TANADA vs TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985

FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent government officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. The petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on matters of
public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also invoking
that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal standing to carry out such petition since they are not personally and
directly prejudiced by the non-publication of the issuances in question. Respondents also
contended that the publication in the Official Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which
provide their own affectivity date. Since the issuances in question contain the date of
effectivity, publication is not necessary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal personality or standing to carry out the instant
petition and whether publication is necessary for laws which have its own effectivity date.

HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizen’s legal personality since the right sought to be enforced
by the petitioners is a public right recognized by the Constitution.

The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that:

“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Publication is indispensable because without such publication, there would be no adequate

notice to the general public of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conducts
as citizens. It would render injustice to punish or burden a citizen for the transgression of law
which he had no notice.

It is the respondent officials’ duty to enforce the Constitutional rights of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all presidential issuances of
“public nature” or of general applicability” is mandated by law. Unless so published, laws shall
have no binding force or effect.
PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954

FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First Instance of Manila for violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Section 34 of Republic No. 265. The appellant was in
possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S dollars, checks and money orders amounting
to about $ 7,000. He failed to sell the said currency to the Central Bank through its agents one
day following the receipt of such currency as required by Circular No.20. The appellant was
sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of Php 1, 000.
The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said circular was not published on the Official
Gazette prior to the act of omission of the appellant, thus, said circular has no force and effect.

Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949. It was not published until
November 1951, or after three months after appelant’s conviction of its violation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:

1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a statute or a law should be subjected to
publication requirement stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said Circular No. 20 when the latter was only published
after about three months of his conviction.
HELD:
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it is being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, therefore it has the force and effect of the law. Circulars
and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. It is based on the general principle that before the public is bound
by penal provisions, the people should be officially informed of its contents and
penalties.
2. Appellant could not be held liable for the violation of Circular No. 20 for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange.

CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 137873, 20 April 2001

FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose
Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a complaint for damages at the RTC of Pasig against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

ISSUES:
Whether or not:

1. The petitioner can be held liable under the grounds of negligence.

2. The injured employee or his heirs have the right to choose between availing themselves
of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages in cases of employer’s negligence.

HELD:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “the thing or transaction speaks for itself” recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof. It has the following requisites:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises.
Claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only
under the Workmen´s Compensation Law. In availing its remedies, claimants are deemed to
have waived their right of the remedies provided by other laws. However, this is an exception
because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim
for death benefits, otherwise, she would have opted to avail of a better remedy than that of
which she already had.

CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. L-15127

30 May 1961

FACTS:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law studies up to
the first semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff was awarded with scholarship grants and his
tuition fees were returned to him at the end of each semester. Plaintiff left the defendant’s law
school and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year at the College of Law of Abad Santos
University where he graduated.

He applied to take the bar examination in with which he needed the transcript of records from
defendant Arellano University. The defendant demanded that he had paid back the P1, 033.87,
noting the contract that he signed stated that in consideration of the scholarship granted to
him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded
to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby the former
waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship is valid or not.

HELD:
The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct
violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract was contrary to sound
policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No.38, 1949 is sound policy.
When students are given full or partial scholarships it is understood that such scholarships are
merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school
or to transfer to another institution.

MICIANO vs. BRIMO

50 PHIL 867

FACTS:

A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in accordance with
the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that
his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their
inheritance.

ISSUE:

Will there be forfeiture as stated in the will of the testator?

HELD:
A testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, however, if the wishes of the
testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be given
effect. A person’s will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute.
It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.

The case at bar falls under the Lex Rei Sitae doctrine; where the estate of a decedent shall be
distributed in accordance with his national law. He cannot provide otherwise.

The Supreme Court held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because
that provision is not legal.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA

174 SCRA 653

30 June 1989|

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and
named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair
with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:

Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce decree was already
issued?

HELD:

The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubine, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines.
In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez,
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile,
Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from Germany. The decree provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss the
nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which was granted by
respondent Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between
her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of
tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity case valid ; it is valid to assume
jurisdiction to tackle child custody and support.

HELD:
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. The court
can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable. Where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in our jurisdiction, but
the legal effects thereof, such as custody must still be determined by our courts. Before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the present
case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.

GARCIA-RECIO vs RECIO
366 SCRA 4372

2 October 2002

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, their
marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree, issued by an Australian Family Court.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia in Cabanatuan City. Since October 22,
1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. Their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she only learned of Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson in
November 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether the divorce decree submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his
legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolve him of bigamy.

HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, it
does not prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. The decree, being a foreign
document was inadmissible to court because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy
of the country where it will be used.

A document may be proven as an official record of a foreign country by either:

1. an official publication;
2. attested by the officer having legal custody of the document;
 3. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
4. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
5. authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court ordered thr RTC to remand trial in the purpose of submitting evidence that Recio was
legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994, otherwise declare the marriage null and void on the
ground of bigamy for having established two subsisting marriages.

NIKKO HOTEL vs. REYES

GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:
On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager,
Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of
fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice
enough to be heard by the people around them. He was escorted by a policeman out of the
hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by
the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto,
if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s
group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the
phone and doesn’t want to interrupt. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant
specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the
list. She was even polite in asking the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms.Lim was when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed
each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request
only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to
leave the party. Petitioners cannot be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20
of the Civil Code.

Under the doctrine of violenti non fit injuria, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury. The doctrine refers to self-inflicted injuries or to consent to it which precludes the
recovery of damages by one knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
QUISUMBING vs MERALCO
GR No. 142943, 3 April 2002

FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house located at
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors
were conducting a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the
house. Permission was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. It was found that the meter had
been tampered with and the information was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house. The inspectors brought the meter to their laboratory
for further verifications. If proven that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services.

The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the laboratory. And unless
they pay the amount of P178, 875.01 representing the difference in the bill, their electric supply
will be disconnected.

The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not

1. MERALCO acted without due process and lack of regard for Quisumbings’ rights and
reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the
other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.

The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However,
any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Meralco may
immediately disconnect service in cases of meter tampering, but it has to be personally
witnessed and attested by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative
was present.

Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential 0f P193, 332. 96
while MERALCO was ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorney’s fees.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA

219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan,
he was an Iranian medical exchange student. He later courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents.

The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in
the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant
but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage, neither
sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay
out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The
private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for damages.

HELD:

Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man
uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that
petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of
the country.

TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965

FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in one of
Pastor’s friend’s house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicenta’s parents arranged
for them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a
priest. Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging that
Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued
to live with her parents and Pastor went back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her
husband’s welfare in her letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they
became estranged.

Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-prosecution
because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single and left for the United States.
She filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character” which the Nevada court granted even when she was not yet an
American citizen (1958).

Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos
in damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the remarriage of
divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other to
recover damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004

FACTS:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955 and they separated in 1966. He contracted a
second marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then Narcisa went to Japan. While Narcisa was in
Japan, he married Zenaida for the second time in 1989.

Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe Corazon Palto and his
second marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed by Salvador’s filing of an annulment case
and the other hand, Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.

In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida and that
the bigamy case should be suspended since the annulment case is prejudicial.

ISSUES:
Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to prosper?

HELD:
Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in bigamy. The
only requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.

Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise by the Court.
Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are both subsisting, which makes him guilty of
bigamy.

A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is
committed against the state. Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced by even a
civic-spirited citizen who may come to know of it.

QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO

34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were neighbors in Dapitan
City. They had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. Carmen got pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by defendant. As a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying.

Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint
was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave
birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted
by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

GELUZ vs. CA
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazo’s wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician Antonio
Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she
and Oscar were legally married. To conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to
have it aborted by Geluz. She had an abortion again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another abortion at
Geluz’ clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to
the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor has he given consent on the abortion.

ISSUE:

Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an
aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find any basis for an award
of moral damages. Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates that
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.

Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but,
including his wife would be the beneficiaries.

It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made since he
sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim,
which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA

G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933

FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an unmarried scion of a prominent family in
Manila. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters
which are solicitous of Antonia and the baby’s welfare. He made hospital arrangements
through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.

After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and married another woma.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of
the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar
Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia are sufficient proof
of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father’s resolution
to admit the status”.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling Syquia to provide
support for the child Ismael Loanco.

LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE

45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the
Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572
of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of
Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public
Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution.

DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC

G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976

FACTS:
On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. “is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the
judgment”.

Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had
become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the
“foreclosure” of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which
he had given as security under the bond. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order
of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was
filed. Oria’s death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Oria, was pending. On March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly probated will,
sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land.

ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate?

HELD:
The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He had
no more civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics cannot be held liable for
damages and other costs because they were in good faith in including Oria as defendant for no
one informed them of his death.

MO YA LIM YAO vs. COMM. IMMIGRATION

41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeng came to the Philippines from Hongkong in a temporary visitor’s visa good for 1
month. She was asked to pay a bond of P1, 000 with the condition to depart on before the
expiration period to stay. She was able to obtain repeated extensions until Feruary 13 1962, in a
period of 10 months.

On January 1962, she got married to Mo Ya Lim Yao a.k.a Edilberto Aguinaldo, a Filipino citizen.
18 months after her first arrival, the Comm. On Immigration confiscated her bond and ordered
immediate arrest and deportation on the grounds of expiration of authorized stay. Defendant
filed for injunction but was denied.

Comm. On Immigration allege that marriage to Lim is an evidence of evading the expiration of
her authorized stay. They also contended that Lau Yuen Yeung is disqualified for naturalization
because she cannot read nor write English or Tagalog and lastly, being a temporary visitor, she
should depart and get the necessary visa for permanent stay before reentering the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Can the Court rightfully allege that the marriage was done for convenience?
2. Is the inability to speak or write English or Tagalog a ground for disqualification to be a
citizen?
3. Does marriage to a Filipino citizen automatically makes an alien into a citizen?
HELD:
No one, not even the Court can rightfully allege that a marriage is done for convenience to
avoid deportation. Marriage is a sacred vow between two people in accordance with law and
no person can be a judge to the motives of those who contract marriage. Lau Yuen Yeung
became a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to Edilberto Aguinaldo.

