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Control Paradox

A writeup on privacy paradoxes

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
98 views17 pages

Control Paradox

A writeup on privacy paradoxes

Uploaded by

Henry Sloan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Chapter 9

The Policy Maker’s Anguish: Regulating


Personal Data Behavior Between Paradoxes and
Dilemmas

Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

Abstract Regulators in Europe and elsewhere are paying great attention to identity,
privacy and trust in online and converging environments. Appropriate regulation of
identity in a ubiquitous information environment is seen as one of the major drivers
of the future Internet economy. Regulation of personal identity data has come to the
fore including mapping conducted on digital personhood by the OECD; work on hu-
man rights and profiling by the Council of Europe and major studies by the European
Commission with regard to self-regulation in the privacy market, electronic identity
technical interoperability and enhanced safety for young people. These domains
overlap onto an increasingly complex model of regulation of individuals’ identity
management, online and offline. This chapter argues that policy makers struggle
to deal with issues concerning electronic identity, due to the apparently irrational
and unpredictable behavior of users when engaging in online interactions involving
identity management. Building on empirical survey evidence from four EU coun-
tries, we examine the first aspect in detail – citizens’ management of identity in a
digital environment. We build on data from a large scale (n = 5, 265) online survey
of attitudes to electronic identity among young Europeans (France, Germany, Spain,
UK) conducted in August 2008. The survey asked questions about perceptions and
acceptance of risks, general motivations, attitudes and behaviors concerning elec-
tronic identity. Four behavioral paradoxes are identified in the analysis: a privacy
paradox (to date well known), but also a control paradox, a responsibility paradox
and an awareness paradox. The chapter then examines the paradoxes in relation of
three main policy dilemmas framing the debate on digital identity. The paper con-
cludes by arguing for an expanded identity debate spanning policy circles and the
engineering community.

Ramón Compañó
European Commission - Directorate General Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective
Technological Studies (IPTS), e-mail: [email protected]
Wainer Lusoli
European Commission - Directorate General Joint Research Centre (JRC), Visiting Research Fel-
low, University of Chester,e-mail: [email protected]

T. Moore et al. (eds.), Economics of Information Security and Privacy, 169


DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-6967-5_9, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
170 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

9.1 Introduction

Regulators in Europe and elsewhere are paying great attention to identity, privacy
and trust in online and converging environments. Understanding and regulating
identity in a ubiquitous information environment is seen as one of the major drivers
of the future Internet economy [15]. Regulation of personal identity data has come
to the fore including mapping conducted on digital personhood by the OECD [18];
work on human rights and profiling by the Council of Europe [4] and major studies
by the European Commission with regard to self-regulation in the privacy market,
electronic identity technical interoperability and enhanced safety for young peo-
ple [13].
These domains overlap onto an increasingly complex model of regulation of in-
dividuals’ identity management, online and offline. This model comprises consumer
policy, where priorities are set based on the critical assessment of location and ser-
vice fruition and trust and privacy as prerequisites for the future common digital
market [11]; human rights agenda, in line with the consequences of advanced pro-
filing techniques [4] and with surveillance concerns in relation to information soci-
ety security [10]; online safety policy, especially in relation with younger users [5]
policies concerning the right of access to advanced, interoperable EU services in
the sphere of justice [6]; and a set of policies regarding the economic impact of
future networks [15]. This implies a regulatory infrastructure of identity which, if
fully sketched, is way grander than one that to date tackles identity-theft and ensures
smooth services fruition across the EU (interoperability).
The paper claims that policy makers struggle to deal with issues concerning
electronic identity. This has two main reasons: the apparently irrational and un-
predictable behavior of users when engaging in online interactions involving iden-
tity management and a seemingly intractable set of dilemmas. The former problem,
verily a set of behavioral paradoxes, is compounded by the lack of multi-country,
systematic, comprehensive data on users’ attitudes and behaviors: trust, privacy, be-
havioral intentions and confidence in relation to personal identity data. In addition,
debate is mainly limited to the so-called privacy paradox and people’s willingness
to disclose personal data.
Building on empirical survey evidence from four EU countries, this paper ex-
amines the last aspect in detail – citizens’ management of identity in a digital en-
vironment. We build on data from of a large scale (n = 5,265) online survey of
attitudes to electronic identity among young Europeans’ (France, Germany, Spain,
UK) conducted in August 2008. The survey asked questions about perceptions and
acceptance of risks, general motivations, attitudes and behaviors concerning elec-
tronic identity.
This paper is unusual as it defies the established practice of hypothesis testing,
corroboration or rejection. Rather, data and results follow a logical argument to sup-
port the main thrust of the paper that identity-related policy making is hampered by
multiple aims, behavioral idiosyncrasies and systemic dilemmas. While this may be
seen as less than ’scientific’ in traditional hard science milieus (physical security of
identity systems), it contributes to articulate a debate that is sometimes overlooked
9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 171

in such circles. In the conclusion, the paper argues for the extension of the identity
debate to span policy circles, the engineering community and a growing section of
multi-disciplinary approaches to identity.

9.2 Existing Work on the Privacy Paradox

The so-called ’privacy paradox’ is one of the central topics in the debate on privacy
and identity. The privacy paradox states that users are concerned about privacy but
they disclose a significant amount of personal data and take no action to protect
themselves. Several studies confirmed the paradox. It has been found in experimen-
tal settings, with specific reference to the role of risk as a discriminant predictor
of attitudes (positive association) vs. behavior (no association) [14]. The paradox
has been found in relation to social networking behaviors among US college stu-
dents [9]. A study of Dutch students confirms the paradox across a range of possible
defensive behaviors such as behavioral measures and common and more advanced
privacy enhancing technologies [16]. For specific services, such as instant messag-
ing, the relation between privacy concerns and protective action may be stronger.
People who remain unprotected do so because of lack of skills [17]. Again in rela-
tion to social networking, young people were found to adopt copings tactics rather
than adapting strategically to the new information environment [22]. This may be
a way of reconciling actual behaviors with attitudes and social desirability. Finally,
privacy concerns have a negative effect on information disclosure but a positive
effect on protection intention; transaction intention, however, remains unaffected.
Furthermore, information sensitivity has a negative effect on information disclosure
and transaction intention [20]. To summarize, people do disclose online despite pri-
vacy risks, but go to some length to mitigate the effects of disclosure, especially in
relation to sensitive information.
However, work on the privacy paradox struggles to cast a net wider than a single
country (e.g. the Netherlands), a target group (e.g. students), a limited theoretical fo-
cus (e.g. the paradox itself). This is in some way understandable; most of the studies
reviewed are small scale experiments; official, multi-country data that would help
casting a wider net are lacking; work is often uni- rather than multi-disciplinary. To
your knowledge, five studies come close to an encompassing definition of possible,
relevant variables:

• European Commission’s Eurobarometer Flash study on 27 Member States on


confidence in the Information Society, with questions on security risk awareness
/ knowledge, damage and protective behaviors [7];
• European Commission’s Eurobarometer Flash study on 27 Member States with
questions in relation to data protection in own country, plus one question on
privacy-enhancing technologies and one on internet trust [8];
• OCLC survey of six countries, focusing on social networking and social media
in relation to privacy and trust [3];
172 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

Table 9.1 Survey totals.


France UK Germany Spain Total
Emails sent 129,828 143,476 101,086 157,053 531,443
Invalid email addresses 1,580 3,000 3,015 559 8,154
Invalid email rate 1.2% 2.1% 3% 0.4% 1.5%
Valid email addresses 128,248 140,476 98,071 156,494 523,289
Emails opened 47,724 20,209 12,009 30,149 110,091
Open rate 37% 14% 12% 19% 21%
Emails clicked on 9,155 3,020 2,672 4,240 18,087
Click rate 7.1% 2.1% 1.7% 2.7% 3.5%
Respondents to the first question 4,485 2,631 1,709 3,318 12,143
Respondents to the last question 2,014 1,258 819 1,174 5,265
Full answer rate 45% 48% 48% 35% 43%

• OECD review of safety and security official statistics focusing mainly on secu-
rity, with limited if no focus on other aspects such as privacy trust and confi-
dence [19];
• FIDIS (Future of ID in the Information Society Network of Excellence) web
survey in 19 EU countries on perceptions of institution-based trust in the han-
dling of personal data [1].

