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Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014

1987

Kant's philosophy of the self.

Michio Fushihara
University of Massachusetts Amherst

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 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

A Thesis Presented

by

MICHIO FUSHIHARA

Submitted to the Graduate School of

University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

September 1987

Department of Philosophy
c Copyright by Michio Fushihara 1987

All Rights Reserved

i i
 Kant's Philosophy of the Self

A Thesis Presented

By

Michio Fushihara

Approved as to style and content by:

Michael Jubien, Department Head

Department of Philosophy
 ABSTRACT
KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

SEPTEMBER 1987
MICH 10 FUSHIHARA, B.A., HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff

In this thesis, Kant’s philosophy of the self is

investigated. By thought alone, the self can me con-
scious of its own existence, but it cannot know itself
as on object. In order to have knowledge of the self,
intuition is required in addition to thought. Thus,
there is a distinction between self-consciousness and
self-knowledge.

For Kant, knowledge of the self is knowledge of

the self as appearance as all human knowledge is knowl-

edge of appearances. Kant's theory differs from that
of Descartes, who insists on knowledge of the self in

itself, since Kant requires both understanding and sen-

sibility for knowledge.

IV
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT
IV
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION L

II. INNER SENSE AND THE SELF IN ITSELF

4

III. TIME AND THE PHENOMENAL SELF IX

IV. THE PROBLEM OF MANY MINDS 15

V. THE NECESSITY OF THE PHENOMENAL SELF 19

VI. BEING PARTLY FREE AND BEING UTTERLY FREE 24

VII. STRAWSON AND WOLFF ON KANT 26

VIII. CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY 34

v
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult passages of

Kant's philo-
sophy occures at the end of Section 24 of the Tran-
scendental Deduction (B). Kant says:
.... as regards inner sense, that by means
•

or which we intuit ourselves only as we are

inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words,
that, so far as inner intuition is concerned,
we know our own subject only as appearance,
not as it is in itself. 1

It is Kant s ultimate theory that appearances are

not the appearances of things in themselves, but ap-
pearances are just appearances. However, in this passage

Kant is making one exception, namely the treatment of

self in itself. He is clearly saying that the empirical

self is the appearance of the self in itself. P.F.

Strawson’s and H.J. Paton's explanations of the relation

between appearances and things in themselves stem from
this passage. Their interpretation is that though we

do not know things as they are in themselves, we know

things as they appear to us. In other words, we know

the appearances of things in themselves. The two Bri-

tish commentators allow us to have an indirect, though

not direct, access to things in themselves. As a result,

they come up with a peculiar conclusion that the phe-

1
nomenal tree is the appearance of the noumenal tree,
the phenomenal desk is the appearance of the noumenal
desk, and so on. Their treatment of the appearance-
reality distinction is not Kantian, Put rather Platonist
as Plato regards human knowledge as knowledge of the
shades of things in the real world. In Book VII of
the Republic Plato presents his
,
famous cave story.
Strawson and Paton would say that the people in the
cave are empirical selves and the objects in the real
world are things in themselves. They would also say
that the shades the people see are the appearances of
real things. Their view is not compatible with Kant’s
view on appearance and reality.

However, Kant cannot accuse them unless he comes

up with a proof to justify his phenomenal self -noumenal
self relation. For instance, Strawson would be able
to argue. If Kant says, ’Man intuits himself as he is

inwardly affected by himself, ’

he should also say,

Man intuits things in themselves as he is outwardly

affected by things in themselves.”' Thus, Strawson
regards things in themselves as causes of the appear-
ances .

Paton, who is not as analytical as Strawson, regards

things in themselves as grounds, though not causes,

of the appearances. Paton 's moderate view seems, at

2
least to some of the Kantian scholars, more reasonable
than Strawson’s view. But Paton cannot quite back up
his interpretation, for his distinction between cause/
effect, on the one hand, and ground/consequent, on the
other hand, is obscure and unclear.
Although the two men's interpretations are contra-
dictory with Kant's view, a few passages in the first
Critique and the Prolegomena can be used to support
them. The passages are as follows:

And we, indeed, rightly considering objects

of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby
that they are based upon a thing in itself, though
we know not this thing as it is in itself but
only know its appearances, viz., the way in which
our senses are affected by this unknown something 2 .