The Comm. of Immigration or any of its representatives is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of Lau Yuen Yeung.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996
FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee made a petition
to cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek public office because he was not a Filipino
Citizen, which was granted by the COMELEC.

Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon until after May 1995
election. His candidacy continued and he was elected as Governor. However, the COMELEC
affirmed his disqualification on May 11, 1995. Raul Lee having garnered the 2nd highest number
of votes was proclaimed Governor.
Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that: 1. He took an Oath of
Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for naturalization in September 1994 had been granted; 2.
There is no more legal impediment for his proclamation; 3. The Vice Governor and not Lee
should occupy the seat as Governor in case of vacancy due to disqualification.

ISSUE:
Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as Governor?

HELD:
Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the issue
of his citizenship and he was stateless when he filed his COC for the 1995 elections, thus making
him ineligible to hold public office. But his case is unique and the law should be interpreted
liberally on his favor.

1. He sought American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial Law, not to

denounce his being a Fiipino.
2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being denied several
times.
3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his citizenship despite
technical setbacks.
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on returning and
serving his country which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and dedication to this country.
5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which makes him
deserving to govern the people.
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted Filipino citizenship.

UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC

95 P.R. 890

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,
1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United
States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in
California. In April of 1950 he returned to the Philippines for a four -month vacation, then on
July 15, 1950, filed an application for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United States
and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He
finished this course in July 1951 but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the
aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once
acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from
1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his
purpose in staying in the United States, at that time being, merely to study.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, when petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition.

HELD:

While domicile and residence mean the same thing, residence combined with intention to
remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time for
business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all
the while, to return to the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for
naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing,
notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines “from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor.

However, the denial of his petition does not bar him to reapply for citizenship and undergo the
same process again. He has to be committed to comply with the requirements.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300

FACTS:
Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents established domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
She finished her studies and got her degree in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to Manila in 1952 to work for her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office at the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and
consequently became a registered voter there.

When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a
“Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.

The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words “since childhood” in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that “she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court favors the
conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence”
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.
 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her action of returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
The petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte.

STAR PAPER CORP. vs. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006

FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies stated
that:

 New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the
3rd degree already employed by the company.
 In case of two employees decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve
the policy stated above.
The complainants alleged that they were co-employees and they got married co-e. They were
compelled to resign because of the company policy. They lodged a complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice.

ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is it a valid
exercise of management prerogative

HELD:
There are two types of employment policies involving spouses:

 No-spouse employment policies – policies banning only spouses from working in the
same company
 Anti-nepotism employment policies – those banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same company
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
 1. That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and
2. That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired after
they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of the employees could be detrimental to its
business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
other will be less efficient.

PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman as reliever
for employees on leave in two instances. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was asked to join
PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She
indicated in the application form that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor
required her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about
the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.

She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who
had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she
had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company
policies.

ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor
laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T
were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married,
or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a widow and works as a court interpreter. She was charged with committing
“Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct” under the Administrative Code for living with a man not her
husband and having borne a child within the live-in set-up. She asserted that her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious belief and has the approval of her
congregation with the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” It allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations, thus
making the union moral and bindings.

Soledad was abandoned by her husband when she started the live-in set-up. Eventually, he died
which lifts her legal impediment to marry but her partner is not eligible for marriage yet. The
above-mentioned declaration is done with diligent investigation as to backgrounds of the
members who avail of it.

Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the declaration ceases and the couple
should legalize their union.

ISSUE:
Can ones religious belief and practice enough reason to dismiss the charge and to justify a
conjugal arrangement?

HELD:
Soledad’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to “freedom of religion”.
Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. Soledad’s sincerity and centrality
of her claimed religious belief and practice is beyond doubt.

The administrative complaint was dismissed.

GOITIA vs CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252

FACTS:

Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila on January 7, 1915. They
established their residence and lived together for a month.

The husband demanded from his wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs which the wife refused to perform. The husband continually demanded such lewd acts
from his wife. The constant refusal of the wife induced the husband to inflict physical injuries.
This forced Eloisa to leave the conjugal home and take refuge in the home of her parents.

Eloisa demanded financial support from Jose. The Court held that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the wife except in his own house, unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her a divorce or separation.

ISSUE:
Would the husband be compelled to provide financial support for his wife who refuses to live
with him?

HELD:
The act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife as a
natural and legal duty. This obligation is not terminated by his own wrongful acts in driving his
wife to seek protection.

Separation and divorce arguments to create financial obligation is weak because separate
maintenance is a specific duty mandated by the State and is not payable either as damages or
as penalty.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ

185 SCRA 45

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
was confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. She cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the intention of
escaping. She died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence on Aug.
28, 1988.

Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the
ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. The court ordered
that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack
of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.”

Petitioner’s claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of the
Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where “a man and a
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions”.

In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON

237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Complainants work in MTC-Tinambak, Camarines Sur. They alleged that Judge Palaypayon
solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, couples were
able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization
reasoning out that he had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondent. Palaypayon contends
that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted
from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same
with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. The spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was then filed with the civil registrar.

The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. The marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage
contract.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal
requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. He was found guilty of
solemnizing marriages without a marriage license
His claim that Abellano and Edralin executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together
as husband and wife for almost 6 years already would show that Abellano is less than 13 years
old when they started living together which. He is found to be negligent in his duty to ascertain
the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in
order to avoid the marriage license requirement.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ

12 SCRA 648

FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. They applied and acquired
marriage license and set the wedding on September 4, 1954. Necessary publication and
preparations including sending off invitations were done.

Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco went home to his province without properly
notifying Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they have to postpone the wedding because his
mother opposes it. He gave an assurance that he will return but he never did.

Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer and was declared in default. The Court
ordered Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders and motion for a new trial. The court then
proposed for amicable settlement.

Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz was due to fortuitous event and
circumstances beyond his control.

ISSUE:
Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own wedding?

HELD:
YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21
of said Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”

Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation and publicity were done only for the
defendant to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. This is contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable
in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This Court’s opinion, considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award.

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996
FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for two acts:

1. For solemnizing the wedding between Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga. The groom is
merely separated from his wife. The judge relied on the affidavit by the MTC Judge of
Basy that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years, thus the presumption that she is already dead.
2. For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma Del Rosario
outside his court’s jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of the above acts.

HELD:
1. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first
wife’s presumptive death. In the absence of which, he remains married to the first wife
thus, legally incapacitated to contract a subsequent marriage. It was an error to have
accepted a joint affidavit. The judge’s negligence resulted to solemnizing a bigamous
marriage.
2. The justification that the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was solemnized in his
home on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Gemma alone is erroneous. According to
the Family Code, marriage can be solemnized outside of the Court’s jurisdiction upon
“request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.”
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and given a stern warning that repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ARAÑES vs. JUDGE OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Arañes and Orobia as husband and wife until her husband passed away. Since the marriage was
a nullity, she was deprived to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia and to receive the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the
marriage of the parties having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete. He agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan.

He discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he suggested
resetting it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. He reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished
the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage
license would be delivered to his sala which never materialized.

Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage outside of his jurisdiction and without the
requisite of marriage license given his reason of human compassion and given the fact that the
petitioner already desisted from her complaint?

HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. The respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.”

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

LIM TANHU vs. REMOLETE

66 SCRA 425

FACTS:
Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, a Chinese citizen partner,
owner with controlling interest of Glory Commercial Co. Antonio Lim Tahhu and Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but wer mere employees of Chuan, both are
naturalized Filipinos.

Tan Put alleged that Tan Hu and several others took actual/active management of the
partnership through fraud and machination. She is claiming entitlement to the share of capital
and profits including assets acquired during the lifetime of Chuan, being the widow of the
latter.

Chuan died in 1966 which dissolved the partnership and shares corresponded to him ws given
to his legitimate wife Ang Siok Tin and his chidren, all residing in Hongkong. Defendants
contended that Tan Put is merely a common-law wife. Their union was dissolved by Chuan
himself when he was still alive and she was given a settlement. They were unable to bear a
child who would have been a lawful heir of Chuan.

ISSUE:
Is Tan Put entitled to claim Chuan’s share in the company?

HELD:
Primary evidence of marriage is the authentic copy of the Marriage certificate. Other
competent evidence may also be accepted when the absence of the Marriage Certificate is
satisfactorily explained. Certification of the person who solemnized the wedding is not
admissible evidence of marriage.

Agreement with Chuan which was signed by Tan Put that she received settlement for property
interests when they terminated their common-law union has greater weight over the
certification issued by Mons. Jose M. Recoleto which does not show the reason why there was
no Marriage Certificate. In as much as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.

VDA DE CHUA vs. CA AND CASTRO

G.R. No. 118635, 5 March 1998
FACTS:
Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock with Roberto Lim Chua, single and begot two children with
him. Chua died intestate in May 28, 1992. Florita filed for petition for declaration of heirship
and guardianship for her sons and real and personal properties of their minor children.

Court ordered hearing and publication of the said petition in Maguindanao, Cotabato City and
Davao City.

Antoinetta Garcia Vda de Chua filed an opposition to dismiss due to improper venue since the
deceased died in Davao, then Davao RTC has the proper jurisdiction. The court denied the
motion for lack of merit.

During the hearing, Garcia contended that she was the legal wife and that Chua resides in
Davao at the time of his death. She presented a photocopy of their Marriage Certificate. She
also submitted TCT, Residence certificate, ITR and passport all stating that he is married.

Florita On the other hand submitted birth certificates of their children as well as certification
from the Local Civil Registrar that Chua does not have existing marriage registered. Judge
Banzali also denied having solemnized the said wedding.

ISSUE:
Where is the deceased’s residence and could Antoinetta be the legal wife and heir of Chua?

HELD:
Evidence proved that Chua’s residence is in Cotabato although he frequents Davao and usually
stays there for business purposes.

Garcia was unable to establish proof of her alleged marriage which consequently denies her
entitlement to oppose Vallejo’s petition.

