EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Marcos v Manglapus
2. Soliven v Makasiar
3. Review Center Association of the Phils v Eduardo Ermita
4. Province of North Cotabato v GP Peace Panel
5. Biraogo v Phil Truth Commission of 2010 / Lagman et. Al. v Exec Sec Ochoa
6. Dennis Funa v Agra
7. Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
8. Dennis Funa v Executive Secretary
9. Aytona v Castillo
10. In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon M.A. Valenzuela and Hon P.B. Villarta as RTV
Judges
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

MARCOS V MANGLAPUS

Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus asking the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.

Issue: whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President (Art. VII, Sec. 1).
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on the
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the power of control over all executive depts., bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the power to submit the budget to congress and the power to address Congress. (VII, Sec. 14-23)

The inevitable question is whether by enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other?

According to the SC, that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. In this case, the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. She
has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. She has to
balance the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration :It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions
of the Constitution.
SOLIVEN vs MAKASIAR

FACTS:
Several issues were raised in the present case, one of which was that deceased petitioner Luis Beltran’s
constitutional rights were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses. Preceding this, in his column in Philippine Star,
Beltran wrote that then President Corazon Aquino “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup attempt staged by
military rebels in December 1989. Insulted by Beltran’s article, Pres. Aquino filed a libel suit against Beltran,
claiming that her stature as President of the Philippines and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was ridiculed.
ISSUE:
Does the Constitution require the judge to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest?
HELD:
No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts.
REVIEW CENTER v MANGLAPUS
SUMMARY. Due to a cheating incident, then PGMA was prompted to expand the scope of
CHED to include review centers by issuing EO 566. The IRR was also revised pursuant to
this change. The petitioners come to this court assailing the validity of the EO and the
revised IRR. The SC held that the EO and the revised IRR were void. Review centers are
not institutions of higher learning, to include them in the scope of CHED would be to
amend the law. The president does not have the power to amend laws nor was it granted by
the congress to amend the law through EO 566
DOCTRINE. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision requires
legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers
and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President
the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722
through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.

Facts:.
A cheating incident during the 2006 nursing board exam. Upon investigation, PRC confirmed that said
incident happened.This prompted then PGMA to issue EO 566 which authorized CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED issued an IRR
with respect to the said EO (Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30)

Petitioner asked CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review
center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively
abolish independent review centers.

Some of the requests of the Petitioner were not answered by CHED, petitioner was prompted to file before
the CHED a petition to clarify/amend the Revised IRR which mainly requests for review centers to be excluded
from the coverage of CHED.

The new CHED chairman wrote to Petitioner saying that while it was true that review centers is not one of
the mandates of CHED, PGMA issued EO 566 which put review centers now under the control of CHED. To
exclude the review centers would be going against the EO issued. petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.

Issues:
1.Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the
CHED’s jurisdiction. - YES
2.Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. – YES

Ruling:
EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power

Powers of CHED include: monitor and evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of higher
learning.. Under sec. 3 of RA 7722,CHED’s coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private.
Neither the law nor its IRR defined the term “higher education.” But the SC defined it using verba legis as tertiary
education or that which grants a degree after its completion.

The EO and the RIRR clearly expanded the scope of RA 7722 when it included review centers under the
mandate of CHED.A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722.
 The exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision requires legislation, the provision states
that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no
law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA
7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.

EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power,

The RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules
and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under
RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education
nor institutions offering degree-granting programs which as already stated, runs counter to RA 7722. Hence the
IRR is also invalid.

The court ruled that there was no delegation of police power that exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President
to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers..
.

