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©Mai ^ MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY & ANALYSIS
JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

Chris Perello Gettysburg 12

Lee's Greatest Gamble

Meredith LeBard The Next Japanese-American War 45

& George Friedman The military aspects of The Next War With Japan

Pat McTaggart Poland '39 54

The initial victory of the German Blitzkrieg

Richard C. Thornton New Light on the Iran Hostage Rescue

& Alan Capps Mission 74

Denarlments
lrv|fill llllvlll#

Short Rounds 4
Medical Dept. — David W. Tschanz 33
Unit Symbols 37
Commentary — Jeffrey F. Addicott 38

On The Cover: David Fuller's images of the

Battle of Gettysburg.

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 Editor: Ty Bomba

Art & Graphics Director: Larry A Note From the Publisher

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COMMAND MAGAZINE
 operations Desert Shield
Trendlines... and Desert Storm.
Earlier this year,

Iraq Equivalents: Aspin's staff completed a

preliminary wargaming-
style analysis that used
U.S. Threat-Assessment in the New Iraq's pre-Desert Storm
military power as a bench¬

World Order mark for analyzing poten¬

tial, conventionally-armed,
In the absense of a report on its performance He said news reports enemies in regional con¬
Soviet conventional threat last year in the Gulf War and rumors had suggested flicts. (Iraq possessed
against which to base US would probably be distort¬ "the Penatagon assess¬ chemical weapons but
non-nuclear strategy and ed by interservice rivalries ment will be a document didn't use them; its nuc¬
funding, an influential and concerns about their negotiated among the ser¬ lear-procurement program
Congressman has advocat¬ post-Soviet futures. vices so that no one comes was reportedly a year or
ed "threat-based force "The performance of off looking much worse more from fruition.)
planning," using Oper¬ technology in this [Gulf] than the other. He announced these
ation Desert Storm as a war is going to have a big "It these reports are figures and methodology
standard for future region¬ impact," Aspin said in a 7 true," Aspin continued, in a 24 January speech to
al conflicts. Rep. Les February speech entered "the war will turn out in the Association of the US
Aspin, chairman of the into the Congressional Pentagon analysis to be Army (AUSA). The same
Armed Services Commit¬ Record. "The impact is so closer to a one-third, one- material was also released
tee of the US House of big that I believe it could third, one-third proposi¬ to the news media. (News
Representatives, suggested alter the balance of roles tion than perhaps we releases from Aspin's
in February that the mili¬ and missions between the remember it." office are commonly made
tary's forthcoming final services." His skepticism was not on behalf of the powerful
a sudden development. In 55-member committee.)
an April 1991 letter (a copy The release was fol¬
of which was also entered lowed, two weeks later, by
into the Record), Aspin his appeal to fellow legis¬
urged President Bush to lators to "read...with
appoint a civilian-led com¬ some skepticism" the
mission, "possibly struc¬ Pentagon's forthcoming
tured along the lines of the final report on the Gulf
World War II 'US Strategic War. This final report to
Bombing Survey,'" to Congress had an original
independently assess the deadline of 15 January. A
military's performance in Department of Defense
the war against Iraq. But spokesman said the com¬
no such executive action plete document, with sup¬
has taken place. plements, would run ap¬
Aspin's political strate¬ proximately 2,000 pages.
gy apparently was to offer (The Pentagon released
new methodology for cal¬ classified and unclassified
culating future military versions of Conduct of the
needs, then challenge the Persian Gulf Conflict: An
credibility of the Penta¬ Interim Report to Congress,
gon's final assessment of in July 1991.) The Wash-
 ington Post reported on 28
January that the final n7r5So-^7lboTanks|
report "has been delayed 11300 Artillery 750 APCs |
by interservice and intera¬
gency disputes over the
way the war was fought
and the meanings to be
extracted from its out¬
come."
February passed, but
no final report has
emerged. This apparent
discord among American
political and military lead¬
ers is an indication of just
how important the "les¬
sons of Desert Storm" will
be to an American mili¬
tary that will receive less
funding in favor of
increased non-military
spending. The so-called
"peace dividend" that
would reward US taxpay¬
ers for their "investment" be "reluctant to pay for
in the Cold War military defense unless there is a IRAQ EQUIVALENTS
is an issue of great politi¬ clear linkage between the
cal significance.
Land, Air, and Sea Strength of Major
forces and the threats
"For the first time in 40 those forces are designed Regional Powers
years," Aspin said to the to deal with."
LAND SEA AIR
AUSA, "we're faced with Aspin and his staff
the very hard problem of evaluated the armies, Iraq (pre war) 1.0 1.0 1.0
how to establish defense navies and air forces of
Mid-East/Southwest Asia
budgets and design forces seven "potential regional
without the sort of domi¬ Iraq (today) 0.4 <.5 <.5
aggressors": Iran, Syria,
nant focus for planning Libya, North Korea, Iran 0.2 7.0 0.4
that the Soviet threat pro¬ China, Cuba, and post- Syria 0.6 2.0 0.8
vided. Desert Storm Iraq. (Of Libya 0.3 13 0.7
"In the post-Soviet era," those, only China is Asia
the Wisconsin Democrat known for certain to have North Korea 0.6 80 0.6
continued, "the threats to nuclear weapons; North
China 1.4 90 2.6
American security will be Korea is believed to have
broader and more diverse, a nuclear-procurement Western Hemisphere
and the security environ¬ program.) Cuba 0.2 5.0 0.2
ment will be murkier, In this analysis, Iraq's
more ambiguous, and military forces — as they SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
more fluid. stood before their defeat NOTE: These estimates are based on publicly
"Threat-based force by the United Nations available assessments of force structure, size and
planning," Aspin said, Coalition — serve as composition. CBO's estimates do not reflect such
makes more sense than benchmarks with values intangible contributors to force effectiveness as per-
the current practice. "Top- of 1.0. The military capa¬ sonnnel quality and training, logistics and command
down force planning — bilities of post-war Iraq and control, morale, or military doctrine.
what they're practicing in and the other six nations For its land, sea and air estimates, CBO used the
the Pentagon as they take are represented by deci¬ unclassified TASCFORM methodology, produced by
successive cuts out of the mals or multiples of that The Analytic Sciences Corportation. TASCFORM
budget — will leave us value. Aspin's office provides a quantitative estimate of the relative capa¬
with a smaller version of revised these threat values bilities of different weapon systems. These estimates
the force we built for the — most of them upward can be summed to provide an overall relative esti¬
Cold War." — in a 25 February report. mate of the combat potential of the weapons
"In this era of belt Aspin noted that a assigned to active and reserve forces.
tightening," Aspin contin¬ future war would not be [Ed's note: China on Land-1 A? Duh?]
ued, Americans will likely an exact repeat of the Gulf

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 topped Aspin's list of six the Congressional Budget

1
_CHINA_
2,300,000 Men 10,000 Tanks I
16,000 Artillery 5,000 APCs |
broad "situations for
which Americans might
Office, and used analysis
methodology from the
want military forces:" 1) Analytic Sciences Corpor¬
countering regional ag¬ ation of Maryland.)
gressors; 2) combating the Of course, Aspin's Iraq
spread of nuclear and Equivalent has an oppo¬
other mass terror wea¬ site: the Desert Storm
pons; 3) fighting terror¬ Equivalent.
ism; 4) restricting drug By his definition, this
trafficking; 5) keeping the US equivalent is not sim¬
peace; and 6) assisting ply the forces that were
civilians. According to deployed to the Persian
this assessment, these Gulf. Rather, the Desert
seven regional powers Storm Equivalent com¬
comprise "the main threat prises those that actually
driver" for the US military "mattered in defeating
in the post-Soviet era. Saddam Hussein" —
"These countries are including tactical and
major powers in regions strategic reserves, along
in which the US has key with a hypothetical
interests, and each of "adjustment" of forces.
them in the past has come The adjustment adds a
into conflict with the US," "heavy armored division"
Aspin explained. He then as a follow-on unit replac¬
added a diplomatically ing the Army's rapidly
appropriate disclaimer: deployed 82nd Airborne
War, "nor will any future future." "Denominating "Their presence on the list Division.
adversary exactly match the threat in terms of does not reflect a judg¬ This wargmaming-
Iraq's circumstances. But 'Iraqs' can produce an ment that a war with any style "adjustment" in¬
by adopting a measure of uncommonly clear appre¬ of these countries is likely creases the US Navy's
capability and calling it ciation of the link between today or in the future." mine-countermeasure
the Iraq [equivalent], we the threat and the forces In the revised table of capability "to provide
are not dooming our¬ required in response," he Iraq Equivalents, North greater access to coastal
selves to fight the last war concluded. Korea, for example, is waters for US forces on a
again....We're creating a The seven regional rated at 0.6 for its army, more self-reliant basis." A
tool to prepare for the powers, as a group. 80.0 for its navy, and 0.6 beefed-up minesweeping
for its air force: in other force, Aspin said, would

1 NORTH KOREA
930,000 Men 3,600 Tanks |
5,500 Artillery 2,150 APCs |
words, North Korea's
army has roughly six-
tenths of the capability of
have permitted an am¬
phibious invasion of Ku¬
wait by US Marines "if
Iraq's pre-war army; its necessary on a timetable
navy has eighty times the consonant with the rest of
capability of Iraq's pre¬ the attack plan." (In reali¬
war navy, and its air force ty, a Marine task force
has six-tenths of Iraq's remained afloat in the
pre-war air capability. Persian Gulf and thereby
But comparing the pinned down several divi¬
quantity and quality of sions of Iraqi defenders.)
equipment and troops of Aspin's adjustment also
disparate countries, as adds "more early-warning
well as their military doc¬ ships with Aegis defenses
trines, can make for im¬ and cruise missiles for
precise "number crunch¬ ground attack."
ing." However, these Iraq Aspin also pointed to a
Equivalents are good major Gulf War deficien¬
enough for the purpose of cy.
introducing the new "Additional fast sealift
methodolgy. (The Con¬ and/or afloat pre-posi-
gressman's staff obtained tioning of equipment
unclassified data on for¬ could have given our
eign military forces from early-arriving forces more

6 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Desert Storm Equivalent Combating the spread to insert forces on the
11,150,000 Men 1.950 Tanks I comprises "six heavy divi¬ of nuclear, biological, and ground to ensure that the
LlSSP-^'teiy 2,300 arcs) sions; an air-transportable, chemical weapons ranked right installations have
early-warning light divi¬ second on Aspin's list. been located and to ren¬
sion; one Marine division "America's experience der them harmless before

■
on land and an excess of with Iraq suggests that they are destroyed or
one brigade at sea; 24 Air eliminating a nuclear removed."
Force fighter squadrons, 70 development program can American peacekeep¬
heavy bombers, and two be much harder than ing missions in Lebanon
early-arriving carrier battle many analysts thought," and elsewhere, "humani¬

■ groups building up...to

four carrier battle groups,
Aspin said. "It was not
enough to attack a few
tarian assistance to the
Kurds and in Bangla¬
including surface combat¬ well known installations, desh," and participation
ants providing Aegis as it was with Israel's 1981 in the UN-sponsored
defenses and capability for bombing of Iraq's Osirak blockade of Iraq should
launching large numbers reactor. serve as planning guides
of cruise missiles." "Even with the benefit for future missions to
He extended the hypo¬ of a heightened intelli¬ keep the peace and assist
thetical analysis into a gence effort," he contin¬ civilians, Aspin said.
future Korean War. South ued, "it may be n — Marty Kufus
Korea, Aspin said, "can
muster about 650,000
army personnel... [and]
more than 1,500 tanks" Dumb Luck...
against the North's mil¬
lion-man army and 3,000
tanks. The Karankawa
"In the units of account
in use here," he said,
"South Korea can bring to
Indians
bear about six-tenths The Karankawa Indians When Texas declared
Desert Storm Equivalents once occupied the lower its independence, Dimmit
of total ground combat gulf plains area of south¬ immediately left for duty
force to deal with North ern Texas and northern in the war against Mexico.
Korea's six-tenths Iraq Mexico. As with most The Karankawas, howev¬
[Equivalent] of total other tribes of Native er, hadn't heard of the
ground offensive power." Americans, the Karan- outbreak. When they
mobility or firepower to This war scenario sees kawas suffered greatly arrived at the ranch a
defend themselves had the commitment of US with the arrival of the short time later, they
Saddam continued south ground and naval forces Europeans, their diseases found it deserted. As¬
into Saudi Arabia," he in accordance with cur¬ and war making technolo¬ suming things were still
said. "As it was, our light rent planning. Addition¬ gies. So much so, in fact, normal, they rounded up
forces felt that they were ally, Aspin said, "provid¬ that the tribe had almost a few head of cattle, as
only speedbumps in ing a Desert Storm Equi¬ ceased to exist by the usual, and began to cook
Saddam's path." valent of ground-attack 1830s. However, it was themselves a beef supper.
Aspin's hypothetical air" would more than only plain bad luck and ill While the Indians were
adjustment of Desert make up for South timing that brought about eating, a group of Mex¬
Storm forces eliminated Korea's lack of "a strong, their final demise, during ican soldiers rode up and
"some Air Force and long-legged, tactical air the outbreak of the Texas demanded to know what
Marine Corps tactical air¬ force for ground attack." Revolution in 1836. the Karankawas were up
craft that had little effec¬ Aspin also proposed a A certain Captain to. "Oh," they replied, "It
tiveness in ground attack, Panama Equivalent and Dimmit owned a ranch is alright. We are friends
and that had a secondary its opposite, an Operation near the mouth of the of Capt. Dimmit."
role in air-to-air combat," Just Cause Equivalent, as Lavaca River, about 90 Hearing that, and
and eliminated two late approximate standards for miles north of what is now knowing Dimmit to be a
arriving Navy carriers, and smaller military opera¬ Corpus Cristi, Texas. He rebel against Mexico, the
"one late-arriving Marine tions to control the spread had always been friendly troopers charged, killing
brigade and its associated of weapons of mass toward the Karankawas, most of the Indians and
air squadron that were in destruction in the Third and allowed them to take forcing the rest to flee.
excess" of the requested World, fight terrorism, or a few cattle from his herds After the surviving
force. combat international drug whenever they came Karankawas had re¬
In sum, the "basic" trafficking. through his ranch. grouped, they met up

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 with a group of Texans. escape into the surround¬ astrophe. He fell mortally "If I had read this at Mr.
Still not quite sure why ing bush. wounded with an Hunt's, I would not be
they had been attacked at Those two incidents so American musket ball in here," and the rebels could
Dimmit's ranch, and not decimated the already his side. While he was never have taken either his
wanting to experience it reduced tribe that they being undressed to be command or his life.
again, the Indians began thereafter disappeared treated by a surgeon, the — Peter Warnock
shouting, "Viva Mexico!" from the face of North farmer's note was found.
At that, the Texans America. No trace of them As he died, he swore that
attacked, and this time has ever been found since
only a handful of the in Texas or Mexico.
Karankawas managed to — Peter Warnock
Behind the Lines...

Dumb Luck II... The Desert Storm

The Battle of Trenton Homefront
[Ed's Intro: Readers of wives, or tried to do
On 26 December 1776, turkey, roast goose, and Command's Desert Storm "damage control" and
a local loyalist (or "Tory") plenty of hot buttered issue, no. 13, will recall an refute that week's rumors.
farmer arrived at Hessian rum. Rail was then enjoy¬ "I Remember" piece written One week it was rumored
commander Col. Johann ing still more rum, along by a senior NCO in the US that tons of mail had been
Gottlieb Rail's headquar¬ with a liesurely game of Army's 1st Mechanized burned; the next week,
ters in Trenton, New cards. Because it was his Infantry Division. Now it's that stuff was being stolen
Jersey. The Tory had an deal, when he got the his wife's turn to write about out of packages. (I don't
urgent msssage for Rail:, piece of paper he merely the war. In the following, think anyone really
he had discovered George thrust it into his pocket, that woman — an ex-soldier understood beforehand
Washington's small "Con¬ rather than read it and herself — describes some of that mail would become
tinental Army" had interrupt the game. By the the problems — particulary, such an important thing.)
crossed the Delaware time his deal was over, the the absence of reliable infor¬ After a short briefing,
River under cover of dark¬ message — which could mation on what was going there would be an excerpt
ness, unopposed and have had a profound and on with their men overseas from a video, featuring a
undetected by British disastrous effect on the — that occurred on the different deployed unit
forces. At that moment, American cause — had homefront at Fort Riley, each week. That was fol¬
Washington's troops were been completely forgotten Kansas.] lowed by a Question and
advancing on Trenton and and went unread. Answer (Q'n'A) Session.
the Hessian encampment Rail came to regret that Officially, there were After that, more video.
there. oversight, along with his not many "true facts." But I only went to one of
The farmer was direct¬ earlier orders not to be there were tons of bull. those things. It was the
ed to a holiday party disturbed. Later, he was in "Official Information" most useless two and half
going on at the house of bed, deep in a drunken usually consisted of, hours I spent during the
Abraham Hunt, a promi¬ slumber, when the for¬ "Officially, we don't whole crisis. You know
nent citizen of Trenton, ward elements of Wash¬ know anything." I think that any time you put a
and also a loyal Tory. The ington's army overran the the people who worked bunch of soldiers in a
farmer attempted to enter Hessian outposts. The sen¬ for the government at the room and tell them to ask
the house to deliver his tries' futile musket shots fort put out just what they questions, you get the stu¬
warning to Col. Rail, but a alerted most of his sol¬ were told to put out. But pidest questions. Well, the
servant refused to let him diers, but it took a great for the most part, I don't wives are worse. (Not to
in. The host had left deal of pounding on the think any of them knew mention the screaming
explicit instructions with door to rouse the colonel anything I couldn't have children who were wanti¬
the staff that the festivi¬ himself. Arising too slow¬ learned myself from ng to see Daddy in the
ties were not to be dis¬ ly and much too late. Rail watching CNN 24 hours a video.)
turbed. Exasperated, the was unable to organize or day — which I did. My biggest gripe about
farmer wrote down his rally his confused men. There were regular the whole thing was that
message and asked that it The Yankees' surprise Thursday night meetings most of the wives just
be delivered to the officer attack was a complete suc¬ at the Family Assistance didn't seem to understand
inside. cess, and gave their cause Center on Fort Riley. The what was going on. They
The servant took the its first major military vic¬ officers who were left in didn't understand what
note into Rail, who had tory in the war. charge of the garrison an army is or what it does.
just finished enjoying a For Col. Rail, that battle usually tried to calm And I can't say that's
table set with venison. proved an even bigger cat¬ down a bunch of irate because most of them

8 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 were never in the army deploy, the "higher ups"
and I had been. The other could look at how Mysteries Revealed...
wives who'd been in the wanked-up things had
army themselves seemed been at other places and
just as unrealistic in their deduce from that what Japanese Military
perceptions of the situa¬ needed to be done better
tion as those women
who'd been married to
here. At least some effort
was made to help those of
Wargaming in World
soldiers only a short time. us who were left behind.
And that goes for officers' We'd heard horror stories War II
wives as well as enlisted. about how at Forts Bragg
And no one who could and Campbell [homes of [Ed's Intro: Here's a follow¬ As war with the United
have made a real differ¬ the 82nd and 101st up to issue no. 14's coverage States began to seem more
ence in the way these peo¬ Divisions ] when the sol¬ of the Midway battle. Most and more likely, the plans
ple thought seemed to diers had left no one of you will already be aware for fighting such a war
give enough of a damn to seemed to give a second of some of this, but I think became the topic of hot
sit down and really ex¬ thought about the depen¬ the whole story of Japanese debate between the Naval
plain what was going on. dents left behind. military wargaming, as told General Staff, under Adm.
I've never been one to Mostly, the briefings here, will surprise many. Osami Nagano, and the
sugarcoat things, and I came to be about mail This is reprinted, with the Combined Fleet, under
didn't think this situation ("Yes, we'll try to see that author's permission, from Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto.
called for that. I thought it gets through."), food The Art of Wargaming, To analyze the effective¬
people would be better ("Yes, we'll do our best to ©1990, Naval Institute ness of a proposed sur¬
equipped to deal with see that your husband is Press.] prise attack on Pearl
anything that happened, if fed."), and other little Harbor, and to rehearse
they knew as much of the morale boosters. ("Yes, After the outbreak of for its execution, a series
truth as I could give them. the command does care European hostilities in of wargames was played
So I told everyone what and we will do everything 1939, the Japanese ex¬ in the fall of 1941 at the
my husband had told me: we can to see that every¬ panded their own prepa¬ War College in Tokyo.
where they would be, one returns safely.") rations for war and in¬ Additional games were
what they would do, etc. Probable casualty fig¬ cluded wargaming among employed to aid the plan¬
Most of the other wives — ures weren't mentioned their research and plan¬ ning for the attacks on
especially the younger in any of the briefings for ning tools. The Total War Malaya, Singapore, Bur¬
ones — were shocked. family members, except Research Institute was ma, the Philippines, the
Most of those guys had to say that, "In war, casu¬ established in 1940. The Dutch East Indies, the
lied to their wives, if they alties are inevitable." institute's job was to ex¬ Solomons, and the islands
told them anything. I After the division was plore the possible course of the Cental Pacific,
don't know why guys deployed in the Saudi of action that might be including Guam and
would lie to their wives, desert for the ground open to Japan in the Wake.
but they did. Evidently, offensive, they [the sol¬ increasingly dangerous After their brilliant ini¬
that was a big problem diers there] were given a conditions of the time. tial successes, the Japan¬
everywhere. briefing in which they Analytical gaming of the ese again began to debate
Most people just were told to expect at least political-military type their future strategy. By
thought of the Army as "a 40 percent casualties dur¬ became one of the princi¬ late February 1942, the
job,'' or a way to get ing the minefield-breach¬ pal tools of the institute. Combined Fleet proposed
money for college. The ing operations alone.
recruiters encouraged that Afterward, those same
attitude, and I have come soldiers were allowed to
to believe that approach is call home. (Such phone Wanted...
wrong. calls were how we got
Writers for Short Rounds
About the "Family most of our "official"
A broad-ranging column like Short Rounds is
Assistance Centers": they information.) So, when
only made possible by contributions from you, the
were set up to help spous¬ the husbands passed
es take care of any prob¬ along that little tidbit, eclectic, brilliant, and hopelessly over-educated
lems that came up, things really got happy at readership of this magazine. If you think you’d
answer questions, etc., Fort Riley! [The 1st I.D.'s like to submit materials for publication in Short
etc. For the most part, actual breaching of the Rounds (articles under 2,000 words), send a SASE
things went the way they Saddam Line was dia¬ for our Writers’ Guidelines to: Command Short
were supposed to. I guess grammed in Command no. Rounds, P.O. Box 4017, San Luis Obispo, CA
we were pretty lucky at 15, and involved virtually 93403.
Fort Riley. Since we [the no casualties.]
1st I.D. ] were the last to — as told to Marty Kufus

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 a plan for an operation in from the north; the plan¬ "American" commander who were intimately
the Indian Ocean. But the ners ignored the warning. for the game. Captain acquainted with the cur¬
scheme played out in the (Of course, that's just Chiaki Matsuda. In post¬ rent conditions of the
game was rejected by the what happended.) war remarks, Genda stated fleet played the Japanese
army, which was preoccu¬ The myth that the that Matsuda's uncharac¬ side. Some naval intelli¬
pied with its ongoing Japanese wargame um¬ teristic play "might have gence officers, thought to
operations in Burma and pires successfully predict¬ given us the wrong im¬ be most familiar with U.S.
its concern about the ed the course and outcome pression of American practices because of their
USSR. of the Battle of Midway thinking." pre-war service at the
Combined Fleet reacted only to be overruled by the The disaster at Mid¬ embassy in Washington,
to the rejection of its west¬ overly optimistic game way did not prevent the commanded the Amer¬
ern campaign by looking director is one that is in Japanese from continuing ican side.
again to the east, but this serious need of exploding. their use of wargaming, The games showed, to
time only as far as Ignoring or changing the but it may have made the dismay of all in¬
Midway, a little over a results of a few die rolls them more careful in volved, that Japan's only
thousand miles from did not constitute the fail¬ their choice of who hope lay in the quick and
Hawaii. Midway was only ure of Japanese wargam¬ would play the Amer¬ early consolidation of its
the beginning of an ambi¬ ing in the case of Midway; icans in their games. conquests. That is, they
tious operation the Japan¬ ignoring the questions and After the U.S. Marine indicated that the greater
ese now began to test, issues raised by the play of Corps' assault on Guadal¬ resources of the United
again with wargames the game did. The almost canal in August 1942, the States, once fully convert¬
playing a prominent role. legendary Commander Japanese conducted a ed to war making, would
On 1 May 1942, the head¬ Minoru Genda, air officer series of games to explore surely force Tokyo to sur¬
quarters of the Combined for Nagumo's staff, put his their options for counter¬ render. Once again, the
Fleet began a series of finger on the principal fail¬ ing the U.S. forces in the games proved unner-
wargames that went on for ure of the game when he South Pacific. Officers of ringly accurate.
four days. These games discussed the play of the the Naval General Staff — Peter P. Perla
encompassed the entire
range of operations envi¬
sioned by Combined Fleet
for the next phase of the Follow Up...
war, including the capture
of Midway and the west¬
ern Aleutians in early Tanks in the Press
June, the seizure of key
points in New Caledonia In issue no. 15's article given greatly sensational¬ "puffery." The illustration
and the Fiji Islands in July, on World War I tank de¬ ized presentations in the below is from an English
carrier strikes against velopment, the author popular media of the day. picture postcard printed
Sydney and the southeast pointed out that when British subscriber Roger shortly after tanks debut¬
coast of Australia, and armored fighting vehicles Sandell has provided us ed in combat.
attacks against Johnston first appeared they were with one example of such
Island and perhaps even
Hawaii in August.
Most accounts of the
Japanese Midway war-
games latch onto the
changes made to the rul¬
ings of the umpires as a
prime example of the dan¬
gers of introducing bias
into wargames. Indeed,
the games were almost
certainly biased; based on
their fundamental premis¬
es of such grandiose oper¬
ational schemes, they
could hardly be other¬
wise. But the point that is
too often missed is that
the game raised the cru¬
cial issue of the possibility
of an [American] ambush

10 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 another 36 heavy machine-
Weapons Backdate... guns in the attached sharp¬
shooter company, for
grand totals of 108 light
The Evolution of German and 144 heavy machine-
guns.

Machinegun Units in World War I The total number of

machineguns of all types
When the German ber of machineguns again machineguns. These were held by the German army
army entered World War increased. But this time manned by personnel can be seen in this chart to
I, its infantry divisions the increase was handled from within the company have increased dramati¬
each held 24 machine- by increasing the number and did not- require new cally throughout the war.
guns. These were orga¬ of guns in each company organization. It was
nized into four companies rather than adding more planned that each infantry August 1914 1,600
of six guns each, one of companies. The number company would eventual¬ December 1915 8,000
which was assigned to of machineguns per ma¬ ly have six light machine- July 1916 11,000
each infantry regiment in chinegun company went guns. January 1917 16,000
the division (along with from 6 to 8 to 10, and At the beginning of January 1918 32,000
the Jager battalion). finally to 12. 1918, most German infan¬ (plus 57,000 light MGs)
As the war went on, At the same time, the try divisions had 108 light — John Mertens
the critical nature of the infantry also began to machineguns, (3 per infan¬ Source
machinegun was realized. receive a small number of try company,) and 108 Nash, David. The German
By the beginning of 1916, light machineguns. By the heavy machineguns in Army Handbook, April
there were over 8,000 end of 1917, each infantry nine machinegun compa¬ 1918. London: Arms &
machineguns throughout company had three light nies. There could also be Armour Press, 1977.
the army. Each regiment
still had one company, but
this was supplemented by

T^South Will
additional MG sections,
and even some "Machine-
gun Sharpshooter" sec¬
tions. In some divisions,
these reinforcements gave
each regiment upward of
25 guns.
In August 1916 the six-
ai
gun company was adopt¬
ed as the standard, but by
the end of that year a new
organization was estab¬
lished. Each regiment was Well, maybe
now to have three Gettysburg: Lee's
machinegun companies, Greatest Gamble is a
each with six guns. The
two-player wargame re-1
two additional companies
^creating the biggest battle o^
were formed from the ear¬
^the Civil War. The Confederate^^
lier reinforcing attach¬
ments. through the Union army to thr^
The machinegun sharp¬ ITelphia and points east. The Union player m®
shooter sections were also rdo all he can to cripple Lee's army and shorten n
converted into companies. The game comes with a rules booklet, a 34" x 22" map and 230 playing
These had the same orga¬ pieces. The rules include a set of Beginners' Rules if you're new to wargaming,
nization as the regimental so you'll be able to start playing immediately.
companies, but were Gettysburg: Lee's Greatest Gamble is available for $12.00, first class postpaid
trained to higher stan¬
(California residents add $0.87 sales tax, foreign residents add $2.00 airmail
dards. These units were
postage). Send check (drawn on a U.S. bank), money order, international
grouped in threes and
money order. Mastercard or Visa information to:
attached directly to divi¬
sions engaged in the most Command Magazine, P.O. Box 4017,
active sectors as a
machinegun reserve.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93403
During 1917, the num¬ Credit card orders may be made by phone (1-800-488-2249) or fax (805/546-0570).