9.3 Methodology

To examine citizens’ seemingly irrational behavior concerning the management of


the identity in a digital environment, we build on data from of a large-scale online
survey of attitudes to electronic identity among young Europeans’ in France, Ger-
many, Spain and UK conducted in August 20081 . The survey examines the attitudes
and behaviors of young people because they are the next generation of internet users,
citizens and consumers; arguably, they also differ from previous generating in their
proximity to and confidence with new digital technologies [2].
Preliminary research steps included two focus groups in each country on a topic
guide consonant with the final questionnaire; a two-day expert workshop to validate
the questionnaire; a pre-test conducted with 100 young people in the UK in June
2008. Once the questionnaire was finalized and pre-tested, invitations to the online
survey were sent to 531,443 young people in France, UK, Spain and Germany, in
July and August 2008. The survey obtained 12,143 responses to the first question
and 5,265 responses to the whole questionnaire [which we use for the analysis re-
ported here]. The survey obtained at least 1000 respondents per country except in
Germany, where the number of completed questionnaires was n = 819. Table 9.1
reports the details of the recruitment process.
In terms of representativeness,

1 More details on the methodology of the study can be found in [12].


9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 173

• Of all respondents (partial and complete), 37% from France French, 27% from
Spain, 22% from the UK and 14% from Germany.
• Overall 56% are male and 44% female, this proportion being different in some
countries, notably in Spain (78% male) and in the UK (65 % male).
• The majority are 15-18 years old (46%), 29% are between 19 and 21 and 26%
are 22 years old or older. There are less ’younger’ people from the UK and
Germany.
• Nearly 50% are students (more students in UK and less in Spain). Around 30%
of young people are ‘blue collar’ workers (but only 2.6% in England and 50%
in Spain).
• Considering education, only 2% have a Doctorate and 18% a Master (less in
UK and Germany). The most common degree is ‘licence’ with 41% (30% in
UK and Spain).
Overall, therefore, there is considerable variance in terms of socio-demographic
factors across the four countries. In future studies, steps need to be taken to standard-
ize the parameter estimates of the sample on those of the population. Conversely,
however, the sample represents very closely the internet access and use of young
people 15-25 years olds in the respective countries (data not reported here, please
refer to [12]).
The survey asked questions about perceptions and acceptance of risks, general
motivations, attitudes and behaviors concerning electronic identity. Dimensional
analysis and factor analysis were used to extract latent indicators. Below, we provide
a list of indicators and variables relevant to this paper. We report below the overall
theme of the question/s, the question formulation, the factor/s extracted via dimen-
sional analysis and other items that are used in the discussion. Question wording,
options, level of measurement and values are provided in the Appendix.
1. Enablers of identifications systems
• Q21 Which of the following elements could encourage you to use identifi-
cation systems?
– 2 factors: guarantees and control devices
2. Online personal data disclosure
• Q22 Indicate what information you provide on Internet
– 4 factors: low disclosure [information that gets rarely disclosed], basic
social networking [SNS], advanced SNS and high disclosure
3. Internet confidence
• Q24 More generally, concerning the Internet, you would say that . . .
– 1 factor: Internet confidence; 1 single item used in analysis: self-
confidence in ability to protect oneself online
4. Privacy risk perceptions
• Q26 How concerned are you about the following risks in relation to your
personal information
174 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

– 2 factors: identity damage, data tracking


5. Responsibility
• Q27 Who is responsible to protect personal data on line?
6. Data protection strategies
• Q28 On the Internet, how often do you . . .
• Q29 On the Internet, I usually protect my personal data in the following
ways
– 5 factors: offline strategies [hardware based], online strategies [soft-
ware based], shielding strategies, minimization strategies and avoid-
ance strategies
7. Data protection knowledge
• Q30 Do you know your rights in terms of data protection?
– 1 scale of data protection knowledge
8. Data protection attitudes
• Q31 For each of the following statements, please state if you tend to agree
or not
– 1 factor: attitude towards data protection
9. Remedies
• Q32 What do you think are efficient ways to protect your identity, online
and offline?
– 2 factors: awareness raising and direct intervention; 1 single item used
in analysis: give users more control on their personal data

The survey also included standard socio-demographic questions and a range of


questions on internet access and use, and knowledge and use of identification sys-
tems. The latter are used to argue the point in relation to policy makers’ dilemmas,
discussed in section 5, and are reported in the Appendix. Socio-demographic ques-
tions and other questions included in the survey are not reported for reasons of space
and relevance to the argument proposed here.

