Secularization in a Society with a Strong Religious Ideology:The case of Turkey

Taleh Tahirli /Linkoping University – 2005

Secularization

Secularization is one of the essential political issues in International Relations’ theory and
practice. The separation of the religion from state is a highly politicized decision. The
religion/politics negotiation is a fluid site of authority with complex relations to the state
system, the global economy, international ethics and other more heavily theorized
locations of power in international relations.

Today Muslim societies find themselves face-to-face with the inevitable challenges of
secularization in the modern world. It should be stressed that secularization is a
comparatively new phenomenon. It began in Western Europe and has spread throughout
the world. Its rapidity and exact form have varied a great deal from place to place,
depending on a host of political, sociological, economic, and other variables. The world's
religions have adopted varying responses to it, usually featuring some mixture of
adaptation and self-defense designed to meet the new conditions. In short, societies have
shown different ways of responding to the secularizing tendency. Accordingly, an impact
of modern western cultures on Islamic societies has created an interesting debate
regarding the compatibility of secularization with Islamic values.

Modern Turkey occupies a unique place in relationship between Islam and secularization.
Turkey was the first among the Muslim countries which accepted a secular concept of the
state, religion, law, education, and economy and secular reforms regarding political,
constitutional, educational and cultural policy that were conducted even at the beginning
of the twentieth century. During the period between 1927 and 1937 secularization
reached its most radical phase and resulted in the significant isolation of religion from
Turkish politics. A decade later period, the late 1940s, a “relaxing of the official attitude
towards religion”, was observed that can be regarded as the end of radical secularization
reform era1. Further events in Turkish politics clearly show the Islamic revival of Turkey.

Kucukcan calls the general elections of December 24, 1995 “a turning point in Turkey’s
modern political history” relying on the fact that the results of these elections led to a
“reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere.
Another uniqueness of the Turkish case is based on the fact that the establishment of a
modern Turkey embodies two features: the Western political model and a dominant
Muslim society. Although, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the
early republican elite developed a state ideology on the basis of modernization and
westernization, the modern political system of Turkey also reflects apparent elements of
the Ottoman Empire which are based on Islamic culture and ideology. This dual character
of the Turkish case makes it an excellent example to study the relationship between Islam
and secularization. Therefore the Turkish experience can be taken as a case in support of
the argument that Islam and secularization are compatible.

Turkish culture
It can be considered as a unique “synthesis” between “Islam-centered traditional culture”
and “Western type of modernity”. Many of the themes, values, norms and behaviors that
are a non-separable part of modern Turkish culture are based in two fundamental sources:
“Islam and Traditions” and “Modernization and Westernization”. The norms that are
shaped by Islam are the primary result of the fact that approximately 98 percent of
population is Muslim. Therefore the influence of Islam on the political system of the
country is inevitable. During six hundred year legacy of Muslim Ottoman Empire the
religious identity of Turkish society had been strongly developed. Despite the fact that
religious level of population has been changed after the decline of Ottoman Empire, it is
very important even for the less religious Muslims in this country to be a believer in
Allah. Almost all population shares the same religious ideology – “the superior being is
Allah and Allah created everything”.

The Rise of Turkish Nationalism and Its Influence on Secularization Process

Reforms conducted in administration and legal system of the Ottoman Empire during the
period 1839-1860, the Tanzimat, led to rise of new movements. The first significant
reaction against imitative Westernization reforms was stated by the Young Ottomans
movement. The Young Ottoman’s conception was elaborated by Namik Kemal and
became the central conception of the intellectual circles of the last decades of the
nineteenth century. As Mardin describes the main goal of this movement was to replace
“the attitude of the suave and europeanized statesman of the Tanzimat” by “the cultural
and religious Puritanism of the Young Ottomans”. At the end of the nineteenth
century the Young Ottoman’s domination was succeeded by the Young Turks, whose
cultural outlook and subsequent policies were formulated under the decisive influence of
Zia Gokalp.
The solution of the main problem – how to avoid the collapse and defeat of the Empire
was remaining urgent during Young Turks domination. Different writers and thinkers
was proposing various ways and solutions to avoid the decline of the Ottomans. The
central question of that discussion within intellectual circles was which kind of factors
must be saved to prevent further decline and moreover to regain past dominance over the
region. The idea of Ottoman citizenship, which includes the union of all the Sultan’s
subjects, irrespective of race, creed, or language, in a single nationality and loyalty the
union, was agitated by official elite. As Lewis describes one of the most important
issues of that time was connected with uncertainty regarding identity problems which
included hesitations between religious and national self-identification. The question of
“whether the Muslim community or the Turkish nation was to be the basis of identity and
focus of loyalty was one of the most hotly debated of the time”. The first theoretical
formulation of Turkish nationalism was elaborated by Ziya Gokalp.
Gokalp was considering the emergence of Turkish nation through the decline of the
Islamic ummet (religion) by influence of the modern technology of Western civilization.
While Westernizers and Islamists were proposing respectively the broad penetration of
western values and Islamic revival as the way to avoid decline, Gokalp’s pan-Turkist
(Political movement in the late 19th century and which aimed to unite all Turkic-speaking
peoples in the world. First theis movement start in the Crimea and on the Volga against
growing Russian domination but later Atatürk de-emphasized Pan-Turkism, and he
encouraged Turkish nationalism only within Turkey) conception included to revive dead
ethnic customs of the pre-Islamic Turks. Gokalp’s
conception of nation included neither “the individuals united by the common ties of
modern economy and technology”, nor “an ummet, a religious community united in the
faith of Islam, nor a race or ethnic family united by archaic, tribal customs”.106 He
formulated the concepts nation (millet), religion (ummet), and modernization
(muasirlashma) with new interpretation.107 His main suggestion was to re-understand the
relationship between Turkish national culture, Islam and modern civilization.
