De Guzman v.

CA
Facts:

Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings
those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip
to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November
1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750
cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150
boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he
was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial
court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier

(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods

Held:

(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court
that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage
of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a
fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.

(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private
respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of
a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold
that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control
of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot
be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.

NATIONAL CTEEL V CA

Facts:

Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one

voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer.

The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. Plaintiff, alleging
negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was

seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as

she was under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; that in the course its
voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to which there exists a presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.
ISSUE: Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

Held:

No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would

be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general

public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space,
for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee [Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil.

836, 842-843 (1952)]. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally,

private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the
general public.

Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship owner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing

provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima
facie presumption of negligence on a common carrie

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in
January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the
Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to
P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the
first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994,
petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from
local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer
denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term
“common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle

the petitioner to the exemption

Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a
limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Case Digest

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance
G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI),
and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of
114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the
Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.

On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru”.
After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the
cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the
goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical
fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages
cost P93,112.00.

SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on
the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On
December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?

Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private
carrier, has no merit.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733
deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)

Te concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of “public service”, under
the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13,
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes:

“ x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,
for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed
route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations
and other similar public services. x x x”

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp. and Lambert M.

Eroles

Facts

Respondent GP Sarmiento Trucking Company (GTS) undertook to transport

cargoes for Concepcion Industries Inc. when it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing damage to the cargoes. Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of
Concepcion Industries Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for breach of contract of
carriage for reimbursement. Instead of filing an answer, GPS filed a demurrer to
evidence, claiming that it could not be held liable as a common carrier because it
was only a private carrier, being the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries
Inc. since 1988.

The lower court granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff FGU failed to prove
that GPS was a common carrier. The CA affirmed the trial court's order.
Issue

Whether or not GPS is considered a common carrier and may be presumed

negligent and therefore liable for damages.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that GPS cannot be considered a common carrier as
it renders service exclusively to Concepcion Industries; that notwithstanding, GPS
cannot escape from liability since in culpa contractual, mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify prima facie a corresponding
right of relief. Respondent driver, however, who is not a party to the contract of
carriage, may not be held liable under the agreement without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court and
the CA insofar as the respondent driver was concerned, but GPS trucking company
was ordered to pay the petitioner FGU the value of the damaged and lost cargoes.

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping
Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags
of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00).
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank.
Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

De Guzman v. CA
Facts:

Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings
those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip
to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November
1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750
cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150
boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he
was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial
court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier

(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods

Held:

(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court
that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage
of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a
fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.

(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:

a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private
respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of
a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold
that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control
of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot
be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.

NATIONAL CTEEL V CA

Facts:

Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one
voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer.

The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. Plaintiff, alleging
negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was

seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as

she was under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; that in the course its
voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to which there exists a presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.

ISSUE: Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

Held:

No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would

be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general

public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space,
for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee [Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil.

836, 842-843 (1952)]. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally,

private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the
general public.

Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship owner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing

provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima
facie presumption of negligence on a common carrie

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in
January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the
Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to
P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the
first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994,
petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from
local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer
denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term
“common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle

the petitioner to the exemption

Held:

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a
limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Case Digest

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance
G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI),
and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of
114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the
Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.

On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru”.
After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the
cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the
goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical
fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages
cost P93,112.00.

SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on
the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On
December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?

Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private
carrier, has no merit.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733
deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)

Te concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of “public service”, under
the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13,
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes:

“ x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,
for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed
route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations
and other similar public services. x x x”

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp. and Lambert M.

Eroles
Facts

Respondent GP Sarmiento Trucking Company (GTS) undertook to transport

cargoes for Concepcion Industries Inc. when it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing damage to the cargoes. Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of
Concepcion Industries Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for breach of contract of
carriage for reimbursement. Instead of filing an answer, GPS filed a demurrer to
evidence, claiming that it could not be held liable as a common carrier because it
was only a private carrier, being the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries
Inc. since 1988.

The lower court granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff FGU failed to prove
that GPS was a common carrier. The CA affirmed the trial court's order.

