Lopez vs.

Court of Appeals [GR L-26549, 31 July 1970]

In the early part of January 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of
which Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United States
Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army
plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things,
a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living
in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1995. Losing no time, the Philippines
defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion
and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted
transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax,"
to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other
newspapers when referring to the incident. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by
Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of 15 January 1956. Mention was made
that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in
that place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing
being scarce. Then in the 29 January 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz"
included an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the
country a good turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the
Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of 18 January 1956, reference was
made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a
murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was
given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the
person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions
were that of Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file, in the library of the Manila
Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when
the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were inadvertently switched. As soon,
however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of Lopez and Gatbonton, the following
correction was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were
rushing to meet the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the
picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own
Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was
connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our
profound regrets that; such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction, Lopez and
Gatbonton published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were
enclosed by four lines, the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a
conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made. The
businessman Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. After trial
duly had, he was awarded P5,000 as actual damages, another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for
attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate Court. Lopez and Gatbonton
filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim of freedom of the press negates Lopez’ and Gatbonton’s liability
arising from libel

Ruling:

A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs
or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty,
virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort
or a quasi-delict action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code
providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph
in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is
published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." Why libel law has both a
criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a
person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather
to be chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong
money damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory
statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of
peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a
crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment." No inroads on press freedom
should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited in what otherwise could be characterized as
libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of
Cruz's picture with the offensive caption as in complained of. This is not to deny that the party
responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that
what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a
man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks
rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what
has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in
safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news
media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the
conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. However, the correction promptly
made by Lopez and Gatbonton would thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be
noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary loss arising from the above publication. It is
worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate
courts on this score, the usual practice being "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase
them."

Miller vs. California [413 US 15, 21 June 1973]

Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books,
euphemistically called "adult" material. Five unsolicited advertising brochures were sent through the
mail in an envelope Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) addressed to a
restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The brochures advertise four books entitled "Intercourse,"
"Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film entitled
"Marital Intercourse." While the brochures contain some descriptive printed material, primarily they
consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more
engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed. The envelope was
opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures; they
complained to the police. After a jury trial, he was convicted of violating California Penal Code 311.2 (a),
a misdemeanor, by knowingly distributing obscene matter, and the Appellate Department, Superior
Court of California, County of Orange, summarily affirmed the judgment without opinion.

Issue:

Whether or not the determination of “obscene” materials is to be determined through the

Ruling:

Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places
of public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in
such public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct
must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection. The
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or
construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are
adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary. Thus, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or
exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. These specific
prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial
activities may bring prosecution. The inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like
precision altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then "hard core"
pornography may be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike.
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do
not vary from community to community, but this does not mean that there are, or should or can be,
fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently
offensive." These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for
this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are asked to decide
whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would consider certain
materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal
prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community,
guided always by limiting instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings
around evidence of a national "community standard" would be an exercise in futility. Thus the Court
herein (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b)
hold that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific safeguards enunciated
above, without a showing that the material is "utterly without redeeming social value"; and (c) hold that
obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community standards," not "national
standards."

Gonzales vs. Kalaw-Katigbak [GR L-69500, 22 July 1985]

Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez is the President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly
registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade; while Maria Kalaw Katigbak and
Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada are the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Board of Review
for Motion Pictures and Television. In a resolution of a sub-committee of the Board of 23 October 1984,
a permit to exhibit the film "Kapit sa Patalim" under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain
changes and deletions enumerated was granted. The film in issue was given an adult classification to
serve as a warning to theatre operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the
young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theatre-club and a good portion of the film
shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theatre
stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward
the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a group of
robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these
scenes. The Board gave Malaya films an option to have the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if
it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Gonzales, in behalf of Malaya Films, Lino Brocka, Jose F. Lacaba, and Dulce
Q. Saguisag, stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. Then on 12
November 1984, the Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration
dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an
examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering,
however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman
of the Board to Withhold the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied." On
10 January 1985, Gonzales, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television have the power to
classify the movie “Kapit sa Patalim” under the classification “For Adults Only” and impose conditions to
edit the material to allow it a “General patronage” rating

Held:

Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. The "importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as
well as to inform." There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords
pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression.
Press freedom "may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without censorship or punishment." This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of
speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the
State] has a right to prevent.'" Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech
or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is, however, except in exceptional
circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that equally
basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. To avoid an unconstitutional taint on its
creation, the power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other
constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may
require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that
freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is
not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. The test, to repeat, to determine
whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive
character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal
connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The
time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the
requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore, is that where the movies,
theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are
concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire
production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter
what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." The law, however, frowns on
obscenity. All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of
the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance. There was an abuse of discretion by the Board in the light of the
difficulty and travail undergone by Gonzales, et. al. before “Kapit sa Patalim” was classified as "For
Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover the Board’s perception of what constitutes
obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. The Court concludes thus that there was an abuse of
discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered
grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie.