Today is Monday, July 08, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered v
m the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs

of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8

EDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

strict of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on E
t for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3

seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of

y on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Correc

ad Office in Intramuros, Manila on

e head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Cand
ed Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she

r as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registrati
ix month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to
rict. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First D
, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off pe
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one ye

even" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should sub
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since ch
e First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

pondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this inten
nstead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

take." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "re
sked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates abou
" Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

on, therefore, is devoid of merit.

e cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only a
he Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot b
ter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the o
he integrity of the election.

ency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. T
mplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said reg
f her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. T
uch limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commis

xxx xxx xxx

be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

spondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

ous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled wit
to Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned

rict since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cann
e continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila whe
he representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positio
San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
t that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy becaus
of Leyte since childhood.

her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Altho
TC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily pre
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter the
omicile.
uct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
tion, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resid

rict of Leyte "since childhood."

st District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter
nconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she wa

tioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of t

D to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition f

ts of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On t

of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Pro
of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

classified into two general areas:

t of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

etitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

ve jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

cation of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the gen
nception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as requ

ons, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile
intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" an

is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicil
n's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thu
ile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
dicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, on
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
stitute domicile.

cal laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence f

rts not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such inten
o, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place w
n individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

e placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile

Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elec
sidence?

ssembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a per

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ner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residen

o back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

hat a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have

he 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same m

ncy requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's C

mining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
erately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

en" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obv
hood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned re
Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place
he confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a cand

yte

and Seven Months.

petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxta
ously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be al
the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
e any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, re
er. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have

and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for variou
sertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certif
election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

herein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either
estion and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter mu

ying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. Wh
ny other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he h
stration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation w
n in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's

petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring t
but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

e, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

er domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she gra
he taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Dan
ered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Ju
ed as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

apped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Ph

held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intentio
lthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's pre
estones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a po
of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the

se she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (s

gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation o

nstrate: 37
 hing a new one; and

med to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
pondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
wn choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

aw as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction betwee
rm "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Ar

Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or ju

xempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of ori

Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultrama

wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it re
ns, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place
not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actu

en and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This d

BLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wi

respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

nto account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or tra
wise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stay

to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a c

xxx xxx xxx

a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acqu
lace, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other

s not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence h
ously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this
at the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wif
o live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
 vince of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. O
enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best su
med to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, for
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the
883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret th
and, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing s
ocured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in

can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a c
as based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago,
cted. (21 Cyc., 1148).

irmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon
me, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) B
ct to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been follo

ed — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is t
ce. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was

d, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore
ent in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rig

Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights
that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a dom

nly acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate th
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to h
rary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the fem
he death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itse

we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of lega

resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
n accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

nstrued to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute h
can authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of th

g a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory p
ch is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute u

sion after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi

it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sect
 ue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all conte
he House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

re or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was m
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he

n for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, Ma
First District of Leyte.

Separate Opinions

e unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence
nd legal propositions:

ciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereaf
micile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 o

mpt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)

ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the h
relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obli

s ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to los
his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile

with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent dom

cile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by th
nnot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity t

omicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout
hen they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected
n Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of t
on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually live

r President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought con
e last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.

s domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified
octrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of
lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law."11 The presumption that th
s under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practic
deed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down betw
d States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they sta
uired probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconven
men to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not mi
heory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."19In publish
es and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20

on law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this commo
Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21

xxx xxx xxx

ain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of th
e so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on se
discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

ing proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such t
e bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour
arricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three c

of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The
he conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.

whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

o eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effe

g sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whe
upport of the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occ
he husband and the wife, thus:

nt, the court shall decide.

e abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is n

and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may n

certain cases like:

gerous to her Life;

ct or insults, making common life impossible;

nnot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);

ey to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 O

as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

ahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

e from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice

xxx xxx xxx

te the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife a
heir children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all m

started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile
er law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bo

of due process and equal protection of

d's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally relate
tween sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To b
se and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

quired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's
me. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a
be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husban
w should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reaso

r Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, pe

xxx xxx xxx

sts for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

nt Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.

oban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The P

a in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, a

my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban C

ouls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and sca

undo for permissions to —

use in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.

xxx xxx xxx

his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quo

n, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and reno
d that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

ce in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred fro

te. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
n 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

e presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolo
Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in w
disprovethat she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First Dis
ere she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek t
ertificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a

xxx xxx xxx

nal certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment

8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on the
her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more

e shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show th
o disqualify her, she averred:36

xxx xxx xxx

ition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and ru
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as
strict to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respo
e another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve
submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in

xxx xxx xxx

spondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani W
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petit
n for Reconsideration of Resolution
y 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commissi
sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in

y promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:

it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both T

s and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic viole
ternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, a

ranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective o
e place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

ectorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while privat
tatistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards

atus between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefinin
malous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yest
nstitution forbids it.