DECISION.
Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007
declared VOID for being unconstitutional

The President’s direct exercise of the power of subordinate legislation is done via the issuance of an executive
or administrative order as an ordinance issued by the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers. The valid grant of the
authority to issue subordinate legislation to the PRC and the exercise of this power by the President as the head
of the executive department of government, however, do not extend to the authority of the President to take
control of the PRC’s powers under the PRC Law, and to assign these to another agency within the executive
branch

The President, through EO 566, took control of the PRC’s authority to issue subordinate legislation to regulate
review centers, and transferred this power to the CHED. This is an illegal sub-delegation of delegated power.
What has once been delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated by the original delegate to
another, expressed in the Latin maxim – potestas delegata non delegare potest. The President cannot transfer
these functions to another agency without transgressing the legislative prerogatives of Congress.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v GRP PEACE PANEL

Facts:

PGMA, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the MILF. MILF, thereafter,
convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government.Resulted to the crafting of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and
c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed. In its body, it
grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further
provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above
it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a
shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative.

With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3,
and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the
petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right
to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid
symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right
of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of official to
give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital
to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is
an enabling law.
 Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting
such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for
free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for
feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is
evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to
conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The
preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation.Clearly, E.O. No. 3
contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to
respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.

EO. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the
extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.

Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers
that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as
a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on
RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the
MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.

The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive
compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. Provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province,
city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state.

The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, the MOA-AD‘s provisions requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions,
specifically the following provisions of Article X:SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines ,SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
 The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on
the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of
the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.

The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the
term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is
to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative
ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a
status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly
not conducive to national unity.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and
the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that
the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
BIRAOGO v TRUTH COMMISSION

Facts:
Assailing the validity and constitutionality of EO No. 1Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
Biraogo assails EO1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Sec1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.
When then Senator Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found
a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Signed Executive Order No. 1
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers... and
employees,during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it
is... essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in... disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is... a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless
to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine
only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a
particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.

Issues:Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code?... is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President
to create a public office?...

Ruling:
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their... prerogatives as legislators.
Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional... and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the
Office of the President to... any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of... economy or redundancy of
functions.
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon
the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,... fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority
of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution or... in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously
stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of... persons
who come before it.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication
on the merits of the charges against... them,is certainly not a function given to the commission.The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. PTC's sphere of function limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land. PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
Nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments... for violations of graft laws.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was "Investigate," commonly
understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle.
DENNIS FUNA v AGRA

Facts:

Petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, PGMa appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes on March 5, 2010 Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity,
on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced
this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra's concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII; that during the pendency of the suit, Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his
duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Appointments being hereby challenged were in acting or temporary capacities. Petitioner submits that the
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII does not distinguish between an appointment or designation of a
Member of the Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity, on the one hand, and one in a permanent capacity,
on the other hand; and that Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not exempt from
the constitutional ban.He emphasizes that the position of the Solicitor General is not an ex officio position in
relation to the position of the Secretary of Justice, considering that the OSG is an independent and autonomous
office attached to the \DOJ.[8] He insists that the fact that Agra was extended an appointment as the Acting
Solicitor General shows that he did not occupy that office in an ex officio capacity because an ex officio
position does not require any further warrant or appointment.
Respondents contend, in contrast, that Agra's concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and
Acting Solicitor General were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which was to confer additional
duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General andActing Secretary of Justice, Agra was not "holding"
both offices in the strict constitutional sense. They argue that an appointment, to be covered by the
constitutional prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere designation.
Respondents further contend that, even on the assumption that Agra's concurrent designation constituted
"holding of multiple offices," his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General was akin to a hold-over; that
upon Agra's designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice. his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired in
view of the constitutional prohibition against holding of multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet; that
under the principle of hold-over, Agra continued his service as the Acting Solicitor General "until his successor
is... elected and qualified"[10] to "prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when a successor may be
chosen and inducted into office; and that during his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General, he did not
receive... any salaries and emoluments from the OSG after becoming the Acting Secretary of Justice on March
5, 2010
Issues:Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?
Ruling:
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII
Unconstitutionality of Agra's concurrent designation being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section
13, Article VII Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
 The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to
all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
Agra's designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would
have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the
consequence of holding the other It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
"allowed by law or the primary functions of his position." To claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section13, supra, he needed to establish herein
that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did not do so.
Principles:
All other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet;
and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
officials' offices
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXEC SECRETARY

Facts:
Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO284 issued by President Corazon Aquino.
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition
to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies
or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they ( sic) must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.