The place of religion of in modern life was one of the important questions of Gokalp.
According to Davison, the first important issues regarding religion and modernity in
Gokalp’s conception was the rejection of the dominance of Islamic jurisprudential
view.108 Gokalp believed that the sources of this jurisprudence – Islamic law (Sheriat),
the Koran and Sunna (the sayings and doings of Prophet) - are inadequate on their own
for legal judgement in Islamic law.109 Therefore, he offered to consider customs and
traditions of other Islamic societies as the source of the law. Such rejection offers
transformation of the role of religious institutions in legal system that can be considered
as the “internal secularization”.110 Furthermore, Gokalp’s suggestion about consideration
of other factors beside Holy Law within legal system led to decrease of religious
authority.
Gokalp’s second significant view included the idea that full separation of religion and
politics is a fundamental legal requirement for modern states.111 The idea of entire
separation of the religion from politics is the most important feature of secularization. In
“The Turkist programme” Gokalp stated the importance of this separation:
The aim of Turkism in law is to establish modern (asri) law in Turkey. The most fundamental
condition for our success in joining the ranks of modern nations is the complete cleansing of
all branches of our legal structure of all traces of theocracy and clericalism. Theocracy is the
system in which laws are made by Caliphs and Sultans who are regarded as the Shadows of
God on earth. Clericalism refers to the acceptance of traditions, claimed to be originally
instituted by God, as unchangeable laws and of the belief that these laws can be interpreted by
spiritual authorities, believed to be the interpreters of God. The state that is completely freed
from these two characteristics of the medieval state is called the modern state. […] The first
aim of the Turkism in law is to create a modern state …all traces of theocracy and clericalism
should be completely eliminated.
The elimination of the position of the highest Islamic official – the Sheyh-ul-Islam from
the Ottoman cabinet in the Ottoman Empire, the transfer of the religious courts to the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice; and the transfer of the administration of the
medrese schools to the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education can be considered as the
examples of secularization reforms during the Young Turks.113 The main aim in
implementation of these reforms was to subordinate religious institutions to state control
and to decrease their authority. The independent financial and political authority of the
Islamic foundations also was eliminated by the advocacy of Gokalp.114 After these
reforms religious institutions continued their function in apart from political institutions.

The important feature of the Gokalp’s conceptions includes view that the “basis of
modern civilization was increasingly becoming non-religious (la-dini) in its
character”.115 The main framework of Gokalp’s conception is based on two phenomena
“internationality/civilization” and “nationality/culture”116. Gokalp argued that through
stages of evolution the world societies were passing two stages of human organization.
While he identifies the first level as culture-nation which includes individuals, the second
level is called civilization, which Gokalp understand as the group of different nations117.
As it described in Davison’s paper, Gokalp claimed that through the secularization
“national identity replacing multinationalism as the hegemonic ideal at the level of
culture, and science replacing religion as the hegemonic ideal at the level of
civilization”118. In other words, through empowering of the national identity and science
leads to decline of religious authority at the individual and institutional level.
Wide application of the European sciences and techniques was met with great concern by
the adherents of fundamental Islamic movements. The rejection of religion was one of
the core points of the Western science.119 As Islamists were arguing the development of
the European science did not mean the decline of the religious authority but furthermore
it leads to deny of religion. Berkes tries to explain the reason for such attitude by the
difference between Christianity and the Islam.120 According to the author, irreligiosity
brought by science was not considered as danger in Christianity, because religion and the
world had been divided in Christianity. The meaning of irreligiosity is different in Islam.
As Berkes describes “doubt, if it was the beginning of philosophy and science, was the
deedless enemy of faith”121. Taking into consideration that in Islamic religion faith is
crucial phenomenon of life and after life period, the deterioration of this main factor is
understood as the ruin of entire system. Berkes identifies such attitude as the main
obstacle for penetration of achievements of the modern European science to Turkish
society. Although the differences always exist between Christianity and Islam regarding
church-state relationship, the interaction between science and religion always was
antagonistic (in Christianity as well). The main obstacle in penetration of science to
society’s life was historical circumstances, Islamic elite of Turkey experienced the
antagonistic attitude towards science as Christian countries in medieval centuries. Such
attitude gradually disappeared by the development of education.
My main argument in this chapter has been that the development of the science and the
nationhood identity created fertile soil for formation of secularized society. The
development of a secular education system, which was copied from the West, increased
the number of the people who were influenced by Western thinkers. Further, these very
people were the main agitators of extreme Westernization. In other words, Western type
of education served as the significant factor which opened the doors for the
secularization. On the other hand, the rise of the Turkish nationalism weakened the
religious identity. “To be Turk” became more important than “to be Muslim”. Such
transformation of self- identification led to decline of the religion at individuals’ level or
to “religious disinvolvement”122. This relationship can be described in a following way:
Why did the decline of Ottoman Empire lead to Westernization and secularization, rather
than strengthening of Islamic values? The possible answer of this question can be
explained by the tight relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Europe. The mutual
relations with European countries were served as the “discovery of a new World”123 for
Ottoman Turkey. Taking into consideration that since the eighteenth century European

countries gained leading positions in World politics, and the “secret” of this success
became attractive for the Ottoman Empire, which entered the decline period. Many
intellectuals began to think about the reasons of decline and in many cases the culture
and tradition was found as the main reason. For example, in Ictihad the reason of the
decline was explained in a following way: It is nothing other than our own Asiatic
minds….our own degenerate traditions and institutions… The power that is defeating us is
none other than our own eyes which do not want to see, our brains which do not know how to
think…These are the forces that have defeated us, that are defeating us, and that will always
defeat us124. Culture was considered as the main source of the decline. Many of the
intellectuals proposed to make cultural changes and to refuse the system which was based on
the old traditions and customs. The closest culture to Ottoman Turkey to imitate was the
cultural system of European countries which were dominating in world politics. The Western
culture which included new institutional arrangement, new technology, modern science etc.,
was considered as the possible alternative for the adherents of extreme Westernist movement.