9.4 Paradoxes

Overall, survey results are in line with previous findings from the literature, par-
ticularly those on young people’s perception of technologies and public policies,
privacy, trust and enablers. However, results point to a number of unexpected atti-
tudes of young people that appear irrational.
9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 175

9.4.1 The Privacy Paradox

The survey confirms the prevalence of the privacy paradox [Table 2, marked in yel-
low], whereby young people disclose a range of personal information despite high
perception of privacy risks. In general, the public is primarily concerned about loss
of privacy that lead to security problems but few everyday activities are considered
extremely or very private. Our results confirm as much, as disclosure of ’basic’ bi-
ographic information is unrelated to privacy concern; on the other hand, there is a
very weak negative correlation (Pearson’s R2 -.04) between these and disclosure
of potentially more sensitive data (medical history, etc). The survey confirms that
social networkers, particularly younger users, may well be ill informed about the
detail they are making publicly available, as it is often unrelated to their privacy
concerns. But the need to appear seems to justify disclosure in young people’s eyes.
Online social networking, for instance, is more about enhanced and increased per-
sonal disclosure than about the maintenance of wider social networks [21].

9.4.2 The Control Paradox

People desire full control on their personal data, but avoid the hassle to keep it up to
date. People know that there are technology tools to protect them and think they may
be efficient, but they do not use them [Table 2, marked in red]. More than 70% of
respondents think that there are efficient solutions to identity-related problems on-
line. Technical solutions are favoured, alongside other supply-side solutions. While
73% claim that it is efficient to ’give users more direct control on their own identity
data’, a minority employs strategies such as data minimization, avoidance or active
management of own personal data. In detail, there is no correlation between shield-
ing and minimization user practices and the call for more user control; there are
weak correlations between data avoidance and hardware-based strategies and the
perception that user should have more control; and there are conflicting (positive
and negative) correlation between employment of Internet-based tactics and user
control perception.

9.4.3 The Responsibility Paradox

Overall, young people consider that the responsibility to manage personal data is
shared. They do not attribute responsibility for the protection of personal data to
governments or police and courts. Most young people believe that it is either their
own responsibility to protect their data online or the responsibility of the compa-
nies they are transacting with. They are asking for tools that give them more direct
control on their own identity data. But at the same time, they are not confident in
their own ability to keep their data protected. Overall, while only half of the re-
176 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

Table 9.2 Correlations between main variables and indicators.


9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 177

spondents said they are confident they can protect their own privacy online, only
21% claim that it is very efficient to ’give users more direct control on their own
identity data’. While most people believe that it is either their own responsibility,
they seem to admit that many users do not have the knowledge to do this effectively
[Table 2, marked in blue]. Furthermore, young people tend to neglect trust seals
and do not appreciate privacy enhancing tools. Overall, there is a negative corre-
lation between perceived efficacy of user control on their own data and perception
of actual measures that would enable this control (such as receipts, information on
systems and counter-profiling information). The awareness paradox Data protection
(DP) legislation is unknown and unloved [Table 2, marked in green]. Young EU
citizens’ knowledge level about DP laws is low. Even lower is their appreciation
of the current DP framework. Paradoxically, more knowledge only breeds slightly
more positive attitudes (Pearson’s R2 .07). People knowing a lot or nothing about
DP (24%), are significantly different in their attitudes. However, for the majority
of the people in the middle (76 % knowing a bit or not much) there is practically
no correlation with attitudes. Moreover, more knowledge on DP rights does not to
influence the behavioral intention to adopt digital services based on personal data
disclosure (weak negative correlation). Finally, there is a strong correlation (.37) of
self-efficacy with DP attitudes, but not with knowledge. But it is knowledge that gets
people to stay protected (correlation .20), rather than attitudes, positive or negative
(no correlation). These findings suggest that personal experience may matter more
than understanding of the legal system. It is not surprising that young people should
ask for ’hands-on’ regulation. Young people desire reassurance, via practical tools
more than via awareness raising. Tools such as guarantees (labels and logos) appeal
to young people, while they also appreciate tools that may assist control of personal
data provided to public or private authorities.