This Executive Order, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions which is against Article VII,
Section 13 of the Constitution. They also contend that the said provision is absolute and self-executing.

Issue: WON Sec13, Article VII insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of
the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for
easy reference is quoted anew, thus:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

Ruling:
Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void

Practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous
public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.

The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
the concerned official's office. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time
job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment.
DENNIS FUNA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those...
positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of
DOTC Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not
occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not require any "further warrant or appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended
to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
Administrator... respondents submit that the petition should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious
considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was...
constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA
OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and members of... the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during... their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read
with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple...
government offices or employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section
7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another... office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is... hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Principles:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure,... directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including... government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or... their subsidiaries.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the... person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. It is said that... appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the... implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the... person
named.
AYTONA v CASTILLO

Facts:
Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office;
and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments
made by the former President Garcia.

On January 1, President Macapagal appointed respondent as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.Later
on Castillo was prevented from holding the office in the Central Bank.

Petitioner, instituted a case (quo warranto) against respondent, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by administrative order no. 2.

Issue:WoN the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

Ruling:
Not. After the proclamation of then Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was no
more than a “care-taker” administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to
the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the
policies of his successor.
An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as he’s special prerogative and is bound to be prudent
to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission on
Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. It is expected that the President
should exercise double care in extending such appointments.

In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia
exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional
provision granting the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VILLARTA

Facts:

The President appointed Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as judges of the regional trial courts of Baguio
City and Cabanatuan City respectively on March 30, 1998. This date is within the period of the ban against
appointments as provided by Art. VII Sec. 5 of the Constitution.

Meanwhile on April 6, 1998, the Chief Justice received appointments of eight Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals all which had been signed on March 11, 1998 ( the day immediately before the the
commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII). Impliedly, the President’s Office did
not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary is covered by the said ban and sought to fill the
vacancy due to the retirement of Associate Justice Francisco.

Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to JBC that the list of the final nominees for the
vacancy be transmitted no later than May 6, 1998 in view of the duty imposed by the Constitution that: “The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice. *** Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.”Chief Justice sent his reply to the President, he stated that no session had been
scheduled for the Council until after the May elections and that the JBC will deliberate on the nominations upon
the completion of the elections.

President replied to the letter of the Chief Justice expressing that the “election-ban provision (Art. VII
Sec. 15) applies only to the appointments in the executive branch of government, the whole article being
entitled “Executive Department”.

Issue:Whether or not the appointment of the two judges to the RTC is prohibited by the Constitution as provided
by Art. VII Sec. 15.

Ruling:
Yes it is prohibited. The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban provided by Art VII, Sec. 15.

Art. VII, Section 15, it appears, is directed against two types of appointments: (1) Those appointments made
within two months preceding a Presidential election 2. midnight” appointments.These midnight appointments are
to be considered also in appointments of the Presidential election because these appointments are obviously made
for partisan reasons.
DE CASTRO v JBC

Facts:

De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries - one side holds
that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before
the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the
other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the
election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the
election ban - has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees,
whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.
He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial function that is not conferred upon it
by the Constitution," which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not
empowered it to "finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court
under the Constitution." As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the
submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a "final and definitive resolution of the
constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the... tension in the legal community that would go a
long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system."
Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief
Justice; that said filling up of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by
analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
Issues: Can current president appoint new CJ even if law tells us that the deadline for appointments should be
two months before elections?
What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides
that any... vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the
matter of the appointment of his successor?
May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even
during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?... whether the incumbent President can appoint the next
Chief Justice or not
Ruling:
The petitioners submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement, on the ground that the prohibition against presidentiaL appointments under Section 15, Article
VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
About the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation
Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to... make an appointment of a Member of
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will
be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
Such appointments, so long as they are can be made by the outgoing President.
To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further
undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the
Executive and Legislative Departments.
 For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will... thereby effectively and
illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications
of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
SARMIENTO v MISON

Facts:

Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from
disbursing payments for Mison’s salaries and emoluments on the ground that Mison’s appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of
Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of
the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Mison is unconstitutional.

Held:
No.

1987 Constitution requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the
President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers:
1st group: The heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in the Constitution,
Specifically:
*Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
*Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commi [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)];
*Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)];
*Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)

The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation:

2nd group:
All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,

3rd group:
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and

4th group:
Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of the
President.
BAUTISTA v SALONGA

Facts:
President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR). The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista
requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA. Bautista refused to be placed
under CoA's review.

Bautista filed a petition with the Supreme Court. While waiting for the progress of the case, President
Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was
not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post.

Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the
CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well.

Issues:
WON the President's appointment is considered constitutional.
WON or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
WON or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.

Ruling:
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she
appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the
President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The
position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA.

It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and
finalized even without the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR,
therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her
acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.

Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by
Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally
guaranteed that they must have a term of office.She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause
and with her right to due process properly safeguarded.

Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from
dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

Petition granted.
QUINTOS-DELES v CA

Facts:
Seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to
perform and discharge her duties as a member of the HoR representing the Women's Sector and to restrain
respondents from subjecting petitioner's appointment to the confirmation process.
Petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article
VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. The above-mentioned sectoral
representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of
Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-
appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the
opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or
assume office as members of the House of Representatives.
This opposition compelled Speaker Mitra, to suspend the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives.
Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by
the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require confirmation by the
Commission oN Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.
Issues: WON Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable
that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express
mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art.
XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in
the Constitution.
We agree with the submission of respondent. The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives
remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second
"Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral
representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.
More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by.virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but
pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require
submission to the confirmation process.
CALDERON v CARALE

Facts:
RA 6715 was passed, amending PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the
Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the
President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.

Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.

Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is
in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the
President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7
of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

Ruling:
Confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors,
public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested
by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights).
 TARROSA v SINGSON

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a “taxpayer,” questioning the appointment of
respondent (being void) Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653,
which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II
of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The
Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:WON the appointment as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas requires the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments

Ruling:

No. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. (refer to Mison case)
FLORES v DRILON

Facts:
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic, Zambales maintain that the
proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 RA 7227 infringes constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure,"because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an
elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he President shall xxx x... appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint" since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive
Secretary
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA).
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective
official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.
Issues: WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Ruling:
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. "Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his
ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor
remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution.On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is
not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of
his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third
persons, where the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a known election or appointment
LUEGO v CSC

Facts:
LUEGO was appointed Administrative Officer II for the Office of the Mayor, Cebu by then-Mayor
Solon.The appointment was described as PERMANENT. But the CSC approved it as TEMPORARY because
of a protest filed by TUOZO and another employee against Luego’s appointment.

CSC found that Tuozo was better qualified for the Administrative Officer II position. Luego’s appointment
was revoked. Then-Mayor Ronald Duterte appointed Tuozo to the position.

Luego filed the present petition to assail the CSC order revoking his appointment.

Issue: W/N the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

Ruling:
No. Luego’s appointment is PERMANENT. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY"
did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space
provided for in Luego’s appointment paper (CS Form 33). What was temporary was the approval of the
appointment, not the appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to
depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the
position.

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

The power of the CSC to “approve” and “disapprove” appointments under Art. V, §9(h) of the old
Civil Service Decree only pertains to the function of the CSC to check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the appointee has the
qualifications, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.

By admitting that Luego and Tuozo were both qualified for the Administrative Officer II position, the
CSC has rendered itself functus officio. It had nothing else to do but affirm the validity of Luego’s
appointment. CSC had no authority to revoke Luego’s appointment simply because it thinks Tuozo is more
qualified. That would constitute encroachment of the discretion vested in the City Mayor.
POBRE v MENDIETA

Facts:
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of officeif Francia as PRC
Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Pobre
was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.
The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of
the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.

Acting Secretary of Justice Bello, III answered the queries as follows: Based on the foregoing premises,
it is our view that Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. It
has been said that "those matters which the Constitution specifically confides to the executive, the legislative
cannot directly or indirectly take from his control"

Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because Aquino had already appointed him PRC
Chairman and already taken his oath of office Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo
warranto contesting Pobre's appointment as chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded
Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that only the
President of the Philippines, in whom the appointing power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the
successor of retired PRC Commissioner/Chairman Francia upon the expiration of the latter's term of office.

The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223
that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior
of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or
removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined.
In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the provision of the Constitution
vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.

Issue: WON the appointment of Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission
by the President is lawful.

Ruling:

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT THAT THE

OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the
Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by
"operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result
would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position
of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President
issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and
limited himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung
of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law
as to avoid it.
 DRILON V. LIM

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code 1. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC
as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional
and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government
Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified
true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
VILLENA v SEC OF FINANCE

Facts:
The respondent Secretary of Interior requested the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice to
conduct an inquiry into petitioner’s actions. The investigation found that petitioner Villena committed bribery,
extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of law profession. Thereafter, the respondent
Secretary of Interior recommended to the Office of the President the suspension of Villena. This
recommendation was eventually granted. Thus, Villena was suspended from office. Respondent Secretary of
Interior wrote Villena a letter informing the latter the charges and the designation of Emiliano Anonas as the
special investigator. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor
Villena

Ruling:
Yes. The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena.

As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code that
Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction.
This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive
supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision
covers the power to order investigation because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render power real and effective.”

However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided in any
law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor.
Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of
suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department
under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation
demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the President. This is under
the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
President, presumptively the acts of the President.”
LACSON-MAGALLANES INC v PANO

Facts
Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of a 1,103-hectare pastureland in Davao, to the
plaintiff corporation Lacson-Magallanes Co. That portion, 392. 76 hectares was released from the forest zone in
1954 as pasture land and was declared an agricultural land. On 1955, Paño and 19 other claimants applied for
the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. In March, they protested the plaintiff’s sales application for the
entire released area.

The Director of Lands, after an investigation, dismissed the claim of the Paño, denied their MR as well. The
case was brought to the President.

Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President," allowed that the land on which the farmers have built
improvements be allocated to them, and that the disputed land be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and
allocated to the actual occupants without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion.

The corporation filed a suit at the CFI, averring that CA 141 §4 is controlling upon the courts and the
president.

Issue:
1. May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands- YES
2. WON The decision of the executive secretary was an undue delegation of power, and that there is no
constitutional provision allowing the presidential control to be delegated to the exec secretary. The president
should personally act upon the matter.
NO.
3. The plaintiff argues that the ES is equal in rank to the other departments, and cannot intrude into the sphere
of another department secretary- NO.

Ruling:
1. The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Department heads are men of his confidence.

Decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President.The right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the executive departments. The president may
undo an act of his department secretary.

2. There are constitutional powers that the president must exercise in person, but he may delegate to his
executive secretary the acts that the constitution does not command he perform in person.The President is not
expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.

3. Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President", his decision is that of the President's. Only the
President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so.Unless the action taken is
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive", that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be
successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
CITY OF ILIGAN v DIRETOR OF LAND

Facts:
President issued Proclamation 335:Withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or
settlement and Reserving such for the use of NPC (Nat’l Power Corporation)

By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named Ma. Christina.Later, NPC: Sold
the fertilizer plant to “Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp” with all the machineries, right of occupancy, and use of
land.

Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued: Proc. 20 – excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas
occupied by “Ma. Cristina” and Employees Housing and declaring such lands for OPEN DISPOSITION. Proc.
198 – changing the technical description of said areas (6 lots

Marcelo Steel” and “Ma. Cristina” filed . Sales Application with the Bureau of Land. , Director of Lands
advised that Bureau will sell in an auction said lands of “Marcelo Steel”

President then issued Proc. 469 – excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in
Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City.Mayor of Iligan wrote to
Director of Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and foreshores in auction.

Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 – excluding from the donation in Proc. 469 certain lands
(Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring same for open disposition.CFI dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved
injunction. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any government like the City of
Iligan.