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 G ettysburg has often been called the
Confederate "High Tide," but that appella¬
Hooker's crossed the Rappahannock, but Grant
could not be turned back. Vicksburg, and with it
tion has more to do with the eastern bias of Pemberton's 30,000-man army — came under com¬
Civil War historians and simple geography (it was plete siege on May 19. The loss of the Mississippi
the war's northern-most major battle) than with the was not critical to the South — the Trans-
course of the war. The Confederate high tide actu¬ Mississippi was of minimal economic or military
ally was reached in the late summer of 1861, when value — though its opening would certainly please
victories at Bull Run and Wilson's Creek secured the western Union states. Of considerably greater
the ends of the long border and induced a short¬ value was Pemberton's army: the loss of 30,000
lived panic in the North. Two years later, individuals could be borne, but the loss of the
Gettysburg was the end result of a desperate gam¬ armaments, equipment and unit cadres could not.
ble by the Confederates to retrieve a deteriorating At the end of the second week of May,
military situation. President Jefferson Davis met in Richmond with
By the middle of 1862, Union armies occupied his cabinet and Robert E. Lee, the only field com¬
most of Tennessee, several key points on the long mander invited, to consider the alternatives. The
coastline, most of the Mississippi, the Queen City primary goal was the rescue of Pemberton, but it
of New Orleans, and were threatening Richmond. was also necessary to stop or reverse the steady
The loss of Tennessee and New Orleans, with their encroachment of Northern armies into the South.
foundries and factories, and disruption of the weak Most of the cabinet favored direct action by
rail net by the loss of key junctions, severely weak¬ sending troops from Lee to Mississippi, to join an
ened the South's ability to sustain its armies. All of army forming under Joe Johnston for a strike at
the armies suffered from a lack of supplies and Grant. There were several problems with this
equipment. The South was near defeat, but lacklus¬ move. First, there was no direct railline from
ter Union leadership and Southern invasions of Virginia to Johnston, meaning the troops would
Kentucky and Maryland temporarily reversed and have to follow a long and torturous route, which
stabilized the situation. would take time. Second, Johnston would be the
More important than the end of the Union commander (Lee adamantly refused to leave
threat, or perhaps because of it, the tottering Virginia), and Davis doubted he had the nerve to
Southern war economy had a chance to get orga¬ launch an all-out attack. Third, Johnston's army
nized. Food procurement for the armies was regu¬ was one in name only — it was a collection of
larized, though no army would ever have more troops from all over the South. Fourth, even with
than a few days' rations on hand. New factories reinforcements. Grant would have a substantial
were established to produce arms, equipment and numerical advantage over the Confederates. Lee
munitions. Blockade running was regulated, and also opposed the move because he felt the swampy
brought in important quantities of materiel and terrain was unhealthful, probably a legacy of his
supplies despite the Union Navy. By the spring of years of duty in the swamps of the southeast early
1863, the worst shortages had been overcome. in his career.
This was just as well, because the spring Several senior officers, among them Beau¬
brought a new set of Union offensives aimed at regard and Longstreet, wanted to send some of
Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Charleston and Rich¬ Lee's troops to reinforce Bragg for a strike at
mond, each a key population, industrial or rail cen¬ Rosecrans, followed by a march to the Ohio. The
ter. At first, events favored the South. In South move was certainly shorter, and if successful
Carolina, P.G.T. Beauregard’s forts repulsed a promised greater potential rewards: an additional
Union naval attack on Charleston. In Virginia, the buffer in front of Chattanooga and the Deep South,
Army of the Potomac retreated when Joe Hooker perhaps enough of a threat to the western states to
lost his nerve at Chancellorsville. In Tennessee, the force Grant to pull back. The problem again was
threat to Chattanooga had not lessened, but the commander — Bragg was engaged in a run¬
William Rosecrans was a marvelously inventive ning feud with his senior officers, all-but paralyz¬
procrastinator and his army did not move. ing his army.
The bad news was U.S. Grant. His army The third plan, Lee's, proposed using the
crossed the Mississippi at the same time as entire Army of Northern Virginia to invade

12 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

armies to defend there, thus easing the pressure in The story of Gettysburg is in many ways the
the west. A successful invasion might also lead to story of the armies which fought there. Similar on
foreign recognition. At the very least it would give the surface — not surprising, as both were orga¬
Virginia a respite, allowing her farmers to get in a nized and trained by the small crop of West Pointers
full harvest, thus easing Lee's supply situation in — they were profoundly different in reality.
the following months. Infantry made up about 80% of both armies,
The advantages of the plan were that it used totalling about 75,000 Union and 60,000
the South's best army as a whole, carried the war Confederate soldiers. As always, there was little to
into the north, and required no major movement of choose between individual veteran soldiers on
troops beforehand. One disadvantage was that it either side, though most observers would agree the
moved that army away from all other trouble spots Confederates had "a certain dash" their opponents
in the Confederacy. More importantly, Lee had no lacked. The basic administrative unit was the 10-
real plan. All his goals were general: he did not company regiment, theoretically numbering about
know which cities he would threaten, what direc¬ 1,000 men but actually much smaller. The basic
tion he would move once in Pennsylvania, or unit of maneuver was the brigade, made up of 2 or
where or whether he would offer battle. He claimed more (usually 4-5) regiments. Confederate brigades
fighting was not his primary goal, even though he were slightly larger, averaging 1,600 to about 1,300
had spent the last year seeking destruction of the for the Union, due to their superior replacement
Union armies facing him. In the end, Lee would system (see box on page 18). Two or more brigades
fight a battle because the opportunity presented formed a division, but here there was a great dis¬
itself, not as part of a master plan. parity. Confederate divisions averaged 4 brigades,
Davis refused to overrule his only truly suc¬ Union divisions only 2-1/2. This may have been
cessful general. He may also have been wary of because the Confederate Congress did not autho¬
attempting a railroad strategy — the South's first rize corps early in the war, and larger divisions
attempt had backfired badly in 1862. After Grant were used to keep the number of subordinate orga¬
took Ft. Donelson, Southern troops were rushed nizations more manageable.
from all over the South, mostly defending along The basic infantry weapon was the rifled mus¬
the coast, to Corinth. The reinforcements were ket. Though it was an improvement on its smooth¬
not enough to gain victory at Shiloh, and their bore forebear, closely-packed linear formations
absence on the coast, especially at New Orleans, were still required to generate effective firepower.
cost the South dearly. Lee would start marching The slow rate of fire meant an attacking force could
in early June. close with a firing regiment before suffering pro-

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 The Confederate Army at the Battle of Gettysburg
Engaged Strength:
59,000 Inf
6750 Cav
270 Guns
XX
Ibty (arrived btys
at Gettysburg 7/3,
not engaged) _1 _Attached_for camgaign^ _

\M as™
Beckham
H. F. Lee-1500^^HB. Rob

... ■
■ Longstreet-20,300 ■ Ewell-20,250 ■
■22 btys ■20 btys

■*ar|y
^-^|M-Jones
■|^L Anderson (GAJ-2000
(AL)-1750
Gordon (GA)-1250
^^^kHays (LA)-2000
k Mahone (VA)-2000
Perry (FL)-750
^^^■Hoke (NC)-1500 (1 Rgt at Winchester) Posey (MS)-2000
Robertson (AR/TX) 1300 Smith (VAJ-1500 (1/2 Bgd at Winchester) Wilcox (AL)*1750
Wright (GA)-1750
-^^HmcLsws
jjjHcabell
Barksdale (MS)-1750
^^^^Bsemmes (GA)-1500
J. Jones <VA)-1500
^^■Nicholls (LA)-1250
k Archer (AL/TN)-1250
Brockenbrough (VA)-IOOO
^^^■steuart (MD/NC/VA)-2000 Davis (MS/NC)-2500
^^Wofford (GA)-2000 ^^Walker (VA)-1250 Pettigrew (NC)-3500
(1 Rgt at Richmond)
—■Pickett -Haodes
-^^Dearing | ^ | L-L
Armistead (VA)-1500 Daniel (NC)-2250 . J. Lane (NC)-1500
l^^fcCorse (VA)-1250 (not at Gettysburg) Doles (GA)-1400 k Perrin (SO-1500
^^^■Garnett (VA)-1500 ^^■iverson (NO-1500 I Scales (NO-1500
, Jenkins (SC)-2250 (not at Gettysburg) ^^■0'Neal (AL)-1750 Thomas (GA)-1250
Ramseur (NC)-IIOO

hibitive losses, and brigade-sized units were never

physically destroyed by firepower. Instead, when
About the Numbers losses, or the perceived threat, became too great,
All the numbers given in the OBs and in the text are the brigade would fall back. If the brigade stayed
very round (usually to the nearest 250 men), but do indi¬ too long, it was in danger of routing. Success in
cate the relative size of the units. It is impossible to know combat depended on the willingness of a unit to
the exact numbers engaged in the battle because of the close with an enemy and stay there. In this, the
way both armies counted their men. The first sergeant of Confederates had a distinct advantage.
each company conducted a roll call; those lists were tab¬ The 370 Union and 240 Confederate cannon
were essentially support weapons for the infantry.
ulated at regimental and higher headquarters. The prob¬
They could be extremely valuable on the defense,
lem with getting a valid number for larger units is that the
where they could fire canister at advancing enemy
company roll calls are incomplete (there were more than
formations. They were less valuable on the attack.
3,000 company-sized units at Gettysburg), and they do Long-range infantry fire prevented them unlimber¬
not always account for the various extra duty detach¬ ing close enough to fire canister, while their long-
ments, sick and stragglers in the same way. Also, as any range effectiveness was reduced by the unreliable
good first sergeant will tell you, there are always good explosive shells of the day (the Confederates expe¬
reasons to report some individuals as "present" when rienced a dud rate as high as 50%). Three to six bat¬
they were nowhere near the battlefield. teries of 4 to 6 guns were grouped into larger orga¬
nizations, called battalions in the Confederate
army, brigades in the Union.

14 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Each army had between 10,000 and 12,000 cav¬ causing casualties. He had not achieved complete
alrymen, organized in brigades like the infantry. success thus far, partly because of the limited
Cavalry had never been a major battlefield force in strength of his army, and partly because of the lim¬
America due to the heavily wooded terrain (the itations of combat in the 1860s.
first mounted U.S. army regiments were dragoons To make up for the numerical disparity, Lee
— mounted infantry — rather than true cavalry). relied on three main factors. First was the naked
Cavalry was useful for reconnaissance and screen¬ valor of his infantry. He expected them to defeat
ing, but was not armed or trained to stand up to any similar-sized Union force. Their consistent suc¬
infantry in battle. cess at doing so gave Lee great confidence — per¬
haps overconfidence — in their capabilities.
The Army of Northern Virginia Second, he achieved a much better force-uti¬
In the year since taking command from a lization (to use the modern term): he kept his
wounded Joe Johnston in June 1862, Robert E. Lee troops on the move or in combat all the time, while
had led his army from the brink of defeat to a posi¬ large parts of the Union army might lie idle.
tion as one of the premier armies in the world — Third, he readily accepted great risks — saying
certainly the best in the Confederacy. In the course "the smaller army must take the longer chances."
of that year, the army had fought the battles of He frequently divided his army, screening the
Seven Days (June 25 - July 1), Second Bull Run main Union force while concentrating better odds
(August 29-30), Antietam (September 17), against an isolated portion. The superior marching
Fredericksburg (December 13), Chancellorsville ability of the Confederate troops, and their better
(May 1-5, 1863), and several smaller ones. Every knowledge of Virginia roads, had led to tremen¬
one of those battles had been a clear-cut victory dous successes at Second Bull Run and
except Antietam, which though a draw on the bat¬ Chancellorsville.
tlefield, was a defeat for the South. Gettysburg was fought outside the friendly
When Lee took command of his army in June confines of Virginia, but the odds would be the
1862, it was an army in name only. It actually com¬ smallest Lee had yet faced.
prised three distinct parts. The main body was the
army which Joe Johnston had commanded at
Manassas ever since Bull Run. The second was
"We must all do more than
Jackson's Valley Army, fresh from its triumphant formerly"
campaign in the Shenandoah. The third were those The death of Stonewall Jackson after
units which had been scattered along the eastern Chancellorsville prompted Lee to reorganize his
seaboard and throughout Virginia for the first year army. It had been operating in two large corps
of the war. Brought together by the crisis of (about 30,000 men each) under Jackson and James
McClellan's drive on Richmond, Lee had to fuse Longstreet. Lee apparently felt the corps were too
these elements together into a single, cohesive large for one man to handle, though why he felt
force, even as he was conducting the battles that this is unclear — there were no instances in the
would deliver Richmond. He largely achieved this army's battles of either of his corps commanders
goal, though the troops continued to define them¬ being overwhelmed by the task. He formed a new
selves as belonging to one or the other of the main corps by combining Anderson's division from
"camps" of the army. Longstreet's corps, A.P. Hill's oversized "Light"
Lee improved the army's leadership by getting Division from Jackson's corps, and two new
rid of commanders who did not measure up, either brigades transferred in from D.H. Hill's North
by transferring them to other theatres or (rarely) Carolina command.
cashiering them. He broke up some divisions and There were two flaws with the new organiza¬
formed new ones to reward better commanders. At tion. First, it reduced the utilization of Longstreet,
all levels, he encouraged and rewarded aggressive¬ who, though slow, was one of the best battlefield
ness, sometimes at the expense of better talent. commanders in the war — Lee did not call him
Aggressiveness became the army's hallmark, and "Warhorse" for nothing. He had the ability to con¬
was undoubtedly a force multiplier. trol large numbers of troops, and had excellent tim¬
ing. Though he preferred the defense ever since his
success on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, his
"If we go to dphering, we are attacks were invariably powerful and well-con-
whipped beforehand" trolled. He may have deemed the reorganization a
That multiplier and many others were needed, demotion, as he went from commander of the larg¬
for Lee's army always fought outnumbered. Twice, er half of Lee's army to commander of the smaller
at Antietam and Chancellorsville, it had fought third, smaller still when two of Pickett's brigades
against odds of two-to-one. Lee himself was cog¬ were left behind.
nizant of, but undaunted by, the odds. Recognizing The second flaw was the destruction of the
he could not win a long war he strove to destroy army as a two-wing organization, in which it had
the Union army in each battle instead of simply developed a hammer-and-anvil combat technique.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 The Union Army at the Battle of Gettysburg

This worked to perfection at Second Bull Run and two two-division corps. A man promoted from divi¬
nearly so at Chancellorsville. With three corps to sion command would have a smaller adjustment to
maneuver, the technique would no longer work — make. Rosecrans used a similar organization in the
some new combination would have to be found. Army of the Cumberland, capitalizing on George
Trying to find that combination in the midst of a Thomas' abilities to command the "center."
high-risk invasion was asking too much of the Still another possibility would have been to
army's leaders, including Lee. create four smaller corps (which he would do in
Lee would have been better advised to have 1864 after Longstreet was wounded). This organi¬
replaced Jackson with another man — the best zation would free Longstreet to be a Chief of Staff
choice being D.H. Hill, then under-utilized in North or Executive Officer. In fact, Lee came close to
Carolina — with Lee exercising greater supervision. doing this at Gettysburg — Longstreet was given
Another possibility would have been to leave Long- command of the right on the second day, and was
street's corps intact, but break up Jackson's to form given control over the charge on the third day,

16 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

even though two-thirds of the troops came from Texas, 1; and Virginia, 8. The 2 remaining brigades
the new corps. Longstreet was operating under the were North Carolinians mixed with Mississippians
assumption he was more than just a corps com¬ in one, Virginians in the other. Arkansas and
mander — when his "advice" was not taken at Maryland each contributed a single regiment.
Gettysburg, he was out of sorts thereafter, at times Longstreet's corps contained the divisions of
almost petulant. Hood, McLaws and Pickett. Hood had commanded
To command the remainder of Jackson's old a two-brigade division during 1862, leading a
corps and the new corps, Lee promoted two of his series of headlong charges, all successful. His divi¬
more successful division commanders, Richard sion was expanded to four brigades before
Ewell and A.P. Hill. Ewell had shone as a division Fredericksburg, but he never commanded it in
commander, but always under Jackson's tight con¬ action: it occupied' a quiet sector at Fredericksburg,
trol. He had been out of action with a wound for and was in southern Virginia during Chancellors¬
about nine months. ville. He never would command a division in battle
Hill had a well-publicized career, but a close — he was hit only moments after the fighting start¬
examination of his battle record shows little more ed on July 2, and would next enter battle, at Chick-
than headlong charges — sometimes they worked amauga, as a corps commander.
(Antietam), sometimes not (Mechanicsville). Hill McLaws resembled Longstreet, in both appear¬
was an excellent example of the Confederate ten¬ ance and combat style. He had performed well in
dency to promote aggressive leaders ahead of less every battle the army fought, but was overlooked
flashy but more talented men such as McLaws and for promotion because his combat was controlled
D.H. Hill. Neither Hill nor Ewell would be success¬ rather than spectacular. His division had been
ful corps commanders. together as a unit since before the Seven Days' bat¬
The upshot of the reorganization was greater tles
reliance on Lee himself, but he did not rise to the Pickett was an unknown. His promotion was
occasion at Gettysburg. This was partly because due more to Longstreet's influence than any great
the organization was new to him too, and partly display of ability. His division was created for him
because he was ill during the campaign. The illness during the general Confederate reorganization in
may have been the onset of the heart disease which the fall of 1862. Like Hood, and for the same rea¬
would eventually kill him, or it may have been sons, he had seen no real combat as a division com¬
simple fatigue; he was 56, had been in a high-stress mander.
position for more than a year, and had just com¬ Ewell's corps consisted of the two divisions
pleted an exhausting march in hot weather. (Early's and Johnson's) of Jackson's Valley Army
plus D.H. Hill's division, now under Rodes. Early
"They tan do anything..." was probably the best division commander in the
As the army marched north, no one in it had army: aggressive — though in a more tempered
any reason to suspect anything was wrong. From way than A.P. Hill or Hood — and capable of inde¬
Lee on down, the Confederates were supremely pendent action. Johnson, like Ewell a returned con¬
confident of their ability to defeat the Army of the valescent, had briefly commanded a brigade before
Potomac yet again. Troop quality had slipped little being wounded; he was untried as a division com¬
if at all, but the army was past its physical peak. mander. Rodes had performed well at
The heavy losses of the previous year could not be Chancellorsville, where his division spearheaded
replaced completely. Three large brigades Jackson's flank attack of May 2d.
(Daniel's, Pettigrew's and Davis') were brought in Early's and Johnson's divisions had been
from North Carolina, but Lee lost three of his vet¬ heavily engaged in most of the army's battles and
eran brigades as compensation. This made for a were a bit thin on the ground, but included some
great deal of friction during the campaign, as Lee of the best brigades in the army, among them
fought with D.H. Hill and Jefferson Davis for the Walker's "Stonewall" Brigade, Hays' Louisiana
return of "his" brigades. Lee's army had been Tigers, and Gordon's Georgians. Rodes' division
unusually large during 1862 because the Union was the biggest in the army, thanks to the addition
coastal threat had receded. Starting in the spring of of Daniel's brigade, which had been in North
1863, more troops were needed and could only Carolina and had not suffered heavy losses. Two
come from Lee's army. At Chancellorsville, of Rodes' other brigades were under new com¬
Longstreet and two of his divisions were in manders. The division had been in both Long-
Suffolk. After Gettysburg, Pickett's division would street's and Jackson's corps at one time or another,
be sent to the Petersburg area. and belonged to neither of the army's "camps."
All eleven Confederate states were represent¬ Hill's division commanders were Anderson,
ed in Lee's army, but nearly two-thirds of the men Heth and Pender. Anderson had done well under
came from Virginia, Georgia or North Carolina. Longstreet's heavy hand, but lacked any real initia¬
The 37 brigades originated as follows: Alabama, 3; tive. He virtually sat out Gettysburg. Pender and
Florida, 1; Georgia, 8; Louisiana, 2; Mississippi, 2; Heth had both been brigadiers, not surprisingly
North Carolina, 7; South Carolina, 2; Tennessee, 1; two of the most aggressive, in the Light Division.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 Neither had any experience at division level, but
great things were expected of Pender.
To Make Good Our Losses Anderson's large division had originally been
By the time of Gettysburg, the 1,000-man regiment was part of John Magruder's army guarding the York-
only a dim memory. The attrition from disease and a long James peninsula. After a few early organizational
year of combat had trimmed the regiments to an average of changes, it had served as a unit in every battle.
about 300 in the Union and 425 in the Confederate army, Despite heavy fighting, its brigades were still quite
even fewer if some of the large new regiments are subtract¬ strong, except Perry's little Florida brigade. Heth's
ed. division was formed of two brigades from the
The concept of "understrength" does not really apply to Light Division plus two very large brigades trans¬
Civil War organizations: that is a term appropriate to mod¬ ferred from North Carolina. It had not yet jelled as
ern armies with their large number of specialist troops. If a unit, but would perform well in bad situations at
the infantry being supported by those specialists falls below Gettysburg. Pender's division was the rest of the
its ideal strength, much of the force multiplier effect of the Light Division; four strong, experienced brigades
specialists is wasted. In a Civil War regiment, every man under good brigade commanders. Its forte was the
was identically equipped and fought on the line — smaller headlong attack.
units just occupied a smaller frontage. In practice it was Lee's artillery was organized into 16 battalions,
probably just as well the regiments were not at full strength, one of which was assigned to each division, with
since most regimental and company commanders had not two additional battalions forming a reserve for
had professional training and the smaller units were easier each corps. The last was assigned to Stuart's caval¬
to manage, both on and off the battlefield. ry. There was no army-level reserve, but this did
With the exception of the U.S. Regular regiments not prove a problem. Reserve artillery at any level
(Day's and Burbank's brigades, 5th Corps), all the infantry was most valuable as a backstop for a defensive
regiments on both sides had been formed by individual line, a requirement minimized by Lee's attack-ori¬
states in response to a Presidential decree. In December ented philosophy. The army also tended to fight
1861, as general-in-chief, McClellan established a system to dispersed, relying heavily on division and corps
keep Union regiments at full strength. Each regiment commanders. It made sense to give them control of
formed a recruiting group, which was to remain in the regi¬ the artillery.
ment's home state to gather recruits. These recruits would The artillery did suffer from the lack of an
be sent to central collection centers for primary training artillery chief. Pendelton officially filled that post,
(boot camp), then forwarded to the regiment. For reasons but in practice his role was exclusively administra¬
obscure to this day, the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, tive. Coordination between different corps'
abolished the system in April 1862. Thereafter, the Union artillery was achieved only with difficulty or (as at
armies relied on new regiments to bring fresh troops into Gettysburg) when plenty of time was available.
the line. Each new regiment had to learn the lessons of Stuart's cavalry division consisted of three
camp, march and battle for itself. Meanwhile, veteran regi¬ experienced brigades — more could not be
ments dwindled. deployed along the Rappahannock because of the
They also left en masse as enlistments expired. Most difficulty in feeding the horses. The qualitative dis¬
Union soldiers had signed on for three years, so the biggest parity between Union and Confederate troops has
potential loss of troops was still a year away. Still, in May been greatly exaggerated. The reputation of
and June of 1863, the Army of the Potomac would lose near¬ Stuart's troopers stemmed largely from two
ly 60 regiments, about 25,000 veteran troops. "rides" they made around the Army of the
The Confederacy, with a much smaller population and Potomac. On both occasions, the rides were made
fighting for national survival, was forced into more efficient while the army was stationary. Cavalry was not
manpower management very early in the war. The draft viewed as a major threat, so the rides were not
law enacted in April 1862 effectively extended all enlist¬ strongly opposed. When Stuart tried a third ride
ments "for the duration," and provided for a steady stream during the Gettysburg campaign, it would be
of new men. Instead of creating new regiments, the new Union infantry on the march, not cavalry, which
men were sent to old regiments, where they quickly learned blocked his way. In individual fights, Union caval¬
from the veterans (making them less likely to break and run ry had done well enough; when Hooker created a
in their first combat). Starting in the fall of 1862, regiments Union cavalry corps, it was able to take on Stuart's
were formed into brigades from the same state or region. whole force.
These policies enhanced the esprit de corps of the brigades For Gettysburg/Stuart's strength was more
and kept the soldier quality consistent. When Lee took com¬ than doubled, in numbers if not effectiveness, by
mand in June 1862, he had about 70,000 infantry. In the fol¬ Beverly Robertson's brigade from D.H. Hill,
lowing twelve months his army took 65,000 battle casual¬ "Grumble" Jones' from Western Virginia, and
ties, most of them infantrymen, and took 60,000 infantry to Jenkins' largely irregular troops from the
Gettysburg. Despite the nearly 100% turnover, his infantry Shenandoah.
quality slipped little if at all. A final reinforcement for the army was John
Imboden's very irregular cavalry/mounted-
infantry brigade from the Shenandoah. This

18 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

brigade would operate independently, marching trol of troops in other departments that led Hooker
well to the west of the main army, but would join to tender his resignation. The limited authority geo¬
the army on July 3rd. Its combat worthiness was graphically circumscribed the operations of the
questionable. army, and made cooperation between departments
more difficult. The overwhelming Union manpower
The Army of the Potomac advantage could not be brought to bear until Grant,
Where Lee's army was the product of one man, as Commander -in-Chief, coordinated all the Union
its Union opponent was the product of two. The armies in Virginia against Lee.
first was George McClellan, who created the army The command situation was complicated by
in the fall of 1861. His persona was imbedded in it: the bifurcated nature of the Union rank structure.
competent and efficient, but careful to the point of There were two separate "armies", the regulars
caution on the battlefield. McClellan instigated this and the volunteers. Most officers held a commis¬
combat philosophy, but it survived him. This is not sion in each: a man might be a captain in the regu¬
entirely surprising: soldiers and leaders follow the lar army but a major general in the volunteers.
same procedures and concepts — in camp and in Regular commissions outranked volunteers.
battle — they are used to following; leaders get pro¬ Worse, the highest rank available was major-gener¬
moted by emphasizing what the army commander al; besides Meade and Hooker, all the corps com¬
emphasizes. Overcoming this inertia takes either a manders, four of the division commanders and
dynamic commander or a long tenure of a comman¬ two staff officers were major-generals. Rank was
der, neither of which was afforded the Army of the determined by seniority of each commission —
Potomac. Subsequent commanders would make Meade was actually the third-ranking man in the
attempts to breathe life into the army, but as the army, after Reynolds and Sedgwick. There are no
current CEO of Union Pacific put it, "The organiza¬ examples of outright disobedience at Gettysburg,
tion wears you out or waits you out." but the army's high command tended to act as a
The second shaper of the army was Joe group of equals, relying heavily on councils of war
Hooker, who took over after the disaster at and cooperation.
Fredericksburg. At the time, the army's morale and On his accession, Meade was given permission
strength were dissipating. He improved the army's to put officers in command of (theoretically) senior
discipline, health and morale. One long-lasting step officers if he thought the situation warranted it —
toward the latter was the promulgation of wearing an authority not previously granted to any other
shoulder patches identifying the wearer's corps (a commander. He also was given control of Union
practice still used in the U.S. Army today). He also troops in Maryland, which also had not been grant¬
created a cavalry corps, an artillery reserve and an ed to any previous commander, leading to charges
intelligence bureau. that Hooker had been deliberately baited into
McClellan and Hooker were only two of the resigning.
commanders who led the army against Lee. In addition to constantly changing comman¬
Ambrose Burnside had led the army for a few ders, the corps membership of the army changed
months, climaxed by the failure of Fredericksburg every few months, the first stirrings of the Amer¬
and the nearly disastrous "mud march" in January ican predilection for treating units and soldiers as
1863. John Pope had commanded the Army of interchangeable parts. Gettysburg would be the first
Virginia, composed of three corps now in the Army (and last) time the army entered a battle with the
of the Potomac, during the Second bull Run cam¬ same corps which fought in the previous one.
paign. Hooker would be replaced on the eve of A frequent criticism of the army's organiza¬
Gettysburg by George Meade. Meade would tion, at least by present-day historians, is that
remain in command of the army for the duration of seven corps were too many to be controlled by one
the war, but only the first six months or so was army commander. In reality, the seven-corps struc¬
spent without the immediate presence of Grant. ture gave the Army a great deal of flexibility.
If the turnover of commanders were not bad Meade could and did create several ad hoc groups
enough, all the commanders operated under two for specific tasks, as had Hooker before him. On no
other restrictions. First, the Army of the Potomac battlefield did the "excessive" number of corps
was charged with protecting Washington and its rail appear to hamper the army's efforts.
corridor through Baltimore. All its operations were
subordinated to that task. Second, the commander "Put in all your men"
of the army also was the commander of one of sev¬ One consistent factor in each of the army's bat¬
eral Union geographical departments. He had no tles was its numerical superiority over Lee's army.
real authority outside his departmental boundary, This had gone for nought in most previous battles
which meant essentially northern Virginia. Union because the Union commanders did not use their
troops elsewhere in Virginia and Maryland were troops as intensively as Lee — whole corps would
controlled by different department commanders, remain inactive through a battle. Gettysburg
who reported directly to Lincoln through Henry would be no different, as 6th Corps was split up
Halleck, the Chief of Staff. It was conflict over con¬ and unengaged (except for minor skirmishing).

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 This was frustrating to Lincoln. He did not heavily engaged in every battle. Each of the others
understand the art of war in any depth, but he rec¬ had sat out one or more battles even though pre¬
ognized the Union army could accept equal or sent on the field — a consistent problem which led
even greater losses than Lee and still maintain its Lincoln to plead each of his commanders to "put in
advantage. Throughout the war, he looked for a all your men" — a symptom of the army's defen¬
commander who could "face the arithmetic." sive orientation.
The 2nd Corps lost 7 regiments and 1 brigade to
expiration of enlistments, but received Willard's
"A reasonable exportation of brigade from 8th Corps as compensation. It was
suaess" probably the best corps in the army, led by one of
The army's morale was not as bad as a year of the best commanders.
defeat and frustration might suggest. Most of the The 3rd Corps lost only 6 regiments, but broke
army's failures were laid at the feet of its generals, up 2 brigades and 1 division because of heavy
not without cause, so the individual soldiers and leader losses at Chancellorsville. It was command¬
units could take satisfaction in their own records. ed by Dan Sickles, the only non-West Point corps
Most of the troops also thought things would go commander, a product of New York's Tammany
differently on Northern territory. organization. Sickles possessed a willingness to get
The Army of the Potomac included troops at the enemy all too often lacking in the army's
from every Northern state east of the Mississippi leadership, but his corps had a reputation for a
(except Kentucky), plus a single regiment from rather casual attitude toward discipline and proce¬
Minnesota and two brigades (Day's and Bur¬ dure.
bank's) of Regulars. Like Lee's army, most (about The 5th Corps, Meade's old command, lost 13
85%) were from states east of the Appalachians, regiments, nearly half its volunteer complement,
more than half from New York or Pennsylvania. and broke up 1 division and 2 brigades. The corps
Unlike their Confederate counterparts, most of was reinforced by 2 brigades of the Pennsylvania
the brigades in the army were not formed of regi¬ Reserves while on the march north. The comman¬
ments from the same state. There were exceptions der was George Sykes, a regular, who performed
to this rule, among them Stannard's and Grant's competently, but did not retain corps command
from Vermont, Webb's from Philadelphia and after the battle.
Brewster's Excelsior Brigade from New York City. Sedgwick's 6th Corps was the largest in the
The most famous exception was the Pennsylvania army, having absorbed half of 4th Corps on leaving
Reserve Division (Crawford's), formed from 13 the Peninsula in 1862 (probably because it was
regiments raised in excess of the state quota from commanded at the time by Franklin, a favorite of
Lincoln's first call for 3-year volunteers. The divi¬ McClellan's). It lost 11 regiments, but broke up
sion served as a unit throughout the war. Meade only 1 brigade. Another reason for its large size
and Reynolds were among its early commanders. was its lack of combat experience — in the year
The stability of Union brigades was affected prior to Gettysburg, its only serious combat had
mainly by the addition of new regiments. As new been at Chancellorsville (where it lost nearly 20%
regiments were forwarded to the army throughout of its strength).
the war, they were assigned individually to exist¬ The three remaining corps had been formed
ing brigades. Each brigade thus would have one or outside the army and attached to it at a later date.
two regiments from each wave of volunteers called Reynolds' 1st Corps had spent most of 1862 in
up. Nevertheless, most of the brigades had served northern Virginia, taking part in the Shenandoah
together for at least several months, and many and Second Bull Run campaigns. Assigned to the
were as stable as those in Lee's army. army before Antietam, it had been heavily engaged
During the Gettysburg campaign, the major during that campaign, but only lightly since. Hard
disruption to the army was not the addition of new hit by enlistment expiration, the corps lost 11 regi¬
regiments (there was no new wave of volunteer ments and 3 brigades. It officially was reinforced
regiments) or a change in the corps, but the loss of by Stannard's huge Vermont brigade, but the unit
57 whole regiments, totalling 25,000 men, to the actually operated somewhat independently during
expiration of enlistments. This necessitated break¬ the battle. Reynolds was one of the most highly
ing up 10 brigades and two divisions, the surviv¬ regarded commanders in the army, but the regard
ing regiments of those brigades (26 of them) being was based on promise rather than performance. He
absorbed into other brigades in the same corps. had been captured on the Peninsula, returning to
The heart of the army were 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th the army after being exchanged. He had com¬
Corps. These units had been together since manded the corps since Fredericksburg, but except
McClellan's Peninsular campaign, and had been for launching a short-lived and unsupported attack
present at every major battle fought by the army, there, he had not led it in active combat.
except 3rd Corps, which missed Antietam. The 11th Corps had been an unlucky outfit
2nd Corps had the unenviable distinction of since its formation. Its first two commanders, John
being the only corps in the army which had been C. Fremont and Franz Sigel, were failures as sol-

20 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

diers but popular among German immigrants, Confederate flank attacks. It would be broken up
which led to a concentration of foreign-born sol¬ after Gettysburg, its units being sent west or to
diers in its ranks. The corps was organized in West coastal operations. The commander at
Virginia, serving in the Valley and Second Bull Run Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, Oliver Howard,
campaigns. It lost only 1 regiment to enlistments, would achieve success (with many of the same
but its stability did not improve its performance. troops) out west later in the war, ending up in
At both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, its only command of one wing of Sherman's army on its
two battles with the army, the corps was routed by March to the Sea.

Who Are These Guys?