Doughtless, indeed, there are intelligible

entities corresponding to the sensible entities .
3

.....what as thing in itself, underlies the

appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not
be so heterogeneous in character.

The above passages give an impression that each phenome-

non is the appearance of its corresponding noumenon.

Kant was not himself quite aware of the fact that he

wrote the passages which contradicts his general theory.

As long as Kant retains these passages and regards the

empirical self as a result of the self in itself affect-

ing inner sense, he cannot accuse Strawson's and Paton 's

interpretations of the Critical Philosophy.

3
 CHAPTER II

INNER SENSE AND THE SELF IN ITSELF

In thus chapter, I would like to investigate the

relation between inner sense and the self in itself.
If empirical objects, and not things in themselves,
affect outer sense; it should be an empirical subject,
and not the self in itself, which affects inner sense.
Can the self in itself, a non-sensible being, ever affect
sensibility? The answer is ’no’. To be precise, the
self in itself is not a being but an activity. By its
very activity, it synthesizes the given manifold, but
it cannot itself be given in sensibility. What cannot
be given in sensibility cannot be intuited. As inte-
llectual intuition is creative and not possessed by

man, we have to give up the hope to receive a manifold

of the self in itself by its spontaneous activity.

When Kant says that the self is affected by its own

activity, he does not mean that the self is inwardly

intuited by itself. He rather means that the activity

of the self holds together the manifold intuited out-

wardly.

Since the self in itself is a pure formal unity

without matter, it cannot provide any material for inner

sense. Nothing can be knowledge unless it is composed

4
Of both form and matter so that the
self in itself cannot
be known. It cannot be known even as it
appears, for
it does not appear at all. There is a distinction bet-
ween the self as appearance and the appearance of the
self in itself. The former is the phenomenal self,
and the latter is a phenomenal aspect of the noumenal
self. The former which has the same status as
phenomenal
objects, such as trees and rocks, can be known; on the
other hand, the latter cannot be known in any way what-
soever. When Kant says that man has no knowledge of
himself as he is but merely as he appears to himself,
he means knowledge of the self as appearance, and not
knowledge of the appearance of the self in itself.

Since the reader might be puzzled, let me clarify

this point by showing the transition Kant took from
the Inaugural Dissertation to the Critique of Pure
Reason. In the Dissertation , Kant said that man knows
the phenomenal world by sensibility and knows the noume-

nal world by intelligence. Eleven years later when

he published the first Critique , he held the new view

that man can know the phenomenal world only when sen-

sibility and intelligence (understanding) are employed

in conjunction; and man cannot know the noumenal world

at all. If this new theory of knowledge were applied

to the self, it should be that the phenomenal self can

5
be known, but the noumenal self cannot be
known at all.
As Kant says, "...in the synthetic
original unity
of apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I appear
to myself, nor as am in myself, but only that am, ”5
I
I

1 am conscious of my existence, but I do not know my

nature either phenomenally or noumenally. There is
a distinction between self-consciousness and self-knowl-

edge. To be accurate, it is not quite appropriate to

ascribe the existence to the former, since apperception
does something but it is not something. It is more
appropriate to say, "I am conscious of my synthetic
activity. As to the latter, the reader might argue
as follows: "Though we cannot have self-knowledge noume-

nally, we can have self-knowledge phenomenally; in other

words, we can have knowledge of the phenomenal self,

if not of the noumenal self." My answer is that the
reader is wrong, if he means knowledge of the appearance

of the noumenal self by 'knowledge of the phenomenal

self’. As it has been repeatedly emphasized in this

paper, noumena cannot be given in sensibility; just

as noumenal objects cannot be intuited outwardly, a

noumenal subject cannot be intuited inwardly. Since

Kant requires both intuition and concept for knowledge,

what cannot be intuited cannot be known. We cannot

have knowledge of the phenomenal self.

