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838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabada vs. Alunan III

*
G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996.

SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE

GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN
III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government & Chairman, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO,
Commissioner, NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman
LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII;
Regional Director EDMUNDO LA VILLA LARROZA,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII;
and MARIO VALDEZ, respondents.

Civil Service Law; Department of Interior and Local

Government; Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 is silent as
regards the availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a
RAB within the reglementary period.—Section 45 of the DILG Act
of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an
appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed
decision becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice
to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of
the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the
availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB
within the reglementary period.
Same; Same; The gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to
prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period.—This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed
to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is
worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein
that explicitly bars any further appeal. Complementary laws on
discipline of government officials and employees must then be
inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate of
the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and
civilian in character, it is now a part, as a bureau, of the
reorganized DILG. As such, it falls within the definition of the
civil service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.

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Same; Same; In cases where the decision rendered by a bureau

or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may virtually
be

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 260, AUGUST 22, 1996 839

Cabada vs. Alunan III

appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.—The

Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of
1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides,
inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau
or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially
be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.
Same; Same; The gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990,
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations
implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim
that every statute must be construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.—In view
then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of
1990, the provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and
regulations implementing it must be taken into account in light of
the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.
Same; Same; As thus construed and harmonized, it follows
that whether the appealed case was decided within or beyond the
sixty days period, the decision of the RAB may still be appealed to
the Secretary of the DILG.—As thus construed and harmonized, it
follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty
days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG.
Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day
period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the
DILG.

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Same; Same; Court considers the appeal and the petition for
review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of
the DILG Act of 1990.—We consider the appeal and the petition
for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section
45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Same; Same; NAPOLCOM; The NAPOLCOM has no
appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the
RAB.—This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises
appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH
(a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion
or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP,
and (b) the RAB in ad-

840

840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabada vs. Alunan III

ministrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims

for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
rendered by the NAB and the RAB.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Sergio C. Sumayad, Lauro G. Noel and Lucas D. de
Guzman for petitioners.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a special civil

1
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to set aside
2
the decision (in the form of
a letter) of 24 March 1995 of public respondent National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course
for lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for
review filed by petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3
Rodolfo G. de Guzman, respectively. Challenged in the said
appeal and petition
3
for review were the decision 4
of 15
August 1994 and resolution of 25 October 1994 of the
Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command
(RAB 8), which affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings and annexes filed by the parties disclose
the following factual and procedural backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners
for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty
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was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human

Rights in

________________

1 Mistakenly designated by the petitioners as a “Petition for Review by

Certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court.”
2 Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 33-34. Per NAPOLCOM Commissioner
Alexis C. Canonizado.
3 Annex “C,” Id.; Id., 65-70. Per RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J.
Alfaro; P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula, Deputy Regional Director for
Administration; and Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr.
4 Annex “F,” Petition; Rollo, 74-76. Per P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula
and Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr., with RAB
Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro, dissenting.

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Cabada vs. Alunan III

5
Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez. The
complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police
Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after
conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative
charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and
instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional
6
Director of PNP-RECOM
8 handed down a decision finding the petitioners guilty of
grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the
police service. Pursuant to this
7
decision, Special Order No.
174, dated 23 April 1994, was issued ordering, among
other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the
service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally
furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were
able to

_______________

5 The private respondent also instituted three criminal cases against

the petitioners, viz., (1) for arbitrary detention; (2) for violation of R.A. No.
7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation As Well As the Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof); and (3) for robbery. The first was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-05-15 in Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 10 August 1994
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upon motion of the petitioners who invoked their right to speedy trial,
considering the private respondent’s non-appearance during the previous
setting and the difficulty met by the sheriff in serving the subpoena upon
the latter (Annex “M” of Petition; Rollo, 89; per Judge Marino S. Buban).
The second was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-05-278 in Branch 7 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, but was dismised on 5
October 1994 upon a finding by the trial court that the constitutional
rights of the private respondent during custodial investigation were not
violated by the petitioners (Annex “N,” Id., Id., 90-91; per Judge Pedro S.
Espina). The third was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-08-309 in
Branch 8 of the RTC of Tacloban City which was provisionally dismissed
on 7 December 1995 upon motion of the petitioners who invoked their
right to speedy trial (Annex “A” of the petitioners’ Memorandum; Id., 158;
per Judge Mateo M. Leanda).
6 Annex “D” of Petition; Id., 71-72.
7 Annex “E,” Id.; Id., 73.