e of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.

tion of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitatio
sure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong H

a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependen
s elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non reverten
nce, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child

Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public resp
ence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in ma
other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 3

arriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's dom
atac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husba
it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domi
her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold o

nd's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, tha
ost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her dom

esidence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presiden
I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro
she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was
8, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement th
after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 199
than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-y

unning for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation
of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and can
ecause she persisted in running, its decision on
e canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over

to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1

poses, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided th
when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her
hoice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in

death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband'

cile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the

e demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer t
given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by

rky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine th
protect the human rights of women, no less than men.

ncerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three ce
on on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concep
g what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made respon
hip property for the purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partne
ssume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating he
arents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto p
n is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibitio
marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly pro
 arching influence from beyond the grave.

rotest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitab
at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the funda

to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implan
ernational treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating sp
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle em
d domicile." 14(Emphasis supplied).

Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady Presid
alues the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role o

ory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them o
rt of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of the commun

passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evide

ents under the same conditions as men;

credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

s and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

e the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in
is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accep

more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and socia

micile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising f
ated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time whe

ections and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A complian
it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let

t or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
 law. These provisions read:

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
ng the day of the election.

oral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Membe
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional r
ts Chairman.

ws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contra
e COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

ement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably link
discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.

he term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may re
micile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is tha

thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non re
n for the new domicile must be actual.

g committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

ectoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of wh
as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.

exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusi
t "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

tion 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candida
inue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

e courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered

ot be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, ju
all not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

pecific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should b
e argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs.
Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 2
liciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on of

he quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second hig

(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winn
y eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

sed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That c
, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, a

nstitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner

e who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
ection. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

lared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained th
office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on th

ndidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qual
case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC

e's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reform
warrantoproceedings against winning candidates.

claration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or convi
ases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

ority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for whic
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period

s a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other m
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited un
didate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign cou
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)

ate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
r due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)

inal judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
e with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pen

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Sec

any elective local position:

for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

epublic;

to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

tion and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations
the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in
on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the Firs

didacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to no
disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Repres

didacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with rega
uo warrantoproceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

lection the qualifications of a candidate.

ing his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election of
That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been vote
e, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated i
ntrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certifica
the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving c

ce President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the preroga
d Vice President, as the case may be.

ter the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same gro

COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:

fications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds f

ule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise
hich essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))

tion is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "di
0 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
scribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is t

not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichot

actices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prol
etermining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding fo

action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to ele
s, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with th
Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on
s against such candidates.

its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos f

SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitio
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.

punan.

ovision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Co
t least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district
nonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases1 where significantly the fact
onduct indicative of such intention.

phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

o prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.

uld have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum p

rn to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile

different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non reverte

f not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be el

to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in allsituations satis
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

ecision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —

er domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she gra
he taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speake
h him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she an
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family we
e of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, res
Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31,
an Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

ot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein

ervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that s

Teacher/ Social Worker

olosa, Leyte

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

EIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years SevenMonths

R IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

on of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and dec
the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

 (Signature of Candidate)2

r seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituenc

tioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
te) immediately preceding the day of election

mportant issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out

4, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 tha

received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of govern
uris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

lared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained th
office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on th

poses) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
f the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the sus

ovision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of dis
ated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is

of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified

se a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of vote

uld not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribe
n the Constitution.

e to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected represen

e conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a

case, and which I have simplified as follows:

Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went

Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
usband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in M

Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

sitions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably v

the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places whic

rtificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

he Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to B
egistered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa

lot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging

of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituen

y" wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO

esidency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

esidence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of internatio
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

rable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations in

e of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the

y choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is tha
the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the

ational or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondin

onolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles o
of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or o

ency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice whic
nstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence a

ply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (
an be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.

do E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition.

sult of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her l
and's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, he
n Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this
heir own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained

aw. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after th
I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I fin

ons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile u
her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.

gin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theo
d obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency sin

ume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her ac
we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
gin which was only in a state of suspended animation.

t to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10

9 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is n
sband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has
ed for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of he

n the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in va
of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference

cally reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part conti
ission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These co

particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

EC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELE

risdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction o

d Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. T
of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or c

oner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

cumentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa
on. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holdin
 yte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, Presiden
s that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her n

mpt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

edominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recogniz
ly domicilehe may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justif
m to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his cho

es that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that

is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court sh
estroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Cod

h the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by ju
omicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercise

e of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
as already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, sh

acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to
e" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
uary 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photoco

ffidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or
her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is
arriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

d the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, p
at transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educ
ce with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The re
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

x "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," an
0 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusi

nest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of c
d was the truth.

