. The misconception causing it arises from approach we have declared impermissible in Collins and Carmell. Henry Black, on
Judge Learned Hand's dictum, mentioned while holding that an extension of an whose work the Court relies the most, see ante, at 6, 7, 11, 12, openly
unexpired statute of limitations is not ex post facto, that if the statute had expired acknowledged that the revival of expired statutes of limitations is not covered by any
there would be a violation. Falter v. United States, 23 F. 2d 420, 425 (CA2 1928). of the Calder categories. See Constitutional Prohibitions Against Legislation
Judge Hand based this distinction on a citation of the faulty decision in Moore and on Impairing the Obligations of Contracts, and Against Retroactive and Ex Post Facto
his belief that whether an extension of a limitations period is ex post facto "turns Laws §227, p. 291 (1887). Black, moreover, relied on the example of the civil
upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair statutes of limitations, which he believed could not be revived. Id., §235, at 296-297.
play." Falter, supra, at 425-426. The Court's opinion is premised on the same The Court's later caselaw has rendered this interpretation questionable. See, e.g.,
approach. It relies on Judge Hand for the proposition that an extension of expired Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314-316 (1945). Other
limitations periods " `seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.'" Ante, at 3 commentators relied, often with no analysis, on the Moore and Falter line of cases,
(quoting Falter, supra, at 426). In previous cases, however, the Court has explained which were plagued by methodological infirmities since discovered. See authorities
that this conception of our ex post facto jurisprudence is incorrect: "[W]hile the cited ante, at 12. None of these scholars explained their conclusion by reference
principle of unfairness helps explain and shape the Clause's scope, it is not a to Calder's second category.
doctrine unto itself, invalidating laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause by its own
force." Carmell, supra, at 533, n. 23 (citing W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental There are scholars who have considered with care the meaning of that category; and
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U. S. 400, 409 (1990)). they reached the conclusion stated in this dissent, not the conclusion embraced by
the majority. In his treatise on retroactive legislation, William Wade defined the
It was the unsupported Hand observation that formed the rationale applied by many category as covering the law "which undertakes to aggravate a past offence, and
of the cases the Court cites, including all the post-Moore cases where expired make it greater than when committed, endeavors to bring it under some description
limitations periods were at issue. See Fraidin, 63 F. Supp., at 276 (relying of transgression against which heavier penalties or more severe punishments have
on Falterand containing no discussion of the Calder categories); Shedd, 702 P. 2d, been denounced: as, changing the character of an act which, when committed, was
at 268(same); Hodgson, 108 Wash. 2d, at 667-668, 740 P. 2d, at 851 (relying on, a misdemeanor, to a crime; or, declaring a previously committed offence, of one of
and quoting from, Falter); Rocheleau, 404 Mass., at 130, 533 N. E. 2d, at the classes graduated, and designated by the number of its degree, to be of a higher
1334 (containing no Calderanalysis but relying instead on its earlier decision degree than it was when committed." Operation and Construction of Retroactive
in Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589, 524 N. E. 2d 829 (1988), which in Laws §273, pp. 317-318 (1880). Joel Prentiss Bishop's work on statutory crimes
turn was based on Falter); O'Neill,118 Idaho, at 246, 796 P. 2d, at concluded that a law reviving expired prosecution "is not within any of the
recognized legal definitions of an ex post facto law." Commentaries on the Law of punishment to be meted out." Ibid. In other words, the Ohio statute fell into none of
Statutory Crimes §266, p. 294 (rev. 3d ed. 1901). The author's explanation is an apt the first three Calder categories. The second category, as the Beazell Court
criticism of the Court's opinion: "The punishment which it renders possible, by understood it, covered those retroactive statutes which "affect the criminal quality of
forbidding the defense of lapse of time, is exactly what the law provided when `the the act charged [by] chang[ing] the legal definition of the offense." 269 U. S., at 170.
fact' transpired. No bending of language, no supplying of implied meanings, can, in The California statute challenged by petitioner changes only the timespan within
natural reason, work out the contrary conclusion.... The running of the old statute which the action against him may be filed; it does not alter the criminal quality
had taken from the courts the right to proceed against the offender, leaving the assigned to the offense.
violated without its former remedy; but it had not obliterated the fact that the law
forbade the act when it was done, or removed from the doer's mind his original The Court's opinion renders the second Calder category unlimited and the
consciousness of guilt." Id., §266, at 294-295. In reaching his conclusion, Bishop surrounding categories redundant. A law which violates the first Calder category
considered, and rejected, the argument put forth by the Moore majority. Id., §266, at would also violate the Court's conception of category two, because such a law would
295, and n. 5. This rejection does not, as the majority believes, undermine Bishop's "inflic[t] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any
conclusion, see ante, at 23; given Moore's infirmities, it strengthens the validity of punishment." Ante, at 5 (emphasis removed and internal quotation marks omitted).
his interpretation. The majority attempts to eliminate this redundancy by limiting its definition to
instances where the conduct was criminal, yet if Justice Chase's alternative
This definition of Calder's second category is necessary for consistency with our description of the second category is supposed to be definitive of its scope, ante, at
accepted understanding of categories one and three. The first concerns laws 4, it would seem to strike broader than the Court's limiting construction. Similarly, a
declaring innocent acts to be a crime; the third prohibits retroactive increases in retroactive law increasing punishment in violation of the third category would also
punishment. 3 Dall., at 390. The first three categories guard against the common constitute an "innovation" for which, prior to the passage of the new law, the offender
problem of retroactive redefinition of conduct by criminalizing it (category one), was not liable, ante, at 5, and so be prohibited under the Court's unbounded
enhancing its criminal character (category two), or increasing the applicable interpretation of category two. The Court's new definition not only distorts the original
punishment (category three). The link between these categories was noted by meaning of the second Calder category, but also threatens the coherence of the
Justice Paterson in Calder itself: "The enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to overall ex post facto scheme.
come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore
they may be classed together." Id., at 397. Realizing the inconsistency, the majority scarcely refers to the authoritative language
Justice Chase used to describe the second category. Instead, the Court relies on
The point is well illustrated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), whose what it terms Justice Chase's alternative description of that category, which speaks
formulation of the Calder categories we later described as "faithful to our best about laws which " `inflict[ed] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to
knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Collins, 497 any punishment.'" Ante, at 5 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Calder, 3 Dall., at 389).
U. S., at 43. Beazell involved a retroactively applied law providing for joint trials for These words are not, strictly speaking, a description of the second category itself;
most felonies, with separate trials allowed only when requested by one of the they are a description of the category's historical origins. Justice Chase used them to
defendants or the prosecutor, and only with the leave of the court. 269 U. S., at 168- refer to certain laws passed by the British Parliament which led the Founders to
169. The prior law had provided for separate trials whenever a defendant so adopt the Ex Post Facto Clause; he did not intend them as a definitive description of
requested. Id., at 168. Reviewing an ex post facto challenge to the new law, the the laws prohibited by that constitutional provision. Ibid.This description of a
Court noted that the first three Calder categories address "the criminal quality category's origins may, of course, shed light on the meaning of Justice Chase's
attributable to an act." 269 U. S., at 170. Applying this definition, the Court held the principal formulation, which was meant to be definitive. The Court, however, uses
state statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because "[i]t does not deprive Chase's alternative description as the independent operative definition of that
[the defendant] of any defense previously available, nor affect the criminal quality of category. None of our precedents, until today, based their holding on the language
the act charged. Nor does it change the legal definition of the offense or the
of Justice Chase's alternative description, certainly not in situations when the statute treasonous offense. Even if Parliament assumed, on the basis of Clarendon's flight,
under review would not fit within the principal formulation. that the allegations were true, see id., at 389-390, that constructive admission did
not alter the fact that, under the laws of the time, the allegations could not support a
The Court, in any event, misunderstands the alternative description. As our charge of treason. By enacting the bill, Parliament declared these allegations
precedents have instructed, this description must be viewed in the context of the sufficient to constitute treason. Some parliamentary colloquy suggested, moreover,
history of the British parliamentary enactments to which Justice Chase that Clarendon was being punished for his flight, rather than for offenses alleged.
referred. Ante, at 6; cf. Carmell, 529 U. S., at 526-530 (examining the historical See id., at 389 ("[I]t is plain, if you proceed upon this bill, you go not upon your
circumstances of the case of Sir John Fenwick, cited by Justice Chase as an impeachment, but because he is fled from the justice of the land"). A flight from
example of the fourth ex post facto category, in order "[t]o better understand the type justice was not considered an offense so severe as to warrant banishment, "the
of law that falls within that category"). With respect to the second category, Justice highest punishment next to death." Id., at 386. If the offense of flight was enhanced
Chase provided two examples: the banishments of Lord Clarendon in 1667 and of because of the prior offenses, then it was an increase in the gravity of the crime after
Bishop Francis Atterbury in 1723. Calder, supra, at 389, and n. ‡ (citing 19 Car. II, c. its commission. Either way, the legislation increased the gravity of Clarendon's
10; 9 Geo. I, c. 17). A consideration of both historical episodes confirms that Calder's offense.
second category concerns only laws which change the nature of an offense to make
it greater than it was at the time of commission, thereby subjecting the offender to The bill passed against Clarendon accomplished what English common-law scholar
increased punishment. Richard Wooddeson described as the danger against which the second ex post
factocategory was designed to guard. The bill "ma[de] some innovation, or creat[ed]
Justice Chase and, it can be presumed, the Founders were familiar with the some forfeiture or disability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law." 2 A
parliamentary proceedings leading to the banishment of the Earl of Clarendon. Systematic View of the Laws of England 638 (1792) (hereinafter Wooddeson). It was
Clarendon, former Lord Chancellor and principal advisor to Charles II, was Wooddeson's interpretation of the English common-law that Justice Chase relied
impeached by the House of Commons on charges of treason. Edward Earl of upon. See Calder, 3 Dall., at 391; Carmell, supra, at 522-523, and n. 10; ante, at 6.
Clarendon's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 292, 330-334, 350 (1667) (hereinafter Clarendon's The Court argues that the innovation deplored by Wooddeson was the imposition of
Trial); G. Miller, Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon 20-21 (1983). The House of Lords, a sanction (banishment) which, under settled law, was the prerogative of Parliament,
however, refused to commit Clarendon to trial, finding the allegations not cognizable not of the courts. Ante, at 6-7. That may be so, but it cannot help the Court because
as treason under the law. Clarendon's Trial 358, 367. With the two Houses this is not what California has done. Section 803(g) did not impose any punishment
deadlocked, Clarendon left the country, an exit wise for his safety, perhaps, but not not otherwise contained in the California Penal Code. It did what legislatures have
for his cause. For upon his departure the impeachment was abandoned yet done throughout history: It specified when the criminal justice system may prosecute
Parliament agreed on a bill banishing Clarendon for treason and imposing an certain crimes. The majority tries to explain away this distinction as "not
extensive range of civil disabilities. Id., at 374, 385, 390-391. determinative," ante, at 7, but it makes all the difference. By imposing on a particular
offender a punishment not prescribed by the existing legal norms a legislature
The principal objection raised against the impeachment charges was that they did signals its judgment that the gravity of the offense warrants its special intervention.
not, under the law of the time, constitute treason. Id., at 342-346, 348-349, 350, 356- In contrast, by prescribing general rules for the adjudication of offenses the
360, 367-372. The objection was not, it must be noted, that the charges were legislature leaves the determination of the offender's culpability entirely to the courts.
premised on innocent conduct. (If that were the nature of the objection, Justice
Chase would have used the case to illustrate his first category, rather than his The majority's explanation of the English precedents, in all events, is not the most
second one.) In fact, the impeachment explicitly alleged that Clarendon violated the logical one. Justice Chase's alternative description covered enactments which
law. See id., at 330-333. The objection made by Chase and by later legal scholars "inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any
was that by the act of banishment the House sought to elevate criminal behavior of punishment." Calder, supra, at 389. Though only a parliamentary Act could subject
lower magnitude to the level of treason, thereby redefining what constitutes a an individual to banishment in 17th-century England, Parliament's power to pass
such Acts was unquestioned. See 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 569 Clarendon example lends no support to the majority's position, but instead undercuts
(1938). A sanction of banishment was acknowledged as a punishment provided for it.
by the existing laws, both at the time of Clarendon's trial and afterwards.
See, e.g., Craies, Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. Rev. 388, 392 It must be acknowledged that, as the majority points out, a number of historians
(1890) ("[B]anishment, perpetual or temporary, was well known to the common law"); have treated one of the charges levied against Clarendon, that of betraying the
An Act for Punishment of Rogues, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 4, s. 4 (1597) (permitting banishment King's secrets to the enemy, as impeachable treason. Ante, at 15-16. The historical
of dangerous rogues); the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 28 (1829) judgment, however, is not as uniform as the Court makes it seem. See 7 E. Foss,
(providing for the banishment of Jesuits). By law, then, a charge of high treason Judges of England 130 (1864) ("No one can read the articles [against Clarendon]
would have made Clarendon liable to banishment, which is inconsistent with Justice without seeing the weakness and frivolity of the allegations, none of them, even if
Chase's formulation. true, amounting to treason"); R. Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems
45-46 (1974) (explaining the articles of impeachment against Clarendon as based
To explain away the inconsistency, the Court redefines the words "by law" to refer on the Parliament's power to declare certain nontreasonous offenses to be treason).
only to punishments "not otherwise available `in the ordinary course of law.'" Ante,at
7 (quoting 2 Wooddeson 638). As already explained, it was an accepted procedure Historians are in agreement, though, that the Commons could not substantiate the
in 17th-century England for Parliament to pass laws imposing banishment. charge of betraying secrets to the enemy. 2 H. Hallam, Constitutional History of
England: From the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II 367, 373 (rev.
The majority must mean, then, that banishment was not available through the courts. ed. 1881); Roberts, The Impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon, 13 Camb. Hist. J.
At the time of Clarendon's trial, however, British courts were empowered to 13-14 (1957); Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England, 84 Yale L. J.
adjudicate treason and to punish it with death. 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *348- 1419, 1426 (1975); Berger, supra, at 45, n. 193. It is due to this absence of evidence
*351; see also 2 Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law 1799-1800 (2d ed. 1977). If the that the Commons refused to produce particulars of the treason charge against
charges against Clarendon accurately alleged treason, he was eligible, through Clarendon, insisting instead the Lords trust their word that the underlying conduct
ordinary judicial proceedings, to receive capital punishment, which was obviously a was treasonous. Although the technical grounds for the Lords' objection to this
sanction more severe than banishment. For the majority's historical explanation to charge was the lack of specificity, the objection can also be viewed as reflecting a
work, Justice Chase's alternative description of the second category would have to belief that the Commons were attempting to aggravate Clarendon's offenses by
prohibit laws which inflicted a punishment where the party was not, through normal labeling them as treason absent any justification. As Henry Hallam has explained in
judicial proceedings, liable to that precise punishment but was liable to a greater his respected study of the English constitutional history, "if the house of lords shall
one. This formulation can hardly be reconciled with the words Justice Chase used, be of opinion, either by consulting the judges or otherwise, that no treason is
much less with his principal formulation of the second category. A legislature does specially alleged, they should, notwithstanding any technical words, treat the offence
not make an individual's crime "greater than it was, when committed," Calder, 3 as a misdemeanor." 2 Hallam, supra, at 413. Justice Chase could have viewed the
Dall., at 390, by assigning a punishment less severe than the one available through betrayal of secrets charge in a similar way, as a subterfuge through which the
the courts. Commons were trying to elevate Clarendon's offenses to the level of treason.