9.5 Dilemmas

Alongside having to deal with a number of paradoxes, policy-makers also face a


number of dilemmas when devising identity-related policies.

9.5.1 The Cultural Dilemma

As digital culture and behavioral attitudes vary across Member States, pass-par-
tout policies are not available. There are significant differences between countries
in terms of digital culture and markets. Countries vary in terms of mode of Internet
connection. In France, 95% connect using home broadband, but 40% also connect
at school or university and 20% through pay wi-fi network. In the UK, 34% connect
at work but only 15% at school or university and very few in other ways. In Spain,
178 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

only 66% connect using home broadband, 24% using dial-up and 19% in an internet
café.
In terms of Internet activities, discrepancies appear between countries. Managing
profile on social networks is today prevalent (43%), although it is less widespread
in Spain (30%). France has a blogging and instant messaging culture; French young
people author more blogs (35%) than people in other countries (<15%), 85% of
French youngsters use instant messaging (more any other country) youngsters are
more skilled in Germany than elsewhere. Fewer youngsters from all countries design
a web site or install plug-ins than in Germany (27%).
Internet access and activities are important for personal innovativeness, and, in
turn, for the take up and regulation of digital services.

9.5.2 The Market Fragmentation Dilemma

The digital market that supports and profits from personal data disclosure is sig-
nificantly fragmented. Young EU citizens are Web experts and connected mainly
at home using broadband. They constitute a specific part of the population particu-
larly Internet minded. However, they are not a homogeneous group. There are three
distinct groups in terms of activities. A group (48%) of new Internet users doing
classical activities (check emails; search engines); a group (34%) of older Internet
users also having web 2.0 activities on social networks; a group (18%) using all
the social possibilities of the Internet such as keeping a blog and participating in
online discussion forums and chats. Young, innovative people who have being go-
ing online via broadband several times a day for more than 5 years are leaders in
relation to managing their identity online. This behavior often requires significant
online disclosure of personal data, which youngsters are mostly happy to provide
However, young people who engage in most advanced internet behavior have a
more positive attitude concerning the Internet and lesser perceptions of risk. How to
cater for these two different publics (lesser skilled, likely to disclose, lacking con-
fidence; more skilled, very likely to disclose, having more confidence) is matter of
great complexity. This segmentation is further propelled by cultural and economic
differences across EU Member States. Difference in technical skills, cultural ap-
preciations and market maturity may lead to different applications of personal data
disclosure across the EU. From a policy maker’s point of view, however, govern-
ments must strive in offering all citizens equal opportunities and this is more likely
the lesser such fragmentation.

9.5.3 The Public-Private Dilemma

Governments, as active stakeholders to promote digital service take-up suffer from a


triple dilemma. First, the survey evaluated the perceived benefits and risks towards
9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 179

personal data disclosure. Contradictory perceptions exist. While systems are not
always seen as risky, EU citizens demand more security and privacy, personalization
of services and ease of use. People want to be safe online, but they are wary of
governments. Young people do not trust governments but expect them to act.
Second, the public hand as one of the largest investors of ICTs would be in a
key position to shape and promote the development of innovative services based on
data disclosure. But the majority of digital services developed by governments are
largely regarded as unattractive by young people, making them useless as platform
for wider deployment in other domains like leisure, work or business.
Third, unlike business players, governments have little room for maneuver for
negotiations. While some people would accept profiling in exchange of commercial
benefits or personalized services, similar incentives are very limited for govern-
ments. It would be unacceptable, for instance, to award a tax discount only to those
citizens submitting the tax declaration online, while asking the payment of full taxes
all others submitting it in paper.