Issue

Whether or not GPS is considered a common carrier and may be presumed

negligent and therefore liable for damages.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that GPS cannot be considered a common carrier as
it renders service exclusively to Concepcion Industries; that notwithstanding, GPS
cannot escape from liability since in culpa contractual, mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify prima facie a corresponding
right of relief. Respondent driver, however, who is not a party to the contract of
carriage, may not be held liable under the agreement without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court and
the CA insofar as the respondent driver was concerned, but GPS trucking company
was ordered to pay the petitioner FGU the value of the damaged and lost cargoes.

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping
Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags
of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00).
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank.
Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

De Guzman v. CA
Facts:

Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings
those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip
to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November
1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750
cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150
boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he
was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial
court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier

(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods

Held:

(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court
that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage
of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a
fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.

(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:

a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private
respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of
a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold
that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control
of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot
be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.

NATIONAL CTEEL V CA

Facts:

Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one

voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer.

The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. Plaintiff, alleging
negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was

seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as

she was under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; that in the course its
voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to which there exists a presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.

ISSUE: Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

Held:

No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would

be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general

public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space,
for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee [Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil.

836, 842-843 (1952)]. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally,
private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the
general public.

Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship owner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing

provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima
facie presumption of negligence on a common carrie

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in
January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the
Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to
P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the
first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994,
petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from
local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer
denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term
“common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle

the petitioner to the exemption

Held:

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a
limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Case Digest

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance
G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI),
and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of
114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the
Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.

On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru”.
After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the
cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the
goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical
fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages
cost P93,112.00.

SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on
the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On
December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?

Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private
carrier, has no merit.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733
deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)
Te concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of “public service”, under
the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13,
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes:

“ x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,
for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed
route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations
and other similar public services. x x x”

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp. and Lambert M.

Eroles

Facts

Respondent GP Sarmiento Trucking Company (GTS) undertook to transport

cargoes for Concepcion Industries Inc. when it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing damage to the cargoes. Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of
Concepcion Industries Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for breach of contract of
carriage for reimbursement. Instead of filing an answer, GPS filed a demurrer to
evidence, claiming that it could not be held liable as a common carrier because it
was only a private carrier, being the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries
Inc. since 1988.

The lower court granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff FGU failed to prove
that GPS was a common carrier. The CA affirmed the trial court's order.

Issue

Whether or not GPS is considered a common carrier and may be presumed

negligent and therefore liable for damages.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that GPS cannot be considered a common carrier as
it renders service exclusively to Concepcion Industries; that notwithstanding, GPS
cannot escape from liability since in culpa contractual, mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify prima facie a corresponding
right of relief. Respondent driver, however, who is not a party to the contract of
carriage, may not be held liable under the agreement without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court and
the CA insofar as the respondent driver was concerned, but GPS trucking company
was ordered to pay the petitioner FGU the value of the damaged and lost cargoes.

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping
Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags
of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00).
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank.
Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.

Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

De Guzman v. CA
Facts:

Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings
those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip
to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November
1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750
cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150
boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he
was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial
court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier

(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods

Held:

(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court
that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he
merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage
of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a
fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:

a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private
respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of
a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold
that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control
of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot
be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.

NATIONAL CTEEL V CA

Facts:

Plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Charterer and defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the MV Vlasons I to make one

voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor, Manila. The handling, loading and
unloading of the cargoes were the responsibility of the Charterer.

The skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets shipped were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. Plaintiff, alleging
negligence, filed a claim for damages against the defendant who denied liability claiming that the MV Vlasons I was

seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s cargo; that said vessel was not a “common carrier” inasmuch as

she was under voyage charter contract with the plaintiff as charterer under the charter party; that in the course its
voyage, the vessel encountered very rough seas.
Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers pursuant to which there exists a presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in case of loss or damage to the cargo are applicable to a private carrier.

ISSUE: Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

Held:

No. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would

be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general

public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space,
for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee [Mendoza vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil.

836, 842-843 (1952)]. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally,

private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the
general public.

Because the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the ship owner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing

provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima
facie presumption of negligence on a common carrie

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in
January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the
Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to
P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the
first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994,
petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from
local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer
denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term
“common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle
the petitioner to the exemption

Held:

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a
common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e.
petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all
persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a
limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Case Digest

Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance
G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI),
and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of
114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the
Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.