Ruling:
YES. Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donation or
transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for purposes conducive to
public interest.

Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director of Lands
(Sec 60)

Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES. Director has direct executive control of lands
Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture. Secretary’s control is SUBJECT to control of
PRESIDENT

Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Hence,
President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his subordinates.Since, President has
the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential, commercial, & industrial purposes. Questioned
Proclamation 469 is VALID and binding:Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.

Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become property of
Iligan.
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation

Facts:

Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4, which they have operated through
the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

When martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military and its facilities were taken
over by Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station

In 1978, KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it under
Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)

After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations and the Office of Media
Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4

On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to them Chs. 2 and 4

On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family

Upon the Lopez family's request, the respondent Executive Secretary, by the authority of the President, entered
into with ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres. Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate"

Arbitration Committee was created composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for RP and Atty. Pastor del
Rosario for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman

Issue:

Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as the court dismissed the case because the petitioners did not have locus
standi. If the need arises, I would say the issue is "Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as an alternative
to a lawsuit against the State, is valid"; to which, the answer is yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate below the
court's statements regarding the expropriation topic.

The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting for and in behalf of the
President when he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines.

Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

The government's immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

Note: In a separate opinion, Justice Feliciano remarks that the above comments as obiter dicta.

Petition dismissed.
KILUSANG BAYAN v DOMINGUEZ

Facts:
Petitioners question the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Dominguez which
ordered:
1. the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa
Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant
to the Department’s regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13,
2. the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt
of the order,
3. The disbandment of the Board of Directors, and
4. The turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee.

The alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance
in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership” of
the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors
shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175,
LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed
therein that the Order was issued by the Department “in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.

Issue:WON the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal

Ruling:
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for
the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be
heard.

A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws.

Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives.The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as
both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and
officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely
on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of
Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly.
IBP v ZAMORA

Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.

The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Ruling:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces.

Calling out power in a differenst category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as
the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present
petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines
does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
OLAGUER v MILITARY COMMISSION

Facts:

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong
Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives
and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs.
Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and
filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the
SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the
persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the
issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from
their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of
Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians
while the civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during
the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed
by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
SANLAKAS v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives,
stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati, demanding the resignation of the President, the Defense
Secretary, and the PNP Chief
Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring a “state of
rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
The Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. The President, however, did not immediately
lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003. During that time, several “search
and recovery” operations were conducted.

PARTIES
Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. There is no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.
Social Justice Society. The declaration is a constitutional anomaly that may confuse overzealous public officers
to violate the constitutional rights of citizens. The President circumvented the report requirement in Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers
as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.
Rep. Rolex Suplico. Prerogatives of the legislature were affected. The declaration is a superfluity and is actually
an exercise of emergency powers and therefore usurpation of the power of Congress in Section 23 (2) Article 6
of the Constitution.
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel. The issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of martial law powers that
has no constitutional basis. Solicitor-General. The controversy has been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration. The petitioners have no legal standing.

ISSUE/RULING/RATIO
WON the issue is justiciable given the mootness of the issue.
Yes. Although the question has been rendered moot, the Court may exercise judicial review if it is “capable of
repetition yet evading review.”
WON the petitioners have legal standing.
Only the legislators have legal standing because the issuances allegedly injured (substantially) the institution of
the Congress. Sanlakas, PM, and SJS were unable to fulfill the direct injury test.
WON the issuances are constitutional.
Yes. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising
chief executive and commander-in-chief powers provided by the Constitution. Besides, the proclamation is
devoid of any legal significance as it only gives notice that such state exists. Further, a declaration of a state of
rebellion does not amount to a declaration of martial law. Lastly, proof that the issuances are without factual
bases is lacking.