6
 Why, then, does Kant often suggest that knowledge
of the self as phenomenon is possible, though knowledge
of the self as noumenon is impossible? The answer is
that knowledge of the self as phenomenon is possible,
but it is possible only with knowledge of every other
phenomenon in the phenomenal world. For Kant, the phe-
nomenal self has the same status as the phenomenal
tree,
and the phenomenal house; furthermore, knowledge of
the phenomenal subject cannot be attained without
knowledge of the phenomenal objects. What we have is
’the phenomenal knowledge of self’ rather than 'knowledge
of the phenomenal self'. The latter term sounds as
though knowledge of the phenomenal self is possible
independently of knowledge of the phenomenal tree, the
phenomenal house and so on. Conversely, the former
term suggests that self-knowledge inevitably contains
knowledge of phenomena in general. The phenomenal knowl-
edge of self is a result of the noumenal self synthe-
sizing a (phenomenal) manifold received by sensibility.

For this knowledge, things outside one's own self are

necessary. These things outside me are things in space,

and not things in themselves, according to the THESIS

of Refutation of Idealism.

The THESIS Kant adds to the second edition of the

Critique is as follows:

7
 The mere, but empirically determined,
consciousness of my own existence proves
the existence of objects in space outside 6
me.

The consciousness Kant is talking about here is not

the transcendental consciousness but the empirical con-
sciousness. Furthermore, as the empirical conscious-
ness is composed of both thought and an empirical mani-
fold, it is a knowledge. As opposed to Descartes, Kant
is saying that this knowledge of self includes the knowl-

edge of outer objects. For Descartes, the mind is better

known than the bodies; on the contrary, for Kant, the
mind is not any better known than the bodies. Kant
says that man can be (empirically) aware of himself
only in time, and the determination of time is possible

only with the change among the things in space (bodies).

It is "that outer experience is really immediate, and

that only by means of it is inner experience possible. " ^

Inner experience does not teil us how the noumenal self

is intuited by inner sense, but it tells us how the

noumenal self synthesizes outer objects intuited by

outer sense within the realm of time, the form of inner

sense. Thus, the (phenomenal) knowledge of self is

at the same time the knowledge of outer things. The

mind (self) cannot be known independently of the bodies

(extended things in space). It is very important to

notice thiat when Kant says, "I know myself as 1 appear

8
to myself,” he does not mean, "I know myself as my self
in itself (intellectual representation) is intuited
sensibly by inner sense.

On the contrary, although an inner object is not

intuited sensibly, an outer object is intuited sensibly.

In other words, an outer object is a sensible being,

and not an intelligible being. The reader might get
an impression that a thing outside one's own self is
a thing in itself, when he reads the passage, "Thus
perception of this permanent is possible only through
a thing outside me and not through the mere repre-
sentation of a thing outside me." 8 He might regard 'a

thing outside me' as a thing in itself and ’the mere

representation of a thing outside me' as the appearance
of a thing in itself. This is misleading as I briefly
showed at the bottom of page 7 and as Kant himself states

in A 373. Thus, when Kant says, 'a thing outside me',

he means a thing in space and not a thing in itself;

furthermore, 'the mere representation of a thing outside

me' means the representation of a representation.

The theory of double affection deals with the above

problem. Robert Paul Wolff says:

He (Kant) sought a way of preserving the

distinction between unconditioned reality and
conditioned experience, while further allowing
a distinction, within the realm of experience.

9
 between perceptions and objects. In his own
terms, he wished to distinguish the
transcen-
dentally real (things in themselves),
the empirically real (objects), and the
empi-
rically ideal (perceptions).

The empirically real (object) can be substituted for

a thing outside me', and the empirically ideal (per-
ception) can be substituted for 'the mere representation
of a thing outside me'. The empirically real is the
empirical cause, and the empirically ideal is the empiri-

cal effect. Moreover, outer sense is affected by empiri-

cal cause; on the other hand, inner sense is not affected
by empirical cause.

Why, then, does Kant use the term, 'affection'

for both outer sense and inner sense? In my view, Kant
himself has to be blamed for a careless use of the term,

'affection'. Inner sense is not affected in the same

way the retina of an eye (one of the five outer senses)

is affected by a visible object (the empirically real).

Inner sense is not affected by the empirically real.

It is not affected by the transcendental ly real, either.

When inner sense is said to be affected, it synthesizes

what affects outer sense. Inner sense is affected only

mediately, though outer sense is affected immediately.