9.6 Conclusion

In their decisions, policy makers need to take into account that citizens do not al-
ways behave rationally. The paper highlights a number of behavioral paradoxes that
became apparent from an online survey of young people. In spite of these appar-
ently irrational patterns, governments are increasingly under pressure to design a vi-
able framework to enable innovative services to the benefit for their citizens, largely
based on personal data disclosure.
From many quarters, based on evidence beyond our own survey, there is a strong
call for effective, fair and transparent data protection rules [7]. In our survey, trust
in rules (fair play by service providers) emerged as an important factor in addition
to traditional understandings of trust. Indeed, there are multiple enablers of identity
disclosure. Guarantees, assurance of data protection law respect and precise infor-
mation on systems are likely to encourage the adoption of services based on personal
data disclosure. Solutions based on these principles need implementing, regulating
and enforcing.
For this to happen, there is an urgent need to look at a wider picture. A com-
plex equation involving internet skills, self-efficacy, privacy perception, global risks
and disclosure needs to be constructed in relation to the efficacy of different regu-
latory alternatives in relation to eID. The survey confirmed the privacy paradox. It
also showed that behavioral paradoxes concerning data control, responsibility and
awareness compound the picture. Any solution tailored to tackle the former needs
to factor in system effects in other domains. But this, it was argued, is not the full
picture altogether. Policy action faces systemic constraints.
Governments have to struggle with a number of dilemmas that further limit the
range of viable policy options. First, governments need to design policies that en-
hance the public good, in contrast to companies that can follow a market segmen-
180 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

tation approach. Second, the EU ICT markets are very different across the Member
States. Finally, there is a cultural component to take into account. These may be-
come serious issues, as there are considerable differences in attitudes with respect
to the use and perception of digital services within society, our survey shows.

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182 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

9.7 Appendix

[enablers]
Q21 Which of the following elements could encourage you to use identification
systems?
Tick all that apply
2101 A receipt after you have provided the information
2102 Information on the identification system
2103 Information on the use of the data you provide
2104 Testimonials of persons having experimented the identification system
2105 The assurance that law on personal data protection is respected
2106 A label or logo proving that the system is secure
2107 Guarantees that data are not resold or reused by another organization
2108 A single record with all my transactions, interactions, traces, so I know
what is around about me
2109 Others (specify)
2110 None
[online personal data disclosure]
Q22 Indicate what information you provide on Internet
Yes No Don’t know
2201 Name/surname
2202 Age
2203 Nationality
2204 ID number
2205 Postal address
2206 Bodily appearance
2207 Things I do
2208 Tastes / Opinions
2209 People I meet regularly, my friends / Membership of associations
2210 Places where I usually go
2211 Information you give on social networks such as Facebook or Study VZ
2212 Photos of me
2213 Financial information (revenues, credits, . . . )
2214 Medical information (social security number, . . . )
2215 Bank information (bank card number, account number, . . . )
2216 Judicial information (criminal record, . . . )
2217 Biometric information (fingerprint, iris. . . )
[Internet confidence]
Q24 More generally, concerning the Internet, you would say that. . .
7-point scale, Strongly disagree To Strongly agree
2401 The internet has enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable giving my
personal details online
2402 The internet is now a robust and safe environment in which to transact.
9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 183