The penetration of the Western values to Turkish life decreased the role of the religion at the
individual and institutional level and led to secularized society.
The uprising in different peripheries of the Empire, the political and economical pressure
of European powers and World War I worsened the situation. Such conditions fostered
the decline process of the Empire. Furthermore, within this collapse period the
conception of Turkish nationhood was improved and became more solid. The
culmination point of collapse opened new page of the Turkish history that characterized
as the transition from Islamic Ottoman Empire to the Turkish secular nation-State.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
FROM ISLAMIC EMPIRE TO TURKISH NATION STATE
5.1 Introduction
The establishment of a modern nation state in Turkey opened new doors for
implementation of new institutional reforms. The abolition of the Sultanate and the
Caliphate and the elimination of all other legacies of the Ottoman Empire were
considered the central task in front of the new republican elite. As in previous phases of
reform, the main aim of the reforms of Kemalist republic was the establishment of
Western types of institutions. All political, social and economic processes were
influenced by the ideas of modernization and secularization. Inspired by Western culture,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of modern Turkey, launched reforms, which
resulted in “sweeping changes in Turkish society”.125 Turkey became the first Muslim
state to voluntarily attempt to conduct radical secularization reforms among whole
Islamic World.126
According to Kucukcan, the secularization program of the Kemalist Republic embodied
three kind of secularization: (1) symbolic, (2) institutional and (3) functional.127 The main
goal of symbolic secularization reforms was to change various aspects of national culture
or societal life, which included symbolic religious elements of Islam by transforming the
perception of Islamic symbols from sacred to secular. The reform addressed to reduce the
institutional strength of Islam and its role in political life of the country was identified as
institutional secularization. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to completely free
the polity from religious consideration. Islam was not supposed to have even the function
of a ‘civil religion’ for the Turkish polity; Islam was no going to provide a transcendent
goal for the political life”. Functional secularization was the third type of secularization
in Turkey; it involved two stages: legal and educational.
5.2 Kemalist Reforms
5.2.1 Institutional secularization
As it stated above the main purpose of the institutional reforms was to reduce the
significance of the Islamic institutions in everyday social life. This task was one of the
most important in front of the Kemalist regime. As Mustafa Kemal stated in the opening
session of the National Assembly, the need “to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by
rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed
for centuries”130 was an important feature of the secularization reform program of the
regime. The formation of entire Western civilization in independent Turkey was
considered as the central point of the Kemalist Republic. Mustafa Kemal always
emphasized the idea, “the war is over with ourselves victorious, but our real struggle for
independence is to begin only now – is the struggle to achieve Western civilization”.131
This “struggle” implied the tussle against Islamic institutions of the Ottoman Empire.
The first significant reform of institutional secularization was abolishing the caliphate on
March 3, 1924.132 The abolition of the Caliphate was the first significant attack of Kemal
towards deep-rooted Islamic institutions of Ottoman Empire.133 During the Caliphate
period, the legitimate source of the power and law was the God, and the Sultan was
God’s vice-gerent on earth.134 This principle was replaced by the principle of populism,
which included “establishment of a nationalist regime with a new constitution on the
basis of the sovereignty of the people as a nation”135. The principle of “sovereignty of
people” eliminated the role of religion as the source of state authority. The institute
secular nation became the only source of authority of the first Turkish Republic.
Throughout history of secularization reforms Ulema was always the main obstacle for
implementation of the reforms. Knowing this fact, elimination of Ulema became an
important target for Kemalist regime. After abolition of the Caliphate, the position of the
religious elite was significantly weakened and this was followed by series of other
institutional secularization reforms such as “abolishing the ancient office of Sheyh-ul-
Islam and the Ministry of Sheriat, closing the separate religious schools and colleges, and
a month later, abolishing the special Sheriat courts in which theologian-judges had
administered the Holy Law”.136 All these changes found their reflection in the republican
constitution which was adopted in 20 April 1924.137
Outlawing of different Sufi movements can be considered as the next step of institutional
secularization. In 1925 many of Sufi movement such as the Mawlawi, the Bektashi, the
Nakshibendi, and the Qadiri were abolished.138 Many authors (e.g. Lewis, Kucukcan)
consider such institutional changes as the entire elimination of religion from Turkish
politics. Regardless of these views, religion Islam was remaining the important element
of Turkish-nation state. Islamists succeeded to include to the new constitution of 1924
the article stating, “The religion of the Turkish state is Islam”(Article 2).139 Proclamation
of Islam as the State religion shows that Kemal was not able to eradicate the Islam in a
whole from the Turkish politics regardless of his power. It can also be explained by the
strategy of Kemal to avoid civil war between Westernizers and Islamists during first
fragile years of independence. Only after few years when Kemal fixed his position, reelected
as the president for second turn was this article removed from the Constitution
(1928).
5.2.2 Symbolical secularization
The elimination of the symbols associated with Islam from Turkish everyday life
occupied an important place within secularization reforms. The most important symbol of
that period was the dress, particularly headgear, which was the evident pattern of
Muslimness. Dress was attributed self-identification of the Turks as the members of
Islamic community and rejection of other cultures. The crucial element of the dress was
the fez (headgear) which was adopted by Muslims in Turkey and in other Muslim
countries as the sign of Muslim identification. The Kemalist regime considered the fez as
the relic of the Ottomans and the barrier for the establishment of western civilization.