 Photostat copy of the marriage certificate cannot be admitted as evidence. Only the
original or an authenticated copy would suffice as evidence of marriage.
 Certification from the Local Civil Registrar that no such marriage was recorded and
certification from the alleged solemnizing officer denying the act made her evidence as
well as the other documents worthless.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994

FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro file a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage with Edwin Cardenas
on the ground that no Marriage License was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
the marriage. Edwin failed to file an answer and was declared in default.

Angelina and Edwin had a civil wedding with Judge Pablo Malvar in Pasay City without the
knowledge of Castro’s parents. Cardenas procured the requirements including the marriage
license in Pasig MM. They cohabited for four months and bore a child. They parted and the
child was adopted by Castro’s brother with the consent of Cardenas.

SCRO of Pasay issued a certification that marriage license of the spouses does not appear from
their registry. Castro also testified that she did not apply for marriage license and did not sign
anything until the marriage certificate.

The lower court denied the petition stating that the certification is inadequate to establish non-
issuance of the marriage license. The inability to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to
show that there was none issued.

ISSUE:
Would the documentary and testimonial evidence presented be sufficient to grant a decree of
nullity?

HELD:
At the time of their marriage the governing law was the New Civil code which states that the
absence of a marriage license would render the marriage void ab initio.

 The fact that only Castro testified cannot be held against her. Her husband’s default
after duly served with notice cannot be faulted on Castro.

 The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro which was undisputed
by any party, sufficiently established the absence of the marriage license. Thus,
marriage was null and void ab initio.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen in Hongkong in 1972. They
had two children. They got divorced in Nevada U.S.A in 1982 and both certified that they do not
have any community property to divide. Alice remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
Upton filed a suit in June 1983 stating that Reyes’ business in Manila is conjugal property. He
demands to render an accounting to the business and declare his right to manage the business.
Reyes moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action is barred by the previous
judgment in Nevada divorce wherein they both acknowledged having no community property
as of June 11, 1982.

Reyes’ motion was denied by the lower court stating that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the divorce decree has no bearing.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties to their property in the Philippines?

HELD:
Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no
standing to sue in the case where the husband is entitled to control over conjugal assets.

 The divorce obtained abroad being valid in his country’s court may be recognized in the
Philippines. The divorce decree granted in Nevada released Reyes from the marriage for
the marriage had been severed by one party ceases to bind either.
 Getting a divorce decree in the US court and contending that it is not valid and binding
in the Philippines being contrary to local law and public policy estopped Upton’s
declaration.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981. Both are Filipino
citizens. They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to the U.S. in 1986 with one
son.

Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000, Orbecindo
learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried. Orbecindo then filed a petition
for authority to remarry. The court granted the petition since there was no opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory relief. The following
are the requisites:
 1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen who
has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried can also be
allowed to remarry.

However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted and on record
and are only based on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized American citizen, had
obtained divorce decree and had remarried an American. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon submission of evidence in his favor.

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. Almst two years thereafter Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?

Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is valid
HELD:
The two marriages involved herein is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
The 5-year cohabitation period should be the years immediately preceding the marriage and it
should be characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. In the case at bar Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time he cohabited with another.

It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed. Void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case.

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001

FACTS:
Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4 children. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez. The
Judge knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”

In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. Had he known that Manzano was married he would have refused to
solemnize the marriage

David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia
Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been
marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore”

ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous marriage?

HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a legal
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in
the case at bar.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage.

Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,
000.

MARIATEGUI Vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named
Ruperto.

Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a
Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected
to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was
issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid and entitles their children of heirship for the
properties left by Lupo.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, Felipa’s
children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA

256 SCRA 324

FACTS:

GINA LAO-TSOI and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988. Distraught, Gina filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity premised on the
following reasons:

 There was no sexual intercourse between them on the first night or on the succeeding
nights until they separated in March of 1989;
 That the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual;
 Results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.
 Chi Ming Tsoi married her, to maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
Chi Ming Tsoi does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons:

 That there is no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
 If there are any differences between them, it can still be reconciled and that if either has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
 He admitted that since their marriage until their separation they had no sexual contact
between them. He reasoned was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse,
 his wife always avoided him. He forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation.

HELD:
 Both defendant and appellant admitted that they did not have sexual relations after
almost ten months of cohabitation, when both are not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder.
 “To procreate is based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation destroys the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. The senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity, since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time.
DOMINGO vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo. They were married on November 29, 1976
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime
in 1983 when Emerlinda sued for bigamy.

Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia while he has
been unemployed and dependent. Out of her personal earnings, she purchased properties
amounting to P350k, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto. In June
1989, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman and he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.

The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; 2. their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and 3. Delia
Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their
void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration
of the attorney-in-fact—Moises Avera, her brother
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for the purpose of remarriage. It is
necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his
partner was not lawfully married thus free from being charged with bigamy.

The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the former’s previous marriage was
still subsisting, thus, bigamous and void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes.

There is no need for a separate action of partition of property because it will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. They were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son, Andre O. Molina was
born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility”. He
preferred to spend time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money. He
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.

Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner. In
October 1986 the couple had a very intense fight, which resulted to their estrangement until
Reynaldo finally abandoned them. Roridel desires to have the marriage declared null and void
in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridel’s strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage, Roridel’s
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and Roridel’s failure to run
the household and handle their finances.
The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. The petitioner is not asking support
or for damages. Their common child is in the custody of the petitioner.

ISSUES:
Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent to psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.

The present case, does not show that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations.

Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to be established:

(The Molina Doctrine)

1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
LEOUEL vs CA
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995

FACTS:
Leouel Santos 1LT of the Philippine Army met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before
a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with
Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr.

Occasionally, the couple would fight over a number of things aside from the interference of
Julia’s parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in the U.S. as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. She only called her husband after 7 months; promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did.

Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he
desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail. He filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more
than 5 years show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

Julia opposed the complaint and denied the allegations, claiming that it was the petitioner who
had been irresponsible and incompetent.

ISSUE:
Does Julia’s behavior of refusing to come home in spite of the pleas of her husband constitute
psychological incapacity?

HELD:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity- a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage (b) juridical antecedence-inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring, and (c) incurability-
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage;

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later
lived in the Philippines for a month. Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. They had a child and in January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married

Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital

responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after
they Toshio returned to Japan and promised to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but he never responded. She learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. June 1996 Lolita filed for
annulment.

Exhaustive efforts were done to contact Toshio to no avail so she was allowed by the court to
submit evidence ex parte. She testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She offered
documentary evidence to support her testimony.
Court found that respondent failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs
and welfare of his family. Such indifference is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of
respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such
behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life. Court granted her petition of nullity.

ISSUES:
Can a mixed marriage be embraced in psychological incapacity?

Is failing to meet a duty to live with, care for and support a family and abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity?

HELD:
In proving psychological incapacity, court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. However,
the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated.
Abandonment is a ground for legal separation. Psychological defect cannot be presumed from
the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family.

CHOA vs. CHOA

G.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002

FACTS:
A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection or exception by one of the parties in an
action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.” The demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict.

The petitioner Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa, respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Two
children were born. The respondent filed a petition for annulment of his marriage to petitioner
based on her alleged psychological incapacity.

The testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s

personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3)
lack of an “intention of procreative sexuality.” The case went to trial with respondent
presenting his evidence.

Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence). The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter. The RTC
issued an order denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that respondent established
a quantum of evidence that the petitioner must controvert.”

ISSUES:
WON (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an “intention of
procreative sexuality constitute psychological incapacity

HELD:
None of the causes complained of against the petitioner separately or collectively constitute
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a
“refusal” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological
incapacity.

Mild character peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
Respondent’s contention that petitioner “lacked the intention of procreative sexuality” is easily
belied by the fact that two children were born during their union.

DEDEL vs. CA
G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel wedding on May 20,
1967. The union produced four children. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.

Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother and had extra-marital
affairs with several men. Sharon once underwent treatment with a clinical psychologist but it
did not stop Sharon in her illicit affairs where she even had two children out of wedlock.

Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children. Petitioner accepted her back and
even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned
petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.

Petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and had no capacity for
remorse. Her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.

ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated?

Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
“psychological incapacity?”

HELD:
Respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming. Neither could her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and abandonment constitute psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. The
manifestations presented refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.

The grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation cannot be
denied. While sympathy is warranted in the petitioner’s marital predicament, the law must be
applied no matter how harsh it may be.

MORIGO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004

FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for 4 years, after which they lost
contact with each other. They reconnected again in 1984 and became sweethearts when Lucia
was in Singapore until she went to Canada in 1986.

They got married in Aug.1990, the following month Lucia went back to Canada leaving Lucio
behind. Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the court to take effect on Feb
17, 1992. On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was charged with
Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol.

Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of his conviction. He should not be faulted
for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith in relying on the divorce decree is negated by
his act of filing a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is
valid.

HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has
not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4)
the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance with the
Family Code. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.

Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent is now
moot and academic.

WEIGEL vs. SEMPIO-DY

143 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage celebrated on July, 1978
with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Weigel on the g round that Lilia has previous existing marriage
to one Eduardo A. Maxion performed on June 25, 1972

Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null
and void. She asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence that:

 The first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and
 The first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone
else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.

Lilia assailed the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit
the case for resolution based on “agreed facts;” and the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying
petitioner’s motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

ISSUE:
Could the resolution of the facts of the first marriage change the result of the annulment case
filed by Weigel?

HELD:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming as such, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married the respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. The marriage of Lilia and Karl would be regarded
VOID under the law.

VALDES vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
The petition for review is purely on a question of law. Petitioner avers that the court has failed
to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of
either or both of the parties to the contract.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971 and had five children. In
22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. In 29 July 1994, the court granted the petition. Judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:

 The marriage declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
 The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. The 2
younger ones shall be in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
 The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in
the custody of the other.
 Petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this decision.

ISSUE:
What will govern the partition of property for annulled marriages on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and
void ab initio. The property regime shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The properties acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares. They own their ‘family home’ and all
their other properties for that matter in equal shares.

A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise
clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters such as property
partition.