SEPARATE OPINIONS
Vitug (concurs). Even with the issuances, constitution is still in force. Violation of rights is therefore not
justified by the proclamation. Panganiban (concurs). The petitions may be dismissed on the basis of mootness
alone. The petitioners have not shown the exemption to mootness (that the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance). Ynares-Santiago
(dissents). The rebellion ended in the evening. No warrantless arrest should have been allowed after that. The
declaration, in its duration, gave legal cover to such warrantless arrests even when the rebellion had ceased. The
issuances are null and void, so are the arrests made after the rebellion. Sandoval-Gutierrez (dissents). The power
to declare a state of rebellion is nowhere to be found in the constitution, and therefore not subject to clear legal
restraints. It is martial law without declaration to that effect and without observing proper procedure. If the goal
is to call out the armed forces, it is unnecessary.
GUDANI v SENGA

Facts:

 Gudani and Balutan are high ranking officials of the Philippine Marines who, at the time of the incidents
in this case, were assigned at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio.
 Senator Biazon invited several junior officers of the AFP including Chief of Staff Senga to appear before
the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security on Sept. 28, 2005, in light of the electoral fraud
in the 2004 elections. (Gudani and Balutan were assigned to maintain peace and order in Lanao del Norte
and Sur during the 04 elections).
 Gen. Senga informed Senator Biazon that he could not attend due to prior commitments but he would ask
the other officers to attend so the PMA superintendent was informed that Gudani and Senga were invited
to appear before the Senate hearing.
 On the evening of Sept. 27, a message was transmitted to the PMA superintendent that as per instruction
of Pres. Arroyo, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional hearing without the approval of
the Pres. HOWEVER, by that time Gudani and Senga already left Baguio for Manila.
 The following day, Gen. Senga informed Sen. Biazon that “no approval has been granted by the President
to any AFP officer to appear” before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections

Note: EO 464 was also issued on Sept 28.

 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifests that shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of
Gen. Senga’s letter to Sen. Biazon sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Tolentino
to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino
on the latter’s cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen.
Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that “it was an order,” yet Gen. Gudani
still refused to take Gen. Senga’s call.
 A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga
issued a statement which noted that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Artcles of
War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings. Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.
 Petitioners were separately served with Orders directing them to appear in person at the Pre-Trial
Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 66 and 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and to
submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of violating
Articles of War 65 and 97.
 It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly
seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners
from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE: WON the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before legislative inquiry?

HELD:

The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President
has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may
be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the
force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s
ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm
that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not
the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
DAVID v ARROYO

Facts:
Randolf David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (BJC)

FACTS
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. ...• and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP
"to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."

At the height of the implementation of PP 1017, several anti-government personalities were arrested and
detained by the police. Operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated
news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while
policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. A few minutes after the search
and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper,
Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated by the Solicitor
General.

ISSUE
W/N the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 was unconstitutional

HELD
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

Calling-out power – NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII … do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Sec 18, Art VII. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration
Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas v. Zamora, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and
any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.

Take Care Power - UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Sec 17, Art VII. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Under the RAC, the President is granted the power to issue EOs, AOs, Proclamations, MOs, Memo Circulars,
and GOs. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws
which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.

Take Over Power – UNCONSTITUTIONAL [Outline Topic]

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.”

Sec 17, Art XII. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power
not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not
the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

What is an “emergency”?
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the
elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the
United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3)
principal heads: a)economic, b) natural disaster,and c) national security.

"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic
crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
KULAYAN v TAN

FACTS:

On March 31, 2009, Governor Tan of Sulu, issued Proclamation No.1 Series of 2009 (Proc. 1-09) which
declared a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. Included in its implementing rules was the establishment
of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province, to conduct general search and seizure including arrests and the
creation of a civilian armed forces. This was because of the numerous kidnappings committed in January by the
Abu Sayaff. The laws he used to support his claim were the Human Security Act and the Sec. 465 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which grants “the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.”

On April 16, 2009, petitioners Kulayan, et al. filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,claiming
that Proc. 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. They contend that it
is only the President of the country who has the authority to exercise emergency and calling-out powers. Thus,
Proc. 1-09 and its implementing guidelines were issued ultra vires. The petitioners also allege that the Governor
is not authorized by any law to create a civilian armed forces under his command.