Disputes regarding abolition of the fez continued for a long time and ended with adoption
of so called Hat Law. According to that law, the European hat replaced the fez; moreover,
wearing of the fez became the criminal offence.
Together with the changes regarding dress, Mustafa Kemal initiated some other reforms
leading to symbolical changes. On 26 December 1925, the Muslim hijri calendar was
replaced by the Gregorian calendar and era officially adopted.140 Furthermore, the
twenty-four-hour “international” clock was confirmed as the only legally valid method of
measuring of time.141
After the institutional and legal reforms which nullified the role of the Islam, Turkey
became “legally and constitutionally, a lay state, secular and modern in her constitution,
her laws, and her aspirations”.142 As Lewis emphasizes “there remained one symbol,
potent and universal, that bound her to the orient and set apart from the Western
community of nations – the Arabic script”.143 At the end of the third decade of the
twentieth century the Kemalist regime strengthened its position in Turkish politics,
creating the opportunity to eliminate the last Islamic relics of the Ottoman Empire. The
religious opposition had been gradually demolished by the legal and institutional
secularization reforms. Furthermore, adherents of the Islamist movement did not hold any
real power in terms of army or citizens. Such conditions encouraged Mustafa Kemal to
make decisive step regarding elimination of one of the most important patterns of Islamic
culture-Arabic alphabet. Introduction of Latin alphabet was also influenced by two
factors: acceptance of Latin script by the Albanian Muslims, who were considered to
have “ceded from the Ottoman Empire and from Islam”; the decision of Soviet Union to
replace the Arabic script with Latin alphabet for Turkish speaking peoples of the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Finally, in 1928, Arabic script was replaced by Latin alphabet. To avoid the protest of
radical Muslims various reasons were given against the Arabic alphabet. The most
common explanations were related with the factors such as unsuitableness of Arabic
letters for sounds of Turkish language, the problems connected with teaching and printing
which was considered as the obstacle for enlightenment of young generation etc.145 But
the main purpose of this reform was to “break the old religious traditions” and to
eradicate the Ottoman legacy from the Turkish life.146
Personal involvement of Mustafa Kemal to introduction process of Latin alphabet shows
how this revolutionary change was sensitive for the Turkish society. He organized tours
to different regions of Turkey and as a schoolmaster participated in enlightenment
process of people.147 The teaching and examining of citizens in village squares,
schoolrooms, town halls and cafes by the president and other government officials shows
that Kemalist regime was concerned with the reaction of the people regarding alphabet
reform. Mustafa Kemal used his personal reputation among Turks to avoid any kind of
protest and to achieve the success of the reform in a short period.
Symbolic secularization continued until the last years of Mustafa Kemal’s authority. In
1935, the Turkish government accepted two remarkable innovations: The first was
compulsory acceptance of surnames by all Turks; the second was the acceptance of
Christian Saturday and the Sunday as the weekly holidays.148
5.2.3 Functional Secularization
Functional secularization covered two main fields of public life: legal, educational.149 The
main aim of legal reforms was to transform “family life and way of living” of Turks.150
The legal reforms of nineteenth century significantly decreased the role of Sheriat, but its
dominance remained at the level of families and individuals. Furthermore, there were still
Sheriat courts, in which judges were applying Holy Law. The existence of such situation
could not be acceptable for Mustafa Kemal, thus revolution in the field of law became
one of the urgent tasks for new regime.
The acceptance of new Civil Code, adapted from the Swiss Civil Code, on February 17,
1926 was the most remarkable reform within secularization program of Mustafa
Kemal.151 The main distinctive feature of the new Civil Code can be explained by the fact
that it did not include the Islamic customs and mores of the Turkish people. Contrary to
previous legal instruments of Ottoman Empire, the Civic Code of Turkish Republic did
not possess any dual character balancing Islam and Westernization. Therefore this legal
reform can be identified as the last crucial step towards elimination of Sheriat as the main
source of Turkish Law.
One of the most important issues solved by the new Civil Code was the alteration of
women’s legal status in Turkish society. The legal reforms of Kemalist regime
established the complete equality of men and women.152 Furthermore, abolishing of the
Sheriat rule, which included permission to marry four wives was a very important sign of
secularization which significantly reduced the role of religion in family institution of the
Turkish society.153 The abolishment of polygamy was not only achievement of the new
Civil Code. The procedure of the marriage became much more complex, because
registration of marriage by authorized representative of the State became obligatory legal
requirement.
Besides the Civil code, others codes were also worked out by the new regime. Most of
these codes were borrowed from Western systems of law in accordance with Turkish
needs. After few years Turkey had new codes of obligations, commerce, maritime law,
criminal law, and civil and criminal procedure, and a new system of judicature to
administer them.
The dominant conceptions of Islam that conflicted with the demands of Western
civilization were considered the main obstacle for development of secularization in
Turkey. The replacement of these religious conceptions with the new conceptions of the
West was the most important task in front of the Kemalist regime. Only possible way of
such alteration was establishment of secular education system, thorough which each
member of the society had to pass and “came to believe in the new conceptions on
through their own education”.