To be strict, inner sense is not intuition, since in-

tuition must be, according to Kant's definition, in

immediate relation to objects.

10
 CHAPTER III
TIME AND THE PHENOMENAL SELF

In the preceding chapter, investigated

I the re-
lation between inner sense and the self in itself.
In this chapter, I would like to investigate the relation
between a form of inner sense i.e., time and the phe-
nomenal self.

Time is a form of inner sense. As there cannot

be a form apart from what it is a form of, there cannot
be time apart from inner sense. Inner sense belongs
to the phenomenal self which comes to exist and perish
after approximately 75 years. Then, there should not
be time apart from a living human being, such as Immanuel
Kant. Nevertheless, there had been time before he was

born in 1724, and there has been time since he died

in 1804 until this very day of 1987. This fact proves

that time can exist independently of Kant's phenomenal

self. Why did Kant say that time is nothing apart from

his sensibility? One might argue that time, though

it cannot be apart from the noumenal self, can be apart

from the phenomenal self by quoting, "(Time) belong(s)

to pure intuition which exists in the mind a priori .

" ^
The word, 'mind' here means the phenomenal self, since

form of the noumenal self are categories and is not

11
time In the Transcendental Aesthetic, the mind is
substituted for the phenomenal self, and the soul is
substituted for the noumenal self, as Kant says, "Inner
sense by means of which the mind intuits itself or its
inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul
itself as an object." ^
If we follow Kant’s treatment of time, we have
to conclude that it cannot be without the phenomenal
self of which it is a form, and it always has to be
with the phenomenal self. This, I think, is what Kant
means when he says:

We (phenomenal self) cannot, in respect of

appearances in general remove time itself, though
we can quite well think time as void of ap-
pearances 1 ^

As long as we are represented, we must be represented

somewhen, and this requires time. What are represented
are not the noumenal selves, but the phenomenal selves.

Noumenal selves are what represent, and not what are

represented. By making the selves represented in the

realm of time, we are making them objects instead of

subjects.

However, if we are not represented, time cannot

be represented, either as Kant says:

Time does not remain when abstraction is

made of all O subjective conditions of its
1

intuition 1 °

12
If the sensible world is the sole world
of its validity,
and no objective use can be made out of
it beyond that
world; time has no validity without the phenomenal
self
that is a source of the sensible world. Accordingly,
Kant cannot answer the questions about the
pre-existence
and immortality of the soul. For Kant’s theory suggests
that the time sequence begins when man is born, or
when the phenomenal self starts appearing, and it ends
when man dies, or when the phenomenal self disappears.
He cannot even talk about life before the birth and
life after the death.

There is only one section of the Critique in which

Kant is concerned with the possibility of time without

one's own sensibility. In the third Paralogism (A),

Kant says;

If I view myself from the standpoint of

another person (as object of his outer intuition),
it is this outer observer who first re-
presents me in time.

This passage undoubtedly contradicts the rest of the

Critique. According to his theory, I represent time

in me, and I do not represent myself in time. The Kan-

tian time is not a container as the Newtonian time is.

For Kant, time is mind-dependent; moreover, this mind

is my mind, and not any other person's mind, since every

other person in time is nothing but a mere structure

13
of judgments synthesized by me.

If time is a form of each person’s inner sense,

it follows that there can be as many different times
as there are persons (phenomenal self). This problem
of many minds will be dealt in detail in the next chap-
ter.

14
 CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF MANY MINDS

The problem of many minds is what Kant

never ponder-
ed. This problem can be hidden if Kant uses
the first
person singular pronoun. ’I* throughout the Critique
of Pure Reason. However, a difficulty is revealed as
soon as Kant starts using the first person plural pro-
noun, ’we’. For example, there is no difficulty in
saying, "I know myself as I appear to myself." On the
other hand, there is some difficulty in saying, "We
know ourselves as we appear to ourselves." In the latter
case, Kant cannot make it clear whether there are as
many noumenal selves as there are phenomenal selves
or only one and the same noumenal self. In order for
his epistemological Theory to be valid, there can be
room for only one noumenal self. Conversely, in order
for his Ethical Theory to be valid, there must be room
for many noumenal selves. Kant, indeed, is in dilemma
here.

