1. Case No.
2-Macariola Asuncion
Bernardita Macariola and her relatives had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land. A trial ensued and
Judge Elias Macariola rendered a decision. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition
reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was unsigned by Macariola, but her lawyer assured
Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. Macariola then approved the project partition and the
decision became final in 1963.
The Lot 1184 of the land were subdivided into five lots. Reyes sold Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon, who later sold
the property to Judge Asuncion in 1965. Macariola alleged that the act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to
be a violation of pars. 1 and 5, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in active service to do so
within the limits of the place where they discharge their duties.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said Code of Commerce provision.
HELD:
No. Article 14 the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in nature and so
was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws
of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. Although the
provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it partakes
of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
2. Facts:
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III but
no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: No. RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. The provision of Sec 2 of Article 17 is not self-executory as it needs
an enabling law to be passed by Congress. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation.
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures
of the 6.3 million individuals.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
No. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition. Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution
and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only
contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable
the would-be parliament to enact more rules.
Facts:
Anastacio Laurel, who was charged with treason, filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who
gave aid and comfort to the enemy during the Japanese belligerency cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized under Art. 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government of the Philippines, as well as, the correlative allegiance of the Filipino Citizens were suspended, and that
upon the proclamation of the Republic of the Philippines there was a change of sovereignty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegiance of Filipino citizens to the Philippine Islands were suspended during the Japanese
occupation
HELD:
NO. A citizen or a subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance, not qualified and temporary, which
have the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance
of the citizens of the legitimate government is not abrogated or severed by the enemy military occupation, because the
sovereignty of the de jure government is not transferred to the occupier. Only the exercise of sovereignty to control and
administer vested to the titular government may be suspended and may be passed temporarily to the occupant. It is
recognized by necessary implication in the rules of international law that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
whose territory was occupied by military forces of enemy is still subsisted, although the former is prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them. The allegiance of the citizens to their legitimate government also subsists the
allegiance is not suspended
HOLY SEE v. HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.
FACTS:
The Archdiocese of Manila donated a parcel of land to the Papal Nuncio in Paranaque City, represented by
the Holy See, to construct his official place of residence in the Philippines. The lot donated was contiguous with other
two lots, both registered under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup
and assigned his rights to sale to the private respondent. A dispute arose on who bears the responsibility of evicting
and clearing the land of squatters refusing to vacate said lots. The parcel of land owned by the petitioner were also
sold to the Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises
Inc. contends that Holy See should clear the property, while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or
the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest
money.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr.
Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and for being an
improper party, respectively. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion because immunity ceased when he entered into the
business contract
ISSUE: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity
HELD:
YES. The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed
in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts
and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of
nations. It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall
be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-
propriety in nature.
Facts:
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both employed as game room attendants in
the special services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and to
institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus back wages.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special
Services Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before
the start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent‘s status and requested concurrence therewith. Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that
the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and had caused them mental anguish,
and prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. They make it
clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction was filed by the petitioner and was denied.
ISSUE: whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which
the private respondents have sued them for damages.
HELD:
YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had
written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case
of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to
the hearing officer's criticism — in effect a direct attack against him — that Special Services was practicing "an
autocratic form of supervision."
Facts:
Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador,
and Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices
by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining
association, in the exercise of their right to self organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador and
Ledesma denied the charges, and contended that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued.
ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?
HELD:
NO. As a government office, without a separate juridical capacity, it cannot be sued. The Bureau of Printing is an
instrumentality of the government; it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary. It is designed to
meet the printing needs of the government. It is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of
Printing would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government itself. The government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection.
Facts:
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
“monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese
businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. Even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be
in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Facts:
FACTS Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
ISSUE : WON RH Law violates the right to health
HELD :
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion.
A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) together with the minors Juan
Antonio Oposa et al represented and joined by their respective parents. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the
right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that a
judgment be rendered ordering Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his agents, representatives, and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements, Factoran being the
secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This
right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action.
Facts:
Respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan over his rival, petitioner, who
seasonably filed a protest with the trial court,
presided by respondent Judge, who initially took
cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a
justiciable controversy.
In the meantime, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire
country under Martial Law; thereafter, a new
Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss
the election protest on the ground that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view
of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by
reason of which — (principally) Section 9 of
Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2
of Article XI — a political question has intervened
in the case. Yu contended that "the provisions in
the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution.
Respondent Judge sustained the
political question theory and ordered the
dismissal of the electoral protest. Hence, this
petition
issue Whether or not the electoral protest filed
by the petitioner remained a justiciable question
even after the 1973 Constitution was adopted,
thus remains to be under the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance.
held
The electoral protest case herein involved
has remained a justiciable controversy. No
political question has ever been interwoven into
this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent
President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if threspondent Judge decides the election protest.
The term "political question" connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to those questions which under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure"
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum
of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief
in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs.
These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his
perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme
Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective.
The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671
has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate
its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced
to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the
Act is coupled with interest.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo where they were confiscated for
violation of the said order.. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right
to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in
order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid exercise of police power.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based
on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
Facts:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional.
He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues:
“If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed
of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make
or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that
the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require”
qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat
of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character
not administrative (not executive).