of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Co
band. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the tim
ses her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her ow
e unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence
nd legal propositions:

ciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereaf
micile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 o

mpt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)

ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the h
relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obli

s ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to los
his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile

with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent dom

cile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by th
nnot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity t

omicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout
hen they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected
n Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of t
on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually live

r President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought con
e last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.

s domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified
octrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of
lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law."11 The presumption that th
s under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practic
deed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down betw
d States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they sta
uired probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconven
men to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not mi
heory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."19In publish
es and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20

on law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this commo
Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21

xxx xxx xxx

ain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of th
e so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on se
discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

ing proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such t
e bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour
arricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three c

of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The
he conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.

whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

o eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effe

g sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whe
upport of the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occ
he husband and the wife, thus:

nt, the court shall decide.

e abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is n

and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may n

certain cases like:

gerous to her Life;

t or insults, making common life impossible;

nnot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);

ey to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 O

as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

ahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

e from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice

xxx xxx xxx

te the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife a
heir children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all m

started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile
er law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bo

of due process and equal protection of

d's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally relate
tween sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To b
se and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

quired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's
me. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a
be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husban
w should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reaso

r Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, pe

xxx xxx xxx

sts for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

nt Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.

oban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The P

a in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, a

my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban C

ouls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and sca

undo for permissions to —

use in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.

xxx xxx xxx

his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quo

n, that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and reno
d that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

ce in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred fro
yte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
n 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

e presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolo
Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in w
disprovethat she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First Dis
ere she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek
ertificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a

xxx xxx xxx

nal certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment

8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on the
her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more

e shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show th
o disqualify her, she averred:36

xxx xxx xxx

ition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and ru
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as
strict to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respo
e another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve
submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in

xxx xxx xxx

spondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani W
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petit
n for Reconsideration of Resolution
y 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commissi
sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in

y promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:

it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both T

s and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic viole
ternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution,

ranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective o
e place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

ectorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while privat
tatistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards

atus between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefinin
malous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yeste
nstitution forbids it.

e of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.

tion of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitatio
sure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong H

a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependen
s elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non reverten
nce, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child

Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public resp
ence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in ma
other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 3

arriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's dom

tac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husban
it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domi
her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold o

nd's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, tha
ost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her dom

esidence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presiden
I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro
she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was
8, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement th
after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 199
than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-y
unning for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation
of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and can
ecause she persisted in running, its decision on
e canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over

to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1

poses, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided th
when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her
hoice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in

death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband'

cile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the

e demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer t
given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by

rky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine th
protect the human rights of women, no less than men.

ncerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three ce
on on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concep
g what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made respon
hip property for the purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partne
ssume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating he
arents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto p
n is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibitio
marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly pro
arching influence from beyond the grave.

rotest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitab
at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the funda

to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implan
ernational treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating sp
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle em
d domicile." 14(Emphasis supplied).

Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady Presid
alues the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role o
 ory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them
rt of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of the commun

passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evide

ents under the same conditions as men;

credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

s and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

e the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in
is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accep

more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and socia

micile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising f
ated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time whe

ections and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A complian
it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let

t or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

law. These provisions read:

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
ng the day of the election.

oral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Membe
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional r
ts Chairman.

ws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contra
e COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

ement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably link
discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
he term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may re
micile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is tha

thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non re
n for the new domicile must be actual.

g committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

ectoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of wh
as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.

exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusi
t "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

tion 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candida
inue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

e courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered

ot be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, ju
all not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

pecific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should b
e argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs.
Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 2
liciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on of

he quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second hig

(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winn
y eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

sed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That c
, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, a
 nstitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner

e who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
ection. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

lared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained th
office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on th

ndidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qual
case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC

e's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reform
warrantoproceedings against winning candidates.

claration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or convi
ases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

ority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for whic
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period

s a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other m
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited un
didate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign coun
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)

ate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
r due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)

inal judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
e with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pen

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Sec
 any elective local position:

for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

epublic;

to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

tion and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations
the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in
on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the Firs

didacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to no
disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Repres

didacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with rega
uo warrantoproceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

lection the qualifications of a candidate.

ing his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election of
That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been vote

, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in
ntrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certifica
the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving c

ce President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the preroga
d Vice President, as the case may be.

ter the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same gro

COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:

fications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds f

ule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise
hich essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
ation is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "d
0 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
scribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is t

not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichot

actices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prol
etermining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding fo

action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to ele
, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with th
Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on
s against such candidates.