During the campaign, Lee, Hooker and Meade had movements in the Shenandoah. Union signalmen sta¬
to make decisions without benefit of complete informa¬ tioned on the hills around Harper's Ferry were able to
tion about enemy strength, positions or intentions. observe Confederate troops crossing the Potomac going
Information about the enemy came to each commander and coming. The employees of the Pennsylvania
from a variety of sources. It was invariably incomplete Railroad also telegraphed reports whenever the
and often inaccurate. Confederates crossed their path. Lee was known to
The type of decisions made under those circum¬ read Northern papers: there was no real censorship at
stances says much about the nature of the commander. the time, so a good deal of information was printed. But
Hooker lapsed into inactivity, much as he had done at reporters, then a now, were not hesitant to exaggerate a
the critical moment at Chancellorsville. His army's story to sell papers, so their reports were not always
march north consisted of long periods of inactivity, fol¬ accurate.
lowed by hard marches to react to Lee. Meade was The armies themselves gave out some information,
careful, combative without being aggressive. He edged though not intentionally. They conducted daily
his army closer to Lee's, keeping his corps in a battalion strength reports (first sergeants had to know how many
cane — separated for ease of marching, but close men they had, commissary officers needed to know
enough to support one another. On the battlefield, he how many men to feed; paymasters how many to pay).
too would leave the decisions to Lee, keeping his army Lee preferred not to collect and publish such reports,
compact and well in hand. Lee generally reacted fearing if they became known they would encourage
aggressively; even when he turned cautious on the 28th the enemy and discourage the Confederates.
and concentrated his army, he did so at Cashtown, clos¬ One tremendous advantage the Union possessed
er to the Union army. was the Bureau of Information organized by Hooker.
The most common method of getting information This bureau collected and analyzed all information
was through cavalry reconnaissance. Cavalry was use¬ form every source, providing the Union commanders
ful for this purpose simply because it moved faster than with accurate reports of Confederate strength and dis¬
infantrymen — the cavalry could catch up to marching positions. In contrast, Lee probably never knew which
troops to observe them, and run away before they were Union corps he was facing at any given time, much less
endangered. Cavalry reconnaissance was best done in the divisions or brigades they contained.
large formations because it might be necessary to fight The information gleaned from all these sources
through an enemy cavalry screen to get the necessary could be in the proper hands the same day by telegraph
information. The Union cavalry was particularly good or courier. Compared to the speed of a marching army,
at using infantry units as strong bases for recon. this was fast enough for the information to form a solid
On the other hand, cavalry formations attracted basis for a decision. On the battlefield, or even within a
enemy attention. An individual scout (called a spy if he few miles of it, intelligence gathering was hampered in
wore civilian clothes) could get just as much informa¬ that the speed of transmitting the information was no
tion as cavalry. Civilians moved freely around the faster than enemy movements. Information even a few
armies, even during campaigns. The Confederates had hours old — such as the report given Lee on July 2 that
particularly good luck with scouts: John Mosby, the the Round Tops were unoccupied — was all but use¬
Confederate partisan/raider, personally located all less. A commander had to base his intelligence esti¬
seven Union infantry corps while Stuart's cavalry was mates on what he could see or what was known to be
fighting Pleasanton in the Loudoun Valley, and another very fresh information. Hills were invaluable for intelli¬
scout (spy) spotted the Army of the Potomac at gence because they gave a better view of the surround¬
Frederick. It was this report which prompted Lee to ing countryside — Little Round Top was occupied by a
concentrate at Cashtown. Union signal detachment specifically because it offered
There were other sources of information. One was such a fine vantage point.
"deserters," often planted by their commanders to mis¬ Lack of information forced commanders to rely on
lead the enemy. Pleasanton learned of Ewell's presence their judgment regarding the battlefield situation. Once
at Culpeper from one, and several others reported again, each acted according to his nature; Lee aggres¬
Ewell's departure at Fredericksburg and Confederate sively, Meade cautiously.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 The 12th Corps was in many ways a sister unit Hooker's creation of the Cavalry Corps brought
of the 11th. Formed in the Valley under Nathaniel most, but not all, the army's cavalry into a single
Banks, another poor soldier, it was the primary organization. A year of campaigning had weeded
sufferer of Jackson's Valley campaign. Despite this out ineffective leaders. In their place came a new
experience, and another drubbing at Antietam, the crop of competent, young men who started the
corps fought well at both Chancellorsville and corps on its way to being an effective battlefield
Gettysburg. The smallest corps in the army, it lost 4 force, as well as a reconnaissance and screening
regiments and 1 brigade after Chancellorsville, group. The emphasis on new, young commanders
receiving an inexperienced Maryland brigade was exemplified during the campaign by the pro¬
under Lockwood on the march. Henry Slocum had motion of Merritt, Custer and Farnsworth from the
been in command since the Fredericksburg cam¬ rank of captain to brigadier general at one swoop.
paign. (He would end up commanding the other Their promotion was one of Hooker's last acts as
wing of Sherman's march.) commander of the army.
There were four other corps which participat¬ After Brandy Station, expiration of enlistments
ed in the campaign, though not as part of the army. and loss of officers led the corps commander,
The 8th Corps controlled the garrison forces Alfred Pleasanton, to break up one division, form¬
throughout Maryland, including divisions at ing two divisions of three brigades each. A third
Winchester, Harper's Ferry and Baltimore. Several division, of two brigades (now led by Custer and
individual brigades (Stannard, Willard and Farnsworth), joined the army from 22nd Corps a
Lockwood) were transferred to the main army few days before the battle.
before the battle, while the rest of the corps, under The corps had been sent off on a raid during
Samuel French, would join in the pursuit of Lee the Chancellorsville campaign, so did not gain any
afterward. combat experience. Gettysburg would be the first
In Washington, 22nd Corps contained all test of the new organization, and it passed with fly¬
mobile troops in the capital. One infantry division ing colors. Pleasanton kept his divisions well out to
(the Pennsylvania Reserves) and one cavalry divi¬ the front, flank and rear of the army, ensuring
sion were dispatched to the army during the cam¬ there would be no major surprises. He did less well
paign, stripping Washington to a very small on the battlefield itself, leaving the infantry to do
mobile force. most of the scouting.
John Dix commanded 4th and 7th Corps, a total
of 30,000 men in 4 divisions, around Fort Monroe June 3-14
and Norfolk. They launched a feint (called a In early June, Lee concentrated Longstreet's
"faint" by D.H. Hill) against Richmond late in and Ewell's corps at Culpeper, screened by Stuart's
June, retreating before any real contact was made. cavalry at Brandy Station, leaving Hill alone at
The Army also possessed 16 artillery brigades, Fredericksburg. His offensive would have to devel¬
of which two were horse-artillery units assigned to op quickly enough to force Hooker north to protect
the Cavalry Corps. One brigade was assigned to Washington before Hill could be overwhelmed.
each infantry corps, varying in size from 20 guns in The best way to do that was to get troops into the
12th Corps to 48 in 6th Corps. The remaining 5 brig¬ Shenandoah, which not only provided an excellent
ades formed the reserve. The artillery brigade com¬ road north but would also shield the army from
manders, though subordinated to each corps com¬ Union eyes.
mander, really came under the supervision of the Hooker, unsure of Ewell's location, sent
artillery chief, Henry Hunt. Unlike his Confederate Pleasanton's cavalry corps, backed by several
counterpart. Hunt had real battlefield authority, infantry brigades, to reconnoiter the Confederate
freely moving batteries around as needed. position around Culpeper. Pleasanton's troopers
One great weakness of the artillery force was attacked Stuart's camp from two directions early
the lack of high-ranking positions for artillerists. on June 9th, taking the Confederates by surprise.
Hunt was only a brigadier general. Under him But Pleasanton had used a complicated plan —
were only three colonels, one commanding the three separate columns converging on the battle¬
reserve and two commanding artillery brigades. field. One column got lost, delaying the main
The remaining artillery brigade commanders were Union force. Stuart's veterans rallied quickly, and
lieutenant-colonels or lower,, outranked by most after a long day of charge and countercharge, the
infantry regiment commanders. The low rank led Federals retired. The battle, the largest cavalry
many able artillerymen to seek positions in the fight of the war, was a draw. Pleasonton did learn
infantry, where they could advance more quickly. Ewell was at Culpeper (though he would set out
For example. Freeman McGilvery and Adelbert for the Shenandoah the next day).
Ames were both captains commanding batteries at Hooker's intelligence service had predicted a
Antietam. At Gettysburg, McGilvery was a lieu¬ Confederate move north, but not its direction or
tenant-colonel commanding one of the reserve goal. Hooker was convinced the Confederates
artillery brigades; Ames was a brigadier-general would march toward Manassas, following the
commanding an infantry brigade in 11th Corps. route of Lee's 1862 invasion. Rather than follow

22 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Lee, he proposed to Lincoln an attack on Hill, fol¬ Chambersburg, Ewell's corps advanced to the
lowed by a rapid march on Richmond. Lincoln Susquehanna. On the 26th, in a minor but momen¬
refused, so June 13th, Hooker sent Reynolds, with tous affray, Early's division ran into a
1st, 3rd, 5th and 11th Corps, to Manassas. The rest of Pennsylvania militia regiment. The 750 volunteers
the army, under Sedgwick, remained at took to their heels before contact was made.
Fredericksburg, dismantling the army's logistical Everywhere they marched, the Confederates
apparatus and camps. stripped the area of food, horses, cattle, wagons,
The next day, Longstreet's Confederates left money, clothing, and shoes. They were marching
Culpeper and Hill's moved out of Fredericksburg. without cavalry, except for Jenkins' small brigade
Far to the north, Ewell's corps approached with Ewell. Stuart, with about half the remaining
Winchester, garrisoned by Robert Milroy's division cavalry, was off on his famous "ride" and would
of 8th Corps, a total of 7,000 inexperienced men. be out of touch for a week. The other half was still
Ewell launched a three-pronged attack, one divi¬ in the Shenandoah, left without orders from Stuart
sion in each, late the 14th. Unlike Pleasonton's, this or Lee.
one unfolded perfectly. Outnumbered, outflanked Hooker's troops did not started crossing the
and outclassed, Milroy's command was routed. Potomac until the 25th, heading for a new concen-
Battle casualties numbered only a few hundred on
each side, but nearly half of Milroy's men were
captured. The remainder escaped to Harper's Ferry
and Pennsylvania, and were known forever after as But Can We Get There From Here?
"Milroy's weary boys." One of the main reasons the battle was fought at
To the Union leadership, it was becoming Gettysburg was the presence of no fewer than eight good
apparent an invasion was underway. Lincoln put roads leading to town. Armies stuck to main roads because
out a call for 100,000 volunteers from Maryland, few maps were available, and those which did exist showed
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Regiments only major roads.
began forming almost immediately, but with few One solution to the lack of maps was to send map-mak¬
trained men among them they were of question¬ ing parties into an area where operations might take place.
able value. From January to April 1863, Stonewall Jackson's topographi¬
cal engineer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, made a map of the
June 15-21 Shenandoah-Cumberland Valley in preparation for a poten¬
While Ewell's corps took up positions along tial invasion. In addition to personal reconnaissance,
the Potomac, Longstreet's blocked the passes in the Hotchkiss made use of county road records — then as now
Blue Ridge Mountains. Hill was moving up the the best source of road information. The map conspicuously
Valley toward Winchester. On the far side of the includes a route to Baltimore. Had Lee decided to leave the
Bull Run Mountains, Reynolds' troops reached area pictured, he would have had difficulties navigating his
their assigned positions, spread out but within easy army. It is undoubtedly part of the reason he decided to stay
supporting distance of one another. The cavalry and fight at Gettysburg.
covered the gaps in the Bull Run Mountains. Each Maps also were used to calculate possible enemy move¬
army was thus using a mountain chain as a curtain ments. It is worth noting Lee's map shows only minor roads
of maneuver; the small number of gaps in each from Frederick to Gettysburg. He knew the Army of the
chain meant prying eyes could be kept out relative¬ Potomac had concentrated at Frederick and may very well
ly easily. have underestimated the speed with which the Union army
The main armies were out of contact, separat¬ could reach the battlefield.
ed by the Loudoun Valley between the two ridges. As hard as it was to move armies around, the situation
Stuart and Pleasanton moved into the Loudoun, was even worse on the battlefield. Detailed local maps were
clashing first at Aldie on the 17th. Over the course virtually nonexistent. (Even Lee's army, ensconced behind the
of the next four days, Pleasanton's troopers, again Rappahannock for months, had few maps of the area —
with infantry support, gradually pushed Stuart's Jackson's famous flank march at Chancellorsville used a route
men back on the support of Longstreet's infantry, shown by a local parson.) At the start of the campaign,
some of whom were taken prisoner. In the end, the Pleasanton's Brandy Station plan was derailed when one of his
cavalry battles were unnecessary. Union signalmen divisions got lost on a similar back road. At Gettysburg, the
operating on the hills around Harper's Ferry locat¬ Confederates lacked friendly local guides. Longstreet's flank
ed most of Ewell's troops, so two-thirds of Lee's march on July 2 took as long as it did because the route was
army were located, as both sides located the other unknown. The situation was not much better for the Union
using scouts and other intelligence. army: Humphreys' division of the 3rd Corps was four hours
late getting to Gettysburg because its guide chose a wrong
June 22-28 road. At a critical moment on July 2, Geary's 12th Corps divi¬
Lee, now sure the Army of the Potomac was sion literally walked off the battlefield; by the time the mistake
following him, sent his army across the Potomac was discovered, the fighting had ended for the day.
— Ewell first, Longstreet last — starting on June
22nd. While Longstreet and Hill concentrated at

COMMAND MAGAZINE 23
 TROOP MOVEMENTS
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TROOP POSITIONS
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24 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 tration at Frederick. Reynolds, with three corps At the center of the mass of two marching
(1st, 3rd and 11th) in another wing configuration, armies, and at the intersection of more than a half-
was sent to an advanced position near Middleburg. dozen major roads, was Gettysburg. Aside from
The new deployment protected Washington, but it the roads, the town was unexceptional. Situated in
also allowed Lee to get far to the north of Hooker's the South Mountain foothills, it was surrounded by
main body — he would be unable to stop Lee rolling, open farmland cut by a few low ridges run¬
marching farther north. ning generally north-south. A few larger hills —
But Lee had already stopped. The lack of a Oak, Cemetery, Culp's, Wolf, Benner's, and the
real plan was coming home to roost. Out of con¬ Round Tops, Big and Little — punctuated the
tact with Hooker's army again and now out of ridges, but none of the heights would provide any
touch with Stuart, he was-uncertain of his next real barrier to troops. The fields were bordered
move, and even looked outside his own army for with stout fences and manicured woods, of which
help. He sent a long message to Davis on the 27th, the former would provide the only real hindrance
suggesting the creation of a new army — or even a to moving about the battlefield.
"phantom" one — under Beauregard to threaten On the 30th, Confederate infantrymen from
Washington. (Davis, preoccupied by Dix's move Heth's division ran into parties of Buford's cavalry¬
on Richmond and the start of Rosecrans' long men at Gettysburg and Fairfield. Heth, with Hill
awaited offensive, ignored the idea). Finally, on approval, planned to move his entire division to
June 28th, after learning from a spy that the Union Gettysburg on the 1st, ostensibly looking for shoes,
army was north of the Potomac, Lee ordered a but in all probability looking for trouble. It seems
concentration at Cashtown, on the "Union" side of likely the ever-aggressive Hill and his proteg4
the protective mountain range. He hoped to make thought the Union troopers were more militia, but
contact with Hooker's army and possibly bring over-insured by sending an entire division.
about a battle, though his subordinates were Farther east, Ewell's other two division reunit¬
warned not to bring on a "general engagement" ed at Heidlersburg. Stuart ran into Kilpatrick's
before the Confederate concentration was com¬ Union cavalry division near Hanover, and was
plete. forced to take an easterly detour. As a result, he
That same day. Hooker lost his job to Meade. missed a rendezvous with Early's division by a
He had been feuding with Lincoln and Halleck matter of hours.
over control of 8th and 22nd Corps, and on a point Buford's contact with Confederates prompted
of principle tendered his resignation. Lincoln Meade to order Reynolds to Gettysburg the follow¬
accepted, unhappy about replacing an army com¬ ing day. He also moved 3rd Corps to Emmitsburg
mander in the middle of a campaign, but not want¬ and 12th Corps to Two Taverns to guard Reynolds'
ing Hooker commanding it in another battle. flanks and reinforce him if necessary. Like Lee,
Meade did not want a full-scale battle yet, but like
June 29-30 Lee he had moved enough troops into close prox¬
Meade moved the army north to a line along imity with the enemy that a major battle was
Pipe Creek, near the Maryland-Pennsylvania bor¬ inevitable.
der. This position would protect both Washington
and Baltimore, and would put the army on the July 1 — 'Taint no militia, boys!
flank of any Confederate move toward Philadel¬ Heth's division ran into Buford's picket line on
phia. It would also give him some time to collect Herr Ridge at about 8:00 a.m., and took two hours
his bearings and decide on a more active course of to drive them back to McPherson's Ridge. The
action. He was not planning to fight west of the Confederates could easily have overrun the caval¬
Susquehanna unless he could catch a portion of the rymen, but Heth knew of no reason to hurry and a
Confederate army in isolation. full-scale attack, even against cavalry, would have
The rapid march cost the army men it could incurred heavy casualties. When he did finally
not afford. The main body of the army had been in launch an assault, his lead brigades ran into
the Frederick vicinity for several days, and had Wadsworth's division, the lead unit of 1st Corps.
taken advantage of local hospitality. When the Reynolds was killed at the outset, but Wadsworth's
army moved out, hundreds, if not thousands, of men drove Heth's brigades (minus hundreds of
troops fell by the wayside, too drunk or too worn prisoners) back to Herr Ridge.
out to keep up. After a two-hour lull during which both sides
The Confederates were also on the move, but were heavily reinforced, Rodes division opened the
with seven divisions trying to use the single road second round of the battle with a badly coordinat¬
from Chambersburg to Cashtown, the concentra¬ ed attack on the north end of 1st Corps' line. Two of
tion would take longer than anticipated. Near his brigades were shot up before his flank brigades
Washington, Stuart had learned of the Union con¬ even came on line. Coming to Rodes' aid, Heth's
centration near Frederick and hurried to rejoin Lee, division started a vicious, 20-minute fight which
but wasted time chasing down a large Union drove the southern half of 1st Corps off
wagon train and tearing up a few miles of railroad. McPherson's Ridge.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 25
 and 12th Corps, Hancock formed
a line covering Culp's and Ceme¬
tery Hills. He decided the posi¬
tion was an admirable one for a
battle, and sent word to Meade,
who accepted the decision and
ordered the army to concentrate
at Gettysburg.
Lee, who had been present for
most of the fighting, was pleased
with the results so far. He wanted
one last attack to break the Union
line before it could reform, but
Hill's divisions lacked the
strength. Only Early's division
was in any shape to launch an
attack, and Ewell felt it wasn't
strong enough to do the job alone.
Two other Confederate divisions
— Anderson's and Johnson's —
could have been available but had
run into each other at the
Cashtown gap, causing a traffic
jam. Even so, Anderson made
camp before dark just two miles
from the battlefield and was not
brought up to the line.
Ewell has been roundly criti¬
cized for not attacking Cemetery
Hill, but it was not a critical fail¬
ure for the Confederates. Fresh
Union troops were available to
cover any further retreat, so there
would not likely have been
another great haul of prisoners.
More importantly, if the hill was
taken, Meade would almost cer¬
tainly have retreated to another
defensive line, perhaps as far
back as Pipe Creek. On this battle¬
field, Lee knew the Union army
was not yet concentrated, and he
had the momentum: four Confed¬
At the other end of the Confederate line, erate divisions totalling 27,000 men had thoroughly
Early's division struck the open flank of 11th Corps, beaten two Union corps totalling just under 17,000
manned by the same division which had occupied men engaged. The losses were close — 9,000
the extreme right of the Union line at Chancellors- Federals to 7,500 Confederates — but the morale
ville. The result was the same. Within minutes, the impact on the Army of the Potomac of two corps
division was streaming for the rear, unhinging the dissolving under Confederate assaults was harder
rest of 11th Corps' line. to measure. It appeared to be yet another in the
On Seminary Ridge, 1st Corps was now struck long string of Confederate victories. If the Union
by Pender's division, nearly 6,000 fresh troops, army retreated, Lee would face the necessity of
who passed through Heth's lines at about 4:30 to finding it again, and might not get another chance
continue the assault. Union resistance was fierce, to catch it strung out on the march. The Army of
but brief. After perhaps 30 minutes, the survivors the Potomac would have to be fought, sooner or
of 1st Corps — casualties for the corps were more later, and this was as good a place as any.
than 60% — fell back toward Cemetery Hill, the
brigades in varying levels of disarray. July 2nd
On the hill, Hancock arrived to take command. By morning, Meade still had only five corps —
Using the broken units of 1st and 11th Corps, 35 of his 51 brigades — available. The Union posi¬
Stannard's brigade and the lead elements of 3rd tion was strong, but too long — even with the

26 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

whole army concentrated, Meade would have few defences to try to rescue it. Sickles felt the move
reserves. There was only one line of retreat for the gave the Union position a depth it previously
whole army, the Baltimore Pike, and it was per¬ lacked; that if Longstreet's attack hit the original
ilously close to both flanks. Union line and broke through, it would immediate¬
Lee, with a momentary numerical advantage ly have been in the Union rear.
(though he did not know it), decided on a flank The move certainly upset the Confederate
attack around the Union left, while Ewell demon¬ attack. Hood, on the far right and first to attack,
strated on the Confederate left. Longstreet's two wanted to move directly east to get around Sickles'
available divisions would make a wide flank new flank. This would be a better approach against
march, then attack up the Emmitsburg Road. As 3rd Corps, but would take Hood out of the planned
the attack moved north, each Confederate division echelon. Longstreet refused, preferring to keep to
on line would join the assault, which would culmi¬ Lee's plan (possibly out of petulance), but Hood
nate by crushing the Union army around Cemetery made the change on his own.
Hill. It was a classic attack en eche¬
lon, dependent on careful timing
between the divisions. As always
with Lee's plans, the culmination
was not the taking of a position, but
the destruction of the enemy troops
on that position.
Longstreet, in keeping with his
defensive mindset, proposed shift¬
ing the entire army around the
Union left flank toward Winchester,
putting the Confederates between
Meade's army and Washington,
forcing Meade to attack. The move¬
ment was impracticable — one or
two divisions might slip around the
Union flank, but moving the entire
army across Meade's front was a
different matter. Meade also con¬
trolled all the good roads to the
southeast, so it was unlikely Lee
could get to such a position ahead
of the Federals. In keeping with his
mindset, he resolved to attack the
Union army here.
Longstreet did not start his
march until after noon, and his
troops were not in position until
3:00 — Longstreet was upset his
"advice" had been rejected, and
there is considerable evidence he
exacerbated his habitual slowness
during this march, though to be fair
he was moving in territory
unknown to him and trying to
avoid Union eyes. In the meantime,
Sickles, unhappy with his position
along the south end of Cemetery
Ridge, had moved 3rd Corps onto Gettysburg
higher ground near the Peach
7/1/63, night
Orchard, getting into position just General Lee's plans
as Longstreet's guns opened fire. for the next day's attack
Sickles' move is one of the most Units enroute to
the battlefield
controversial aspects of the battle.
Initial attacks
Meade (and most others) felt Follow-up attacks
Sickles' move exposed 3rd Corps to
the Confederate attack, and forced
Meade to wreck the rest of his
 "The best three hours
fighting ever done."
Starting the assault at about 4:00
p.m., Hood's division (and two
brigades from McLaws') made little
headway against Sickles' line,
anchored on Little Round Top and
Devil's Den. The over-publicized
fight on Little Round Top (despite
the drama, the position was not that
valuable to the Confederate — it
would have been impossible to get
much artillery up there to threaten
the Union rear) has drawn attention
from the real Confederate success
along the line. On one hand, Hood's
attack drew a disproportionate
number of Union soldiers to that
part of the front; 4 of Sickles' brig¬
ades, a 2nd Corps division and most
of 5th Corps. Meade, overreacting,
also ordered all but one brigade of
12th Corps, and (somewhat later)
two divisions of 6th Corps to the
area, though none were engaged.
On the other hand. Hood's attack
was made on a divergent line from
the planned line of attack, so subse¬
quent Confederate divisions did not
Gettysburg join a growing wave, but went for¬
7/2/63 ward alone. It also wrecked the tim¬
ing of the assault, as each Con¬
8-4 pm federate division was supposed to
attack when the battleline reached
its position.
At 5:30, when Longstreet
6-night
unleashed McLaws' remaining
brigades on the apex of the Union
salient, there were no Union
reserves on the spot. The Union line
collapsed, not reforming until it was east of Plum
Run.
At the same time, Anderson's two southern¬
most brigades hit Sickles' right flank, driving it
back quickly though the odds were about even.
The two Confederate brigades nearly reached
Cemetery Ridge, but were delayed by artillery and
a suicidal one-regiment counterattack until
Hancock could move his remaining two divisions
south to plug the gap. A counterattack by units of
2nd and 12th Corps ended the threat. Hancock's
move made a new gap in the line, which was hit by
Anderson's next brigade under Wright. But
Wright, on his own, was soon forced to retire by
Hancock's divisions and part of the attenuated 1st
Corps.
Looking south from the Angle. The taller hill left of center is Big Round A mile to the east, Ewell pushed three brigades
Top; Little Round Top is in front of and to the left of Big Round Top. of Johnson's division across Rock Creek. They ran
The Peach Orchard, the apex of Sickles' salient, is in the background on into Wadsworth's depleted division and the
the right. remaining 12th Corps brigade, which held the line.

28 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Meanwhile, even as the last
Union reserves were being used
(eleven Confederate brigades
now fought 34 Union along
Cemetery ridge) and the north
end of Cemetery Ridge was
nearly unoccupied, the main
Confederate attack broke down.
Anderson's remaining two
brigades, his largest, failed to
advance. Anderson, unsure of
whether he was under Long-
street's or Hill's control, did
nothing to urge them on. Worse,
Pender was knocked out by a
stray shell fragment (he would
Johnson
later die), and his division
remained in position. Neither
Hill nor Lee could or would give
the orders needed to resume the
assault.
The Confederate brigades
still engaged, strength spent and
badly outnumbered, slowly
pulled back. The main fight was
over by 7:30, though the battle
around Culp's Hill would sput¬
ter on for another two hours.
Meade, Hancock and Slocum
began rearranging the Union Gettysburg
line. 7/2/63, night
Suddenly, at 8:00, Ewell General Lee's plans
launched Early's division for the next day's attack
straight at Culp's hill. The two Units enroute to
lead brigades, under Hoke and the batdefield
Planned attacks
Hays, broke the 11th Corps line
and reached the summit. But it
happened too quickly —
Gordon's brigade on the left and
Rodes' division on the right were not yet ready to
advance. By the time they were. Union reserves
from 1st and 2nd Corps had reached the hill and
were driving Hoke and Hays off. The Confederate
advantage was lost, so the supporting attacks were
called off.

"...Ia<k of a proper concert of

attion..,"
Everywhere, the Confederates had come up
just short of a breakthrough. The commanders let
the troops down. Longstreet was unduly parochial,
concerning himself solely with his two divisions,
Ewell fought his own battle, and Hill fought hardly
at all. Even Lee, forgetting his admonition to "do
more than formerly," was seized by inertia. At
Chancellorsville, every Confederate unit had been
in action or in motion most of the time, which went
far toward compensating for Union numbers; on Looking west from the brow of Little Round Top. The tree line in the
this day, the decisive moment of a battle the Con¬ distance is the south end of Seminary Ridge. The woods in the fore¬
federates had to win, only 16 of 34 available ground are on the eastern side of the Wheat field.
 Meade had dodged a bullet, and
seemed to know it. At a council of war
late that night, he considered and reject¬
ed a retreat behind Rock Creek or a
longer one to Pipe Creek. The final deci¬
sion was to hold the present position and
let Lee do the attacking, though Meade
authorized an attack by Slocum to regain
the ground lost near Culp's Hill, but did
not even consider going over to the
offensive. Meade considered it likely
that Lee, having attacked both flanks,
would attack next in the center.

July 3rd
He was right, but for the wrong rea¬
sons. Lee was ahead on points, but need¬
ed a knockout if the battle was to be
worth anything to him. In one sense the
Union position was stronger, having
been compacted by the Confederates
assaults. But being more compact, it was
also more brittle — a Confederate break¬
through at any point would doom the
rest of the line. Not surprisingly, Lee
gambled on one last attack.
He wanted to repeat the assault
started thae day before, with dawn
assaults on both flanks to be followed by
an all-out charge in the center to crush
the Union forces around Cemetery Hill.
Unfortunately, he did not meet with his
corps commanders to give orders, rely¬
brigades fought at all. Three more, under Pickett, ing on couriers carrying verbal instructions.
reached the field with seven hours of daylight Fighting started near Culp's Hill about 4:30, as
remaining, but went into bivouac. Still, the day was Johnson (reinforced by three brigades from Early
not a total loss. Union losses for the day were and Rodes) beat Slocum to the punch. But
another 12,000, against just over 9,000 Confed¬ Longstreet was not yet ready to attack, having
erates. Both Union flanks had been driven in, and interpreted his orders to allow for a flanking
3rd Corps was out of action. maneuver around Big Round Top. Johnson's men
fought on for 6 hours, gaining no ground. With
Johnson's attack stalled and Longstreet's stillborn,
Lee had to rethink his plan.

Pickett's Charge
He decided on a massive attack in the center,
still with Longstreet in charge, though the latter
opposed the attack as impossible and most of the
troops would have to come from Hill's corps. The
main attack consisted of nine brigades: Pickett's
three, Heth's four, and two from Pender, about
11,500 men in all. Wilcox and Perry were to accom¬
pany the attack on the right, but no arrangements
were made for other flank supports or reserves.
Longstreet did order Hood and McLaws to attack
after the breakthrough was made.
For some reason, Lee and Longstreet chose to
make this attack in an unusual manner. The
infantry advanced slowly and deliberately, rather
(3) Looking east from Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Ridge; the clump of than in their usual ferocious rush, and only after a
trees in the center is in the Angle. 90-minute bombardment by two-thirds of the

30 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 army's artillery. By trying this new tactic, they vio¬ Lee apparently did not consider remaining in
lated a fundamental precept of human endeavor — Pennsylvania for any of the other reasons he had
"Ya dance with who brung ya." put forth to support his invasion — plunder,
The charge itself lasted less than an hour. The threatening cities, giving Virginia a breather. He
attacking column, massing toward the center to still had 40,000 veteran infantry, including several
avoid Union artillery fire, struck the Union line brigades which had scarcely been engaged, and
near the famous clump of trees. The 5,000 men of was more than capable of putting up a good defen¬
2nd Corps facing the column were badly outnum¬ sive fight against a Union army that had been just
bered, but the Confederates were packed so deeply as badly hurt. More importantly, none of the
most could not fire. infantry brigades was out of action, with the possi¬
Armistead's brigade, in'the center-rear of the ble exception of Pickett's three. Even those which
assault formation and thus relatively untouched, had taken heavy losses were still intact as units,
pierced the Union line. There were no Union though a day's rest would not come amiss.
reserves — a legacy of the previous day's disper¬ Artillery ammunition was low, but only the long-
sion — but the few Confederates who made it into range shells — plenty of canister was on hand.
the Union position were shot or captured. Union Once again his lack of a plan haunted him. Having
brigades on both flanks of the fight swung forward cast the dice for a decisive victory, he could consid¬
and fired into the column, which gave way. Those er no alternatives.
nearest Union lines surrendered; the remainder On the afternoon of July 4, as rain began to fall,
made their way back across the valley, mostly in the Confederates retreated. The Confederates were
small groups or individually. trapped against the flooded Potomac at
Wilcox and Perry moved forward, but were Williamsport for a week, but Meade would not
too little, too late. Caught in the open by Union attack the strongly entrenched position. Lee's army
artillery, and facing Union troops freed by the col¬ escaped on the night of the 13th. Meade did not fol¬
lapse of the charge, they quickly retreated. low until the 17th.
There was no follow-up Union attack. A week later, the armies were back on the
Meade would not consider the idea of a direct Rapidan. Lee was already thinking about another
attack on Lee's lines for the same reasons offensive, but was forestalled by the transfer of
Longstreet had not wanted to attack Meade's. In Longstreet's corps to Bragg's army. Meade, who
any case, there were no fresh troops in position to also lost two corps to the western front and had
make the attack — 6th Corps was fresh and many green troops in his army, was unwilling to
unblooded, but had been spread all over the field. launch an offensive. The campaign was over.
Meanwhile, Stuart's cavalry, reinforced by
Jenkins, made a wide flank march around the
Union right to strike at the Union rear. Stuart was
intercepted at about 3:00 by David Gregg and the
brigades of Custer and McIntosh. The sides were
evenly matched, perhaps 5,000 men apiece. For
three hours, the cavalrymen charged back and
forth across the low hills east of Gettysburg, until
Stuart finally withdrew. Casualties totalled fewer
than 300 men on each side, laughably light by
infantry standards.

"We must now return to Virginia"

The day had been an unmitigated disaster.
Lee had lost most of the advantages gained over
the previous 48 hours, both physical and psycho¬
logical. His losses in the assault were five times the
1,500 Union casualties; he knew his army could not
launch another large scale attack. His artillery
ammunition was also low due to the tremendous
expenditure in the bombardment. That night, he
withdrew his flanks to a tighter line along
Seminary Ridge. He hoped to entice Meade to
attack, but Meade would not be drawn out. He had
only been in command for 6 days, and had suf¬ Looking west from the Angle, a reverse shot of the photo on page 30.
fered 23,000 casualties (with another 15,000 or so The Emmitsburg road runs parallel to and just beyond the fence in the
temporarily unaccounted for), so it is perhaps foreground. Note the gentleness of the slope in both photos: the ridges
understandable he did not want to start another on the battlefield did hide troops movements, but were not rise high
major battle just yet. enough or sharply enough to give the defender a significant advantage

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 Certainly the troops never lost faith in Lee. More
Is that all?! importantly, Lee did not lose faith in himself.
To manyat that time, Gettysburg did not
Heavily outnumbered with Longstreet gone, he
appear to be a decisive Union success, especially
nonetheless took the offensive again in October
after Lee's easy getaway. The Army of the Potomac 1863. Even while being hammered by Grant the
had held off Lee's attacks and had stymied his next year, he constantly sought ways to attack,
plans, whatever they had been, but his army was with a view to punishing the enemy rather than
intact and apparently no nearer defeat than after simply fending him off.
Chancellorsville. Nor did Gettysburg do much to instill any
Speculation on the results of a Confederate vic¬ offensive spirit in the Army of the Potomac or its
tory run the gamut from active foreign intervention leaders. Defensive success, like offensive failure,
(very unlikely) to Northern peace initiatives (possi¬ did not lead to major changes in morale. The
ble) to an extended northern campaign by Lee army's leaders, the same men after all, were every
(likely). bit as cautious in 1864 as they had been in 1863.
Foreign recognition was a chimera sought by Grant would be driven to distraction by their
the South throughout the war. Even if gained, it did apparent fear of Robert E. Lee and his gray host.
not necessarily mean British or French intervention The war in the east had been, and continued to
in the war or as mediators — both faced substantial be, a stalemate. Union numerical superiority was
domestic political opposition to support for the balanced by Confederate leadership and troop
South. Both had already given the Confederacy quality. In battle after battle, though one side or the
"Belligerent" status, making it possible for the other might retreat, neither army was ever deci¬
Rebels to buy weapons and get loans. In the final sively beaten. Far from being the decisive engage¬
analysis, foreign recognition is a case of "Them as ment of the Civil War, Gettysburg should be
has, gits:" the South would get recognition if she viewed as one in a long string of battles between
proved she could defend herself; but if she could two well-matched protagonists. O
defend herself, she didn't need recognition.
It also is unlikely — hyperbole aside — the Sources
Army of the Potomac would have been destroyed Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign.
entirely. Lee's army just wasn't big enough to do Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968.
that. But another Union defeat at Lee's hands, with Dowdey, Clifford. Death of a Nation. Alfred A.
or without a longer Confederate sojourn in the Knopf, New York, 1958.
North, might discourage the North sufficiently to Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative, v.2.
quit the war (as would nearly happen in the dog- Random House, New York, 1963.W
days of 1864). Whether the victory would be Hassler, Warren W., Jr. Crisis at the Crossroads. Univ.
enough to overcome the jubilation over the fall of of Alabama Press, University, Alabama, 1970.
Vicksburg — virtually a certainty by the time Longacre, Edward G. The Cavalry at Gettysburg.
Gettysburg was fought — is another matter. Associated University Presses, Cranbury, New
In any event, Lee's loss at Gettysburg was not Jersey, 1986.
the final or even the biggest nail in the Confederate Martin, Dr. David W. Regimental Strengths at
coffin. Little was lost except opportunity — the two Gettysburg.
armies were back in about the same place, and McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack
with the same relative strength, as they had been at and Die. University of Alabama Press, 1982.
the start of the campaign. Patterson, Gerard A. Rebels from West Point.
It is tempting to say Gettysburg formed a Doubleday, New York, 1987.
watershed for the armies involved — that Lee's Riggs, David F. East of Gettysburg. Old Army Press,
army lost its confidence and the Army of the Bellevue, Nebraska, 1970.
Potomac started believing in itself — but this is not Rogers, Col. H.C.B., OBE. The Confederates and Federals
borne out by later campaigns. at War. Hippocrene Books, New York, 1975.
In the Army of Northern Virginia, the casual¬ Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War,
ties were replaced fairly quickly, with no loss of vol. 1. Louisiana State University Press, Baton
quality. The Army of the Potomac actually had a Rouge, Louisiana, 1979.
much harder time recovering from the losses suf¬ Stewart, George R. Pickett's Charge. Houghton
fered in the Gettysburg campaign, though is was Mifflin, Boston, 1959.
heavily reinforced by troops from other commands. _. Battles and Leaders, Grant-Lee Ed., v. 3, pts 1
The new men entering the army increasingly were &2,v.4ptl. The Century Co., New York, 1884.
brought in as a result of the draft, and their quality
was not up to that of the early-war volunteers. Photos taken by author July 1991. The trees on the bat¬
Despite theories about Lee's lost "aura of tlefield are taller and thicker than in 1863. The fields
invincibility," his army's morale remained high. around the battlefield are leased to local farmers, who
Two months after the battle, Longstreet's men plant crops of approximately the same type as were
attacked as furiously as ever at Chickmauga. grown at the time of the battle.