The primary task in educational reforms for the Kemalists was to convince the people to
believe in the merits of a secular society through a new system of national education. The
Kemalists saw public education as the main state apparatus for transforming people into
citizens who were committed to the principles of secularism. The Kemalist regime placed
public education through a radical restructuring process, ending the dual track education
system the republic had inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The dual track system of
education, one based on traditional religious elements, and the other on modernization,
had been in place when the Turkish Republic was founded. While Islam had constituted
the backbone of education in the Ottoman Empire, modern elements had already been
introduced into the Ottoman education system in the nineteenth century. During the
Tanzimat era, new engineering, military, and medical schools were opened to
accommodate the growing needs. The Kemalists pressed on with the education reform by
expanding national education based on secular curricula with a heavy emphasis on
nationalist elements, while confining or eliminating much of the Islamic content in
general education. In 1923, the Ministry of Education took over the administration and
control of all existing religious schools and their means of support in the forms of
endowments and funds. Subsequently, the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic
placed all education under the supervision and control of the state. The unification of the
entire educational structure was the main principle of education reforms. The most
important aspect of the secularization policy was formation of secular primary
education.157On March 3, 1924, the Official Gazette published the Tevhidi Tedrisat
Kanunu (Law of Unification of Instruction), which provided that ‘all educational
institutions are to be placed under the control of the Ministry of Education.’158 With the
1924 law mandating the unification of all education, religious education was brought
under strict control of the state. By introducing the Law of Unification of Instruction, the
government centralized education and developed a single curriculum under the auspices
of the regime. After the elimination of the article stating Islam as the state religion in
1928, religious classes were taken out from study program of the schools and this
decision was implemented in urban schools in 1930 and village schools in 1933.159
Furthermore, one of the most important legacies of Ottoman Empire, teaching of the
Arabic and Persian, was removed from secondary school education.160 Such a move
clearly was aimed at creating a monolithic national character that fitted the mould of the
Kemalist definition of the modern citizen.
Reforms of the Kemalist regime significantly decreased the place of religion in education
system of Turkey. As Oran describes:
The republic was particularly anti clerical in the field of religious
education. The number of students at the Theology Seminar fell from 284
in 1925 to 167 in 1926 and 20 in 1933. The seminar was closed in 1941
because ‘there were no more students’. There were 29 Imam-Hatip (prayer
leader) schools in 1924. This number was reduced 2 in 1930, and in the
same year these schools were closed.
As I stated above the main factor that affected the above numbers was western secular
institutional arrangements. In other words, secular political, social, economical
institutions established during Ataturk’s authority decreased the role of religion in
everyday life of individuals and created secularization at individual level. Another factor
can be related with high involvement of Ataturk and government officials. For example,
during educational reforms president and other government officials by organizing
several tours to different regions of Turkey were examining and also teaching the citizens
in village squares, schoolrooms, town halls and cafes. By doing so the Kemalist regime
has gained a positive reaction and high reputation among people.
The implementation of the reforms in the field of education aimed to introduce to masses
new values of Western civilization. The Islamic religion in old the interpretation was
considered alien the new value system of Turkish society. In other words, establishment
of Western civilization required the creation of new intellectual environment in which the
reformation of Islamic religious thought was possible.
5.3 The Success of the Kemalist Secularization
The reforms of the Kemalist regime resulted in the establishment of new institutions
which were directly imitated from the West. In this part I will argue that these western
institutions are the main reason of secularization in Turkish society. But the
determination of the level of secularization is an important question to answer. What was
the level of achievements of Kemalist secularization reforms? Did Turkey become
secular state?
As stated before, my main argument is that the establishment of western institutions is the
main reason for secularization in Turkey. Before to begin supporting my argument, it is
necessary to answer questions: why did Kemalist Westernization achieve dominance over
the Islamism; and how it was possible to conduct radical secularization reform in society
which has strong religious ideology? The possible answer of success of Kemalist
Westernization over the Islamism can be explained by the leadership feature of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk.162 The glory that he gained during independence War created for him the
“honeymoon” period and equipped him with military power. According to this
explanation, the main reason for the success of westernization reforms was personal
reputation and unique military power of Kemal. Ataturk’s personal reputation among
Turks and loyal military power were the crucial factors for the emergence of the
westernization. In other words, Turkish society was forced to accept Western values by
the direct influence of military power. This can be shown in a following way:
162 This
name was given to Mustafa Kemal in 1934, which means “Father Turk”. He also dropped the
Arabic name Mustafa and became Kemal Ataturk. See: Lewis, B. (1968).
Taleh Tahirli / Secularization in a Society with a Strong Religious Ideology: The case of Turkey
Many authors163 emphasize the significance of the military in the development of
secularization in Turkey. Regardless the fact that military really played the crucial role in
victory of the Westernization over the Islamism, this theory has some weaknesses. The
first lack of this theory is connected with the understanding of the relationship between
army and society. Army is nothing else than group of society members, which has the
special function. Army takes its roots from society and it is not possible to exclude
influence of society’s culture on army. If one argues that before Kemalist reforms
Turkish society was not secular, then it means that the army also included people with
strong religious identity. How then can the non-secular army struggle for secularization?
This contradiction is the first weakness of this theory.
Furthermore, there were conflict within army, between Ataturk and other military
officials, who felt that their efforts were not less than Ataturk’s.164 Some generals of the
Independence War supported the Caliph and Islamism.165 These cleavages in the military
forced Ataturk to find the equilibrium point between Islamism and Westernization during
first years of the independence. The article 2 stating Islam as the state religion in the first
constitution of Turkey was the main achievement of Islamic opposition. The main aim of
this policy was to avoid civil war among Turks. In other words, military power did not
only belong to Westernizers. It can be claimed as the second weakness of the argument
stating military as the reason of Westernization reforms.