I have to treat every other person rationally be-

cause he is a being with a dignity. However, a person

can be said to have a dignity only if he has his own

noumenal self. Without the noumenal self to which his

phenomenal self corresponds, he only has the status

15
equal to the phenomenal tree and phenomenal rock. Just
as it is not immoral to cut a tree or throw a rock,
it is not immoral to slap his face insofar as he is
a mere appearance. It is not immoral to use violence
toward him unless he is the appearance of the noumenal
self which is utterly rational and free. Moreover,
it is not only that this person associate
I with has
to have the noumenal self, but he has to have his private
noumenal self which is distinct from my noumenal self.
To use specific names. Bob has to have Bob's private
noumenal self, Henry has to have Henry's private noumenal

self, and Margaret has to have Margaret's private noume-

nal self.

Thus, in order for every person to have a moral

obligation to every other person, there have to be as
many noumenal selves as there are phenomenal selves.
If, on the other hand, there were only one and
the same noumenal self of which all the phenomenal selves

are the appearances, it would be morally acceptable

for me to lie to someone. This someone is another phe-

nomenal self distinct from my phenomenal self in the

phenomenal world, but his noumenal self is same as my

noumenal self. Accordingly, as I, as a noumenon, know

that I am lying to him, he, as a noumenon, knows that

he is being lied to by me because two of us share one

16
and the same self. Furthermore, even if I kill someone,
it is not evil. Since each phenomenon in the phenomenal
world is a mere structure of judgments synthesized by
my (and his) noumenal self, killing him only means making
one phenomenon disappear. Although his phenomenal self
disappears, his noumenal self continues to exist as
long as my noumenal self exists. Consequently, the
only moral obligation I have would be that to myself
and not to the others.

Now, according to Kant, the noumenal self is a

free moral agent who is also a lawgiver to nature.

By insisting on the plurality of the noumenal selves,
he also has to admit the plurality of the laws of nature.

In other words, it should be possible for there to be

as many laws of nature as there are people (appearances
of the noumenal selves). Kant has no way of proving
that all human minds give exact the same law to nature.

Kant's philosophy is aimed at correcting the mistake

David Hume made. Nevertheless, he seems to have returned

to the Humean Doctrine of 'subjective necessity'. For

Kant, the law of causation has to have 'objective nece-

ssity'. It is not, contrary to what Hume said, a sub-

jective habit of the mind which unites cause and effect,

but it is an objective connection which has to be between

them. It is not a lucky accident that the subjective

17
propencity of mind fits in with the
objective structure
of nature. Kant, indeed, is successful in proving the
objective necessity of cause and effect.
Nevertheless,
he has to concede that it is a lucky accident that
all
minds share one and the same law. In Kant's theory,
although the law of causation is necessary, the po-
ssession of that law by each mind is not necessary.
In order to solve the ancient problem of the one
and the many, Kant presents the subjective unity, and
not the subjective habit, of mind for the objective
constitution of nature. It is 'a unity’ which makes
nature possible. But by admitting the existence of
many minds, he is faced with 'unities’ rather than ’a

unity ' The problem of '

the one and the many ' was not
answered but replaced by the problem of '
the ones and
the manies '

18
 CHAPTER V
THE NECESSITY OF THE PHENOMENAL SELF

So far I have investigated how the noumenal self

is necessary for the phenomenal self. In this chapter,
I would like to investigate how the phenomenal self
is necessary for the noumenal self. When Kant says.
"I know m yself as I appear to myself," he is implying
that the self cannot be known without what it appears
to i.e., the phenomenal self.

According to the theory in the first Critique ,

it is the noumenal self, and not the phenomenal self,

which acts. So that one may argue that the noumenal
self can act without the phenomenal self, though it

cannot be known without the phenomenal self. However,

the phenomenal self is the necessary result of an acti-

vity of the noumenal self. And if the activity is an

essence of the noumenal self and never ends, the pheno-

menal self should neither start or stop appearing in

the phenomenal world. It should have appeared from

all eternity and should appear to all eternity. As

long as Kant insists that the mind is nothing but an

activity, he also has to admit that the phenomenal self

is an eternal appearance. The activity always affects

inner sense and makes its result, phenomenal self, ne-

19
cessary. Synthetic activity of my mind is what makes
nature, the sum of all phenomena, possible, and my own
body is one of several phenomena synthesized
by my mind.
The mind cannot synthesize the phenomenal
world without
synthesizing the phenomenal self.