32 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Medical Department

A Grayer Threat Than Rebel Bullets:

Infectious Disease and the Union Army
by David W. Tschanz

[Ed's Intro: In issue no. 14, our "Medical Affairs blithely ignored. Military doctors took the attitude
Editor" told the story of “The Fate of the Wounded in anyone fit to be a farmer, clerk or machinist was a
the Civil War." Here he completes the cycle by describ¬ good candidate for soldiering. As a result, physical
ing the fate of many of the not-wounded.] examinations were perfunctory, when they were
even done. (Not only did an untold number of sick¬
Now I lay me down to sleep, ly and disabled men get into the army, at least 400
While graybacks o'er my body creep. women posing as men also managed to pass the
If I should die before I wake, physical "examinations.")
I pray the Lord their jaws to break. The second great health crisis came as the
— Union soldiers' parody of a popular prayer troops were gathered together. Sickness was at its
most common and deadliest during the first year of
Invisible Killers a soldier's service. Even the most able-bodied
Two out of every nine men who served in the recruits fell victim to the maladies awaiting them in
Civil War, Union and Confederate together, never the army. Coming mostly from farms and small
returned from it. Two out of three of those who rural communities, the men had never before been
died in the Union army (and probably a similar with so many others in confined spaces. Relatively
proportion in the Confederate army), did not fall to few had been exposed to the common communica¬
enemy bullets, but to unseen and unknown ene¬ ble diseases: measles, chickenpox, mumps and
mies — microbes. whooping cough. The results were predictable.
Infectious disease was far and away the great¬ Many promptly came down with one or sever¬
est killer in the Civil War. A total of 220,000 men al of these "childhood" maladies. There were
died from diseases unrelated to combat. Surgeons 76,318 cases of measles, with 5,177 deaths; and
treated 6 million cases of sickness, as opposed to 60,314 cases of mumps, with 84 deaths, reported
only 400,000 wounds. among recruits throughout the war. Often a man
That those statistics are so lopsided is not, on would get the childhood diseases one after anoth¬
reflection, surprising. Battles and skirmishes with er. While most lived, those illnesses could cripple
the enemy have beginnings and endings. A soldier whole units for weeks at a time. The most feared of
could, when a particular fight was over, be reason¬ the "recruit diseases" was smallpox. The disease
ably certain the risk of loss of life or limb had, at could go through a regiment like a scythe through
least for the time being, passed. But every day of wheat. Smallpox, in its most virulent form, variola
his life in the army he was in mortal peril from the major, occurred in 18,952 reported cases, of whom
germs shadowing him, like invisible assassins, 7,058 (37%) died.
from the day he entered service to the day of his
discharge.
Sicknesses Reported per 1000 Men
Recruitment and Mustering Union Army 1861-1866
The first medical crisis facing the Union army
appeared as soon as mobilization got underway. In
their haste, recruiters failed to guard against enlist¬
ing the diseased and unfit. Men were brought into
the army who never should have been there. By
the end of 1862, over 200,000 had been discharged
as unfit for service, on the basis of ailments they
had at the time of their entry. It was not supposed
to happen that way.
Regulations for the examination of recruits
existed, and spelled out exactly what should be
done and who should be rejected — but they were

COMMAND MAGAZINE 33
 than from men not receiving it. Sources of the vac¬
cine were not standardized and often unreliable.
Storage and handling procedures were crude. The
process of vaccination itself often exposed the men
to a whole host of other diseases from secondary
infections, or even other disease organisms that
had grown up in the serum. The entire 7th Rhode
Island was disabled for a week following its vacci¬
nation.
Gradually, as the men became accustomed to
their circumstances and survivors acquired immu¬
nity to the "common" diseases, their incidence
declined. At the same time, the longer they
remained in camp, the more likely it was that they
would contract one of the three principal killer dis¬
eases of the war: diarrhea/dysentery, typhoid
Field Hospital at Savage's Station fever, or pneumonia.
But the overall problem of smallpox was much Upper-respiratory infections were also rife,
milder than would have been expected just a quar¬ especially in winter. "Epidemic catarrh," the then
ter-century earlier. Army doctors looked on small¬ current term for all viral respiratory conditions,
pox as contagious, and accordingly placed all such afflicted each man an average of four times a year.
cases in isolation. (It was, unfortunately, the only Most recovered, but for some the ailment spread
disease which they gave that status.) The entire into the more dreaded pneumonia. The third most
11th Michigan was placed under quarantine (nearly frequent cause of death recorded, pneumonia,
causing a mutiny) in December 1861, because of struck 77,335 times, proving fatal in 19,971 (25.8%)
the mere rumor of a case in the unit. In addition, cases.
new recruits were vaccinated as required by the
Medical Corps. Sanitation and Hygiene
Sadly, vaccination against smallpox was con¬ The filth of the first camps is hard to imagine.
ducted with the same disregard and lack of appre¬ Improper sanitation was the norm, and the result
ciation for sterile technique that characterized the was a stinking, malevolent, unhealthy place where
surgical procedures of the era. A soldier from the agents of fecally-spread disease held sway. One
Massachusetts described a typical regimental vacci¬ half of all those who died of disease in the Civil
nation: "Such a wholesale slashing and cutting War died from either diarrhea/dysentery or
never was witnessed before. The commanding offi¬ typhoid fever. The problem was worst among the
cer of each company would march up his men, all volunteer units.
with bared arms. The doctor would make three or The regular army, from long experience, had
four passes with a knife, cutting through the skin, fashioned lengthy sets of regulations for maintain¬
and punch a little of the vaccinating matter into the ing the health of men in the field. These required
wound." strict cleanliness in living quarters and food prepa¬
The outbreaks of smallpox that did occur ration areas, personal bathing, regular airing of
resulted from problems with the vaccine, rather tents and bedding, and the purity of the water sup¬
plies. Latrines and garbage pits were heavily regu¬
lated as to placement, use and the daily application
Death Rate from Disease of earth and lime atop them.
Union Army 1861>1866 But the volunteer units had no such experience
and no belief in the regulations. The great majority
of the recruits were in their teens or early twenties.
All their lives women had cooked for them,
washed for them, and cleaned up after them. Now
that they had to perform those tasks for them¬
selves, they would do them their own way, defy¬
ing the "fussy" orders of medical directors, sur¬
geons and officers.
Latrines were the single most despised institu¬
tion in the army. Many men refused to use them.
Troops from the western states vocally objected to
the odor and flies. They complained they were
embarrassed to be seen in an "undignified" posi¬
tion. So instead, they simply relieved themselves
behind the nearest bush or tent.

34 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Worse yet, volunteer officers, some of whom were ubiquitous in both the Union and
depended for their positions on the votes of their Confederate armies. The men and their clothing
men, were not willing to enforce the rules. They were infested with them. "Hunting graybacks"
saw little need for them and were not strict disci¬ (searching for lice) was a routine daily chore.
plinarians. Hence it took months and sometimes Soldiers described seeing discarded clothing literal¬
years for some regiments to accept the rules. ly swarming with them. Uniforms and under¬
Medical Corps records contain one report indicat¬ clothes were boiled to kill them. One
ing it took 18 months of argument with one New Massachusetts infantryman wrote home: "Our new
Hampshire regiment to get them to accept the idea position would furnish an excellent study for a nat¬
that sickness could be reduced, and the potabality uralist. Every species in the bug and insect line that
of their water greatly enhanced, if they would stop can kick, jump, bite' or sting is here represented in
locating their trench latrines upstream. By that astonishing numbers." Typhus fever thrived in
point, however, the thousand-man regiment, such an environment.
which had not yet seen combat, was reduced to 225 There were only 2,624 cases of typhus fever
men. diagnosed, of which 95 proved fatal. It is probable,
Bowel disorders constituted the soldiers' most though, the low number resulted from confusion
common complaint. There was much confusion in over the diagnosis of the disease, and that there
the minds of 19th century doctors between diar¬ were no foci of endemic typhus fever in the United
rhea — which is a symptom — and dysentery — States. The lice, common as the filth, were thank¬
which is a disease in its own right. But there was fully not infected to any large degree.
no mistaking when men were sick. The affliction of Finally, in May 1863, Joe Hooker, then com¬
loose bowels was so widespread it generated its mander of the Army of the Potomac, issued
own soldiers' lexicon. The men called it "the runs," "General Order No. 52," requiring camps be
"the Virginia Quickstep," or "the Tennessee Trots." pitched on new grounds, and drained by a system
The doctors took the disease for granted, pre¬ of ditches eighteen inches deep. Tents, he instruct¬
scribing salt, castor oil, and if all else failed, lau¬ ed, were to be struck twice each week to allow the
danum (an opium derivative). The Army of the sunning of their floors and contents. Cooking was
Potomac reported in 1861 that 640 out of every only to be done by company cooks, and refuse was
1,000 men contracted diarrhea and dysentery. The to be burned or buried daily. Latrines were to be
next year, the rate was 995 per thousand. One sur¬ trenches eight feet deep, into which 6 inches of dirt
geon wrote, "Few soldiers ever had a natural or would be shoveled daily. Men were required to
moulded evacuation." bathe twice a week and change their uniforms at
Typhoid fever was the greatest killer of the least once a week.
war, causing up to one quarter of all the non-com¬ They were unpopular orders, but they saved
bat deaths in the Union forces. Thriving in circum¬ lives and were quickly adopted throughout the
stances where ingestion of food or water contami¬ entire Union army. William Tecumseh Sherman
nated with fecal material containing the organism went so far as to pick the sites for latrines and to
can occur, it found conditions ideal in the camps. instruct his men how to dig them.
So common that it was simply called "camp fever,"
it could kill in a matter of days. One Connecticut Malaria
soldier told of 42 "camp fever" deaths in as many Malaria was the second most common disease
days in his regiment alone, with barely 225 out of reported. There were 1,315,955 attacks, of which
600 remaining fit for duty. 10,063 proved fatal. These numbers are not surpris¬
Given the general lack of hygiene and sanita¬ ingly high. It is often forgotten today that the
tion, it is not surprising that flies, lice and fleas Mississippi river valley and most of the
swarmed over the camps. One soldier wrote: "I get Confederacy (as well as Washington, D.C.) were
vexed at them and commence killing them, but as I
believe 40 of them come to every one's funeral, I
have given it up as a bad job."
In addition to biting, stinging, clinging, and
otherwise making life miserable, the vermin car¬
ried disease. Flies would land on the scattered piles
of feces, where they would feed and then head to
the kitchen. Once there they would regurgitate the
contents of their most recent meal (along with any
bacteria present) on the food, and commence eat¬
ing again. What they might have picked up on any
of their six legs they would also leave on the food,
which would then be eaten by the troops.
That the troops on both sides were lousy is a
literal, rather than figurative, description. Body lice Field Hospital at Antietam

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 malarial regions. Persons living there were familiar one fifth of units that never heard shots fired in
with "ague" and "intermittent fever," as it afflicted anger. Occupation forces were similarly afflicted.
millions. Malaria was extremely common among troops in
The figure cited above also records recur¬ Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina.
rences. Despite this, the number is probably lower Occupation forces in southern cities, as well as
than actually occurred. Many attacks went Confederate soldiers camped near other cities —
unrecorded. Many men knew when they were hav¬ especially Richmond — experienced other soldiers'
ing a recurrence of malaria, and often kept their maladies: gonorrhea and syphilis. There were as
own supplies of quinine, preferring not to report many reported cases of those two sexually trans¬
their illness to the regimental surgeon. mitted diseases (STDs) as there were of measles,
Quinine was known to be effective, but its mumps and strep throat combined.
specificity for malaria was not understood. Its use The average death rate from disease was 53.4
for other fevers led to confusion about its value for per thousand — in other words, a full-strength reg¬
malaria, especially as a prophylactic. Some physi¬ iment could expect to lose 53.4 men per year to
cians did use it as a preventative measure against death from disease. When the sickness and death
repeated attacks of the disease. When used in that rates are analyzed by year, it can be seen the sick¬
way, the quinine was usually dissolved in whiskey, ness rate fell constantly until the end of the war,
which greatly increased the treatment's popularity. but death from disease increased sharply each year
Though the death rate from malaria was low, until 1864, when they fell back to the 1862 level.
the disease was a huge problem in many cam¬ The dwindling sick rate was due to both
paigns. Reports of malarial officers and men con¬ improved sanitation and the smaller proportion of
tinuing in action during important battles notwith¬ recruits each year in relation to the number of sea¬
standing, the disease rendered several large com¬ soned men. The increasing mortality rate was part¬
bat units ineffective during the sieges of Port ly attributable to the larger number of men cam¬
Hudson and Vicksburg. paigning in the lower south, where malaria and
dysentery were more common. The reduction after
Patterns of Disease 1863 in mortalities is consistent with men acquiring
Geography and time of year played a signifi¬ immunity and with the imposition of stricter
cant role as to what diseases were prevalent at par¬ hygiene and sanitation standards.
ticular times and places. In general, troops in the
west were unhealthier than those in the east; both Impact on Military Operations
sickness and death tended to increase the further The prevalence of sickness and death meant
south the armies went. every regiment underwent a slow but steady
In May 1861, the sick rates were substantially process of attrition, which began the moment the
the same for all the forces, regardless of theater. men arrived in camp and never ended. From their
But with the coming of summer, and the more initial complement of about 1,000 men, disease
southerly march of the western armies, diseases alone reduced most regiments to about half that
there rose out of proportion to those of the Army of size before the units went into battle the first time.
the Potomac. By the spring of 1862, the two princi¬ The 12th Connecticut marched off to war 1,000
pal western armies of Grant and Buell had been strong and entered its first battle with just 600 men.
stricken with dysentery and malaria. Those two ill¬ At the end of its first year, the 128th New York,
nesses were to characterize and impede operations which had not been in combat, could muster only
in that region throughout the rest of the war. 350. As well as killing, the presence of disease
The Army of the Potomac went from having always placed a substantial proportion of the men
roughly one-third of its strength on sick call on the sick list.
throughout the summer of 1861, to a rate of 6 per Disease could and did have crippling effects on
100 in October. This trend reflected the gradual Civil War operations at various times and for both
acclimatization of the troops to the diseases of sides. Lee's 1861 West Virginia campaign failed in
recruits. But the eastern army, too, faced problems part due to the large amount of sickness in his
as it marched south. During the early phases of the army. One reason cited by Union surgeons for the
Peninsular Campaign in May 1862, the sick rate abandonment of the first effort to take Vicksburg in
was low. Starting around the end of June, however, 1862 was the sickness of more than half the army.
malaria, dysentery and typhoid fever became Beauregard's decision to abandon Corinth (June
widespread. Six thousand sick were sent north in 1862) was influenced as much by the dysentery of
June; by July, 20 percent of the Army of the epidemic proportions that put a third of his army
Potomac was on sick report. on the sick list, as by the long odds he faced. In the
If a man was able to avoid serving in a combat opposing Union army, under Halleck, a third of
unit, either by luck or design, he could be reason¬ the troops were sick. Half of the 29 Union generals
ably sure he would avoid death from enemy were also ill, including Halleck and Pope, who
action. No such surety existed in avoiding disease. both had dysentery, while Sherman was down
One fifth of all death from disease occurred in the with malaria.

36 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 The denouement of McClellan's Peninsular
Campaign was profoundly altered by the ravages
How to Read Unit Symbols.
of malaria and dysentery. The decision in
Unit symbols are a quick and easy way (once you get used to them) to clearly show the
Washington to withdraw the forces, over the gen¬
makeup of even the largest and most complex military organizations. The symbols are used
eral's objections, was caused by concern over the
to show the location of the unit on a map. When combined with other symbols in a wire-
high levels of illness and fear the army might be
diagram, the symbols can be used to show the strength and weaponry of a single unit (a
completely devastated.
Table of Organization and Equipment, or TO&E) <>r show all the units commanded by some
higher organization (an Order of Battle, or OB).
Finale Each unit is identified by a box. The symbol inside the box indicates the unit's type, meaning
Compared to later wars, the death rate from the primary weaponry and equipment the unit uses to carry out its missions. Examples of
disease in the Civil War was appalling. The unit types are:
Spanish-American War had a mortality rate of 16
per thousand, less than one-third that of the Civil 1X1 Infantry [—iS>| Rocket Artillery
War. During World War I, American forces suf¬
IX Road-Motorized Infantry | j 1 Mortars
fered 12.6 deaths per thousand per year, of which
9.9 per thousand were attributable to the Spanish D^CI Cross-Country Motorized Infantry |\$/| Anti-Tank
Influenza epidemic of 1918-19 (see Command no.
16, pp. 40-44). DYCI Airmobile or Air Assault (heliborne) |/\| Anti-Aircraft Artillery (pre-1945)
Yet all things are relative. Civil War doctors
Airborne (or Paratroop) |^—J Modern Air Defense Artillery
felt justifiably proud of the fact they had succeed¬
ed in cutting down disease mortality in compari¬ l^jxl Marines or Naval Infantry XI Signals or Communication Troops
son to previous wars. The Mexican-American
War, for example, had seen seven disease deaths IXI Mountain Infantry |q|p| Fixed-Wing Bombers
to every single combat death. The sanitation scan¬
l^^l Mechanized (or "Armored") Infantry 1X| Fixed-Wing Fighters
dals of the Crimean War had led to a British dis-
ease-to-combat mortality rate there of eight to 1m Combat Engineers |cfp| Attack Helicopters
one. In some peacetime years, the French army of
the Second Empire had a disease mortality rate 1X1 Commando or Special Forces | ^ | Supply or Transport
higher than that of the Union army during \y^\ Horse Cavalry | R 1 Replacments
wartime.
The reason for this improvement lies not in \(y^\ Armored Cavalry or Reconnaisance I^Cl Motorized Special Ops
any major advances in medical science between
1^^| Motorcycle Troops ^ | Military Police
1846 and 1861. There were really none made dur¬
ing that time. The lower mortality was due mostly 1°°°| Armored Cars 1X1 Motorized Anti-Tank
to the improved sanitation measures the regular
army had first devised and then Hooker later |( )[ Armor or Tank IXXI Self-Propelled Anti-Tank
enforced. So successful were they European
|C*~)1 Assault Gun or Self-Propelled Artillery \^\ Combined Arms
armies, especially the Prussian, quickly adopted
them. 1^» J Truck-Towed Artillery l^j^l Wheeled Marines
Little good ever comes from war. But when the
armies dispersed in 1865, the survivors took back IXI Horse-Drawn Artillery Ijjfefl Motorized Marines
home with them the lessons they had learned in
hygiene and sanitation. A realization there was a
Unit Size
connection between filth and disease had been
XXXXXX - Theater of Operations 111 - Regiment
imbued in the men. The adoption of those attitudes
XXXXX - Army Group or Front 11 - Battalion
led to the rapid acceptance of the call of the
XXXX - Army 1 - Company
Sanitary Movement in the 1870s for measures to
XXX - Corps ••• - Platoon
ensure pure food and water, and a belief disease XX - Division •• - Section
really did not have to happen. Q X - Brigade • - Squad or Fire Team

Sources
Adams, George W. Doctors in Blue. New York,
Notes
1952.
1. If a unit symbol displays a heavy band down its left side, or a portion of its symbology is
Catton, Bruce. Mr. Lincoln's Army. New York, 1951.
filled in, that unit is armed with "heavy" weapons . For instance, this Ijxj would mean
McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom. New
"heavy weapons infantry," while this |o| would mean "heavy tanks."
York, 1988.
2. If there is bracket (ri) atop a unit's size-symbol, that unit is ad hoc in nature, Meaning
Robertson, J.I. Soldiers, Blue and Gray. Columbia, it was/is) not a regular organization in its army, but was created for some special
SC, 1988. (temporary) purpose or mission.
United States Government. Medical & Surgical 3. The number or word appearing to the side of a unit box is that outfit's numeric or name
History of the War of Rebellion (6 vols.). identity. For instance, this unit |^=^j ^ would be the 1 st Mechanized Infantry Division.
Washington, 1875-88.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 37
 Commentary

Desert Storm:
Robert E. Lee or William Tecumseh Sherman?
by Jeffrey F. Addicott
[Ed's Intro: Jeffrey Addicott is a Major in the US Army, arrogantly relied on sheer numbers to ensure suc¬
currently serving as Senior Instructor in the cess on the battlefield, there is the story of a small
International Law Division of the Judge Advocate army, with a great leader, overwhelming numeri¬
General's School, in Charlottesville, Virginia. Before cally superior forces.
going further, however, Union men be warned — the Operation Desert Storm confirmed that the
good Major is what J.R.R. Tolkien would’ve termed a American commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf,
"Southron."] was no mediocre leader. Clearly, he had learned
well many of the lessons written in the bloody ink
Captains — Great and Small of military history. In this context, the war also paid
As the Coalition military victory in the Persian a magnificent tribute, albeit a silent one, to a man
Gulf passes its first anniversary, the focus has shift¬ who is arguably the greatest military leader this
ed from the emotions of homecoming celebrations country has ever produced — Robert E. Lee.
to the seriousness of lessons learned and lessons Indeed, not only in the sphere of battlefield tactics,
validated. While the ingredients of victory are a but in ensuring strict adherence to the laws regulat¬
combination of many factors, from logistics to ing warfare, Generals Lee and Schwarzkopf had
training and armament, history has shown that one much in common; tactical skills and ethical conduct
of the most important elements in successful com¬ go hand in hand in the making of a great leader.
bat operations is always the quality of the com¬ Unfortunately, however, there are many who
mander. are unaware of the phenomenal benefits that our
It is the commander who decides the strategy, military has drawn from Gen. Lee. Curiously, this
directs the tactics, and inspires the morale of his was brought out by the battle in the Persian Gulf.
soldiers. For every mediocre captain of history who When reporters asked Gen. Schwarzkopf which
military leaders he most admired, Schwarzkopf, as
expected, turned to the Civil War for his examples.
What was totally unexpected, though, was that he
cited Gen. William T. Sherman as one of his heroes.
In fact, the U.S. was fortunate that both Gen.
Schwarzkopf and the forces under his command
actually emulated the tactics and humanity of the
Confederate general, and not the Union man.
Though Gen. Schwarzkopf's public admiration
for Gen. Sherman raised little concern at the time
about the soundness of America's military strategy
and its willingness to abide by the law of war in
the conduct of hostilities, his recognition of
Sherman and exclusion of Lee does raise several
critical issues. First, recognizing the importance of
image projection, it provides an opportunity to
examine the roots of America's international repu¬
tation for war making and the role of law in regu¬
lating such conflict] Second, from both a tactical
and law of war perspective, we can now determine
whom, in actuality, our commanders and soldiers
in Desert Storm most emulated — Robert E. Lee or
William T. Sherman.

Robert E. Lee
Norman Schwarzkopf: Did this man fight the right war but An unspoken tribute to Gen. Lee was evident
pick the wrong hero? with regard to the strategy used by the American

ISSUE 17
38 JULY-AUG 1992
commander in the Gulf. As Gen. Schwarzkopf held offered the opportunity for what every soldier
his "victory" press conference and explained the dreams of — fantastic success and fame — Lee
concept of the overall operation that defeated the maintained his loyalty to his state and family,
Iraqi forces, it was obvious he had not only been thereby giving to the world a glimpse of his
able to successfully apply the lessons and experi¬ integrity.
ences of his own career, he had also drawn heavily A product of southern aristocracy, honor and
from the wisdom of Lee. duty were more important to him than fame; he
To the serious student of American history, could not draw his sword against his native state.
Schwarzkopf's celebrated "Hail Mary" flanking Sherman would later write of him, "His Virginia
movement to the west of the enemy strongly was to him the world."
echoed from another time and place. While no two At the end of the Civil War, military leaders
wars are ever alike, and each commander's actions throughout the world quickly recognized the
must be evaluated in terms of their unique circum¬ incredible battlefield accomplishments of Lee.
stances, the basic tactics employed in the "hundred British, Prussian, and French officers, renowned in
hour" ground war were undeniably similar to their own right, expressed only the highest regard
those used by the commander of the Confederacy's for Gen. Lee. The great British officer, Gen. Garnett
Army of Northern Virginia. Joseph Wolsely, had observed Lee at first hand
Time after time, Lee executed magnificent during the war and called him a genius in the art of
flanking movements at such battles as Second warfare, "being apart and superior to all others in
Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness. In every way, a man with whom none I ever knew
short, the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm and few of whom I have read are worthy to be
was vintage Lee — fix the enemy in place and hit classed."
him suddenly and heavily in the flank. The heart While the Virginia of the Old South has long
and soul of Lee's superior strategy was based on since faded, in the decades that have passed Lee's
surprise and economy of force, the same key ele¬ name has only increased in brightness. Today he
ments superbly utilized in Desert Storm. illuminates the pages of military doctrine as per¬
haps no other soldier in American history. Indeed,
Lee's Impact on the US Military in the whole history of the United States, there has
Apart from being the most enduring conflict in never been an officer who inspired such great
the nation's collective psyche, the Civil War devotion and trust in his soldiers as did Lee.
brought into focus the extraordinary genius of Lee, That fact was illustrated in an incident just
a genius so phenomenal his impact on the armed before the surrender at Appomattox, when Lee
forces of the United States is still felt over 125 years
after his death. This is not so surprising, however,
when one considers that Lee's military value was
already firmly established in the young nation
even before the outbreak of the Civil War.
Gen. Winfield Scott, commander of the
American forces during the Mexican War (1846-
48), noted on many occasions that war was won
due largely to the efforts of (then) Capt. Robert E.
Lee. Capt. Lee had made such an impression on
Scott that 13 years later, in 1861, when asked about
the best officer in the US military, he promptly
replied: "I tell you, sir, that Robert E. Lee is the
greatest soldier now living, and if he ever gets the
opportunity, he will prove himself the greatest
captain of history."
President Lincoln was also well acquainted
with Lee's military acumen. In April 1861, before
Col. Lee (then serving in the US 2nd Cavalry ) had
to decide between Virginia and the Union, Lincoln
eagerly tendered him the supreme command of all
Union forces in the field. If he had accepted, Lee
would have been second only to Gen. Scott, who
was then the General-in-Chief of all Federal forces.
Weighing a devoted career spanning over 30
years of service to the armed forces of the United
States against his attachment to Virginia, Lee
turned down this greatest of all opportunities.
Taken to the mountain top of temptation and R.E. Lee: The "Christian General."

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 turned to Brig. Gen. Henry Wise and asked him U.S. military establishment. Although these quali¬
what the army and country would think of him ties certainly existed before the emergence of Lee
once he surrendered. Gen. Wise, a former governor the general, it was his genius and humanity that
of Virginia, blurted out: "Gen. Lee, don't you know epitomized and translated them into the very fab¬
that you are the army.... There is no country. There ric of subsequent American military doctrines.
has been no country for a year or more. You are the For these reasons, any analysis of the US mili¬
country to these men." tary, either in terms of tactics or comportment with
Arguably, Lee contributed more than any other the law of war, that ignores the amazing contribu¬
single man in setting the very bedrock for some of tions of Lee, can never be more than a fraction of
the most outstanding and valuable attributes of the truth. He, more than any other officer, is most
American military power. A bedrock so strong that qualified to project the American standard of
today, when asked to identify the most notable behavior in these areas.
characteristics of the U.S. military, one can expect
the worldwide response to literally echo his signa¬ William T. Sherman
ture: 1) the superior tactical abilities of the combat When Gen. Schwarzkopf listed Gen Sherman
leaders; and 2) the civilized conduct of Americans among those whom he most admired in history,
at war. many misunderstood the reasons associated with
That the American military establishment has the choice. In the minds of most knowledgeable
proudly maintained its reputation for sound mili¬ Americans, particularly in the South, the name of
tary tactics as well as an unmatched sense of W.T. Sherman is immediately associated with a
humanity is well known. What is not as well adver¬ heinous array of war crimes.
tised is the man most responsible for all of this. Best remembered today for his concept of
Perhaps it is the passage of time that conceals his "total war," that is, brutally targeting defenseless
name. More likely, however, it must be attributed civilian populations of the Confederacy, Gen.
to the prejudice of those who are loathe to find any¬ Sherman's wanton destruction and theft of non¬
thing worthy associated with the Southern cause. military property in his 1864 march from Atlanta to
In spite of the fact their greatest champion is the sea, and then on through South Carolina,
often overlooked, "Leeonian" tactics and civility marks him among the most infamous figures in
have become ingrained into the character of the American history.
This, of course, was not the quality Gen.
Schwarzkopf sought to embrace when he listed
Sherman as one of his heroes. Was it then the tacti¬
cal side of Sherman that won Schwarzkopf's
respect?
Few historians rank Gen Sherman among the
brilliant. Most writers believe he was far too cau¬
tious when conducting war against sizable concen¬
trations of enemy soldiers.
As a military commander, Sherman was at best
only average. However, compared to the vast
majority of Union general officers, who were noto¬
riously incompetent, Sherman looked fairly capa¬
ble. His mainstay was his tenacity, not his imagina¬
tion. Tenacity, though, can do great things when
juxtaposed with a tremendous military might, such
as was furnished to him by the industrial North.
Because of that, Sherman could systematically con¬
duct his version of "total war" at will.
After burning the entire city of Atlanta to the
ground, Sherman set out with over 62,000 Federal
soldiers; not to engage Confederate combat forces,
but to "make Georgia howl." Tragically, the only
persons who "howl" in such brutal circumstances
are the defenseless civilians, primarily women and
children. Though Sherman issued "official" orders
prohibiting the trespass of all dwellings, required
the leaving of reasonable provisions for families
who were forced to provide food, and even banned
profane language, in reality none of those orders
were enforced. The soldiers were allowed to rob,
W.T. Sherman: War Criminal? pillage and burn in a swath of horror that, from

40 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

wing to wing of his forces, extended almost 60 "inexcusable and wanton acts." While still march¬
miles in width. ing through Georgia, well before the most bar¬
As the Union army approached their homes, barous atrocities were committed, Gen. Howard
southern civilians understood the approaching ter¬ even issued his own orders:
ror. In the distance, they could see the pillars of It having come to the knowledge of the
smoke by day and the fires by night. If Sherman major general commanding that the crimes of
did not order the rape and other physical abuses arson and robbery have become frequent through¬
that accompanied his campaign of terror, he, as the out this army, notwithstanding positive orders
commander of the army, must still share responsi¬ both from these and superior headquarters having
bility for those additional crimes. been repeatedly issued...it is hereby ordered: that
Boasting of the wholesale'looting and burning hereafter any officer or man of this command dis¬
through Georgia, Sherman telegraphed his superior, covered in pillaging a house or burning a building
Gen. U.S. Grant: "I sincerely believe that the whole without proper authority, will, upon sufficient
United States, North and South, would rejoice to proof thereof, be shot.
have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to
devastate that state in the manner we have done in Despite such "official" directives threatening
Georgia." Later, as Sherman headquartered in the death by firing squad for any form of pillaging, not
finest mansion in Savannah, he again corresponded a single Union soldier was ever executed. The
with Grant concerning his upcoming march through obligatory wink at the law had been made.
South Carolina. As if attempting to shed all respon¬ Accordingly, bands of roaming marauders, calling
sibility for controlling his army, Sherman wrote: themselves foragers, or "Sherman's Bummers,"
"The whole army is burning with an insatiable engaged in indiscriminate plunder of the civilian
desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I population.
almost tremble for her fate, but I feel she deserves In later defending the atrocities, Sherman made
all that seems in store for her." no attempt to conceal the crimes behind the guise
of military necessity — Article 44 of the Code
The Law of War, 1861-65 allowed destruction of private property upon the
Granted that the modern international rules order of an officer in the case of military necessity.
regulating the conduct of armed forces during Although the exception was worded in the nega¬
combat, codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, tive, "all destruction of property not commanded
did not exist during the Civil War, Sherman still by the authorized officer...is prohibited..." it was
certainly violated the well established customary in no way meant to be broadly construed.
prohibitions of his day, in addition to the much If Article 44 allowed the means for an officer to
praised "Lieber Code." order otherwise illegal acts. Articles 14-16, by set¬
Issued to the Union forces as "General Order ting out strict definitions of the term "military
No. 100," the Lieber Code spelled out specific rules necessity," certainly limited his ability to issue such
in the conduct of warfare, "corresponding to a commands. Article 14 held that military necessity
great extent to the laws and customs of war exist¬ "consists in the necessity of those measures which
ing at that time." This code, coupled with the are indispensable for securing the ends of the war,
already existing customary obligations, absolutely and which are lawful according to the modern law
prohibited the larceny, vandalism, or indiscrimi¬ and usages of war."
nate burning of civilian property, as well as all Anticipating that most cases of military neces¬
associated crimes of violence against civilians. sity would involve the taking of food stuffs from
Article 47 of the Lieber Code provided that: the local population. Article 15 of the Lieber code
did allow for the "appropriation of whatever an
Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as enemy's country affords necessary for the subsis¬
arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway rob¬ tence and safety of the army."
bery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if Sherman, however, paid little attention to the
committed by an American soldier in a hostile code. In twisted logic based on pure vengeance, he
country against its inhabitants, are not only pun¬ openly and intentionally targeted civilians — but
ishable as at home, but in all cases in which death in order to make them suffer for having supported
is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be the Confederacy, not to feed his troops. Claiming
preferred. his barbarous machinations had a bright side, that
To be sure, a handful of Union officers and sol¬ they might somehow induce the civilians to sue for
diers assigned to Sherman did display military dis¬ peace, Sherman freely admitted: "If the people
cipline, but the vast majority of Sherman's troops, [civilians in the south] raise a howl against my bar¬
intent on booty, soon discovered the chain of com¬ barity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war,
mand made little effort to protect civilians or their and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace,
property. Early on the "march," some subordinate they and their relatives must stop the war." By his
commanders, such as Gen. Oliver Howard, dutiful¬ own admission, then, Sherman purposefully violat¬
ly informed Sherman the soldiers were committing ed Article 16 of the Lieber Code:

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 Military necessity does not admit cruelty — them. The real point of shame must rest on the fact
that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of Gen. Sherman was never held accountable for the
suffering or for revenge, nor of wounding or outrages he sponsored.
maiming except in fight...nor wanton destruction
of a district. It... does not include any act of hostil¬ Conclusion
ity which makes the return to peace unnecessarily The antithesis of Sherman, Gen. Lee is not only
difficult. remembered as a military genius, but he is equally
praised, north and south, for his careful adherence
Thus we can see the popular but erroneous to the laws of war, particularly in the protection of
contention by some modern writers that Sherman's the property and persons of civilians. Lee never
march may be viewed as lawful under the rules of subjected the northern civilian population to the
war of the time, is simply a twisted manifestation terror and horror that was visited on his own peo¬
of "victor's justice." The adoption of the Lieber ple. To those who knew Lee, it could have been no
Code as an official military order made that code other way.
absolutely binding on all Federal soldiers, particu¬ In April 1861, when Lt. Gen. Scott received
larly the officers who were solemnly charged with Lee's resignation from the US Army, tendered that
upholding the law. he might offer his services to the South, Scott
expressed great regret. A witness, however, noted
Total War Scott was consoled in that he "would have as his
In today's setting, had Gen. Schwarzkopf fol¬ opponent a soldier worthy of every man's esteem,
lowed Sherman's example of "total war," he would and one who would conduct the war upon the
not only be guilty of numerous war crimes, but the strictest rules of civilized warfare. There would be
army he commanded and the nation he served no outrages committed upon the private persons
would have been subjected to the scorn and or property which he could prevent."
ridicule of the entire civilized world. Even by the Clearly, even before their codification in the
somewhat less rigid standards of his own day, Lieber Code, Scott understood, as did Lincoln,
Gen. Sherman left the civilized world nothing Sherman and Grant, what the customary interna¬
worth emulating. Obviously, however, and in stark tional rules regarding civilized conduct in war
contrast to his opponent, Saddam Hussein, Gen. required of them.
Schwarzkopf strictly adhered to both the spirit and On both of his campaigns into the North, Lee
letter of all aspects of the law of armed conflict. conducted his army impeccably, punishing all
With the wholesale looting, hostage taking, mur¬ those soldiers arrested for larceny of private prop¬
dering, torturing, raping, and environmental erty. Fully realizing that Union forces had wanton¬
destruction visited upon Kuwait, it was Saddam ly razed civilian homes and farms in the neighbor¬
who carried Gen. Sherman's notion of "total war" ing Shenandoah Valley, Lee nevertheless kept close
to unspeakable extremes. rein on his men. He wrote:
Further, it would be inconceivable that the
No greater disgrace can befall the army and
American government would long tolerate abuses
through it our whole people, than the perpetration
of this critical rule of law, particularly abuses that
of barbarous outrages upon the innocent and
were command-directed. The Administration
defenseless. Such proceedings not only disgrace
could be expected to take steps immediately to halt
the perpetrators and all connected with them, but
any such violations of the law of war and to prose¬
are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of
cute promptly those Americans charged with such
crimes. the army, and destructive of the ends of our move¬
ment.
Unfortunately, Sherman's conduct was not
shocking to the Lincoln Administration, regardless Although some Southerners have criticized Lee
of the rules breached. On the contrary, Lincoln was for not authorizing lawful reprisals, in order to
well pleased. Then again, the same authorities who deter Federal violations in the future, Gen. Lee
had earlier condoned the forced evacuation of firmly believed such acts were not the answer.
every human being throughout the border areas of Responding to a letter from the Confederate
western Missouri, and the burning of every single Secretary of War, regarding possible southern
home there (General Order No. 11), could hardly responses to Union atrocities, Lee iterated his posi¬
be expected to flinch over atrocities committed in tion in the summer of1864:
the heart of Dixie.
As I have said before, if the guilty parties could
Thus, when Sherman quipped "War is hell," it
be taken, either the officer who commands, or the
was only he, by his barbarous acts, that made it so
soldier who executes such atrocities, I should not
hellish. Sherman's tactic, to assert that because war
hesitate to advise the infliction of the extreme
is so utterly repulsive that one need not abide by
punishment they deserve, but I cannot think it
rules, is as old as it is fallacious. There have always
right or politic to make the innocent...suffer for
existed rules regulating the conduct of war and the
the guilty.
associated punishments for those who violated

42 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 With Americans fighting Americans, Lee knew Whether judged in the light of tactics or moral
the long-term effects of engaging in reprisals conduct, the actions of the American military in
would not be profitable for the nation or the South. the Gulf War reflected the impact of Lee, not
In this, he was undoubtedly correct; Lee's strict Sherman. Gauged by these two factors, Operation
adherence to the rules regulating war, coupled Desert Storm was not a place where lessons were
with his firm policy prohibiting reprisals, con¬ learned, but a place where lessons were validated.
tributed greatly to the healing process after the In turn, with this validation of the magnificent
ability and character of America's fighting forces,
This is one of the reasons he has been called there must come an appropriate tribute to Robert
the "Christian General," as reflected in his address E. Lee.
to the troops as they marched into Pennsylvania Great armies are neither created nor sustained
during the Gettysburg campaign: "It must be by accident. To a large degree, they are maintained
remembered that we make war only on armed by those officers who understand and are able to
men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the apply the lessons of military history. In this
wrongs our people have suffered without lowering respect, no officer can truly be called a professional
ourselves in the eyes of.. .Him to whom vengeance unless he has a firm commitment to the moral and
belongeth." ethical rules regulating combat. Quite naturally,
Instructing his officers to arrest and punish all this objective requires constant training as well as a
soldiers who committed any offense on the person comprehensive understanding of one's moral
or private property of civilians, he reminded them, roots.
"the duties exacted of us by civilization and With the collapse and dismantling of the Soviet
Christianity are not less obligatory in the country Union, some argue America has become the role
of the enemy than in our own." model of the world. Of course, this is only part of
In contrast, Sherman's atrocities simply sowed the truth. To a large degree, the tyranny of commu¬
the seeds of hatred for generations of Southerners, nism met its end precisely because America has
a common epitaph for those who commit war always been humanity's beacon for all that is wor¬
crimes. His assumption he could terrorize the thy in mankind. Consequently, the armed forces of
South into submission by devastating its farms and the United States must reaffirm their commitment
towns was wrong. to the positive values of military proficiency and
The contention that violations of the law of ethical integrity.
war are necessary in an "ends justifies the means" For that instruction, inspiration and inculca¬
analysis is also fundamentally inaccurate. Aside tion, American officers can find no better role
from the obvious issue of morality, violations are model than Gen. Lee. While some may forget,
most often simply an unwise waste of military ignore, or purposefully deny the role Lee has had
resources. As the pragmatic Prussian soldier and in shaping our modern military, to those who are
author, Karl von Clausewitz, observed: "If we find objective, his impact can never be obscured. To
that civilized nations do not...devastate towns and those who rediscover him through the pages of his¬
countries, this is because their intelligence exercis¬ tory, he still has much to impart.
es greater influence on their mode of carrying on Perhaps the most telling tributes to Lee came
war, and has taught them a more effectual means from his former enemies. When Lee died in 1870,
of applying force." newspapers throughout the North universally
In the context of Desert Storm, it is clear the praised his military genius and morality. The New
only quality Gen. Schwarzkopf took from Sherman York Herald wrote: "In him the military genius of
was his reputation for ferocity. Gen. Schwarzkopf America was developed to a greater extent than
related on numerous occasions that he hated war ever before. In him all that was pure and lofty in
and all that it brought. He also brought out, how¬ mind and purpose found lodgement. He came
ever, that "once committed to war then [one nearer the ideal of a soldier and Christian general
should] be ferocious enough to do whatever is nec¬ than any man we can think of."
essary to get it over with as quickly as possible in In a speech given in 1874, Sen. Benjamin H.
victory." Hill of Georgia summed up the greatness of Robert
The difference, of course, was that Edward Lee:
Schwarzkopf, in lawful combat, directed his feroci¬ He was a foe without hate, a friend without
ty toward legitimate military targets of the enemy,
treachery, a soldier without cruelty, and a victim
while Sherman illegally directed his ferocity
without murmuring. He was a public officer with¬
toward innocent and helpless civilians. Obviously,
out vices, a private citizen without wrong, a
it was only in this limited analogy to the concept of
neighbor without hypocrisy, and a man without
"ferocity" that Gen. Schwarzkopf paid respect to
guilt. He was Caesar without his ambition,
William T. Sherman. From both military and legal
Frederick without his tyranny, Napoleon without
perspectives, Gen. Schwarzkopf was not advocat¬
his selfishness, and Washington without his
ing the United States military should find anything
reward. O
positive associated with Gen. Sherman.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 Late 1942, America
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 The Next Japanese-
flmerican War by Meredith LeBard and George Friedman

[Ed's Intro: Meredith LeBard afid George Friedman are tantly, oil. The more successful Japan's indus¬
co-authors of the recent best-selling and politically trial plant, the more dependent she becomes
incorrect book, The Coming War With Japan. As soon on foreign sources of raw materials.
as I read it, I got in touch with them and asked if they'd Like all nations, Japan is concerned with the
like to do a piece for us expanding on the military immediate physical security of its territory, and
aspects of their thesis. Herewith is their excellent therefore has an interest in controlling its immedi¬
response.] ate physical environment. Unlike most countries,
however, Japan has another zone of interest — its
In our book, The Coming War With Japan, we economic zone — which is not at all identical to its
attempted to explain why a war between the U.S. physical zone of interest. Because of her geograph¬
and Japan is likely within the next 20 years. We did ic isolation, Japan's physical security zone is
not have an opportunity to go very deeply into how
extremely modest compared with that of other
such a war might be fought, but merely asserted great powers. Japan's zone of economic interests,
that American victory in it, though likely, is not a
on the other hand, is geographically vast, and
foregone conclusion. expanding along with her economy.
The precise shape of a war 20-30 years hence is
The first U.S.-Japanese War occurred because
hardly knowable, but it is at least amusing, and
Japan attempted to expand its politico-military
possibly useful and instructive, to extrapolate from
power, its zone of physical security, to make it
geography and technology to try to glimpse its coincide with her zone of economic interests. To be
shape. At the very least, such speculation forces us more precise, Japan's vast economic interests were
to consider the fundamentals of war, such as the contracted to the maximum limit her military
correlation of forces at the moment of conflict, the power could control and defend. The Greater East
nature of the prevalent technologies involved, and Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACS) was an over¬
the strategic and geopolitical situation that will
lay of the minimum area of economic dominance
determine the victor. Such an examination also
Japan's economy required and the maximum area
provides opportunity to consider the extent to
her military forces could (theoretically) control. As
which Japan must master the hard lessons of the
it turned out, however, the GEACS proved not
first U.S.-Japanese War. quite sufficient for Japan's economic needs, and a
bit too much for her military power.
Japan's Strategic Imperatives During the Cold War, the U.S. guaranteed
Let's begin by considering the underlying ele¬ Japan's physical and economic security zones. The
ments driving Japanese security policy. cost for Japan was political and strategic subordi¬
1. Japan is located in one of the emptiest corners nation to the U.S. During the Korean War, for
of the globe. Only the Korean peninsula instance, the islands served as a base for logistical
comes close to the Japanese archipelago, and and air support of the war. During the Vietnam
therefore has historically represented the War, Japan again served an important logistical
most immediate source of threat to Japan. function. Throughout the Cold War, Japan's geog¬
The neutralization of Korea is the first, raphy, and its passive willingness to permit
though not necessarily the most complex, American forces to utilize that geography, effec¬
dimension of Japanese foreign policy. tively bottled the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of
2. Japan was the last major power to industrial¬ Japan. This made control of the Pacific relatively
ize. This has meant, among other things, her easy for the U.S., barring an amphibious assault on
economy has been fueled less by domestic Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island.
consumption than by exports. In a world Thus we see Japan has had two models for pur¬
undergoing cyclical protectionism, the domi¬ suing its national security interests. In the Cold War
nation of foreign markets of appropriate size model, Japan relied on another power, one tied to
and type becomes a central foreign policy her for geopolitical reasons, to guarantee her securi¬
goal for Tokyo. ty and economic interests. In the other model, the
3. Japan is a geological freak: she is the only Pre-World War II pattern, Japan felt compelled to
industrial power totally lacking in most rely on its own strength to secure its national secu¬
essential industrial minerals — most impor¬ rity interests, essentially without allies.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 45
 Japan's pre-1945 politico-military strategy had the harbor itself inoperable, as such a development
four geographical elements. would have made American naval operations west
1. The domination of an interior security zone of the International Dateline at least temporarily
by the direct occupation of Korea and impossible. Destroying battleships — or even air¬
Taiwan, and control of adjacent waters. craft carriers — was secondary; bombing oil tanks
2. The creation of an exclusive trading relation¬ or dry docks was more useful. But even with that,
ship with Manchukuo, and later all of north¬ there could be no substitute for the actual seizure
east China, designed to substitute for the lost of the Hawaiian Islands, which would have
American and European markets. required the U.S. to mount a massive operation to
3. Securing exclusive control of a resource zone retake them before beginning any assault on the
running on a line from Burma-Malaya- main defensive perimeter of the Japanese Empire.
Netherlands East Indies-New Guinea. Hawaii, not the Marshalls, should have been the
4. Securing those areas by seizing the eastern terminus of the Japanese drives.
Philippines (for north-south access) and But the Japanese could not invade and occupy
establishing an eastern frontier on a line run¬ Hawaii because of their over-commitment in
ning from Wake to the Gilberts, then south¬ China. They had considered seizing Oahu, but
west to the Solomons. were forced to reject the idea. First, they needed
The defect of the Japanese strategy lay in that it their transports and landing craft for the other por¬
was driven by direct interests — the direct tions of their offensive. Second, the troops needed
approach. That is, Japan's primary interest was to take Oahu were also committed to the other
China, where her economic stake was greatest. By amphibious operations their broad-front and light¬
single-mindedly pursuing that interest, the ning strikes elsewhere required. The China opera¬
Japanese found themselves with the bulk of their tions, coupled with the diffuse vastness of the new
ground forces tied down on the Asian mainland. centrifugal offensives, made it impossible for the
Instead of dealing first with her main military Japanese to concentrate their forces.
adversaries — the Anglo-Americans — Japan In sum, they attempted simultaneous — rather
squandered her power on a secondary foe under than sequential — operations. This meant,
the illusion such a direct approach was best. inevitably, the Pearl Harbor strike as carried out
Because of this fundamental strategic error, might be a tactical/operational success, but would
Japan was forced into World War II with inade¬ certainly be a strategic failure. The U.S. Navy was
quate resources, and then committed those not knocked out of the war for any strategically
resources to a series of strategically and opera¬ significant length of time.
tionally flawed campaigns.
Japan's World War II strategy included:
Lessons Learned and Future
1. Using its temporary advantage in carriers to
deliver a smashing blow to American naval Japanese Strategy
power in the Pacific, by striking at Pearl Japan tends to be the weaker and more vulner¬
Harbor. able power when it encounters the U.S. The
2. Conducting a rapid offensive using light Japanese weakness is rooted in their inability to
infantry, buttressed by strong naval support, threaten fundamental American interests. The
to seize an appropriate resource zone — North American continent is both relatively self-
including the Malay peninsula, the Nether¬ sufficient and beyond Japan's power to neutralize
lands East Indies, New Guinea and Singa¬ or occupy. Thus, in any conflict with the United
pore — thus sealing off the Pacific from the States, Japan starts in the strategically inferior posi¬
Indian Ocean. tion. All of its chips are on the table, while the U.S.
3. Seizing the Philippines in a behind-the-front can be choosy about what it places at risk.
operation, mopping up at leisure. Paradoxically, as seen in World War II, Japan is
4. Isolating the main theater of battle by creating forced by this imbalance of risks to increase its
an in-depth defense to the east of the main aggressiveness, attempting to force a decision
north-south line, in order to prevent any through swift, preemptive blows.
American naval movement to relieve the Japan's strategy in any future confrontation
Philippines or Southeast Asia. Using overlap¬ with the U.S. must be to seize assets crucial to the
ping air defense zones to hold the region functioning of its own' economy, and construct a
while the main fleet attended to affairs in the defense that imposes costs for recovery greater
southwest. than what the United States would rationally be
5. Relying on events in the Atlantic to prevent willing to pay. The Japanese failure to do just that
the British from bringing a decisive force to in World War II lay in her miscalculating the
bear and to divert American power. American valuation of the seized assets, and over¬
The destruction of the existing American fleet estimating the effort necessary to recover them. By
should not have been the central purpose of the the time they discovered their error, the Japanese
Pearl Harbor attack. The real key lay in rendering were no longer in a position to raise the cost of

46JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

recovery for the Americans to truly unacceptable Japanese base. The Philippines are in chaos and
levels. officially neutral, though American and Japanese
The fundamental strategic principle for Japan arms are being shipped frantically to various mili¬
must therefore be to strike first and decisively and tant factions and ethnic groups. Much of mainland
thus raise the price of recovering seized assets China is likewise linked to Japan and receives sub¬
beyond America's estimation of their value. stantial support from Tokyo, while coastal China is
Let's then assume the following. In the year under the sway of the U.S., Taiwan, and possibly
2010, the Pacific Basin has been divided into two other western powers.
blocs. The more industrialized parts of Asia, whose The United States, seeing itself being forced
economic and strategic interests are least compati¬ out of Asian markets, and becoming increasingly
ble with Japan's — Taiwan and the Korean penin¬ uneasy about Japanese expansionism and growing
sula — are Allied with the United States. The less military strength, presses Tokyo politically, trying
developed nations — including Malaysia, to sabotage Japanese relations in the region
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam — are linked to through the judicious use of arms sales, infusions
Japan economically and politically. Singapore has of capital, and covert operations. The U.S. also tries
become a key American facility; Cam Ranh Bay is a to interfere with Japan's access to raw materials. In

47
COMMAND MAGAZINE
 particular, the American presence in Singapore, Assume therefore a Japanese-American nuc¬
and the constant patrolling of American hunter- lear stalemate. Assume further Beijing retains
killer submarines outside, and sometimes inside, direct control over most of China, and then enters
Indonesian waters, is a constant reminder to Japan into satisfactory economic and political arrange¬
of the precariousness of her position. ments with Japan (while remaining formally neu¬
Assume further that U.S. pressure becomes tral), and Japan avoids the trap of the 1930s by
sufficient to cause Japan to wish to rectify the situ¬ resisting a premature over-commitment in China.
ation. What strategy ought Japan follow, and what This leaves Japan the task of securing Southeast
forces would it have to carry out such a task? In Asia, along with the sea lanes between Indonesia
other words, what kind of preemptive strike and her own islands.
should Japan consider against the U.S. sphere? In general, securing those north-south lines of
In such a new war, as in the last one, the basic supply and communication would require Japan to
Japanese strategic principle remains to make her force U.S. forces to a position east of a line running
zones of economic interest and military power south from Tokyo to New Guinea, which we might
coincide. The same operational principle remains call the "Imperial Line." Key to this line would be
as well: since Japan is unable to defeat and occupy the choke points behind it.
the U.S., but is itself vulnerable to defeat and occu¬ As in 1941-42, the seizure of Singapore is the
pation, she must make the price of waging war too centerpiece of the drive. Also as in 1941-42, the
high for the U.S. to be willing to pay it. This must immediate question is how to prevent the United
be done by a judicious seizure of territory and with States from counterattacking and cutting the lines
an economy of force. of supply to Japan. In 1941-42, the Philippines were
Therefore, Japan's strategic tasks will be: the central part of that problem. In 2010, Korea and
1. Maintaining sea lane control from the Indian Taiwan together will play essentially the same role
Ocean to the South China Sea, and north of as the Philippines did in the earlier war. That is,
the Formosa Straits. from air bases in southern Korea, American and
2. Maintaining good relations with China with¬ ROK aircraft would be able to interdict shipping in
out committing substantial forces to the those southeasterly sea lanes.
mainland, at least prior to settling matters Assuming Japanese forces would be able to
with the Americans. control the approaches to Japan sufficiently to pre¬
3. Neutralizing the presence of U.S. and allied vent U.S. and Allied amphibious operations being
troops in Korea and Taiwan, in order to launched from out of Korea, and assuming the
secure a zone of physical security. Japanese navy would be able to seal off the sea
4. Creating a defensive system across the lanes leading to Korea, it is unlikely offensive oper¬
Central Pacific, at least extending from the ations against Japan proper could be carried out
Bonins through the Marianas to Truk. from that peninsula. Therefore, the key to the
5. Neutralizing the threat of an American "Korea Problem" for the Japanese would be a pre¬
nuclear strike. emptive strike against air and missile bases there, as
That last is less a military problem than a psy¬ well as port facilities. Without that, a nasty air duel
chological one. The mention of nuclear weapons could drag on for an indefinite time, until reserves
frequently adjourns all rational discussion of strat¬ of material and POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants)
egy, on the assumption there can be no serious were exhausted — which would represent a
non-nuclear strategy in the face of nuclear tremendous loss of time and strength to Japan.
weapons. This is an odd assertion. Taiwan would be a more difficult problem. If the
From 1945 to the present, there have been end¬ U.S. were to base substantial air forces on the island
less wars where the interests of nuclear powers and were able to maintain their resupply, a Japanese
were attacked by non-nuclear powers, or where amphibious approach would be extremely difficult.
nuclear powers were defeated without employing At the same time, though, Taiwan sits directly
their nuclear weapons. It is an extraordinary fact astride Japan's sea lanes. Avoiding that island would
nuclear weapons have not been used in war even require Japanese ships to pass east of the Philippines.
once since Nagasaki. A reasonable assumption can An American air base on Palau would be sufficient
therefore be made that the utility of nuclear to block that path, if backed up by air and sea forces
weapons has been vastly overestimated. in the Marianas and on Guam. Assuming, then, the
During the 1950s and 1960$, the U.S. assumed US carries out a rational defense policy in the Pacific,
nuclear weapons could compensate for the lack of a there would be no alternative for the Japanese other
host of other strategic weapons. We have since than to neutralize Taiwan.
learned they do not. The most reasonable assumption The Japanese neutralization of Taiwan could,
that can be made is nuclear weapons limit the scope again, be achieved either by direct or indirect
of war between great powers: the total defeat and approach. Since a direct amphibious assault would
occupation of any nuclear power becomes impossible, be both costly and time-consuming, the indirect
since we assume nuclear weapons would be approach would be preferable. For example, Japan
employed to prevent national political annihilation. could seize Luzon and thus bracket Taiwan. This

48 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

move would also be preferable in that it would be manpower to put on the ground — there is no
head off any US seizure of the Philippines. China front — but the number of ships available.
At any rate, both Singapore and Taiwan must
be rapidly neutralized. This is particularly true of The Revolution in Weapons and
Singapore, where shore based anti-ship missiles
could easily threaten the movement of tankers. Japanese Strategy
If operational and tactical surprise are What resources would the Japanese need to
achieved, and if the Japanese prepare carefully for carry out simultaneous and divergent strikes?
the ASW tasks, there is no reason to believe they Obviously, the answer to that depends on the evo¬
cannot achieve the quick neutralization of both lution of technology between now and 2010. The
those places. The second phase, the actual clearing attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out with air¬
and occupation of Taiwan and Singapore, would craft carriers projecting war planes that lacked the
then have to be carried out in conjunction with a range to attack Pearl Harbor from the nearest
move to the strategic defensive by means of an Japanese-held ground facilities. Thus, the airplanes
operational offensive: the securing of the Imperial had to be sailed into range to drop iron bombs and
Line, from which to withstand American counter¬ simple torpedoes. Will carriers be required to bring
attacks, resupply efforts, and feints. Japanese strike aircraft into range in 2010?
The more general problem of securing the If that were the case, even assuming Singapore,
Imperial Line would ultimately depend on Korea and Taiwan could be hit from land installa¬
American strategy. The main American Pacific tions, Tinian, Saipan, Guam and Palau would all
bases will continue to be at Pearl Harbor, the need to have naval/air battle groups targeted
Marianas, and Singapore. against them, each containing, probably, at least
The U.S. lines of supply and communication four large carriers. Thus, using such World War II
from Guam to Singapore will be tenuous at best. methods, a Japanese fleet of 20 aircraft carriers,
Therefore, the U.S. will have to decide the quantity accompanied by other major surface combatants,
of forces to be based at Singapore. Prior to World amphibious warfare groups, plus numerous ASW
War II, the U.S. chose to withdraw the bulk of the assets spread out in all areas north of Singapore,
Asiatic Fleet to Pearl Harbor, on the theory resup¬ would be required.
plying the fleet in Manila would be impossible in Such a force would strain the capacities of
the event of war. That was sound strategy. One Japan to support it, even if the number of carriers
would assume the same reasoning would apply in per target were reduced to three, or even two.
the future: Singapore would be stripped of its carri¬ Further, such a vast, diffuse offensive carries with
er battle groups. Their place would be taken by a it obvious Command, Control, Communications
squadron of fast attack craft for shore protection and Intelligence (C3I) problems as well, which
and anti-tanker operations, hunter-killer sub¬ could be deadly to an operation where success
marines, and land-based maritime attack aircraft. might hinge on surprise. Obviously, then, Japan
If Singapore were thus stripped, the main for¬ will be forced to explore alternatives to the now
ward American facilities would be in the Marianas, traditional naval airstrike as the opening gambit.
Tinian, Saipan, Guam and Palau. Palau, in particu¬ It's not clear that by 2010 munitions will still
lar, would have the responsibility for security require proximate weapons platforms for their
south of Mindanao, and the Marianas responsibili¬ delivery. A revolution has and is taking place in
ty for the area to the north. Japanese forces munitions technology. Ever since the explosive-
assigned later to Taiwan would have to be aug¬ tube-projectile combination was invented, the
mented for operations against the Marianas, while essential reality has been that ballistics governed
forces assigned to Singapore would also have to the movement of the projectile once out of the tube.
deal with Palau. The initial Japanese strikes against But the invention of highly efficient rocket and jet
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan would have to be fuels, and computerized guidance systems, is end¬
supported by other strikes aimed at Tinian, Saipan, ing the tyranny of ballistics.
Guam and Palau. Munitions launched from aircraft or ships close
In all, seven U.S. bases, each with multiple tar¬ to enemy vessels can now maneuver with precision.
gets on or within them, would have to be hit simul¬ More important, munitions launched from substan¬
taneously by the Japanese. (We assume, like French tial distances, even intercontinental distances, can
Gen. Gamelin, who expected another 1914 now be maneuvered toward individual enemy ves¬
Schlieffen sweep in 1940, CINCPAC will brace for sels. By 2010, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
another strike at Pearl Harbor by dispersing the might render traditional weapons platforms (ships
U.S. fleet. Such a move actually would enable the and planes) too vulnerable for tactical deployment.
Japanese to forgo an attack.) Instead of one deadly The basic tactical issue between now and then
blow, then, the new war would begin with a series becomes the survivability of those traditional
of blows, each followed by amphibious assaults or weapons platforms in the age of PGM.
complex naval envelopments and isolations. This The current U.S. cruise missile is one particu¬
time the main limitation on the invaders would not larly intriguing example of the potential for

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 extreme range and accuracy already available. The important targets to be located are enemy ships,
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor required planes deliv¬ whose mobility will defy ground-based C3I plat¬
er their munitions to within sight of their targets. A forms.
2010 attack on Tinian or Palau might be delivered The crucial C3I platform will therefore be the
from a base in Japan, which was itself protected by maneuverable satellite, which will become essen¬
strong anti-air and anti-missile systems. tial for both strategic and tactical intelligence.
There are, of course, obvious weaknesses in Satellites currently provide precise navigational
cruise missiles — most notably their subsonic data. Combining navigational capabilities with sur¬
speed and the inability of their terminal guidance veillance, satellites in 2010 will be able to acquire
mechanism to find and attack targets which may targets, trigger missile launches, and guide those
have moved between the time of the missile's missiles to their targets, even if the targets have
launch and arrival. A cruise missile attack on ships maneuvered substantially since launch. Such sys¬
at sea might therefore suffer from the twin prob¬ tems may be automated, with surveillance data
lems of having the attack telegraphed at launch uplinked to the satellite and processed on board.
and then foiled by the targets' maneuvering. Alternatively, the data might be continually down¬
Finally, cruise missiles today are susceptible to linked to an earth station, which would then relay
intercept and destruction, while their range is lim¬ commands to various missile launch sites.
ited by fuel capacity. Since the possibility for Electronic Warfare
(EW) interference is doubled with a second
sequencing of data, and since it is still hard to
imagine the creation of a fully automated C3I satel¬
lite system by 2010, it might follow that it would be
necessary to station humans aboard space plat¬
forms for real-time battle management. It might
even be useful to base missiles aboard the orbital
platforms, thus eliminating the need for any com¬
Specifications for the U.S. General Dynamics BGM-109 mand downlink.
"Tomahawk." In any case, the evolution of missile technology
Dimensions: length 21 ft.; diameter 21 in.; span 8 ft., 4 in. that we have been discussing would create a new
Weight: 2,645 - 2,794 lbs. strategic problem in the Pacific. In 1941, the essen¬
tial tactical problem was one of mobile weapons
Warhead: 1,000 lb. high explosive
platforms, and the way to strategic success lay in
Performance: speed Mach 0.7; max. range 1,609 miles.
the elimination of those same enemy mobile
weapons platforms. Put more simply, the problem
was really preventing the enemy from being able
Will future generations of missiles evolved from the likes of this American to strike, and the destruction of enemy weapons
"Tomahawk" become the arbiters of 21st century warfare? platforms was an efficient way to achieve that end.
If, however, the evolution of missiles we've fore¬
Of course, over the next quarter-century, the seen here actually takes place — and it almost cer¬
likelihood of stealthy, hypersonic missiles, with tainly will — then the elimination of mobile
sophisticated terminal guidance, increases to near weapons platforms would no longer necessarily
certainty. Both stealth and radically increased destroy an enemy's firepower and ability to wage
velocity are already being worked into new missile war. The dispersal of missiles to many small sites
designs. If range can also be increased, then the would make their pre-launch destruction difficult.
need for close approach by a weapons platform is The solution to the "missile problem," then,
finally eliminated. will not be found with ground based systems, but
We therefore feel confident in positing that the rather by destroying the enemy's ability to collect
opening round, targeted against vessels at sea, as intelligence about targets, communicate with
well as those in port and planes on airfields, will be "smart" weapons able to destroy located targets, to
carried out by missiles. (It should also be noted control the missiles en route to targets, and to com¬
here the Japanese today already run one of the mand warfare in general.
most sophisticated tactical missile development The simple solution would be to perfect EW
programs in the world, and have already complet¬ systems to interfere with satellite signals. But since
ed preliminary work on hypervelocity.) experience in war has already shown that guaran¬
In 1941, the key weapons system in the Pacific teeing the permanent success of any EW solution is
was the aircraft carrier. In 2010, the key will be the impossible, a less subtle capability may actually be
C3I platform, which secures intelligence on the central for defense in the future: the ability to
location of targets, communicates data in real time destroy space based platforms located, in all likeli¬
to command centers controlling available missiles, hood, in geostationary orbits above the Pacific at
and launches those missiles in a timely way against the equator, from 150°-160° east latitude.
appropriate targets. In a large naval war, the most Alternatively (or supplementarily) maneuverable