2403 The internet provides a trusted environment in which to make transactions


for leisure, work and business
2404 The internet is safe enough to preserve my privacy as I carry out business
and personal activities
2405 I am confident that I can protect my privacy online
[privacy risk perceptions]
Q26 How concerned are you about the following risks in relation to your per-
sonal information
5-point scale, Very concerned To Not at all concerned
2601 Companies possess information about me that I consider private
2602 My personal information is used without my knowledge
2603 My personal data is shared with third parties without my agreement
2604 My behavior and activities can be monitored online
2605 My online personal data is used to send me commercial offers
2606 My identity is reconstructed using personal data from various sources
2607 My views and behaviors may be misrepresented based on my online per-
sonal information
2608 My reputation may be damaged by online personal information
2609 My identity is at risk of theft online
2610 My personal safety may be at risk due to online personal information
2611 I may be victim of financial fraud online
[responsibility]
Q27 Who is responsible to protect personal data on line?
Tick one
2701 On the Internet, it is my responsibility to protect my personal data
2702 It is the government responsibility to protect my personal data online
2703 It is everybody’s responsibility to make sure personal data are safe online
2704 It is the responsibility of the company I transact with to protect my personal
data online
2705 It is the responsibility of the police and courts to ensure that personal data
are protected online
[data protection strategies 1] Q28 On Internet, how often do you . . . Never Some-
times Often Always
2801 Give your real identity
2802 Use a pseudonym
2803 Give a minimum of information
2804 Give wrong information
2805 Do not answer personal questions
2806 Give the identity of another person
[data protection strategies 2]
Q29 On the Internet, I usually protect my personal data and identity in the
following ways
Never Sometimes Often Always
184 Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli

2901 Read the privacy policy of web sites


2902 Use dummy email account to shield my identity
2903 Update virus protection
2904 Scan data with anti-spy ware
Q2905 Install operating system patches
2906 Erase cookies
2907 Use tools and strategies to limit unwanted email (spam)
2908 Check that the transaction is protected or the site has a safety badge before
I enter personal data
2909 Adapt my personal data so that no linking between profiles is possible
2910 Change the security settings of my browser to increase privacy
2911 Use tools limiting the collection of personal data from my computer (e.g.
Firewall, cookie filtering)
[data protection knowledge]
Q30 Do you know your rights in terms of data protection?
Tick one
I never heard about it
I heard about it but I do not know it really
I know a little bit about it
I know it very well
[data protection attitudes]
Q31 For each of the following statements, please state if you tend to agree or
not
7-point scale, Strongly disagree To Strongly agree
3101 In [country], my personal data are properly protected
3102 [Nationality] legislation can cope with the growing number of people leav-
ing personal information on the Internet
3103 I believe that the systems used by the public authorities to manage the
citizens’ personal data are technically secure.
3104 I believe that citizens will be able to keep a good level of control over their
personal data
3105 I will always be able to rely on public authorities for help if problems arise
with my personal data
3106 I believe that the authorities that manage my personal data are professional
and competent
[remedies]
Q32 What do you think are efficient ways to protect your identity, online and
offline?
Very efficient to Not at all efficient
3201 Give users more direct control on their own identity data
3202 Allocate more resources to monitoring and enforcing existing regulations
3203 Require that service providers take greater care of their customer’s identity
3204 Find better technical solution that preserve users’ privacy and safety
9 The Policy Maker’s Anguish 185

3205 Provide formal education on safe identity management


3206 Raise awareness of the implication of unsafe identity behavior
3207 Set up clear guidelines for safe identity management, online and offline
3208 Make greater use of warnings and signs to signal possible unsafe behaviors
[Internet access and activities]
Q2 How do you connect to the Internet ?
Tick all that apply
201 Where I usually live (home, parent’s home, Uni) using broadband
202 Where I usually live (home, parent’s home, Uni) using dial-up
203 At work
204 At school or university
205 Through pay wi-fi network (airport, train station. . . )
206 In an internet cafe
Q3 How often do you connect to the Internet?
Tick one
301 Several times a day
302 Once a day
303 A few times a week
304 Less than once a week
305 Less than once a month
306 Never
Q4 What devices do you use to connect to the Internet?
Tick all that apply
401 Personal Desktop PC
402 Shared Desktop PC
403 Laptop computer
404 WII, playstation or other gaming console
405 On mobile phone or PDA, using GPRS or 3G
Q5 Do you do the following activities on the internet?
Tick all that apply
501 Check email
502 Instant messaging
503 Participate in chat rooms, newsgroups or an online discussion forum
504 Use a search engine to find information
505 Use website (flicker, Youtube, etc) to share pictures, videos, movies etc.
506 Make or received phone calls over the Internet
507 Manage your profile on a social networking site such as Youtube, myspace
or Facebook
508 Design or maintain a website (not just a blog)
509 Keep a web-log (or what is called a Blog)
510 Install plug-ins in browser to extend its capability
511 Use peer-to-peer software to exchange movies, music, etc.

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