On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru”.
After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port
Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the
cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the
goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical
fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages
cost P93,112.00.
SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on
the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On
December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?

Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private
carrier, has no merit.

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733
deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)

Te concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of “public service”, under
the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13,
paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes:

“ x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines,
for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed
route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration
plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations
and other similar public services. x x x”

FGU Insurance Corp. vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp. and Lambert M.

Eroles

Facts

Respondent GP Sarmiento Trucking Company (GTS) undertook to transport

cargoes for Concepcion Industries Inc. when it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing damage to the cargoes. Petitioner, FGU, insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes. Then, as subrogee of
Concepcion Industries Inc., petitioner FGU sued GPS for breach of contract of
carriage for reimbursement. Instead of filing an answer, GPS filed a demurrer to
evidence, claiming that it could not be held liable as a common carrier because it
was only a private carrier, being the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries
Inc. since 1988.

The lower court granted the motion, ruling that plaintiff FGU failed to prove
that GPS was a common carrier. The CA affirmed the trial court's order.

Issue

Whether or not GPS is considered a common carrier and may be presumed

negligent and therefore liable for damages.

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that GPS cannot be considered a common carrier as
it renders service exclusively to Concepcion Industries; that notwithstanding, GPS
cannot escape from liability since in culpa contractual, mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify prima facie a corresponding
right of relief. Respondent driver, however, who is not a party to the contract of
carriage, may not be held liable under the agreement without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court and
the CA insofar as the respondent driver was concerned, but GPS trucking company
was ordered to pay the petitioner FGU the value of the damaged and lost cargoes.

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping
Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags
of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00).
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance
Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank.
Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS
Shipping is liable.
Held:

PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a
limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area
indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier
change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet
and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise
Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC,
common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to
any of the following causes, among others:

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Asia Lighterage.docx - Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Prudential ...

https://www.coursehero.com › ... › LAW › LAW MJD-15-008

1.
Asia Lighterage & Shipping, Inc. vs CA & Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
G.R. No. 147246 August 19, 2003 On appeal is the CA's May 11, 2000 ...

TRANSPORTATION LAW (PUP COLLEGE OF LAW) – ASSIGNED ...

https://engralvinclaridades.wordpress.com/.../transportation-law-pup-college-of-law-as...

1.
Nov 30, 2016 - CA, GR L-47822. Dec. 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 612 Fabre, Jr. v. CA, GR
111127. ... 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 312 · Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc. v. CA ...

Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Case ... - The Law Student Digest

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 1.
Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Case Digest. Facts: Wheat in bulk, was shipped
by Marubeni American Corporation of Portland, Oregon on board the vessel ...

Law San Beda College - Facebook

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1.
Dec 4, 2015 - Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. vs. CAG. ... Court of Appeals, supra)
2.6. .... Case Law (Santiago Lighterage Corporation vs. CA. G.R. No.

Notes of Atty - Angelfire

www.angelfire.com/me4/francute/TL-cc.htm

1.
2.
In Asia Lighterage & Shipping Co vs CA, April 9, 2003, a common carrier need not
have a fixed and public route known nor does have a terminals or issue ...

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Asia Lighterage.docx - Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Prudential ...

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Asia Lighterage & Shipping, Inc. vs CA & Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
G.R. No. 147246 August 19, 2003 On appeal is the CA's May 11, 2000 ...
TRANSPORTATION LAW (PUP COLLEGE OF LAW) – ASSIGNED ...

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Nov 30, 2016 - CA, GR L-47822. Dec. 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 612 Fabre, Jr. v. CA, GR
111127. ... 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 312 · Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc. v. CA ...

Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Case ... - The Law Student Digest

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Asia Lighterage Shipping Inc vs CA Case Digest. Facts: Wheat in bulk, was shipped
by Marubeni American Corporation of Portland, Oregon on board the vessel ...

Law San Beda College - Facebook

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Dec 4, 2015 - Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. vs. CAG. ... Court of Appeals, supra)
2.6. .... Case Law (Santiago Lighterage Corporation vs. CA. G.R. No.

Notes of Atty - Angelfire

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In Asia Lighterage & Shipping Co vs CA, April 9, 2003, a common carrier need not
have a fixed and public route known nor does have a terminals or issue ...

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