PEOPLE vs. ARAGON

100 Phil 1033

FACTS:
On September 28, 1925, Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in
Cebu. While marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, Aragon, contracted a canonical
marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934. Accused and Maria Faicol established residence
in Iloilo while he maintained his first wife in Cebu.

Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 and the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu
in 1940. Proceso and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life. Faicol suffered injuries
because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. Proceso sent Maria Faicol to
Iloilo to undergo treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, he contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953.

CFI Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the
filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could
not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage
to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of
such marriag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage to Jesusa Maglasang was bigamous.

HELD:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annullable marriages.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, marriage with Maglasang was a valid one and
appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for
having contracted the second bigamous marriage.
MERCADO vs. MERCADO
337 SCRA 122

FACTS:
In June 27, 1991 Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married with
which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. The status indicated by
the accused was ‘single’.

At the time of the celebration of the wedding with Tan, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on
April 10, 1976

Both marriages were consummated: Ma. Thelma Oliva had two children and Tan had one. On
October 5, 1992, bigamy was filed by Tan; where he was convicted by the lower court.

Dr. Vincent G. Mercado assailed the decision the ground that on November 13, 1992 accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva and was
granted by the court. While acknowledging the existence of the two marriages, accused posited
the defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and void and that the
private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code punishing bigamy negates the guilt of petitioner. Is the petitioner entitled to an acquittal
on the basis of reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The elements of BIGAMY are as follows: (1)That the offender has been legally married; (2)That
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; (4)That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
without judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. That he subsequently obtained a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because the crime had
already been consummated.

Justice VITUG dissenting opinion:

 No judicial declaration of nullity should be deemed essential when the “marriage,” is 1.)
between persons of the same sex or 2.) when either or both parties had not at all given
consent to the “marriage.”
 Complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent,
should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case
for bigamy. No incongruence bet this rule in criminal law and that of the Family Code,
and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.
REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 20

FACTS:
Nolasco was a seaman and met Janet Monica Parker, a British in a bar in England. 15 January
1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique. After marriage
celebration, he obtained another contract and left his wife with his parents.

In January 1983 his mother informed him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son and that
Janet Monica had left Antique. He then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to
return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983 (after 11 mos)

His efforts to look for her proved fruitless, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker not knowing her background. He did not report the matter of
Janet Monica’s disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.

5 August 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife
Janet Monica Parker or that the marriage be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Does the circumstances of Jessica’s disappearance constitute a presumptive death?
HELD:
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code: (1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; (2)That the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3)That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

Respondent failed to prove a “well-founded belief” that the absent spouse is already dead by
failing to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-
founded belief”

Inquiring from friends instead of reporting to the proper authorities among the other superficial
testimonies given by the respondent does not constitute a diligent search

LUKBAN vs REPUBLIC
L-8492, 29 February 1956

FACTS:
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of LOURDES G. LUKBAN. Petitioner is a
widow of Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage.

Lourdes G. Lukban, married with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. After 17 days
Francisco left after a violent quarrel then he has not been heard from despite diligent search.
She inquired from his parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She
believes that he is dead because he had been absent for more than 20 years.

She intends to marry again and she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may
be relieved of any liability under the law.

Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law.

ISSUE:
Can death be presumed by the nature of Francisco Chuidan’s disappearance?
HELD:
Judicial declaration that Petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law. The court cannot declare the status of Petitioner as a
widow since this matter depend upon the fact of death of the husband which the court can
declare upon proper evidence, not because he is merely presumed to be dead.

CIVIL CODE Section III Paragraph 2, General Orders No. 68) requires that:

 The former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage. The spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living.
 that former spouse is generally reputed to be dead;
 the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO
G.R.No. 138467, 6 April 2000

FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds who disappeared without a trace on 11 Feb 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, without Marietta having secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.

Antonia Armas, a sister of Teodorico, filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir. She
alleged marriage between Teodorico and Marietta being is bigamous and thereby null and
void. She asked the court to have her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed
administrator.

Marietta opposed, stating that her marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
latter’s absence for more than 11 years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Being the surviving spous, she sought priority in the administration of the estate.

Trial Court handed a judgment that Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of
the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage contracted by Teodorico and Marietta valid?

HELD:
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code: Art. 83 which states that:

Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

 The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

 The first spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive; or
 If the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court.”

 It remained undisputed that Marietta’s first husband, James William Bounds, had been
absent for more than 11 years before she entered into a second marriage. This second
marriage, under the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds. A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met.
 The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, without other evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly
be divided in two equal portions. One portion going to the surviving spouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
 The dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance the other one-half share of the
decedent’s estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
35 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953. Defendant Fernando filed
an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation.

Judgment was rendered dismissing Fernando’s petition, upholding the validity of the marriage
and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. Accordingly Fernando had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his prior to their marriage. The non-divulgement to her of the pre-marital
secret constituted ‘FRAUD’, in obtaining her consent. Aurora further alleged that Fernando
sought to marry her so he could evade marrying the close relative and he intended from the
beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations in order to appease the immediate
members of the family of the first girl.

Fernando in his answer, denied the allegation of having had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative, thus having committed no fraud against her. He courted a third girl with whom
he cohabited and had several children during the whole range of nine years that the Civil Case
had been litigated between them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under
Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides that a marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

 Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

 Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
 Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband.
Any secret intention on the husband’s part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that
fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant’s wedding
was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be
declared already barred.

BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT

72 Phil 19

FACTS:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, as only
raises a question purely of law.

The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938, committed on Sept and got married on 26
November the same year. After living together for 99 days ,Luisa gave birth to a child of nine
months, in February 23, 1939. Godofredo abandoned Luisa and did not return.
In March 29, 1939 GODOFREDO requests the annulment of marriage with Luisa Buccat
Mangonon on the ground that he was defrauded in consenting to the marriage with Luisa. She
had assured him that she was virgin but the circumstances of the birth of the child after only 99
days of cohabitation speaks otherwise.

Luisa failed to appear despite having been summoned which allowed Godofredo to present
evidence. The lower court decided in favor of Luisa in upholding the marriage. Godofredo
appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Godofredo’s ground is valid to be granted an annulment.

HELD:
The plaintiff’s allegation of fraud is impossible after it has been proven that Luisa is in advanced
pregnant condition by the time they were married. It seems childish considering that the
applicant was a freshman in law.

Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation on which society rests. In this case no
evidence has satisfied the court to merit an annulment. All the intendment of the law leans
towards the validity of marriage.

AQUINO vs. DELIZO

109 Phil 21

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
dismissed complaint for annulment of Fernando Aquino’s marriage with respondent Conchita
Delizo. Complaint which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud.

Conchita Delizo, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man. Sometime in April,
1955, or about four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a child. She claimed that the
child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the
child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that
concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage dismissed the complaint.

Fernando appealed the case with the following information:

  At the time he courted Conchita she was living with his own brother Cesar Aquino who
admitted that he was the father of Conchita’s first-born. Cesar and Conchita hid her
pregnancy from Fernando.
 Conchita is presently living with Cesar and had 2 more children; he submitted the birth
certificates
Stating that it “does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes”, the
Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions alleged sufficient to seek for annulment.

HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. 4)

The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already
been adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Supreme Court
found the appeal meritorious and ordered a new trial for the annulment case.

MENCIANO vs. SAN JOSE

89 Phil 63

FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944. Before the
marriage they lived together as husband and wife, there having been no impediment to their
marriage. As a result of their cohabitation the child Carlo Magno Neri was born, baptized and
was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents. The second child Faustino Neri,
Jr., was born on April 24, 1945 is a legitimate child.

Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and
Rodolfo Pelaez, designated universal heir in the will of the deceased filed a motion to question
the declaration of heirs.

They alleged that marriage between said deceased and Matilde Menciano was in violation of
the legal provisions and requisites, because he was deprived of free will due to his age and
sickness. Accordingly, Matilde Menciano took advantage of his condition, by intrigue, deceit
and threat of abandoning him, forced Neri to marry her. The deceased was impotent and
congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and sister Conchita, who had no children therefore
it would have been impossible for him to have fathered the children

Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of P286, 000 in cash, and for jewels and
certain properties, which, as alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde
Menciano.

ISSUE:
1. Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano
valid?
2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?
3. Did Matilde Menciano have illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties
above mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by a valid Marriage License and Marriage
Certificate both of which were signed by the parties and properly recorded at the Office of the
Civil Registrar. Being official and public documents, their validity can be successfully assailed
only by strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony.

Faustino’s meticulous signature cannot be signed by one who is not of sound mind and of fair
physical condition. He may have been sick at that time, but not to such a degree as to render
him unconscious of what he was doing.

Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. The presumption is in favor of
potency. The fact that the deceased was able to produce the specimen as what was instructed
by his doctor shows that he was potent. The necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino
Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino Neri with
Matilde Menciano in lawful wedlock.

The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review of the evidence, correctly reached the
conclusion that allegation of illegally disposing money and jewelry has not been substantiated.

JIMENEZ vs. CANIZARES

L-12790, 31 August 1960

FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed a petition for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the condition of her genitals is
incapable of copulation and it existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. For that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file
an answer so the court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was
collusion.

On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
physical exam to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, in ten days a
medical certificate on the result which she did not comply with. The Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage which prompted the city attorney to file a motion for reconsideration
upon the ground that the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; because the wife refused to be examined.

Instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court
and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate. The
decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end
their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

ISSUE:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the strength of the lone testimony of thhusband?

HELD:
The annulment cannot be decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected
to give testimony which is aimed at securing the annulment he seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking
part therein. Her refusal to be examined and failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

Impotency should not be presumed. The presumption is always in favor of potency.

SIN vs. SIN

G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001

FACTS:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-
Sin’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity for
insufficiency of evidence.

January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp
T. Sin, a Portugese citizen, were married. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed for annulment
which was dismissed June of the following year. She appealed and again dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Florence was given a fair trial.

HELD:
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While
Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994,
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein.
The Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.

Decision of the trial court as “prematurely rendered” since the investigating prosecutor was not
given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.