If Justice Chase's reference to Clarendon's trial is to have explanatory power, one The proposed interpretation of Clarendon's example is reinforced by considering the
must look for an alternative interpretation. What was repulsive to Chase and proceedings against Bishop Francis Atterbury, who, in the midst of hysteria over
Wooddeson in Clarendon's trial was not the imposition of banishment as such, but both real and supposed Jacobite plots, was accused of conspiracy to depose
that the sanction was outside the limits of what Clarendon's offense merited under George I. The evidence against Atterbury was meager, and supporters of the Crown,
the law established at the time of its commission, and was instead premised on fearing that neither the common-law courts nor even the House of Lords would
Parliament's exaggeration of the gravity of the offense. Viewed this way, the convict, introduced a bill of banishment. G. Bennett, Tory Crisis in Church and State,
1688-1730, pp. 258-265 (1975); Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 640
(1723) (reprint 2000) (hereinafter Atterbury's Trial). The bill declared Atterbury a The character of the offense is therefore unchanged; it is perceived by the criminal
traitor, and subjected him to a range of punishments not previously imposed, justice system in the same way as before, and punished with the same force. The
including exile and civil death. Id., at 644-646; Bennett, supra, at 265. The Duke of only change is that Stogner may now be prosecuted, whereas prior to the statute the
Wharton, who registered the lengthiest dissent, commented that "this Bill seems as prosecution could not have taken place. These illustrative examples, then, suggest
irregular in the punishments it inflicts, as it is in its foundation, and carries with it an the second Calder category encompasses only the laws which, to the detriment of
unnatural degree of hardship." Atterbury's Trial 691. The only bill of comparable the defendant, change the character of the offense to make it greater than it was at
harshness was the Act banishing Clarendon. Those sanctions were more mild, id., at the time of commission.
691-692, but, as we have seen, just as violative of the rule against penalties
imposed after the fact. As in the case of Clarendon, Parliament adjudged Atterbury's The majority seems to suggest that retroactive extension of expired limitations
offense to be so grave as to merit a singularly severe punishment. The bill designed periods is "`arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation,'" ante, at 3-4
vindictive forfeitures and disabilities not imposed in the ordinary course of law. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 29, and n. 10 (1981)), but does not
attempt to support this accusation. And it could not do so. The California statute can
The Atterbury case illustrates again the close relationship between the second and be explained as motivated by legitimate concerns about the continuing suffering
the third Calder categories. See supra, at 8 (quoting Calder, supra, at 397 (Paterson, endured by the victims of childhood abuse.
J.)). As already explained, supra, at 8-9, the Court's misconstruction of Justice
Chase's historical examples takes the second category out of this logical continuum. The California Legislature noted that "young victims often delay reporting sexual
Contrary to the majority's belief, ante, at 18, an interpretation which highlights the abuse because they are easily manipulated by offenders in positions of authority and
link between these two categories is more faithful to the original understanding. trust, and because children have difficulty remembering the crime or facing the
Richard Wooddeson, the Court's preferred commentator, discussed these two trauma it can cause." People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737, 744, 982 P. 2d 180, 183-
categories together, noting that both "principally affect the punishment." 2 184 (1999). The concern is amply supported by empirical studies. See, e.g., Summit,
Wooddeson 638-640; see also id., at 624. Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, in 1 J. of Child Sexual
Abuse 153, 156-163 (1992); Lyon, Scientific Support for Expert Testimony on Child
Atterbury's trial also illustrates why the majority's interpretation of the historical Sexual Abuse Accommodation, in Critical Issues in Child Sexual Abuse 107, 114-
examples as premised on the courts' inability to impose banishment is untenable. 120 (J. Conte ed. 2002).
See supra, at 13-14. Had Atterbury been convicted of treason through the courts, he
would have been subject to capital punishment. Parliament's decision to prosecute The problem the legislature sought to address is illustrated well by this case.
Atterbury may have been driven by fear of backlash provoked by a death sentence, Petitioner's older daughter testified she did not report the abuse because she was
for Atterbury enjoyed considerable popularity and sympathy in some circles. See afraid of her father and did not believe anyone would help her. After she left
Bennett, supra, at 259. Wooddeson speculated, in an observation in tension with the petitioner's home, she tried to forget the abuse. Petitioner's younger daughter did not
majority's interpretation, that Atterbury's sentence may have been motivated by a report the abuse because she was scared. He tried to convince her it was a normal
desire "of mitigating punishment." 2 Wooddeson 639. The mitigation, of course, was way of life. Even after she moved out of petitioner's house, she was afraid to speak
in comparison to the possible death verdict, not, as already explained, in comparison for fear she would not be believed. She tried to pretend she had a normal childhood.
to the ordinary noncapital punishment Atterbury could have received. It was only her realization that the father continued to abuse other children in the
family that led her to disclose the abuse, in order to protect them.
Clarendon's and Atterbury's trials show why Stogner's case does not belong
in Calder's second ex post facto category. The California Legislature did not change The Court tries to counter by saying the California statute is " `unfair and dishonest'"
retroactively the description of Stogner's alleged offense so as to subject him to an because it violated the State's initial assurance to the offender that "`he has become
unprecedented and particularly severe punishment. The offense is described in the safe from its pursuit'" and deprived him of "the `fair warning.'" Ante, at 3
same terms as before the passage of §803(g); the punishment remains the same. (quoting Falter v. United States, 23 F. 2d, at 426; Weaver, supra, at 28). The fallacy
of this rationale is apparent when we recall that the Court is careful to leave in place does matter. We allow the civil wrong to be vindicated nonetheless. If we do so in
the uniform decisions by state and federal courts to uphold retroactive extension of the civil sphere where reliance is real, we should do so in the criminal sphere where
unexpired statutes of limitations against an ex post facto challenge. Ante, at 5-6. it is, for the most part, a fictional construct.

There are two rationales to explain the proposed dichotomy between unexpired and When a child molester commits his offense, he is well aware the harm will plague the
expired statutes, and neither works. The first rationale must be the assumption that if victim for a lifetime. See Briere & Runtz, Post Sexual Abuse Trauma: Data and
an expired statute is extended, the crime becomes more serious, thereby violating Implications for Clinical Practice, 2 J. of Interpersonal Violence 367, 374-376 (1987);
category two; but if an unexpired statute is extended, the crime does not increase in 1 J. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases §4.2, pp. 221-223 (2d ed.
seriousness. There is no basis in logic, our cases, or in the legal literature to support 1992); Browne & Finkelhor, Initial and Long-Term Effects: A Review of the
this distinction. Both extensions signal, with equal force, the policy to prosecute Research, in A Sourcebook on Child Sexual Abuse 143, 150-164 (D. Finkelhor et al.
offenders. eds. 1986). The victims whose interests §803(g) takes into consideration have been
subjected to sexual abuse within the confines of their own homes and by people they
This leaves the second rationale, which must be that an extension of the expired trusted and relied upon for protection. A familial figure of authority can use a
statute destroys a reliance interest. We should consider whether it is warranted to confidential relation to conceal a crime. The violation of this trust inflicts deep and
presume that criminals keep calendars so they can mark the day to discard their lasting hurt. Its only poor remedy is that the law will show its compassion and
records or to place a gloating phone call to the victim. The first expectation is minor concern when the victim at last can find the strength, and know the necessity, to
and likely imaginary; the second is not, but there is no conceivable reason the law come forward. When the criminal has taken distinct advantage of the tender years
should honor it. And either expectation assumes, of course, the very result the Court and perilous position of a fearful victim, it is the victim's lasting hurt, not the
reaches; for if the law were otherwise, there would be no legitimate expectation. The perpetrator's fictional reliance, that the law should count the higher. The victims
reliance exists, if at all, because of the circular reason that the Court today says so; it whose cause is now before the Court have at last overcome shame and the desire to
does not exist as part of our traditions or social understanding. repress these painful memories. They have reported the crimes so that the violators
are brought to justice and harm to others is prevented. The Court now tells the
In contrast to the designation of the crime, which carries a certain measure of social victims their decision to come forward is in vain.
opprobrium and presupposes a certain punishment, the statute of limitations has
little or no deterrent effect. See Note, Retroactive Application of Legislatively The gravity of the crime was known, and is being measured, by its wrongfulness
Enlarged Statutes of Limitations for Child Abuse: Time's No Bar to Revival, 22 Ind. L. when committed. It is a common policy for States to suspend statutes of limitations
Rev. 989, 1014 (1989) ("The statute of limitations has no measurable impact on for civil harms against minors, in order to "protec[t] minors during the period when
allegedly criminal behavior, neither encouraging nor deterring such conduct"); Note, they are unable to protect themselves." 2 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §10.2.1,
Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 1491, 1513 (1975) p. 104 (1991). Some States toll the limitations periods for minors even where a
("[W]hile many defendants rely on substantive definitions of proscribed conduct, few guardian is appointed, see id., at 105-106, and even when the tolling conflicts with
rely on many of the numerous laws regulating the enforcement processes"). The statutes of repose, id., at 108. The difference between suspension and reactivation
Court does not claim a sex offender would desist if he knew he would be liable to is so slight that it is fictional for the Court to say, in the given context, the new policy
prosecution when his offenses were disclosed. somehow alters the magnitude of the crime. The wrong was made clear by the law
at the time of the crime's commission. The criminal actor knew it, even reveled in it.
The law's approach to the analogous problem of reliance by wrongdoers in the civil It is the commission of the then-unlawful act that the State now seeks to punish. The
sphere is instructive. We have held that expired statutes of limitations can be gravity of the crime is left unchanged by altering a statute of limitations of which the
repealed to revive a civil action. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp., 325 U. S., at actor was likely not at all aware.
314; Plaut v. Sprendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 229 (1995). These holdings
were made in the areas of contracts and investments where reliance does exist and
The California statute does not fit any of the remaining Calder categories: It does not
criminalize conduct which was innocent when done; it allows the prosecutor to seek
the same punishment as the law authorized at the time the offense was committed
and no more; and it does not alter the government's burden to establish the
elements of the crime. Any concern about stale evidence can be addressed by the
judge and the jury, and by the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 803(g), moreover, contains an additional safeguard: It conditions
prosecution on a presentation of independent evidence that corroborates the victim's
allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§803(g)(1),
(2)(B) (West Supp. 2003). These protections, as well as the general protection
against oppressive prosecutions offered by the Due Process Clause, should
assuage the majority's fear, ante, at 24, that the statute will have California overrun
by vindictive prosecutions resting on unreliable recovered memories. See United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789 (1977).

The statute does not violate petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause. We
have held, in the civil context, that expired statutes of limitations do not implicate
fundamental rights under the Clause. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp., supra, at
314. For reasons already explained, see supra, at 20-21, there is no reason to reach
a different conclusion here.

The Court's stretching of Calder's second category contradicts the historical

understanding of that category, departs from established precedent, and
misapprehends the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court also
disregards the interests of those victims of child abuse who have found the courage
to face their accusers and bring them to justice. The Court's opinion harms not only
our ex post facto jurisprudence but also these and future victims of child abuse, and
so compels my respectful dissent.
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA (SEPT 1989) Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
Republic of the Philippines whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
SUPREME COURT vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
Manila without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
EN BANC Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone
thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S a court order or search warrant.
RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
COMMAND, respondents.
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof
has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the
military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and
PADILLA, J.: seizure or other rights.

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of interest.
the people.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
association whose members are all members of the IBP.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
The factual background of the case is as follows: without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light
therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted
and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan
Police Director. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
VALMONTE V. DE VILLA (MAY 1990)
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right to "free
passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
EN BANC
of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For
as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
[G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990.]
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES’S RIGHTS
(ULAP), Petitioners, v. GEN.RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S.
COMMAND, Respondents.
Supreme Court: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and co-petitioners.

"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise
as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped
DECISION elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve
PADILLA, J.: the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where
it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those
In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for prohibition seeking the
cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals them there
declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was
was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in
dismissed.
locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review." 2
cha nrob les vi rtua l lawlib ra ry

Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and,
Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his
therefore, violative of the Constitution. 3
comment, to which petitioners filed a reply.
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all
and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable
checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-
are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized
offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints
the U.S. Supreme Court —
may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation
clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
"Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a
warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by
Ct 1302(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925).
either military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d’etat (stronger than all previous ones)
The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have
was staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d’etat is taken almost for granted.
‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence
The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed
pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search. . . ." 4
forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily
occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and
at an all-time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the
seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a
In People v. Kagui Malasuqui, it was held —
dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the
ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance.
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." 5
But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in
power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those
By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and
objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means
departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is
and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.
chanrobles vi rt ual lawli bra ry
 checkpoints are used only where absolutely needed and that the officers who are assigned to these
Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses checkpoints discharge their duties as professional soldiers or peace officers in the best traditions of the
committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court’s decision was concerned with power, i.e. military and the police. I repeat that this is a problem of enforcement and not legality. chanrob les law l ibra ry : red

whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But CRUZ, J., dissenting:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. I reiterate my original dissent and add the following observations.

The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of how some The majority would justify the checkpoints on the ground of rampant criminality, e.g., the failed coup,
checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the "sparrow" killings, murders, sex crimes, drug abuse, smuggling, etc. I was not aware that the failure
the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other of the authorities to suppress crime was an excuse to suspend the Bill of Rights. It has always been my
urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly impression that even criminals, and more so the innocent, are entitled to the right against unreasonable
become "experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy. chanrob les lawl ibra ry : red nad searches and seizures.

But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in uniform are rascals or The protection of the security of the State is a convenient pretext of the police state to suppress
thieves. The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they individual rights. Constitutional shortcuts should not be allowed in a free regime where the highest
are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military function of authority is precisely to exalt liberty.
"concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these
checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and The ponencia says that the Constitution is not violated because "the inspection of the vehicle is limited
dedicated. to a visual search." Assuming that this is all the search entails, it suffers from the additional defect of
inefficaciousness, making it virtually useless. It did not prevent the staging of the December 1 coup,
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the where the rebels used all kinds of high-powered weapons that were not detected by "a visual search." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, probable cause is determined "personally by the judge,"
authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts. 7 This tenet should be not by a soldier or a policeman. It is not for the peace officer to decide when a warrantless search and
ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher military authorities. seizure may be made save in the exceptional instances allowed, as where a crime is being committed or
before or after its commission. I can hardly believe that the majority is seriously offering this exception
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This denial is as a continuing situation to justify the regular warrantless searches at the checkpoints. chanrob les.co m:cralaw: red

FINAL.
It is easy to say that "where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless." Let
SO ORDERED. us at least be realistic. This Court would be the first to dismiss the complaint if not supported by hard
evidence, which we know is not easily come by. The remedy, in my view, is to remove the source of the
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and evil instead of leaving it unchecked and then simply suggesting a cure, which is not even effective. It is
Regalado, JJ., concur. like inoculating a patient after exposing him to contagion.

Gancayco, J., is on leave. SARMIENTO, J., dissenting: chanrob 1es virtual 1aw l ibra ry

Separate Opinions The majority states that checkpoints are justified by "grave peril." The question, however, is whether or
not the existence of such grave perils has the effect of suspending the Bill of Rights, specifically, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Under the Constitution," [a] state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution."
The problem we face in the resolution of this petition arises from our knowledge that law enforcement (CONST., art. VII, sec. 18). If not even martial law can suspend the fundamental law, I do not see how
officers use checkpoints as opportunities for mulcting, oppression, and other forms of abuse. However, a mere executive act can.
to completely ban checkpoints as unconstitutional is to lose sight of the fact that the real objective
behind their use is laudable and necessary. If we say that ALL checkpoints are unconstitutional, we are That the State has the light to defend itself is a proposition difficult to argue against. The query, again,
banning a law enforcement measure not because it is per se illegal but because it is being used for evil is whether or not it may defend itself against its enemies at the expense of liberty. After fourteen years
purposes by the soldiers or police who man it. of authoritarian rule, I think by now we should have learned our lesson, and known better.

This is another instance where the Supreme Court is urged to solve a problem of discipline facing the Although "routine inspections" are another matter, I can not think that the checkpoints in question have
executive and the military. My reluctant concurrence with the majority opinion is premised on the hope been meant to undertake routine inspections alone. As it is, no ground rules have been given our law
that our top military and police officials will devise effective measures which would insure that enforcers, which is to say that they have the carte blanche to search vehicles and even persons without
the benefit of a valid judicial warrant. I do not believe that this can be done in a constitutional regime.

I find references to the case of People v. Kagui Malasugui [63 Phil. 221 (1936)] to be inapt. In that case,
there was a waiver of the right against unreasonable search and secondly, there existed a clear probable
cause for search and arrest. Certainly, there was reason for excepting the case from the rule. Malasugui,
however, is an exception. And obviously, the majority would make a general rule out of it. chanrob les.co m : virt ual law li bra ry

Certainly, it is different where the authority has probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed by a suspect, in which case, it may place him under arrest or search his person (Malasugui,
supra). But I do not think that it may claim the existence of probable cause for every vehicle or person
stopped and searched at a checkpoint. And precisely, checkpoints are intended to allow the authorities
to fish for probable cause even if in the beginning there was none. This makes, to my mind, the setting
up of checkpoints unconstitutional.

Endnotes:

1. U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L Ed. 2d 1116 (1976).

2. Ibid.

3. Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

4. Dyke v. Taylor, 391 US 216, 20 L Ed 538, 88 S Ct 1472.

5. 63 Phil. 221.

6. Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:c hanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

SEC. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory.

7. Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 590.
COLUMBIA V. CA dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and
subject of its organization.
EN BANC
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT PETITIONERS ARE COPYRIGHT OWNERS OR OWNERS OF EXCLUSIVE
[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996.]
DISTRIBUTION RIGHTS OF FILMS, NOT AN INDICATION OF "DOING BUSINESS." - The fact that
petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES
motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would
CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS
require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER
BROTHERS, INC., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CANNOT BE DEEMED AS "DOING
DANILO A. PELINDARIO, Respondents.
BUSINESS." — With express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, tantamount to doing
business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one’s legal and property rights and taking
steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be
SYLLABUS deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENGAGING IN LITIGATION, NOT WITHIN THE MEANING OF "DOING BUSINESS." — In
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; FOREIGN CORPORATIONS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN THE accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for
PHILIPPINES MAY SUE IN PHILIPPINE COURTS; LICENSE NOT NECESSARY. — The obtainment of a which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution or
license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the defense of a suit, particularly if the transation which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State,
maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by foreign corporation. However, under the do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is
aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, neither the making of contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision placing foreign
as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations, limitations and liabilities
law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as
any suit in local courts. As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of Jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the
defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but 6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE,
"doing business" in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from DISTINGUISHED FROM LACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE. — Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss
access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of
business in the Philippines, it does not follow that It has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or
not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines. Based on Article 133 of the Corporation does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
action. There is no showing that, under our statutory of case law, petitioners are doing, transacting, proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to
can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the
transact business in the Philippines. latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be
a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, whereas the
2. ID.; ID.; FOREIGN CORPORATION; "DOING BUSINESS" OR "TRANSACTING BUSINESS", CONSTRUED. second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
— No general rule or governing principle can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental
circumstances. The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, NOT LACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE, PROPER
body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has GROUND AGAINST A FOREIGN CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE. — As a
substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. As a general proposition upon which many consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents’ basis for arguing that
authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may be necessary in view of the petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations
particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their
"doing", "transacting", "engaging in", or carrying on "business in the State when, and ordinarily only pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine courts.
when, it has entered the State by its agent and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse, to our
them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should
may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts. The properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose
Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit
in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain
any suit before our courts. INFRINGEMENT CASES ONLY WHERE THERE IS DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE NEXUS BETWEEN THE MASTER
TAPE AND THE PIRATED COPIES. — The supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE; NEVER INTENDED TO INSULATE FROM SUIT for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants
UNSCRUPULOUS ESTABLISHMENT FOR VIOLATION OF LEGAL RIGHTS OF UNSUSPECTING FOREIGN should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable
FIRMS. — The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master
on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to
establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation of legal rights of no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible
unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed
country. within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly
fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
9. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655),
WITH NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. — Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655) DOES NOT RULE OUT USE OF
decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling (164 TESTIMONIAL OR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. — It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th
SCRA 655) calling for the production of the master tape of the copyrighted films for determination of Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of
probable cause cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the
Warrant No. 87-053. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that" (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is
unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that" (j)udicial true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the
decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of
cannot create law. While it is true that Judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to
laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decision, though not prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in
laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.
legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as
the statute itself. Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the 14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN THE ISSUANCE OF
above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. that the principle of SEARCH WARRANTS. — Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to
prospectivity applies not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or
but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of
fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches. Indeed, Article III of our
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — Our holding in the earlier case of People v. Jabinal echoes the Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.: Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the
legal system." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
the date that the law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule 15. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. — The constitutional (Sections 2 and 3, Article III) and statutory
obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. . ., (Sections 3,4,5 of Rule 126 of the Rule of Court) provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing
but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be complied with, and
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted such a showing has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A
on the faith thereof . search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary.
11. ID.; COURTS; JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION BECOMES PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND AS OF THE
DATE THAT LAW WAS ORIGINALLY PASSED; QUALIFICATION. — It is consequently clear that a judicial 16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED. — At best, the term "probable cause" has been
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should which he is charged, or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in
not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that
to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is true. Probable cause does not mean actual and
transpired prior to such adjudication. positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed
12. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; RULING IN CENTURY FOX CASE (164 SCRA 655) in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable
SERVES AS A GUIDEPOST IN DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN COPYRIGHT grounds for his belief. The requirement is less than certainty or proof , but more than suspicion or
possibility. In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration
been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to and deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even without prior registration and deposit of a work
be searched. It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refused to issue, the warrant as soon as which may be entitled to protection under the Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its
practicable after the application therefor Is filed, the facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause rights." He cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement. The same opinion
must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then stressed that "the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as
set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter. conditions for the acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages."
The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE THEREOF. — The prescribed procedure for
the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant 22. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS THEREUNDER SUBSISTS FROM MOMENT OF CREATION. — Section 2 of the decree
and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the rights granted
seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following
answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to classes of works." This means that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is
them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and
attached to the records. deposit.

18. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY); 23. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY OR CONSENT TO SELL, LEASE, DISTRIBUTE OR CIRCULATE
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT, CONSTRUED. — The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in COPYRIGHTED FILMS CONSTITUTES FILM PIRACY; LICENSE FROM THE VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY
conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. BOARD, NOT A BAR TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — This case has been fought on the basis
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private
copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show proof of their
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or
the copyright. circulate petitioners’ copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of probable
cause. That private respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate from
19. ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT; COPY OF A PIRACY IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL. — A copy of criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business practices.
a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not
know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he was infringing any
copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In DECISION
determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an
important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large
portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated REGALADO, J.:
by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.

20. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MUST PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on
THINGS TO BE SEIZED. — A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized July 22, 1992 and its resolution 2 of May 10, 1993 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, both
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 of which sustained the order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated
Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order 4 on
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when September 5, 1988 for violation of section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, otherwise
the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant known as the "Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property." cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). If the articles desired to be seized have any
direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for
violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of
21. COMMERCIAL LAW; P.D. 49 (DECREE ON PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY); the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro
REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT, PREREQUISITE ONLY TO A SUIT FOR DAMAGES. — It is Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A.
pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit requirements Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the court’s protective mantle in copyright
infringement cases. As explained by the court below: As correctly pointed out by private complainants- On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a
oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all
of which were enumerated in a list attached to the application; and, television sets, video cassettes corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Bldg. 68, or the
and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the
used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search
the premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon warrant. 7
questions by the court a quo, reiterated in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was
corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo’s deposition was also In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines, 8 and contend that
taken. On the basis of the affidavits depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar private respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here,
and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant No 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 9, as as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments
amended, was issued by the court a quo. in the quoted portions of petitioners’ "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant"
dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingo’s affidavit of December 14, 1987. Moreover, an
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively
representatives. In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business. 9
Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or
exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, The Corporation Code provides: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties
accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video. Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court. corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280,
Records). The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition
precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation.
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact
reconsideration and justified it in this manner:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have
the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business here, it shall not
"It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts. 10 As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation doing
allegedly copies (sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that
in question. The orders of the Court granting the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside." (p. 13, prescribed license bud "doing business" in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign
Appellant’s Brief) 5 corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license
to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial, court granting private respondents’ motion for license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines. 11
reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had therefore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As
stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes "doing business" or
Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court’s "transacting business" within that forum, in which case said provisions are controlling there. In others
retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 6 in where no such definition or qualification is laid down regarding acts or transactions falling within its
dismissing petitioners’ appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court. purview, the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all the combined acts of a
foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance is material which indicates
I a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business in the State. 12

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in"
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the challenge to or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental
petitioners’ legal standing in our courts, they being foreign corporations not licensed to do business in circumstances. 13 The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the
the Philippines. body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has
substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. 14
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able
to maintain an action in Philippines courts. In so challenging petitioners’ personality to sue, private As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications
respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of recognized that a foreign corporation is "doing," "transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business
Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-at-fact, as being constitutive of "doing business in the in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged
Philippines" under Section 1(f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary
business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or x x x
occasional transactions and isolated acts. 15

The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting (d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether
business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of called ‘liaison’ offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines
commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eight(y)
works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business,
purpose and subject of its organization. 16 firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works,
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of,
some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our jurisprudence. commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the
phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such
investors; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor
SECTION 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. — (1) . . .; and the phrase "doing business" shall include appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own
soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or name and for its own account.
branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any
calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case
corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would
or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been
some of the functions normally incident to, and in-progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act
purpose and object of the business organization. indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.

Presidential Decree No. 1789, 18 in Article 65 thereof, defines "doing business" to include soliciting Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission 20 stating that its
orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; records do not show the registration of petitioner film companies either as corporations or partnerships
appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar or that they have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no
year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; consequence to petitioners’ right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not
corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take
or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of recourse to our courts.
some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
purpose and object of the business organization. Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code
lists, among others —
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the enumeration of acts
constituting "doing business" with a catch-all definition, thus: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary (1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a
foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting
Sec. 1(g).’Doing Business’ shall be any act or combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. to negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of where
In particular ‘doing business’ includes:
cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has
no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time
x x x and terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which
does business through the middlemen acting in their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers
or commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors,
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the
contemplate to the extent the performance of acts or, works, or the exercise of some of the functions Philippines.
normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object
of the business organization. (2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said
representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042 19 embodies such concept in this wise: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
own account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is
represented in the Philippines by a person or local company which does not act in its name but in the
SEC. 3. Definitions. — As used in this Act: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign
owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert corporation. 27
such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before
they can use upon a cause of action in local courts. As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents’ basis for arguing that
petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their
authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia — pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine courts.
28
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide evidence in support of both
civil and criminal proceedings against any person or persons involved in the criminal infringement of Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue 29
copyright, or concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or distribution of any and that the complaint states no cause of action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the
cinematographic work(s) — films or video cassettes — of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in
owner of exclusive rights of owner or copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. 31 On the other hand, a case is
Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of copyright in such dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
cinematographic work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of . . . criminal or civil actions in the hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. 32 The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be
Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general
any films or video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or
distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real
copyright in such works. 21 party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground
of lack of legal capacity to sue, 33 whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one’s legal and property based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. 34
rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the appointment of an
attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here. Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our
courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose
because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated legal rights have been violated is undeniable such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit
outside the State. 22 In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain
merely because sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is any suit before our courts.
transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where such activities
are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court’s rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring local
agent as an independent business. 23 companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the
Philippines, invoke the latter’s supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has based on failure to first acquired a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never
purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of
the corporation. 24 Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to persons styled valid obligations or violations of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because
"distributing agents" in the State, for distribution by then, is not doing business in the State so as to they are not licensed to do business in the country. 35
render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they
shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at II
trade prices established by it.25cralaw:red

It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of the ruling
a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., promulgated on August 19, 1988, 36
contact test. 26 With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. that for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright
Domingo for legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy. infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison with the
allegedly pirated copies is necessary.
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for
which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution or Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion of the court
defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, subject to the determination of probable cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor
do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is under Section 3 and 4 of Rule 126. as of the time of the application for the search warrant in question,
neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision placing the controlling creation for the finding of probable cause was that enunciated in Burgos v. Chief of Staff
foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations, limitations and 37 stating that:chanrob1es vi rtu al 1aw li bra ry

liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a to the finding of probable cause.
reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that" (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that" (j)udicial decisions applying the laws
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower court determined or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and which determination in fact led
to the issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it
that any search warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the cannot create law. 40 While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or
lower court could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable cause the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though
for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, a not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of
pronouncement which was not existent at the time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, and the legal system of the Philippines. 41 Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same
is, the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over authority as the statute itself. 42
eight months later.
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition,
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the this Court emphatically declared in Co v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 43 That the principle of prospectivity
quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, applies not only to originator amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and
they claim, goes into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case of People v. Jubinal 44 echoes the
warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article rationale for this judicial declaration, vis.: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure embodied the
prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or
since the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system." The interpretation upon a
supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the solution of private respondents’ motion for law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally
reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant for failure of the trial court to require passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
grave abuse of discretion. 38 restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law. . . ., but when a doctrine of this Court is
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
resolving petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof . . . . (Emphasis
renovated thesis: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry supplied).

And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th Century Fox This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 45 where the Court
case, the lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the Supreme Court expounded: chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

affirmed the quashal on the ground among others that the master tapes or copyrighted films were not
presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the . . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maximum lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
Court would have invalidated the warrant just the same considering the very strict requirement set by rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
the Supreme Court for the determination of ‘probable cause’ in copyright infringement cases as unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA (565 [1961]). The same consideration underlies our
enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in the rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. . . .
said case, the master tapes and the pirate tapes must be presented for comparison to satisfy the
requirement of ‘probable cause.’ So it goes back to the very existence of probable cause. . . . 39 The reasoning behind Senarillos v. Hermosisima 46 that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes
part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar.
our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a
to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners’ consistent position that the construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining in this
order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants’ motion to lift the order of case.
search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing
standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law
not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the
good faith. 47 To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures, as applied to copyright
there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. 48 infringement cases involving videotapes.

There is merit in petitioners’ impassioned and well-founded argumentation: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary Therein it was ruled that —

The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly
1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was inexistent in December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the
was issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the imagination how the lower court could be expected pirated films. The petitioner’s argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the
to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable cause when the formulation was yet time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
non-existent. determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
x x x from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting searching examination questions engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
of the applicant and his witnesses that "an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in pursuant to P.D. 49.
connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched" (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, Et Al.,
133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of the application, or on December 14, The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal requirement for purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
the valid issuance of search warrant. copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having followed the requirements of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
noted that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents that the lower court failed to apply search warrant.
the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise,
because it is simply impossible to have required the lower court to apply a formulation which will only be For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the
defined six months later. pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, to wit:jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or doctrinal requirements which "In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
are inexistent at the time they were supposed to have been complied with. respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants
and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
x x x copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court stated in its
questioned order dated January 2, 1986: jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph

. . . If the lower court’s reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can be given to courts and "According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three
litigants to respect the law and rules if they can expect with reasonable certainty that upon the passage search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that
of a new rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds instability in our system the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video
of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to redress their grievances and to protect cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The
their property rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is most unfair that fealty to the witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it was pirated
rules and procedures then obtaining would bear but fruits of injustice. 49 and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.

Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports application thereof not "On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master
only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision was promulgated, tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him it is of his personal
should not be countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. knowledge.
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling
for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in "At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that
copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification. when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in anticipation Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to
of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted films in videotape format in the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of the NBI
agent on the witness stand.
 to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement
"Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An
the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is merely the objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said
presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time- directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright
honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their
interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged offender. parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
x x x
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant with
the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his affidavit 51 and his
"This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of deposition, 52 did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on said complaint of
Rights in our 1973 Constitution. petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents’ video rental
shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-at-fact, stated in his affidavit 53 and
"So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were further expounded in his deposition 54 that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents had
compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents’ establishments, it should be never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of
dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in the copyrighted films.
that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private
"But the glaring fact is that ‘Cocoon,’ the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise
duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition p. 152 record.) So, that lacking presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings. 55 The records clearly reflect that the
in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the testimonies of the above named witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters within their
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there was personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the
no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of the complainant 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was
Twentieth Century Fox." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
what initially and correctly convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable
cause.
x x x
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the search warrant,
obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners’ witnesses — NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes,
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar — did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of
cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found by the court, the NBI agents who acted as their respective testimonies and that said witnesses’ claim that the video tapes were pirated, without
witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the stating the manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact without basis. 56 The difference,
alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of
also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners’ witnesses;
knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private, respondents were pirated tapes taken from (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of
master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his the copyrighted ones nor have they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy,
testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said
court during the application." (Emphasis ours). video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by
petitioner’s witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions
The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the presentation of regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the existence of probable
cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in
observed: copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the
absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is
c hanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the
master tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties which may be seized, were available for ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the
presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search warrant to determine the existence senses of the presiding magistrate. 57 Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of
of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not the present testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to
them (Italics supplied for emphasis). 50 prove the factum probandum, 58 especially where the production in court of object evidence would
result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value. 59
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the
master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search warrants prohibits
their issuance except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. These
provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances
the purpose to protect against all general searches. 60 Indeed, Article III of our Constitution mandates which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the searched. 69 It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be practicable after the application therefor is filed, 70 the facts warranting the conclusion of probable
seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.

These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, Et Al.,
Court:chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal
standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding or probable cause is tested. Since the proprietary
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable of the issuance of a search warrant is to be determined at the time of the application therefor, which in
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of the offense alleged to have been
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should logically
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. look to the touchstones in the laws therefore enacted and the decisions already promulgated at the
time, and not to those which had not yet even been conceived or formulated.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause,
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the court’s discretion within the particular facts of
statements together with any affidavits submitted. each case. Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of
probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not command the legislature to establish a definition
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of or formula for determining what shall constitute probable cause. 71 Thus, Congress, despite its broad
facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures, 72 does not venture to
must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. make such a definition or standard formulation of probable cause, nor categorize what facts and
circumstances make up the same, much less limit the determination thereof to and within the
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in deference to judicial discretion and probity. 73
before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing
has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the
not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for
arbitrary. 61 It behooves us, then, to review the concept of probable cause, firstly, from representative a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no
holdings in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines on the matter. purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a court’s prerogatives and to denigrate the
judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or
is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been
which would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the
facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in
be applied to the facts of every situation. 62 As to what acts constitute probable cause seem incapable infringement cases.
of definition. 63 There is, of necessity, no exact test. 64
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court followed the
At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, prescribed procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the examination under oath or
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; 65 or the existence of such searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form
facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts
circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the applicant for the personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits
warrant is true. 66 submitted, which were duly attached to the records.

Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it important absolute certainty. The Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance of the search
determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the warrant now subject to this controversy: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but
only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. 67 The requirement is less than certainty In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles
or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 68 enumerated in Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered
for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred by defendants at their video
outlets, without the written consent of the private complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered or that the master tapes of a motion picture required to be presented before the court consists of several
confiscated from defendants’ possession were video tapes containing copyrighted motion picture films reels contained in circular steel casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike
without the authority of the complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or unauthorized diminutive objects like video tapes which can be easily concealed. 76 With hundreds of titles being
persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact reproductions of the film listed in the search warrant pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat,
whose copyrights or distribution rights were owned by complainants. discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.

The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of intellectual property
V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind the Court’s admonition also in La
counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against Chemise Lacoste, supra, that —
certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No.
1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance operations on said video . . . Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not be used
establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in the as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of
illegal sale, rental, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA without its the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and administrative
written authority or its members. Knowing that defendant Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties.
Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the purpose of
selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, he instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent III
two video cassettes from said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine
Home Video and rented tapes containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362
dated October 21 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, he returned The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree No. 1987, 77 which
to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00. On the basis of would here be publicized judicially, brought about the revision of its penalty structure and enumerated
the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Video at additional acts considered violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or
No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987. indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any sound recording or motion picture or other audio-
There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing, distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or publicly
copyrighted and without the authority of MPAA. exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures, or
other audio-visual works are so transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee;
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . . 74 (2) selling, leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, distribution, or
possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and substantiated findings, abovementioned articles, without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or
by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of compensation any
quashing the search warrant that — equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that such equipment,
machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to reproduce, without the consent of the
. . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of owner, any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures
private complainants which were found in the possession or control of the defendants. Hence, the or other audio-visual recordings may be transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal
necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly copied is prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended,
necessary in the instant case, to establish the existence of probable cause. 75 aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such infringement under Section 29.

Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the master tape The trial court’s finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant transgression of Presidential
requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation completely different from that in Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of probable cause, which determination can be reached
the case at bar, and without anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a even in the absence of master tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive
gross reversible error. in fact, this observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, Et concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for the protection of
Al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial vigilance and activism, instead
of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that
they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its
during the trial on the merits of case. . . . gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private
domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the master infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable cause, is too exacting and doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do
impracticable a requirement to be complied with in a search warrant application which, it must not be which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. 78
overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic considerations, a strict application of
said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which underlie covert investigative A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases,
and surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality, considering did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he was infringing
any copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In 49 as amended. This is not well-taken.
determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an
important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this
portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works and
by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy. 79 The question of whether there has PD No. 49 "had done away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even
been an actionable infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to protection under the Decree,
television being one of fact, 80 it should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage the creator can file action for infringement of its rights." He cannot demand, however, payment of
calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the issuance of a damages arising from infringement. The same opinion stressed that "the requirements of registration
search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master tapes. and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of copyright and
other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages." The statutory interpretation of the Executive
In disregarding private respondent’s argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.
the lower court observed that "it was worded in a manner that the enumerated seizable items bear
direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the x x x
seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts
in violation of PD 49 as amended. . . ." 81
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., Et. Al. v. Ruiz, Et Al., 82 instructs and enlightens: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
existed when in fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not
require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action for infringement of his rights.
As search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an action for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when are shown to exist, an action for infringement may be initiated. 84
the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things Accordingly, the certifications 85 from the Copyright Section of the National Library, presented as
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being evidence by private respondents to show non-registration of some of the films of petitioners, assume no
issued (Sec 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct evidentiary weight or significance, whatsoever.
relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to works
merely to strengthen such evidence. . . . which are required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and with copies to deposited with the
National Library, such as books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and
On private respondents’ averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than one gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses,
specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as there are rights dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with said requirements does
protected and, therefore, to issue one search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance merely limits
the rule that a search warrant must be issued only in connection with one specific offense, the lower the remedies available to him and subjects him to the corresponding sanction.
court said:chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its enumeration of
. . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the rights granted under this Decree shall, from
amended only. The specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works." This means that
motion pictures/films belonging to private complainants which defendants were in control/possession for under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from
sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended. 83 the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and deposit. As has been authoritatively
clarified:
chan rob1e s virtual 1 aw lib rary

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirate video tapes is not to be confused with the The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the National
number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense library within three weeks after the first public dissemination or performance of the work, as provided
rule. for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing a copyright of the work,
but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit recover damages in an infringement suit. 86
requirements under presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the court’s protective
mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the court below: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed
by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without so much as an
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only producers who have complied with the attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and
requirements of deposit and notice (in other words registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was
Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right created, hence, no infringement under PD consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners’ copyrighted
films immeasurably bolsters the lower court’s initial finding of probable cause. That private respondents
are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil liability
for their unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some
unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for
intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be glossed over but should be
denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an international pariah in the global intellectual
community.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily
inclusive of the order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No.
87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such
appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this case. Trebles costs are further assessed against
private respondents.