its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos f

SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitio
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.

punan.

ovision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Co
t least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district

nonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases1 where significantly the fact
onduct indicative of such intention.

phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

o prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.

uld have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum p

rn to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile

different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non reverte

f not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be el

to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in allsituations satis
ongress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
 ecision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —

er domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she gra
he taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speake
h him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she an
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family we
e of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, res
Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31,
an Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

ot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein

ervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that s

Teacher/ Social Worker

olosa, Leyte

Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

EIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years SevenMonths

R IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

on of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and dec
the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate)2

r seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituenc

tioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for fa

mportant issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out

4, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 tha

e received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of govern
uris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

lared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained th
office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on th
poses) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
f the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the sus

ovision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of dis
ated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is

of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified

se a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of vote

uld not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribe
n the Constitution.

e to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected represen

e conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a

case, and which I have simplified as follows:

Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went

Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.

usband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Ma

Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

sitions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably v

the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places whic

rtificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

he Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to B
egistered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa

lot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging

of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituen

y" wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO
residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

esidence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of internatio
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

rable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations in

e of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the

y choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is tha
the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the

ational or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondin

onolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles o
of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or o

ency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice whic
nstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence a

ply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (
an be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.

do E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition.

sult of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her l
and's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, he

Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this
heir own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained

aw. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after th
I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I fin

ons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile u
her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.

gin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theo
d obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency sin

ume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her ac
we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
gin which was only in a state of suspended animation.

t to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10
 9 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is n
sband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has
ed for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of he

n the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in va
of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference

cally reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part conti
ission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These co

articularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

EC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELE

risdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction o

d Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. T
of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or c

oner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

cumentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa
on. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holdin

yte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, Presiden
s that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her n

mpt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

edominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recogniz
ly domicilehe may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justif
m to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his cho

es that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that

e is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court sh
estroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Cod

h the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by ju
omicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercise

e of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
as already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, sh

acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to
e" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
uary 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photoco

ffidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or
her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is
arriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

d the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, p
at transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; edu
ce with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The re
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

x "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," an
0 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusi

nest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of c
d was the truth.

of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Co
band. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the tim
ses her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her ow

less he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
ediately preceding the day of the election.
ollo,

unding the filling up of the original certificate thus:

House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filom

e as I allegedly lack residence in the constituency because of the entry of the word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candida

ord "RESIDENCE" to mean actual or physical residence, and the word "SEVEN" merely reflected my actual and physical residence in

cate that at lease one (1) month had passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" m

cy stating "THAT I AM eligible for said Office" was sufficient to affirm that I possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for M

n City, a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte I never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to wh
15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).

vit explaining her residence:

in 1938, when was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes R

xxx xxx xxx

or residence of origin have not abandoned and have never intended to abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there

still the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.

s Norte and registered as a voter there.

lippines. Together, we lived in Malacañang Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

San Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he
ce of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I was a child.

xxx xxx xxx

ersaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even he

and innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequest
 xxx xxx xxx

e in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized

xxx xxx xxx

nce of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tac

ed the majority opinion. Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.

, 1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's Ma

ndo and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:

arch 8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is disqualified to run for failure to meet the constitutional requiremen

supra

uly 22, 1986).

 xxx xxx xxx

y solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or nav
w shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

L CODE, 220 (1987).

CODE, 220 (1987).

e domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate dom
use for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by
5, cited in De La Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her original domicile or acquire a new domicile unde

domicile is not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesc

However, taking another approach, she writes:

ad of family residence because the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residenc
1988).

cel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by

han twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later t
 742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.

353, 354.

n declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
ommission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any interve

course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

bunal which shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . .

1925 ed).

ves unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to rea
mmediately preceding the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)

omicile different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husban

99 Misc. 582.
o, the Civil Code Revision Committee stated:

nd changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino Life since then have revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Co
elopments and trends.

onjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom, especially in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute co
tuation of several marriages already annulled under Canon Law but still considered subsisting under the Civil Law and making it nece
o the long-standing clamor for equality between men and women now mandated as a policy to be implemented under the New Const
pments have shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds provided under the Civil C
r abreast of the latest scientific discoveries." (Emphasis supplied)

84-185.

eprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

(1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).

guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service . . . ."

Family Code of the Philippines.

epresentatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of ag
n one year immediately preceding the day of the election."

rt may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

er No. 227, July 17,1987, which took effect on August 3, 1988.

.

SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial governor).

ssman).

r); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo warranto against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a
dent); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto against a municipal president). Cf. Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1

s, G.R.
ember 24, 1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798. August 31, 1935; but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, whe

vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863).

2, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.

.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 55
tate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.

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