Why, then, does each man require a couple of other

phenomenal selves, besides his own phenomenal and noume-

nal self, to step into the phenomenal world? Why does
each child have both a father and a mother? Kant cannot
answer such questions. J.N. Findlay says:
A transcendental (noumenal) self must choose
the whole course of its actions in one single,
metempirical package.

What he means is that each man chooses the course of

his life and once he has chosen it, he has to follow
i t But how can anyone possibly select his own life?
It is his parents, and not himself, who choose to produce

him and determine the course of his life. The problem

here is twofold. First, the choice depends on other

selves. Secondly, the choice made by them is limited.

Each man can choose his wife and each woman can choose

her husband only among a limited number of people (phe-

nomenal selves. Each couple of phenomenal selves to

a certain extent can will what their child (future phe-

nomenal self) is going to be like by thinking how the

two genes get mixed and so on. This means that they

20
are partly, and not totally, free to choose their child’s
course of life. In other words, they cannot choose
their prospective child in the same way
they can choose
clothes by mail order. When they decide to buy a shirt,
they can look through the catalogue and choose what
they like most among all kinds of shirts. They are
free to choose a red, instead of blue, striped, instead
of solid, and cotton, instesd of polyester, shirt.
On the other hand, they cannot choose their baby in
this way because they never know what their baby is
going to be like.

Going back to the argument of Findlay that the

self chooses the whole course of its actions, it is

not a particular action one chooses to do at each time,

but it is a sum of all his actions which he chooses

that he will do at one time at the beginning of his
life. For example, it is not that I plan to kill someone
a few days before I actually do so, and it is not that
I decide to lie to someone a few seconds before I really
lie to him. It is that I will to do these two things

along with all other things I am going to do at the

very beginning of my life. Using Kant’s own example,

it is not that Kant willed to write the Critique of

Pure Reason in 1770 and committed himself to writing

it for the following eleven years. It is that Kant

21
Willed, before the earliest stage of his
life, to choose
the course of life in which he would be going
to decide
to write the first Critique in 1770 and publish it in
1781 and die in 1804. The question is how Kant could
do so before he was born, for he had been unconscious
until the moment he stepped into the empirical world.
One may object that though the self must
be in the empi-
rical world in order to be empirically
conscious of
himseif. it can be outside that world in order to be
transcendental ly conscious of himself. However, tran-
scendental consciousness is the consciousness of exist-
ence, and nothing can be conscious of its existence
unless it actually exists.

One may also argue that the noumenal self can exist

and will independently of the actual existence of the

empirical self. This argument cannot be valid, since,
as described on page 19, the noumenal self necessarily
entails the empirical self. There is something in common
between Kant s two selves, on the one hand, and Aristo-
tle's mind and body, on the other hand. Omitting for
simplicity his active mind, Aristotle's passive mind
is a form of man whereas body is a matter of man. Nei-
ther of them can exist without the other. Although
they are distinguishable, they are inseparable. Simi-

larly, Kant's two selves are distinguishable, but they

22
are not separable. If there were a difference between
the two views, it would be that for Aristotle, it is
the mind which is an actualization of the body whereas
for Kant, it is the phenomenal self containing the body

which is an actualization of the noumenal self, mind

in itself. However, both philosophers, think,
I would
agree that the distinction between two aspects of man
is merely logical.

23
 CHAPTER VI
BEING PARTLY FREE AND BEING UTTERLY FREE

In the preceding chapter, showed that

I the phe-
nomenal self and the noumenal self are mutually
dependent
on one another. This suggests that will which belongs
to the noumenal self cannot be utterly free from the
constitution of the phenomenal self and the phenomenal
world i.e., nature.