Supreme Court declined to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO

107 Phil 35

FACTS:
On July 5, 1955, petition for legal separation was filed by Jose De Ocampo. It described their
marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with
Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.

The defendant made no answer so the court defaulted her, and directed the provincial fiscal to
investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. There was none. The plaintiff
presented his evidence consisting of several testimonies which established that they were
married in April 5, 1938 and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff.

Plaintiff discovered on several occasions illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. He sent Serafina
to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff
discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside
from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952 she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately.

The night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit connection with Nelson
Orzame, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed.
Her conformity to the legal separation was treated a confession of judgment by the Appellate
Court and declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

ISSUE:
DOes the defendant’s conformity to the legal separation constitute a confession of judgment
that proves collision?

HELD:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife as
having committed, a matrimonial offense or to suppress evidence of a valid defense for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be
implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. Collusion may not be
inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the
other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it

What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant’s confession. If a
confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. Collusion implies more than consent or
lack of opposition.
LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio and he
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. They were married civilly on
21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934. They lived together as husband
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They had no child; that they acquired properties
during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about March 1949.

Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other
claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok

Before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident
on. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death and moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUES:
What is the effect of death of either party to a legal separation case?

HELD:

The Article 100 of Civil Code allows only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in
Article 108, provides that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even
if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. Property
rights acquired by either party could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, such
action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned
union.
GANDIONCO vs. PENARANDA
G.R. No. 72984, 27 November 1987

FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco respondent and legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment of damages presided over by respondent Judge. The wife also filed a separate
concubinage case. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private
respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10
December 1986, ordered payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner Froilan Gandionco contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private
respondent. He also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured
before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordered support arising from a legal separation case should be suspended
until the pending criminal case of concubinage is decided upon.

HELD:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of off springs, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse,
among others.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.

Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and
granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956
FACTS
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on
motion of the defendant, the case was dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground that there is
absolutely no question of fact involved.

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on
August 27, 1949 while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived
with his sisters in Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside
with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to
study in a local college there.

Benjamin received several information from different people about his wife’s infidelity. This
prompted him to go home and confront his wife. They stayed together in his cousin’s house as
husband and wife for a few days. Instead of answering his questions, she left which made him
assume that it was an admission of guilt. He filed for legal separation on the ground of adultery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not his assumption of his wife’s guilt is enough basis for a legal separation to be
granted.

HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or
“conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the
latter has committed”.

The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with
him to the house of his cousin and slept as husband and wife for one day and two nights; these
facts show reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the
wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of
the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, the conduct of the
husband despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him of the right of any action
for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.

PACETE vs. CARIAGA

231 SCRA 321

FACTS:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the CFI of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of which, among other
things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent
Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to
Clarita de la Concepcion.

Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile
husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation and
accounting and separation of property. She averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April
1938 and they had a child named Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion. She and Pacete acquired vast property that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names
of his children with Clarita and other “dummies;”

After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly asked the court for extension of filing
for an answer which eventually resulted to being declared in default. Five months after the
petition was filed the court granted the issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation and declared
the properties in question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which were ordered
forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court also nullified his marriage to Clarita.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in deciding the case.

HELD:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action
for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The decision of the lower court was nullified.

MACADANGDANG vs. CA
108 SCRA 314

FACTS:
Filomena and Antonio contracted marriage in 1946. From humble beginnings they slowly
expanded their business and wealth. They had six children. After several setbacks in their
relationship, each accusing the other of infidelity, they separated in 1965.

Filomena left and resided in Cebu. When she returned, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. She initiated a legal separation against Antonio and later filed for a petition
for the appointment of an administrator for their properties. Antonio opposed the appointment
of an administrator.

No action was made on Antonio’s petition. In spite of that, the court granted the legal
separation with all its legal effects particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the community
property. Pending the inventory and dissolution of property, Antonio was ordered to pay
support to Filomena.

Filomena filed for another motion for administration to impede unlawful sequestration of some
conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio. Antonio opposed the move and filed a
motion to stop the court from executing orders for administration and to null the legal
separation. CA upheld the decision of the lower court. Antonio appealed but he unexpected
died on November 30, 1979.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of Antonio’s death to the legal separation case and the dissolution of
conjugal properties?

HELD:
Upon finality, legal separation shall have the following effects: 1.) Spouses shall be entitled to
live separately, but the marriage bond shall be severed; 2.) Conjugal properties shall be
liquidated and dissolved but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community.

The decision of the trial court on Jan 4, 1973 finding Antonio guilty of concubinage and granting
the legal separation and all its legal effects along with the division of conjugal property had long
been final and executory.
Upon the death of the guilty party, the liquidation of the conjugal property can be resolved by
the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the exclusive property of the
deceased petitioner. Thus, the process be:

1. Liquidation and distribution governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation;
2. Whatever remaining properties allocated to the deceased petitioner shall be governed
by intestate succession.

POTENCIANO vs. CA
G.R. No. 139789

FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her
husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband. It was denied for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject,
Potenciano Ilusorio

Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via
certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was
consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner
and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that
he never refused to see her.

One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and
Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio (which he denied in court) to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. She claimed that her two children were using
their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda’s property to companies
controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and
officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically
assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.

Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code
support her position that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care for each
other.

ISSUE:
Can spouses be compelled to live together by an order issued by the cout?

HELD:
The Court is not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
whether to see his wife or not. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the
corporations, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant
in habeas corpus.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity and is premised on “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not by any legal mandate or court order”

Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the
relationship with “amor gignit amorem” respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

TY vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000

FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva both in civil and church ceremony.
However, on August 4, 1980, the marriage was declared null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of
consent of the parties. Before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,
Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty in civil and a church.
Reyes filed a civil case for his marriage with Ty to be declared null and void for having no
marriage license when they got married. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not yet been issued, thus, he was still
married to Anna Maria.

Ty pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is
untrue. She submitted their Marriage License issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did
not question this document.

The Pasig RTC sustained Reyes’ civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and
void ab initio. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals which ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted and upheld the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validly.

HELD
Art. 40 Family Code. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense.

The Court finds that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for
a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies.
So that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is
hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING

As for the payment of damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment,
our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because
of breach of a marital obligation

AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA

G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed
security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo
Ching. The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly pay AIDC the
principal amount of P50, 300,000.00 with interests.

Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on three of
their conjugal properties. Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.

Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging
that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The auction sale took place, being the only bidder, AIDC was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption
period, issued the final deed of sale which was registered on August 9, 1983.

ISSUES:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against
the conjugal partnership?

HELD:
Article 122 of the Family Code provides that “The payment of personal debts by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.”

“Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession, by
which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
private debts.”

If the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot be categorized as
falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor (Corporate Debt of
PBC) and not for the surety or his family. Therefore, the spouses Ching’s conjugal properties
cannot be executed in favor of AIDC.

AGAPAY vs. PALANG

276 SCRA 341

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol. A few months after
the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. They had 1 child Herminia Palang. Miguel returned
twice but he stayed with his brother, not his wife and child. It was found that as early as 1957,
Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.

In 1973, 63 year-old Miguel contracted second marriage with 19 year-old Erlinda Agapay.
Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land, with the TCT issued in their
names and a house and lot with the TCT issued in Erlinda’s name. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son Kristopher.
Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement
to settle a case filed by the latter. They agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of
six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two
years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted an action for recovery the rice land
and the house and lot both purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda.

ISSUE:
Does Carlina have the right to recover the properties acquired during Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation?

HELD:
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was void because the marriage with
Carlina was subsisting and unaffected by the de facto separation.

Article 148 of the Family Code provides that for cases of cohabitation when parties are not
capacitated to marry each other, the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.

Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money to buy the rice land. Consequently,
the rice land should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang.

 As to the house and lot, testimonies reveal that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase and directed that Erlinda’s name be placed as the vendee. This too should
revert to the conjugal partnership.
 As to Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s
estate should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose.

MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES

38 SCRA 284

FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, Petronila
Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation
was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Cornelia Matabuena, being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed
a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.

The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.

HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
or their children to the other half.

BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CA

161 SCRA608

FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by
a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L
Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily
Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered,
purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2
months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto
failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with
the order; petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the
properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment
which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE:
Can A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.

HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family
and left their conjugal home.

Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto
against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued
against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages
amounting to P660, 000.00.

MARMONT RESORT HOTEL vs. GUIANG

168 SCRA 373

FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont
Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc. (“Marmont”). Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to
drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water supply
facility to service the Marmont Olongapo, for a stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its
contract, Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a parcel of land
then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang.
Five months later, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and
Aurora Guiang, with Federico Guiang signing as witness. This agreement states that in
consideration of the sum of P1, 500.00 the Guiangs sell and cede all rights and claims over the
lot where the water source of Marmont is located unto and in favor of Maris Trading.

After some time, the water supply of the Marmont became inadequate which prompted them
to secure the services of another contractor. They sought permission from the Guiang spouses
to inspect the water pump which had been installed but it was not granted. Marmont filed a
Complaint against the Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their refusal. The claimed
damages totaled P110, 000.

The Guiangs moved to dismiss the Complaint. They assailed the validity of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal
property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of her husband, Federico
Guiang.

ISSUE:
Would the spouses be solidarily liable for the damages claimed by Marmont?

HELD:
It was established that The Guiangs have acted contrary to the principles of honesty, good faith
and fair dealing embodied in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code when they refused petitioner
Marmont access to the water facility and to benefit from it which forced Marmont to locate an
alternative source of water which resulted to their lost revenues. Therefore, they are liable for
damages.

The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by Aurora Guiang was with full consent of
Federico and the proceeds thereof redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Therefore, they are solidarily liable for the damages claimed.

UY vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000

FACTS:
The controversy came about when Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffered of a stroke which left
him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. He is the father of respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of petitioner Gilda Jardeleza.
Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, assumption
of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same.
Gilda averred the accumulated expenses sets the urgency to sell one piece of real property.

RTC of Iloilo rendered a decided that Ernesto was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of the property was necessary to
defray the mounting expenses for treatment and hospitalization.

Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the petition for declaration of
incapacity, assumption of sole powers of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal
properties was a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., as such, it cannot be prosecuted on summary proceedings. He further alleged that Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be
impaired or prejudiced without his consent. While the motion for reconsideration was pending,
Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her
daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy for P 8 million.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. manage their conjugal
partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property

HELD:
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly… In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.

A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under
Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code.

DELA CRUZ vs. DELA CRUZ

130 Phil 324
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their cohabitation, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their
properties. Alleging that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their
conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the
conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business.

Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The
latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency
of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the
conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been abandonment and abuse of authority as administrator of the
conjugal partnership.

HELD:
To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and
with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment
and not mere separation.

The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the
family. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the
wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The plaintiff even
testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more than one visit. Likewise, as testified
by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of
P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.

Mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform
the wife of the progress of the business does not constitute abuse of administration. In order
for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

DEL MUNDO vs. CA

97 SCRA373

FACTS:
Respondents Antonio, Eugenia, Delfin and Marciana all surnamed Alvarez are legitimate
children of Agripino Alvarez and his first wife Alejandra Martin. After the death of Alejandra
Martin, Agripino Alvarez married Isidra de la Cruz in February 1927 and they had one child
named Teodora Alvarez.

Agripino Alvarez died intestate, survived by his widow Isidra and his five children, the four
plaintiffs and Teodora. Through an ‘Extra-judicial Partition with Absolute Sale of Shares’ was
executed by the widow Isidra and her daughter Teodora Alvarez wherein, after reciting that
they are ‘the legal and absolute heirs they adjudicated to themselves in equal shares then sold
the entire property in Rizal to Pacifico C. del Mundo who registered the instrument .

The children of Agripino by his first wife sold to Simplicio Balcos four tenths (4/10) undivided
share in the property in question which they claim as their share in the estate of their father.
The deed of sale has never been registered.

They filed a complaint against Isidra and Teodora in order to annul the sale they made on the
property. The Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the property in question is the
paraphernal property of Isidra de la Cruz. The CA reversed the decision declaring the property
to be conjugal and the four children co-owners of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether the property in question is the conjugal property of Agripino Alvarez and Isidra de la
Cruz or the paraphernal property of the latter alone.

HELD:
The property in question is a paraphernal property of Isidra de la Cruz as shown in the deed of
sale executed by Simplicio Dantes and Emilia Rivera of the property to Isidra de la Cruz when
the latter was then single and the money with which the lot was purchased her own money.
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition submitted cannot change the paraphernal character of the
property. The open acknowledgment of one spouse that the money used to purchase the
property was paraphernal funds of the other cannot be contested by his heirs.

Granting that the property is conjugal to the spouses, it should be liquidated and adjudicate
one half of the property in favor of the surviving spouse in full ownership and the other half, to
the deceased husband’s heirs, wherein Isidra shall likewise be entitled to a portion thereof in
usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children.

VILLANUEVA vs. IAC

192 SCRA 21
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,
Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas,
mortgaging as collateral their father’s property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described
themselves as the absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting
to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the
highest bidder. He then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to
redeem it within the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled
and another TCT issued in his name.

Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they
adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. In 1978, petitioner
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses
Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases,
and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and
Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and
Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victoria’s shares
from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modesto’s interests in his conjugal
partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and
Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners
of the disputed property.

ISSUE:
Does Corazon have a right over the land and the improvements thereon?

HELD:
The land was Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover,
since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore
had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise.

Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on
the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through
the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at
the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses
also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who
owns the same.

Without proof that the improvements comes from conjugal funds, the presumption is that is
belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to
be conjugal in character.
Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears to be regular, he must
therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be
defeated or negated by claims that he had no knowledge of.

BPI vs. POSADAS

56 Phil 215

FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila
absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in
recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de
Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy
of the deceased.

Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will
in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The
deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal
property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal
property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by
the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate
of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and
only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of
the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under
protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such
amount.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured’s estate, on which
the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and
belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums
were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like
proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured’s estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration,
are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the
assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon
the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first
premium.

JOCSON vs. CA
170 SCRA 333

FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving
offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra Poblete predeceased
her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972. The controversy concerns the validity of three documents executed
by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife.

Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void
and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only
heirs of their deceased parents the properties in question being a conjugal property of both.

He explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are living
under the same roof, especially so when the properties sold were all income-producing.
Allegedly their father was induced to sign the contract of sale through fraud.

ISSUE:
Are the properties involved conjugal properties of the parents, therefore entitles Moises to
claim his share and make the sale void?

HELD:
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, a contract of sale with a simulated price is void. The
burden of proof in showing that contracts lack consideration rests on who alleged it. The
degree of proof becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show that the
vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where the documents were notarized,
as in the case at bar. Petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are
without consideration.

As for the properties being conjugal, Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof
that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of the parents. The fact that
the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. Therefore, the Court ruled that the properties under Exhibit 3
are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

WONG vs IAC
200 SCRA 792

FACTS:
Romarico Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during
the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land
in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June
1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former
pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day
period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check
of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.

The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against
Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of
Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued
upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina
Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with
Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of
the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE:
Could the debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband be satisfied through the
conjugal property?

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized
her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with
unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed
to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of
the husband and even though they had been living separately.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support
of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of
judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal
properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without
the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also
no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to
Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void
only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still
execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

ZULUETA vs PAN-AMERICAN AIRWAYS

49 SCRA 1

FACTS
Petitioner Rafael Zulueta and his family were passengers of respondent Pan-American Airways
bound to Manila from Wake Island. Before the plane took off, Rafael got off the plane to relieve
himself. It took a full hour before he came back, which caused the trip substantial delay. As a
consequence, an altercation happened between him and the airplane captain. The heated
argument prompted the captain to order the crew that Rafael and his family to be off-loaded
from the plane.

Because of the humiliation and embarrassment, they filed an action for damages. The court
ordered the airline to pay moral damages in the amount of P700, 000.

ISSUE:
Whether the amount of money collected as a result of litigation forms a part of conjugal
partnership.

HELD:

Moral damages have arisen from inter alia, a contract was breached when the airline off-loaded
the family from the flight that they have paid for and the airline has agreed to service them.
This falls under those acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Hence, the rights accruing
from such contracts including those from breach thereof are presumed to belong to the
partnership

JOVELLANOS vs. CA
210 SCRA 126

FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a
house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had
three children, the petitioners. When Leonor Dizon died, Daniel married private respondent
Annette with whom he begot two children.

The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of
Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises.

With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of
absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title
and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.

Respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was
acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms
part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property,
were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and
conditional sale agreement with Philamlife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in question belongs to the second marriage?

HELD:
In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the
property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Ownership is transferred upon delivery.
Daniel acquired ownership only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had
been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975
that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale in his favor.

As early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos. Article 118 of the Family
Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such
property shall belong to the conjugal partnership. Thus, the property in question necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.

Annette on the other hand is liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners
who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot.
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON vs. CA AND PINTUAN
G.R. No. 102692, 23 September 1996

FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of
“Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven checks
of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Partial payments were made after several demands. When no
further payments were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses
for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages.

RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no “privity of contract between
J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the
wife”. Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise after the obligation involved in this
action has been incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to
execute judgment on the properties of the wife.

The notices of levy on execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also
the properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This led the husband to file a third-
party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the
third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when he did not seek the intervention
of the Court to air his objections in his wife’s engaging business coupled by the fact that he
made several representations for the settlement of his wife’s account. Thus, even his capital
may be liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal property.

ISSUE:
Can the husband be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife?

HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding
the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can
be held liable. And since the power of the execution of judgment extends only to properties
belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband
cannot be levied upon. In any event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in
order to bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by
either the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business.

The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his consent neither did the
obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family. Therefore, the conjugal
property cannot be held liable for the debts
LACSON vs. DIAZ
14 SCRA 183

FACTS:
Abelardo G. Diaz was sentenced to pay the Soledad Lacson the sum P132,718.30.of from July 1,
1960 until fully paid. The Sheriff sent a notice to his employer to garnish one-third of his
monthly salary and of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the
total amount.

Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of
garnishmenton the ground that the same are not enforceable against his present family. The
money-judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage said
judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of
the second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a
cause for extinction of obligations.

ISSUE:
Is Diaz’s contention correct?

HELD:
The appellant, who became a widower in 1951, remarried in 1960. The writ of execution and
notice of garnishment in this case were issued and implemented in 1961. The conjugal
partnership of the second marriage is different from that of the first marriage, during which
existence the obligation arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal partnership is
concerned, is personal to the husband and cannot be charged against the properties of the
second union. Since his salaries form part of the conjugal asset the same cannot be garnished
to satisfy his personal obligations.

As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as
fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and
that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is insufficient.

In the instant case, it is a personal obligation of the husband, and it has not been established
that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to satisfy
appellees’ claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article
161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered in order that the personal obligation of
the husband may be made chargeable against the properties of the second marriage.
GARCIA vs. MANZANO
103 Phil 798

FACTS:
Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia and defendant are husband and wife but they have been living
separately from each other since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation between them having
failed. Plaintiff, veterinarian used to be employed in the slaughter-house of the City of Manila,
while defendant, was engaged in cattle and fresh meat business. As a result of their joint
efforts they acquired and accumulated real and personal properties. Upon their separation the
defendant assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership
property and even transferred or alienated a majority of said property in favor of third persons.
Defendant has failed and refused to turn over and deliver to plaintiff his rightful share.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action because “it does not allege any of the grounds recognized by Article 191 of the new Civil
Code for decreeing a judicial separation of properties”.

The lower court held that plaintiff’s complaint is not included under the provisions of Articles
190 and 191 of the new Civil Code providing for judicial separation of the conjugal partnership
property and ordered the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.

ISSUE:
Is the husband entitled to some relief?

HELD:
ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by
the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property.

ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not
affect the conjugal partnership, except that:

1. In the spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein without just
cause, shall not have a right to be supported;
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be necessary;
3. If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership or administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property, or separation of property.
Action is dismissed in view of the impropriety of the principal remedy sought, but without
prejudice to proper proceedings

TODA JR. vs. CA

183 SCRA 713

FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed
with two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred
the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.

After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further “disagreeable proceedings,” filed
on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under
Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated
with the aforesaid civil case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981,
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the
conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R.
No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and
the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9,
1981.

ISSUE:
Is a compromise agreement sufficient action in dissolution and partition of property?

HELD:
Supreme Court is in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise
agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial
court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the
Civil Code, 14 “In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue
of a judicial order.”

Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or
agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore,
becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void.

Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is
dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
MALLILIN vs. CASTRO
G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000

FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo was alleged to be both married and with children
but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages
still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union
of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992.

Petitioner demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married
at the time of cohabitation.

Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion
for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.

ISSUE:
Can petitioner validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of
the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living
together?

HELD:
Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution, property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed
to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not
capacitated to marry each other.

When CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity,
his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is
unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the
case.

The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

VALDES vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.

JUANIZA vs. JOSE

89 SCRA 306, 30 March 1979

FACTS:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident
of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7
deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but
had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and
wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir
of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be
reconsidered.

ISSUE:
Are Eugenio and Rosalia co-owners of the jeepney?
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to
marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife.

The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages
caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from
the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

TUMLOS vs FERNANDEZ
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000

FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma,
Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to
occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that
Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month
which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate
the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:
Is Guillerma a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The
claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented
to validate it except for the said affidavit.

Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were
true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes
hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.

The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family
Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work
or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can
be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

DOCENA vs. LAPESURA

GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001

FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period
provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum
shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
one of the petitioners.

HELD:

In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ
of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is
clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the
province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of
the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his
behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the
petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena
alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two
petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged
to be a conjugal property.

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband
and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management
alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

GAYON vs. GAYON

39 SCRA 104

FACTS:

Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva Gayon,
alleging that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed of sale whereby they sold to
Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land including the improvements
thereon, subject to redemption within five years or not later than October 1, 1957. That said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre and Genoveva or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period.

Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita by virtue of a deed of sale sold the aforementioned land to
plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00. The plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced
improvements worthP1,00. He had fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967.

Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the
title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale. Plaintiff filed a suit praying that an
order be issued in plaintiff’s favor for the consolidation of ownership of the aforementioned
property.

In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case. The complaint is fictitious, for her
signature was forged. Neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed “any document
of whatever nature in plaintiff’s favor”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the Mrs. Gayon that an earnest effort toward a compromise
before the filing of the suit is tenable.

HELD:
In the plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provide:
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but if the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
provision applies to suits filed or maintained between members of the same family.”

The phrase, “members of the same family,” shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among
brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces,
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Article.

HONTIVEROS vs. RTC

GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros who is the brother of Augusto, and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case.

In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was
a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of
and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of
the writ of possession.

Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE:

Can the court validly dismiss the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise
as stated in Article 151?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or
half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in
this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to
the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

MANALO vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died intestate on February 1992, was survived by his wife Pilar and his 11
children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In
November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their
brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and
the herein petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

The only issue raised by petitioners is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for
the outright and to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the
same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

ISSUE:
Is the case at bar covered by Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first
be made prior the filing of the petition?

HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action.

The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term
“suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of
justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in
the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.
The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a
special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are
not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced
therein.

ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN

A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976

FACTS:
Redentor Albano filed a case for malpractice against Judge Gapusan for having prepared and
notarized a document providing for the personal separation of Sps. Valentina Andres and
Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership five years
before his appointment to the bench. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse
should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from
filing an action against the other.

Respondent Judge denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained that the spouses
had been separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children
with her paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that
the spouse would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation
agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing
the malpractice charge is in effect asking the Court to take belated disciplinary action against
Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Gapusan should be disciplined for notarizing the void agreement
between the spouses.

Held:
There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are
contrary to law, morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of
marriage and the family. “Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution.
The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.”

To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void any contract
for personal separation between husband and wife and every extrajudicial agreement, during
the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership”.
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging
the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership.

Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized the void separation
agreement already mentioned. However, his notarization of that document does not warrant
any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of
the peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the
Commission on Appointments.

MONDEQUILLO vs. BREVA

1. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located
at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated.

With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.

Article 162 of the Family Code, provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152
and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and
liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

MANACOP vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to
a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein
(FF Cruz & Co).

The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the house of the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon
City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the
attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and
is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property
is therefore not exempt form attachment.

The petition was dismissed by SC.

TANEO vs. CA
304 SCRA 308

FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case for recovery of property in favor of private respondent
Abdon Gilig, two properties of the petitioner were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. One
was a parcel of land and the other was the family home. The subject properties were sold at
public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest
bidder. Consequently, after petitioners’ failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance
was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties
to the private respondent.

To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the
deed of conveyance void. The petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa
Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their
death, they left the subject property and that said property has been acquired through free
patent, therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt

Private respondent refuted petitioners alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject property
which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale. Said sale has become final as no
redemption was made within one year from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale is prohibited; and whether or
not the family home is exempt from execution.

HELD:
The conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale was not violative of the law. The judgment
obligation of the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were
levied and sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12,
1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon
Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary
period.

Pablo Taneo’s application for free patent was approved only on October 19, 1973. Therefore,
even before the application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the
owner of the land

The house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one
Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the “family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated,” it is
understood that the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to
another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was
merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property.

BALUYOT vs. BALUYOT

186 SCRA 506

FACTS:
Petitioners Victoria and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot filed a petition for intervention in Special
Proceedings No. entitled “Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,’. The petition alleged
that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut being the
illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and
petitioners’ mother and guardian ad litemNorma Urbano. They were conceived and born at the
time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already married to
Felicidad S. Baluyut and that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of
children of the deceased during his lifetime by having supported and maintained them.
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the
petition for intervention

ISSUE:
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate
spurious children?

HELD:

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary
recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of
record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory
recognition under Article 283 of the same law.

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were
recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners’ records
of birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was
neither authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of record which would prove
that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.

In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire
to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously’

The grounds relied upon by petitioners were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the
status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time
when their mother cohabited with the deceased. The evidence presented by petitioners failed
to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory
recognition.

CASTRO vs. CA
G.R. No. 50974, 31 May 1981

FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were
married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The
husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of
bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and living. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while

Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law
granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden
name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. After the requested oral
argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

ISSUE:
What is the real status of the child Jose Gerardo?

HELD:
 Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, he never became
the former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the
child. Theresa’s contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of
her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no
right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not
permitted by law to question the son’s legitimacy.
 Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress”. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his
legitimacy was upheld by the Court.
  As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot
then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.
ANDAL vs. MACARAIG
GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by her and Emiliano
Andalon the premise that Mariano is the legal heir being the legitimate son of Emiliano.
Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in
favor of Emiliano.
Emiliano was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with
them to work in his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and
get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the
house of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not
attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE:
Could Mariano Andal be a legitimate child of the deceased?

HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted
by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during
the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.

Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of
conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be
shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s
illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude
cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner
of the parcel land.

BENITEZ-BADUA vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while her husband died in1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the
nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and
cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor
legally adopted.

The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents
such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses’ name were reflected as her parents. She
even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the
other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically
procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

Thus the present case…

ISSUE:
Would the petitioner’s certificate of live birth suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon
the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of
the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”.
In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the
petitioner where it appeared that he was the petitioner’s father.

MACADANGDANG vs. CA
100 SCRA 73

FACTS:
VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez. She met Carlito sometime in 1983, at the Meralco
Compound tennis courts. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed
that they started their illicit sexual relationship six months after their first meeting. The tryst
resulted in the birth of petitioner She did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of
her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985,
however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth,
identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which
also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra.

Private respondent declared that he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both
petitioners as their father after he was sued for support. He averred he only served as one of
the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary evidence presented sufficient proof of filiation.

HELD:

Photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As
explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner
Claro.

There is no showing that private respondent participated in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates naming him to be the father. Baptismal certificates may be only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not competent
evidence with respect to the child’s paternity.

The records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates. A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity.”

The court adopts the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioner’s
action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering the findings that petitioners
evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
Res judicata—“a matter judged” – a matter generally may not be relitigated once it has been
judged on the merits.

BABIERA vs. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged,
and contained false entries. She alleged that: (1)That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa; (2) Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is
falsified; (3) Teofista’s correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera; (4) Her real mother was
Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child; (5) It was clinically and medically impossible
for Hermogena to bear a child at 54 years of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion
was born.

Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista’s certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to
order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion
who inherited the estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed in her
certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion
on the grounds that the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as
the child of Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition
pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family Code; that the petition was barred from prescription
pursuant to Art 172 of the family code.

ISSUE:
Does Presentacion have legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171;
whether the special proceeding is improper and barred by the statute of limitation; whether
the public record of Teofista’s birth is superior to the oral testimony of Presentacion.

HELD:
Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to instances when the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to Eugenio
and Hermogena, the reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista’s status is to protect
her successional rights.

The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn
her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was
allegedly declared void ab initio.

First, the totality of the evidence presented, negates the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of birth certificate. The birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and
the mother’s signature appears to be forged. Second, no medical records or doctor’s
prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena’s pregnancy. It was impossible for her to
have given birth at 54 years of age.
DE JESUS vs. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with Inventory
and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.

Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can impugn their own legitimacy.

HELD:
Petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would
also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The law established the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus which the law does not allow. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs,
can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their
legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock.

LIM vs. CA
270 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a
receptionist in a Club where she met petitioner during her first night on the job.
Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love and soon lived together. Maribel left
for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year.
On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter and he egistered the name Joanna
Rose C. Pe Lim on the child’s birth certificate. After Joanna Rose’s birth, the love affair between
Maribel and petitioner continued.

Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner’s feelings toward her started to
wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel then filed a complaint for
support.