50 JULY-AUG 1992
ISSUE 17
craft, with sufficient power to remain in temporary tical control of sea lanes and as air support in
orbits at lower altitudes, may also be engaged in ground combat. The second aspect, as we've
combat tasks. already described above, would involve both sides'
The seven-target-attack discussed above would attempts to destroy their enemy's strategic C3I
therefore have as its preliminary an assault on assets dedicated to observation of the Straits from
those orbiting battle management platforms. orbits high above it.
Current Anti-Satellite (ASAT) technology assumes
such platforms will be non-maneuverable and Conclusions — The Japanese
undefended. As the importance of those platforms
grows, however, and the potential threats to them Solution
increase, we can assume both their own maneuver From all this, we can see that, in the most gen¬
and defense capabilities will likewise enlarge. eral sense, any new war begun by the Japanese
The initial Japanese task therefore will most would start with their clearing of the sea lanes
likely involve a surprise attack to destroy from Malacca to the Formosa Straits. Such a strate¬
American battle management platforms. They gy would consist of the following operations.
would follow that up with coordinated attacks Opening Strikes:
against American ground facilities holding 1. Attacks on space based Cal platforms and
weapons platforms capable of launching proximate other American offensive capabilities in
munitions against Japanese ships and bases. space, in low orbit, or on the ground.
During World War II, limits on Japanese pro¬ 2. Attacks on tactical and operational facilities in
duction imposed by mineral shortages made it Singapore, Palau, Guam, Tinian, Saipan,
impossible for them to recover from battles such as Taiwan and Korea.
Midway — materiel losses could not be made up Follow-Up, Short-Term Operations:
fast enough. The relative decline in importance of 1. Opening systematic ASW operations against
industrially complex and demanding systems, such U.S. submarines, designed to prohibit their
as capital ships, and the growth in importance of operations west of the Imperial Line.
technologically advanced but industrially unde¬ 2. Initiate an air-sea blockade against Korea,
manding systems such as missiles, would work to designed to seal off that peninsula from rein¬
the advantage of the Japanese. The new importance forcement and prevent its serving as an effec¬
of non-resource-consuming laboratories designing tive base for US/Allied operations against
weapons and satellites plays to Japanese strength. Japan.
The U.S. should be able to match such develop¬ 3. Begin the process of neutralizing Taiwan as a
ments, but the advantage that would have gone to base for sea lane interdiction. (Failure to neu¬
the larger country in the smokestack era of more tralize will require costly assault and occupa¬
brutish industrial undertakings will be missing. tion of the island.)
The outcome of a new Japanese-American war 4. Movement into areas east of the Imperial
is not easily predictable. The Japanese have an Line, from Wake to Fiji, to create tactical
extensive space program already underway. They zones of interdiction as far east as possible.
have already become the third nation to send an Long Term Operations:
unmanned craft to orbit the moon, and they are 1. Project power into space in order to preclude
well along with plans for space planes and stations. American space operations. Seize all key geo¬
In addition, the Japanese have emphasized the stationary points and control them with forti¬
development of tactical missile technology, from fied platforms.
hand-held anti-tank to large air-to-air devices. The 2. Conduct space-based and submarine interdic¬
needed technologies for all these new kinds of war¬ tions east of Hawaii, designed to isolate and,
fare are clearly within growing Japanese capabili¬ if possible, destroy U.S. forces massing there
ties. for amphibious counter-operations.
By 2010, we may have crossed the threshold to 3. Place pressure on an isolated Australia, New
a radically new type of warfare, in which the tradi¬ Zealand, and independent Pacific states,
tional battle platform has been eliminated and OI designed to force them into a neutral, negoti¬
platforms have become the capital weapons sys¬ ated peace, and deny their territories as bases
tems. for U.S. counterattacks. (Failing that, mount
Under such new war making circumstances, selected amphibious operations.)
the control of the Straits of Malacca, for example,
would have two aspects. One would be its tactical The American Strategy
control based on ground installations, fast attack We have been concentrating on Japanese solu¬
boats, and submarines, along with the missiles they tions, since, in many ways, they have the most
could launch. Conventional aircraft, relatively interesting battle problem as the aggressor force.
immune to strategic interdiction once airborne, will The American solution, in general, is as old as War
still play important roles, both as part of missile Plan Orange, which had its origins in Pre-World
defense systems and as weapons platforms for tac¬ War I days.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 That plan called for: 1) temporarily accepting American survival at the beginning of the war
Japanese control of the Philippines and Central will depend on the ability of its interdictive
Pacific; 2) concentrating the main U.S. fleet at Pearl weapons systems — ground bases, space bases,
Harbor; and 3) conducting a counteroffensive in submarines — to survive the initial assault and
the Central Pacific, aimed at forcing a decisive then be able to interfere with the Japanese ability to
engagement there with the Japanese fleet (which, maneuver. Such interdictions would be the key to
in turn, forces the capitulation of Japan). preventing the initiation of the second phase of
The nexus of War Plan Orange was its assump¬ Japanese operations.
tion that the American ability to construct and con¬ During World War II, the ability of the U.S.
centrate a decisive battle fleet was far greater than submarine force to continue interdiction while the
the Japanese ability to replace their losses. Given other strategic forces regrouped was important to
that, the imposition of attrition, coupled with ultimate success. The same remains true today, and
American strategic mobility, against ever weaker will be even more so in 2010.
Japanese forces, could have only one outcome, the In the end, the natural advantage is still with
defeat of the islanders. Indeed, that was (broadly) the United States. America can never be put at risk
what happened. The offensive power of the in a war the way Japan can. America, a vast conti¬
Japanese fleet was broken at Midway, and its rem¬ nental power, is both self-sufficient in most war
nants were systematically crushed in the Great making resources and self-contained in its national
Mariana Turkey Shoot and Leyte Gulf. supply lines. Japan, on the other hand, is neither
The ability to overwhelm the Japanese in brute self-contained nor free from having to maintain
industrial production is still the American strong long and vulnerable lines of supply.
suite. But the ability of the U.S. to be assured of Speculations on wars 20-30 years hence is,
maintaining the technological supremacy neces¬ obviously, interesting but frustrating. But appreci¬
sary to hold the strategic geostationary points and ation of the performance of the geopolitical rela¬
deny them to the Japanese is less certain. The U.S. tionship between the world's two greatest
may well be able to do it, but the certainty the War economies is not. Such study and conjecture drives
Plan Orange designers had in overall American home the necessity which ultimately governs rela¬
warmaking supremacy is no longer there. tions between them. O

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 Poland *39 by Pat McTaggart

[Ed's Note: In this article, all German units are shown The German port of Danzig was declared a "Free
in italic, and all Polish in plain text.] City." Although Danzig was internally controlled
by an overwhelmingly German city population
Background to War and its legislature, the Poles were put in charge of
On 3 November 1918, the Polish Republic was its customs offices and foreign affairs, and main¬
proclaimed in Warsaw. The creation of an indepen¬ tained a military presence.
dent Poland had recently become an Allied war As Poland was coming into being, Adolf Hitler
aim, and with the end of World War I, the victors lay in a hospital, recovering from blindness suf¬
went about the business of carving up eastern fered in an Allied gas attack. Like most Germans,
Europe. Poland's borders were fixed by the Treaty Hitler regarded the separation of East Prussia,
of St. Germain, the Versailles Treaty, and — after a along with the resultant "Polish Corridor," as a
bitter and see-saw 18-month war with the nascent national disgrace. Twenty years later, as leader of
Soviet Union — the Treaty of Riga. the Third Reich, he sent his armies to avenge the
The men who redrew the map of Europe tried "Shame of Versailles," and in so doing triggered
to please everyone, and — of course — in so doing, the greatest conflict in history.
actually pleased no one. Poland was given a land Prior to the 1939 invasion, reclamation of lost
corridor to the Baltic Sea, thus placing thousands of German territory was already a large part of
Germans under Warsaw's control, and separating Berlin's foreign policy. The Saar, Upper Silesia,
East Prussia from the rest of the Weimar Republic. Austria, Memel, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia
were all incorporated into the Reich with lit¬
tle real opposition from the Allies.
Accordingly, even though Poland had a
defense treaty with Britain and France, Hitler
did not believe the westerners would go to
war to defend a country barely two decades
old.
On 23 August 1939, the fate of Poland
was sealed when German Foreign Minister
Jochim von Ribbentropp signed a non¬
aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
Included within the pact was a secret codicil
dividing Poland between the two totalitarian
powers. With the threat of a two-front war
thus at least temporarily removed, Hitler
issued instructions to his generals to proceed
with the plan to invade Poland. He set 1
September as the date for operations to
begin.
German planning foresaw the battle for
Poland developing in the following manner.
Army Group North's 3rd Army, attacking
from East Prussia, would send the bulk of its
forces directly toward Warsaw. One corps
would swing west to link up with 4th Army,
cutting the Polish Corridor. That combined
force would drive south to link up with
Army Group South's forces at the juncture of
the Oder and Vistula Rivers.
Army Group South's 8th Army would
push toward Warsaw, while establishing
contact with 4th Army on its left flank. The
10th Army's task was to sweep across central
Poland and reach the Bug River, thus effec-

54 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 tively cutting the country into northern and south¬ Army Croup North,
ern halves. Finally, the southern-most German
army, the 14th, was to attack through the moun¬ 1-3 September
tainous region of southern Poland and capture the At 4:40 a.m. on 1 September 1939, Luftwaffe air¬
fortress town of Lvov, while at the same time pre¬ craft began the systematic destruction of the Polish
venting retreating enemy units from escaping to air force. Five minutes later, the vintage (1906) bat¬
Hungary and Romania (then neutral countries). tleship Schleswig-Holstein, which was officially on a
The Polish commanders unwittingly helped "courtesy call" to Danzig, opened fire on the Polish
the German planners by concentrating their forces fortress of Westerplatte in the harbor. Meanwhile,
near the border between their two countries. They Kriegsmarine submarine and surface units blockad¬
did this out of a misguided political determination ed Polish Baltic ports, preventing ships of the
to hold all of Poland, rather than take up the excel¬ Polish navy from escaping to friendly countries.
lent interior defensive positions provided by the (Luckily for the Poles, their five-boat submarine
Narew, Vistula and San Rivers. fleet was already at sea.)

Organization of Polish Ground

Forces for War, 1 Sept. 1939

1P07ZE1 ^ tiifer |
iai- ribiK^rfTp^
udziadz [jte mi
[±>
1

til I vHof the High C

(around Wars
trsr-dbw [ft
Oth^:
Rza
X ISTXXl II III I__ pG^Northern Qlm
-IZI &=w| 02Lt | IOf | 5> l2rGroup
[fj* wllenskaI^F
3 \±M-
i r H5H & &
Krakowsk £ K s | | lit” | dod tin I
dS tbL^- eh
III Border Guard or Fortress Troops

| •f | Armored Train
: *5rib S'
tp™ &
R= Reserve

COMMAND MAGAZINE 55
 The opening minutes of the ground battle bridges before German ground troops could cap¬
almost cost the Germans one of their best generals. ture them. Some artillery and Luftwaffe units mis¬
Heinz Guderian, accompanying the forward ele¬ takenly attacked their own troops, but German
ments of the 3rd Panzer Brigade, came under fire casualties remained light, and the errors did little
from his own artillery. His command car ended up to prevent the attackers from advancing in all sec¬
in a ditch, with shells exploding around it, but tors.
Guderian was not even scratched. As troops of the Danzig Brigade fought for con¬
A dense fog kept the Luftwaffe from carrying trol of that city from within, elements of the 3rd
out many planned close support missions. In many and 4th Armies began their drive to seal the
places that inactivity allowed the Poles to blow up Corridor.

& «

XXX XXX XXX XXX

H21 plfl Wodrig (Special EjMl9 Mot. |S<J2
“^'"“Purpose Corps) ^
I I I--1
■ p m &
XX,<xx German Ground Forces used
[soi
for the Invasion of Poland,
1 Sept. 1939

^""^168 Mt
~hxx

M°
| |
1 .i 1-1

fro
m & m m B _ XX XX _XX_
f
_XX_
7
XX XX XX
05

?■ jt
&
56 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17
ARMY GROUP NORTH
BALTIC SEA
AS OF CLOSE OF FIRST PHASE
OF OPERATIONS
Konigsberg
3 September 1939

0_1_2_32_£_3°
S
EAST PRUSSIA

Mohrungen

GERMANY f?/

Guderian's 19th Motorized Corps, supported by tion of Warsaw. The 1st Corps immediately ran
an infantry corps on each flank, forced the Polish into stiff resistance from the Polish 1st Infantry
9th Infantry Division and Pomorska Cavalry Division and Nowogradzka Cavalry Brigade. The
Brigade to withdraw behind the Brda River. Poles fell back to a fortified area around the town
Though the Poles destroyed the bridges spanning of Mlawa, and waited there for the Germans to
the river, the 3rd Panzer Division's motorcycle bat¬ advance.
talion was able to establish a bridgehead on the
eastern bank, using rubber boats to ferry the men
across. By the end of the first day, engineers had
built a pontoon bridge over the Brda, and motor¬
ized elements were rushing to meet their comrades
from 3rd Army, who were by then advancing from
the east.
Though the Poles were generally stunned by
the initial onslaught, a few Polish commanders
quickly organized counterattacks. However, the
Poles' tactics and weapons could not match those
of the German mechanized units. The 3rd Panzer
Division reported a massed attack (probably from
Pomorska Cavalry Brigade) on that first day. "It
was like something out of World War I," an officer
noted. "Massed squadrons charging with sabres
drawn. Our machine guns decimated row after
row of enemy riders. They would retire, regroup,
and come again until none were left."
While 4th Army moved eastward, 3rd Army
crossed the East Prussian border. Its 21st Corps
advanced southwest to meet 4th Army, while 1st A dead Polish tanker lies next to his burned out light tank, a PZI Tk.3,
Corps and Corps Wodrig moved south in the direc¬ on the road to Mlawa.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 57
 Panzer Division Kempf, an ad hoc unit centered lightning German drive directly to Warsaw by the
around the 7th Panzer Regiment and the S.S. shortest route.
Motorized Infantry Regiment Deutschland, ran Meanwhile, the somewhat lengthy Polish
straight into the withering fire from the Mlawa mobilization plans had been wrecked, thanks to
defenses. Polish bunkers and minefields dotted the Luftwaffe strikes on rail and communications cen¬
landscape, and the defenders' interlocking fields of ters. But those troops who had been called up in
fire made open movement hazardous. S.S. assault the last days before the war started were for the
troops suffered heavy casualties as they worked to most part able to reach their assigned positions.
breach the bunkers, and Polish anti-tank fire One such unit, the 1st Reserve Cavalry
destroyed 7 panzers and damaged 32 more. Regiment, reached the northern front on 2
Kempf was forced to call for help from the 11th September. Due to German control of the air, the
and 61st Infantry Divisions. Three days of heavy horsemen had been forced to use trails through
fighting were needed before the Poles were finally wooded areas instead of the main roads. "The
compelled to give up Mlawa. The stand at Mlawa Luftwaffe was everywhere," one survivor recalled.
had blunted what otherwise could have been a "They hit us every place we went. We lost our field

The War in the Air On the whole, the Poles suffered devastating sur¬
In September 1939, the bulk of the Luftwaffe was prise from the suddenness, ferocity and potency of the
concentrated against Poland in a gamble that France Germans' attack. The notable exception was their air
would not move against Germany's western border. In force. With the German bombers, including half of
the east, German airpower was organized into two Lohr's group, striking airfields, the Polish ground facili¬
Luftflotten (Air Fleets). Luftflotte 1, under the command ties were hit hard. But their aircraft had been well dis¬
Albert Kesselring, supported Army Group North; persed and hidden and, contrary to German plans, the
Luftflotte 2, under Alexander Lohr, supported of Army Luftwaffe failed to destroy a large number of Polish
Group South. planes on the ground. The Polish Air Force survived,
The flyers' objective was the destruction of the but was thrown badly off balance by the speed of the
Polish Air Force on the ground. Simultaneously, the German ground advances and the need to face a much
Luftwaffe was to execute Operation Seaside, a massive larger and technologically superior foe. Yet it was able
bombing attack on Warsaw, on 1 September. Finally, it to put up a spirited resistance from the first day.
was supposed to aid army and navy operations, pri¬ Failure to destroy the Polish Air Force on the
marily with interdiction missions, as only 36 of the old ground was not the only initial setback for the Luftwaffe.
Hs 123s were allocated to direct combat support. Fog over Warsaw and much of the rest of the front
forced the cancellation of Operation Seaside, and hin¬
dered the interdiction raids and other missions against
Polish ground forces.
The Germans also had their successes, however,
and they proved decisive. No fog lasts forever, and as
soon as Polish troop concentrations were spotted, they
were attacked by Stukas and broken up. Morale suf¬
fered and the Polish Army retreated, abandoning not
only the western provinces but their air force's forward
airfields.
The Luftwaffe did not ease the pressure. Stukas con¬
tinued to pound the roads and railways to impede any
kind of rally. The momentum of the Polish retreat and
German advance was maintained.
Sometimes in the heat of action German planes
bombed their own troops, a recurrent theme of air war¬
fare ever since. On 8 September, a Stuka interdiction
raid against Poles falling back across the Vistula River
at Gora Kalwarja instead bombed the bridge there, a
span needed by the 1st Panzer Division to maintain the
pursuit.
The Luftwaffe failed to attain complete air suprema¬
cy, at least to the extent that lead elements of the
German army all across the front were sporadically
attacked by Polish bombers. Try as they might, though,
the Polish fighter pilots could not long prevent the
A flight ofPZL P-llc's, Poland's most advanced fighter. eventual establishment of air superiority by the

58 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

kitchen the first day. That was the end of hot meals Nowogrodzka Cavalry Brigade, which had been
for the rest of the campaign." mauled at Mlawa.
Despite the Luftwaffe attacks, though, the caval¬ Gen. Anders, commander of Nowogrodzka,
ry regiment was able to attack some German posi¬ kept his unit moving south. They stopped in
tions just across the East Prussian border. The Warsaw for only one day before continuing their
attack met surprisingly light opposition from the journey. Cavalry units would be of little value in
frontier battalions of Provisional Corps Brand. "Most street fighting, so Anders kept heading south
of the troops we encountered in our foray into East toward the open Polish plain where his unit might
Prussia seemed over-age," that same survivor do some good.
recalled. "They didn't want to stand and fight." While 3rd Army's left flank was still fighting
The Poles' cavalry probe ihto East Prussia was near the frontier, its'21sf Corps continued moving
cut short, however, when other German units southwest to link up with 4th Army. On 2
swung in behind the attackers in an attempt to cut September, the 21st and 228th Infantry Divisions
them off. The 1st was able to retreat before the last advanced to within five kilometers of Grudziadz.
exit closed, then headed south to join with the There the Polish 4th and 16th Infantry Divisons

Luftwaffe. Their best plane was the PZL P.11, a high¬

winged monoplane with an open cockpit. It was unable
to stand up either to the Me 109 or the Me 110. The lat¬
ter was a twin-engined, long-range Zerstorer (destroyer)
"strategic fighter," that relied on firepower to compen¬
sate for inferior maneuverability. Though it would
prove a dismal failure in its assigned role in the Battle
of Britain, the 110 was more than adequate for the earli¬
er campaigns in general, and especially the airwar over
Poland.
The Polish Army presented the Germans with a cri¬
sis on the night of 9-10 September, when the battered
but still large Poznan Army counterattacked across the
Bzura River against the German 8th Army. This forced
the 8th and 10th Armies to pivot in order to face the new
menace.
But a crisis is a combination of danger and oppor¬
tunity, and in this case the opportunity was one for
German airpower to prove itself. Stukas and Hs 123s This atypical photo shows the effect of a Polish air attack on
struck the Polish bridgeheads and inflicted heavy loss¬ a motorized column of the German 16th Motorized Corps
es. After 48 hours, the Poles were forced to retreat back on 4 September.
across the Bzura, where they were sealed off in a mas¬
sive pocket by the 8th Army. areas. There is much that the Luftwaffe did wrong or
As the same time, in the skies above, time ran out failed to do at all in September 1939, but with persever¬
for the Polish Air Force when the Soviet Union invaded ance and a willingness to improvise, all of its goals
on 17 September. This spurred the Polish command to were accomplished in the end. Having a wide range of
issue an order for their remaining planes to fly to capabilities, and the ability to use them in unplanned
Romania and internment there (though many of the ways proved critical to air warfare.
pilots went further, eventually continuing the fight The second lesson was that an air force can assist its
from Britain). army through interdiction of enemy communications
The last enclave of Polish resistance was Warsaw, and movement as much as or more than through close
and the German Army was reluctant to launch a costly support of ground attacks. Interdiction contributed
assault on the rapidly solidifying defences of that city. directly to the shattering of the Polish ground defense
So on 25 September, the German siege culminated in an from the very beginning, while Luftflotte 2's entire
intense air bombardment. Though Luftwaffe strength in ground attack support commitment on 1 September
Poland was already declining due to the transfer of was a single group of obsolescent biplanes.
planes to the western front, enough were still on hand Indeed, one reason for the effectiveness of Luftwaffe
to shatter the capital. Three days later Warsaw surren¬ interdiction was that it targeted more than movement
dered, and with that effective Polish resistance ended. and communications. Its central objective was the
Two major lessons emerged from the Polish cam¬ destruction of Polish morale and unit cohesion, routing
paign. First, an efficient air force with a coherent and forces in supposedly safe rear areas and keeping them
flexible strategy can overcome the friction of active routed through repeated aerial assaults.
operations, in spite of its own shortcomings in other — James Werbaneth

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 To and Fro, Back and Forth
The actual military offensive against Poland was to old Prussians, "young Turks," and Nazi Party hacks —
have begun precisely at 4:30 a.m. on Saturday, 26 none of whom particularly liked the others. Gen. Franz
August. That was Hitler's original plan, and up until Haider, chief of the Ftihrer's military headquarters, got
6:00 p.m. on the 25th it was also the plan the entire the order about an hour after it was first issued, and he
Wehrmacht was expecting to carry out. The point-of-no- took another hour or so to pass it before the various ser¬
return deadline for calling off the attack (if there were vice chiefs to get their nods.
some radical change in the diplomatic scene) had been Once the various military staffs knew for certain the
set for 3:00 p.m. That deadline had come and gone invasion was called off, it became their job to inform the
when der Ftihrer received a piece of news that made him lesser headquarters throughout eastern Germany about
rethink the invasion's entire rationale. what was going on. It proved almost impossible,
The news was from Mussolini. It was not good. Italy though, to get in contact with the units already in the
would be unable to go to war against France and Britain field and rolling toward their jump-off points.
unless it immediately received huge and impossible For instance, the 1st Corps headquarters in East
amounts of supplies from Germany. Failing that, the Prussia only got the cancellation order at 9:37 p.m., after
Italians recommended the whole thing be postponed several of its units were already beginning their final
until 1942. In light of all this, the message concluded, if moves to cross the border. Several staff officers were
Germany went ahead, Rome would provide moral and frantically rushed toward the front, and they just man¬
political support for Berlin, but little else. aged to stop the infantry and tanks in time.
Hitler had been counting on the threat of Italian A few units didn't get the word until after they'd
participation in the war to hold off Britain while Nazi actually begun to engage Polish forces with small arms
forces overran Poland. With that aid no longer forth¬ fire. (Their rear-area artillery units had already been
coming, the dictator fell into a crisis of self-doubt. The stood down, so it appeared no full-fledged campaign
order to halt troop movements toward the border was was really beginning. The eager-for-peace Polish gov¬
given at 7:30 p.m., only nine hours before the offensive ernment explained away all the incidents as the work of
was supposed to start. "marauding German bands" that had merely roughed
Totalitarian governments are usually thought to be up some frontier customs guards.)
run on the principle that once the supreme leader gives Of course. Hitler soon regained his initial resolve,
an order, it is carried out as fast as the speed of commu¬ figured Germany could win without Italian help, and
nications permits. Hitler's government, however, was ordered a new start date of 1 September. That time, of
in reality not a well-oiled machine, and neither was the course, it went ahead as planned.
German high command. That body was an odd mix of — L. Dean Webb

were kept from retreating across the Vistula River destroyed, though, the peninsula would not be
by concentrated artillery fire, and were instead secured for several more days.
forced to fall back to the south.
Then, on the evening of the 2nd, the reconnais¬ Battle for the Narew
sance battalion of the 3rd Panzer Division reached With the former Polish Corridor now under
the Vistula from the west. The 20th Motorized German control. Army Group North was free to hurl
Infantry Division, after suffering setbacks the previ¬ the combined weight of its 3rd and 4th Armies
ous day from Polish cavalry attacks, provided southward toward the Polish capital. The 4th Army
flank cover for the rest of 3rd Panzer, and by 3 swung southeast, scattering the Polish 15th
September, the forward elements of the 3rd and 4th Infantry Division and taking the town of
Armies were firmly linked. That juncture trapped Bydgoszcz. At the same time, 3rd Army's 21st Corps
the Polish 9th and 27th Infantry Divisions, as well forced the remnants of the Poles' 4th and 16th
as the Pomorska Cavalry Brigade, north of the new Infantry Divisions to retreat toward Torun. Then
German lines. Those units destroyed themselves in 1st Corps and Corps Wodrig continued their advance
a series of desperate attacks against the German toward the Vistula and Bug Rivers, meeting only
units holding the base of the blocking corridor. light opposition.
Farther north, Polish forces still held the forti¬ The Poles fought well, but with their supply
fied Hela Peninsula, but they were also under con¬ columns continuously decimated by the Luftwaffe,
stant attack by land, sea and air. Lt. Karl Hermann and on-hand ammunition running out, there was lit¬
Lion, a Stuka pilot of Attack Group 186, sank the tle that could be done to stop the Germans. The
Polish destroyer Wicher and minelayer Gryf in Polish commander-in-chief. Marshal Rydz-Smigly,
Hela harbor on the 3 September. Those ships, along sent a message to Paris and London, underlining the
with several coastal batteries, had given the Poles disaster in the making: "The entire front has been
vital support against the German forces attacking broken. We can only retreat to a defensive line
across the peninsula. Even with that support behind the Vistula and hope that it will be held."

60 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Von Bock, Army Group North's commander,
was quick to issue orders keeping his divisions hot
on the heels of the weakening Modlin and
Pomorze Armies as they retreated. The 4th Army
executed a wide sweep to the southeast with the
bulk of its forces, while 3rd Army pushed the
Pomorze Army eastward toward Warsaw. Von
Bock planned to trap and destroy the Poles north
of the Narew-Vistula line, using 4th Army as his
hammer and the 3rd as his anvil.
But things did not go as planned. The 4th
Army's repositioning took extra time, allowing the
majority of the Pomorze Army still in the field to
retreat in good order. The Modlin Army, however,
was exposed to continuous air attacks, which fur¬
ther disorganized its units. Ignoring their flanks,
German motorized formations sped forward in an
effort to split up the retreating Poles. Several Polish
units were destroyed in the bitter race to the A destroyed Polish bunker at Mlawa.
Narew River.
That running fight was not totally one-sided, Corps' 21st Infantry Division breached the Polish
however. As the S.S. Regiment Deutschland closed line and fought its way to Nowogrod and Lomza,
on the Narew crossing at Rozan, it came under while 10th Panzer crossed the Narew east of Wizna,
heavy machinegun fire from Polish fortifications driving into the Polish rear.
on the east bank. Rozan was a former Imperial Guderian's corps then sliced through several
Russian fortress town, with four World War I forts elements of Operational Group Narew, and contin¬
which the Poles had modernized. ued a wider sweep to the south. Guderian, ignor¬
Supported by elements of the 7th Panzer ing his exposed flanks, never gave the defenders a
Regiment, along with two battalions of artillery, the moment to regroup. His motorized corps kept on
men of the Deutschland Regiment stormed forward. the move, outpacing the footbound 21st Corps and
But the Poles that day were giving as good as they overturning all new Polish defense plans as fast as
got. The 7th's command post was hit, killing sever¬ they were turned out.
al headquarters personnel and wounding others, While the Poles were no match for the panzers,
while small arms and machinegun fire raked the they did slow the 21st Corps. The 21st Infantry
German infantry as it advanced. Panzers were Division was heavily engaged by the Pole's 18th
brought up, and by firing into the bunkers at Infantry Division in a wood just south of the
almost point-blank range, finally managed to Narew. But then the 20th Motorized Infantry and
silence the Polish forts. Several of the tanks were 10th Panzer were diverted to the area, inflicted
knocked out during the operation, but in the end heavy casualties on the 18th Infantry, and thus
the Germans took the town and crossed the river. cleared the way for the 21st to resume its advance.
By the evening of the 6th, the Polish high com¬
mand realized the Narew River line could not be Beyond the Narew
held. New orders were issued for the Modlin As the 21st Infantry Division marched south, it
Army and the Narew Operational Group to retreat ran into a defensive line of bunkers and machine
to a new defensive position behind the Bug and gun positions manned by the Polish 33rd Infantry
San Rivers. Division. An additional surprise came in the form
The Poles had destroyed most of the bridges of an attack from the Podlaska Cavalry Brigade.
spanning the Narew, but German engineer units Luckily for the Germans, their divisional artillery
quickly rebuilt them. The 61st Infantry Division was in position to fire a devastating barrage that
crossed the Narew at Pultusk, then pushed imme¬ disrupted the cavalry and forced them back. The
diately toward the Bug, scattering the Polish rear¬ invaders then turned their guns on the bunker line.
guard units before it. That division, now guarding Soon, the 21st was on the move again.
3rd Army's right flank, became the pivot on which In the west, the operational area of 4th Army
the 1st Corps turned. Once across the Narew, 1st was taken over by 8th Army, which was simultane¬
Corps moved southwest toward Warsaw. With 4th ously fighting a battle on the Bzura River with the
Army advancing from the west, the Polish capital Poznan and Pomorze Armies. But once 4th Army
was effectively isolated on two sides. was thus released, it moved eastward across East
The 3rd Army's left flank was meanwhile rein¬ Prussia to establish new positions on 3rd Army's
forced by Guderian's 19th Motorized Corps, along left. From there, 4th Army prepared a new attack
with the 10th Panzer Division. Once in position, that designed to eliminate all Polish forces in the
flank began a wide sweeping maneuver. The 21st Bialystok/Brest areas.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 While 4th was still repositioning, Guderian's digging in at the fortress city. As 3rd Panzer sped
19th Motorized Corps continued its drive. By the toward the place, it ran into the remnants of the
evening of the 11th, the 20th Motorized Infantry Polish 18th Infantry Division. In a brief, but vio¬
Division was engaged in a hard fight with the rem¬ lent, engagement, the troublesome 18th was finally
nants of the Polish 18th Infantry Division, south of destroyed, and its valiant commander. Col.
Zambrow. The corps' other units were even further Kossecki, was taken prisoner.
south, with 10th Panzer at Bransk, and 2nd Farther east, 21st Corps (21st and 216th Infantry
Motorized and 3rd Panzer near Bielsk. Divisions ), along with Corps Brand, was moving on
The divisions comprising Operational Group Bialystock. They took 6,000 prisoners in a fight
Narew began to fall out of contact with each other near the village of Andrejewo before even reaching
because of Guderian's motorized exploitation. As the larger town's main defense line.
4th Army's infantry hurried to catch up, they fol¬ On 14 September, Guderian received word
lowed the paths torn open by Guderian, in the from 10th Panzer that it had reached the outer forti¬
process destroying several more Polish units that fications of Brest-Litovsk. An initial assault was
had been left disorganized in the wake of the panz¬ successful in breaching that line, but was stopped
ers' advance. short of capturing the city proper. The Poles
The 3rd Panzer took Bielsk the following day, retreated into the inner fortress, called "the
all but destroying the Polish 35th Infantry Division Citadel," and awaited the next attack.
in doing so. The fall of that town opened the way Guderian reacted by sending the 20th
for Guderian to concentrate his forces for an Motorized Infantry Division to Brest, to provide
assault on Brest-Litovsk. There, Polish units that much needed infantry support. After two days of
had escaped his initial onslaught were hurriedly heavy fighting, the Citadel was finally taken. Six

The Western Front

Despite binding treaties and a declaration of war French division for a day. Von Leeb used the opportu¬
on 3 September, Britain and France did little to help nity the French timidity provided to reshuffle his
their Polish allies. During that autumn, British unpre¬ troops, reinforcing the threatened sector with more
paredness for war was matched only by French incom¬ artillery and reserve divisions.
petence in waging it. French press communiques, meanwhile, made wild
Gen. von Leeb, commander of Army Group C on claims to upgrade the offensive in the public's percep¬
the western front, was a defensive expert. On 1 tion. They spoke of capturing "100,000 acres" of
September, he had 34 divisions (made up mainly of German territory — a figure that sounds impressive
reservists) with which to guard against an Anglo- until one realizes it only represented a 1.5x15 mile area
French attack. The Germans' vaunted Siegfried Line of little strategic significance.
was strong in places, but was still largely unfinished. The French advance stopped dead even before it
France's mobilization gave that nation an army of reached the main Siegfried Line defenses. Pretelat
81 infantry (7 motorized), 3 cavalry, 2 mechanized, and claimed he needed more time and troops: his timetable
13 garrison divisions. Of those, 23 divisions were either set 17 September as the earliest possible date for renew¬
on duty in the colonial holdings or guarding the fron¬ ing the offensive.
tier with Italy. Long before that, though, the Germans had massed
The British Expeditionary Force was still crossing 17 divisions to repel the push. The Soviet intervention in
the Channel when Gen. Gaston Pretelat, commander of Poland on the 17th put an end to any hope of survival
the French 2nd Army Group, ordered his forces to attack for that nation. The same day, the French command
into the Saar region on 7 September. Nine divisions of ordered their troops to give up the captured German ter¬
his 3rd and 4th Armies cautiously advanced on a 15-mile ritory and move back to the safety of the Maginot Line.
front. They encountered only light opposition at first. The failure of the French can be blamed on a num¬
Although practically the entire Luftwaffe was engaged ber of factors — poor planning, general incompetence,
in Poland, the French air force was no where to be seen. low morale, and — perhaps most of all — nightmare
Pretelat had picked one of the strongest and most visions of the millions who died during the years of
defensible parts of the Siegfried Line to attack. As the trench warfare in World War I. Whatever the primary
French moved forward, they ran into minefields, cause, there was really no effective way the western
boobytraps, and concentrated fire from German Allies could have fulfilled their treaty obligations to
bunkers and artillery. Poland. The speed with which the Polish resistance col¬
As soon as casualties started returning to the lapsed under the new Blitzkrieg style of warfare psy¬
French rear areas, their commanders began to display chologically cowed the Allies into a completely defen¬
extraordinary degrees of caution. That mood, of course, sive posture. That posture would last until Hitler
soon spread to the soldiers in the field. In one case, a directed his combat-proven armies against them in the
single German machinegun nest stalled an entire spring of 1940.