SO ORDERED

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM V. CA On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.

Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made
Republic of the Philippines and left with the private respondents.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
THIRD DIVISION warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of
the order reads:
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024;
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner, issued against Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro
vs. Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres. Avenue BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro
LEDESMA, respondents. Manila; and SW No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video
Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be lifted.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioner.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants which
could not be a basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the
B.C. Salazar & Associates for respondents.
National Bureau of Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this
Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to be returned to their
owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or
representatives, against proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: purposes, as proof that said properties have been returned to the possession of
the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)
The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures to raids conducted in
connection with the government's anti-film piracy campaign. The main issue hinges on whether or not the judge properly lifted the
search warrants he issued earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its order dated
petitioner. January 2, 1986.

In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985
through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.
searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
Hence, this petition.
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property). The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973
Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants
against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The applications were consolidated The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search warrants after finding
and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132. the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower
court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses
which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces Section 3, Article connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision
IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches and seizures provides: also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the judge, not
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any probable cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue AFP, supra).
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search
persons or things to be seized. warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his court stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:
privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People
v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the
important: application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal
knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were
US 293 119661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose pirated without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo
who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can that has knowledge of that fact.
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the
kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated
as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox,
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is because, according to him, it is of his personal knowledge.
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino
(Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI,
States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
(Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the
constitutional right as the embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief that to master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of
against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74). Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of
criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and effects is required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time- honored precept
Constitution. that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be
interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined probable cause for alleged offender.
a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in xxx xxx xxx
 This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution. engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed
by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
respondents' establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
respondents herein. linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the search cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C
of Opposition p. 152 record). So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought to be seized as
Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased follows:
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents,
there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the xxx xxx xxx
film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of head cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their rental/lease distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search described." (p. 26, Rollo)
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
xxx xxx xxx
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only "on the fact that the original or master copies of
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading
it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo)
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM'
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
newspaper and any and all document/communications, letters and facsimile of
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of
prints related to "WE FORUM" newspaper.
the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate 2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
 Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; happened in the instant case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8,
and 1985 said:

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM and other Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party
should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property,
but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright
laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax
tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
Returns of Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the
video tape industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure, The applicant
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP and his agents therefore exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate
665;and, personal property usually found in a video cassette store or business
establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong Silang." All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it lifted the
search warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents. We agree with the appellate
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd 431), the search warrant court's findings to the effect that:
which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that the main ground
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in upon which the respondent Court anchored said orders was its subsequent
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In findings that it was misled by the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise' have been held too general, and that portion of a when it issued the questioned warrants.' Stated differently, the respondent Court
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could merely corrected its erroneous findings as to the existence of probable cause and
be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute declared the search and seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such action is
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]"' was held to be a general warrant, and within the power and authority of the respondent Court to perform, provided that it
therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737). The description of the articles is not exercised in an oppressive or arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be respondent Court declaring the existence of probable cause is not final and does
characterized differently. (at pp. 814-815) not constitute res judicata.

Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the articles sought to A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did
be confiscated under the questioned search warrants. not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders.
Grave abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles which can be judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they in contemplation of law.' But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed
were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The search warrant too general orders were motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually erroneous findings collided with the constitutional rights of the private
respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even contest the righteousness and
 legality of the questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged denial of
due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of much needed
revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline.
Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy
campaign. However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say
that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to
denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of
Rights. The trial court did not commit reversible error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur

QUINTO V. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon
in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed
Republic of the Philippines
space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
SUPREME COURT
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Manila
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009 For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty
(120) days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local,
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except
vs. for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid
DECISION campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the
deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President,
NACHURA, J.: Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or
manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.1 It is in this light that we should address the Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures
instant case. which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers
upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing
contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate resolution. To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
The Antecedents inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated provided on the ballot.
election system (AES).
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1)
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.2
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A.
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT
FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads: AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the
PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus: To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink,
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows: microprinting, are provided on the ballot.

Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one
and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3
filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where
practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his
or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
and size.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files shall be until midnight.
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start
of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must
No. 8678 as null and void.
vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
The Petitioners' Contention
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty
(30) days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National
for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such
Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private
advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the
printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission
moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign
may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing
period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned
Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited
from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet
treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices
only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners
candidates.6 actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a
declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief,12 over
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC which this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.13
resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give
effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of
positions upon the filing of their CoCs.7 both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and
resolve the instant petition.
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office
upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling
Constitution.8 state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010
elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices
The Respondent's Arguments are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means
of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to
respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed
provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of
unripe for judicial determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of
speculative and contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to
petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.14
made in the exercise of the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an
improper remedy.9 II.

On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the
discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the
The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference
that should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider is quoted as follows:
appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the
same day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
time. Further, this - deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the innovations brought about files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
by the automated system.10 start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
Our Ruling aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
I. government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in candidacy.15
their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a
remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political
9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office
(OEC) of the Philippines, which reads: by appointive or elective, shall be considered to have resigned from such office from the moment
of the filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS,
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941,
It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not
Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus' appointive, officials.

SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person holding a public Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto
cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted
Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the
following: No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the
time that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election,
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person holding a public except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of
and every officer or employee in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or
cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived
filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years:
liabilities which he may have incurred. Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21,
1947, also provided that From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. - position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in
Every person holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy- traces its roots to the period of the American occupation.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO
PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with
PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal
APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946, author of the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an
contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following: old provision which was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus'
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor.- Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to
This reads like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE itself which is not available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the
POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED- [which means that the answer is, the reason why we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a
prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of
ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our
means if one is chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his term expires. But if we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then we have to
certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention be considered resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is
unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President. our colleagues, I will understand.

Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment. Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a good policy.-
However, this is something that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there. in a recent case that the rider was not upheld and that it was valid.17

Senator Osmeña.- I see. The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil
servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following
during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain
CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT
people.
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said
proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by
Senator Osmeña.- All right.16 considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period,
thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law
over the inclusion of the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be as candidates.
disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a
consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus' Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No.
8436 contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point their CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President
more as a matter of record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act,19 in
we come to a division of the House, it will be upheld by the majority. 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created a
situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.
PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO
FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE." This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fari᳠v. The Executive
Secretary21 when it ruled that
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me,
no valid reason for exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
the law.- If we are going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP
members and officers of government-owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of Is Not Violative of the Equal
the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective sector for, after
all, even senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳠/i>, was intently focused on the main
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed
and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the
provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to OEC, vis-୶is the equal protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳠/i> was shrouded
reasonable classification.- If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that by the fact that petitioners therein, Fari᳠et al., never posed a direct challenge to the
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Fari᳠et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional
Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted
declaration in Fari᳠/i> may then very well be considered as an obiter dictum.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit III.
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the
conferred and liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which,
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those the equal protection clause.
who fall within such class and those who do not.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former and on the existence of an actual controversy.
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. difficult constitutional questions.23 In this case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected
by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their
8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are provision in the COMELEC resolution.
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A
restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge,
those occupied by them.- Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.25
the wisdom of this classification.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the and rulings.26
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.22
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.27 The Court, in this to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio
case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, election system that made it virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot.
the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have The Court found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and
alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied
enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects
the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or
said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.28 participate in an organization or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new
group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters and fellow party members may
IV. decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus
restrict the options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with
the constitutional challenge. the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful
if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are
precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental
freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v.
Taft,29 viz.: Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or
associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office.
The fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local
be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on
newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an
television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may
official building to seek redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First
be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views.
Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and
In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not
safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual
available to even the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today,
wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his
that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an
message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an
outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the preserve of the professional and
effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The
the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and
dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and resources to
a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest
his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective expression
must be subjected to strict equal protection review.30
changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or
to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way to give
expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of
candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most appropriate for those Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now
desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal
filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. protection clause and for being overbroad.
And in the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging
that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond the particular office the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
an individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of
concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass
the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:
 (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is also justified
by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to
their campaign rather than to their office work.
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that
the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
Works and Highways,31 a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they
ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and
both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file
more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
requirement if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his
treatise on constitutional law, explains,
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show
to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men his fitness for the position aspired for.
and women will justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in
other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which
cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical
restricts the rights of civil servants to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of
strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a
expression and association, is not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest.
higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but
Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares'
their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing
violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of
these rules.32 In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some
contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order
for the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but
exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling
as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.33
interest in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial
character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized if people in positions of authority
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to a public employee pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for
the purposes of the law. promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was
seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might themselves
to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated seriously erode the public's confidence in its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality
is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they
who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay
pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
takes advantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a involved on such a sweeping scale.36
compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to governmental power emanates from them.
satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes
affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs
conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed
manner and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of
regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. absence. Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off
Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful.
prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would pose none of the Moreover, a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in
problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of the questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the
public employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions candidate would feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted
make them vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest. discretion, nor any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to
confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the security of hard-won public
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the employment should he desire to compete for elected office.
law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through
dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests,
V. bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of
using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v.
Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to asserted that the interest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and three month
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that could be used to punish voter fraud
elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the
the government to wield influence in the political world. record in this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used
against opportunistic public employees.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those
who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much
with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and effort into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem.
unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the The charter forbids a Cranston public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The
laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices
participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the
public office. Such is the essence of democracy. United States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same
employee if he were running for a local office where the contacts and information provided by his
job related directly to the position he was seeking, and hence where the potential for various
abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the public employee who works in Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic
Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal
Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners,
service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County
also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become
in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that time other courts have found candidates in any general, special or primary election.
the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as
often be blurred by systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law,
their architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it merits the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping
fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on
politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort. its face unconstitutional.

The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the
not to the type of office sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It
Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old,
administrative employees who either participate in decision-making or at least have some access but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.
to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial
employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be
distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that
SO ORDERED.
focuses on the type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In
both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The
courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too broad and ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule was one in which Associate Justice
an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these
considerations, we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing
the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to
avoid.

We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy
of the public employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that
inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others.
Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official
work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire
the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others.
Also, the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies
equally well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the
Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest
seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and
still continue to do his job well.38
HELVERING V. HALLOCK property in the decedent's gross estate. In Nos. 110, 111 and 112 his determination was
reversed by the Board of Tax Appeals (34 B.T.A. 575) and the Board was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 102 F.2d 1. In No. 183, the taxpayer paid under
United States Supreme Court protest, successfully sued for recovery in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and his judgment was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
HELVERING v. HALLOCK(1940) Circuit. 103 F.2d 834. In No. 399, the Commissioner was in part successful before the Board
of Tax Appeals (36 B.T.A. 669) and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
No. 110 affirmed the Board. 104 F.2d 1011

Argued: Decided: January 29, 1940 Neither here nor below does the issue turn on the unglossed text of 302(c). In its
enforcement, Treasury and courts alike encounter three recent decisions of this Court,
In Nos. 110-112: Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51 S. Ct. 398, Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S.
39 , 56 S. Ct. 74, 100 A.L.R. 1239, and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 , 56 S.Ct. 78.
[309 U.S. 106, 108] Mr. Arnold Raum, for petitioner. Because of the difficulties which lower courts have found in applying the distinctions made
by these cases and the seeming disharmony of their results, when judged by the controlling
Messrs. Walker H. Nye and Ashley M. Vau Duzer, both of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondents purposes of the estate tax law, we brought the cases here. Helvering v. Hallock, 308 U.S.
Hallock. 532 , 60 S.Ct. 82, 84 L.Ed. --; Rothensies v. Cassell, 308 U.S. 538 , 60 S.Ct. 94, 84 L.Ed. --;
Bryant v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 543 , 60 S.Ct. 141, 84 L.Ed. --. All
Mr. W. H. Annat, of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent Squire. involve dispositions of property by way of trust in which the settlement provides for return
or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death.
In No. 183: Whether the transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime is 'intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death' by reason of that which he retained, is the
Mr. Arnold Raum, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. crux of the problem. We must put to one side questions that arise under sections of the
estate tax law other than 302(c)-sections, that is, relating to transfers taking place at death.
Mr. Wm. R. Spofford, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent Huston. Section 302(c) deals with [309 U.S. 106, 111] property not technically passing at death but
with interests theretofore created. The taxable event is a transfer inter vivos. But the
In No. 399: [309 U.S. 106, 109] Messrs. J. Gilmer Korner, Jr., of Washington, D.C., and David S.
measure of the tax is the value of the transferred property at the time when death brings it
Day, of Bridgeport, Conn., for petitioners Bryant. into enjoyment.
Mr. Arnold Raum, for respondent Helvering.
We turn to the cases which beget the difficulties. In Klein v. United States, supra, decided in
1931, the decedent during his lifetime had conveyed land to his wife for her lifetime, 'and if
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
she shall die prior to the decease of said grantor then and in that event she shall by virtue
hereof take no greater or other estate in said lands and the reversion in fee in and to the
These cases raise the same question, namely, whether transfers of property inter vivos
same shall in that event remain vested in said grantor , ....' The instrument further
made in trust, the particulars of which will later appear, are within the provisions of 302(c)
provided, 'Upon condition and in the event that said grantee shall survive the said grantor,
of the Revenue Act of 1926.1 They [309 U.S. 106, 110] were heard in succession and may be
then and in that case only the said grantee shall by virtue of this conveyance take, have,
decided together. In each case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trust
and hold the said lands in fee simple, ....' The taxpayer contended that the decedent had In Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, the decedent had declared himself trustee of
reserved a mere 'possibility of reverter' and that such a 'remote interest',2 extinguishable property with the income to be accumulated or, at his discretion, to be paid over to his
upon the grantor's death, was not sufficient to bring the conveyance within the reckoning daughter during her life. The instrument further provided that ( 296 U.S. 48 , 56 S.Ct. 79) 'If
of the taxable estate. This Court held otherwise. It rejected formal distinctions pertaining the said beneficiary should die before my death, then this trust estate shall thereupon
to the law of real property as irrelevant criteria in this field of taxation. 'Nothing is to be revert to me and become mine immediately and absolutely, or ... if I should die before her
gained', it was said, 'by multiplying words in respect of the various niceties of the art of death, then this property shall thereupon become hers immediately and absolutely ....'
conveyancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders. It is perfectly plain that the
death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger On the authority of the Klein case the Commissioner had included in the taxable estates
estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living, the gifts to which, in the St. Louis Trust cases, the grantor's death had given definitive
thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax imposed.' Klein v. United measure. If the wife had predeceased the settlor in the Klein case, he would have been
States, supra, 283 U.S. at page 234, 51 S.Ct. at page 399.[309 U.S. 106, 112] The inescapable repossessed of his property. His wife's interests were freed from this contingency by the
rationale of this decision, rendered by a unanimous Court, was that the statute taxes not husband's prior death, and because of the effect of his death this Court swept the gift into
merely those interests which are deemed to pass at death according to refined the gross estate. So in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, the grantor would have
technicalities of the law of property. It also taxes inter vivos transfers that are too much become repossessed of the granted corpus had his daughter predeceased him. But he
akin to testamentary dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise. By bringing into predeceased her and by that event her interest ripened to full dominion. The same analysis
the gross estate at his death that which the settlor gave contingently upon it, this Court applies to the Becker case. In all three situations the result and effect were the same. The
fastened on the vital factor. It refused to subordinate the plain purposes of a modern fiscal event which gave to the beneficiaries a dominion over property which they did not have
measure to the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law. prior to the donor's death was an act of nature outside the grantor's 'control, design, or
Surely the Klein decision was not intended to encourage the belief that a change merely in volition.' Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 43 , 56 S.Ct. 74, 76, 100 A. L.R. 1239.
the phrasing of a grant would serve to create a judicially cognizable difference in the scope But it was no more and no less 'fortuitous', so far as the grantor's 'control, design, or
of 302(c), although the grantor retained in himself the possibility of regaining the volition' was concerned, in the St. [309 U.S. 106, 114] Louis Trust cases than it was in the Klein
transferred property upon precisely the same contingency. The teaching of the Klein case is case. In none of the three cases did the dominion over property which finally came to the
exactly the opposite. 3 beneficiary fall by virtue of the grantor's will, except by his provision that his own death
should establish such final and complete dominion. And yet a mere difference in phrasing
In 1935 the St. Louis Trust cases came here. A rational application of the principles of the the circumstance by which identic interests in property were brought into being-varying
Klein case to the situations now before us calls for scrutiny of the particulars in the St. Louis forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests-was found sufficient to exclude
cases in order to extract their relation to the doctrine of the earlier decision. the St. Louis Trust settlements from the application of the Klein doctrine.

In Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, the decedent had conveyed property in trust, the Four members of the Court saw no difference. They relied on the governing principle of
income of which was to be paid to his daughter during her life, but at her death 'If the 302(c) that Congress meant to include in the gross estate inter vivos gifts 'which may be
grantor still be living, the Trustee shall forthwith ... transfer, pay, and deliver the entire resorted to, as a substitute for a will, in making dispositions of property operative at death.'
estate to the grantor, to be his absolutely.' But 'If the grantor be then not living' then the Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. at page 46, 56 S.Ct. at page 77, 100 A.L.R. 1239. To
income was to be [309 U.S. 106, 113] devoted to the settlor's wife if she were living, and upon effectuate this purpose practical considerations applicable to taxation and not the 'niceties
the death of both daughter and wife, if he were not living, the trust property was to go to of the art of conveyancing' were their touchstone. 'Having in mind', said the dissenters, 'the
the daughter's children, or if she left none, to the grantor's next of kin. purpose of the statute and the breadth of its language it would seem to be of no
consequence what particular conveyancers' device, what particular string, the decedent
selected to hold in suspense the ultimate disposition of his property until the moment of his principal and all accumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uber-in
death. In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at death we look fee, free and clear of any trust.'
to substance, not to form. ... However we label the device it is but a means by which the
gift is rendered incomplete until the donor's death.' 296 U.S. at page 47, 56 S.Ct. at page Mrs. Uber outlived her husband, who died in 1934. The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed
78, 100 A.L.R. 1239. For the majority in the St. Louis Trust Company cases, these Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, controlling against the inclusion of the trust corpus in
practicalities had less significance than the formal categories of property law. The grantor's the gross estate.
death, the majority said, in Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra, 'simply put an end to
what, at best, was a mere possibility of a reverter by extinguishing it; that is to say, by Finally, in No. 399 (Bryant v. Helvering), the testator provided for the payment of trust
converting what was merely possible into an utter impossibility.' 296 U.S. [309 U.S. 106, income to his wife during her life and upon her death to the settlor himself if he should
115] 39, 43, 56 S.Ct. 74, 76, 100 A.L.R. 1239. This was precisely the mode of argument which survive her. The instrument, which was executed in 1917, continued: 'Upon the death of the
had been rejected in Klein v. United States, supra. survivor of said Ida Bryant and the party of the first part, unless this trust shall have been
modified or revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer, and pay over the principal
We are now asked to accept all three decisions as constituting a coherent body of law, and of the trust fund to the executors or administrators of the estate of the party hereto of the
to apply their distinctions to the trusts before us. first part.' There was a further provision giving to the decedent and his wife jointly during
their lives, and to either of them after the death of the other, power to modify, alter or
In Nos. 110, 111 and 112 (Helvering v. Hallock) the decedent in 1919 created a trust under a revoke the instrument. The wife survived the husband, who died in 1930. The Board of Tax
separation agreement, giving the income to his wife for life, with this further provision: 'If Appeals allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedent's gross estate only the value
and when Anne Lamson Hallock shall die and in such event ... the within trust shall of a 'vested reversionary interest' which the Board held the grantor had reserved to himself.
terminate and said Trustee shall ... pay Party of the First Part if he then be living any On appeal by the taxpayer, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this determination.
accrued income, then remaining in said trust fund and shall ... deliver forthwith to Party of
the First Part, the principal of the said trust fund. If and in the event said Party of the First The terms of these grants differ in detail from one another, as all three differ from the
Part shall not be living then and in such event payment and delivery over shall be made to formulas of conveyance used in the Klein and St. Louis Trust cases. It therefore becomes
Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock, respectively son and daughter of the Party of the First important to inquire whether the technical forms in which interests contingent upon
Part, share and share alike ....' When the settlor died in 1932, his divorced wife, the life death [309 U.S. 106, 117] are cast should control our decision. If so, it becomes necessary to
beneficiary, survived him. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had determine whether the differing terms of conveyance now in issue approximate more
conveyed the 'whole interest' of the decedent, subject only to a 'condition subsequent,' closely those used in the Klein case and are therefore governed by it, or have a greater
which left him nothing 'except a mere possibility of reverter.' Commissioner of Internal verbal resemblance to those that saved the tax in the St. Louis Trust cases. Such an essay in
Revenue v. Hallock, 6 Cir., 102 F. 2d 1, 3, 4. linguistic refinement would still further embarrass existing intricacies. It might
demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it could hardly strengthen the rational foundations of
In No. 183 (Rothensies v. Huston) the decedent by an ante-nuptial agreement in 1925 law. The law of contingent and vested remainders is full of casuistries. There are great
conveyed property in trust, the income to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, diversities among the several states as to the conveyancing significance of like grants;
subject to the following disposition of the principal: sometimes in the same state there are conflicting lines of decision, one series ignoring the
other. Attempts by the Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Courts of Appeal to administer
'In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime of said George F. Uber to 302(c) by reference to these distinctions abundantly illustrate the inevitable confusion. 4
pay over the principal and all accumulated income thereof unto the said George F. One of the cases at bar, No. 399, reveals vividly the snares which inevitably await an
Uber in fee, free and clear of any trust. [309 U.S. 106, 116] 'In trust if the said Rae attempt to base estate tax law on the 'niceties of the art of conveyancing.' In connection
Spektor after the marriage shall survive the said George F. Uber to pay over the
with the ascertainment of its own death duties, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut interests created or maintained in reliance on those cases. We do not mean to imply that
defined the nature of the interest which the decedent in that case retained after his inter the inevitably empiric process of construing tax legislation should give rise to an estoppel
vivos transfer. Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233, 171 A. 664. And yet the nature of that against the responsible exercise of the judicial process. But it is a fact that in all the cases
interest under Connecticut law and the scope of the Connecticut Court's adjudication of before us the settlements were made and the settlors died before the St. Louis Trust
that interest were made the subject of lively controversy be- [309 U.S. 106, 118] fore us. The decisions.
importation of these distinctions and controversies from the law of property into the
administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the Nor does want of specific Congressional repudiations of the St. Louis Trust cases serve as
same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or not, depending an implied instruction by Congress to us not to reconsider, in the light of new experience,
upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have their historic justification but possess whether those decisions in conjunction with the Klein case, make for dissonance of
no relevance for tax purposes. 5 These unwitty diversities of the law of property derive from doctrine. It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence
medieval concepts as to the necessity of a continuous seisin. 6 Distinctions which to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To explain the cause of [309 U.S.
originated under a feudal economy when land dominated social relations are peculiarly 106, 120] non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into
irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible speculative unrealities. 7 Congress may not have had its attention directed to an
wealth. undesirable decision; and there is no indication that as to the St. Louis Trust cases it had,
even by any bill that found its way into a committee pigeon-hole. Congress may not have
Our real problem, therefore, is to determine whether we are to adhere to a harmonizing had its attention so directed for any number of reasons that may have moved the Treasury
principle in the construction of 302(c), or whether we are to multiply gossamer distinctions to stay its hand. But certainly such inaction by the Treasury can hardly operate as a
between the present cases and the three earlier ones. Freed from the distinctions controlling administrative practice, through [309 U.S. 106, 121] acquiescence, tantamount to
introduced by the St. Louis Trust cases, the Klein case furnishes such a harmonizing an estoppel barring re examination by this Court of distinctions which it had
principle. Does, then, the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to accept the distinc- [309 U.S. drawn. 8 Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be suggested
106, 119] tions made in the St. Louis Trust cases as starting points for still finer distinctions as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they would only be
spun out of the tenuosities of surviving feudal law? We think not. We think the Klein case sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of
rejected the presupposition of such distinctions for the fiscal judgments which 302(c) corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.
demands.
This Court, unlike the House of Lords,9 has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an disability at self-correction. Whatever else may be said about want of Congressional action
element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable to modify by legislation the result in the St. Louis Trust cases, it will hardly be urged that
expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of the rea- [309 U.S. 106, 122] son was Congressional approval of those distinctions between the
adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence St. Louis Trust and the Klein cases to which four members of this Court could not give
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, assent. By imputing to Congress a hypothetical recognition of coherence between the Klein
and verified by experience. and the St. Louis Trust cases, we cannot evade our own responsibility for reconsidering, in
the light of further experience, the validity of distinctions which this Court has itself
Nor have we in the St. Louis Trust cases rules of decision around which, by the accretion of created. Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real
time and the response of affairs, substantial interests have established themselves. No problem is whether a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. Surely we are not
such conjunction of circumstances requires perpetuation of what we must regard as the bound by reason or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in
deviations of the St. Louis Trust decisions from the Klein doctrine. We have not before us distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further examination, appear
consonant neither with the purposes of the statute nor with this Court's own conception of regulation, and, with this background, Congress has three times reenacted the law without
it. We therefore reject as untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases in amending 302(c) in respect of the matter here in issue. The settled doctrine, that
applying the Klein doctrine-untenable because they drastically eat into the principle which reenactment of a statute so construed, without alteration, renders such construction a part
those cases professed to accept and to which we adhere. of the statute itself, should not be ignored but observed. [309 U.S. 106, 124] 1. The Revenue
Act of 1926 lays a tax upon the transfer of the net estate of a decedent. That estate is
In Nos. 110, 111, 112 and 183, the judgments are defined to embrace the value of all his property, real or personal, tangible or intangible
(less certain deductions), at the time of his death. 1 As the Treasury Department stated in
REVERSED. its earliest regulations: 'The statute also includes only property rights existing in the
decedent in his lifetime and passing to his estate.' 2 In all the treasury regulations, from the
In No. 399, the judgment is earliest to the one now in force, applicable to the relevant sections of the successive
Revenue Acts defining the 'gross estate' of a decedent the Treasury has used this
AFFIRMED. language:3 'The value of a vested remainder should be included in the gross estate.
Nothing should be included, however, on account of a contingent remainder where (in the
The CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the result upon the ground that each of these cases is case) the contingency does not happen in the lifetime of the decedent, and the interest
controlled by our decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51 S.Ct. 398. [309 U.S. 106, consequently lapses at his death.' (Italics supplied.) The next sentence: 'Nor should
123]
anything be included on account of a life estate in the decedent,' has been repeated in
substance in the corresponding article of all subsequent regulations.
Mr. Justice ROBERTS.
If by the will of his grandmother A is given a life estate, with remainder to another, his
There is certainly a distinction in fact between the transaction considered in Klein v. United
executor is not bound to return anything on account of the life estate because, in respect of
States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51 S.Ct. 398, and those under review in Helvering v. St. Louis Union
it, nothing passes on A's death. The estate simply ceases. The Treasury has never
Trust Company, 296 U.S. 39 , 56 S.Ct. 74, 100 A.L.R. 1239, and Becker v. St. Louis Union
contended the contrary. If, however, A's grandmother gave a life estate to B, and the
Trust Company, 296 U.S. 48 , 56 S.Ct. 78. The courts, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the
remainder to A, A has something which, at his death, will pass to someone else under his
Treasury have found no difficulty in observing the distinction in specific cases. I believe it is
will, or under the intestate laws. The statute plainly taxes the value of the interest thus
one of substance, not merely of terminology, and not dependent on the niceties of
transferred at A's death. [309 U.S. 106, 125] If A's grandmother, by her will, gave interests in
conveyancing or recondite doctrines of ancient property law.
succession to specific persons and then provided that if A should outlive all these persons
the property should pass to him, A would have a chance to receive and enjoy the property.
But if I am wrong in this, I still think the judgments in Nos. 110- 112, and 183 should be
If he did so receive it, it would pass as part of his estate. If he died before the other
affirmed and that in 399 should be reversed. The rule of interpretation adopted in the St.
beneficiaries named by his grandmother his death would deprive him of that chance. The
Louis Union Trust Company cases should now be followed for two reasons: First, that rule
chance would not pass to anyone else. No tax would be laid on the supposed value of his
was indicated by decisions of this court as the one applicable in the circumstances here
contingent interest or chance, because the chance cannot, at his death, pass by his will, or
disclosed, as early as 1927; was progressively developed and applied by the Board of Tax
the intestate laws, to another. I do not understand the Government has ever denied this.
Appeals, the lower federal courts, and this court, up to the decision of McCormick v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 , 51 S.Ct. 343, in 1931; and has since been followed by those tribunals
Subsection (c) of 302 lays down no different rule respecting similar interests created by
in not less than fifty cases. It ought not to be set aside after such a history. Secondly. The
irrevocable deed or agreement of the decedent. The subsection directs that there shall be
rule was not contrary to any treasury regulation; was, indeed, in accord with such
included in the gross estate the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of any interest in
regulations as there were on the subject; was subsequently embodied in a specific
property of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer 'intended to take effect in U.S. page 243, 50 S.Ct. page 287, 67 A.L.R. 1244): '... At the death of Mrs. May no interest in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death' ( excluding sales for adequate consideration). the property held under the trust deed passed from her to the living; title thereto had been
definitely fixed by the trust deed. The interest therein which she possessed immediately
A transfer can only take effect, within the meaning of the statute, by the shifting of prior to her death was obliterated by that event.' (Italics supplied.) DP It will be noted that
possession or enjoyment from the decedent to living persons. The fact that the terms of this is the equivalent of the Treasury's statement, supra, that such an interest lapses at
the gift bring about some other effect at the decedent's death is immaterial. The fact that death.
something may happen in respect of the beneficial enjoyment of the property conditioned
upon the decedent's death is irrelevant so long as that something is not the shifting of That decision is indistinguishable in principle from the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases
possession or beneficial enjoyment from the decedent. This is made clear by Reinecke v. and the instant cases; and what was there said serves to distinguish the Klein case.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347 , 49 S.Ct. 123, 125, 66 A.L.R. 397.
McCormick v. Burnet followed May v. Heiner, supra. The court there held that neither a
If A makes a present irrevocable transfer in trust, conditioned that he shall receive the reservation by the grantor of a life estate with remainders over, nor a provision for a
income for life and, at his death, the principal shall go to B, B is at once legally [309 U.S. 106, reverter in case all the beneficiaries should die in the lifetime of the grantor, made the gifts
126] invested with the principal. A's life estate ceases at his death. Nothing then passes. transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's death.
There is no tax imposed by the statute because there is no transfer any more than there In the Circuit Court of Appeals the Commissioner urged that the provision for payment of
would be in the case of a similar life estate given A by his grandmother. (This is May v. the trust estate to the settlor in case she survived all the beneficiaries rendered the transfer
Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 , 50 S.Ct. 286, 67 A.L.R. 1244.) If, on the other hand, A creates an taxable. That court dealt at length with the point and sustained his view. Commissioner of
estate for years or for life in B, retaining the remaining beneficial interest in the property for Internal Revenue v. McCormick, 7 Cir., 43 F.2d 277, 279. The Commissioner made the same
himself, and, whether by the terms of the grant, or by the terms of A's will, or under the contention in this court, but it was overruled upon the authority of May v. Heiner, supra.
intestate law, that remainder passes to someone else at his death, such passage renders
the transfer taxable. (This is Klein v. United States, supra.) If what A does is to transfer his Then came the two St. Louis Union Trust Company cases, decided upon the authority of
property irrevocably, with provision that it shall be enjoyed successively by various persons May v. Heiner and McCormick v. Burnet, supra. Finally, the McCormick case was followed in
for life and then go absolutely to a named person, but that if he, A, shall outlive that Bingham v. United States, 296 U.S. 211 , 56 S.Ct. 180.
person, the property shall come back to him, and A dies in the lifetime of the person in
question, A has merely lost the chance that the beneficial ownership of the property may Since the opinion of the court appears to treat the St. Louis cases as the origin of the
revert to him. That chance cannot pass under his will or under the interstate laws. As there principle there announced, [309 U.S. 106, 128] it is important to emphasize the fact that the
is no transfer which can become effective at his death by the shifting of any interest from rule had been settled by this court as early as 1930; and to note other decisions rendered
him, no tax is imposed. (This is McCormick v. Burnet, supra, and Helvering v. St. Louis prior to the St. Louis cases. In seven intervening between May v. Heiner, supra, and the St.
Union Trust Company, supra.) Louis cases, the Board of Tax Appeals reached the same conclusion as that announced in
the St. Louis cases. 5 The Board's action was affirmed in four of them. 6 Four other
2. These governing principles were indicated as early as 19274 and were thereafter decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeal were to the same effect. 7 In practically all, reliance
developed, in application to specific cases, in a consistent line of authorities. was placed upon Shukert v. Allen, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, May v. Heiner, and
McCormick v. Burnet, supra, or some of them. Thus, when the question came before this
In May v. Heiner, supra, it was held that a transfer in trust under which the income was court again in the St. Louis cases, there was a substantial body of authority following and
payable to the transferor's husband for his life and, after his death, to the transferor during applying the Heiner and McCormick cases.
her life, with remainder to her children, was not subject to tax as a transfer intended to take
effect [309 U.S. 106, 127] in possession or enjoyment at or after death. This court said (281
Since the St. Louis cases were decided, the principle on which they went has been It is familiar practice for Congress to amend a statute to obviate a construction given it by
repeatedly applied by the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts. The Board has followed the the courts. The legislative history of 302(c) demonstrates that Congress has elected not to
cases in no less than seventeen instances. 8 [309 U.S. 106, 129] The record is the same in the make such an amendment to [309 U.S. 106, 131] meet the construction placed upon it by this
courts. The St. Louis cases have been followed in fourteen cases. 9 In some of these the court in the St. Louis cases.
Government has sought review in this court but in none, except those now presented, has it
asked the court to overrule those decisions. May v. Heiner, supra, was decided in 1930. The Treasury was dissatisfied with the decision
and in three later cases attacked the ruling, amongst them McCormick v. Burnet, supra.
If there ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis should govern, this is it. The court announced its judgments in these cases on March 2, 1931, reaffirming May v.
Aside from the obvious hardship involved in treating the taxpayers in the present cases Heiner, supra. On the following day Congress adopted a joint resolution amending 302(c)
differently from many others whose cases have been decided or closed in accordance with to tax a transfer with reservation of a life estate to the grantor, but, in so doing, it omitted
the settled rule, there are the weightier considerations that the judgments now rendered to deal with a contingent interest reserved to the grantor or the possibility of reverter
disappoint the just expectations of those who have acted in reliance upon the uniform remaining in him, involved in both Heiner and McCormick. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S.
construction of the statute by this and all other federal tribunals; and that, to upset these 303, 308 , 309 S., 58 S.Ct. 559, 562. The omission is significant.
precedents now, must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and the public in the
stability of the rulings of the courts and make it impossible for inferior tribunals to It may be argued that in the haste of preparing and passing the amendment the point was
adjudicate controversies in reliance on the decisions of this court. To nullify more than fifty overlooked. But the joint resolution was reenacted by 803 of the Revenue Act of 1932,12
decisions, five of them by this [309 U.S. 106, 130] court, some of which have stood for a without any alteration to cover the point. The Revenue Act of 193413 amended 302(d) of
decade, in order to change a mere rule of statutory construction, seems to me an the Revenue Act of 1926 but did not change 302(c) as it then stood.
altogether unwise and unjustified exertion of power. As I shall point out, there is no
necessity for such action because it has been, and still is open to Congress to change the The day the St. Louis cases were decided, this court announced its opinion in White v. Poor,
rule by amendment of the statute, if it deems such action necessary in the public interest. 296 U.S. 98 , 56 S.Ct. 66, construing 302(d) of the Act of 1926. In order to make the section
apply to such a situation as was disclosed in that case14 the Congress, on June 22, 1936, by
3. 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 225, imposes a tax upon the Act of 1936,15 amended it to preclude the construction the court had given it. Again
the value of the net estate of a decedent. 302, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Act, page 227, provides Congress let 302(c) stand as before and as construed in the St. Louis cases. [309 U.S. 106,
the method for determining the value of the gross estate. Subsections (c)(d)(e)(f) and (g) 132] Three revenue acts have since been adopted,16 in none of which has the wording of
require inclusion in the gross estate of interests which otherwise might be held not to form 302(c) been altered. If there is any life in the doctrine often announced that reenactment of
a part of the decedent's estate or not to pass from him to others at his death. These a statute as uniformly construed by the courts is an adoption by Congress of the
subsections sweep such interests into the gross estate in order to forestall tax avoidance. construction given it, this legislative history ought to be conclusive that the statute, as it
302(c) was the successor of analogous sections in earlier acts and the predecessor of similar now stands, means what this court has said it means.
sections in later acts. 10 The subsection has been amended in successive Revenue Acts. As
a result of the Treasury's experience in the enforcement of the law, Congress has from time Little weight can be given to the argument of the Government that the Treasury has not
to time thought it necessary to extend the scope of the subsection in the interest of more applied to Congress for alteration of the section because of the difficulty of wording a
efficient administration. Within constitutional limits such extension is a matter of satisfactory amendment. A moment's reflection will show that it would be easy to phrase
legislative policy for Congress alone. 11 such an amendment. Whatever the reason for the failure to amend 302(c), whether
hesitancy on the part of the Treasury to recommend such action, or the satisfaction of
Congress with the construction put upon the section by this court, or mere inadvertence,
the fact remains that the section has been reenacted again and again with the courts' What, then, is to be said of the principle that reenactment of a statute which the Treasury,
construction plain for all to read. by its regulations, has interpreted in a given sense is an embodiment of the interpretation
in the law as reenacted? Surely the principle cannot be avoided, as the Government argues,
4. As shown by the matter above quoted from the Treasury Regulations affecting the be- [309 U.S. 106, 134] cause the Treasury felt bound so to interpret 302(c) by reason of this
estate tax,17 a contingent interest is not to be included in the taxable estate. In the light of court's decisions. That fact should make application of the principle the more urgent.
this construction, estate tax provisions were reenacted or amended in 1921, 1924, 1926,
1928, 1931, 1932, 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS joins in this opinion.