The respondents used to Secs. 16 and 465 of the LGC “which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out
emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition” for their defense. It also mentioned
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan if Sulu authorized the declaration of the State of Emergency.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 465, in relation to Sec. 16 of the LGC authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state
of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proc. 1-09-NO.

RATIO:

The ponencia was clear in saying that “The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers
as the President.” Sec. 18, Art. 7 of the Consitution which provides for the calling out powers of the President
is exclusive only to him. This was also reiterated in the ruling in IBP v. Zamora. Thus, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police and his own
Civilian Emergency Force.

The respondent fails in relying in paragraph.1, subparagraph (vii) of Sec. 465. This provision refers to
calamities and disasters. The kidnapping incident does not fall under this category. Thus, the Governor cannot
validly enact and implement emergency measures for this situation. In relation to this, paragraph 2,
subparagraph (vi) of Sec. 465 which refers to calling out the AFP is also inapplicable for two reasons. “First,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to
which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the
sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign
and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory.”

The Court emphasized that the LGC is “concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic
services more effective to the constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on
local executives.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

NOTES:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and
natural disasters and calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the
appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies,
programs, projects, services and activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence,
rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces
of the component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with
the situation or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants. (Emphases supplied)
TORRES v GONZALES

Facts:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Torres vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987]
FACTS: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring
that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the
estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended
for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
--
A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY
OTHER LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON MAY BE WITHDRAWN. It
may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent
offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment
of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer
the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
MONSANTO v FACTORAN

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment
but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's
civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss
of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation
PEOPLE v SALLE

Facts:
FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed
their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant
Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that
with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants
impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. La’o further informed the Court that
appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's
motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote
has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?

RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person
withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw
his appeal. – “WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30)
days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to
this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant
of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek
the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”
GARCIA v COA

Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications.
He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case
against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative
case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal
offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated
from his work and is now claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to
present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an
executive clemency (absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due
course to petitioners claim.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.

Holding:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further
articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative
charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his
office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
LLAMAS v ORBOS

Facts:

Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for office for 90 days;
hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months, however, Executive Secretary Orbos,
without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency.
Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province.

Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted by
the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which
allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction
by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also
contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the
running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were
violated since he was not notified of the pardon.

Issues:

1. May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

2. Has there been a final judgment?

3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?

Held:

1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If
executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do
not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative
cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary
cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant
executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.

There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is
deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the
presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision
final.

Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)

3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that
petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs.
Executive Secretary Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)
EDUARDO KAPUNAN v CA

Facts: The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi have been charged with the killing of KMU
Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay. On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay’s dead body was
found. The murder of Olalia is a controversial case during that time, for Olalia’s profile to be the Chairman of the
KMU.

On Nov. 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a complaint letter to Department
of Justice for the alleged complex kidnapping and killing of Olalia and Alay-ay, against Edgardo Kapunan and
Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
Sec. Serafin Cuevas, Secretary of Department of Justice, created a panel which are tasked to conduct a preliminary
investigation on Olalia’s case.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss with the Department of Justice on the ground that the amnesty granted to
them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal liability under Proclamation 347 issued
by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos entitled, “Granting of Amnesty to the rebels, insurgents and all other persons, who may
or may be committed crimes against public order and crimes committed in furtherance of political ends. However,
the motion has been denied, hence this motion for certiorari.

Issues: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their criminal liability in the
Olalia case.

Held/Ruling:
The panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of the petitioners on
the ground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to show that the Olalia murder case is
one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for.
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition, finding no grave of abuse of discretion on the panel created by
the DOJ, the Appelate Court refused to rule on the applicability of Amnesty issued to Kapunan and Legaspi.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi
pertains only to the crime against rebellion and does not cover the murder case of Olalia and Alay-ay.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v EASTERN SEA TRADING

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because
EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328
w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial
Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said
EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter
ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred
to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from
time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act,
have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade
agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have
abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them
were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
RUBRICO v ARROYO

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa
City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean
Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following
them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them
on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments
against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly
reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition
to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the
threats and harassment that followed.