62 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

hundred Poles marched in to captivity with quiet
dignity; the German troops saluted them as they
marched out. The same day, 17 September, 3rd
Panzer reported it had contacted advance elements
of Army Group South near Wlodawa.
Around Warsaw, 3rd Army had taken most of
the northern suburbs then formed a barrier prevent
Polish units inside the city from escaping to the
north and east. On orders from Hitler, who was
worried about heavy casualties that could be suf¬
fered in house-to-house fighting, the city was to be
bombed into submission.
Along the Baltic coast, the Poles continued to
put up a fierce resistance at Gdynia. The backbone
of that defense was the Polish Naval Infantry
Brigade, under Col. Dabek. Corps Kaupish (207th
Infantry Division and Brigade Eberhard) paid for
every gain with blood, as it slowly forced the Poles
back against the sea. Aided by Luftwaffe bombers Shortly after the start of the campaign, German motorized infantry
and the guns of the Schleswig-Holstein, the Germans southern Poland fire while still in their truck.
managed to cut off the Polish forces on Hela by 12
September. Two days later, Kaupisch captured Despite growing Polish resistance, 8th Army
Gdynia, forcing Dabeck's troops to retreat across a was able to reach the Prosna River by the end of
flat coastal area north of the city. the day, inflicting heavy casualties on the 2nd and
The Poles continued to fight stubbornly, but 10th Infantry Divisions of the Lodz Army in the
the destruction of a their major ammunition depot process.
by aerial attack finally put an end to organized Gen. Reichenau's 10th Army held the bulk of
resistance. Some 2,000 Poles surrendered, but Col. the armored and motorized units of Army Group
Dabeck was not among them. He chose suicide, South. The 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions, forming the
rather than suffer the indignity of captivity. By the cutting edge of that army, engaged three Polish
night of the 16th, the only Polish units left along infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade in a drive
the coast were the defenders of the Hela that carried the panzers 15 miles into enemy terri¬
Peninsula. tory in the first day. Most of the enemy units trying
to make a stand were simply bypassed and left to
Army Group South, the following infantry divisions.
The Poles, though, earned the respect of the
1-6 September tank crews early on that first day. A cavalry
By 6:00 a.m., 1 September, advance elements of squadron of the Wolynska Cavalry Brigade held
Gen. Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South had up a column of the 4th Panzer with one anti-tank
already driven four miles into Poland. It took the gun and a few machineguns. It was only after aeri¬
defenders several hours to recover from the initial al and artillery bombardment, coupled with
shock, but by midday, von Rundstedt was receiv¬ massed fire from the panzers, that the defenders
ing reports of cavalry counterattacks and the were dislodged. The 1st Panzer Division also ran
demolition of bridges and roadways — which into fierce resistance from the 7th Infantry
slowed the advance considerably. Division.
Gen. Blaskowitz's 8th Army (the only German That division had the misfortune to occupy
army made up entirely of infantry units) engaged positions at the boundary of 10th and 14th Armies.
the Lodz Army in a head-on attack. At the same A key objective for von Rundstedt during the first
time, Blaskowitz extended his left to prevent effec¬ days of the war was to separate the Polish armies
tive coordination and communication between the facing him in the south, so they could be destroyed
Lodz and Poznan Armies. piecemeal. So, as the 7th fought with 1st Panzer,
The S.S. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Motorized units of the 14th Army hit its flank and rear. The 7th
Infantry Regiment (LAH), operating on 8th Army's was destroyed, opening a breach between the Lodz
extreme right flank, was able to capture several and Krakow Armies.
bridges by surprise in the opening hours of the bat¬ Farther south, other 14th Army units, coming
tle. Soon after 9:00 a.m., however, Polish sniper fire out of Slovakia, drove Polish defenders out of the
slowed their advance. Enemy anti-tank guns Jablunka Pass and the town of Nowy Targ. The
destroyed two LAH reconnaissance vehicles near Krakow Army was already penned in from three
the village of Boleslawez, causing the first casual¬ sides by the evening of 1 September, and its divi¬
ties of the war for what was to become one of sions were in disorganized retreat toward their
Germany's premier units. namesake city as the sun rose the following day.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 During the night of 1-2 September, Polish German bridgeheads were soon established on
forces facing the 8th and 10th Armies had a chance the east bank of the Warta River. Armored and
to regroup. They established defensive positions motorized formations crossed quickly, creating
along the eastern bank of the Warta River, and havoc among the Polish defenders. Czestochowa,
occupied fortifications around Czestochowa, Katowice and Nikotow were all taken, opening the
Katowice, and Nikotow. Polish engineers carried way for a German advance across the southern
out demolitions of bridges and roadways, which Polish plain. The line had held for two days: Rydz-
made motorized movement through the area diffi¬ Smigly had hoped for ten, which would have been
cult. German aerial reconnaissance also reported a enough time for the Poznan and Pomorze Armies
number of divisions from the Polish general to reach new positions, and to complete the mobi¬
reserve moving into the area. lization of the rest of the forces in the area.
At 6:00 a.m. on 2 September, von Rundstedt While 10th and 8th Armies continued to
renewed his attack. The 4th Panzer Division's advance in south-central Poland, 14th Army fought
advance north of Czestochowa was halted by a its way through the mountainous terrain in the
counterattack by Uhlan (lancer) Cavalry Regiments south. German troops of the 1st and 2nd Mountain
27 and 28, supported by an artillery battalion. The Infantry Divisions battled the Polish 2nd and 3rd
panzer division's unit history states the Polish Carpathian Mountain Brigades for key access
"cavalry was armed with modern weapons, and routes through the rough country. As the Poles
their anti-tank unit was very strong." retreated, 14th Army advanced on Krakow from the
On 3 September, von Rundstedt ordered his west, while its right flank moved steadily to the
armies to break the Polish line at any cost. Luftwaffe north, cutting off any chance of escape for the
bombers pulverized Polish positions as the units of Polish units being surrounded throughout the
Army Group South moved forward. The Poles, lack¬ area.
ing any aerial reconnaissance, didn't discover which Once the main Polish line was broken in the
were the main German thrusts until it was too late. south, events moved quickly. The commander of

64 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

the Lodz Army reported his right had been by 8 September, with the LAH providing flank cover.
smashed, and that his 10th Infantry Division "has Polish forces had abandoned Lodz, and the city sur¬
fallen to pieces. We are leaving the Warta rendered to the 17th Infantry Division the same day.
line.. ..The situation is grave." The 10th Army's penetration into central
The 16th Motorized Corps had already cut Poland had destroyed any hope the defenders
deeply into the Polish center. That corps' panzer there might be able to regroup. The Germans'
units had taken Radomska by the evening of the armored pincers were already closing the noose
3rd, and two days after that were another 60 kilo¬ around five Polish infantry divisions (3rd, 7th,
meters to the northeast, advancing on the town of 12th, 19th and 29th), as well as the Krakowska
Gora Kalwarja. Those panzers were, of course, fol¬ Cavalry Brigade.
lowed by infantry units, which cleared the cap¬ Further to the sduth, units of the 14th Army
tured areas of bypassed Polish stragglers. fought a series of sharp engagements that drove
the Poles north and east, opening the way for an
Beyond the Warta Line advance on Lwow by elements of the 1st Mountain
On 6 September, von Rundstedt's forces con¬ Infantry Division.
tinued their advance. The 8th Army swung toward The Poles seemed all but finished — but they
Lodz, with its left heading north, in the direction of still had a few surprises left.
Poznan. In the center, 10th Army's panzers set out
for the town of Radom; intelligence had reported Counteroffensive along the Bzura
the remnants of the Krakow Army were attempt¬ Early on 9 September, Blaskowitz received
ing to rally there. word that divisions on his army's (8th) left flank
The strung out panzer columns made inviting were engaging Polish units of unknown strength.
targets for Polish counterattacks. Elements of the As more reports came in, it became apparent this
1st Panzer Division were hit in the flank by the was not just another desperate effort to escape, but
Polish 29th Infantry Division. A running battle an all-out counterattack.
ensued for most of a day. Again and again, the Generals Kutrzeba and Bortnowski had moved
Poles threw themselves at the Germans, only to be most of the Poznan and Pomorze Armies into posi¬
driven back each time with tremendous losses. The tion along the Bzura River. Three divisions, sup¬
battle resulted in the virtual destruction of the ported by cavalry brigades on both flanks, crossed
29th, and the capture of its commanding general. the Bzura and sent the 30th Infantry Division reel¬
As the day ended, the panzer's were about 90 kilo¬ ing. (The 30th's commander lost an arm during the
meters southwest of Warsaw, and the 14th Army opening phase of the battle, but continued to direct
had taken Krakow. his unit.) More Polish units entered the gap left by
That same day also marked the end of Army the 30th, and soon Blaskowitz was in danger of
Group South's first operational phase. The Poznan having his left flank turned.
Army was retreating eastward, the Lodz Army The Polish objective was to link up with the
was under heavy attack, the Krakow Army was Lodz Army, thus forming a new defensive ring
being enveloped, and the Karpaty Army was with¬ around the capital. As the attack continued, all
drawing toward Lwow and Lublin. three divisions on 8th Army's left flank were forced
In the early hours of 7 September, 1st Panzer to give ground. The situation was viewed as "criti¬
Division received its new order: "Forward to the cal" by Blaskowitz, but von Rundstedt saw the
Vistula." With 4th Panzer Division on its left, 1st Polish attack as a means to bring about the final
Panzer swept aside the 13th Infantry Division and destruction of all the enemy forces in the Kutno-
took the town of Rzeczyca after a bitter fight against Bzura area. He ordered the units of the 10th Army
entrenched defenders. Toward evening, the lst's to head north to reinforce Blaskowitz's 8th. At the
headquarters received more encouraging news from same time, German divisions pushing from the
its mechanized neighbor: the 4th had taken Balisk, a north and west succeeded in breaking through the
town less than 60 kilometers from Warsaw. weakened Polish defense lines there and fell on the
The 8th Army, advancing northeast, was find¬ rear of the attacking force.
ing it increasingly difficult to keep up with the The 10th Army also kept up pressure on the
motorized elements of 10th Army on its right. The Lodz Army, and by 12 September, Gen. Kutrzeba
8th's left was also extending dangerously. Those had received word that Polish force was retreating
infantry divisions, facing the Poznan and Pomorze north toward Modlin. Any cooperation with the
Armies to the north, were occupying a consider¬ Lodz Army was now out of the question, so the
ably longer front per unit than was acceptable. Polish commander was forced to call off his
Gen. Blaskowitz, 8th Army's commander, relayed attacks. He then made new plans to head east,
his concerns to von Rundstedt, but was curtly told directly to Warsaw.
not to worry about it.
Looking at the overall picture, von Rundstedt Elsewhere in the South
had every reason to be optimistic. Elements of the While the battle along the Bzura was in full
4th Panzer Division were at the outskirts of Warsaw swing, other elements of Army Group South contin-

COMMAND MAGAZINE 65
 ued to hammer at the Polish forces before them. A battlegroup of the 1st Mountain Infantry
The 4th Panzer Division launched the first in a series Division was already approaching Lwow, over 90
of attempts to breach Warsaw's defenses, but was kilometers east of Przemysl. The mountaineers
stopped by heavy enemy fire. After three hours of captured the Zboiska Heights, which dominated
fighting, the 4th's commander reported losses of 63 the northern approach to Lwow, on 13 September.
out of 120 tanks involved. He withdrew his bat¬ Despite several Polish counterattacks, supported
tered division to its initial position and waited for by heavy artillery fire, the 1st clung to the heights
infantry support. until other elements of 14th Army arrived the fol¬
South of Warsaw, 1st Panzer Division had taken lowing day.
Gora Kalwarja, and had established a bridgehead Inside Przemysl, the Polish defenders main¬
on the eastern bank of the Vistula. The Poles fought tained a stubborn resistance. Several German divi¬
like demons to eliminate the bridgehead, but sions had to be diverted from other areas for the
Luftwaffe support prevented them from making final assault. The town finally fell on 15 September.
headway. Except in Lwow itself, the fall of Przemysl put
At Radom, the encircled Polish units were an end to organized resistance in the 14th Army's
through fighting. By 11 September, an estimated area of operations. As Lwow came under siege by
60,000 prisoners had been taken; organized resis¬ the 18th Corps, other German units fanned out and
tance there was at an end. The end of the Radom destroyed the isolated pockets of shattered Polish
battle left 10th Army with a powerful reserve, most units still fighting in the south. The Germans also
of which was moved north to destroy the Lodz attempted to set up a screen to prevent fleeing
Army. Polish units from reaching safety in Hungary and
The 14th Army crossed the San River on 10 Romania.
September. Within two days, the Polish 24th With northern and southern Poland basically
Infantry Division was smashed beyond repair, and secured, the Germans were able to concentrate
surviving elements of the 11th Infantry Division their forces to destroy the Polish armies still oper¬
were forced into the fortress town of Przemysl. ating around Kutno, on the Bzura River, in

The Soviet Intervention

On 17 September, Soviet troops crossed into eastern
Poland on the pretense of protecting ethnic Ukrainian
and Belorussian inhabitants of the area. The Polish bor¬
der units in the east were quickly overwhelmed by the
massive intervention. Gen. Schtemenko, a staff officer
in the Soviet 6th Army, received promising indications
from their advance elements within the first hours of
the attack. Those reports stated, "No organized resis¬
tance is being encountered. Our troops are advancing
and have already captured many Polish officers and
soldiers."
The Reds advanced on two axes. The Belorussian
Front swept through northern Poland, advancing on
Brest-Litovsk and Bialystock. The Ukrainian Front came
through south-central Poland, with Lublin and Lwow
as its objectives.
The rapid movement of the Soviet forces kept the
Poles off balance. Red Air Force planes bombed assem¬
bly areas with the same success the Luftwaffe was enjoy¬
ing to the west. Sometimes, though, it was Germans
who were on the receiving end of the Soviet bombs.
Early on the 17th, Soviet aircraft bombed an area west
of Bialystock that had already been reached by the
advancing Wehrmacht. Three infantryman and an
unspecified number of Labor Service personnel were
killed.
Similarities in the appearance of Polish and Soviet
uniforms also caused several incidents between
German and Red Army units. For instance, at one point
the 10th Panzer Division engaged a Soviet cavalry recon-

66 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

Warsaw, and in the fortresses of Brest-Litovsk, through the Germans and reach Hungary. A battle-
Lwow and Modlin. group of the Krakow and Karpaty Armies sur¬
Over one-third of the entire Polish ground prised the S.S. Motorized Infantry Regiment
force was encircled in the Kutno-Bzura cauldron. Germania, forcing the Germans to retreat and clear¬
Twelve infantry divisions (2nd, 4th, 10th, 13th, ing the way for several thousand Poles to reach the
14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 25th, 26th, 28th and 30th) and neutral countries to the south.
three cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska, Kresova, For all the surviving Polish units, movement to
and Wolynska) were hemmed in by 29 German the south and east represented the only means of
divisions. As the vice tightened, the Luftwaffe escape. On 17 September, however, the entire situa¬
dropped over 328 tons of bombs. tion changed again when a strong Soviet force
By the night of the 16 September, there was no crossed the Polish border.
longer any chance of escape for the Poznan and
Pomorze Armies. Only two cavalry brigades and Operations, 17 September -
the remnants of the 15th and 25th Infantry
Divisions managed to slip through the German
6 October
lines and reach Warsaw before the iron ring finally The first of the final series of German objectives
closed. Gen. Kutrzeba was among those who to be taken was Brest-Litovsk on 17 September. The
escaped. 10th Panzer and 20th Motorized Infantry Divisions
The Germans were on the threshold of victory, made a final and victorious assault on the Citadel
but the fighting in Poland was by no means over. just as the Polish garrison began an attempt to
The situation between the Vistula and Bug Rivers breakout. (Even though Brest-Litovsk was in the
was still fluid. In the Lublin-Chelm area, remnants Soviet sphere, as laid down in the Pact of 26 August,
of the Prusy and Modlin Armies were still on the the German high command allowed their units east
march; their objective was Romania. Further south, of the boundary to continue their missions.)
surviving elements of the Krakow Army fought a The 8th Army's operations against the Kutno-
series of bloody battles in an attempt to break Bzura Pocket also met with success. On 17

naissance unit, which resulted in 2 dead and 23 wound¬ Communists murdered the commander of the Polish 3rd
ed Russians. Other incidents were reported on both Corps, along with his entire staff, only moments after
sides, but were usually straightened out by the com¬ accepting their formal surrender. By 6 October, the
manders on the scene. Soviets had taken over 200,000 prisoners. Many of the
The Soviet intervention proved to be the psycho¬ officers were shot out of hand, while others simply dis¬
logical "last straw" for many Polish soldiers retreating appeared without even a record of their execution. Such
eastward to escape the Germans. Most of them turned actions proved to be a taste of much worse to come, cul¬
around and headed back toward the Nazis. One report minating in actions like the Katyn Forest massacre.
from 3rd Panzer Division mentioned hundreds of Poles At a cost of only 737 dead and 1,859 wounded, the
approaching their lines, hands raised, saying they did Soviets had gained a vital buffer zone that would make
not want to fall into the clutches of the Reds. One com¬ the difference between defeat and victory when Hitler
pany took over 1,500 Polish prisoners between 19 and unleashed his armies against them during Operation
21 September. Barbarossa, 21 months later.
The few Polish units that attempted to stand their
ground against the Soviets were shot to pieces. One
Red Army communique, dated 21 September, spoke of
over 60,000 Polish prisoners taken and 3 infantry divi¬
sions destroyed.
Despite the overwhelming odds against them, a
few Polish units reacted with the same elan that had
caught the Germans off guard earlier in the war. In
scenes reminiscent of 19th century battles, Polish
lancers engaged Soviet cavalry on the plains of eastern
Poland. Part of the Polish 110th Uhlan Regiment defeat¬
ed a superior force of enemy horsemen, but was then
forced to retreat into nearby forests when a Soviet tank
unit arrived. But the Poles continued to harass the
Soviets from their wooded hideout, marking the birth
of the first partisan unit of World War II in Europe.
In the end, however, the Poles were crushed by Officers of the German 1st Mountain Infantry Division talk
sheer numbers. The Soviets were brutal in their treat¬ with their Red Army counterparts about turning over of the
ment of their Polish prisoners. In one case, the area around Lwow to Soviet control.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 67
 September, over 40,000 Poles went into captivity. surrounding the city the Poles' defenses would
The 4th Panzer Division and the LAH repulsed sev¬ never crack. Sometimes the men of the 1st
eral attempts by the 17th Infantry Division to Mountain Infantry Division found themselves under
escape the encirclement. Another larger force man¬ attack from two sides: as they attempted to break
aged to breach the German line and headed in the in, they were often also engaged from the rear, as
direction of Modlin. However, those Poles were Polish troops heading south crossed through their
intercepted and destroyed the next day by units of lines.
the 10th Army. With the Soviet intervention, the mountaineers
No one could deny the bravery of the Poles. feared they might be robbed of their final victory.
Time after time, they threw themselves at the Lwow was in the Soviet sphere, and orders were
German positions. But bravery and determination already on their way to hand over positions
alone were no match for tanks, planes and artillery. around the city to the advancing Red Army.
Realizing the futility of sacrificing more men in a But the Polish garrison in Lwow was also
lost battle, Gen. Bortnowski surrendered his com¬ aware of the Soviet attack. After discussing the sit¬
mand on 19 September. In all, some 150,000- uation with his officers, the city commander sent
180,000 Poles were taken prisoner in the Kutno- an emissary to the Germans, offering to surrender
Bzura pocket. to them before the Communists arrived. That offer
Lwow had been under siege since 13 was accepted, and the Poles marched into captivity
September, and it seemed to the German troops on the 22nd. The mountain troops saluted the

Remember. • .
A Polish Soldier's Odyssey Through World War II
by Stanislaus Piorkowski, as told to Pat McTaggart
My entire company, about 140 men, surrendered to I remember driving my horse-drawn cart through a vil¬
an Austrian [German] mountain infantry unit on 27 lage, when I spotted a German general walking along
September. They treated us pretty well — gave us cof¬ the sidewalk. Since my hands were holding the reins, I
fee and food — before sending us to the rear. The next gave him a cavalry salute — you know — sitting erect
day, we were put on trucks and shipped to and snapping your head to the right with your chin
Czechoslovakia, where we spent two weeks. From held high. He returned the salute, and with a kind of
there, we were sent to Stalag 8A, in Gorlitz, a city east of half-smile on his face, continued on his way.
Dresden. In the spring of 1940, we were shipped to
I was put to work transporting sugar beets from the Ludwigshafen, in western Germany. There were about
surrounding farms and villages to a processing plant. A 1,600 Poles in this new camp. The Germans gave us an
German civilian was responsible for me during the day. opportunity to sign papers giving us civilian status, but
very few signed. We still considered ourselves soldiers,
and the Germans seemed to respect us for that.
Our camp was in the center of the I.G. Farben facto¬
ry complex. I was put to work building bomb shelters
for the factory workers and those living in the sur¬
rounding area.
As the war progressed, more Allied prisoners filled
the camp. We eventually had about 300 French, 600
Russians, and — after they surrendered — about 5,000
Italians.
We had little respect for the French and Italians.
The French had no military discipline whatsoever, and
the Italians — well — they came into the camp dressed
like they were going to a ball. Within a couple weeks,
though, their uniforms were torn and filthy. Seeing
them then, you would never have guessed they were
soldiers. The Germans treated them with utter con¬
tempt.
Our guards were mostly over-age reservists. They
treated us fairly well. Sometimes we would get invalids
Stanislaus Piorkowski in his Polish lancer uni¬ from the Russian Front as guards. You could tell some
form, 1938. of them were crazy just by looking into their eyes. One

68 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

Poles as they laid down their arms — a sign of The bombardment caused thousands of civil¬
respect for soldiers who had fought one of ian casualties. The city water works, as well as
Germany's elite divisions to a standstill. most other utilities, were wrecked, but the Poles
The Polish government, along with Rydz- still resisted every German attempt to breach their
Smigly, fled to Romania the day after the Soviet defenses.
intervention began. They left orders Warsaw On 25 September, over 1,000 cannon began a
should hold out until France and England could massive bombardment of Warsaw. That artillery
relieve the pressure with a massive attack on the was joined by 240 Stukas and 100 Do. 17 bombers,
western front — an attack which the men giving which unloaded more than 560 tons of explosives
the order must have known would never come in on the city. They were followed by 30 Ju.52 trans¬
time to save Poland. port planes that dropped 72 tons of incendiary
Once the pocket at Kutno was eliminated, bombs. (See "The War in the Air" sidebar.)
Luftwaffe bomber formations returned to the sky The defenders had put up a gallant fight, but
over Warsaw. But the German command still ruled deteriorating medical and health conditions, cou¬
out a ground assault there as too costly. The pled with mounting civilian casualties and a grow¬
140,000-160,000 defenders inside Warsaw were ing shortage of food, made further resistance futile.
firmly dug in. Aside from a few German probing On the morning of 27 September, the Polish com¬
attacks, the job of reducing the city was to be left to mander sent a delegate to 8th Army headquarters to
artillery and air power. negotiate the city's surrender. At 2:00 p.m. that

of them shot a camp inmate for having an unaccounted American soldiers got. Our job was processing and
for loaf of bread. However, most of the guards were guarding German prisoners.
O.K. Once a corporal even gave us a radio for six One day we got an order to dye our uniforms dark
months. We listened to all the Allied newscasts on it. blue. It had something to do with Stalin complaining
My job required me to travel to different parts of about the Americans forming a Polish army within the
the city. Usually a civilian went with us, but sometimes US Army. Anyway, we dyed them and then carried on
we traveled on our own, using a camp pass. At the as usual.
time, we didn't think about escaping — there was no In the spring of '49, we got a new lieutenant,
place to go. straight from the States. He went strictly by the book —
One day a friend and I were going back to camp, something you couldn't do when dealing with our
riding on a train. A German soldier started giving us a German prisoners, especially the S.S. men. They had
hard time, threatening to throw us off. We just stood lived through the war, and knew all the tricks of the
there and stared at him. It could have gotten nasty, but trade. You had to beat them at their own game.
an S.S. man in a black uniform came up and told the After several arguments with the lieutenant, I'd
soldier to shut up and keep his hands off us. The sol¬ had enough. A friend of mine had received sponsor
dier moved off fast. papers from America, but he worried he was too old to
Since our camp was in the center of a factory com¬ start over again there. I told him I'd go for him, and
plex, we got bombed often. In one raid, we lost 72 men filled out the papers myself. A few months later, I was
— four of them good friends of mine. The Germans sitting in Elkader, Iowa, working on a farm. Two years
gave them a military funeral with individual caskets, later, I was able to bring my wife and son over, and I've
flowers, and an honor guard. They even fired a salute. I lived here ever since. It's been a good life.
don't know if it was for propaganda purposes or not,
but they treated us as fellow soldiers, and it made us
feel proud.
In early 1945, the Americans were very near. We
were packed up and made to march to Schweinfurt.
Anyone who couldn't keep up was shot. We had
started out with 1,600 Poles when we first got to
Ludwigshafen, but by the end of the war there were
only 800 of us left.
In April 1945, 47 of us took off and made it to the
American lines. We joined up with an artillery unit.
They were short-handed, so we worked as a howitzer
crew.
When the war ended, I stayed with the US Army.
Very few of my comrades wanted to return to Poland
while the Russians were still there. I eventually
became a staff sergeant with the Polish auxiliaries. We Piorkowski again, sometime in 1945-49, in his dyed-blue US
received no pay, but we got everything else regular Army service uniform.

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 First Engagement — Western Poland, Fall 1939
by Ian MacMillan

This is the first chapter of the novel Proud Monster by Ian snorts of horses, but only a few. The rest lie slaugh¬
MacMillan (Northpoint Press, 1987 reprinted with permis¬ tered on the plain among the lances, soiled flags, men,
sion). I highly recommend it as one of the best historical overturned machine-gun wagons. Now steps, close
novels yet written about World War II in eastern Europe. by. A hand on his shoulder.
"Come, we must leave now."
In the low wood, his head bowed so that his line "I have no horse. My horse is dead." Vyuko looks
of vision to the long column of infantry is blocked by up. It is Jasiu, his pale and wrinkled face streaked
the lightly fluttering leaves in the foreground: Vyuko, with dirt. The old army man is an encyclopedia of
thighs embracing the horse, his lance point on the tales about heroic exploits during the Bolshevik cam¬
ground to his right. In the distance, the powerful roar paigns, and Vyuko is glad he is still alive.
of engines. His commanding officer looks doubtfully "Come," the old man says, "we're going to
around him. Panzers? Horses snort. Vyuko's flesh regroup closer to the river. But I'd advise you not to
vibrates with the current of a hatred so potent that it go charging off after a tank next time."
feels like joy: They shall not reach the Vistula. He pats "I hate them. They do not fight like men, and I
the horse's neck. Oh, beautiful animal, you and I will hate them."
be first to reach them. We will gather them on the The old man looks at Vyuko, thinking. "I know,"
lance like garbage! Like insects! The upper bodies of he says, "and you'll need that, because this is not 1920.
the men around him surge forward and back with the This is different."
movement of their horses. The younger ones are Richter, standing by the tank after having
frightened and shaky; the older ones are calm with cleaned himself up. He looks at its shape, thinking.
resignation. And Vyuko, among the youngest, is Behind him the other men laugh and poke fun at him
incandescent with exhilaration. Vyuko, the first into for his indiscretion. He drinks water from a canteen,
battle; Vyuko, whose lance will be painted end to end feels the cool air on his forehead. Then it hits him:
with bright German blood. Down the line the order is What an invention! What a beautiful invention! Even
called, and he lifts the lance, spurs, and feels the the shape is sleek, artistic, and he is awed by the
mighty flesh erupt under him. He shouts, aiming the purity of its function. "Steel!" he says, and hits the
lance at the now-scattering column. The wind presses side with an openhanded metallic whap. He goes to
his eyes; he knows by the sound of the hoofbeats that the other men and gestures with the canteen. "It is
he leaves his compatriots behind. His heart soars. beautiful, no?"
Divine music. "What?"
In the tank, gripped with nauseating, claustropho¬ "That. It is beautiful. It is a beautiful device, a
bic fright: Richter, hands on the automatic, testing the great invention."
turn — up, down, side to side the turret goes. Encased "When did you discover this?"
in his coffin of steel with the two men below him, he "Just now. All the training, all the preparation,
realizes that he is about to mess his pants, and the none of that struck me until just now. This is magic,
effort of holding it in is so great that sweat bursts from magic!"
his face. The tank turns in a gasping jerk, throwing "Ah, you have confidence now?" one asks.
him against the housing. When he sees the enemy, the "Horizontal assaults we can handle. I trust we'll have
pressure overcomes his strength, and he feels it rush no more vertical ones from you? You see, it's techni¬
forth, then run like warm syrup down his legs. cally a form of sabotage."
Cavalry, someone yells from below. Richter tests the The men laugh, Richter the loudest. "No, no more
turret again, aims. The slit is too small. Horses, lances, vertical ones," he says, "not while in a masterpiece
puffs of smoke, deafening noise, and then across his like that."
vision in a blazing flash a horse and rider. He lets off a "Good. We'll not tolerate such insults to our steel
quick burst, misses, and knows he is doomed. There is lady. And now we will drink to your coming of age."
no surviving this; the magnificent forms of horses rip¬ Richter is abundant with pride.
ple everywhere, slick and powerful, vapor shooting
from their snouts. There, there is one, coming straight [Copyright from Proud Monster, Northpoint Press, 1987.
and yelling. Richter pulls and cuts the horse from MacMillan is the author of Proud Monster and Orbit of
under the lancer, whose strange helmet flips in the air Darkness, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991). He is a pro¬
above his head. Gone. fessor of English at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and
In the low wood, Vyuko, sitting with his head is currently at work on a novel that takes place at the
resting on his crossed forearms. He weeps for his Treblinka concentration camp. Orders for Proud Monster
horse. So fine an animal, and to be ripped from under may be sent in care of the University of Hawaii at Manoa,
him by someone he could not even see. He hears the Department of English, 1733 Donaghho Road, Honolulu,
soft footfalls of other survivors and, in the distance. Hawaii 96822.]

70JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

same day, the Warsaw garrison received the order Light, and the S.S. Motorized Infantry Regiment
to give up. Deutschland, were given the task of cracking the
With the fall of Warsaw, only two organized Polish defenses. Luftwaffe bombers and army
pockets of resistance, Modlin and Hela, remained. artillery pounded the Poles day and night, but the
At Modlin, about 35,000 soldiers, mostly survivors old Russian forts had been built to last. In the end,
of the Modlin and Lodz Armies, occupied an Modlin had to be taken the old fashioned way —
extensive network of forts and other defensive with infantry assault troops.
positions. Supported by Kempf s panzers, Deutschland
Three German infantry divisions (14th, 32nd breached the Polish lines east of the town on the
and 228th), along with Panzer Division Kempf, 1st 25th. At the same time, the 1st Light and 32nd

COMMAND MAGAZINE
 Infantry Divisions began clearing the forts south of Most of the Poles, however, did not make it.
the Narew. It was tough fighting. Though many of The final stand of the Polish army took place
the forts were surrounded, the Poles inside contin¬ between 4 and 6 October. The 50th and 60th
ued to resist, causing many deaths among the Infantry Divisions, along with three cavalry
attackers. brigades, were surrounded and destroyed by
The Germans called in combat engineers to German motorized and panzer units in a forest
help, and by the 28th, several key Polish positions north of Kock.
had been captured. The formal surrender followed The results of the Polish campaign shocked the
the next day. world. German losses were placed at 8,082 killed,
The Poles at Hela surrendered three days later. 5,029 missing, and 27,278 wounded, along with 217
That narrow peninsula was ideal for defense, and tanks (mostly Pz. Is and IIs) destroyed. Between
the Naval Brigade had fought with tenacity. Again, 400-500 Luftwaffe aircraft were lost.
though, Luftwaffe bombardment, this time coupled Against that, the German armed forces effec¬
with the heavy guns from two World War I era bat¬ tively destroyed the Polish army, navy and air
tleships, proved decisive. On 1 October, 5,000 force. The Polish army alone lost 123,000 killed and
Polish troops surrendered at Hela. 133,700 wounded. Another 694,000 soldiers were
taken prisoner by the Germans, and 217,000 more
The End were lost to the Soviets. About 60,000 made it
There were still thousands of Polish soldiers at- across the borders of Hungary and Romania, while
large in the countryside. Penned in by the Germans another 15,000 crossed into Latvia and Lithuania.
in the west and Soviets to the east, their only salva¬ Three Polish destroyers and two submarines
tion lay in the south. They moved in formations escaped to England; three other submarines were
ranging in size from small groups to multi-division interned in Sweden.
conglomerates, fighting running battles with Poland itself was dismembered. It would be
enemy troops as they attempted to reach the five long years before a new Polish state emerged,
Hungarian or Romanian borders. and 45 years beyond that before the Poles again
As soon as the Soviets had invaded eastern Pol¬ achieved a truly independent nation. ©
and, many individual Polish commanders had
decided to take their men into neutral countries, in Sources
the hope of continuing the struggle at a later date. Von Allmayer-Beck, and Christoph Freiherr. Die
Thousands of Poles did manage to make it to safety, Geschicte der 21.1. D. Munich: Schild Verlag,
in at least one case, with the help of the Germans. 1990.
After a meeting between a Polish cavalry comman¬ Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York:
der (whose unit had been fighting Soviet forces) and Ballentine Books, 1957.
the commander of the German 28th Infantry Division, Hubatsch, Walter. Die 61. l.D. Friedberg, Germany:
the Poles were allowed to continue south with a Podzun-Pallas Verlag, 1963.
signed document stating "the 28th Infantry Division Kaltenegger, Roland. Die Stammdivision der
guarantees the Polish free access to the south." Deutschen Gebirgstruppe. Graz, Austria: Leopold
Stocker Verlag, 1981.
Kennedy, Robert. The German Campaign in Poland.
Washington, D.C.: Dept, of the Army, 1956.
KrSutler, M. Es War ein Edelweiss. Graz, Austria:
Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1962.
Lehmann, Rudolf. Die Liebstandarte, vol. 1.
Winnipeg, Canada: J. Fedorowicz Pub., 1987.
Von Manteuffel, Hasso. Die 7. Panzer Division.
Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas Verlag,
1983.
Neumann, Joachim. Die 4. Panzer Division, vol. 1.
Bonn, Germany: Neumann, 1985.
Paul, Wolfgang. Brennpunkt: Die 6. Panzer Division.
Osnabruck, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1984.
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Polenfeldzug. Bergisch
Gladbach, Germany: Liibbe Verlag, 1982.
Schachtman, Tom. The Phoney War. New York:
Harper & Row, 1982.
Stoves, Rolf. Die 1. Panzer Division. Osnabruck,
Germany: Munin Verlag, 1967.
Weidinger, Otto. Das Reich, vol. 1. Osnabruck,
Leni Riefenstahl (crouching, center) confers with a senior German officer Germany: Munin Verlag, 1967.
before her crew begin filming the Warsaw victory parade, 5 October 1939.