Why did Westernization ideology become dominant in Turkish society? I argue that to
answer this question it is important to consider the evolution process of westernization in
Turkish society. As it was stated in the third chapter, westernization emerged within the
collapse period of the Ottoman Empire. With the purpose of avoiding the collapse of the
Empire and regaining lost positions, Turkish intellectual elite began to search for
alternative ideologies which could be solution. Inspired by the success of Western
countries in the World politics, many Turkish intellectuals believed that Western culture
was only way to regain glory of Turkey. The pre-Republic westernization reforms which
were conducted by the direct ideological influence of these intellectuals played the
crucial role in success of westernization within Kemalist regime. In other words, the
reforms of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks played ground role for the
dominance of the Westernization over Islamism. The institutions which were established
by the Pre-Republic reforms affected the Turkish culture and made it tolerant for further
westernization reforms of Kemalist regime. Furthermore, these institutions created new
intellectual elite (especially through education), which had more power and opportunities
to implement more radical reforms than reforms of Ottoman period.
The determination the role of the military within the political system of Turkey raises an
interesting question regarding the military elite: who are they, “guardians or decision
makers?”166 Before answering this question it is important to clarify the role of Ataturk in
the Turkish politics. Was he just a mere general or ideologist of the nation? As Lewis
describes after the War period “the Gazi Pasha became a civilian President, and setting
aside his uniform, appeared to his people in a top hat and evening dress”.167 The name
“Ataturk” (father Turk) shows that the role of Mustafa Kemal in Turkish history as the
ideologist is more important than military role. Like Mustafa Kemal, other military
officials also followed the same way and become civilian officials of the first Turkish
Republic. It is necessary to emphasize that political decisions of the first Turkish
Republic were not made by the military elite, rather than by civil official. The role of the
military should be interpreted as the “guardians” of the rules and laws which were
accepted during the Kemalist regime. The military elite was not involved to the decision
making process. The role of the army was to protect westernization and to avoid any kind
of internal conflict. This role of the army should not be explained by the preferences of
the military elite regarding Westernization or Islamism, but should be defined on the base
of the loyalty principle of the army to Ataturk’s ideology.
The main achievement of the Kemalist reforms was the successful replacement of
religious institutions by the western institutions. Politics, education, everyday life
achieved autonomy from the religion, and religious institutions such as Ulema and
Sheriat entirely disappeared from the Turkish politics. Although “laicization” can be
shown as the main achievement of the Kemalist reforms, success of secularization at the
individual level (religious disinvolvement) is the ambiguous issue to discuss.
The success in the field of the institutional reforms affected the individuals and reshaped
Turkish culture. I agree with Peters point regarding the relationship between institutions
and the individual behavior.169 The new institutional arrangement imitated from the West
forced Turkish society to live in a different way. For example, the abolishment of
polygamy reshaped the family institution of Turkish society. Replacement of religious
education by the secular education in secondary schools made revolutionary impact on
people’s consciousness. This change significantly reduced the role of religion in
individuals’ life.
As Lewis argues, the imitation of the western institutions did not transform Turkish
society “overnight into Middle eastern Switzerland”.170 While in the towns and villages
near to the main roads and railway lines, the results of the reforms were more visible, in
the countless villages the old way of everyday life remained. It is important to note that
cultural transformation process was different in rural and urban areas of Turkey.
Regardless of the institutional secularization reached rural areas as well, secularization at
the individual level was weaker in rural areas than in the urban settlements. Religious
participation, religious values and religious beliefs were remaining very strong in a quite
large territory of Turkey.
The impact of the development of the Turkish nationalism on individual secularization
should also be mentioned as a significant factor. It can be argued that development of the
citizenship identity does not conflict with the religious self-identification. But in the
Turkish case, entire elimination of the religion from public sphere brought different
results. The “Turkish identity” was the only identity that was possible to express itself
and all “other religious and ethnic identities are considered to be private identities and are
excluded from the public space”.173 Therefore development of national identity in Turkey
was not parallel with the development of religious identity, because Kemalist republic
deliberately rejected Islam as the element of Republican identity.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I described the role of the Kemalist reforms within development of
secularization in Turkey. I argued that the main reason for the success of radical
secularization reforms is the institutional arrangements established during the Ottoman
period rather than military power. In other words, westernization movement took
dominance over Islamism because of the reforms implemented in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. These reforms emerged the new generation which was in favor of
imitation of the West.
The main difference between the Ottoman Empire and the first Turkish Republic can be
stated according to the ideological differences. While Islamic religion was the central
ideology of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist regime achieved to establish society on the
base of nationalism ideology. The main purpose was to transform Muslim people of the
Empire to the citizens of the nation-state by elimination of religion from everyday life.
Nevertheless, Islam was not disappeared from everyday life of Turks. It continued to be
important element of Turkish culture separated from the state control. Towards the end of
the World War II, changes in the Turkish politics, which led to political liberalization,
created multi-party system and conditions for people to express their religious needs.

DISCUSSION
REVIVAL OF ISLAM AND THE END OF SECULARIZATION ERA
6.1 Introduction
Significant changes in the world politics in 1940s affected also Turkey. Towards the end
of World War II, Turkey was faced by the “communist threat” and at the same time
became the target of American foreign policy in the Middle East.174 To be part of “the
new international alliances of the West” became the most important priority of foreign
policy of Turkey.175 Therefore to change the situation in domestic politics turned out to
be urgent problem for the republic. The political liberalization and the replacement of the
dictatorship regime by more democratic one was the main task in front of the political
elite of the country.
Elimination of the one party system and the emergence of the opposition was the first
necessary sign of the political liberalization. The first free and fair election which was
held in May 1950 can be considered as the most important step within political
liberalization.176 As the result of the elections the Republican People’s Party (RPP,
founded by Ataturk and which was on power 27 years) was replaced Democratic Party
(DP). After this change the role of religion increased in Turkish society and Islam has
became important element of the Turkish politics.
In this chapter, I will describe the decline of radical secularization and revival of Islam in
Turkey. Why did religion return to the political life Turkey? What is its place in Turkish
politics? On the other hand, revival of Islam has not led to disappearance of the western
values and the institutions from Turkish society. The second important question is
connected with the relationship between religion and secularization. How can secular
institutions and values survive in religious society? In other words, I will explain the
reasons of survival of secularization.