Suppose someone tries to commit suicide. He wills

to kill himself and jump out of the window of the twen-

tieth floor of the building. It is he, and nothing

else, that makes himself jump out of the window. There
is nothing which physically forces him to do so. Never-
theless, as soon as he jumps out of the window, he is

inevitably going to fall down according to the law of

gravitation. He cannot change his will, once he is

in the air, and go up rather than go down. All this

is common sense, but it is contradictory with Kant's
central thesis in the first Critique. If mind is the

lawgiver to nature, this man should be able, not only

to change his will of committing suicide, but also to

change the law of gravitation while upon the air. The

law of gravitation is one of several laws man gives

to nature so that he should be able to change it by

24
mere willing.

Man is free insofar as being able to

make a decision
of his suicide. In other words, he could have
chosen
not to commit suicide. This, however, does not solve
the conflict between freedom and determinism, for it
only shows that the mind is partly free, and
not utterly
free. For Kant, the mind has to be utterly free. In
this case of suicide, all we can see is that man is
a free actor in nature, but he is not a lawgiver to
nature. If man were truly a lawgiver to nature, he
should be able to alter, not only his action in nature,
but also the law of nature itself.

In Section 21 of the Transcendental Deduction (B),

Kant clearly says that mind has no choice in the sort

of law it gives to nature. He says:

This peculiarity of our understanding

(mind), that it can produce a priori unity of
apperception solely by means of the categories,
and only by such and so many, is as little capable
of further explanation as why we have just these
and no other functions of judgment, or why space
and time are the only forms of our possible
intuition

This passage suggests that the law of nature is given

to mind, rather than mind gives the law to nature.

What Kant says here contradicts the central theory of

his philosophy.

25
 CHAPTER VII

STRAWSON AND WOLFF ON KANT

Before concluding this thesis, would

I like to
insert a chapter contrasting the two very different
interpretations of Kant by Peter F. Strawson and Robert
Paul Wolff. Strawson and Wolff have mirror opposite
views on things in themselves. In The Bounds of Sense,

Strawson says that appearances are the appearances of

things in themselves; conversely, in Kant's Theory of
Mental Activity, Wolff says that appearances are just
appearances. According to the former, things in them-
selves affect our senses and make appearances occur.
In other words, appearances are the joint products of
things in themselves and sensibility. Such a view is

Transcendental Realism, and not Transcendental Idealism,

since it permits the independent existence of things
in themselves.

Transcendental Idealism, I believe, is the basic

foundation of Kant's whole philosophy, as Kant unambi-

guously says:

By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine

that appearances are to be regarded as being re-
presentations only, not things in themselves.
To this idealism there is opposed a transcendental
realism thus interprets outer appearances as things
in themselves, which exist independently of us
and of our sensibility. It is this transcendental

26
 Wh °
terWardS PlayS the part of empirical
^if,%
idealist. a ?f
After wrongly supposing that objects
,

of senses must have an existence by

themselves
and independently of the senses, he finds
that'
all our sensuous representations are
inadequate
to establish their reality.

In this passage, Kant is denying transcendental realism

and defending transcendental idealism. If one tries
retain Kant’s transcendental idealism, Wolff’s view
is inevitable. The weakness of Wolff’s view, however,
is that it cannot prove the existence of nature or
cosmos
apart from the existence of man. Wolff cannot answer
such a question as: 'How could there have been the earth

before the creation of the first man on that same earth?’

and 'How will there be a universe after the humanity

becomes extinct?'

In contrast, Strawson has no difficulty allowing

nature to exist apart from the humanity, since the exi-
stence of things in themselves apart from the perceiver

is presupposed in his interpretation of Kant. Never-

theless, the kind of nature which had existed until

the first occurence of man is different from the kind

of nature we now see because the law of nature cannot

be imposed upon nature without someone to impose it,

namely man. In the Strawsonian world, what had existed

before the birth of man is not nature, but it is what

would cause man to represent it as nature if he were

27
born In such a world, the earth does not exist as
the earth, and the earth does not go around the sun
without man, lawgiver to the world. Unless it contains
at least one man in it, the Strawsonian world would
be a complete chaos as opposed to the Newtonian world
organized according to a rule. Strawson failed to re-
cognize the fact that there can be no nature
apart from
a lawgiver to nature, though things in themselves which
would, according to his theory, be provided as materials
for a lawgiver can exist independently.