72 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

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 New Light on the Iran
Hostage Rescue Mission
by Richard C. Thornton and Alan Capps

[Ed's Intro: This article originally appeared in the near the town of Tabas, some 200 miles southeast
December 1991 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. I of Tehran. There they would rendezvous with
thought its conclusions interesting and bold enough to eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters flown in
warrant its presentation here for a wider audience.] from the carrier USS Nimitz on station in the Gulf
of Oman. Auxiliary fuel tanks gave the helicopters
Critical to the successful outcome of any mis¬ the needed range to fly the nearly 600 miles from
sion, particularly covert operations, is the ability to the Nimitz to Desert One. After refueling at Desert
exercise effective command and control. One, the helicopters were to take the assault force
Additionally, contingency planning is vital to pro¬ 135 more miles to a mountain hideout, code-
vide adequate options for those making the deci¬ named Figbar, about 65 miles southeast of Tehran.
sions on the ground when something unexpected Arriving before daylight, the assault force would
does go wrong. The more people involved in mak¬ rest all day until nightfall.
ing those decisions, the more complicated the chain After nightfall, the team was to travel to
of command, the greater the possibility for the Tehran in trucks provided by agents in Iran for an
wrong decision to be made or an option to be over¬ after-midnight assault on the compound and for¬
looked. eign ministry. They would then speed the freed
These axioms were never more true than in the hostages to a pickup point — either the adjacent
aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission. Minor soccer stadium or, if possible, the courtyard inside
mechanical problems that could have been fixed, a the embassy compound itself. The helicopters from
complicated chain of command that stretched from Figbar would swoop in to pick them up and fly
Desert One all the way back to the White House, them to an abandoned airfield at Manzariyeh, 35
and hasty decisions made at all levels from the miles southwest of Tehran. That airfield would
President to the commander of Desert One, prior to have been secured by a Ranger company prior to
the accident, condemned the mission to failure. the helicopters' arrival. There they would board C-
The mission to rescue the 53 American 141 transports for the flight out of Iran, accompa¬
hostages held by the Iranians got under way at twi¬ nied by a fighter escort.
light on 24 April 1980. The plan called for the sur¬ As is well known, this complex rescue plan
reptitious insertion into Iran never got beyond its first step, and then it turned
of a specially trained 208- into a disaster. Two of the eight helicopters did not
man force (118 in the rescue make it to Desert One due to instrument failure
team and 90 in the combat- that occurred while passing through an unexpect¬
logistics support role) that ed dust cloud. One returned to the Nimitz; the
would assault the U.S. other landed en route and was abandoned, its crew
Embassy compound and the picked up by one of the other helicopters. The dust
Iranian foreign ministry, res¬ cloud caused a delay of some 90 minutes in the
cue the hostages, and fly remaining 6 helicopters' flight. Instead of arriving
them to safety. The mission at 2230 [10:30 p.m.j, they did not arrive until after
was undertaken despite the midnight.
fact that it would place in Upon arrival at Desert One, it was discovered
jeopardy the lives of some that a third helicopter had developed a leak in its
300 other Americans in Iran, flight controls system, causing a second-stage
including many journalists. hydraulic pump to burn out. What had happened
There seemed little doubt was that a fitting between a pump and a hydraulic
that some of those would line had cracked, causing the leak. It could not be
suffer reprisals, or be seized, repaired, and no spare pumps or fittings were
if the hostages were rescued. available. Ironically, a spare pump had been
Hmt-» iiv" * mt ini The assault force was to aboard the helicopter that returned to the Nimitz.
be transported by six C-130s This left five helicopters capable of proceeding: it
Mid-1980 Iranian postage stamp from Egypt via the island of had been determined in advance that unless six
commemorating the Iranian hostage Masirah to an isolated site, helicopters were available, the mission would be
crisis. (Shown at 200%) code-named Desert One, scrubbed. After consultation with mission com-

74 JULY-AUG 1992
ISSUE 17
manders, the President quickly ordered the rescue
team to withdraw. The mission was aborted.
But in the process of departing, a helicopter
collided with one of the C-130s, and the resulting
explosion killed eight crewmen and severely
burned three others. As the aircraft burned, the
rescue team hurriedly boarded the remaining
transports and departed, leaving behind all of the
helicopters and their contents. The collision turned
a failed rescue mission into a domestic and interna¬
tional crisis, and it was a political calamity for
President Carter. Coming just as the Mariel boatlift
was getting underway, depositing thousands of
Cuban refugees on American shores, the rescue
debacle made the President appear to be extremely
weak, indecisive, and incompetent.
There are numerous grounds for criticizing the
hasty decision to abort the rescue mission — a
decision the President made in 12 minutes. The
abruptness with which the decision was made
raised questions afterward about the President's
intention to see the mission through to completion
— "a failure of nerve," as one writer put it.
However, the mission commander at Desert One,
Col. Charles A. Beckwith, USA, refused to proceed
with five helicopters on the grounds that it had
been determined beforehand a minimum of six
was necessary.
Beckwith's reasoning was that with only five
helicopters he would be forced to leave behind
between 18 to 20 men, which would compromise
the mission. Further, he argued, if any other heli¬ with their machineguns, ammunition, and tear gas
copters were lost during the mission, there would canisters, or by simply removing one or both of the
not be enough to pick up the rescuers and inboard auxiliary fuel tanks. The palletized fuel
hostages, a total of 178 people in all. But containers were specifically designed for easy
Beckwith's explanation is unsatisfactory. Not only installation and removal. Thus, it would seem that
did he decline to take even minimum risks to pro¬ a simple space-weight calculation could have
ceed — a decision in which his superiors concurred determined which combination of inboard tanks,
— key parts of the explanation to abort do not gun crew members, and equipment would have to
stand up to close scrutiny. be removed from one, two, or three helicopters to
For the long-distance flight from the Nimitz to obtain the needed space.
Desert One, the RH-53Ds had been equipped with Jettisoning the inboard auxiliary fuel tanks was
4 auxiliary fuel tanks — 2 inboard 300-gallon, feasible because the remaining distance the heli¬
fiberglass, palletized fuel containers and 2 out¬ copters would have to travel — under 400 miles in
board 600-gallon drop tanks strapped onto either all — was well within the RH-53D's range with the
side of the fuselage. The inboard auxiliary tanks two 600-gallon outboard tanks. The published
restricted the helicopters' carrying capacity. It was range of the RH-53D is 685 miles (596 nautical
the restricted capacity, in turn, that had deter¬ miles). Yet when the on-scene mission commander.
mined a minimum requirement of 6 helicopters to Col. James H. Kyle, USAF, asked Marine pilot Lt.
transport 118 men and their equipment from Col. Edward R. Seiffert whether he could "dump
Desert One to Figbar. This worked out to between gas and hack it," Seiffert claimed that he could not
18 to 20 men aboard each helicopter. Beckwith because he would "need every gallon...to make it
claimed that with only 5 helicopters available he through Night Two."
would have to leave behind 18 to 20 men. This con¬ If six helicopters were deemed absolutely neces¬
clusion is not convincing. sary, there were three possibilities. First, the decision
Space could easily have been made for four could have been made to risk flying the helicopter
men and their equipment aboard each of the with the burned out backup hydraulic pump — a
remaining five helicopters either by leaving behind not uncommon decision in crisis situations. The load
a few of the gun crew members assigned to the could have been lightened to reduce the risk. The
helicopters (each helicopter had a crew of five — advantage in proceeding was that no additional
pilot, copilot, crew chief, and two gunners) along time would have been lost. The disadvantage was

COMMAND MAGAZINE 75
 that the condition of the craft would have remained nario worked out, it would have made seven heli¬
precarious throughout the mission, making it the copters available to the mission. On balance, deliv¬
least satisfactory of the three alternatives. ery of the hydraulic pump kit by speedy aircraft
Second, the damaged helicopter could have was the preferred solution — if only the President
been repaired. What could have been done was for and his advisers had given the problem sufficient
the five flyable helicopters to proceed to Figbar with thought.
the full Delta Force complement, rearranged as Beckwith's second reason for not proceeding
noted, leaving behind the disabled helicopter, its — that he might not have enough helicopter capac¬
crew, and those crew members, machineguns, ity available for retrieval of the hostages and res¬
ammunition, and loaded auxiliary tanks stripped cuers and their transport to Manzariyeh — has, as
from the flyable helicopters to make extra space. A suggested above, even less merit. Maximum seat¬
call could have been placed to Nimitz to fly in a ing capacity on the RH-53D was 56. But seating
hydraulic pump kit to repair the downed helicopter. capacity was reduced to 20 during the first phase,
The pump itself weighed 13 pounds, the replace¬ the flight from the Nimitz to Desert One, because of
ment fitting a few ounces. A carrier aircraft could the inboard auxiliary fuel tanks.
have airdropped a replacement pump with fittings The point is the inboard auxiliaries were
to Desert One in a few hours, certainly by daylight. unnecessary for the last phase of the mission
Even though the pump replacement would because the helicopters had sufficient range with¬
take less than one hour, to preserve secrecy the out them. Moreover, without the tanks, there
sixth helicopter would still have been required to would be more space available for picking up the
spend the day a Desert One, waiting until nightfall hostages and rescue team and transporting them
to proceed to Figbar. There was less risk here than the 35 miles from Tehran to Manzariyeh. In fact,
it might seem. Although a fairly well-traveled road the plan in any case was to jettison the inboard
passed close to Desert One, the helicopters had auxiliary tanks when they reached the mountain
been painted in the Iranian Air Force color scheme hideout. Thus, removal of the internal auxiliary
with appropriate decals. Iran, in fact, had several tanks would give the helicopters something like
RH-53 helicopters, so if the helicopter was spotted their maximum capacity of 56. According to
during the day, there would have been no immedi¬ Beckwith, the total number to be transported was
ate cause for alarm. Finally, one of the Farsi speak¬ 178 men, which 4 helicopters — not 5 or 6 — could
ers on the strike team could have been left behind, accommodate with room to spare.
just in case a passer-by became curious. This calculation also assumes that there would
The trip from Desert One to Figbar was 270 not be a single casualty in the rescue attempt,
miles and would take just over two hours, flying at which, of course, was highly unlikely and, in fact,
the RH-53D's cruising speed of 120 knots. The sixth not expected; President Carter himself publicly
helicopter would still have arrived at Figbar sever¬ assumed there would be casualties. Pentagon
al hours before the embassy assault was scheduled analyses had predicted between 45 and 70 fatalities
to get under way, after mid¬ among both hostages and rescuers. Very likely, in
night. Moreover, that heli¬ the darkness and chaos, some would be killed and
copter could have hauled not make it to the pickup point. In terms of lift
fuel left behind at Desert requirements, this meant that possibly even three
One. There was, in short, helicopters, with a maximum capacity of 168 peo¬
ample time to assemble even ple, would have been sufficient to extricate the res¬
the declared minimum num¬ cue team and hostages from the Embassy com¬
ber of helicopters at Figbar pound in a single trip. Of course, if necessary, one
prior to the rescue attempt. or more of the helicopters could have made two
Alternatively, the third trips. Extra fuel would have been available at
option would have the heli¬ Manzariyeh.
copter that had returned to It is truly difficult to believe that there was no
the Nimitz sent out again, attempt to identify precisely what was wrong with
with the spare pump kit it the disabled helicopter beyond the vague diagnosis
had on board. However, it of an unfixable "hydraulic problem," and that no
would have had to get attempt was made to find a repair solution. Once it
underway almost immedi¬ was recognized that continuation of the mission
ately in order to make hinged on repair of a backup hydraulic pump, it is
mWkt Of V. S. MILITARY' Desert One before daylight, incredible that the idea of flying in a pump and
^AGGRESSION AGAINST WAV* and there is some question repair kit did not occur to any of those involved. If
m-< TARAS -* whether it could have been it did not, then it simply testifies to the inadequacy
made ready in time because of the Carter leadership under pressure. But if the
Mid-1980 Iranian postage stamp of crew fatigue and instru¬ repair idea was considered and rejected, there
commemorating the failed hostage ment damage suffered in the needs to be further consideration of why the mis¬
rescue attempt. (Shown at 200%) dust storm. If the above sce¬ sion was aborted.

76 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 The official criticisms of the mission — both The second, and more likely, possibility is that
military and civilian — were clearly inadequate, the rescue mission was cut short because the
focusing on mission mechanics, not on politics. The President had never intended to do more than
top secret Pentagon critique charged that the heli¬ carry out a show of force in the first place. He
copters were inadequately maintained, that the needed to shore up a badly sagging image of inep¬
helicopter pilots never practised the mission in bad titude, and so in an attempt to intimidate the
weather, and that the weather forecasters missed a Iranian leadership and to demonstrate to the
200-mile-wide, 6,000-foot-high dust cloud. American people his ability to take action, he
Criticism also focused on selection of Maj. Gen. authorized the "rescue." New York Times columnist
James B. Vaught, USA, as overall commander, on William Safire trenchantly criticized the mission
grounds that he lacked experience in inter-Service plan as Carter's "tentative, hypercautious, escape-
operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee hatch-laden foray into military force." The political
report focused on the same areas. question he posed at the time is well worth asking
Two other possibilities occur, both suggested again: "Did the President see any advantage in
at the time. The first is that the mission was called making a feint and then withdrawing?" Whatever
off after the Soviet Union discovered it and sent a President Carter's original intent, the rescue mis¬
message threatening to attack the transports as sion had been a fiasco of the first order — and a
they exited Iran through Turkey. The day after the fiasco tainted with blood.
failure, the administration went to great pains to
note that mission secrecy was not compromised. In Sources
a news account of Defense Secretary Harold Beckwith, Charles, and Knox, Donald. Delta
Brown's press conference, it was stated according Force. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, New
to "informed sources," that "the military high com¬ York, 1983.
mand carefully monitored the status of Soviet Kyle, James H. The Guts to Try. Orion Books,
forces. There was no sign that the Russians either New York, 1990.
detected the mission or put forces on higher alert." Newspaper accounts and commentary by
AWACS planes were also continually aloft to Richard Burt, John K. Cooley, Charles W.
detect any Soviet or Iranian reaction and to direct a Corddry, Douglas B. Feaver, John J. Fialka,
response from carrier-based jets, if needed, but no Seymour M. Hersh, Richard Halloran,
response was detected. In any case, the actual exit Stewart Lytle, and William Safire.
plan called for a flight across Saudi Arabia, not Correspondence with Col. Jerry King, USA, JCS
Turkey, which largely discounts the Soviet threat operations planner for the Desert One mis¬
argument. sion.

Second Guessing Desert One

[The above article brought forth a huge reaction from the extended flight without that hydraulic system, especial¬
Gazette's military-professional readership. Herewith some ly in exceptionally trying conditions that would require
samples of that.] every possible aid to the pilot, is ludicrous. The thought
As a CH-53 pilot I could not pass the opportunity to that it is "not uncommon" to fly that way is also ridicu¬
comment on "New Light on the Iran Hostage Rescue lous.
Mission." The article is a perfect example of why pro¬ The pilot's decision to continue to Desert One
fessionals (in this case military) distrust so-called acade¬ rather than land in the middle of Iran with the possibili¬
micians and dislike their armchair analyses. In this case ty of not being recovered was probably correct, but dur¬
the alternatives offered by Thornton and Capps are not ing Vietnam, pilots with hydraulic problems landed in
physically possible, let alone tactically sound or feasi¬ disputed territory rather than attempt further flight.
ble. The authors offer three alternatives to the lack of The difference being they had radio communications
helicopter assets that doomed the Iranian hostage res¬ with friendlies and could expect someone to come get
cue attempt: continue the mission by flying the 6th RH- them.
53D without its backup hydraulic system; repair the The authors further comment about reducing the
helicopter at Desert One before continuing the mission; load to reduce the risk belies a complete lack of under¬
or have the helicopter that had returned to the Nimitz standing of the nature of the problem. The weight of the
sent out again. This last option was dismissed (correct¬ aircraft has little bearing on the primary control servos. A
ly) by the authors, but the other alternatives deserve lighter aircraft requires smaller control inputs, thereby
some comment.... putting less of a strain on the system, but the salient point
The RH-53's second stage hydraulic pump is not is if the first stage hydraulic pump subsequently fails, the
merely a backup system for the flight controls, it also is aircraft' s controls will freeze and the aircraft will crash.
the primary hydraulic power to other aircraft systems, To attempt to continue with the mission-critical aircraft in
such as the automatic flight control system. To attempt a much degraded condition makes no sense.

COMMAND MAGAZINE 77
 The second alternative, repairing the aircraft, I read with great interest the article, "New Light on
required a Nimitz aircraft to deliver the part to Desert the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission," by Richard C.
One, hiding the helicopter at Desert one during the day, Thornton and Alan Capps, and their conclusions corre¬
and then continuing the mission the next night. I can spond more or less to my own. Having said that, I must
only assume that the authors envisioned the C-130s point out that it is much easier to arrive at such conclu¬
departing Desert One to avoid detection during the sions from a distance, with the benefit of hindsight. The
day. This means the authors would leave a crew with a commander on the ground did not have that luxury.
downed airplane in the middle of "enemy" territory on I also believe that criticism of President Carter is not
the hope that: 1) the part parachuted to the crew was justified. If the commander on the ground recommends
not damaged in delivery and indeed fixed the problem aborting the mission, it would be irresponsible of the
once installed; and 2) the aircraft would not be noticed President to order a continuation. I must say that
because it was painted to resemble an Iranian heli¬ President Carter came on national television and
copter. acknowledged that he made the decision to abort. He
Replacing the pump would have taken about an made no effort to evade his responsibility, which is not
hour as the authors assert, but that may not have fixed true of some others I could mention.
the problem. Often the hydraulic pump burns up due to I would also like to commend Secretary of State
a lack of hydraulic fluid caused by a leak somewhere Cyrus Vance, who had the courage of his convictions
else in the system. Without a hydraulic jenny, a piece of and resigned because he opposed the mission at the
gear about the size of a desk on wheels and weighing outset.
several hundred pounds, the system could not be pres¬ — Maj. John P. Oliver, USMC (Ret)
sure checked to see if there was a leak or the pump just
gave out. Having gone down in farmers' fields many We can learn many valuable lessons from the
times, watching as everyone within sight flocked to see Desert One operation. Much of the success of our cur¬
the big helicopter, I will not even comment on the possi¬ rent MEU(SOC) program is due to careful analysis of
bility of the aircraft and crew remaining undetected this and other operations and their failures. However,
next to "a fairly well-traveled road," just because the in an effort to shed "New Light on the Iran Hostage
local inhabitants thought it belonged to their govern¬ Rescue Mission," the authors have wrongly criticized
ment. what was actually one of the mission's creditable
Elsewhere in the article, the authors question Col. actions — Col. Beckwith's recommendation to abort,
Beckwith's decision to abort because he needed X num¬ based on his "No Go" criterion for transportation.
ber of personnel and 5 aircraft could not carry them. "No Go" criteria are determined during the relative
Their answer is to remove the unnecessary internal fuel calm of a raid's planning period and represent the sober
tanks to provide additional seating. Space was never recognition of baseline factors required for a mission's
the reason the helicopters could not have carried extra success. Without these minimums the mission cannot
personnel; the problem was weight. The maximum continue. These criteria should be held up to extremely
gross weight of the RH-53 is listed at 42,000 pounds; the critical analysis and review during the planning
Desert One aircraft were already loaded to 48,000 process, and they must be briefed back up the chain of
pounds at a high altitude and high outside air tempera¬ command prior to the mission's execution. But once a
ture (OAT — which degrades engine performance), and raid launches, "No Go" criteria are not flexible without
on a surface that did not permit a rolling takeoff to take substantial changes in the situation.
advantage of transitional lift. In combat, the number of Let's make sure we learn the right lessons from the
passengers is never determined by the number of seats operation. The decision to abort this raid on the basis of
available, but by the power available versus the power predetermined "No Go" criteria was correct. The impli¬
required to lift off. cation that easy solutions were available "if only the
I was not involved in the Iranian rescue attempt President and his advisors had given the problem suffi¬
and have no axe to grind, but I was appalled at the cient thought," is ludicrous. Raids are far too complicat¬
authors' lack of technical investigation when writing ed to make up as we go along. To suggest that this mis¬
this article. The authors' only listed aviation source. The sion's failure had anything to do with "a failure of
Guts to Try, by Col. James H. Kyle, USAF, even pointed nerve" is insulting and uninformed.
out the weight overloading problem (p. 295), but this — Capt. Gary R. Oles, USMC
was evidently missed by the authors. I wholeheartedly
agree with the need to critically examine our failures as As a transport pilot, I must take issue with certain
well as publicize our successes, and agree that the points in Thornton and Capps' article. I must first quali¬
Gazette should publish provocative articles about our fy my comments by saying I am a CH-46 pilot, and my
profession; but I would hope that prospective authors exposure to Desert One has been only in the ready
would thoroughly investigate the subject prior to publi¬ room and the officers' club, talking with people who
cation. flew the mission. As a pilot in Operation Eastern Exit,
— Col. Michael J. Cross, USMC however, I saw only too well how quickly things get
complicated on a rescue mission.

78 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 My first objection concerns the issue of Attention
the hydraulic pump; initially, it is referred to
Command Foreign Subscribers
as a "second stage pump" and later on as a
"backup hydraulic pump." Beyond nomen¬ Due to the increasing cost of
clature, hydraulic problems in a helicopter
flight control system are not minor, nor are mailing to foreign countries,
they to be treated lightly. we have been forced to raise
Next on my list is the idea that the air¬ our foreign subscription rates.
craft should give up aircrew members, guns,
and ammo to accommodate raid force per¬
This will not affect your cur¬
sonnel. No transport helicopter commander rent subscriptions.
is going to give up his right of self-defense;
likewise, I can think of no other place where a
proficient crew is more essential than when
operating with night vision goggles in a
threat environment.
The authors also make mention of the
RH-53D's "published range" and "maximum
World War It Books
(personnel) capacity of 56;" these two issues Rare & Out-Of-Print Books on:
are a constant sore spot in these operations. Eastern Front • Natzi Germany • SS • Marine Corps
Our pilots — wing. Corps, or joint force — do Unit Histories • Avaiation • Weapons • Uniforms • Naval
not necessarily operate at published maxi- Send $1.00 for Latest Catalog to:
mums; more often than not maximums don't
include a comfortable reserve in case of emer¬ Harold's Book Shop
gencies. Paul E. Kisselburg
The concept of repairing the aircraft with 186-A W. 7th Street • St. Paul, MN 55102
the bad hydraulics is sound, but for two
burning issues: the raid force is only dealing
with a predetermined amount of time in the
op area; and more important, it is doubtful a
commander would deliver repair parts in
broad daylight given such a covert operation.
Naval, Military, Aviation Books
Two other issues were clearly glossed Receive your informative catalog by return mail.
over — minimum crew rest and aircraft com¬ Send only $5.00 for a 1-year subscription consisting
mander's judgment. Although crew rest is of 4 issues.
not the deciding factor in a mandatory mis¬ Each catalog has 48 pages and contains approximate¬
sion, pilots still need a minimum of sleep to ly 1500 book listings. Catalogs are sent by 1st class
accomplish their mission. Likewise, pilots mail.
and aircrew are "on-scene" — hence, when Don't delay! Write now to....
they make the call on an inflight situation
(fuel, mechanical systems, weather, etc.) the I 2177C Isabelle Court
chain of command must implicitly trust then- III IV1I No. Bellmore, NY 11710
BOOKSELLERS
decisions as military aviators. Most any com¬
mander, ground or air, would agree that it is
frustrating and foolish to be "second
guessed" by a command and control system
that is far removed from the tactical situation. BRITISH
In that respect, I agree with Mr. Thornton and
Mr. Capps; the fact the tactical situation was MILITARY HISTORY
being influenced from the White House does
not speak well for command and control pro¬
Fine Used and Rare Books
cedures during the period in question.
Finally, the article demonstrates, once and Autographs on the
again, that impressive academic credentials British Empire, 1600-1935
— books, articles, and interviews — are no Illustrated catalogue, $3.00
substitute for experience and no guarantee
that someone has an accurate grasp of the
OWEN D. KUBIK BOOKS
pertinent facts. 3474 Clar-Von Drive, Dept. C
— Capt. Peter B. Gill, USMC Dayton, OH 45430
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COMMAND MAGAZINE 79
 *

25. Vietnam
Command Reader Survey
26. International Military Review
Please help us make Command into 6. Short Rounds 27. World War II
the magazine you want it to be by par¬ 7. Gettysburg 28. Second World War
ticipating in this reader survey. Use the 8. Sherman or Lee 29. Are you a subscriber to this maga¬
bound-in, postage-paid card to cast 9. Disease in the ACW zine? (1 = yes, 2 = no)
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Historic Era Preference 15. Compare this issue (17) with the Cape Cod [Link]
This list refers to questions 1 -4 previous issue (16). Fresno Gaming Association.2
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0=Ancient Period (3,000 B.C. - 500 1 = This issue was better than the GMT [Link]
B.C.) previous. Game Designers' Workshop.44
l=Classical Antiquity (500 B.C. - 2=This issue was not as good as the Harold's Book Shop.79
500 A.D.) previous. Helio-Graph.52
2=Middle Ages (500-1500) 3=The two issues were of about Hudson's Hobby Games.80
3=Early Modern Period (1500- equal worth. J.R.'s.79
1789) 16. What branch of the service did Owen D. Kubik Books.79
4=Napoleonic Era (1789-1815) you serve? l=Army, 2=Airforce, The Music Group.73
5=American Civil War 3=Navy, 4=Marines. Tell us when and Time-Life [Link]
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1914) 17. What is your income?
7=World War I era (1914-1933) 1 =$20,000, HUDSONS
8=World War II 2=$20,001-30,000,
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Theaters 5=$201+
2. The Eastern Front 20. When you recieve your new issue
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This Issue 2=2...9=9 or more
the Tet Offensive, Soviet
Rate the contents of this issue using a 21. How many in your household? Sub Operations During
0-9 scale. "0" means you weren't even 0=0, 1=1,2=2... 9=9 or more
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lar piece. "1" means you read it, but MAND Magazine? (l=yes, 2=no) Super Power, Glory-The
hated it. From there, "2," "3," "4," Do you subscribe to the following 54th Massachusetts
etc., each indicate a slightly more military history magazines? (l=yes,
favorable opinion, until you reach "9," 2=no)
Regiment, Hybrid
which means, "I can't imagine a better 23. Military History Warships and much more.
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80 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

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GREAT BAT. ALEX.
 25. Vietnam
Command Reader Survey
26. International Military Review
Please help us make Command into 6. Short Rounds 27. World War II
the magazine you want it to be by par¬ 7. Gettysburg 28. Second World War
ticipating in this reader survey. Use the .
8 Sherman or Lee 29. Are you a subscriber to this maga¬
bound-in, postage-paid card to cast 9. Disease in the ACW zine? (1 = yes, 2 = no)
your ballot. Vote by placing one whole 10. Poland '39
number (only!) in the space on the 11. Next War with Japan
postcard corresponding to each ques¬ 12. Iran Hostage Rescue
tion below. 13. This issue overall. Advertisers Index
14. This issue's cover art. Antheil Booksellers. .77
Historic Era Preference 15. Compare this issue (17) with the Cape Cod Connection. .IBC
This list refers to questions 1 -4 previous issue (16). Fresno Gaming Association. .2
below. 0= I didn't see the previous issue. Fresno Gaming Association. .53
0=Ancient Period (3,000 B.C. - 500 1 = This issue was better than the GMT Games. ....OBC
B.C.) previous. Game Designers' Workshop.... .44
1 =Classical Antiquity (500 B.C. - 2=This issue v not as good the Harold's Book Shop. .79
500 A.D.) previous. Helio-Graph. .52
2=Middle Ages (500-1500) 3=The two issues were of about Hudson's Hobby Games. .80
3=Early Modern Period (1500- equal worth. J.R.'s. .79
1789) 16. What branch of the service did Owen D. Kubik Books. .79
4=Napoleonic Era (1789-1815) you serve? 1 =Army, 2=Airforce, The Music Group. .73
5=American Civil War 3=Navy, 4=Marines. Tell us when and Time-Life Books. .IFC
6=Other 19th Century topics (1815- where in the comments below.
1914) 17. What is your income?
7=World War I era (1914-1933) 1 =$20,000, HUDSON'S
8=World War II 2=$20,001-30,000,
9=1945 to Present 3=$30,001-35,000,
HOBBY GAMES
1. List the one era about which you'd 4=$35,001 -40,000, P.O. Box 121503, Arlington, TX 76012
most like to see article coverag Mail Order
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cle coverage.
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This Issue
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lar piece. "1" means you read it, but MAND Magazine? (i =yes, x.=nuj
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etc., each indicate a slightly more military history magazines? (l=yes,
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which means, "I can't imagine a better 23. Military History Warships and much more.
article on the subject; I loved it." 24. America's Civil War

80 JULY-AUG 1992 ISSUE 17

 Cape cod Connection
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—ROLLING THUNDER.$19.95
BOOKSHELF SECTION —STORY NAVAL AIR.$19.95
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HARPOON 90 91 ED.$19.20
NEW WORLD.$20.00 OSPREY BOOKS
PAS DE CALAIS. ...$20.01
THE URALS. .. $20.01
CARRIERS SERIES
1830. $20.00 (ENTIRE LINE) LANGLY/NEW WEAPONS.$19.95
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ATTACK SUB.$20.00 NAP S EGYPTIAN CAMP.$10 MIDWAY.$19.95
CROSS OF IRON.$20.00 NAP.S DRAGOONS/LANCERS. REHEARSAL FOR WAR.$19.95
HOLLOW LEGIONS.$20.00 NAP.'S HUSSAR'S.$10 VIETNAM.$19.95
KINGMAKER.$20.00 NAP. 'S GUARD CAV. WAVE OF VICTORY.$19.95
RED BARRICADES.$20.00 NAP. LIGHT INF.
IN THEIR QUIET FIELDS.$23.00 AUSTRIAN ARMY 1 INF.$10
NAPOLEON S BATTLES.$21.00 WELLING. LGT. CAV.$10 COLORS OF WAR SERIES
THIRD REICH.$21.00 BRIT. ARMY ON CAMP. VOLUMES 1.2,3. OR 4. $19 95ca
NAP. ITAL. CAMP.$21.00 FRENCH ARMY 70-71.
NAP. RUSSIAN CAMP.$21.00 ZULU WAR.
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CRESCENDO/DOOM.$22.00 KOREAN WAR. VOLUMES 1 - 26.$19 each
AACHEN (LIMITED).$27.00 ISRAELI ARMY.
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THE ATLANTIC CAMPAIGN.$20.00 —AFTERMATH.$19.95
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THE EMPERIOR RETURNS.$24.00 —AIR WAR.$19.95
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CIVIL WAR: BRO V BRO.$37.00 UP TO 30% OFF THE RETAIL PRICE OF ANCIENT EMPIRES.$28.00
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FIRST TO FIGHT.$32 00 ORDERING AND [Link]!) FIRE & FURY CIVIL WAR RULES.. $18.00
GREAT BAT. ALEX.$32.00 JOHNNY REB.$16.00
The Art of War in the Classical World
NEW!
The Great Battles of

SPQR exander
The Roman Art of War acedonian Art of War

Beneventum • Cannae • Gaugamela • Issus •

Zama • Cynoscephalae • Granicus • Chaeronea
Bagradas Plains
The Great Battles of Alexander is an
exciting battle game that challenges you to
SPQR is an exciting battle game recreating
match the generalship of Alexander the
with great historical accuracy the Art of
Great in four of his most important
Warfare in the Roman Republic.
victories - from his initial triumph over the
hoplites of Greece to his final conquest of
Based on a highly-refined and expanded
the massive armies of the Persian Empire,
Great Battles of Alexander game system,
338 B.C.-331 B.C..
SPQR covers the development of the legion
during the heyday of the Roman Republic
To win, you must balance audacity with
with a focus on both playability as well as
shrewd calculation. If you are too
historical detail.
conservative, your opponent can seize the
initiative and crush your army before you
Five battles (including the bonus game)
can react. If you are too bold, your troops
trace warfare from the supremacy of the Game Designers: will disintegrate trying to obey your orders.
phalanx to the ascendancy of the legion,
Mark Herman
275 B.C. - 197 B.C. The game system
Richard Berg The simple game system focuses on
includes an expanded Command System,
Art Director: leadership, unit cohesion, and troop quality.
plus new rules that capture the full flavor of
The result is a dynamic, fim-to-play game
each particular battle, including War Rodger B. MacGowan
that captures the essence of ancient warfare,
Elephants, Roman artillery (scorpiones),
where the right gamble at the right time
and Cavalry Pursuit.
- can change history.

Quantity Game Price Extended Price

I Juggernaut:
SPQR: Art of Roman Warfare
Great Battles of Alexander
Juggernaut Module
Thunderbolt+Apache Leader
$40.00
$40.00
$10.00
$32.00
Alexander moves east, into India, to fight Hornet Leader $30.00
his final, major battle. Juggernaut includes 1863: Four Civil War Battles $37.00
Mail to: Silver Bayonet $20.00
a $10 Off Coupon towards the purchase of
GMT Games Air Bridqe to Victory $25.00
Great Battles of Alexander or SPQR. Operation Shoestring
310 W. Lacey $30.00
Hanford, CA 93230 Sub Total
($3.00 per game; International 10% Surface, 25% Air) Shipping
Or, for faster service, ‘7.25% sales tax for CA residents TAX*
use our Toll Free TOTAL
SPQR Alexander
Order Line:
Number of Battles
Counters
Maps (22x34 inch) Four Four
mm
(Fax) 209-582-7775
City
CHECK ONE:
ZiP

Playing Time 2-8 hrs. 1-4 hrs.

I I Check enclosed (payable to GMT Games) Q Money Order Cash
Solitaire Playability
| | Charge my credit card. Q] | |
Scenarios Multiple Multiple
Account [Link]. Date
Special Rules Signature