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842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabada vs. Alunan III

secure a copy thereof “thru

8
their own effort and initiative”
only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a copy of
Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis 9of the appeal before
RAB 8 was Special Order No. 10
174, petitioner Cabada
stated under oath in his Appeal filed with the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however,
failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he
asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the
RAB. 11
In its decision of 15 August 1994, the RAB 8 affirmed
the decision of 12
the Regional Director. In its resolution of 25
October 1994, it denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a
copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the
Honorable Secretary of the13 DILG and Chairman of the NA-
POLCOM their “Appeal” 14
dated 5 February 1995 and
“Petition for Review” dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM,
through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due
course to the

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________________

8 Petitioners’ Memorandum, 8; Rollo, 154.

9 Paragraph 12 of Petition; Id., 17.
10 Annex “B-1,” Id.; Id., 51. It may also be pointed out that in its
decision of 15 August 1994 (supra note 3), RAB 8 stated that the appeal
interposed by the petitioners is based on the following grounds: (a) errors
of law and irregularities have been committed during the investigation
prejudicial to their rights; (b) the findings of facts are not supported by
substantial evidence; and (c) the denial of their motion for reconsideration
is contrary to law and jurisprudence. This shows that the petitioners
appealed from the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 and
not from Special Order No. 174, and that the motion for its
reconsideration was denied.
11Supra note 3.
12Supra note 4.
13 Annex “B-1” of Petition; Rollo, 51.
14 Annex “B,” Id.; Id., 35.

843

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Cabada vs. Alunan III

petitioners’ appeal and petition for review for lack of

jurisdiction “it appearing . . . that both the Decision and the
Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had long
become final and executory and there being no showing
that the RAB failed to decide respondents’ appeal 15
within
the reglementary period of sixty (60) days.” In support
thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule IV of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and
Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular
No. 91-006, which provide as follows:

Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal.—Failure of the

Regional Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the
reglementary period shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either
party with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
xxx
Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution.—The decision of the
Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become final
and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by
the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said
period.

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A Motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from

a Decision rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an
appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only
one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this
petition on the ground of prematurity because the
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they
should have instead appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government
personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia,
dismissal from office. The said provision reads:

_________________

15 Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, 33-34.

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Cabada vs. Alunan III

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall

decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion
in rank or salary or transfer, or removal or dismissal from office. x
xx
(2) The Secretaries . . . shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction . . . In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
Department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal,
the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal,
in which case, the same shall be executory only after confirmation
by the Secretary concerned.

The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this

provision covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners;
consequently, they should have appealed to the CSC. It
also advances the view that the instant petition should

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have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial
Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our
determination are whether

(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying due course, for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal from and
petition for review of the decision and resolution of
the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for
failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies.

I
16
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides for the
finality of disciplinary actions against members of the PNP
as follows:

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action.—The disciplinary action

imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and execu-

_______________

16 R.A. No. 6975.

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Cabada vs. Alunan III

tory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional

director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the
service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within
ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision:
Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the
Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be
appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the regional or
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the
appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal:
Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to
act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final
and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal
by either party with the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)

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The last proviso of this section is restated in Section 23,

Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002.
And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 provides:

Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality

of RAB/NAB Decisions.—The NAPOLCOM appellate board
concerned shall decide the appealed cases within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNP
summary dismissal authority. However, failure of the
NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal
within said period renders the decision final and executory
without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the respondent-
appellant with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government. The decision rendered by the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an
appealed case shall be final and executory unless a timely Motion
for Reconsideration is filed within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, in which case, it shall become final and executory upon
receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the
aforesaid board denying, modifying or affirming the decision.

Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides

that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision
becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to
the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary
of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as
regards the availability of
846

846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabada vs. Alunan III

an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the

reglementary period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit
appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section
is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing
therein that explicitly bars any further appeal.
Complementary laws on discipline of government officials
and employees must then be inquired into considering that
in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that
the PNP 17 must be national in scope and civilian in
character,
18
it is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized
DILG. As such, it falls within the definition of the civil
19
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19
service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.
For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990
provides:

SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws.—The Civil Service

Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all
personnel of the Department.

The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG

Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of
Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where
the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to
the Commission, the

______________

17 Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution.

18 Section 6, DILG Act of 1990, provides:

Section 6. Organization.—The Department shall consist of the Department Proper,

the existing bureaus and the offices of the Department of Local Government, the
National Police Commission, the Philippine Public Safety College, and the
following bureaus; the Philippine National Police, the Bureau of Fire Protection,
and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.

19 It provides as follows:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.

847

VOL. 260, AUGUST 22, 1996 847

Cabada vs. Alunan III

same may initially be appealed to the department and

finally to the Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil
Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of
1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative
Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32,
Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:

SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by

law, the Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and

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employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in
an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the
same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.
20
Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262, the Secretary of the
DILG has the power of supervision and control of his
Department. His powers and functions thereunder are
recognized
21
and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of
1990.

________________

20 Entitled “Reorganizing the Department of Local Government and for

Other Purposes,” issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987.
21 The said section reads in part as follows: Sec. 10. Specific Powers and
Functions of the Secre-tary.—In addition to his powers and functions as
provided in Executive Order No. 262, the Secretary as Department head

848

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Cabada vs. Alunan III

In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the

DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of the Civil Service Law
and the rules and regulations implementing it must be
taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with 22other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a
RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days from
receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG.
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Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the

sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the
Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada’s appeal was addressed to
“the Honorable Secretary of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government . . . as Chairman and 23
Presiding
Officer of the National Police Commission,” while De
Guzman’s petition for review was addressed to “the
Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government and Chairman, 24National Police Commission,
Makati City, Metro Ma-nila.”
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as
appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of
the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way
or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over
the appeal and the petition for review, and just because
both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or
Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them
within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does
not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG
Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:

______________

shall have the following powers and functions . . . .

22 Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, 232 [1994], citing RUBEN E.
AGPALO, Statutory Construction 192 [2nd ed., 1990].
23 Rollo, 51.
24Id., 35.

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VOL. 260, AUGUST 22, 1996 849

Cabada vs. Alunan III

SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission.—x x x

xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate
Board, personnel disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the
Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional
appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and
over decisions on claims for police benefits . . . .

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This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises

appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and
THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions
involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed
by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative
cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for
police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power
or authority to issue, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision denying due
course to the appeal and petition for review filed by
petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack
of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. The
reference to these rules suggest that the NAPOLCOM
believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of
the RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is
flawed because it would allow a ridiculous situation where
the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdiction
from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of
the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner
Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM
because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and
four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG
Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly
invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary
writ
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850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cabada vs. Alunan III

of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul

and set aside the NAPOLCOM’s decision of 24 March 1995.
It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its
reconsideration before the institution
25
of this special civil
action may be dispensed with.

II

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The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the

instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have
sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who
denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner
Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De
Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act
of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed with the
CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their
Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case falls
within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other
issues raised by the petitioners relating to the merits of the
case and on the issue of due process is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a letter) of the
National Police Commission of 24 March 1995 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government is
DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the
appeal and petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL
CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN,
respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and
resolution of 25 October 1994 of the Regional Appellate
Board, Eighth Regional Command, if the same were filed
on time.

_________________

25 See FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 1

[1988] 460, citing cases.

851

VOL. 260, AUGUST 22, 1996 851

People vs. Dizon

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and

Pan-ganiban, JJ., concur.

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Petition granted. Judgment of respondent annulled and

set aside.

Note.—The enforcement of statutory rights is not

foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure.
(Provident Tree Farms, Inc. vs. Batario, Jr., 231 SCRA 463
[1994])

——o0o——

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