As it described in the fifth chapter, secularization reforms of the Kemalist regime did not
have significant impact on rural areas of Turkey. Especially the level of individual
secularization was very low in countless villages of the country. The new post-war
political environment which is characterized by political liberalization and emergence of
democracy resulted with involvement of the citizens to the political decision making
process. Furthermore, under conditions of the economic development the proportion of
the urban population raised because of migration of religious people from peripheries to
cities. I argue that involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political
decision making process is the main reason of Islamic revival.
Establishment of multi-party system opened opportunity for new parties, especially for
Democratic Party, to agitate restoration of Islam and by this way to get support of
majority of people.177 On the other hand, political liberalization gave to people freedom
to express their opinion, including opinion based on religion. Thus, Islam returned to
politics through the political parties.
Although Islam became the important element of the politics, it did not restore Sheriat
and replace parliament with Ulema. In other words, achievement of the Kemalist
secularization survived within renewal period of Islam. Which factors affected survive of
secularization? In fifth chapter I claimed that the institutional arrangements established
within Kemalist regime reshaped the culture and changed the consciousness of people. In
this chapter, I will argue that the legacy of the Ataturk regime played the crucial role in
survival of secularization.
6.2 The emergence of Islamic revival
Through the development of the western institutions the Turkish society was changed in
political, social and economic aspects. The development of the cities resulted with
significant increment of urban population (see Table 1).178 The level of literacy, the
number circulation of newspapers, wireless sets were expanded steadily.179 Such changes
transformed Turkish Society to “the modern community of mobile, participant
citizens”
The victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 was direct result of these social changes. As
Kucukcan states, the main reason of DP’s success was based on the “tolerant attitude of
the party officials towards religion” and “party’s response to the pragmatic needs of the
population, including its religious needs”.182 DP leaders were identifying the political
struggle between the ruling bureaucratic elite, private capital groups, and the peasantry as
the conflict between the “center” and “periphery”.183 While the ruling elite was identified
as the “center”; people from other social economical categories of the society was defined
as the “periphery”.184 On the other hand, the “center” and the “periphery” were
respectively represented “high” and “little” cultures.185 The reason of DP’s victory
contained in that party officials managed to gain support of the citizens from rural areas
by incorporation of religion to their pre-election platform.
Regardless of the secularization reforms of Kemalist regime the question of selfidentification
was remaining problematic feature of Turkish society. As I described in
previous chapter, while in urban areas nationhood identity become much more important
than religious identity, strong religious self-identification was remaining in rural areas of
the country. Furthermore, perceptions regarding the idea that “Muslim equals Turk and
non-Muslim equals non-Turk” persisted.186 Although new laws of the first Turkish
Republic provided equal rights for all citizens, non-Muslims were segregated from
Turkish social and political life. After establishment of the Republic the level of
participation of non-Muslims in social life significantly decreased.187 Discrimination and
the segregation of the non-Muslims provoked grievances against Kemalist Republic and
they were also in favor if to change current regime. Therefore, religious minorities also
supported DP in 1950 elections.
Restoration of the religious education in secondary schools was the most important issue
debated during last years of RPP authority. This debate raised the questions regarding
whether religious education should be compulsory or optional within secondary schools.
Another question was related to the administration of the religious education: by which
institution religious education should be controlled? The debate was settled by a
compromise decision which contained of introduction of two hour religious classes on
Saturday afternoons for pupils only whose parents permitted it.188 Special text-book was
prepared by the joint working group of representatives of the Ministry of Education and
the Department of Religious Affairs.189 In 1950, the religious education in secondary
schools became obligatory, only that pupils were exempted whose parents asked to drop
them.190 The abolishment of the religious schools-medreses during Kemalist period arose
new problem for DP government –lack of educated religious instructors. Therefore new
authority initiated religious education in universities.191
Beside education sphere, functionaries of DP expanded religion role in other spheres of
society’s life as well. Ataturk regime replaced Arabic by Turkish as the language of call
to prayer. New government restored “holy language”, Arabic as the language of Koran
reading and everyday pray.192 Furthermore, the publication of the religious journals and
magazines increased because of the liberal attitude of the government.
How to explain the Islamic revival in Turkey? What factors played the crucial role in this
process? I argue that involvement of citizens to political decision making process as the
result of political liberalization caused the Islamic revival in Turkey. Transformation
from the dictatorship regime of Ataturk to liberal and democratic society gave to people
opportunity to express their opinion and to demand the provision of their religious needs.
According to Lewis, another reason of Islamic revival in Turkey can be explained by the
affect of the Communism. He describes that at the level of different tarikats (sects)
revival can be inspired by the Communist agitators.193 This argument states that
Anatolian religious brotherhoods had the signs of the primitive religious communism that
can be used by the clever propagandists to influence on political regime.194 Lewis
criticizes this view by the historical roots of the Russian-Turkish relations. He argues that
deep-rooted Turkish mistrust of Russia makes impossible the development of
communism in Turkish lands.195 In my opinion, beside this explanation, Turkish
orientation to the West during post war period also could serve as the obstacle for the
emergence of the communism. The second explanation of Lewis regarding revival of Islam in
Turkey states that a profound root of Islam among Turks is the only factor caused Islamic
restoration.196 He argues that the half a century Westernization period could not eliminate six
hundred year legacy of Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, according to the author, Islamic
religious identity “to be Muslim” that had been developed within several centuries was much
more strong than national identity to be “Turk” developed under impact of European
nationalism.197 Although Lewis’s arguments seem to be convincing, they lack to explain
the Islamic revival in more detailed way. Firstly, Lewis neglects the importance of
Ataturk’s reforms and transformation of the Turkish culture within radical Westernization
period. The second lack is that if Turkish society was not changed during the radical
westernization period, why Islam did not reach the same level which was during Ottoman
Empire? Why was Sheriat and Ulema not restored within revival period? These questions
have not been answered by Lewis that makes his view weak. In next section of this
chapter, I will explain the answers of these questions.
6.3 Survival of secularization
With the liberalization of expression of opinion, Islam again has become an important
element of the Turkish politics. Regardless of fact that revival has resulted with the
certain changes in society, it does not affected the Western political institutional
arrangement. Arabic script, Muslim calendar, the rule of Sheriat and other important
elements of Muslim societies were not restored within revival period in Turkey. The
study of religion’s role in modern Turkish politics emerges the question: how did
secularization survive within revival of Islam?
Ataturk reforms played the most important role in survival of secularization. As it described
above reforms of the Kemalist regime were inspired by Ziya Gokalp’s conception which
includes three factors: Turkification, Westernization, Islamization. Achievements of the
reforms of the first Republic proved the efficiency of the Western political institutions. On the
other hand, through the reforms of Ataturk nationhood identity became a strong element of
self-identification and Turkey was transformed from Islamic Empire to nation-state. I believe
that these factors make it impossible to restore previous level of Islamic influence.
After the World War II Turkey has joined to globalization process. This period of the
Turkish history is overlapping with the revival of religion.
Taking into consideration that contrary to Islamic institutional arrangement (such as Ulema,
Sheriat etc.) the western institutional arrangement allows to citizens to express their religious
needs, the restoration of the extreme Islam in Turkish politics is not possible. The army
should also be considered as the loyal guardian of the Ataturk legacy. I believe that the army
played the crucial role in preventing of restoration of the extreme Islam in Turkish politics.
Another interesting question is related with the comparison of the Turkish experience
with the experience of the other Muslim countries. Why Turkey has not became Islamic
Republic like Iran and Pakistan or other countries? The first explanation regarding close
ties of Turkey and Europe through history has already been discussed in previous
chapters. Oran argues that Turkey could not become like Iran and Pakistan, because
through the successful Westernization reforms Turkey experienced another phase, the phase
2, while other Islamic Republics had never really passed beyond phase 1.
CONCLUSIONS
Modern Turkey occupies unique place within the Muslim countries, because it embodies
particular features of the interaction between religion and state. The uniqueness of the
Turkish case is based on the fact that the establishment of modern Turkey embodies two
features: the secular political institutions and a predominant Muslim society. Although,
after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the early republican elite
developed a state ideology on the basis of modernization and westernization, Islamic
religion remains the important element of the modern political system of Turkey. This
thesis has analyzed the development of secularization in Turkey from the Ottoman period
until present days. I have argued that the Turkish experience can be taken as a case in
support of the argument regarding compatibility of Islam and secularization.
One of the main arguments is that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created the need
for the introduction of new reforms. The perception of culture as being the main obstacle
impeding the development of the Turkish society evoked Turkish intellectuals to turn to
the West. Furthermore, success of the Western European countries in the world politics
encouraged them to introduce the westernization reforms in order to avoid the collapse
and to regain the dominance over the region. Weakening of the authority of the Sultanate
led to the emergence of new liberal movements such as the Young Ottomans and the
Young Turks who succeeded to implement the reforms addressed to establish Western
type of institutions. Although reforms of the nineteenth and early twentieth century
achieved “laicization”, religion remained the most important element in the everyday life
of the individuals.
I argued that the rise of Turkish nationalism led to the decline of religion’s role in
society. Islamic religion, which was the state ideology of the Ottoman Empire, was
challenged by the new ideology of Turkish nationalism. The ideology of nationalism
replaced religious self-identification by nationhood self-identification and led to the
development of the secularization.
I have analyzed the role of the Kemalist reforms in the development of secularization in
Turkey. Radical secularization reforms of the Kemalist regime succeeded because of the
institutional arrangements established during the Ottoman period. In other words,
westernization movement took dominance over Islamism because of the reforms
implemented in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The difference between the westernization reforms of Ottoman Empire and the first
Turkish Republic was that while the former aimed to find equilibrium between Islamic
and Western values, the latter addressed to entirely eliminate religion from political,
social and economical life. Furthermore, nationalism replaced religion as the state
ideology. The main purpose was to transform Muslim people of the Empire to the citizens
of the nation-state.
Nevertheless, Islam has not disappeared from everyday life of Turks. It has continued to
be an important element of Turkish culture separated from the state control. Although the
results of the reforms were more visible in the towns and villages near to the main roads
and railway lines, in the countless villages the old way of everyday life remained.
In the fifth chapter, I explained the reasons of revival of Islam in Turkey. The
liberalization of the Kemalist regime increased the level of participation of citizens in
political decision making. Furthermore, citizens gained opportunity to express their
religious needs. The introduction of multi-party system gave opportunity to the
Democratic Party to respond to these religious needs and to get support of majority of
people. The involvement of citizens with strong religious identity to political decision
making process was the main cause for Islamic revival in Turkey.
The second important issue analyzed in the fifth chapter is the reasons for survival of
secularization in Turkey. The achievement of westernization reforms of the Kemalist
regime was the most important factor for survival of secularization. The reforms of the
Kemalist regime both established western political institutions and strengthened the
nationhood identity among Turks, which led to the formation of the nation-state. These
two factors decreased the role of Islam at the institutional and individual levels.
Furthermore, military forces, which were loyal to the Ataturk ideology, did not allow the
restoration of extreme Islam in Turkish politics. All these factors played crucial role in
survival of secularization in Turkey.