I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified
from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did
the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a
startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results
of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that
petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by
directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.

Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat.1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election
purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte
and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile
of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one
adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled
in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to
live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this
point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or
"domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed
by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.

In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary
tie imposed by her husband.

It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or
domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes
even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to
close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will
have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one
must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by
the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more
murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is
imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by
experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with
the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.

Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights
are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It
is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a
conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889,
the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's
being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the
right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is
related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the
family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is
also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the
law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental
authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother
assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal
freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case
the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income
is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother
who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless
the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow
might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from
beyond the grave.

All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked
no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among
nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the
Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had
been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women."
(Emphasis supplied)

It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to
the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international
bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In
ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit
and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the
 generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and
women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14(Emphasis supplied).

CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for
its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the
sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men."17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family
domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the
right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of
the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several
others.

Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to
that of men are:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure
visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.