The difference between Strawson s and Wolff's views

arises from the fact that the former regards the un-
synthesized manifold as composed of things in themselves

whereas the latter regards a manifold as nothing but

a manifold. For Strawson, the mind synthesizes but
does not create a manifold; on the other hand, for Wolff,
the mind both creates and synthesizes a manifold. Con-
sequently, the existence of cause of nature is possible
apart from the mind for Strawson, and the existence
of nature is absolutely impossible apart from the mind
for Wolff.

Each interpretation of Kant, I think, is valid

in its own regard. Strawson and Wolff cannot be blamed

for a difference between their views. It is Kant who

has to be blamed for once having said that appearances

28
are just appearances and yet occasionally
suggesting
that appearances are the appearances
of things in them-
selves. If one follows Kant's former
remark, he has
to accept Wolff’s interpretation. If one follows Kant’s
latter remark, he has to accept Strawson's interpreta-
tion .

29
 CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The question Kant is faced with in his Critical

Philosophy is: How are synthetic judgments knowable
a priori possible? He tries to answer this question
by presenting the appearance-reality distinction, or,
in his own terms, the phenomena-noumena dichotomy.

However, by distinguishing the phenomenal world

i rom the noumenal world and limiting human knowledge
to the former only, Kant is denying us an access to
the world in which we are supposedly going to stay
after
our deaths. We living human beings are all interested
in what will happen to us after we die. If we follow
Kant s theory, after death, we will lose our phenomenal

selves and become pure noumenal selves. Ironically,

these noumenal self cannot know the noumenal world,
whether it be heaven or hell, for the only world they
can know is the phenomenal world. Then, why do we ask
ourselves how we ought to act in this world in order

to be rewarded in the next world? The noumenal world

might exist, but we cannot know what it is like even

when we become the members of such a world. If there

is nothing we can know about it, there is no need for

us to hope for or to be afraid of it. For example.

30
the Bible tells us that everything will be judged by
God on the Judgment Day. Nevertheless, there can be
no judgment in the noumenal world, since it is not,
unlike the phenomenal world, a set of judgments synthe-
sized by us.

In order for Kant to make us act morally, he has

to tell us how the noumenal world,
and not the phenomenal
world, can be known; and how the noumenal self without
the phenomenal self can know. According to his theory,
they are both impossible. He only tells us how the
noumenal self with its own phenomenal self can know
the phenomenal world. Moreover, even the latter kind
of knowledge faces a serious problem, when given the
fact that there are many phenomenal selves. Kant's
philosophy is possible if and only if there is one phe-

nomenal self. Finally, the only man who would accept

both Kant's theory of knowledge and theory of morals
is Adam before the creation of Eve.

31
 FOOTNOTES

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason , translated

N ° rman K emp Smith (New York: St Martin’s Press."
1929 16 8

Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysi cs,

newly revised by James W. Ellington from Carus (Indiana-
polis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), p. 57.

^Kant Critique, p. 270.

^Ibid. P. 381.

5
Ibid . , P. 168.

^Ibid. P. 245.

^Ibid. P. 246.

8., . ,
Ibid . , P- 244.

9
Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Activity ,

(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University,

, p. 169.

10„ 4-
Kant, Critique, p . 66

11 T1 ,
Ibid. •

P- 67.

12 t1 ,
Ibid .

. , P- 75.

13 T , . ,

Ibid . P- 76.

14
Ibid . pp. 341- 342.

lj
J.N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcendental Object ,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 224.

32
^Kant, Critique, d. 161

17
Ibid. PP. 345-346.

33
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Findlay, ii-ant and the Transcendental Oh-jent- New

York Oxford University Press, 1981 .
'

Kant Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason —

Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St Martin’stranslated
,
by
Press, 1929.
Prolegomena to Any Future
newly revised by James W. Ellington fromMetaphysics ,

Carus, In-
dianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977.

Paton, H.J., Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience

, New York-
Humanities Press, 1936

Str n' P F
' " The Boun ds of Sense London:
?o?? , Methuen,
1966 .

Wolffs Robert Paul, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity,

Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1963. ^
' The Autonomy of Reason , New York-
Harper Torchbooks, 1973.

34