At the bar counsel for the Government stated that it had always been the view of the JM TUASON CO V. MARIANO
Treasury that the article in question applied only to 302(a) and had no application to 302(c).
But we are not concerned with what the Treasury thought about the matter. The
regulations were issued to guide taxpayers in complying with the Act. Section 302 is an Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
entirety. Subsections (a) and (c) were [309 U.S. 106, 133] not intended to contradict each Manila
other, but the latter was to supplement the former. The gross estate was to be computed
according to the section as a whole. It is hard to understand how the taxpayer was SECOND DIVISION
expected to discriminate between a contingent interest of a decedent under the will of his
grandmother and a similar interest under an absolute deed executed by him inter vivos. If G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
the one did not pass from the decedent at death neither did the other.
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
After the decisions in the St. Louis cases, the Treasury rendered its regulations even more vs.
explicit. In Regulations 80 (Revised), promulgated October 26, 1937, a new Article 17 was HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
inserted which is: MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
'The statutory phrase, 'a transfer ... intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death,' includes a transfer by the decedent ... whereby and Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
to the extent that the beneficial title to the property ... or the legal title thereto ...
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
remained in the decedent at the time of his death and the passing thereof was
subject to the condition precedent of his death. ... Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
'On the other hand, if, as a result of the transfer, there remained in the decedent at
the time of his death no title or interest in the transferred property, then no part of
the property is to be included in the gross estate merely by reason of a provision in
the instrument of transfer to the effect that the property was to revert to the AQUINO, J.:
decedent upon the predecease of some other person or persons or the happening of
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of
some other event.'
Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with
areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin
If theretofore doubt could have been entertained, it then must have vanished. And with case, infra).
this regulation in force, Congress reenacted 302(c) as so interpreted.
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late
Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are
the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965
Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the
hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have
issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943). encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, 26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July
6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511,
July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña,
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club. Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil.
16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29,
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses
in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and
Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in
court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein. dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of SO ORDERED.
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument. Fernando, J, took no part.
ANDERSONS GROUP INC V. CA On February 5, 1992, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with
the Kalookan RTC on the ground that there was another action pending between the same
Republic of the Philippines parties for the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao City.
SUPREME COURT
Manila On February 14, 1992, petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.
SECOND DIVISION
On April 24, 1992, the RTC of Kalookan City issued the questioned order, the decretal portion of
which states:

G.R. No. 114928 January 21, 1997 The Court finds the instant motion without merit.

THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., petitioner, Admittedly, the Davao case involves the same parties, and involves substantial identity in
vs. the case of action and reliefs sought, as in the instant case.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES WILLIE A. DENATE and MYRNA LO
DENATE, respondents. Perusal of the record in this case, however, shows that jurisdiction over the parties has
already been acquired by this Court, as herein defendants received their summons as
early as January 8, 1992, and the plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment has been set for hearing last January 21, 1992, but which hearing was
ROMERO, J.: cancelled until further notice because of the filing of the instant motion to dismiss by the
defendants herein on February 17, 1992, after asking for extension of time to file their
Petitioner, The Andresons Group, Inc., questions the decision1 of the Court of Appeals which set responsive pleading. Clearly, the instant case has been in progress as early as January
aside the two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied of this year. On the other hand, the summons in the Davao case has not yet been served
private respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground of lis pendens. as of April 21, 1992, the date of the hearing of the instant motion, so much so that the
said Davao Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that private respondent Willy Denate entered
into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits On May 29, 1992, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
(wines and liquors) in Davao city, three Davao provinces and North Cotabato. the trial court on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set
aside the order of the trial court.
On November 18, 1991, private respondents filed a civil action for collection of sum of money
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 21, Hence, this petition.
061-91. In the complaint, private respondent Willie Denate alleged that he was entitled to the
amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions from petitioner but that the latter had The sole issue set for resolution before the Court is: Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be
maliciously failed and refused to pay the same. dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?

A month later, or on December 19, 1991, petitioner likewise filed a complaint for collection of We hold in the affirmative.
sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 22, docketed Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
as Civil Case No. C-15214. Petitioner alleged in the complaint that private respondent still owed another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.2 To
it the sum of P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances. constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the
two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief
sought.3 Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be
rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money
judicata on the case on hand.4 collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and
try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in
the Davao and Caloocan cases are the same. They are suing each other for sums of WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
money which arose from their contract of agency. As observed by the appellate court, petitioner.
the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity of rights asserted.
Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. SO ORDERED.

In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata as Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
a doctrine, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits.5 The
principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action
is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.6

Petitioner asserts that the Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties
as the summons had not been served as of April 21, 1992 and it claims that pendency of
a case, as contemplated by the law on lis pendens, presupposes a valid service of
summons.

This argument is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court.7 The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss.
As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is
enough that there is a pending action.8 Neither is it required that the party be served with
summons before lis pendens should apply.

In Salacup v. Maddela,9 we said:

The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts only upon the
filing of a complaint in court.

The fact that when appellant brought the present case, it did not know of the filing
of a previous case against it by appellees, and it received the summons and a
copy of the complaint only after it had filed its own action against them, is
immaterial. Suffice it to state that the fact is, at the time it brought the present
case, there was already another pending action between the same parties
seeking to assert identical rights with identical prayers for relief based on the
same facts, the decision in which would be res judicata herein.

It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case
should yield to the earlier.10 The criterion used in determining which case should be
abated is which is the more appropriate action11 or which court would be "in a better
position to serve the interests of justice."12
VILLANUEVA V. CA
PEOPLE V. PINUILA The following facts are not disputed. Early in the morning of October 20, 1948, the Barge No. 560 of the
Visayan Stevedoring Company, loaded with molasses, was anchored some distance from the mouth of
the Victorias River, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Bonifacio del Cano and Buenaventura Dideroy as
EN BANC
members of the crew of said barge, were sleeping inside its cabin, with a lighted petroleum lamp
hanging from the ceiling. Dideroy was suddenly and violently attacked by men provided with stout
[G.R. No. L-11374. May 30, 1958.]
wooden clubs, which were being used as the capstan handle bars, resulting in a fracture of his skull and
other injuries to his body, which caused his death hours later. Del Cano went ashore and reported the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIOSCORO PINUILA, ET
tragic incident to the person in charge of the barge, who in turn notified the authorities, and the police
AL., Defendants, ABSALON BIGNAY, Defendant-Appellant.
and the president of the sanitary division lost no time in going to the vessel and making the
corresponding investigation. On the basis of said investigation, appellant was arrested together with
Attorney de oficio Julio T. de la Cruz for Appellants.
Dioscoro Pinuila and Conrado Daiz, who were later charged with murder.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Hector C. Fulefor appellee.
At the trial, the Government presented its evidence and after it had rested its case, counsel for the
accused filed a motion for dismissal on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental had not been duly established. Although the information charged that the crime was
SYLLABUS committed inside the barge and within the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the evidence for
the Government tended to show that at the time, the barge was not exactly docked at the bank of the
Victorias River, but was some distance from the mouth of said river, a precaution taken by the master of
1. LAW OF THE CASE; JUDGMENT WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE BECOMES LAW OF THE the barge, so that at low tide, the barge would not be stranded. On the basis of this finding, the trial
CASE; EFFECT OF NEW INTERPRETATION OF LAW ON THE FINAL JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. — court sustained the motion for dismissal and claiming that its jurisdiction had not been duly established,
Appellant was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. In the course of it dismissed the case, but provided in its order that the three accused should not be released until the
the trial, after the defense had raised the point of jurisdiction, the court dismissed the case. Upon order shall have become final.
appeal by the Government, this Court resolved to remand the case for further proceedings, following the
doctrine in People v. Salico, 47 Off. Gaz., 1765, which held that an appeal by the Government from an The order of dismissal was appealed by the Government to this Tribunal, over the objection of the
order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when such jurisdiction really existed, which order of dismissal defense which invoked the principle of double jeopardy. But this Court in a decision promulgated on
was based on or prompted by a motion to dismiss filed by the court thereafter convicted the appellant March 28, 1952, found that the jurisdiction of the trial court had been proven, and that the appeal did
who has now appealed to this Court. In the meantime, the doctrine laid down in the Salico case, not not involve double jeopardy, and so remanded the case for further proceedings.
being in accordance with the law on double jeopardy, was abandoned by this Tribunal. Query: Whether
the new doctrine overruling that of the Salico case should and could be applied to the present case. As already stated, the three accused continued to be under arrest. However, while the order of dismissal
Held: The decision of this Court on that appeal by the Government from the order of dismissal, holding was pending appeal in this Court, by virtue of an order of the trial court in a petition for habeas corpus,
that said appeal did not place the appellants, including appellant herein, in double jeopardy promulgated the three defendants were released. When criminal proceedings were resumed by the lower court, the
way back in the year 1952, has long become final and conclusive and has become the law of the case. It arrest of the three accused was sought, but only appellant Bignay could be apprehended. His co-
may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. accused, Pinuila and Daiz, evaded arrest and until now are still at large. For this reason, the trial was
Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. The recent interpretation of the law may be applied to continued only against Bignay.
new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined.
The evidence shows that about three months before October 20, 1948, when Dideroy was killed, the
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WAIVER OF DEFENSE. — One aspect of the case of latter and Dioscoro Pinuila were in the aforementioned Barge 560, anchored along the Pasig River in
double jeopardy is that said defense may be waived, and that failure to urge it in the appeal may be Manila, Dideroy as a plain sailor and Pinuila as master or patron. It seems that Pinuila had misused or
regarded as a waiver of said defense. embezzled the mess funds in his care, and the crew resented it, resulting in a violent quarrel and fight
between Pinuila and Dideroy. In the course of the fight, the two men fell into the Pasig River and they
continued the fight in the water. Being a bigger and stronger man, Dideroy was winning the fight, and
DECISION had it not been for the intervention of his companions, Pinuila would have drowned. Pinuila not only lost
the fight, but also lost his job as master of the barge, presumably because of his embezzlement of the
mess funds. Because of all this, he nursed a grudge against Dideroy and he found the opportunity of
MONTEMAYOR, J.: getting even when he learned of the presence of Barge 560 with his enemy in it, anchored near the
mouth of the Victorias River.

Defendant Absalon Bignay is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Pinuila enlisted the aid of appellant Bignay and one Conrado Daiz, ostensibly to help him get his
finding him guilty of murder for the death of Buenaventura Dideroy, and sentencing him to reclusion equipment, including a table, from the said barge, and for this he paid each of them two pesos. There is
perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of no proof that Bignay and Daiz were informed by him or came to know before hand that they were going
P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-third of the costs. to attack Dideroy inside the barge. The truth is that at about 2:30 in the morning of October 20, 1948,
the three took a small sailboat and boarded the barge, and the three of them, each provided with a
capstan wooden handle bar, attacked Dideroy while he was sleeping. Del Cano, his companion, was basis of the evidence of record, claimed that said appellant has once been placed in jeopardy and,
rudely awakened by the noise, and seeing the assault and realizing the danger to himself, he jumped therefore, he should now be acquitted. It is argued that the decision of this Court on the appeal
out of the cabin through its window, hid under it, but through a large hole he looked inside the cabin prosecuted by the Government from the order of dismissal of the trial court on the ground of lack of
and witnessed the progress of the attack. By the light of the petroleum lamp, he could easily identify jurisdiction, (G. R. No. L-3217) was based on the case of People v. Salico, * 47 Off. Gaz., 1765, which
Pinuila and saw the faces of his two companions, noting that one of them was limping, as though he held that an appeal by the Government from an order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, when such
were lame. After the attack, and possibly believing that Dideroy was dead, Daiz said, "Where is the jurisdiction really existed, which order of dismissal was based on and prompted by a motion to dismiss
other man, companion of this man Dideroy? Let us finish him also." But Pinuila interceded, saying that filed by the accused himself, did not place him in jeopardy, and that the doctrine laid down in said case
Del Cano had no fault at all and deserved no punishment, and he (Pinuila) proceeded to call out to Del of Salico has recently been overruled by this same Tribunal in more than one case. The argument is
Cano, telling him not to be afraid because he would not be harmed. Relying on this assurance, Del Cano valid and correct. As a matter of fact, the writer of the present opinion, together with Mr. Justice
came out of his hiding place and approached the group. Pinuila said that they were leaving, and that he Bengzon, concurred in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, holding that the doctrine laid down in
(Del Cano) should take care of everything, at the same time, giving the hint or warning that they had a the case of Salico was incorrect, not being in accordance with the law on double jeopardy, and
rifle in their boat, presumably meaning that if he informed the authorities of the identity of appellants, therefore, it should not be applied in the determination of the former appeal by the Government (G. R.
his life would be in danger. No. L-3217) from the order of dismissal, consequently, said appeal should be dismissed. And it is really
a fact that the principle enunciated in the Salico case has already been abandoned by this Tribunal.
In the course of the investigation by the police, Manuel Ligada, police desk sergeant of Victorias, went to
the barrio within which the crime was committed, and informed the residents that he was looking for However, the writer of the present opinion cannot in conscience and under the law agree to, much less
Pinuila, Daiz, and Bignay, not to arrest them for any killing, because according to him, Dideroy was recommend that the new doctrine overruling that enunciated in the Salico case should and could be
alive, but rather for them to enter into negotiations with the victim of their attack who wanted an applied to the present case. The decision of this Court on that appeal by the Government from the order
amicable settlement. The news spread in the community and the three accused fell into the trap set for of dismissal, holding that said appeal did not place the appellants, including Absalon Bignay, in double
them. They appeared before Sergeant Ligada, Pinuila readily admitting that they made the attack in jeopardy, signed and concurred in by six Justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief
order for him to get even with Dideroy for what he had done to him in Manila three months before. Justice, promulgated way back in the year 1952, has long become final and conclusive and has become
Bignay impliedly admitted participating in the attack because he told the sergeant that he had to help the law of the case. It may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted
Pinuila in the assault because Dideroy was a big man. by this same Tribunal. Even so, it may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent interpretation of the
law maybe applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. As
During the trial, Del Cano readily identified not only Pinuila but also Bignay and Daiz as the assailants of already stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law of the case.
Dideroy. There is, therefore, no room for doubt that said three men were responsible for the death of
Dideroy, with Pinuila as the mastermind. "Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
The trial court found the crime committed to be murder, qualified by evident premeditation, with the .same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principle
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and treachery, compensated by the or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and imposed the penalty in its medium degree. Of before the court." (21 C. J. S. 330) (Emphasis supplied.)
course, the aggravating circumstance of treachery absorbs that of nighttime.
"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding
We are inclined to be lenient with appellant Bignay. Of the three accused, he is clearly the least guilty. appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal. all matters, questions, points,
Moreover, he has been in jail since 1952 when re-arrested, because by order of this Court, the criminal or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not
proceedings were resumed. This, aside from the fact that he had also been under arrest since 1948, up be considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C. J. S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.)
to the time he and his co- accused were released after instituting habeas corpus proceedings in 1949. In
other words, he has been in jail for about seven years. We are ready to believe and to find that the "In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821. where, after a definite determination, the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation found by the lower court to qualify the murder, does court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than
not apply to him. For two pesos, it is hard to believe that appellant would agree to kill Dideroy. It is those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the
more likely, even more probable, that he only agreed to accompany Pinuila to get the latter’s equipment compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
from Barge 560, and only learned and realized that their trip to the barge was for a sinister purpose, directions of the appellate court, its action will ,not be questioned on a second appeal. . . . .
when they were already aboard the barge and shortly before the actual attack. In the absence of
evident premeditation, the aggravating circumstance of alevosia should be used as the qualifying "As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case
circumstance of the crime of murder, thereby leaving no aggravating circumstance. With the presence of whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, Bignay is entitled to the penalty for the crime being seek a rehearing." (5 C. J. S. 1276-77). (Emphasis supplied.)
imposed in its minimum degree, namely, reclusion temporal in its maximum degree. Applying the law on
indeterminate sentence, appellant Absalon Bignay should be sentenced to not less than twelve years of "Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the
prision mayor and not more than seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the
court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
In the course of the discussion of this case and before it was actually submitted to a vote, Chief Justice consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion." 5 C. J. S. 1237-87). (Emphasis
Paras raised the question of double jeopardy, and without questioning the guilt of the appellant on the supplied.)
The reason behind this well settled principle of law of the case is wholesome and salutary.

"The reason for the finality of the appellate decision is sometimes alleged, without direct reference to
either stare decisis or res judicata, to be found in the want of power in an appellate court to modify its
own judgment otherwise than on a rehearing, and in that the issuance of a mandate for a retrial takes
the case out of its jurisdiction. Again the rule has been said to be founded on the policy of ending
litigation, and to be necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question. once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. If a different rule were
admitted, it is said. every change in the personnel of the bench would produce confusion." (5 C. J. S.
1274).

Furthermore, in his appeal brief, appellant’s counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy,
confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of
the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double
jeopardy is that said defense may be waived, and that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded
as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy.

"While the rule is not inflexible, and its application lies within the discretion of the court, except in cases
where the error assigned is fundamental, or is so plain that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the
record, or unless the point is expressly reserved by the report of the lower court for the appellate court’s
consideration, questions assigned as error are generally considered to be waived by implication where
they are not urged or brought forward on appeal. . . .

"Subject to the exceptions stated in the preceding section, questions assigned as error by an appellant
are generally deemed to have been abandoned or waived where they are not urged or discussed on
appeal." (5 C. J. 1218-19).

In truth, counsel for the appellant may not be blamed for failing or declining to raise said question of
double jeopardy, knowing as he did that it had already been formally and conclusively determined and
adversely decided by this Tribunal in a decision long final and conclusive.

In view of the foregoing, and with the modifications above-stated, the decision of the trial court is
hereby affirmed. With costs.

Appellant will be credited with any preventive imprisonment already served.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
PBMEO V. PBMI 4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, 5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
vs. demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
RELATIONS, respondents. further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
MAKASIAR, J.: without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, amounting to an illegal strike;
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
are officers and members of the petitioner Union. 7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for
work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties — STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969; 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which
are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
 JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
rec.) invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day
period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary
as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding
complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October
Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.) 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements
of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order
CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from
firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.) the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for
reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the
M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969,
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
(Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
I
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11,
rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed
(p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground
by the case at bar.
that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file
their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec. ) (1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
principles."3 dubious intrusions." 11

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose
reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a
courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well- immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by
its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5 the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief
majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7 Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and II
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set
employees. against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9 of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective
otherwise. tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer
to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the
more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have
the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4,
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard
enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of unconstitutional.
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches III
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19 part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent
observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act
abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere
slender ground. with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to
Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22 cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its
own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its
as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of
promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that the absence of its workers for only one day.
for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1)
on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective IV
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24 Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent
by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as
their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from ordained and directed by the Constitution.
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress. V

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas
by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment
the local police officers involved. through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or
who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the years. 27
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually
sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity
to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10)
battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court
its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by
who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion
for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
VI October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or
writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
(Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-
Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29 a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice
on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must
claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday. be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional
rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution
omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress,
light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to charge.
any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and
logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the impinges on such human rights. 30-a
constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for
justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is
the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision
lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact,
without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the supplied.)
herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according
supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant
this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can
demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights. no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law,
simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration
more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969
rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the was a Sunday.
organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court
of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing
union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record. the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma
vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
 As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good
The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view
them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language
or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was
partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are ... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g ... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we
dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of
such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are The case at bar is worse.
members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police.
As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits
firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It
labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the
firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage. Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner
Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ...
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees."
the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the
 It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in (1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly (2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings
in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp.
vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773,
April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the
Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right
to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the
mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
ECHAGARAY V, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
vs. Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents. matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement
the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113)
congressman.
RESOLUTION
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of
judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional
prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the
PUNO, J.: Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition;
(4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public
respondents that: Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not
incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No.
the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing
TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated
as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she
that Congress may repeal a law. has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before
the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward
I
while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has
transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court
effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the
become nil, to wit: petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer
be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to
end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
repeal of the law;
 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT A
G.
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above- DI
entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as MA
follows: ISI
P
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks
to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as Acti
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of ng
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 Chi
are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) ef
Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Jud
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal icial
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably Re
makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested cor
parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents ds
are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Offi
Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules ce
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable
with this Decision. Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the
Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision.
SO ORDERED. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he
has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and
hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19
of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177
Manila, Philippine. cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered
a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
Cle
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
rk
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
of
follows: 2
Co
urt
xxx xxx xxx
By:
(S the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor
GD the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
) amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the
TE court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference
RE between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
SIT amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
 has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot
terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power
become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the
execution unjust or impossible.5 important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz: necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of
order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âw phi 1.nêt

terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of

the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has
writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the
to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this
Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others,
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction
point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should
the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII
that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the provides:
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules
investigation. of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
 concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
of law in the Philippines. judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar. 13
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others,
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951
and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In xxx xxx xxx
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now,
for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
xxx xxx xxx
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a
clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the practice and procedure in all courts, the admission
license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
the practice of law in the Philippines. shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
provided:
Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away
xxx xxx xxx the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of
practice, and procedure in all courts, the the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
admission to the practice of law, and the public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after
all courts of the same grade, and shall not November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge,
the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified execution set by the President would be earlier than that
true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated designated by the court.
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the
contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when 8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about
requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary the date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates
of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state: Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987
xxx xxx xxx Philippine Constitution which read:

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to
statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional such limitations as may beprovided by law.
guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of
public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
appropriate relief. State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his 9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies
power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections "the rules by means of which the right to information may be
pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of
mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
execution of sentence are faithfully observed. Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.
President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and
amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter."
out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution
of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner
[1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his
exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as
the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at
has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they
are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The III
jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its
II proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28,
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on
having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his
executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that
proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads: capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate
President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress. When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would
only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very
respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether
also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law
of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court
the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on
Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary —
no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect
and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent,
citizens. beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of
justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be
crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business
public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can
possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
supervening events as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
xxx xxx xxx Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the
Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in
the law; accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature
and that of Senator Pimentel. 18 SO ORDERED.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima
House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing and Pardo, JJ., concur.
the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which
provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a
marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally
adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In
addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol
in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Separate Opinions
Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital
punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be
unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been
regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and
no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition
a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to
be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the
respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the
opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
the purpose. postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged
that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial
convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty. duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if
however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt
otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to
processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive
lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within their
that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station,
whose right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June
First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus — 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner
becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as of the
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the
has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would
court can not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty
terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical phrase. When in law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even
cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in now to lift the TRO.
the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most
the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect,
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:
the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon. The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial
instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this the capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental
point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date theretofore alreadyprovided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment
 of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have
make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I
of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily
precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and
circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA
is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner
rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.
accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of
standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be required the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by
in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.
great prejudice of victims and society.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly
met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in
accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the
imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
pertinent thereto.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone
else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority. SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion; In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-
retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief
disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well- and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel,3 this transcendental issue
reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
death penalty. court's sentence of death.4

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will
veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate
its juridical essence. Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness"
 provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied) "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-
making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their
1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing
death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," said crimes.
and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both
a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment). death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by
incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the
imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code
automatic commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other
effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more
capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for each of them.
be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-
claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty." Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had
been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind
was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This became the The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority
intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act
the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it
a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA
7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality. Heinous Crimes

The Constitution Strictly Limits To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty
ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it
prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress
then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a
empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the
authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited: WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous." just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape
characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder;
be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty,
clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be determined. I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already
definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and
renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns. 1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an
inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its until then; or
intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a 2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show malevolence; or
compliance with the Constitution. 3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out
evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity,
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances. 16 For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime
as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder
and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by Compelling Reasons
death under said law were already to punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special
laws. Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs
Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this
answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19 requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be remembered
that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of
existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually
death as the maximum penalty. and separately.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm.
with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and
positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission)
to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred
the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty.
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to
stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo
charter debates on this matter. Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these
compelling reasons: 23
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment
introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .
 MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were
Speaker. That is one. even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and
crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659
like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman
claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr.
Speaker? Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume
of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the
Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman
as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after
1987. MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.
one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
committed.
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution by the PC.
speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it
refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the
of robbery in 1987?
Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this
time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
who have committed heinous crimes.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40
xxx xxx xxx percent.

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death
order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
 MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker. statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any
conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is
percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary
that, Mr. Speaker? risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued
indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and
now from the same document. "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime Other Constitutional Rights
rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent.
Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker? Militate Against RA 7659

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our
document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be
document that I have here. zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to persons accused of
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that? crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself. So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that
"(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This
primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of
reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights
persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board. penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the
mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the
figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988. This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the
state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report. constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of
society against its perceived enemies.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in
1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991. Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even
religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no
death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991. This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty
militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and
to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of understand Niponggo.
1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double 6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven
the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January percent (47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven
to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them
imposed in 1995. graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn (9) convicts did not study at all.
between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent
(27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those
P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation,
earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not
know how much they earn in a month. To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange,
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated,
government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often
below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded,
P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
only one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or
earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the
unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural
socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way
workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth
single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in
thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and
another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and
fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers
intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of
(delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them
the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will
drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with
always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack
fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living,
vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards,
working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors
shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as
clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are
victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving
government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP,
the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise,
PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives
such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much
comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty
four percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog;
twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of
The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require
and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and
from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise
above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply "Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the
that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which
to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro- the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe
poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to
greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the
permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it
our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament. would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-
existent."
Epilogue
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the
In sum, I respectfully submit that: death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life
over and above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him.
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving
suspend or prohibit its imposition. heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity"
involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty,
which is really a species of the right to life. In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply
discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe
death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic
right and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged. I respectfully submit it has not.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly- WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental
treated or brushed aside. Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court
by deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute
therefore reclusion perpetua.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the
the crimes mentioned in its text.
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the
crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define
or characterize the crime as "heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons
which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of
the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must
both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the
heinous nature of the offense.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be
set out for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.1

The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
vs. that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on
LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
JR., respondent.
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security,
---------------------------------------- then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of
vs.
Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former
PUNO, J.: President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice"
of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to
is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the his office and refused to resign.
constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many,
the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of
Philippine style. Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime
Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2,
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November
President. 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47
representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13,
voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives,
the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering
former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support
Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries,
points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To
Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening
affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment of the highly controversial second envelope.26There was no turning back the tide. The tide had
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15 become a tsunami.

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the
January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside
account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30
impeachment tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of "20 January 2001
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20
STATEMENT FROM
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-
kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of
EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
 her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society. authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice
on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. 1âwphi1.nêt

this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be
for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead filed by a proper party."
in the same service of our country.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
MABUHAY! government.36

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the
House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of
the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
"Sir: Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby under the Constitution."39
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days
President. later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge
was received only at 9:00 p.m.33 on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa
Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as
powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution Vice President two (2) days later.46
in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the
Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the
Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused
balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked
52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to- the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they
upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50 have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the
parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. submit their simultaneous replies.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, 146738, the Court resolved:
perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc;
(3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November "(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder,
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under
indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-
pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in
00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court,
and
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,
office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing
the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February
complaints against him.
15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought
submitted for decision.
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos.
OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent I
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR
Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment II
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
 Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
III potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. cases'."

IV In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a
firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
prejudicial publicity.
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
I when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
Whether or not the cases or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the
At bar involve a political question judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of
its jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with
that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket.
taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid
presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter. factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of
habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift
the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that
separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they
a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President
Carr,56 viz: Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful
one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,
that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took
at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and
discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution. hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the take place without destroying the society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are
and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers
raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been
(1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a
are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, foray in the dark.
individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United
States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine II
Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to Whether or not the petitioner
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was Resigned as President
carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act
of Congress of August 29, 1966.66 We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or
the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President
1987 Constitution, viz: was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.

"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for which provides:
redress of grievances."
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
 Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the
or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it.
Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at
x x x." the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes)
(Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The
as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and
to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but
listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to
the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary
follow the succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to
Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request.
the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already
the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was
snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 implied.
of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him.
Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20
Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1)
advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry. the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety
of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in
outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration
quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire. "x x x
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations.
the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by
Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
 If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. Our deal

The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any
more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and
intrigue.) undertake as follows:

I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88 '1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is Macapagal-Arroyo.
clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of
resignation. '2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of
their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government
following happened: and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

"Opposition's deal This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities –
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Vice President (Macapagal).
Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads: will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that
the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that
will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will '4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001
assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate
briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the
new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately. implementation and observance thereof.

4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and
security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
authority (Vice President).
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President. undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided
the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However,
the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara 'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait?
diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90 What about the agreement)?' I asked.

"xxx Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with
a group he is with. I hear voices in the background. And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the
part).'
Agreement.
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this
assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision
and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to
xxx Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

The rest of the agreement follows: I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the
signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least,
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence should be respected.
on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various
government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials. I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide
will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as The President is too stunned for words:
approved by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
Final meal
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authorities. 12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.

'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the 12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject
savings account does not belong to the President.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends
and Cabinet members who have gathered.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed already withdrawn their support for the President.
by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
 1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated
personal possessions as they can. January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is
cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final
statement before leaving Malacañang. "Sir.

The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal- By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor president.
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation.
for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral
in the same service of our country. argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never
referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was
leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it
was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was
MABUHAY!"' prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's
resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical
will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be
discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under
President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
presidency is now in the part tense. "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect
that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15: under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of
an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against
him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
bribery. prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his when he resigned.
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
III
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
tenure.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As
Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the
provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or
retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a
can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the
time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid "SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
prosecution. Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him President as Acting President.
before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose President.
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity
from suit of a sitting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
 the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall development;
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it
is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office." WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to
unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to
That is the law. Now, the operative facts: be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of
the various segments of the whole nation;
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House; WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the
January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now,
24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96 therefore, be it

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into
17697 which states: office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE Adopted,
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION Speaker

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
support from him; Secretary General"

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 17898 which states:
January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for
to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately; WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative
measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate
Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President
Republic of the Philippines; Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's
challenges." 99
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
responsibility and patriotism;
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
it
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the
Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

Adopted, WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate
Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Republic of the Philippines;
Speaker
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity,
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001. competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General" WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
of the Senate signed the following: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
"RESOLUTION
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. (5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to
be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate
Adopted, garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate (6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
respondent Arroyo as President.
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
Secretary of the Senate" Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
govern is only momentary.
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No.
83101 which states: What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
OFFICIO
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Court is functus officioand has been terminated.
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v.
Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved. government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president. transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
Adopted, temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. cannot be reviewed by this Court.
President of the Senate
IV
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate" Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
whether criminal or civil. determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be
most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted
In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a immunity from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and
Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the
Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to
City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E.
no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or "The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the orders during his tenure.
contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and
the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary Article XVII of this Constitution.
has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All
nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of
learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the
privilege. To quote his disquisition:
Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the
Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it. "In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and
fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not
only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On
duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but
the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that
also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from
and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that
he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament,
judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity
not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He
denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
failed. resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him,
viz:110
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not "xxx
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was
given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108 Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you. been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the
impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then
Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision
provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall
be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are
of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in- immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily? tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things. plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
President. to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it
facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a
is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later
acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages
arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. "We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now,
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out,
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to and criticism.
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of
the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
acts committed during his incumbency. fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
V members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice
guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
criminal cases violation of his right to due process. prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar,
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a
rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence
threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In
etc.130 and its companion cases, viz: guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive
while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
investigation. courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
xxx having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the
draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments
where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and
in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and
quality of what takes place.
high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms
Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today.
guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental
Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and
rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the
sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their
enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials,
media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond
speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
xxx
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense
based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that
important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from
of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment
of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is
minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong.
pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some
the petitioner.
1âwphi1.nêt people's prejudice.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him
by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent SO ORDERED.
Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of
the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and
the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own
findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be
reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if
the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter
believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman.
Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the
gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent
Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused
to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all
freedoms."135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His
is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-
TECSON V. COMELEC his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, v. Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
EN BANC initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
[G.R. NO. 161434 - March 3, 2004] thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., Petitioners, v. The COMMISSION ON Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
FORNIER, Respondents. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
[G.R. NO. 161634 - March 3, 2004] Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, Petitioner, v. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., Respondents. In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of
his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a
[G.R. NO. 161824 - March 3, 2004] certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having
filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering
his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, Petitioner, v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., Respondents.
the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and
DECISION 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
VITUG, J.: birth of Allan F. Poe.

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it. Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo
the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of
laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on
26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February
Antecedent Case Settings 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order,
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his the COMELEC resolutions.
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., v. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected
the basic issue on the case. to occupy the highest government post in the land.