Petitioner negated all of Maribel’s claims and even his paternity. The trial court rendered a
decision on in favor of Maribel ordering herein defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to
his natural daughter.

Petitioner then elevated his case and argues before the Court that there is no clear and
convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation between him and
Maribel

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented sufficient to claim filiation therefore, making the father liable
for support.

HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code states:

“The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.’
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

3. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;

4. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to
be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose
and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.

CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ

209 SCRA 18

FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought
monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at
his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita.
Afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual
contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside
by CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the
first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on
direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the
months of September, October and November, 1974.

More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse
indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit
herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

CONDE vs. ABAYA

13 Phil 249

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya died in 1899 unmarried however leaving two unacknowledged children by Paula
Conde. The two children died as minors in 1902 and 1903. The mother sued for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased.

The trial court, with the opposition of the Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered
judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent’s natural
children.

ISSUES:
Can an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children be brought in special
probate proceedings?

Can the mother of a natural child now deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment
of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to receive the inheritance from the person
who is supposed to be his natural father?

HELD:
Section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to the lawful heirs of the
deceased person are, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the
judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is
affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment

The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants cannot be
sustained under the law, and still less to his mother. Only the child can bring such action to the
courts and lasts only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. Presumed parent died during
the minority of the child

The court concluded that the right is not transmissible to the heirs of the natural child by the
following argument:
It cannot place a natural child on a better position by assuming that the right is transmitted to
the heirs as a general rule when it only grants exceptions to a legitimate child

MARQUINO vs. IAC

GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994

FACTS:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of
Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status
of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his
family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her
evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while
Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that
the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed
by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such
action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:
Whether the right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs;
and whether Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

HELD:
SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted
because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The
right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for
recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in
the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case
at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of
death of their father.

IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
AM No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995

FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.

With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to
the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate
children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing separate affidavits
stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight
when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.

The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in
1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor
immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children
(1970, 1971 and 1975).

ISSUE:
Whether the three children can be considered legitimate.

HELD:
The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents, who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:

1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of
the child.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND BOBILES
GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her
family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned
was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to
oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to “Bobiles”.

The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After
the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
Court of Appeals, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory

ISSUE:
Whether the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the
petition.

HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After
the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
Court of Appeals, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.

Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family
Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When
Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law
in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced.

A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and
effect at the time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that
he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent
child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of the pleadings.

REPUBLIC vs. ELEPANO

G.R. No. 92542

FACTS:
The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a verified petition for adoption of the
minors Pinky Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan
Urbano, the daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her daughters. However, she received
an urgent call from the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland requiring her to report for work, so
much so that she will not be able to testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled.
The respondent judge ordered that notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to the
OSG.

The OSG subsequently filed an opposition averring that the jurisdictional requirement of
publication has not been complied with, the lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant. The respondent judge denied the said Opposition. The respondent judge
granted the petition for adoption

ISSUE:

Whether the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be complied first to allow the
deposition taking in adoption proceedings?

HELD:
The petition has no merit. While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of
summons within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, in an adoption case which involves the
status of a person, there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem. In
such case, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the
taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over the res, to
render judgment with respect to such “thing” (or status, as in this case) so as to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right so established.
Publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is necessary for the validity of
a decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely of taking a deposition.
No abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge in allowing the taking of private
respondent’s deposition. Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her control, private
respondent could not be present to testify at the trial of the main case for adoption. The OSG
was notified of the scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the
petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to attend ALL the said hearings, without
explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the
welfare of the child and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective.

TAMARGO vs. CA
209 SCRA 518

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer’s natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc’s
natural parents.

In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was
granted in November 1982.

Adelberto’s parents claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was
decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition
for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Rapisuras are parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

HELD:
In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject
to the appropriate defences provided by law.” In the case at bar, parental authority over
Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened.
It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.

JAVIER vs. LUCERO

GR No. L-6706, March 29, 1953

FACTS:
Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son before they got married, named Alfredo
Jr. After the celebration of marriage, the father went to US since he was listed as US Navy. The
mother and Alfredo Jr. went to live with her parents while the husband was in US. When the
relationship between the spouses becomes strained, husband petitioned for divorce before
State of Alabama. After the decree was issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice (having
been divorced with the former before celebration of subsequent marriage).

An action for alimony was filed where respondent Judge ordered the father to give a monthly
allowance of P60 to his wife and son. The father filed notice of appeal questioning the status of
the wife; the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer entitled to be
supported and third, decision is vague and silent in relation to granting the son entitlement to
support even if over 21 years old for purposes of completing his education/ training for some
profession, trade or vocation. Nevertheless, the judge directed the father to pay the monthly
pensions notwithstanding pendency of the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support being at the age of majority.

HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, article 290 support also includes the education of the person to be
supported “until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation
even beyond the age of majority” and on the basis of this article support was granted to Alfredo
Javier Junior. While it is true that plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior, who was born on December 2,
1931, has reached the age of majority on December 2, 1952, yet, under the last part of article
290 of the new Civil Code, support may be given him even beyond the age of majority in order
to enable him to complete his education, for some trade or profession.”

If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal, his education or
the completion thereof would be unduly delayed. This is a good reason for immediate
execution. The father claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer
studying. However, it might have resulted to lack of means to support his studies considering
that the father admits that the son is just a pre-law graduate.

LERMA vs. CA
G.R. No. 33352, 20 Decemder 1974

FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They married on May 19, 1951.
On August 22, 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a
certain Teodoro Ramirez

The respondent filed with the lower court, presided by Judge Leonor Ines Luciano, a complaint
against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their
children 2 and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their
youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent’s
complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her
life.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.

Judge Luciano granted the respondent’s application for support pendente lite in an order dated
December 24, 1969, which she amended in an order dated February 15, 1970 to the following
effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the date of the
filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced from
P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.

ISSUE:
Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for support pendente lite.
HELD:
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the
petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article
303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease “when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;” and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is “when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation.” The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible
with any claim for support pendente lite.

DE ASIS vs. CA
303 SCRA 176, February 15, 1999

FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in
1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it
seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim.

However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the
minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of
the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of
paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim
support.

ISSUE:
Whether the action for support is already barred.

HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The
original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.

With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child
and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack
of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but
should be decided by the Court itself.

While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between
the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is
vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first
dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and
effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since
future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
ESPIRITU vs. CA
242 SCRA 362

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los Angeles to
work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita began to
maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind
Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the
time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born. The relationship soon
deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California. Because his assignment is not
yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the
Philippines.

Teresita filed an action for custody. Result of psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five
years old show that the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to
the U.S. to live with her mother. She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother
kissing a “bad” man who worked for her father. Both children are now over seven years of age
and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

ISSUE:
Whether the custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:
Both children are now over seven years of age, their choice of parent should be given respect
by the court. The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the
mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore. As the
children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to their
decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines.

Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by the
court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said behavior forms
an immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit
person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.

LUNA vs. IAC

137 SCRA 7

FACTS:
Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents
Ma Lourdes and Sixto Salumbies gave her to the petitioners Horacio and Liberty Luna, a
childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection
and brought her up as their very own..

A few months before September, 1980,the Lunas decided to take Shirley abroad and show her
Disneyland and other places of interest in America, when the petitioners asked for the
respondents’ written consent to the child’s application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused
to give it as a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the
private respondents, upon the latter’s request.
When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to
another school. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the
said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners.

The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus against the private respondents to produce
the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. After the filing of an answer and
due hearing, a decision was rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child’s custody
and forthwith granted the writ prayed for.

Upon appeal of the respondents, the decision was reversed by the CA and a writ of execution
was issued to return Shirley to her biological parents. However, testimony of the child shows
that she would rather stay with the Luna couple. She even made a pronouncement that she will
kill herself if she will be taken by her biological parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final
decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and
preference of the child

HELD:
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower
court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution. However, the child’s manifestation to the trial court that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should be forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening
event that would justify the cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules
and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life
and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an
intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and
substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her
physical, moral and intellectual development.

AMADORA vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito
Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics
teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were
dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s
decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning
and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since
the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In
any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school
regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE:
Wh0 can be held liable for the death of a student inside the premises of the school?

HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school. That
classes had formally ended when the incident happened was immaterial. What was important
is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear
negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting
incident.

On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was
exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the
injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

YLARDE vs. AQUINO

163 SCRA 697

FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in
Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. The school had several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War
II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and
ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be
buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the
Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation.

Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the
school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when
suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall
causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days
thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both
Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE:
Whether both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.

HELD:
The general rule where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student. As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students”.

However, in case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held
liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents should make sure that the children are
protected from all harm. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing
himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning
given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the
excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.
LIBI vs. IAC
209 SCRA 518

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she found out that he was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but
was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found
dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun.

The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell
to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was
set aside by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under
Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from
both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for
quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall
cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box
inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise
admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell
could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that
he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe
and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique. Santamaria
on March 1939. Events led her to cease from living with Enrique. A decree of legal separation
was later on issued to the spouses.. During their marriage, she naturally used her husband’s
surname, thus adopted Elisea L. Santamaria.

After the decree of legal separation was granted she wanted to revert to her maiden name
thus, filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using Elisea Laperal. She was claiming that
continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Article 372 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.

It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate
that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

LLANETA vs. AGRAVA

G.R. No. 32054, 15 May 1974

FACTS:
Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had one child named
Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations
with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita’s birth, Atanacia
brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia’s mother-in-law,
Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s, using the surname
of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling.

When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin,
Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a
scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her
registered surname is Llaneta — not Ferrer — and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia
and an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she
had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion,
Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita
Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.

After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition upon reliance on the doctrine
that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita can be allowed to continue using the surname Ferrer

HELD:
The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she
can remember; that all her records, her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer.
Even the late Serafin Ferrer’s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the
surname Ferrer. A sudden shift by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to
conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion..

As to the false impression of family relationship, the late Serafin Ferrer’s widowed mother,
Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest
support of the petition. Those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname
Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. Petition granted.