Jurisdiction of the Court In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

In G. R. No. 161824 Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the
cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition purpose."
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
false" Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez v. Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
Code - President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" - subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party"
to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
642in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
of the 1987 Constitution also reads promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the "Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition
for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the "Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an differing views among experts;15 however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the
file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.18

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country
of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. was included, would be governed by special laws.19

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., v. Commission on Elections et It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which
al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
The Citizenship Issue
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship. "(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to "(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the Monarchy."20
holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
interests to the general interest of society. would remain virtually intact.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual States.21Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -
century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
be the internationalization of citizenship.12 professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration
of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th Thus
century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14 States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States. the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Congress of the United States on the Philippines - Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting,
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and "Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,
and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who "(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24 Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July "(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the
view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, "(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, Philippine citizenship.
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 -
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at
the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men,
States, if residing therein."26 the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to
reflect such concerns -
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the "Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines: chan roblesv irt ua1awli bra ry

Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916,
the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as "(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of hundred and thirty-five.
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; "(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed
certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship." 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

"The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; chan roble svirtuall awlib rary

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
reaching the age of majority; and
cralawlib rary

cralawlib rary

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
The Case Of FPJ citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC.
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two
documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27
of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou
on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res originals.
judicataand jus sanguinis28 had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa v. Collector of
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa
in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth. "Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan
F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death "x x x - x x x - x x x
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. "(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office."
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, v. Mella,34 the Court ruled -
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public
is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the
might have occurred.31 parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some
not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no other public document." In Pareja v. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any "Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law. The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when
must be used. the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was parent.
required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing
document.32Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public
Section 5 thereof, that - or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to
state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give "Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
therein any information by which such father could be identified."
chan roblesv irtua1awli bra ry

"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
signed by the parent concerned. regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: chan roblesv irtua1awl ibra ry
among members of a society for the protection of private interests."37

"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or In Yañez de Barnuevo v. Fuster,38 the Court has held:

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. "In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside
in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of
the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
the parties. of the husband and wife."

"x x x - x x x - x x x. The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that -
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children. "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
lifetime of the alleged parent." citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads: would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate
child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights
of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia v. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled: the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article paramount.
278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own
retroactive effect." Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The
of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in "18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family "Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
(e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
by evidence other than such act or declaration. filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing -
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family - and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the
U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that: chanro blesvi rt ua1awlib ra ry

child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe. hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr. to deny progress."

"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to
Manila. his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita
Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could
"x x x - x x x - x x x be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself,
consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
year. child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano v. Vivo,43 citing
Chiongbian v. de Leo44 and Serra v. Republic.45
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing;
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
he states -
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge
Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of
the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald
Allan Poe. doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
"x x x - x x x - x x x
"First, Morano v. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so
"Second, Chiongbian v. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father
about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here. duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against
him.
"Third, Serra v. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
invidious jus sanguinis. explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no
"Finally, Paa v. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the
illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his In Sum
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not (1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter
dictum in Morano v. Vivo. (2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434
and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only
"x x x - x x x - x x x tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently,
the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it held.
would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would
make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would (3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
child of a Filipino mother. citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People v. Cayat.47 I respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion
would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose. was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954,
in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to children are legitimate or illegitimate.
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there
is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated." (4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,48 must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, v.
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, v. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, v. Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
CAPRIO- MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the
following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during
EN BANC his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the lack
APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows:
(1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3)
DECISION P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5)
P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking
Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18,
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release
be[.]"1
ChanRobles Vi rtual awlib rary

of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2)
P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4)
The Case P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner (c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract41 on September
Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December
Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the 20, 2012; and
implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to
0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance
petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in
the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order,
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services
covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
The Facts
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special
VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the
City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of
Parking Building).13 the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay,
Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact- pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension
finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st of a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong
Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had
complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record
cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed
the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of
proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay,
Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO
Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.77
against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56
In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition
and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57 for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing
of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the CA
The Proceedings Before the Court
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted
held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman
of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA
City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In any the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is
event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay,
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.84
that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the
2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63 government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman
suspension order through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining
III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In this
personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive
around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could
on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in
Mayor.64 2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his
previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence,
prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the
day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact
to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. contempt.89
were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.69 The CA then directed the Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70 held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can
there was no longer any act to restrain.72 hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor
of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by
the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments
were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added The Ruling of the Court
that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July
3, 4, and 24, 2013.98 The petition is partly meritorious. chan robles law

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
I.
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65
preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed
acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
On April 14 and 21, 2015, the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties.
101 functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Thereafter, they were required to file their respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
the following day.104 petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each reliefs as law and justice may require.
other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10)
days from receipt of the notice. xxxx

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with
this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
submitted for resolution. proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
cha nro bleslaw

The Issues Before the Court

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
this Court, the main issues to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may
still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or
issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
speedy, and adequate remedy; cralaw lawlib rary
case.110

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA- Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal
G.R. SP No. 139453; cralawlawli bra ry remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman; cralawlawlibra ry petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x
x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) remedy for and as an incident in the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction"
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113 The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress,
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious
fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of
government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer
application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123
administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this
Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA- On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or
G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified. chan rob leslaw application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman
II. particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for
resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then,
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had "The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the words employed to express it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words
validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in
given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the
opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x
perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue. x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction
has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."124
Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or
matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?
Senate deliberations:127
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for"
delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the
from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari. Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult
to reverse the decision under review? Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to
the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have
would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very enumerated.
strict appeal procedure.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive for review and a petition for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any
remedies available to a respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is
remedies available to him? now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising judicial review
will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct. evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative
agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Court only on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him? President.

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President? xxxx

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions.
appointee who is the respondent, if there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?
exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law be the Supreme Court to make the final determination.
principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to
him before he goes and seeks judicial review. The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

xxxx Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to
introduce an appropriate change during the period of Individual Amendments.
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method
of appeal from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari? xxxx

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the
effect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.128
evidence.
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with
concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for
review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the
the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken
exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at
review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x least in the provision's final approved version:
more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to
"petition for certiorari" was approved. RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are
nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment
provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15)
should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and
taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall
oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis
of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. supplied)
In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain
the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. B. Construing the second paragraph of
139453 petition. Section 14, RA 6770.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the
approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding provision.
may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on
the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any
(third paragraph): appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ; cralawlawlib ra ry

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the
filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being
following grounds: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; c ralawlaw lib rary or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda:
general words are to be understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings,"
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section
more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable. 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within Procedure:
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of RULE 45
justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition xxxx
for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that
under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved,
said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in
the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that
petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section
together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion
for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition. In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since
it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be
on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated,
petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling
in Fabian were recounted:

RULE 45 The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No.
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect,
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review
underscoring supplied) on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition courts authorized by law." We pointedly said: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule
whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the
establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA
should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice
appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and
provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the
the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law. above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770. Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of
the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was similarly
by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not against adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
"findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with
matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party
"findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in
denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook III.
or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no
constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment. jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension
orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming
statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."159
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is Ombudsman:
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex
mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied) Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
(Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before of the Office of the Ombudsman:
the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory
order,148 hence, unappealable.149 Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as
the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the
unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.
Court:
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as
for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative
incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152 act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the
Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct
for certiorariassailing a final and unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding
administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this information, and control the prosecution of these cases.
case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated
that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional
Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of
Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions
Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict read:
was reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent
with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable
SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
 In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise
the impetus behind its independence: that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a
similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function political pressure."165
essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the
abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. supervision of the Executive Department:
Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall [T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence"
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are
Constitution. executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing
the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, meaning" it might have been.
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the
the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x. under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling similar in degree and kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy
daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a- Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the
vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed: Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the principle of
Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within
In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the Constitution.167
impairment of their core functions"163; cralawlaw lib rary

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence independence covers three (3) things:
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made; cralawlawl ibrary

and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";164 and
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions;
and Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional
of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority. remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman
from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169 With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this
the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised
which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's and presented during the course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly
notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174
against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the
office from political harassment or pressure. In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."176 The constitutional demarcation of
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of
Court under the 1987 Constitution. powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the domain of another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179
injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general
phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme
prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate Court and all such lower courts:
deliberations:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would established by law.
just like to inquire for the record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that
there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
have a special paragraph for that? which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against instrumentality of the Government.
the Ombudsman being issued.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest established by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang
constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional
injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no Courts183were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD)
injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are 1486,185the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect? Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all
courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President. enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment. Section 5 hereof.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171 xxxx ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
 territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
defines its powers.'" catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this
Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired
courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended. over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly
promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended: authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise: manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is
not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
subject matter."194
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts'
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
xxxx
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.189 judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said
court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old
defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying
decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show200 that the Framers
Government." debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was
an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate
Constitution: rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules. ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in
turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction
of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over
textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist
Legislature, have their inherent powers."201 with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray: A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has
r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among jurisdiction:
others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies
needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies [A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to
of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided. enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are
inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of
availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere such process.
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole
objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether xxxx cralawlawlib rary

prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be
heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such
an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
the interim acts of the parties. and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional
WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or
enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters. other is also conferred."215

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal
issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired with diverse matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-
jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads: making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a
court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be constitutionally mandated functions."216
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited
courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary
appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held: writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right220 since it only
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated
said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
. the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries
with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
of justice." (Emphases supplied) appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. ChanR obles Virtualawl ibra ry

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of

the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
with the same was constitutionally impermissible: power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio
Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases
jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and
to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on
exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and
grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action. executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its]
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is institutional independence."226
exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview
of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section
be granted or denied. 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated,
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own
interfere with or to inhibit the performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure
functions, x x x for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
xxxx misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of
courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this
of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under
necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied) court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be
manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation
not necessarily mean that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding: of powers principle.

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control a allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is
subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied) injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's
acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's
Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction
to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should
be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our
Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?
even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should
only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
same. Correct, Your Honor.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and JUSTICE LEONEN:
the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an
observations: ordinary case?

JUSTICE LEONEN: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court? It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: JUSTICE LEONEN:

Rule 58, Your Honor. In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the Correct, Your Honor.
rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so
Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x. JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be
xxxx rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if Correct, Your Honor.
you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the
Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision? JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
and procedure in all courts..." No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN: xxxx

Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ? JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
The Supreme Court, Your Honor. ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been JUSTICE LEONEN.
discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not correct? What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the
supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
That is true.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct? JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
JUSTICE LEONEN: IV.
So what's different with the writ of injunction?
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a
Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first
created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted) provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

JUSTICE LEONEN: A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian
court it has all procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure.
correct? In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction, stating that its
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY: prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court... be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

JUSTICE LEONEN: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the
procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct? suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
Yes, Your Honor. administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
JUSTICE LEONEN: witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of
injunction in a court, is that not correct? acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and
xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied) other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis supplied) ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part
which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive
officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the
shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230 employee found guilty.232 (Emphases supplied) ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory
provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman
issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was
already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay,
Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged.
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative
defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;cralawlawl ibra ry
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court
now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine. offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."246

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as
non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that
of the assailed injunctive writs. originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the
case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in
were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on
during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial
administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for
among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense,
court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were
of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during
proceedings. his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later
decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a
on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.
an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order,
finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to
re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior
term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it
Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases proceeded to state that:
of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine
was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove
the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242 one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation
doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no
during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in
not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office
provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case,
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to
demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an
treatment is nuanced: outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making.
current term or office for misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate
by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular case analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in
(see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare
expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica,
prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office" the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against
(see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances
removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out,
previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court
phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."271
containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence
of clear legislative language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal
the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution,
Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987
the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of
Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had
been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words
"in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent elected for each term is separate and distinct:
of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for
misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257 Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification
office for which he has been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p.
in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex
re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous term rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P.
of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
where the condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer
charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court [T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs.
still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)
is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present
term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of
commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas candidates, of their right to elect officers:
held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing
duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS)
present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
"weight of authority" in the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty disenfranchise.
of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of
the people.274 (Emphases supplied) (7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it
would have been prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows: against the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the
condonation doctrine.
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation
doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim. A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,
and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation under
doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent
administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still
public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where
serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to
offense. administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff
the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested
Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent
E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings. on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of
our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the of condonation.
condonation doctrine by stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According
to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative cases The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;284 thus,
filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to the detriment the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the
of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account
covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith.279 the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government.286
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the
doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature
days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing
execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character, with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of
including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the military or civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability,
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy
the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers,
Court explained the doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit: found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic
office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of accountable to the people."
the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987
long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he
which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution
strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding
public officers to be accountable to the people at all times: x x x x (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:
efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

In Belgica, it was explained that:
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil
office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should service examinations.
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies
the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x
x.289 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary

unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service
the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration
Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
Employees.291
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective
local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect
on January 1, 1992: xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or
(6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
removed from office on any of the r following grounds:
respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; c ralawlaw lib rary

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the
cralawlawlib ra ry

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
cralawlawl ibra ry

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor;
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
cralawlawli bra ry

(e) Abuse of authority;

accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
cralawlawlib rary

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
barangay;
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
cralawlawlibra ry

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
another country; and
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
proper court.
was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office
as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
position: President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may
be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
position:
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
xxxx
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
than criminal offenses. unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of
cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an
elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a
local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that
of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of
to the penalty of dismissal from service. knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings
provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal
previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy
under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court
reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306
incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used
as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws. Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run them.307
for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v.
Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In
the faith thereof.
political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to
hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been [Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
been abdicated. maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity
is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.310 ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary

to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its
statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal
have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a
most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
 public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
E. Consequence of ruling.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court
injunctive writs. must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting
public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of that paramount public interest is involved.
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the
of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the
lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for
jurisprudence."312 abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed
16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and
Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a
the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty,
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the
"good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the
attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
correctly issued.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty discussion moot. chanrob leslaw

of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office,
for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been V.
mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at
its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final
has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to
investigation in the instant administrative case. comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle. The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the
subject of a charge for indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the therefor would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March
validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This
determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to
moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition
review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case: for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt
hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not
ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may
discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer,
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that
the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s
contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the
contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to
rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court
resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme
Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of
the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor; c ralawlawli bra ry

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect; cralawlawlib rary

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay,
Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's
supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable
in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-
15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA
is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost
dispatch.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., no part/ on leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
Bersamin, J., please see my concurring & dissenting opinion.
CORPUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from
Republic of the Philippines one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
SUPREME COURT men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00,
Baguio City or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under
expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said
EN BANC items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with
intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with
his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
vs. Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. amount.

DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW.

PERALTA, J.: On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional be summarized, as follows:
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged
Penal Code.
in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they
earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
The antecedent facts follow.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry he did not even see.
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence,
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former
that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD,
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
(14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit. FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
SO ORDERED.
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and INCIDENT;
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as CASE;
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands. 4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

SO ORDERED. In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following
counter-arguments:
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds: The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS offense and the acts complained of.
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE;
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE
315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT - The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO
findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive
BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
issues.
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE
a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that
petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of mentioned hereinbelow.
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
xxxx
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the them. Thus:
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of
the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
PROS. MARTINEZ
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the a I went looking for him, sir.
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as q For whom?
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the a Lito Corpuz, sir.
charges proferred against him.7
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads: a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir. When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary,
the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
q Did you go there? meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
a Yes, sir.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
q Did you find him? the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

a No, sir. x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime
of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property
held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
a I talked to him, sir.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
q How many times? jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
a Two times, sir. when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
q What did you talk (sic) to him? demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
q Referring to Exhibit A-2? gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial
and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir. court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full? is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.17
a No, sir.9
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided
People:13 to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M.
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus: Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with
Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is,
following: that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by
penal statute.
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the punish such act.
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
(RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads: Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.20
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation. The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must
be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the
caused by the offense.18 prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency
should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which
is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of
tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus,
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the
but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature
non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty. acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus: amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to
₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum
be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law,
provisions state that: the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum
period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed
the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. penalties are not changed:

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the 1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by
value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos. prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by
pesos. prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years).24
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5
pesos. 3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the 4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable. medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value 5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1
of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the month and 1 day to 6 months).
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family. 6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 x x x x.
years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalties are not changed, as follows: penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to
day to 8 years).25 Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
years and 2 months).26
xxxx
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years JUSTICE PERALTA:
and 4 months).
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months unconstitutional because it is absurd.
and 1 day to 6 months).
DEAN DIOKNO:
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that
the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
Clause.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites: Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; DEAN DIOKNO:

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
JUSTICE PERALTA:
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial Pesos ...
distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher DEAN DIOKNO:
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person
who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering
that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that
no longer exist today. JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand JUSTICE PERALTA:
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you
right? The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation. Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ... The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted) ... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

....then.... Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
amount ... Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
(₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
Thank you. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
x x x x29
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a twelve thousand pesos.
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem
what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have of the property embezzled.
been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he
of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
present controversy. has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially (under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The
allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the
protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the
of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
commission of such wrongful acts. government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month
to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to
subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the
money malversed by the public official, thus: The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value
property, shall suffer: of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the
premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will
fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the
in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the
fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special
taking. Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is
needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the
if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of
damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under
the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six
situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one
categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades
we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and conditions.
constitutionally feasible.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
(Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to
render accounts before leaving the country). Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which
are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the
 physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly
death; runs counter to what the law provides.

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said
or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June
2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the
death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested
ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete,
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental prohibition.44
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45
to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear
and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written. Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to
our modern time.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects
penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and ... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

xxxx There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you
have to take into consideration several factors. Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes. And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to
One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
JUSTICE PERALTA: adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA: With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Thank you, Professor. ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
Thank you.46 period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions. The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in penalty prescribed are:
the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum
the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the
in light of current conditions. penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
highly instructive, thus: next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months. CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
I take no part due to prior action in the
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a I join the Dissent of J. Abad
CA
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision See Dissenting Opinion
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub- Associate Justice
Associate Justice
paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. Associate Justice Associate Justice

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
No Part
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. BVIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
SO ORDERED. Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA CERTIFICATION

Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
WE CONCUR: Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE See: Concurring Opinion